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The Korean Peasant at the Crossroads

Willard D. Keim

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Willard D. Keim

The Korean Peasant at the Crossroads
A Study in Attitudes
The Center for East Asian Studies publishes scholarly works on topics relating to China, Japan, Korea, and Mongolia.

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Professor Henry G. Schwarz
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To the Korean peasant,

hardy and hospitable.
FOREWORD

Since the advent of written history at least some four millenia ago, the world has been to a large degree a peasant world. There are still nations among those newly independent since World War II with 80 percent of their populations living in the countryside. And it has not been so many decades ago that the major nations of Europe were composed predominantly of a peasantry and its concomitant technology. The United States crossed the rural-urban divide of 50 percent living in rural areas in about 1920, Italy in the 1940s, and Korea in the early 1970s. Were it not for the industrial revolution, which originated in Europe and has extended its impact around the globe, the world would still consist of urban centers surrounded by vast oceans of countryside, villages, and peasant-tillers. It is certainly no news to persons living in the United States, where less than ten percent of the population is at present actively engaged in raising the crops needed to feed its expanded population, and to some of the rest of the world that the age of the peasant, the even pace of life in semi-isolated villages, is gone forever.

There are some urban sophisticates who look back upon the rural past with a feeling of relief that the coarse and provincial rural milieu is over and done with. Karl Marx was certainly among these. In the *Communist Manifesto* he and Engels found reason to praise capitalism for rescuing "a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life." Others, many of whom have had little or no immediate experience in living from the soil, evince a nostalgia for the scenery of the rural landscape which is fast disappearing in the encroaching expansion of highways, cities, and suburbs. They may even be aware of a flicker of reminiscence, as if the sense of the rural ecology existed ineradicably as an inherited trait. But speak to most urban scholars and technicians of an intention to study the attitudes of the nation's peasants, or to survey the conditions of the villages, and one can easily sense an undertone that might be expressed by the phrase, "Why do you want to waste your time doing that?" Indeed, why not study the bureaucracy or the intellectual elite instead? The peasant is not a vanguard of change.

Aside from the utilitarian aim of contributing to the output of agricultural production, which most presently less developed nations desire very much, a goal that is certainly embedded in the reasons for this present study, there are other somewhat less tangible reasons for studying the peasant. The long day of the peasant began in such countries as Korea millenia ago, perhaps with the domestication of such basic crops as millet, and that day has lasted through all of Korea's recorded history to the present time when, to conclude the simile, the late afternoon of his history draws on. Although not so quickly as it may seem, but inevitably, the day of the peasant society is waning. For this reason alone, it is important that studies be conducted to preserve the record of the peasant, his views, his outlook, his values. The opportunity to do this is gradually disappearing as developing nations vie with the already industrialized nations to increase their status, their power and, it is to be hoped, the quality
of life for their citizens by introducing modern technologies.

It is my conviction that the peasant is important in his own right, for himself, and not alone for what he can contribute to the growth of his country's wealth or for the potential turmoil that he may threaten under some extremities through contributing to rural revolutions. While peasant attitudes and opinions have less impact upon the ultimate behavior of nations under the leadership of urban political and social elites than do the attitudes of citizens in an industrialized democracy, these opinions do have some impact, and the contents of the human psyche are by no means contemptible simply because they cannot find outlet in national decision-making. Peasant resistance has toppled many a well-laid plan of an ambitious urban elite. This is the spirit that infuses the research reported in this book: The peasant is worth studying for himself.

Some comment is required concerning the survey method of research used in this study. If this were the only study extant on the Korean peasant it might have been desirable to conduct research by means of anthropological techniques, studying a village or several villages through participant observation. Fortunately, there are a number of such studies, albeit not enough at this crucial time of Korean history, and a few other detailed studies done by Korean sociologists and economists, some of which are listed in the Bibliography. Our study is supplemental to these other works. There is no intention of suggesting that the techniques used to obtain the data reported here are in any way superior to other techniques. The purposes of studies are not always the same, and while a survey might obtain a wider range of attitude and opinion information, studies in depth of individuals through psychological techniques or studies of villages through anthropological methods provide invaluable contributions to the whole of our understanding of the peasant. If this study contributes something to the understanding of the contemporary Korean peasant it will have attained its modest goal.

Any study owes a debt to countless persons, some whose work has been read and pondered—the notes acknowledge only a portion of these innumerable influences—and some whose contributions have been more personal. To Professors Chung-hyun Ro, Jong-nae Yoo, Tae-dong Chung, and Suk-bum Yun, colleagues at Yonsei University in Seoul, I am indebted for much good advice and valuable assistance. Mr. Won-Taek Han prepared the initial translations of the questionnaires into Korean, a most difficult undertaking. Several officials in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Forestry and Agricultural Resources were most liberal in allowing the use of their facilities. Above all, the ability to conduct this research freely and without harassment is deeply appreciated. The research would have obviously been impossible without the good-natured contributions of the Korean peasants—village hospitality is not easily forgotten. Finally, Dr. Chong-sik Lee has long been an inspiration for high standards of scholarship to anyone interested in the politics of Korea.

My presence in Korea was the result of a Fulbright teaching fellowship without which no research could have been contemplated. The Social Science Research Council, Joint Committee on Korean Studies, provided a grant that was crucial for the preparation and printing of questionnaires, codings and key punching, and all the other miscellaneous expenses of survey research. Yonsei University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Hawaii freely provided computer and other facilities. Carol Carstens typed a draft of the manuscript;
a final draft was prepared by Joanne Yamashita. Janis Shirai was most helpful in finding and correcting those minute errors that so easily escape the eye. Finally, several editorial readers provided suggestions that strengthened the manuscript significantly. To all of these people and institutions I am greatly indebted. Any shortcomings of the research and its interpretation rest on my own shoulders.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Peasant in the Modern World

In many developing nations of the world most people are rural dwellers who partake but little of the benefits of increasing productivity such nations strive for. They are, however, greatly affected by the impact of change. What effect does the process of change or, very roughly, modernization have on the peasants in nations that are dedicated to industrialization? Do they see themselves as condemned to the backwaters of the new national experience that these nations are entering upon? If they do, is this a demoralizing perception, and does it interfere with the modernizing efforts in the countryside? For many less developed nations the experience of nationhood, the attainment of independence itself, is recent so that, suddenly plunged into the swift currents of a modern national experience, the peasants find themselves beset by a multitude of changes, buffeted by assiduous criticisms of their time-honored way of life, and besieged by innumerable attempts to alter their customs and beliefs. While the center for the proselytization of change is the city, most saliently the capital city, urban decisions constantly impinge on the countryside which must bend with the desires of urban reformers, adopt new world views in accord with the advanced opinions of urbanites, or resist with stubborn and sometimes effective peasant inertia.

These tensions, occasionally erupting into violent conflict, are occurring throughout the less developed world, in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Some countries, such as the highly industrialized nations of Europe, have already survived the conquest of the countryside by the cities, and not without considerable violence as the history of those countries reveals. Sir Thomas More, observing the effects on the countryside of measures adopted there by a developing England, commented acridly that those were times indeed when "sheep ate men." Languedoc became a rural haven of reaction against the nationalizing propensities of the French revolution. The Soviet Union has not yet emerged from the terrible days of Stalin's destruction of the kulaks for the sake of rapid industrialization not only of the urban environment but of agriculture as well. The United States, which has never had a widespread segment of its population that could be called a true peasantry, has avoided some of the trauma of modernizing the countryside and attained a high degree of industrialization and economic development without encountering stubborn peasant resistance. For this reason, the United States can hardly serve as a model of development for most of the world, and its politicians are sometimes hard put to comprehend the obstinate problems that beset political leaders elsewhere. But the experience of other modern nations might be more germane to the travails of peasant societies. Japan was also a "typical" peasant society when it began its efforts to modernize, but even that nation did not experience the complications of a world permeated by busy media. Yet it
should be noted that development in Japan did not occur without ample unrest and occasional rebellion in the countryside, conditions that have been well documented and analyzed.1

While the 1940s and 1950s were generally devoted to developing urban centers and manufactures, symbols often more illusory than real of rapid advance and prestige, the rural segment of the population, ranging from 60 to 90 percent of the citizenry, was both neglected and exhorted to sacrifice for the good of the cities. In their efforts to display modernization at the greatest possible speed in a world in which they were being left rapidly behind by nations already far along in the process of industrialization, leaders in the less developed nations frequently advocated a lopsided form of development—that is, when they were successful in breaking through centuries of inertia, governmental corruption and inefficiency, and the economic drain of historical colonialism—placing all their emphasis on the urban sector and ignoring and exploiting the rural sector. To the peasant, who has his own views of the proper state of society, the urban elites of the newly independent polities must have greatly resembled a new style of colonial exploitation, sometimes more vigorous and effective than that of the former colonial rulers who occasionally could be barred from penetrating the "bamboo walls."

With the advent of the 1970s, however, some nations hitherto self-sufficient in foodstuffs found that the rural sector was not maintaining sufficient productivity to keep abreast of populations increasing in some extreme cases, like the Philippines, at an annual rate of 3.5 percent. Capital that might better have been spent in other forms of modernization was now drained from more productive uses to pay for imported foods. The brief effervescence of optimism associated with the Green Revolution in the late 1960s gradually dissipated as the problems of the rural sector were more fully and realistically appraised. Lasting gains in agricultural productivity seemed further in the future than originally anticipated. While the Green Revolution is still a viable reality, naive optimism has been replaced by a greater sense of realism. In addition, there is some realization that while fruits might still be gathered from the countryside, greater efforts and more resources must be invested there as well.

Among the presently developing nations, an interesting case study is that of Korea2 which, following the conflict that disrupted development throughout the peninsula, has made impressive strides toward a more modern economy. As it entered the 1970s, Korea seemed to have reached the verge of that economic condition that some economists refer to as the "take-off," a stage in the course of modernization at which a nation seems capable of sustaining relatively independently the steady growth of its economy. Thus Korea is further along than a great many countries striving toward development in spite of its many present problems and the uncertainties of its economic and political future. In fact, by 1973 only somewhat less than half of its population worked in the rural sector, a division of national labor that marked Italy roughly during the mid-1940s. Korea, like Italy three decades earlier, could be expected to become an increasingly urban society, with a declining labor force working the land as manufactures came to dominate the gross national product. But in the early 1970s the peasants still formed a significant proportion of the population, and rural problems still exercised the minds of administrators bent on the goal of economic development. New programs were in the process of implementation with the intention of increasing the morale of the peasant, his well being and,
consequently, his output. Thus the period covered by the analysis in this book was particularly critical for the peasant and the nation, holding some promise of improved living conditions for the peasant, presumably in return for increased agricultural output.

The transition from a predominantly rural society to a contemporary urban society marked by increasing industrialization was a significant new experience for Korea which hitherto had been economically indistinguishable from its rural-based neighbors in Asia. The peasant had always been the ubiquitous and exploited "average" inhabitant of the peninsula, perhaps from time to time faring slightly better than other peasant populations throughout the world, but generally faring much worse. Mongol, Manchu and Japanese invaders devastated the Korean countryside. By the nineteenth century an increasingly reactionary traditional regime pressed its demands more and more oppressively on the peasants, sometimes to the point of driving many from their lands into the precarious existence of slash-and-burn agriculture. Viewing the rural landscape even in the 1970s, the cursory visitor could be plunged backward into history. Certainly the straw-thatched roofs and the paddy fields of many villages seemed to be not much different from what they must have been centuries ago, although now and then a cement factory on the industrialized outskirts of an urban conglomeration like Taegu loomed into view to disturb the tranquil timelessness of the countryside. Such a juxtaposition of the modern against the backdrop of the ancient is aesthetically disconcerting; it must be somewhat disconcerting to the economic reformer as well.

Yet the timelessness of the countryside, although probably a restful experience for the visitor from a frenetic urban environment, is to some degree spurious, for innovations have occurred from time to time in the countryside, albeit at a much slower rate than in the societies of the industrial revolution. The terraced slopes of many hills must have been introduced by some villagers in a past age. More fundamentally, the development of rice culture and the characteristic crops of Korea were once innovations, and some intrepid innovators may have accepted significant risks.

A Brief History of the Korean Peasant

The origins of the contemporary crops of the Korean fields have been lost in the shadows of mythology, their introduction attributed to a supernatural national father figure, Tan-Gun. Some archeological research tentatively suggests that rice culture was introduced by the sixth century B.C., but certainly by the second century A.D. rice was a flourishing crop on the Korean peninsula. It can be conjectured that the benefit to those who grew the new crops was likely to be shortlived, as the increased ability to feed a population was drained through tax systems into developing towns and cities where the apex of society—the courts, retainers, and armies—was supported by agricultural wealth. The basic strength of these agricultural kingdoms, their foundation, certainly rested in the countryside, for the countryside could survive without the court and, barring invasion, could have enjoyed a higher quality of life without it, while the court was dependent on the produce of the farms. Thus the fall of a highly developed civilization at Angkor Wat did not seem to radically affect the surrounding peasants. New hierarchies might be built on the peasant's shoulders and then crumble or evolve, but the peasant would survive to form the support
for yet another court, another regime. Although denied adequate rewards, the peasant and his importance did not go unrecognized. Confucius had awarded him a position in the social hierarchy below the mandarinate, to be sure, but above the artisan, the merchant, and the soldier. While this was probably small compensation during times of famine and heavy taxation following invasions or threats of invasion, it may have contained some real ideological effects mitigating the economic realities during periods of better times. To this extent the peasant of East Asia was better off socially than the despised serf of medieval Europe. At least he was not a "villain."

The peasant's conditions fluctuated throughout most of Korean history. During the Three Kingdoms when the formerly independent local units, the sijok and pujok, had disappeared, the land was farmed by independent small peasants many of whom, however, were eventually driven from the lands through taxes, corvée and military service. The displaced peasants would voluntarily, or sometimes under threat, place themselves in the service of the powerful. But times changed on the peninsula, and peasant fortunes waxed or waned with dynastic fortunes. Descendants of the slaves of Silla became the common people of the eleventh century, whose new and improved status as peasants was the result of their service in the dynastic war that produced Koryŏ. Now they were allotted land, seed, and oxen. But the weight of restrictions inevitably grew. Rules to hold peasants to the land were instituted; costume, housing, and marriage were minutely regulated; and peasants were prohibited from buying or selling land. They were unable to move from their registered residences. Nobles in the kingdom of Koryŏ received private agricultural estates (chönjang, nongjang, or changwŏn) which provided them the income to live in the capital, the only locus for social amenities for the nobility. These estates had undermined the revenue supporting Koryŏ and thus enabled Yi Sŏng-gye to depose the king and implement reforms which deprived the old elite of their land holdings. Thus in 1391, a year before Yi himself assumed the throne but while he already controlled the government, the new land reforms were instituted. Peasants were allowed to retain the land that they already held, but no new lands were distributed. The new classified field law, the Kwajŏn-pop, somewhat improved conditions, for it gave tenants a guaranteed status in society. But in fact most of the arable land was in the hands of the government, so that peasants gained little from this reform. Indeed, during the height of the Yi dynasty, under Sejong, Sejo, and Sŏngjong, the agricultural estates were cultivated mainly by slaves, not by tenants, while tax and other onerous burdens were heavy. In any case, while the peasants were now tenants, unwritten traditions afforded some protection for their right to cultivate.

The reign of the ruler canonized as Sejong (r. 1418-1450) was one of the brilliant periods of Korea's social and intellectual development such as the invention of the modern Korean alphabet. It was also a period of interest in agricultural innovation, some of which possibly improved the peasant's lot. Compilations of books on agriculture were produced, such as Chŏng Cho's Nongsa jipagol (The Art of Farming) that may have stimulated the use of fertilizers, thereby allowing fields to be cultivated year after year rather than having to be left fallow for a season. This practice, of course, increased agricultural output. An irrigation project was carried out in Kimje district in Cholla province, and waterwheels were introduced but never as widely used as in China.

The Hideyoshi invasions toward the end of the sixteenth century were vastly destructive to the countryside, devastating fields and displacing or killing
many peasants, but the war did have the advantage of destroying the land records so that peasant entrepreneurs were later able to amass larger land holdings. Yet the peasant's burdens remained generally unrelieved. The practice of taxing households for grain, services, and innumerable other items placed most of the burden on the peasants, while the landlords generally escaped paying the tribute tax. The Taedong-bôp, or Law of Great Equity, was intended to distribute the burden more equably by levying a tax on land only in the form of grain and cloth payments. This law was first applied in Kyŏnggi province in 1608, but the government was glacially slow in extending these benefits elsewhere in the countryside.10 Kim Yuk, governor of Ch'ungch'ŏng province, spent a lifetime in instituting this law throughout Korea. He levied taxes on land amounting to a p'il (roll) of cloth and two tu of grain on each kyŏl of land, thereby freeing the peasant from the accretions of miscellaneous taxes and the tribute tax. Kim was not to witness the success of his effort, as evidenced by an ex-censor's memorial to the throne a year before Kim Yuk's death in 1658:

A farmer's agricultural production per year does not exceed ten kok of grain; [with] these ten kok, he [has to] meet his military tax as well as his corvée tax. Even if he has infant sons, all of them are enlisted as military [-aged] adults; therefore, he also has to meet their duties. Then what is left for eating and clothing?

It was not until 1688 that the Taedong-bôp was instituted in all but two provinces.

Kim Yuk's lifelong efforts on behalf of the Korean peasant served to increase government revenues, for landlords were now taxed, as well as to alleviate peasant poverty. But the peasant's condition improved only slightly, and in the course of the nineteenth century his standard of living probably declined. The Old Regime of Korea, like that of Ch'ing China, had seen its apogee and seemed to degenerate steadily throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries despite the sturdy efforts of a few modernizers and would-be reformers. Chŏng Yag-yong (1762-1836), for instance, advocated communal ownership of land, with peasant communities integrated into an hierarchical political structure. Less radical reforms, based on fairer taxation, were recommended by other nineteenth-century memorializers of the throne such as Yi Kyu-ŭng, Hŏ Pu, and Kim Yun-sik.11 There is evidence that King Kojong himself was not unfeeling toward the peasants, for he had been thoroughly imbued with the principles of kingship, including frugality on the part of the monarch, concern for the welfare of the peasants, and the maintenance of status distinctions in society, all good Confucian lessons delivered twice a day in the Royal Lectures. In 1862 conditions pushed peasants into a rebellion which spread from Kyŏngsang to Ch'ŏlla and then to Ch'ungch'ŏng provinces. The reputed cause of this rebellion, known as the Hong Kyŏng-nae Rebellion, was taxes, and Palais points out that the peasants directed their ire against venal officials, but they remained very traditional in their demands for change.12 A veritable exodus of peasants from their villages helped to reduce the number of peasant households from 302,844 prior to the rebellion to some 192,867 following the upheaval. This decrease continued a trend that seemed to have started shortly after 1800. The total population is said to have decreased from 7,561,403 in 1807 to 6,755,280 in 1837.13 Considering the difficulties of gathering census figures in modern nations, it is unlikely that the figures of nineteenth-century Korea were accurate, but the record of a population decline seems plausible.

Despite this rebellion and a similarly abortive uprising in 1871, little was
done to alleviate the peasant's plight. In 1883 a model farm was established outside Seoul with foreign seeds and breeding cattle, but no rural reforms were forthcoming, a fact that Heydrich correctly attributed to a demoralized and corrupt bureaucracy. The dire conditions in the countryside were manifest even to the casual observer of Korea. Bonar noted that "any signs of wealth entail squeezing by the officials and the people consequently spend all they earn on themselves in the way of clothing and food." Benjamin Weems provides an illustration of one corrupt official:

Three specific acts of this *kansu* (county chief magistrate) of Kobu County during 1893 were (1) taking advantage of the collapse of a river bridge to impress several hundred thousand people as slave laborers; (2) imposing on the farmers a water tax amounting to about 20 percent of the rice crop and appropriating the receipts himself; and (3) levying forced contributions of rice upon tenant farmers under the pretense of charity for poor Buddhist monks and with the force of authority of the central government.

All land was owned by the monarchy which assigned it to government officials who, in turn, leased it to tenant peasants. As a result, the peasants had to pay taxes in kind both to the landlords and to the government. Because the *yangban* amassed lands that were not registered, government revenues declined, while the burden of support fell more and more heavily on the tenant peasants.

This oppressive system of exploitation was the major reason for the Tonghak Rebellion which broke out in 1894 and almost swept the Old Regime away. It bore some resemblance to several other rural revolts in Asia and elsewhere. Like the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, which scourged China from 1850 to 1864, it originated in the insufferable rural conditions and it unified its adherents through a doctrine synthesizing new ideas from the West and traditional themes. The vacillation of the Tonghak forces, which enabled the Korean government to put them down by the end of 1894, reminds one of similar vacillation outside Mexico City of the peasant forces of Father Hidalgo who suffered the same consequences.

Some reformers looked with favor on neighboring Japan where modernization was gathering speed following the Meiji Restoration and development was based to a large degree on using increased farm output to support the new industries in the cities. The growing strength of Japan, coinciding with the declining fortunes of the reactionary Yi dynasty, created the condition for growing Japanese influence in Korea, an influence that supplanted the former role of China in Korea. Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and a colony in 1910. Thus Korea fell under the control of the most economically progressive nation of Asia, a fate that foretold mixed blessings, for the Japanese were intent, as far as possible, on modernizing Korean agriculture for the benefit of the mother country. The rule of the *yangban*, a rule that was harsh during some periods of the Yi dynasty, was now replaced by the rationalized bureaucracy of the Japanese. Some modernization occurred; Japan introduced innovative agricultural practices and, in return, learned the utility of animal power from the Koreans, with the result that the demand for cattle steadily increased in Japan. Yet conditions in the Korean countryside probably continued to deteriorate.

Intent on increasing the productivity of Korean agriculture to feed its own people, Japan did institute improvements, some of these in farming techniques, but each improvement caused a decline in the fortunes of the Korean peasants, rather like the eerie results of the three wishes in W. W. Jacobs classic tale
The Monkey's Paw. By the Irrigation Association Order of 1917 irrigation kyès were formed, and the money advanced to these kyès by the colonial government had to be paid by the tenant peasants and the landlords from the profits anticipated through increased productivity. Membership fees remained unchanged, but the price of rice fell precipitously, so that many members could no longer pay the fees. In the 1930s roads were constructed, a much needed improvement in the countryside, for it made markets more accessible to the peasants, but the roads were built on land confiscated from the peasants who sought but received no compensation. By 1929 there were at least twenty-four industrial schools specializing in agriculture, and the famed College of Agriculture at Suwon was training rural leaders. There was also a single missionary agricultural training institute at the Union Christian College in P'yōngyang. Such efforts should have enabled peasants to increase productivity, and this seemed indeed to have been the case. Lee showed that ordinary rice gradually increased from 17.3 to 20 bushels per acre, and Brunner noted increased yields and other evidences of added resources in rural Korea. From 1910 to 1925 a 42.0 percent increase in the production of rice and a 67.8 percent increase in cereals were recorded, although some of this increase was the result of a 17.2 percent increase in the land farmed to rice and a 45.3 percent increase in cereal lands. Lee also found that in the early 1930s some thirty million bushels of rice had been exported to Japan but, as he pointed out, this traffic did not benefit the Korean peasant. A classic colonial trade pattern, in which Korean agricultural products were exchanged for Japanese manufactured goods, created adverse conditions that "will eventually drain all the wealth in any form from the Korean peasants and farmers." In fact, as specified by Japanese government publications, the Land Amelioration Project, which was formed in 1927, was intended to increase the productivity of the Korean farms for the manifest purpose of producing more rice for Japan.

An increasing amount of land was also passing from Korean into Japanese hands, as the avowed purpose of the Oriental Development Company was to displace Korean peasants by Japanese immigrants. This policy was far from successful—Brunner mentions that in the first seventeen years of Japanese occupation of Korea, only some 10,000 Japanese farm families were actually settled there—but the fact remains that land ownership changed from Korean to Japanese hands. While the agricultural and residential lands actually registered under Japanese ownership amounted to only some 6 percent, this was misleading since the lands belonging to Japanese corporations under Korean charter were classified as Korean-owned. According to knowledgeable assessments given by Brunner, the land actually owned by the Japanese amounted to some 12 to 20 percent throughout Korea, with much of this located in the more fertile South. In one county, an investigation suggested that 120,000 Koreans owned only some 32 percent of the assessed property valuation, while 68 percent was owned by Japanese. Lee also suggested, without providing figures, that the number of large Japanese landlords "is far greater than that of Koreans." This change probably did not make much difference to the peasant tenant, for in some areas where he made any distinction between Korean or Japanese landlords, he sometimes preferred the Japanese. The latter still demanded high rents, but it was not so necessary to ply them with those additional gifts which Korean landlords expected periodically.

Tenancy increased during the Japanese colonial period, for this was a useful mechanism for shipping more rice from Korea to Japan. Tenants paid as much as 50 percent, possibly as much as 60 percent of their crop each year; worse, these
crops had to be delivered to the landlord even if he lived in the city. Tenants were also responsible for providing all the labor, usually all seeds and fertilizers, taxes and irrigation charges, which brought their actual net share down to about 20 percent of the crop. Some 73 percent of the tenants lacked a written contract, and of those who possessed one, most were without the assurance of a fixed term. The tenant had little protection, and sanctions could easily be applied to stifle any possible protest. In connection with the Kwanghwa-do Treaty of 1876 between Korea and Japan, a land survey had been conducted that showed only 1.8 percent of the peasants being landowners, of whom many were absentee landlords who held over half the cultivable lands. Landownership improved during the first five years of the Japanese colonial regime when of the total farm households of 2,554,000 some 21.8 percent were landowners, another 38.8 percent were landed-tenant peasants, and 39.4 percent were full tenants. But by 1938 the percentage of landowners declined to 19 percent, with 55.7 percent being full tenants. Brunner called attention to the important fact of population increase of 48 percent (or 54 percent if measured by households) from 1910 to 1925, which had the effect of reducing the size of the holdings. Large landlords held over 49 acres, while medium landlords held from 12.25 to 49 acres. The large owner-peasants might have had over 7.35 acres, while a middle peasant would farm from 2.45 to 7.35 acres. Small landlords were those whose holdings were about 2.45 acres, and the small peasants' holdings were from less than an acre to 2.45 acres. The number of households with these holdings is shown by Lee from statistics of the Social Section of the Home Bureau of the Government-General in 1925 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large landlords</td>
<td>6,866 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium landlords</td>
<td>22,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small landlords</td>
<td>39,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest landlords</td>
<td>52,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large owner-cultivators</td>
<td>94,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium owner-cultivators</td>
<td>179,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small owner-cultivators</td>
<td>172,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest owner-cultivators</td>
<td>107,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The part owners included the remainder of households, with distributions similar to those of the owner-cultivators. By far the greatest percentage of households were, of course, tenants, and the statistics laconically provide a figure of 162,209 impoverished households.

The tax rate on land in 1922, omitting provincial and township rates, was 1.7 percent of the total assessed rural land value and 0.95 percent on urban land. While this evaluation may not seem high, it has to be compared to the income of the Korean peasant, which from 1925 to 1930 was about 1/5 yen per person per day, a figure that was about six American cents. As in many other agricultural countries, a modern system of taxation was imposed on a traditional rural farming system to collect its pennies from the peasants. The peasants' task, for which they were so poorly compensated, must have been arduous, for Brunner quoted a survey conducted in Korea by John H. Reisner, the dean of the College of Agriculture and Forestry of Nanking University, as follows:

The per-capita population per square mile of total area is approximately 205 persons, and the per-capita per square mile of cultivated land is approximately 1,125. These estimates are based on government
data and include total population. If 80 percent of the population are farmers, then the density of the farm population would alone be approximately 900 persons per square mile. The soil must provide a living for not only this dense farming population, but for an additional 225 persons who must get their living out of the farmers. Of course, a mounting national debt pays for the time being for many of the modern developments and improvements, but the bald fact remains that the carrying capacity of the soil is most heavily loaded, and, as far as one can see from the conditions of the peasants, grossly overloaded. The rapidly increasing population only aggravates the situation and makes a solution of the problem more pressing and complex.3

Thus the basic question for the peasant under the conditions of Japanese occupation and the economic difficulties that beset the world was whether he could make a living from the land at all. Brunner provided some statistical assessment of this which concluded that in most cases he was probably not making a living, the aggregate conclusions being as follows: "Of the owner-cultivators, 30 percent made a profit, while 70 percent broke about even, showing a profit or loss of 10 yen or less. Of the part-tenants, 95.9 percent closed the year with a deficit. Of the full tenants, 96.9 percent failed to make ends meet." Many village families were therefore chronically dependent on charity. How did rural families survive when their income so inadequately covered their expenses? Through credit. Small amounts of money, somewhere from 60 to 300 yen, were the typical debts of many farm families, borrowed at interest rates of anywhere from 12 to 48 percent interest annually. At 36 percent interest, peasants were unable to extricate themselves from any debts of 100 yen or more, for these often exceeded their annual income. Interest rates tended to decline under the Japanese, but debts that might have been carried year after year for the interest during the Yi dynasty were more frequently foreclosed. Likewise, cooperatives or thrift kyes, sometimes formed in the villages, would lend at a lower rate of interest but only on security that the peasant could not provide. Brunner gave an assessment of the average income and expenditures of sixty villagers in the 1920s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures (in yen)</th>
<th>Receipts (Rice, sale of mats, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed, fertilizer, etc.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs, education, travel</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>268</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit</strong></td>
<td><strong>59 yen</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These villagers were church members and hence in no way a representative sample, yet Brunner suggested that they were not particularly badly off.

Thus through his taxes the peasant paid for the Japanese program of reforestation, for the development of roads and ports, for some of the irrigation work, and for subsidies to peasants and to village associations, while he benefited minimally or not at all. The problem of surviving through the spring was tough,
Introduction

as attested to by frequent newspaper articles. For instance, Dong-A Ilbo, March 24, 1932, described conditions in the countryside as follows:

The impoverished peasants are looking ahead to the seeding season, to start on their beggars' march! Where will the floating exodus go? Spring has come, every living thing is beginning to start a new life. Yet the villagers of the peninsula are gloomy and melancholy. News reports from all parts of the country are filled with stories of the death and life struggles of peasant farmers. In spite of the sowing season ahead, numberless impoverished peasants are drifting away from their villages. Northern Korea is experiencing the greatest hardship the peasants have ever encountered. The conditions are no other than a living hell. The peasants in Bookchung county had not enough to maintain even their bare lives since the early autumn months. They have been depending on grass roots and tree bark for their sustenance, but even such stiffs have now been exhausted. There is no other way for them than to go out and beg. The number of those leaving the county has already been more than three thousand. The rest of the inhabitants, over ten thousand, must go away to seek a living somewhere else. Those remaining are surviving only by eating millet bran and legume pods. They live because they cannot die. They are soon to start out, a roaming army, for the maintenance of a bare existence. Floods and droughts forced innumerable peasants from the countryside into other occupations or into the cities, where they eked out meager existences, and others migrated to Japan as workers or into Manchuria or Siberia where conditions were sometimes better. That the conditions reported in the papers were not exaggerated was attested to by Governor-General Ugaki Issei, who also mentioned that throughout the spring peasants were driven in search of roots and bark in their effort to survive until the next harvest. McCune reported that those peasants under the cruel sway of the annual spring hunger, when the diet might consist of bark, roots, and edible weeds, probably consumed about thirty-eight calories daily.

To provide impetus to the modernization of agriculture, the Japanese conducted a land survey in 1939 which revealed that 68 percent of the paddy fields were cultivated by full-time tenants, 52 percent of the farm families were full-time tenants, and 25.2 percent were part-time tenants. The tenancy rate was somewhat higher in the South than in the North. The consumption of Indian millet increased in the 1930s, a sign of a declining standard of living for most Koreans. McCune showed that a farm family's average amount of land was 3.6 acres, higher than the average acreage for farm families in Japan, but the Koreans lacked subsidiary incomes. Moreover, this average was skewed by larger holdings—some 63 percent of the Korean peasants farmed less than 2.4 acres, half less than 1.2 acres.

Emerging from the ineffective rule of the tottering Yi dynasty into the modern era in which fertilizers, improved roads, and extended irrigation systems were possible, the peasants were nevertheless provided an ill lesson in the benefits of modernization. The great majority of villagers could not have been much motivated to improve their planting techniques or to purchase the necessary fertilizers because any effort on their part rarely led to an increase in their well-being. Yet in spite of all the factors operating against the countryside, there seems to have been a general increase in agricultural productivity under the Japanese, and the use of fertilizer became almost universal.
What the peasant thought of all this and what his attitudes might have been during this strenuous era of economic struggles has not been recorded. Perhaps it appeared to the average peasant as more of the same fate that had been his lot whether the country was ruled by Mongols, Japanese or a Korean dynasty. With this bleak background of historical experience, the Korean peasant entered a new era of national independence after World War II, perhaps bolstered by a new feeling that the post-war world might hold in store more opportunities for his own and his family's development than had past centuries. Unfortunately, new troubles lay ahead, first the division along the thirty-eighth parallel and then the calamitous Korean war.

The Recent History of the Korean Peasant

Although peasant experiences in no other country can be identical to that in Korea, there seem to be enough common attributes among peasants to form some general propositions regarding their attitudes. These attributes commonly found are summed up by Rogers as follows:

1. Mutual distrust
2. Lack of innovativeness
3. Fatalism
4. Low aspirational levels
5. Lack of deferred gratification
6. Limited time perspective
7. Familism
8. Dependency on authority
9. Localiteness (parochialism)
10. Lack of empathy

This list is reproduced not to illustrate what the Korean peasant is like, for that assessment depends on the survey data to be reported, but to indicate the general nature of the structured outlook that seems to characterize some contemporary peasant cultures. Naturally, disagreement is possible with some of these attributes; the notion of innovativeness is in part a function of the time perspective, for over a period of a thousand years, many innovations have appeared in the countryside. It is a modern attitude to see innovation as a matter of months or a few years. But in light of the historical background briefly recounted on the preceding pages, one might suspect peasant attributes and attitudes in Korea to closely resemble the depressing list provided by Rogers. As Erasmus points out in a reply to an essay by Huitzer, such attributes must not be regarded as a kind of "peasant character," but simply as an underdog syndrome with many cross-cultural similarities. It was in consideration of a context such as this that Whitney Young of the Urban League in the United States drew the parallel, striking to some, between the outlook within an American urban ghetto and that in many rural developing countries. Huitzer puts the issue very well when he says that "the existing resistance among the peasants can be interpreted as a resistance to minor changes within a social system from which they have no expectations for essential betterment." It was with such a legacy that the Korean peasant entered into the second half of the twentieth century.

I would now like to emphasize a point that will be repeated later, for it is important that in the study of human attitudes and behavior, the characteristics
of the individual must always be considered within the context of the society. This point has been stated very well not only in recent sociological controversies concerning the relationship of attitudes and behavior, but by John Dewey:

Thus Mill says in his discussion of the logic of the moral and social sciences, "The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in the social state. Men, however, in a state of society are still men; their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature." (J. S. Mill, Logic, Book VI, Ch. 7, Sec. 1) Obviously what is ignored in such a statement is that "the actions and passions" of individual men are in the concrete what they are, their beliefs and purposes included, because of the social medium in which they live; that they are influenced throughout by contemporary and transmitted culture, whether in conformity or protest. Dewey's statement can only be affirmed, and in the analyses that follow, much of which will be concerned with individual peasant attitudes, the context in which these attitudes exist and are engendered must always be borne in mind. It is true that the peasant is often characterized by a low level of aspiration, but where this is not simply the result of parasitical infection, from which much of the rural Korean population suffers, or other physical ailments, it is most easily attributed to the rational critique carried out by the peasant concerning the whole social environment in which he lives. Even more emphatically than other analysts Joel Migdal makes the point of the social context in which peasant attitudes are formed: "Even peasants in freeholding villages were part of the larger society, and they sharply felt the pressures other classes generated. Their inward-orientation can be understood, in great part, as an adaptive response to their relationship with these socially and spatially removed classes which controlled the state, and to the insecurities of outside market participation." We will now turn to the conditions of the peasant in South Korea, with only a few brief allusions to rural changes in the North. While it was still a traditional rural society, the geography of the South was not particularly suited to support the size of population that presently inhabits the country, for only some 20 percent of the total land area is arable. A few lush valleys, fully cultivated, are broken frequently by hilly or mountainous areas. Often cultivation continues in terraces up the sides of the more gentle slopes, and occasionally steeper hillsides will show eroded terraces that once were farmed but are now, perhaps temporarily, abandoned. Thus, with its geographical and climatic limitations, Korea entered the mid-1940s as a chiefly rural society: in 1920 some 85.5 percent of its population had lived in rural areas, a figure that decreased only slightly to some 79.5 percent of the total population by 1955. North Korea at the end of World War II accounted for only 33 percent of Korea's food production, so that the South gained some advantage in its rural sector. The partition left the North with about one-third of the rice paddy land and about two-thirds of the dry field farming area. Overall, it could be said that North and South Korea had insufficient agricultural resources to feed their population, although this assessment must be a relative one because, as has been shown, exports had been enforced under Japanese colonial rule at the price of leaving the population at the starvation level.

The improvement of agricultural productivity in the context of the
developmental aims of both the North and the South, was therefore imperative, and rural problems were solved quite differently in the two sections, the South adopting, by and large, a system of small, independent landowner agriculture, the North, a full-scale system of collectivization.

Although the American military government moved to reduce rents to a maximum of one-third of the annual crop in Korea, the new Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, mostly representing landlords, was reluctant to reform rural society. Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, a professor of agricultural economics at Iowa State College, was the author of a land reform program offered by the U.S. Department of State Economic Mission to Korea in March 1948. The plan called for compulsory sale of privately-owned land at a standard price of three times the value of the annual crop, less any encumbrances on the property. Peasants could purchase this land in accordance with priorities that had to do with the ability of families to work the land. Peasant purchasers paid a mortgage to the National Land Reform Administration. The former owners were compensated by negotiable bonds issued by the Farm Loan Bank which they liquidated in fifteen annual installments. Inflation was buffered by tying the value of the bonds to one-fifth of the annual crop yield. Some former landlords, of course, also purchased land up to the maximum allowable and attempted, not always successfully, to farm themselves. A peasant's life takes practice before one becomes inured to it. Buyers of former Japanese holdings were limited to two chǒngbo (1.9 acres), and by mid-1948 85 percent of the 1,400,000 plots of land formerly held by the Japanese had been redistributed.

The National Assembly continued to stall on redistributing Korean-held lands, and Cho Pong-am was dismissed from his position as Minister of Agriculture when he attempted to speed action on a land reform that would have greatly favored the peasants. Ultimately a more conservative bill passed the assembly, but its abrogation brought about a conflictive special session and a new bill, promulgated on June 22, 1949, provided for purchase of all land not farmed by the owner and a redistribution of holdings to three chǒngbo, whether cultivated by the owner or not. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was put in charge of administering the law, and land committees were established at various government levels. Now former landlords were to receive 150 percent of the average annual production of the farmland, and the peasants were to pay 125 percent of the same base, allowing them to purchase the land in ten annual installments of 12.5 percent of the land's produce. Yet by the end of the year redistribution had moved slowly, and it was the Korean conflict which broke out in the following year that hastened redistribution. In effect, this thorough reform continues to prevail and sets the conditions of the countryside, making rural Korea a sphere of small, independent peasant farmers. Overall, the bad old days of the Yi dynasty and the colonial period were effectively replaced once and for all, and the centuries-old tradition of landlord domination was rooted out in the course of a decade.49

After the land reform and the ravages of the war that swept over the peninsula in the early 1950s, agricultural productivity generally improved. Rice production increased from the pre-World War II high of three million tons in 1937 to about 4.1 million metric tons in 1967 on slightly less land.50 The annual growth rate for farming (omitting fishing and forestry) from 1959 to 1969 was 3.8 percent, a quite respectable showing for a developing economy. The total contribution to the GNP fell to 28.4 percent because of relatively greater
growth in the nonfarm economy, but it was still a respectable contribution.\textsuperscript{51} The United Nations suggested that this relative decline of the agricultural share in the GNP obscured the more fundamental fact that agricultural output had in absolute terms increased by over 75 percent.\textsuperscript{52} Much of this increase might be attributed to larger inputs into the agricultural sector and particularly to the increased supplies of fertilizer by the government through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation.\textsuperscript{53}

In spite of this performance by the agricultural sector, the peasants did not reap the benefits to which they may have felt themselves entitled. There was a deterioration in their terms of trade, partly because the increased productivity of agriculture did not keep pace with that of other economic sectors. It was also apparent that productivity did not keep pace with the increase in population which forced Korea to spend about 30 percent of its trade export revenues on importing food. The United States provided agricultural commodities to help meet food shortages, but this worked to the peasants' disadvantage by a reduced demand for Korean agricultural products.\textsuperscript{54}

The capital invested in agriculture can be roughly determined by the average farm household's assets which in the 1970s were about 915,000 won. Figuring some 2.5 million farm households, this represented some US $5 billion.\textsuperscript{55} On the basis of this capital investment, however, the peasants generally just managed to maintain themselves above the subsistence level. While the average annual income of a farm household doubled between 1962 and 1968, it reached only some US $753 in 1968 of which about half was in cash and about one-fifth came from activities other than farming. This may seem a reasonable income for a developing nation, but after deducting the costs to the peasant in seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, wages, irrigation charges, interest payments, and taxes, he was left with something closer to US $100. Furthermore, this meager income was for an entire household which averaged about six persons.\textsuperscript{56} In 1972, just before this survey, rural household income was 83 percent of urban income but without taking into account the larger size of a rural household. Efforts were made to eliminate this gap by 1981. In fact, by 1974 the ratio of rural household income to urban household income was 104.7, but the ratio of income for a rural worker to an urban counterpart was only 46.57 These figures do not, of course, discount expenses.

The relative poverty of the peasant was partly the result of governmental choice. The agricultural share of the national income fell from 40 percent in 1963 to 26 percent in 1969, although the latter figure might have been affected by the bad crops of 1968, and this decline outpaced the slight decrease in agricultural employment.\textsuperscript{58} This share of the national income fell further to about 20 percent by 1974.\textsuperscript{59} Also contributing to the peasant's relative poverty was the advantage held by the industrial over the agricultural sector. While the supply of agricultural goods remained relatively inelastic (notwithstanding the gradual increase in productivity noted earlier) and the demand for food remained price inelastic, any increase in agricultural production worked to the peasants' immediate disadvantage. But since the supply of and the demand for manufactured products was elastic, producers had greater control over their supply and demand and could adjust production rates and prices of goods for their benefit.\textsuperscript{60} It should also be pointed out that the nature of Korean agriculture, namely a large number of small landholders, approached the condition of a perfect market in which no one peasant could significantly affect the supply.
In any case, the peasant did not operate in a free market, for the prices of rice and foodstuffs were controlled by the government which favored the cities over the countryside. This was generally the government's policy throughout the 1960s, although the military government was cognizant of the need to improve the peasants' lot. It provided agricultural credit at low interest and increased the available amount thirty times over the pre-1961 average. It also offered to relieve the peasants from perennial debt by taking over their high-interest loans outstanding to private lenders. Indeed, one of the slogans of the new government had been "Agriculture First." But this did not mean that the countryside was to be favored over the city. Citing the need for safeguarding the full effect of currency devaluation, the president in 1964 discontinued subsidies and liberal credit policies and sought to emphasize the development of new lands, technological improvement, and market efficiency. The new emphasis did engender growth in the industrial sector, but it also had the effect in the elections of reducing the president's rural support. This certainly proved that in assessing political candidates, Korean peasants chose quite rationally in terms of their economic and social interests.

Control over the price of rice was in the hands of the government which sought throughout the 1960s to keep the price relatively low for the benefit of urban workers. In some ways governmental actions were beneficial to the peasant. The institution of a buffer stock operation, which was applied to several commodities, most notably rice, tended to stabilize the price of rice and to increase demand slightly. The government purchased rice during the large harvests, stored it, and released it to supplement market stocks when demand pushed the price up later in the year. While the price was controlled to the advantage of the cities, the government did increase the rice purchase price from 1965 through 1970 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6.2 percent increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5.0 percent increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8.6 percent increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>17.0 percent increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>22.6 percent increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35.9 percent increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Economic Survey, 1971, p. 16)

This policy of higher prices for rice led to a purchase price in 1970 of US $280 per ton which was twice the C.I.F. (cost, insurance, and freight included) price of imports! Support prices for rice continued to increase about 9 percent a year through the year of the survey, although the increase was more modest in 1973. The government was still supporting peasant incomes in 1976 when it raised the purchase price of rice 19 percent. A negative effect of this policy was to keep some 100,000 hectares of land under cultivation in rice that might have been better suited to other crops. Farm income in 1970 was about 60 percent (in real terms) higher than in the preceding year. Most of this increase was a result of the price of rice, for about half of the peasants' income (in 1970 as well as in 1870) was accounted for by rice sales. From 1970 a determined effort was made to stimulate agricultural production by maintaining more favorable prices for the peasant. Among the reasons for this were the continuing efforts to make Korea self-sufficient in foodstuffs, efforts dating back at least to the Nathan Plan of the 1950s. The government claimed that agricultural products were the "key parameter in maintaining price stability,
due to their dominant role in the economy." The Economic Survey 1971 also provided an idea of the substantial emphasis given agriculture by the Korean government. In 1970 the primary sector received 46 billion won in loans and investments, albeit a 6.1 percent decrease over the preceding year. Most of this went to the agricultural sector, with 13.6 billion won for improving agricultural production, 7.9 billion won for raising agricultural productivity, 3.4 billion won for agricultural price stabilization, 1.8 billion won for flood control, 2 billion won for workers' self-help projects, and 1.6 billion won for extension and experiment services. In 1976 the government allotted 156.5 billion won in loans and investments to agriculture and forestry, 8.2 percent above the amount in the previous year. Twenty-six billion won in loans provided peasants with new farm implements, such as powered tillers and threshers.

This represented a change in government policy to one favoring agriculture and a reemphasis on making Korea an agriculturally self-sufficient society within a decade. Connected with this program was a new movement initiated from above, the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), which was in its first years when the survey reported in this book was conducted. This was, of course, not the first effort to improve the peasant's standard of living. The Japanese had been quite interested in increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector, although they were little interested in the standard of living of the Korean peasant. A Community Development Program was begun in 1958, but it was not effective and was terminated in favor of "direct support for agricultural production." During the exciting years of democratic ferment, 1960-1961, there was a National Construction Service which was a labor intensive reconstruction program for the countryside. Yet despite a good deal of initial enthusiasm, the program was not successful and faded out.

In North Korea the solution of agricultural problems took the Communist road toward collectivization, a road pursued rapidly and completely after collectivization was decided upon in 1953: the percentage of private peasants shrank from 66.4 in 1953 to 16.6 in 1956 until it was completely eliminated on December 1, 1959. It is quite possible, as was the case in other Communist nations, that the collectivization program was not fully supported by all members of the regime, and Paige suggests that it might have caused conflicts leading to the elimination of the opposition to some of Kim's policies in the years 1953 to 1955. Collectivization had certainly generated ample friction between the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and agricultural policy was the chief immediate reason for Marshal Tito's defection from the Soviet bloc. Kim's pronouncement on agriculture was quite orthodox: "The final solution of the peasant and agrarian questions is possible only when the distinctions between town and country and the class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry are obliterated."

In any case, the failure of several previous community self-help programs did not raise the peasant's hopes when he was presented with yet another program in the form of the Saemaul movement. The movement accepted the existing organization of the countryside and by no means looked to any radical alterations there. Rather than collectivization or a move toward larger farms, the program intended to rely on the small peasant. There is a good deal of evidence that the small peasant is potentially more efficient than a large peasant. There is also some indication that by spreading small amounts of capital thinly over the whole agricultural population rather than concentrating expensive
machinery on a few farms, agricultural productivity will increase most rapidly. In fact, agricultural improvement is a most complex problem that can ill afford to concentrate solely on the increase of farm productivity, for there is also the need to link the countryside to the "agroindustries" that provide improved seeds, fertilizers, tools and machines, feed grains and pesticides, and to the consumer industries. There is also a need to initiate small industries in the smaller cities and market towns, allowing farm families to supplement their incomes. Thus the Saemaul movement was coupled to many other economic and social efforts presented in South Korea's Third Five-Year Plan. Since the new program was to be largely one of self-help, it could be viewed as a response to the criticism by the United Nations that "reliance placed on local autonomy to rehabilitate the presumed dynamism of the rural society did not take into account the fact that stagnation of rural communities could be due as much to their dependence on a paternalistic government and on bureaucracy as to their apathy and isolation from the external world."

The Third Five-Year Plan coupled the improvement of the countryside, which stressed village initiative, to a general approach to the economic problems of agriculture: agricultural production was to be aided through seed improvement, the increased use of pesticide and fertilizer, the expansion of irrigation facilities, farmland rearrangement (for many peasants held more than one parcel of land, and some of the parcels were far from one another), and the promotion of farming mechanization. Some emphasis was also to be placed on the growing of cash crops, such as tobacco, ginseng, and silkworms, raised by some one-fifth of Korean farm households. All of these policies were to supplement the continuing "optimum agricultural price policy," which began in the 1970s, and were to attain a projected growth rate in the agricultural sector of 4.5 percent during the plan period, with rice having top priority. This was not, in fact, an unrealistic goal, for it has been shown that even under less favorable conditions the agricultural sector had experienced a sizable increase in productivity. The technological aspects of these agricultural improvements were lodged in the Office of Rural Development.

There were several ways of increasing the rural standard of living, e.g., through decreasing production costs, decreasing the number of peasants on the land, or increasing the price for agricultural products, but some of these solutions to the farm problem were not feasible. In particular, so many people migrated to the cities in the mid-1970s that the cities were unable to employ them, while the rural areas suffered from the loss of labor and the inevitable transfer of rural wealth. It was hoped that increasing the rural standard of living would reduce some of this strain on urban facilities. Meanwhile a significant milestone was passed in the 1970s. During the late 1960s the farm population had tended to stabilize at about 16 million. Then, while the economically active population in the farm sector expanded 7.0 percent, the economically active population in the farm sector began to shrink. It declined 2.3 percent in 1970 when it represented 51.0 percent of the total economically active population. Shortly thereafter the proportion of the population engaged in farming fell below one-half. The Third Five-Year Plan looked forward to reducing this percentage even further.

Since the Saemaul movement takes us up to the time of our survey, it is useful to note some of the particulars of this program through the year in which the survey was conducted. The launching of the program was suggested by President
Park Chung Hee in a speech to a provincial governors' conference on April 22, 1970, when he requested them to "prepare new rural development programs which will be attractive enough to win the interest and enthusiasm of our farmers and fishermen, so that they may learn the wisdom to help themselves and cooperate with each other to create self-supporting communities for themselves." This emphasis on agriculture came to be spelled out in the Third Five-Year Plan, and the government promised to provide more support to the countryside than it had in the past. Early discussion of the impending Third Five-Year Plan spoke of two trillion won (about US $1 billion) to be spent for various rural development programs during the Five-Year Plan, and for 1972 300 billion won was to be set aside for the effort. The ideological crux of the program was to advance national solidarity by eliminating the social and cultural imbalances between urban and rural communities. Since part of the movement was unabashedly ideological, the "spiritual revolution" aspect of the Saemaul movement was to be conveyed through the Ministry of Education which would introduce pertinent materials through all schools. Among the slogans to be promulgated were self-help, self-reliance and cooperation. Some 9,000 schools were initially selected throughout the country to extend the message of the Saemaul movement and to cooperate with a designated village in their vicinity. Saemaul schools in the summer of 1972 were to be composed of "60 percent enlightenment, 20 percent case study, and 20 percent agricultural skills." The winter schools, however, were to place 60 percent of their emphasis on techniques and skills. Silkworm culture and the new rice, IR 667, were to be encouraged. Each class featured a 45-minute lecture followed by a 20-minute film. Among the rallies that were organized was that of the Federation of Future Farmers of Korea (agricultural high school students), held in May, 1972 at Suwon where many pledged to devote themselves to practical farming upon their graduation. About half of the booklet published for use in the peasants' winter schools, which furnished the opportunity for this survey, was devoted to practical advice on farming and improvement of techniques and half to "spiritual" or ideological messages.

In addition, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs devoted a portion of the program to stressing the values of austerity, simplicity and fraternity. While it is debatable whether the rural inhabitants needed to be reminded of the lessons of austerity, there was some latitude for the operation of this concept in the form of decreasing expenditures for wedding ceremonies and funeral services, which had tended to produce a competitive atmosphere and to drain the villages financially. After the survey had been taken, these festive expenditures were simply banned by the government in the spring of 1973, thus making official the voluntary effort to encourage "no bouquet, no entertainment, and no mourning dress." The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was also concerned with the birth control program which, to judge by the results of this survey and the national census statistics on the birth rate, had considerable success. The generation of news and media coverage was the task of the Ministry of Culture and Information.

While these ministries tended to emphasize the ideological content of the movement, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was more directly concerned with increasing productivity and consequently village income. Among the major projects outlined for the movement were the following:

1. Increase in production: 8,275 metric tons of various grains, 3,341 metric tons of profitable farm products, 28 metric tons of cocoons, 1,157 metric tons
of fishery products, 43,500 metric tons of vegetable compost, 47,000 head of oxen and cows, 12 million cultivated fresh water fish.

2. Elimination of insect damage: 1,227 hectares.
3. Reclamation of arable land: 26,000 hectares.
4. Cultivation of low hills: 600 hectares.
5. Afforestation of "Unification Hills": 12,533 hectares.
8. Methane gas systems: 10,000 units.

The collective village projects recommended by the ministry included:
1. "Unification" rice: 11,885 places.
2. Cultivation of barley: 375 places.
4. Model villages to be mechanized: 17.
5. Training for farming equipment and tools: 16,000 persons.
6. Raising of oxen and cows: 31,000 head.
7. Fish farming: 12 million fish.

About half the nation's 34,668 villages were selected by the Ministry of Home Affairs to undertake improvement projects in 1972. The rest were not included because they had failed to meet accomplishment standards in the experimental stage of the Saemaul movement, which lasted from October 1970 through May 1971. However, 1,517 of the omitted villages joined the movement voluntarily, raising the total of Saemaul villages to 21,117 with 1,980,000 households. While there is doubt that all these villages joined without pressure, most of them probably did. At the same time, there were reports of coercion, and Hahn reported that "at least, so far as a basic village is concerned, analytically and for practical purposes alike, we cannot deny the existence of the compulsory character of the Saemaul Movement. At the early stages of the New Community Movement, it is a well-known fact that instructions of the government were often enforced on the spot and lower-echelon servants were at a loss to explain the excessive force used by the government."85

The Home Ministry had some US $27 million in order to help villages accomplish various tasks with additional money and labor. These projects included construction of farming roads, expansion of village lanes, replacement of straw roofs with tiles or slate, provision of potable water supplies, communal wells, repair of river banks, repair of sewage systems, opening communal laundries, methane gas systems, communal bathhouses, building of "New Community Plazas," planting "New Community Trees" and building collective villages which could benefit through mechanization.

The villages that had been selected to participate in the program organized Saemaul committees to conduct the projects selected for their villages. These were to be guided by coordination committees formed at higher levels, such as the myŏn, town, city, county and province. Such committees were composed of local government chiefs, school and police superintendents, chiefs of farm and fishery cooperatives, doctors, local judges, rural representatives, and volunteers. They were to provide the general plans for regional development and to extend administrative, technical and financial assistance to participating villages. At the top of the organizational hierarchy was the General Coordination Committee, headed by the Minister of Home Affairs and included the vice ministers.
Introduction

of the Economic Planning Board, Home Affairs, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce and Industry, Construction, Health and Social Affairs, Communications, and Culture and Information, the assistant to the Minister without Portfolio in Charge of Economic Affairs and the chief of the Rural Development Office. This was the controlling organization for the movement. By the end of the experimental period in May 1971, the government had provided 4.1 billion won, or about one third of the total funds necessary to construct some 362,970 projects throughout the nation. The villages themselves furnished the work, labor and purchase of material necessary to complete the projects, or about 8.1 million won of materials and services.

To buttress the movement with a cadre, some 16,000 leaders were graduated from Saemaul schools in all provinces. Following a three-day orientation, each leader returned to his assigned village. Advanced training for the program was to be provided at a Saemaul training center at the Agricultural Cooperative College in Seoul. Persons who attended these schools were "intellectuals, successful farm producers, clergymen, ex-school teachers or government officials, village chiefs, and farm cooperative chiefs."86

Villages were divided into groups in accordance with their accomplishments during the movement. Group A included communities with competent leaders and a demonstration of willingness to carry out their projects. Specifically, they were those villages that had completed more than 70 percent of the projects they undertook, such as modernizing roofs, expanding village lanes, repairing sewage systems, and reforestation work. Group B villages were those with potential in the form of sound financial backing but without much evidence of enthusiasm. Group C villages lacked both finances and enthusiasm.

This was the essence of the Saemaul program when the government first formulated it. While it originated at the apex of the government hierarchy, rarely a providential sign, and attempted to generate enthusiasm at the local level, there was some evidence that it occasionally accomplished this purpose.87 Villages, including one I studied following the national survey, did make perceptible efforts to improve their conditions, and these accomplishments were evident throughout the countryside in the form of dikes along the rivers, bridges, sewage improvements, improvements on village roads, and some afforestation. In other cases there was evidence of resistance to the program. There was evidence that the government pressure to exceed goals, which marked the initiation of the movement, compelled peasants to adopt certain projects rather than allowing them to make their own choice. Hahm suggests that "up until now, the Rural Community Guidance projects have been characterized by their tendency to implement non-relative [relevant?] educational programs without predetermining farm desire and direction of learning spirit."88 Moreover, there was some bias in the improvement generated geographically; for instance, tiled roofs were certainly more numerous along the major highway between Seoul and Pusan than back in the hinterlands, an example of obvious governmental efforts to display improvements in places where they would be conspicuous. Through 1973, however, when the national survey was taken, this was the major rural event throughout Korea, and it probably colored the responses of Korean peasants, raising hopes in some, and perhaps providing another example of official enthusiasm and little returns to the peasant in others. In the short run, at any rate, there was some evidence that the Korean government was indeed committed to a program of genuine improvement of the countryside, provided that it did not have to drain its resources in
Chapter 1

order to bring this result about. 89

At the time of the survey reported here there were 18,500 so-called basic villages (or self-preparatory villages), some 14,500 assistance villages (or self-aid villages), and some 2,100 self-sufficient villages (or self-reliant villages), categorizing thereby all the villages in Korea, from the least to the most developed. The basic villages were to be aided by improving their environment by opening farming roads and providing improved irrigation. Self-aid villages were to work on the expansion of roads, tile roofs, reforestation, and the improvement of river systems, for which wages would be paid. The projects of the self-reliant villages included improved irrigation, methane gas facilities, the introduction of manufacturing of simple commodities, electrification, and sanitary water supplies. Unlike North Korea, which had a head start in electrification thanks to Japanese initiative during the colonial period, and furnished electricity to the South until the borders were sealed, the South still had a long way to go in providing electricity to its villages in the 1970s when as many as 79 percent of them were still not electrified.90 To stimulate the self-reliant villages further, the Home Affairs Ministry planned to provide them with interest-free 200,000 won loans on a three-year repayment basis. This money was to go to the village development committees and to be used in accordance with village needs.91

The Korea Herald of April 17, 1973 reported that by March 1973 56 percent of the 223,941 projects of the Saemaul movement were completed. The government's motives in the Saemaul program were many and complex. There was definitely an intent to narrow the gap between city and countryside and to extend more benefits to the villages than during the great emphasis on industry in the 1960s. Presumably this would stimulate productivity in the countryside and alleviate the chronic food deficit that the South had suffered. In addition, there was also the desire to create a stronger sense of national unity and to generate support for the government of President Park Chung Hee. The need for this was sorely felt during and after the declaration of martial law and the formulation of a new constitution in the fall of 1972. Moreover, there must have been an idea of competition with the North which had its own agricultural problems and was conducting its own efforts to resolve them. During the 1960s Kim Il Sung had declared that "the entire peasantry should be urged to display voluntary enthusiasm and devotion in labor, and to take part more earnestly in communal labor in the interests of the collective and of society."92 Kim had proposed the Chollima work-team movement in an effort to increase the productivity of his collective farms. Naturally, leaders in the South were well-informed of the efforts of the People's Republic. As in the South, the flow of guidance and directions was hierarchic; party and government directives were introduced to the farm villages through the medium of the county, the lowest party and administrative unit, "which directly guides the farm villages."93

Some coercive measures were probably conducive to improvement in rural areas in connection with the Saemaul program, for instance, a new law requiring medical students after graduation to serve for one year in Saemaul rural areas under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. However, the general tenor of the program through 1973 tended to emphasize the achievement of established goals, thus making the results more important than the process.94 Since the program's success would eventually come to be measured by how much peasants evinced voluntary motives of "self-help" and perceived their conditions as
Improving, the status of the program through 1973 was still moot, a conclusion that will be supported by certain of the data reported in Chapter 3. While Saemaul symbols were given wide publicity in Korea from the initiation of the program in 1970, symbols have a way of turning sour if unassociated with real perceived gains.

One problem in developing initiative and self-motivation is the gradual induction of citizens into participating in the decisions that affect their lives. No nation has adequately solved this crucial problem, and the most difficult transition of all is that from a history of authoritarian rule to one of increasing democratization. This problem certainly affected the Korean peasant in 1972-1973, and there was evidence that the government's choices were toward more rather than less authoritarianism. The announcement of a new constitution in 1972 was the most significant political event talked about throughout Korea.

The move toward increasing authoritarianism is evident in a review of provisions of the new constitution. A major aspect of these October Revitalizing Reforms, as they were referred to in the Korean press, was an extensive constitutional revision. The former constitution stressed the separation of power between the National Assembly and the President of the Republic. The new Yushin constitution, however, vested predominant power with the President who, according to Article 53, had the power to "take emergency measures which temporarily suspend the freedom and rights of the people prescribed in this Constitution, and to enforce emergency measures with regard to the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary." These measures were not made subject to judicial review. Article 59 provided the President with the power to dissolve the National Assembly, elections to follow within thirty to sixty days. The election of the President by secret ballot and without debate was made the prerogative of a National Conference for Reunification, themselves elected through direct and popular election. In addition, the Conference was to elect one-third of the National Assembly. The rationale for these measures was given as the necessity for unity in the face of the potential complexities of the reunification talks, which were still showing progress in 1972. Such national unity, according to defenders of the constitutional changes, was unlikely to result from a democracy based on a Western tradition which was seen as unsuited to the history, the traditions, and the international pressures experienced by Korea. Thus the Yushin constitution was hailed by its supporters as defining a "Korean democracy" and a "nationalistic democracy."

Chapter II of the new constitution, "Rights and Duties of Citizens," enumerated rights consonant with the prescriptions of John Locke and other Western democratic political thinkers but, as in all constitutions, the reservation was made, "except as provided by law." Some laws restricted these rights considerably, particularly because martial law was in effect during the tense months that followed the promulgation of the constitution. Prison sentences of three years were the sanction against certain comments critical of the new order.

These events were perceptible in the countryside in the form of suspicion and reticence on the part of some peasants. The purposes of a stranger visiting the villages were subject to some nervous speculation. It was obvious that 1972 and 1973 were times of uncertainty. The direction that democratic processes had seemed to be taking earlier had received a sharp change and, some would aver, a
setback. Critical allusions to the changes were sometimes loudly applauded at the formal political meetings during the election campaigns for the National Assembly in 1973. It would thus probably be accurate politically to place more emphasis on the uncertainty of the period than on the high rate of over 90 percent of voter approval of the Yushin constitution. Moreover, insofar as the Saemaul movement was perceived as related to the constitutional reforms, some of the uncertainty about the new political order may have affected the movement's impact.
Part I

THE NATIONAL SURVEY
Chapter 2

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND DESCRIPTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF KOREAN PEASANTS

Some Technical Points

It is unfortunate that the history of the world's cultures is written in terms of the Great Society, with hardly an indication in some of the cultural and historical chronicles of what was occurring in the Little Society. The meager descriptive apparatus of the older histories, insofar as they touched on the countryside at all, consisted mainly of such terms as "famine," "flood," and "rebellion," or in times of relative plenty, of indifference. The Introduction provided some historical context to the condition of the Korean peasants who were never in authority, were forever dominated by others (and in the rare event one of their own rose to the pinnacle of power, he no longer remained a peasant), and had almost always been in a state of subjugation. In modern and transitional societies, these conditions have not much improved and, compared to his urban counterpart, the peasant seemingly occupies a sort of backwater of cultural lag. Karl Marx was neither the first nor the last to point out the reasons for the peasants' seeming lack of impact on the culture of the Great Society, but he did put it into a strikingly concise formulation:

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. . . . Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name.

The peasant, then, constitutes a group that Dahrendorf calls a quasi-class, a large group of persons in a common situation who have not yet arrived at a form
of organization that can break down the communications barriers that still exist in the countryside, in spite of modern communication systems and the emphasis, in such countries as Korea, on roads. Peasant interests generally remain latent interests because organization that would raise them to the level of manifest interests is difficult to form. This is a social and historical condition that makes the peasant the underdog par excellence. Throughout the history of all traditional societies it has been the peasant who has provided the resources necessary for the political and social system. So vital to the continuing existence of society and yet so removed from the accoutrements of the Great Culture, the peasant, when the light of literature or poetry occasionally illuminates his life for us, is often treated as a member of another race, scarcely human, scarcely to be distinguished from the oxen which he might be fortunate enough to own to plow his fields. While the percentage of peasants initially possessing above-average intelligence must have been as great as that of any other social group, lack of schooling, constant manual labor, and the process of social conditioning certainly have made this appear otherwise. On rare occasions only, such as in the Chinese classic Shui-hu chuan (Water Margin) and the unique English poem by John Lackland, Piers Plowman, does the peasant appear in a more favorable context.

This study attempts to cast some light upon the contemporary status, conditions, and attitudes of the Korean peasant, mainly by describing peasant values and attitudes obtained from a national sample of responses to a questionnaire. Since this study deals with a single period it lacks a certain dynamism that would have resulted from several studies over a larger period of time. The nation is in a state of rapid change. Traditional culture and economy are being very quickly replaced and more and more evidences of a modern industrial society are dotting the countryside as well as the cities, making Korea a transitional rather than a traditional society. This process is not a phenomenon since World War II but dates back to the period of Japanese colonialism, particularly in the North. Abutting the fields of ageless villages, many with traditional thatched roofs, may be large, technologically modern factories. Most of the factories are at the fringes of urban conglomerations, but others rise like islands from the midst of an enveloping sea of rice paddies.

In addition to this descriptive purpose, however, analysis will be devoted to the problem of hypothesis testing. The status of this hypothesis testing must be clearly understood. The analysis covers only one "slice of time" because there is little or no comparable information from the past, and many parameters that affect rural attitudes must therefore be considered as constant. This means that a hypothesis, such as that persons with a predisposition to change as evidenced by certain attitudes also exhibit innovative behavior as indicated by the planting of new rice strains, may or may not be supported. If the hypothesis is supported, a clue to innovative behavior is provided; if it is not supported, however, it would be incorrect to conclude that attitudes do not contribute to modernizing behavior. While the conclusion is warranted that such attitudes apparently do not contribute to modernizing behavior at present, it may also be that they do not make a contribution because of social institutions over which the peasant has no control. Later studies might in fact show that the hypothesis has been supported, provided that the peasant could anticipate an improvement in his standard of living as a result of his modernizing behavior. There is ample support for the sensitivity of peasants to economic conditions. Since urban society and government control many of these economic factors, we can at best
test hypotheses against that economist's backdrop of "all other things being equal." It would be well to reconsider John Dewey's statement, quoted in the Introduction, to remind ourselves that human attitudes, although ultimately the attitudes of individuals, are nonetheless the products of the society in which they arise. Under different circumstances, different conjunctions of attitudes may well arise. There is certainly more than a grain of truth in the viewpoint of some economists that it is the anticipated rewards that motivate the peasant much more than it is the individual attitudes of the peasant, whatever these may be. While it would be well not to exaggerate this proposition, it must always be borne in mind when faced with some of the negative findings that occur not infrequently in connection with the seemingly most obvious hypotheses. To some degree it will be possible to draw some comparative material from societies either somewhat farther ahead than Korea on the road to economic development or from those somewhat farther behind. But there are imposing problems here, too, for the variables that relate to one culture may not be the important variables relating to the Korean condition, and the questionnaire used in this study has not been applied, with the exception of some portions of it, to peasants in other societies. Thus in the hypothesis-testing portions of the analysis there is also an element of the strictly descriptive.

This leads to another methodological question concerning the choice of a questionnaire survey technique as against several other methods, some of them quite different. In some countries the use of a questionnaire consisting of closed responses would not be advisable because illiteracy would have precluded the administration of such an instrument without numerous interviewers. In Korea, on the other hand, the literacy rate is high, and only among older persons, especially women, is illiteracy a problem. About 95 percent of the population of Korea is literate, and while that does not mean that everyone regarded as literate is capable of reading and comprehending the daily paper, it does make it possible to use questionnaires. These questionnaires were at about the same level of difficulty as the booklets written for peasants by the Ministry of Education. They were, moreover, administered under conditions in which problems could be discussed and explained. In other societies it would have undoubtedly been better to conduct personal interviews, using open-ended responses that could be recorded and coded later, but this technique has other inherent difficulties.

Another chief methodological alternative is that used by the anthropologists, and a number of fine contributions to the understanding of Korean peasants have been made by anthropologists such as Brandt  and Osgood. Living in a village and conducting daily research into the detailed interactions and behavior of villagers is of unquestioned value, and I have great admiration for the scientific acumen and the diligence of those who conduct research in this fashion. There is little doubt that the findings of these investigations are of great value, but their major shortcoming is the risk involved in generalizing peasant behavior in one village to other villages or regions. For example, Brandt conducted his research in a Korean fishing village and, while rice was also grown by the villagers, there is a possibility that fishing villages might differ in some respects from predominantly rice-growing villages. Osgood's study may have been conducted in a village and at a time (shortly after World War II) in some ways unusual. Therefore the questionnaire technique, with its shortcomings such as the closed nature of the responses and the formal atmosphere engendered by the process of answering questions presented in a "document," is not an alternative but rather a supplement to the anthropological technique of village studies. Rather than
advocating a replacement of these valuable investigations, I would recommend that more of them be conducted, particularly in this crucial period of Korean history.

At this point the critical reader is likely to respond, "If there are so many weaknesses in the methodology of the study, why bother with it?" The reported substance of the results themselves will have to serve as the chief answer to this query, but it is advisable at all times to be aware of the shortcomings of our study and the methods it employs. To emphasize these is not to suggest that the study is thereby rendered nugatory, but to put the reader on his guard against placing undue faith in results reported quantitatively. All human observations are plagued by inaccuracies, as the good Bishop Berkeley proved through impeccable logic two centuries ago.

The choice of methodology is also constrained by problems of time and costs that are faced by all researchers. The opportunity for a national survey occurred while I was a lecturer at Yonsei University in Seoul. The Saemaul movement was in its first stages, and the price support for agricultural products had been rising for some years. In 1972 the President of the Republic of Korea proclaimed a new constitution (the Yushin Constitution) which had been in preparation for some time, and to preclude the possibility of protest demonstrations in the universities, these were closed through much of the remainder of the fall term. The so-called revitalization (yushin) program was combined with the Saemaul movement, and it was at this point that the opportunity to conduct a rather large-scale peasant survey came about.

The Ministry of Education had planned to use the schools, closed during the mid-year academic break in January, for the purpose of promulgating the Saemaul movement at rural winter schools throughout Korea, and this was the administrative apparatus that made possible the nationwide distribution of questionnaires. The questionnaires, some 2,000 of them, were distributed in a "random" way to these winter schools throughout Korea through the facilities of the Ministry of Education. The section in this chapter on peasant attributes will make clear how widely representative the responses were. This method of distribution afforded the additional advantage that each school was in the charge of a leader whose level of literacy was as high as or higher than that of the peasants who attended these schools, who would be able to explain the requisite directions if the need arose or interpret a question that might be ambiguous to the respondents. The questionnaire, in the original English, and the instructions provided to the Saemaul winter-school leaders are included in Appendix A.

Although the respondents in this study are not a true random probability sample of Korean peasants, the winter schools seemed to offer a representative group, since the schools were aimed at the largest possible proportion of peasants and not at any select group, such as village chiefs. Some 2.5 million peasants attended these schools during the course of the winter making it possible for all heads of household to attend, presumably on a voluntary basis. Since a true random sample would have been prohibitively expensive to obtain, the best available alternative to the method of distribution used here would probably have been a cluster sampling of myöna, villages within myöna, and random individuals within the selected villages, an alternative that would also have required substantially more resources than were available.

While I am convinced that a true random sample would not differ in important
ways from the respondents reported here, there is no way to support this conviction in terms of probability. Therefore, the statistics, used to assess the significance, or lack of it, of the findings reported in their applicability to a population, are not in a technical sense appropriate. Given the problems of cost, time, and situation, the most appropriate research method seemed to be the questionnaire method selected, and the most appropriate means of distribution appeared to be the opportunity offered by the administrative apparatus established by the Ministry of Education. One thousand four hundred thirty completed questionnaires were obtained from winter schools throughout Korea. There is some reason to believe the respondents are fairly comparable to a random sample of peasants from the population. In terms of amount of land owned, religion, and several other attributes, these 1,430 respondents seem comparable to national averages. For this reason, statistics sometimes have been used as though the respondents represented a true random sample of the population, and these statistics will be interpreted with caution. They should be regarded as illustrative. It may be generally assumed that where relationships exist between attributes, that these relationships may also exist, with a degree of error, in the population of Korean peasants as a whole.

The construction of the questionnaire posed many problems. Surveys have indeed been conducted along the same lines in other countries, but nothing comparable to the questionnaire devised for this study has been developed for use in rural Korea. There was therefore the problem of selecting apt questions for inclusion in the study and the very difficult task of translating these, since most of them had been devised for use in other cultures. In a few cases, questions had to be omitted when a smooth Korean translation could not be devised. Among the innumerable decisions made in the translation was the appropriate form of "I." We opted for the Korean 1, indicating social equality between speaker and hearer. Since there were many sources for the questions finally selected for inclusion, citation to these will be made in the course of the discussion of the hypotheses. A questionnaire is, of course, an instrument containing a large number of questions, selected on the basis of their contribution to hypotheses. A single question will occasionally be designated to stand for a concept of importance in testing these hypotheses, but more often and more adequately several questions will be selected to assess the pertinent concepts. The concepts involved in the hypotheses presented will therefore be discussed in terms of the clusters of questions that were selected to represent them.

Concepts

Table 2.1 presents the concepts that were to be represented by the items on the questionnaire. The complete questions are presented in Appendix A. Some comments should be made, however, on some of the questions and their related concepts. The question on religion drew the greatest number of "no responses," which probably reflects the complex nature of religion in Korea rather than a real reluctance to respond. The query on the president of Korea, in the concept "political knowledge," ought to have been replaced with another national figure, for although villagers may have been out of contact with events in the capital in earlier years of the century, almost no peasant was so parochial as to be unable to recall the name of President Park Chung Hee.
There are two questions concerning health which called for a personal assessment. It would have been desirable to verify these subjective assessments with an actual physical examination that would have also benefited the peasants.

Table 2.1
A Conceptual Key to the Questions in the National Korean Peasant Survey Questionnaire

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
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<td>DURRES</td>
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|                                               |      | III-26  | SAEFARM |
|                                               |      | III-27  | SAEINGMT|
| K. Attitude Toward Farming                    |      | II-1    | FARMRDG |
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|                                               |      | II-8    | WORRY   |
|                                               |      | II-9    | STANDING|
|                                               |      | II-15   | ENJOY   |
|                                               |      | II-16   | DEPRIVED|
|                                               |      | II-22   | DISADVTG|
|                                               |      | II-23   | MOVECITY |
|                                               |      | II-29   | LESSED  |
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|                                               |      | II-43   | BESTPLCE|

*The Roman numeral shows the section of the questionnaire, the Arabic numeral the number of the item in that section.*
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*A printing error omitted response categories for this item, which was dropped from the analysis.*
Korea, like most rural communities of the world, is beset by many parasitical infections, some of which cannot but affect the attitudes and outlook of peasants. For instance, liver and lung flukes infest most of the rivers and streams of Korea, and some 60 percent of the school children in the area of one reservoir were found in 1973 to be infected. In the past it had been shown that infestation with hookworm, as in the American South, was responsible for the "lack of ambition" among many peasants, and it is surprising that little attention has been paid to this causal relationship.\(^1\)

Among the questions under the concept of familism or traditionalism is one asking if the respondent calls upon a mudang when there is illness in the family. It might be objected that this question is paternalistic, and there was some discussion as to whether to include it. While there was no intention to ridicule practices such as the mudang kut, a shamanistic ritual to drive out sickness, some respondents might have been hesitant to answer this question frankly. I might add here parenthetically that the mudang kut is conceivably superior to a few Western medical practices I have come into contact with. As usually happens in a survey, it became evident after the survey was complete that another response choice on medical advice would have been more appropriate, since many peasants treat themselves by applying to the town pharmacist.\(^2\)

Part II of the questionnaire consisted of sixty-six attitudinal questions, with responses based on three distinctions: agree, uncertain, and disagree. Experience in other cultural levels suggested that these distinctions were sufficient, and in the rural milieu to have extended the number of categories to the seven of the typical Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, and so forth) would have been of doubtful utility.\(^3\) Table 2.1 shows that the concepts tapped by these attitudinal questions included attitude toward farming, propensity to change, trust, personal efficacy, village morale, cooperativeness, personal morale,\(^4\) isolation (or alienation), authoritarianism, future orientation, familism (or traditionalism), and attitude toward government. Some overlap will be noted, with a single question appearing under two or more concepts. It would be expected that personal morale must have some affinity to the concept of alienation, and traditionalism certainly implies something about the propensity to change. This, however, is no disadvantage given the multivariate approach.
adopted for the analysis of the questionnaire, namely, factor analysis, through which innumerable variables can enter a single analysis. It would certainly be much more disadvantageous to select single questions to stand for concepts because then there would be no way to check an item's validity by comparing its relationships with other cognate items. In survey research there is a tension between the length and the comprehensiveness of a questionnaire. On the one hand, the questionnaire should be short enough so that respondents do not find the instrument a tiring experience; on the other hand, it should be comprehensive enough to allow the researcher an optimum number of attributes in adequate depth. Our questionnaire was an effort to balance these somewhat incompatible aims.

While attitudes could be designated, according to hypotheses to be presented shortly, as either dependent or independent variables (as "cause" or "effect") in the problem of agricultural innovation and modernity, most of them were considered independent variables, predicting to innovative behavior of various kinds, as will be explained in more detail. The two most important dependent variables in this study were those indicating the peasants' reports on yield and increase in yield. Other kinds of personal farming innovations were also listed under this heading (see Table 2.1, W) as were those showing a concern with village improvements and the desire to cooperate (see Table 2.1, P).

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that formed the basis for the questionnaire and the concepts it contained were drawn from a vast literature, and some concepts with their associated hypotheses replicated research that had been conducted in rural areas in other parts of the world. Much has already been written on modernization or innovation, and some of it reports on surveys such as this one. Many of these other surveys, however, have been carried out in areas where the socioeconomic conditions are not so far along the path to industrialization as those in Korea where only half, or slightly less, of the economically employed population is engaged in agriculture. Korea is in a unique stage of transition, and it is debatable whether this might have the effect of increasing the number of "innovative" responses and peasant morale or the opposite effect of demoralizing the peasants who sense that the stream of change is leaving them far behind and making them a residue of tradition, as it were, ultimately dispensable for the future of their country. Some of the concepts, particularly that pertaining to attitudes toward farming, have not been widely used in research of this nature. In the following pages the major hypotheses and some of the support for these will be set forth.

There are two main types of dependent variables of interest in this research. One set quite obviously consists of innovative farming techniques. Questions of this type include those in Table 2.1, W, Innovation. In a sense, the questions about yield and increase in yield are the most interesting, because while the others are indicative of innovative behavior, the ultimate test of the effectiveness of innovation must lie in the yields obtained by the peasants. Thus it does not follow that adoption of various innovations necessarily leads to an increase in crop yields, although this presumably is the goal of innovation. It is the yield and the increase of that yield (in terms of the peasants' perceived profits) which provide the necessary social reinforcement for innovative behavior. The chain of events would be the causal attributes and attitudes that lead
peasants to adopt innovations, the innovations leading to an increase in output, and the rewards of an increased output that reinforce the causal attitudes and attributes. The last link in this chain is the "feedback" of the systems analyst. It is easy to see that the weak link in this chain has been the social reinforcement of innovative behavior. Through the manipulation of prices, governments have often insured that the rewards for innovative behavior will be meager, therefore making it irrational for peasants to innovate.

A second set of dependent variables is concerned with the peasants' willingness to participate in village improvement projects, one of the major aspects of the Saemaul movement intended to improve the quality of village life. The questions intended to assess actual cooperativeness among peasants are those from Part I of the questionnaire, listed in Table 2.1, P. While villages could possibly be developed and the quality of life improved through coercive measures, the literature of development amply attests to the failures of community development efforts that have not enlisted the voluntary support of villagers. Without such support a community movement can be adjudged a failure, for when coercion is removed, such projects generally fall into disrepair and the community development program ceases to have any import. While some tangible improvements probably resulted from the brief enthusiasm of the rural development programs of 1958 and the democratic interlude of 1961, these efforts ultimately failed because they never succeeded in providing continuity through enduring village cooperation. Thus the relationship of villagers' attributes and attitudes toward village cooperativeness will be assessed in some of the proposed hypotheses.

It will be seen that we use Rogers' definition of innovativeness. In order to be considered an innovator, a peasant need not invent or be the first in his village to introduce a practice but only that he had adopted a practice regarded as progressive. Modernization is both the sum of the innovative practices and techniques adopted by the peasant as well as his progressive attitudes. Modernization in outlook is associated with attitudes commonly accepted as progressive by urban industrial societies; the acceptance of birth control might be an example. While it should be stressed that we have no intention of valuing the modern outlook over the traditional one, the hypotheses generally suggest that modernization and innovation may lead to higher outputs and more positive outlooks overall. This result may or may not be supported. Like Rogers, I regard modernization as a complex phenomenon, not as a single dimension and certainly not as a single variable, and the technique of factor analysis used in Chapters 3 and 5 is admirably well suited to the recognition of the complexity of these data. Of course there may be several possible social conditions in which traditionalism may be warranted as being rational and perceived by the peasants as rewarding.

Let us now spell out the hypotheses used in our study.

(1) Age is positively associated with personal innovativeness. Except insofar as the Saemaul movement has penetrated the countryside, age is not associated with village cooperativeness. Cooperativeness is a traditional rural pattern, but the young might be influenced by the Saemaul movement to emphasize this trait. One would expect age to be positively associated with propensity to change, negatively associated with traditionalism. One would generally expect age to be related to an increase in conservatism and a growing tendency to cling to traditions, a relationship that has frequently been found in voting studies. Rogers points out that in more modern villages, the leaders are often somewhat younger
Galtung goes so far as to state emphatically that no measure of modernization can be valid that does not correlate positively with age. There is reason to be more reserved than this, however, because if it is accepted that peasants will rationally innovate provided they receive adequate rewards, then factors other than age may be more important in generating innovative behavior.

(2) Education is positively associated with personal innovativeness in behavior and attitudes. This seems to be the generally reported association in a number of studies, although for at least one chief reason this relationship in a rural context may be moot. As Galtung says, "it is not education as such, but what is taught that counts." In Korea as well as in most presently developing societies, schools teach a curriculum that is divorced in every possible way from the problems of agriculture. While this phenomenon is widespread, it may be particularly marked in Korea where the Confucian tradition has for centuries geared education to the aim of attaining mandarinal status in the government bureaucracy. The contemporary peasant may still regard education in this light, and to determine this several attitudinal questions relate to the issue of whether education is desirable for peasants. Thus, while the hypothesis will be tested as stated, there is some reason to suspect that it may stand in no particular relationship, either positively or negatively to farm innovativeness, because the educational system is divorced from peasant interests and oriented to urban concerns. In all countries it is an urban elite that dominates the curriculum and the ends of the educational process. It is interesting to note that education seems to be a source of egress from farm life, according to statistics of educational attainment and employment, as shown in Table 2.2. Although peasants are to be found at all levels of educational attainment, most are to be found at the lowest levels.

(3) Protestantism and Catholicism are associated with personal innovativeness in behavior and attitudes, but there is no relationship between religion and cooperativeness. This hypothesis is based on the principle that a change in religion from those associated with Korean tradition, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, marks an individual with a propensity to change in other ways. Such an individual tends to be more receptive to changes in other role areas of his life. This is not to say that Buddhism is necessarily a conservative force, for Buddhists have been reinterpreting their role in social and political development since World War II and some have adopted modern and reform-oriented positions. Many precepts of Korean Won Buddhism, a reform movement of this century, stress "a life of reliance on self-ability" and "public interest." But in a general sense, and in the special case of Korea, it is expected that a change to a Western religion may well imply a desire to change to a Western concept of progress. Among the Korean elite, at least since the end of the nineteenth century and even prior to that, the pronouncement that one had accepted the ideas of progress and science has sometimes been symbolized by adopting a Western religion. The motivations leading to contacts with missionaries, and the frustrations involved in these cultural contacts, are poignantly presented in Younghill Kang's autobiographical classic, The Grass Roof. By becoming a Christian, one seemed to renounce the stagnation of Korean society and the conservatism of its regime, and some individuals probably also hoped that the spread of new religions throughout Korea would bring a new spirit of reform. There is little doubt that the missionaries stimulated this belief and in some instances acted to introduce innovation. For example, the raising of potatoes, a new crop in Korea, had originally been introduced by Korean Christians, who in the face of persecution fled into the mountains.
Table 2.2

Educational Attainment and Entry into Occupation for the Year 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Professional and Technical Workers</th>
<th>Clerical Workers</th>
<th>Sales and Service Workers</th>
<th>Agriculture and Fishery Workers</th>
<th>Production Workers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General high school</td>
<td>3,827</td>
<td>3,827</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational high school</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior college</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior technical or</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational college</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and university</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate school</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where the potato rather than rice became their sustenance. Missionaries were also influential in extending education to women and founded the first educational institutions for girls at the end of the nineteenth century.

(4) Military service is positively associated with personal innovativeness and cooperativeness. Among Korean social institutions, the military unquestionably harbors many of the attitudes associated with reform and innovation. General arguments have been advanced that military regimes may often be more oriented toward progress than civilian regimes, but there is some reason to believe that military regimes, whatever their original motivations might have been, are no more successful in accomplishing economic development than other regimes faced with the same problems. While there is no need to debate this controversial issue here, it is possible that service in the armed forces has expanded the Korean peasant's outlook beyond what it would have been had he remained in his village. The recruit, however unmechanized his home village might have been, is inevitably confronted with a technically impressive array of weapons and machines, and he learns at least something of their potentialities. His service also takes him to other parts of the peninsula, and with the expansion of his geographical horizons, his social and cultural horizons are probably widened too. This hypothesis assumes that cooperation needed to carry out military functions is transferred into civilian life, making it more likely that those who served in the military are also among those who participate willingly in village projects.

(5) Contact with urban environments is positively associated with personal innovativeness. It does not affect cooperativeness, or it may even decrease the propensity to cooperate. Like in the case of the military, although perhaps to a lesser degree, a relationship with a more urban life ought to inculcate attitudes and behaviors directed toward change and innovation. Rogers, citing several studies, uses "number of trips to an urban center" as his measure of cosmopolitanism. There is also some evidence, although much of this is impressionistic, that it is the more progressive individuals who leave the farm for the city, hence causing a drain of leadership capabilities.

(6) The amount of land farmed is positively associated with innovativeness and yield per majigi. The number of parcels farmed is negatively related to yield and innovativeness. These hypotheses are argued from the position that the larger the farm, the more likely a peasant is able to introduce innovations and the more he attends to his business of farming. One of the problems encountered in the Korean countryside is that land is sometimes divided into several parcels, so that a peasant might have to spend a good deal of his day's labor in traveling from one plot to another. The traditional rationale for this land division is that it allows more villagers to farm some good land. A peasant might have several parcels of particularly fertile land and one or two that are less desirable. While no one is completely satisfied, no peasant is entirely dissatisfied either. There is also a likelihood that while the maximum limit on riceland is not high, larger farms may indicate a wealthier peasant. Because, as Rogers argues, officials who advocate change tend to interact with wealthier clients, it may be the richer peasants who tend to adopt innovations most rapidly. It should be understood, however, that unlike the rural situation in some other developing nations, the Korean countryside is relatively homogeneous. Extreme wealth and poverty are not as evident in the country as before the land reform.

(7) The status of a peasant's health is positively associated with innovativeness and cooperativeness. This hypothesis is self-evident; it is unlikely that one plans for change and the future in a condition of sickness or lack of physical energy.
(8) Increasing contact with the media fosters innovativeness and cooperative behavior. This hypothesis has been researched on many occasions, and the result seems borne out that the more media contact, the more an individual becomes progressive. However, there are different forms of media contact. Rogers states that illiterates may listen mainly to music and entertainment while literate listeners are mostly interested in news and information. To check this aspect of the hypothesis, questions about interest in national and international affairs were added to the questionnaire. The frequency of listening to agricultural programs was also ascertained because the Saemaul movement, a matter of current interest in 1973, was then being propagated through the media. While the hypothesis is intended to be general, the questions also focused on contact with media having specific reference to agriculture; thus it was not how many movies an individual attended, but how many government movies or slide presentations on agriculture the peasant viewed.

(9) Memberships, meetings, and official positions tend to make individuals progressive, innovative, and more cooperative. Of particular interest here were the 4-H clubs which were very popular in the Korean countryside after their introduction in the 1950s. Chung mentions 18,874 clubs throughout Korea by the end of 1962, with a sizable membership of 548,695.

(10) Influence and the desire for more influence makes an individual more likely to participate in village cooperation and be more innovative. These attributes would seem to relate to self-esteem and leadership, or a desire for more leading roles.

(11) Positive attitudes toward farming are positively associated with a desire for village cooperation and personal innovativeness. This is posited as a crucial independent concept, for if persons have education, interest in the media, and good land but lack the motivation for channeling their personal energies into farming as their occupation, they possess little motivation for innovation. In a certain sense, the attitude toward farming represents occupational morale, and if this is lacking, progressive innovations can hardly be anticipated. It is also possible that given certain other attributes, such as education and ample land, attitudes toward farming may be a critical intervening factor predicting to the dependent concepts of farm yields. Peasant attitudes toward farming have not often been explicitly researched as a factor in modernization. The questions that were used to elicit these attitudes were derived from a scale developed by A. M. Myster. This scale was intended to measure attitudes toward farming both as a vocation and as a way of life, but the two separate aspects of the scale proved to be highly intercorrelated. On the whole, the full scale from which some of these questions were drawn has acceptable reliability and evidence of validity. The results of the analysis corroborated Myster's results; among all the scales and attitude sets used in the research, the attitude-toward-farming questions were the most reliable, clustering on a single dimension or factor. Another question was asked regarding whether one would rather have his sons attend an agricultural or another kind of high school. This question not only seems to elicit attitudes about farming but also expectations about the future viability of the occupation: Would you want to commit your children's future to farming? This is a critical question for a peasant who perceives alternatives.

(12) Propensity to change is positively related to innovative behavior and cooperativeness. This hypothesis suggests that attitudes affect behavior, a proposition that is not undebatable. Besides, as mentioned earlier, it should be remembered that attitudes affect behavior depending on social conditions.

(13) Personal efficacy is positively associated with innovative behavior, but
it has little effect on cooperative behavior.

(14) Trust has a positive association with cooperativeness. It has little effect on personal innovativeness. The second proposition may be debatable, for it probably takes a measure of trust to adopt innovations on the basis of some government official's claim that certain practices lead to increased output. Moreover, accepting Saemaul slogans enthusiastically entails some trust of government goals.

(15) Village morale is positively associated with cooperative behavior. It has little effect on personal innovativeness. To the extent that village morale represents "need affiliation," it may even depress innovativeness, for a peasant may hesitate to adopt new ideas that could make him appear deviant among his peers.37

(16) Personal morale has a positive association with personal innovativeness. It may have a positive relationship with cooperative behavior.

(17) Alienation is negatively associated with personal innovativeness and with cooperative behavior.

(18) Future orientation is positively associated with personal innovativeness and with cooperative behavior.

(19) Authoritarianism is negatively associated with personal innovativeness. This argument is spelled out in some detail in several books on political and economic development. It is one of the chief attributes analyzed by Hagen.38 However, since the concept was devised originally in the context of European and American culture, there is some difficulty in applying it to Korea. There is, in fact, some reason to hypothesize that, given the traditions of Korean villages, the relationship between authoritarianism and cooperativeness might be positive. As Castillo suggests, the authoritarian patriarch might decide for new agricultural ideas. 39 This hypothesis is therefore probably questionable.

(20) Familism, or traditionalism, is another concept that provides problems of ambiguous relationships. On the basis of Banfield's "amoral familism" the inclination is to posit a negative relationship between familism and personal innovativeness and cooperativeness. However, Galtung found familism connected to preference for the nuclear rather than the extended family and higher among young persons with at least minimal education. These persons were also more mobile.40 Thus familism was related more strongly to behavior, some of it modern, than it was to attitudes, except for attitudes specifically concerning the family. On the other hand, insofar as familism in Korea is a traditional attitude, it might be expected to be related to other traditional behaviors. Among these traditional behaviors would be a propensity to cooperate. Village mutual assistance had already been observed by the earliest visitors to Korea.41 Lee states that "the habit of working in company with villagers is so persistently practiced that it may be said to characterize the life of Korean farmers."42 Given the ambiguous nature of familism, the very tentative hypothesis is advanced that familism is negatively related to personal innovativeness and cooperativeness.43

(21) A positive attitude toward government is positively associated with personal innovativeness and village cooperativeness. The hypothesis is based on the argument that since it is the government that is propagating the Saemaul movement, which aims at the ultimate transformation of the Korean countryside, a positive attitude toward the central government also makes the peasant more receptive to its messages. The notion of political accountability takes some time to develop. Traditionalism would thus seem to diminish the acceptability of more positive attitudes toward government.

(22) Debt contributes to a lack of innovativeness and village cooperativeness.
Debt is expected to relate to a whole body of deleterious attitudes and behaviors, particularly if the peasant perceives his debt as increasing. On the other hand, some debts might be contracted in order to purchase modern equipment, a possibility easily assessed in the analysis.

(23) Clan villages tend to be less capable of stimulating personal innovativeness but may be better able to bring about cooperativeness. As Osgood remarks, "at its best, the clan is the source of invisible security, at its worst it turns all eyes backward on the past, limiting opportunity for complete individualism and demanding greater personal courage of him who would originate something new or change the age-old customs."

These are the chief hypotheses that were built into the questionnaire. Additional subsidiary hypotheses and some considerations of intervening variables will appear in subsequent chapters. Of some 2,000 questionnaires distributed to peasants through the Saemaul winter schools, 1,430 were returned completed. Had the respondents represented a true random sample of the population, roughly 95 percent of such samples would have fallen within less than 3 percent from the true value of the population. In other words, 1,430 questionnaires are a relatively adequate number on the basis of which to make inferences about Korean peasants. Since ample reservations have already been made with regard to the randomness of our sample of respondents, it might be well to conclude this chapter on a more upbeat note, calling attention to the fact that survey research in Korea, focusing attention on individuals as separate and independent units, makes more sense than it would in a more heterogeneous society such as India, Burma, or Indonesia. Korea is, in fact, a homogeneous society by comparison with most other less developed nations of the world, and this fact ought to contribute to the external validity of the analytic results.

In the following section, the responses on the questionnaire will be treated in a descriptive manner so as to suggest the attributes held by Korean peasants. The hypotheses will be tested in Chapter 3, and comparable data from two Korean villages related to the hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 5.

General Attributes of Korean Peasants

Korea is a relatively homogeneous country, with no sizable minorities. Even the Chinese do not comprise a significant ethnic minority, as they do in some Southeast Asian countries, and there is only a scattering of other non-Koreans. The nation is divided into nine major provinces and, as Table 2.3 shows, peasant respondents in our sample were located in all of them, including thirty-seven individuals in Cheju-do, an island some distance to the south of the Korean peninsula. While there are differing character traits attributed to individuals from various areas in Korea, it is unlikely that any of these differences would be perceived by an outsider, except for the difference between the Seoul sophisticate and the provincial from elsewhere in Korea. The folklore of differing character traits is intrinsic to all cultures, but there is no sharp division among persons from different regions such as, e.g., in Burma where several quite distinct cultural groups coexist. Although linguists can discern some local differences in the Korean language, these distinctions are minor compared even to those existing in Germany. Korean is mutually comprehensible from one area to another. Certainly there are fewer differences in most outlooks among the peasants than probably exist between peasants and the urban population.
Table 2.3
Respondents by Province of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyŏnggi</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwŏn</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ch'ungch'ong</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ch'ungch'ong</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kyŏngsang</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kyŏngsang</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ch'olla</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ch'olla</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>*<em>1,430</em></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One thousand three hundred seventeen were male and 113 were female respondents.

There were some differences among respondents between the provinces, according to several dependent variables of innovative behavior. For instance, the yield reported from the various provinces was rather similar, with the modes for yield ranging from six to thirty sŏk. Five provinces—Kyŏnggi, South Ch'ungch'ong, South Kyŏngsang, North Ch'olla, and South Ch'olla—generally reported eleven to thirty sŏk, while Kangwŏn, North Ch'ungch'ong, and North Kyŏngsang reported modes from six to twenty sŏk. In South Ch'ungch'ong, several peasants reported yields in the upper ranges, from thirty to over sixty sŏk. In reporting a yield increase, however, provinces were somewhat similar, ranging from a low of 66.2 percent in South Ch'olla to a high of 82.5 percent in South Ch'ungch'ong.

There were some differences in technological innovations, such as the use of weedicide, with North Kyŏngsang and North Ch'olla reporting 60.1 and 66.4 percent use of weedicide over hand-weeding. Of course, many of those using weedicide also hand-weeded. Kangwŏn registered a low of 28.7 percent using weedicide, so that the respondents from the various provinces did differ in adopting technology. Insecticide was in such general use, however, that the main distinction was whether the peasant used it before or only following an attack by insects. Almost 90 percent of the peasants in all provinces said that they used insecticide before their plants were attacked. Plows were not yet in universal use, and about four-fifths of the peasants in all provinces did not own any. Threshers, however, were more widely used. North Ch'ungch'ong, South Ch'ungch'ong, and Kyŏngsang had over 70 percent of the respondents owning threshers, while in the remaining provinces about half the peasants owned them.

Tongil rice was planted by over half the farmers of four of the provinces—Kyŏnggi, Kyŏngsang, North Ch'olla, and South Ch'olla—with the last-named having the highest percentage, 64 percent. Less than half of the respondents in the
other provinces had planted Tongil, with the lowest percentage being in Cheju. The number of thatched roofs, picturesque to the foreigner but less desirable to the peasant, had gradually given way to corrugated or tile roofs. Yet quite a few thatched houses remained in the villages, and about one-third of the respondents from Kangwon, South Ch'ungch'ong, North Cholla, South Cholla, and Cheju continued to have their homes thatched.

There were no sizable differences in the various provinces of willingness to donate time to village projects. The expression of willingness was quite general, ranging from a low of 62.4 percent in North Kyongsang to a high of 76.5 percent in Kangwon. Kangwon is sometimes said to be the most backward province, so that it is possible that the tradition of mutual help has lasted longest there. While the Saemaul movement attempted to stimulate village projects on the basis of village cooperation, tradition was undoubtedly an aid to this modernizing effort. The impression to be gained is that considerable support for village improvement existed in the countryside. This view is supported by the evidence of donations of time in the past, showing little difference among peasants of the various provinces. In North Cholla, where the responses were lowest in this category, 59.1 percent reported having donated some time while in most of the other provinces the figure was 70 percent. Well over two-thirds of the peasants said they were from villages that had cooperative arrangements with neighboring villages.

Finally, there were marked differences as to whether peasants wanted to see their sons continue in agricultural high schools. Only in Kyonggi (53 percent) and Kangwon (60.6 percent) did more than half the peasants want to see their sons continue the profession of farming. In all other provinces, peasants were more negative about this, with South Ch'ungch'ong and South Cholla expressing over 70 percent negative responses. Table 2 summarizes these regional differences. On the basis of the responses, no salient patterns can be discerned. For example, it did not seem to make much difference how a province rated on the dependent variables, yield and increase in yield, the decision whether to send sons to agricultural schools did not seem to rest on these considerations. Kyonggi, for instance, which rated rather higher than some other provinces and at least with the norm on others, indicated a greater desire to see sons attend agricultural school, but in North Cholla, which in some respects appeared to be the most progressive province, the feeling was negative about agricultural school. Moreover, the desire to donate time to village projects and the past behavior in doing so were not associated with any other perceptible patterns, although it should be remarked that the least progressive province, aside from Cheju, also registered the highest tendency to cooperate. These are of course all relative assessments, within the Korean context, and a cooperative spirit would seem to prevail.

The respondents indicated a high degree of stability in residence. Only some 14.9 percent (213 respondents) reported living in their present village less than five years. While 53.6 percent had never lived in a larger town or city, 45.9 percent reported having lived in a more urban locale, although all of these were for periods of less than two years. Only one respondent reported living in a town or city for more than two years.

Some 41.9 percent of the respondents had held some official position at one time. About the same percentage (41.6 percent) had held some office in an organization. This might seem to be a high percentage, but village life provides possibilities of this kind beyond what is usually imagined. We must disagree
Technical Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>AGSCHOOL</th>
<th>COMPENS</th>
<th>FASTEAT</th>
<th>DONATE</th>
<th>TONGIL</th>
<th>ROOF</th>
<th>FLOW</th>
<th>THRESHIR</th>
<th>INSCTCID</th>
<th>WEBDICID</th>
<th>VIRIDIC</th>
<th>YIELD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyŏnggi</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ch'ŏngch'ŏng</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ch'ŏngch'ŏng</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kŏmsa</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kŏmsa</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ch'ŏlla</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ch'ŏlla</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* + = somewhat above the average; 0 = about the average (which in the case of ROOF, DONATE, and INSCTCID is generally high; — = somewhat below average. Parentheses indicate a very slight difference from the average. The names of the full variables can be found in Appendix A.
with Marx's famous comment, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that village life has "no wealth of social relationships." In some respects the fabric of modern urban life may be more drab. Besides a rijang, or village chief, there is likely to be a Saemaul leader and several persons heading various committees within the village.\textsuperscript{47} Such committees—as in Nae-il, a village to be reported on more fully in Chapter 5—might be in charge of combating superstition and various other village projects. There are other village-level organizations such as the kye, some of which have little bearing on agriculture and play only a small role in village-level affairs. Others, such as the wu kye, might provide credit by lot, so that members will have enough money to purchase an ox.\textsuperscript{48}

Observed closely, the Korean peasant in the 1960s and 1970s was not quite a politically apathetic individual. There were numerous opportunities for participation, although his influence did not generally extend beyond the village level.

Media contact among these peasants was considerable, with almost all reporting that they read the newspaper daily (73.9 percent) and owned a radio (97.8 percent). This might seem a remarkably high figure, setting off these winter-school respondents from other Korean peasants, but this is not so because the literacy rate in Korea is quite high. Moreover, there is a very active provincial press, aside from the large number of papers published in the capital and the larger cities. Only among older Koreans is illiteracy still a problem. Higher education for women was not common earlier in the century, except for the few who attended Ehwa University and several other women's colleges founded by missionaries. The Korean alphabet, a most remarkable system invented during the reign of King Sejong with the aid of Chinese linguists, was a great boon to those who wanted to teach themselves to read and write, and some older peasant women, in their forties and fifties, used it to become literate. In rural households in 1931, for example, only 22.5 percent of the Korean farm women could read Korean, compared to 57 percent of the men, and only 3.6 percent could read Chinese compared to over a third of the men.\textsuperscript{49} These percentages improved during and after the Japanese occupation, although there is still some educational disparity between rural men and women. It was, of course, known that the radio had already become ubiquitous, and the figure cited earlier suggests just how widespread this media form is. Not only in Korea but in the Philippines and other less developed nations, the radio has furnished a cheap and modern form of communication fundamental to the process of nation-building.

Most respondents (86.9 percent) believed that it was possible to improve conditions in their villages, and most (67.8 percent) were willing to donate some of their time for this purpose, while others (26.9 percent) advanced a more tentative "maybe" in response to this query. Most peasants (67.5 percent) had already participated in village projects. Once again, a preconception was verified, for village cooperation, while sometimes exaggerated, had been a long-standing tradition. Heavy farm tasks enlisted five or more neighbors in a form of cooperative labor called pum-asi. For a day's work done for a neighbor, a peasant could claim the same amount of time later. The host was responsible for providing the best available food. Heydrich was told that this system was "a real democratic assembly line system" in which everyone competed.\textsuperscript{50} As a formal arrangement among neighbors pum-asi has declined, but the spirit of cooperation is still in evidence.

Table 2.5 reports the age distribution of these respondents. The age distribution did not, of course, resemble the general population because there were
fewer persons thirty years or younger. Many of these younger peasants did not
yet have their own farms and thus did not have the incentive to attend the
Saemaul winter schools, while some may have been in the military service. It
will be seen later that age explained very little innovative behavior. Perhaps
Korea had had a money economy long enough so that older peasants responded to
market conditions and changed their farming practices if they saw an advantage
in doing so, making age a less important factor in rural modernization.

The educational level of these peasants is given in Table 2.6. The level of
education in Korea seemed to be considerably higher than that in many another
less developed country, attesting to the transitional status of Korea as it has
moved closer to industrialization. As explained in the note to the table, these
peasants were much more responsive to this question than those in the two vil­
lages surveyed in 1973 where there was a substantial minority of "no responses."

Table 2.5
Respondent's Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-25</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,426*</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There were four "no responses."

Table 2.6
The Education of Korean Peasants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or university</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate school</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,424*</td>
<td>99.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There were six "no responses" for this question in the national
sample. Comparison with a village study done later, in which there
were substantial "no responses," suggests the direction here of some
bias toward at least a higher degree of responsiveness. Since the
interviewers were students from a nearby agricultural college, it is
possible that some degree of "face" was involved on the part of the
respondents. A good guess, therefore, would be that Saemaul attend­
ance was increased with education.
Since the land reform the maximum amount of farmland a peasant could own had been three ch'ongbo (one ch'ongbo equals 2.45 acres). The mode of the land farmed was 1,500 to 2,999 py'ông (3,000 py'ông equal one ch'ongbo), while most farms ranged from 1,500 to 5,999 py'ông. Most peasants generally agreed that they did not want more land and, given the technology of rice farming, farms of the size of those in the modal categories were probably optimal for Korea's labor-intensive farming. These peasants grew mainly rice, although many also owned some amount of dryland. The distribution of land owned is shown in Table 2.7. On this land the mode for yield was eleven to twenty sŏk of rice, with the categories for output ranging from six to thirty sŏk. Yet, as Table 2.8 indicates, the distribution ranged up to sixty sŏk and above, probably because some farms in the South were able to harvest two crops of rice in a season. Some 1,031 peasants (72.1 percent) reported an increase in yields as against only 5 percent reporting a

Table 2.7
Farmed Land of Korean Respondents, Wetland and Dryland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Py'ông</th>
<th>Wetland</th>
<th></th>
<th>Dryland</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Peasants</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 899</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Less than 899</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900-1,499</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>900-1,499</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500-2,999</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>1,500-2,999</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-5,999</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>3,000-5,999</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000-8,999</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6,000-8,999</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000 or over</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9,000 or over</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>85.9*</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>86.9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The remainder did not respond to the question.

Table 2.8
Yields of Korean Peasants, in sŏk
(one sŏk equals about 5 bushels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sŏk</th>
<th>Number of Peasants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 or over</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
decrease. There were heavy rains in August of 1972 which flooded some regions of Korea and destroyed the crops of some peasants. Whether agriculture is modernized or traditional, the weather is still a major factor related to output, and modern science has not altered this situation much. Unlike peasants in some other countries, Korean peasants keep meticulous records of their finances and their agricultural production, and the responses may thus have been fairly accurate. 51 On the other hand, depending on the context in which they were questioned, peasants may have tended either to exaggerate their output or to understate it. The same reservation must be stated concerning the amount of land farmed, for while it is illegal to own more than three chôngbo of riceland, there are probably many peasants that have surreptitious arrangements of ownership unreported to the authorities.

Several questions were asked in order to assess political knowledge. Few respondents (9.5 percent) were unable to give the name of the American president at the time of the survey, fewer still (1.2 percent) the name of the president of Korea, Park Chung Hee, although 29.9 percent did not correctly identify the Japanese premier. The last figure may possibly have been influenced by reasons other than lack of knowledge. Twenty-five years after Japanese colonial occupation ended, feelings against Japan as a former oppressor still ran deep. 52 In any case, the great number of correct responses showed that a more subtle series of indicators of political knowledge ought to have been included and so, reluctantly, these responses were dropped in the later analysis.

A large minority of peasants (39.3 percent) were in debt, and 150 of them reported that their debts had increased over the previous year. As has been shown before, debt has been the nemesis of the Korean peasant although conditions are now at least as favorable as they have ever been for him. Later in 1973 and, unfortunately, after our village survey had been completed, the government moved to eradicate at least one source of debt in the countryside by banning any ostentatious exhibition of splendor and limiting the cost of gifts that could be offered in weddings, funerals, and village festivals. On the one hand, it might be regretted that these rare occasions of color and pageantry were to be eliminated from the drab routine of the peasants' existence. On the other hand, it provided an excuse, possibly sought by some peasants, for marshaling their small savings against the pressures of their neighbors to provide a respectable showing when burying a parent. In fact, expenses of this type were cited in the village survey as only a minor source of debt there. From a strictly economic rationale, the elimination of this form of expense was quite likely beneficial. But because one of the ends sought by the Saemaul movement was an increase in the cultural as well as the economic level of peasant life, the disappearance of pageantry was deleterious. The traditional market days, which had featured gambling and heavy drinking, were also discontinued in 1973 by order of the central government.

Table 2.9 reports in aggregate figures the technological adaptations of the Korean peasant. It is an impressive showing, with high rankings in the use of insecticide, weedicide, and several kinds of fertilizers. Almost half of the peasants grew various kinds of commercial crops, two-thirds had threshers, and their homes had been improved by the addition of slate, tile, or corrugated roofs. 53 Almost half of them grew the Tongil rice. Twenty-five had begun growing it in 1970, 102 in 1971, 577 in 1972, and seven were planning to plant it in 1973. This does not mean, of course, that they had switched entirely to the new
Table 2.9
Technological Adaptations of the Korean Peasant
(percentages show responses in the "innovative" direction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innovation</th>
<th>Number of Peasants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weedicide</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urea</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphate</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcium cyanamide</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial crop</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresher</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof: tile, slate or corrugated</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Saemaul school</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rice strain which was still in an experimental stage. The success in rice output that was anticipated by the introduction of Tongil did not come about in 1972, as we have seen, for the weather conditions in much of the planted areas were adverse, providing too much rain prior to harvesting. In any case, the table provides a good indication that Korea was not a nation of primitive peasants but had gone some distance toward modernizing its agriculture, and the peasants themselves undoubtedly deserve a large share of the credit for this. This also shows, by the way, that Marx was wrong in his proposition that science is inapplicable to peasant small-holdings.

A large number of the respondents already had attended a Saemaul school, probably during the summer; they were, of course, attending one at the time of responding to the questionnaire. Interestingly, some 41.5 percent of the respondents had first learned of the Saemaul movement over the radio, and another 20.5 percent had read about it in the newspapers. This attests to the growing importance of the media in the countryside. An additional large percentage (19.2 percent) had been informed of the program by an official, probably a myonjang, or county official. Only a few (4.8 percent) had first learned of the movement through a pamphlet or a friend. While some studies of modernization, such as Rogers', suggests that most innovations in traditional agriculture come about through interaction with one's peers, this may be no longer the case when conditions have advanced to the stage where most persons are literate and read the papers or listen to the radio to the extent done in Korea. Face-to-face communication, while still significant, is probably not now the predominant way that peasants learn of new developments in Korea.

Finally, several interesting results should be pondered for the possible
significance they may hold for future developments in the countryside. Overwhelmingly (79.8 percent), these peasants would have liked to have more influence in the operation of their villages. The increase in organizational skills, literacy, and agricultural skills generated a desire to participate more than they had done in the past. These respondents had obviously not sunk into apathy but had developed notions of how their conditions could be improved. They would have probably liked increased opportunities of putting their ideas and goals into effect. Another interesting result, already noted by province, was the small number (38.0 percent) who would have liked their sons to attend an agricultural high school. While conditions in the countryside had improved perceptibly, they still had not achieved by 1973 the economic well-being possible in the city. This is shown by the one response that was almost unanimous in the attitudinal section of the questionnaire: 1,131 peasants agreed that "the standard of living of peasants is below that of most other persons in Korea." There was still the perception, undoubtedly accurate in 1972 and 1973, that peasants had simply not done as well as other sectors of the population. To succeed, the Saemaul movement will have to provide the conditions necessary to allow peasants to raise their living standards to that of their urban compatriots. Until then it is unlikely that most peasants will want to see their sons follow in their own profession. Moreover, this attitude has a very special relationship to some of the ends that the Saemaul movement is trying to achieve, as we will see in Chapter 4.

Responses to the question on influence suggest that the peasant would have liked it, if at all possible, to increase his social power. It has been suggested that social power is a process with positive feedback in system terms. If one attains a little, the inclination will be to try to attain more, and from a position of some power, a position of more power will be easier to attain. If the Saemaul movement works in accordance with its original intent, it might have this effect but might then also displease some of its urban initiators. In any case, there were some improvements in the years following this survey, and in 1974 farm income for the first time reached 104.57 percent of urban income. By 1975 the income of peasants and fishermen had reached 106 percent of the income of urban workers. According to government sources, which in this case were probably accurate, the drain of resources from the countryside into the manufacturing sector, characteristic of the 1960s, had been reversed.
Chapter 3

THE ATTITUDES AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF ATTITUDES
AND ATTRIBUTES OF KOREAN PEASANTS

The Attitudes of Korean Peasants.¹

The ultimate purpose in assessing attitudes is to predict behavior. It is probably true that under certain conditions modernizing behavior is accompanied by attitudes and propensities inclining people in an innovative direction. Those having propensities to change, high self-esteem, and a sense of personal efficacy should, other things being equal, be those whose behavior will include the adoption of modern techniques. But one of the chief problems in attitudinal research lies in that all-embracing phrase, "other things being equal." In the case of peasant agriculture, "other things" are rarely ever "equal," for the peasant has little control over the economy in which he operates. He has little control over the prices he receives for his rice and foodstuffs. If the markets offer high prices for his produce, he is likely to adopt methods that promise him an increased output. If the prices for crops are depressed in relation to the goods and services that he must purchase, there would seem to be less incentive for increasing his productivity for the market. While other factors encourage or inhibit the peasant in his farming techniques, the market undoubtedly affects the practices of the peasant in Korea, for that country is well on its way toward a money or market economy. Few Korean peasants are strictly subsistence agriculturalists. They generally grow farm products for the market in exchange for other products and necessities.² In traditional Korea the family might have made most of the items used in the household, but while some handicraft remains, it is now a residue of the past. Few peasants any longer make the traditional white cloth used for ceremony and mourning. Many of the peasant arts associated with times past have now disappeared, and the market furnishes most of a peasant family's needs. The fact that corrugated, slate, or tile is used for roofs more generally now than in the past attests to the degree to which the market is relied upon.

There is some doubt, therefore, concerning the actual relationships of attitudes toward behavior and particularly modernizing behavior. While these doubts must be maintained in the ensuing discussion about attitudes, conditions in 1972-1973 when the survey was made were, or could have been, contributive to efficaciousness, self-esteem, and positive morale. The Saemaul movement did promise some improvement of the peasant's condition and, insofar as the relative income of peasants had actually increased by 1974, there was at least some substance to government promises. These years would seem to have been years of hope in the countryside and, if attitudes are capable of affecting behavior at all, they would seem to have been operative during this initial era of the Saemaul movement. In spite of a history of disappointments with government promises which had not borne fruit, it was in this period, if in few others, "all other things" might truly have been considered "equal."
There are several reasons why skepticism is warranted in any report of the attitudes of Korean peasants. In an effort to provide at least some opportunity to compare the results of this study with several other surveys conducted among peasant populations questions were taken, sometimes with necessary modifications, from other interview schedules. Moreover, because some questions had never been asked of peasants and were regarded as interesting and potentially revealing, such questions were devised or taken from sources that were not focused on either the Korean milieu or on peasants. All of these questions had been formulated in English, a language quite unlike Korean in syntax and idiom. It would be presumptuous to suppose that even the most painstaking efforts at translation resolved all the problems of transferring the meaning of the English into the Korean of the interview schedules. For the full text of the Korean translation see Appendix A (3).

To this preliminary and obvious difficulty in assessing opinions among Korean peasants must be added the likelihood that meaningful attitudes in one culture may not be meaningful, or meaningful in the same way, in another culture. This problem exists over and above the translation difficulty. Since some of the questions were derived from studies of other cultures, there was the possibility that the Korean peasant might not, for instance, view his community or village in the same way as peasants in the Philippines or farmers in the United States. Some, but certainly not all, of these problems might have been resolved in the process of translation.

Moreover, the questionnaire was applied not to individuals having a high degree of sophistication in arranging their attitudes into consistent and structured patterns, but to individuals who might not have given much thought to some of their attitudes. Attempts to discern ideological patterns in the attitudes of American voters, for example, encounter the problem that in reality most voters have not given much thought to patterning their attitudes about goals, issues, and candidates. For this reason it becomes very difficult for most individuals to delineate any kind of tightknit pattern for their numerous attitudes. Any pattern that may be presented among a sample of American voters is very likely to be a loose one. It seems likely that among Korean peasants patterns that are present in the attitudinal data would be tenuous. To state this fact is not to disparage the respondents. There are many rational reasons why Korean peasants would be unlikely to attend to the structure of their attitudes or to bother whether these were mutually consistent. Peasants are pragmatists, and there are few compelling reasons to expect them to arrange their propositions and thoughts as might an ideologist. It takes time to arrange thoughts logically, and it is not likely that many of us suffer much from "cognitive dissonance" because of this inconsistency. Indeed, it is probably presumptuous of the social scientist to anticipate a well-structured system of attitudes.

Finally, there is reason to doubt the usefulness for some purposes of ascertaining attitudinal structures. We might find evidence of attitudes toward modernization, but whether these attitudes are allied to behaviors that could be characterized as modern is not simply a function of attitudes but also of the social structure in which the peasant lives and works his land. Under some conditions, we might predict that attitudes toward modernization will indeed lead a peasant to adopt certain innovations, like spending more on fertilizer or diversifying his crops. But these conditions may not exist in the particular
region or country under review, in which case some of these attitudes will be stillborn, so to speak, leading to no perceptible differences in behavior. It is not only the individual and his propensity to reform that brings about innovative behavior and activities that ultimately lead to increased productivity. The social and economic structure within which he lives rewards an action or renders it unfeasible and makes innovative activities rational rather than self-defeating. To review individual attitude patterns, therefore, is to look at only one side of the equation of modernization. The other side is the social aggregate and the interrelationship of classes, prices and social influence over which the peasant has little or no control. This criticism of attitudinal surveys has been cogently argued in a number of books and articles, and it is an argument that is very apt. However, this is no reason to dispense with attitudinal surveys altogether. The results of such surveys and the patterns that may be uncovered are certainly of interest in themselves.

We will now discuss attitude results on the basis of percentages agreeing or disagreeing with the attitudinal statements. These attitudes will be presented in terms of clusters on the basis of a priori face validity. Indeed, in a factor analysis of attitudes, the first cluster, attitude toward farming, did show a remarkable interrelationship among the separate responses. The other clusters, with the exception of village morale, were less coherent. This chapter also will report the empirical patterns among behavior, attributes, and a number of attitudes selected for their saliency in the research cited in note 4.

Referring to Table 3.1, some thirteen items were developed into a grouping called "attitude toward farming." The items in this table were selected from among a large number of scale items developed by A. M. Myster. Although such a cluster of attitudes may be potentially related to the propensity to adopt farm improvements and innovations, it has never been studied systematically in the rural population of a developing nation. The place of these attitudes toward farming in the context of innovation and the improvement of rural conditions is not difficult to surmise. Although the Korean Third Five-Year Plan was intended to benefit the rural sector, as opposed to the heavy emphasis on the industrial sectors in the previous five-year plans, most of the development effort was to come from the peasants themselves. Those who enjoy what they are doing, who perceive their occupation as rewarding, psychologically if not economically, and who would rather remain in the countryside than cast off their rural heritage for urban novelties, will be more likely to favor innovations and the cooperation that is probably essential to the improvement of their villages. This, at any rate, is one direction hypotheses based on this group of attitudes might take. There are other possibilities, however, which also find some basis in the literature on rural populations, and it is possible, although less probable, that it is the peasants most satisfied with their present way of life who are the most conservative, traditional, and inimical to change. However, the essence of previous findings elsewhere would suggest otherwise: Innovating behavior and cooperativeness, as means of improving the conditions of oneself and his fellow villagers, demand individuals with higher morale, and high morale is presumably associated with liking one's daily work.

The table clearly shows that Korean peasants were not dissatisfied with farming as an occupation. If the transition to an industrialized society affected the peasant by devaluing his occupation, leaving him psychologically trapped
Table 3.1
Attitude Toward Farming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm work is drudgery.</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The standard of living of peasants is below that of most other persons in Korea.</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A peasant has more worries than persons who do other kinds of work.</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming reduces one's social standing.</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work on the farm is really enjoyable.</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education.</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disadvantages of farming outweigh its advantages.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would move to the city if I knew for sure that I could earn more money there.</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming requires less education than most other work.</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming is uninteresting work.</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The farm is the best place for children.</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming offers little opportunity for meeting other people.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that peasants are an interesting group of people.</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in the past while events swept on toward a more enviable future, such an effect was certainly not perceptible among these attitudes. These respondents seemed basically satisfied with their work, a result perhaps somewhat more surprising considering the fact that with constant media contact these peasants were well aware of social changes in the cities.

Yet there were some reservations perceptible among these attitudes. Peasants did not regard the farm as the best place for children, and this attitude may have stemmed from the difficulty of educating children in the rural areas as compared to the better schooling Koreans perceived as associated with the cities. Interestingly, a factor analysis (a technique explained in Appendix C) of peasant attitudes showed one pattern combining the notions that the farm was the best place for children with the attitude that young people were getting too much education and could learn more by working than by attending high school.

In addition, there was the almost unanimous realization that the peasant's standard of living was below that of others. This perception was probably
realistic, although peasants might have been better off economically than the recent immigrants into the cities, all of whom had come from the land. In spite of this, even the poorer urban immigrants preferred the city to the farm, according to surveys conducted in Seoul. When such a perception of rural living standards is accompanied by the desire to increase influence, the possible beginnings of a peasant political movement can be sensed in the Korean countryside.

Associated with the assessment of the rural standard of living was the propensity of peasants to move into the city, provided that they could be sure of more money. While the tendency was by no means overwhelming, it was distinct enough to invalidate the hypothesis that sentimental "love of the land" held the peasant back from improving his life chances elsewhere. The Korean peasant seemed quite capable of assessing his condition and adjusting his life according to a rational calculation of the market.

A second set of attitudes, propensity to change, is provided in Table 3.2. Certain items seemed, on the basis of their face validity, to be obvious aspects of a favorable predisposition toward change, while two others had a more tenuous relationship to such a grouping and demand further explanation. The feeling that a person could learn more by working than by attending secondary school suggests an individual not in favor of new experiences that might enable him to accomplish his task more effectively. Birth control was evidence of a change already accepted or resisted, and a person who favored limiting family size might have also been predisposed to adopt other, possibly less radical, changes in his farming techniques and way of life. Korea, like other societies permeated with the Confucian social ethic, has regarded children, particularly boys, as highly desirable. There is a traditional positive evaluation for large families as preparation for security in one's old age and for the secular immortality afforded by ancestor worship. In spite of this, Korea has been quite successful in its program to limit the size of families. The birth rate, previously a relatively high 2.5 percent a year, had fallen to 1.8 percent at the time of this survey, and the government anticipated lowering the rate still further. Since accepting the practice of birth control necessitated that the peasant eschew a portion of his traditional belief system, it was expected that such a breakthrough would make further changes even easier. The relationship of the propensity to change to the adoption of actual innovations and the attribute of cooperation with others in the village toward common improvements would seem to be rather direct.

The percentages show that birth control had wide acceptance in Korea. A factor analysis indicated, however, that there was little or no spillover between this attitude and other attitudes assessing change. One other attitude that seemed to be associated with birth control was that "a person should always consider the needs of the family as a whole more important than his own." This makes sense, for one possible motivation for birth control might be that fewer family members would make it easier for a peasant to provide for them economically. Although the attitude toward birth control was something of a real breakthrough from the mores of the past, it appeared to be isolated from other change factors. Another reservation must also be expressed. The attitude toward birth control need not correlate with small families; some large families result from the attempt, after several daughters, to produce at least one son who can continue the family traditions. This could occur even though the parents were for birth control.
Attitudes

Table 3.2
Propensity to Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be willing to try it.</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you start trying to change things, you usually make them worse.</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person can learn more by working three years than by going to high school.</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life and to be content with what comes your way.</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should limit the number of children they have.</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to make plans for one's life and not just accept what happens.</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Otherwise the attitudes pertaining to change suggest an ambiguous and rather complex pattern. On the one hand, peasants were quite clear about the need to plan rather than accept whatever happened, but on the other hand they were not adverse to being content "with what comes your way." Perhaps the clearest indication of the feeling toward change was in the response to the second statement, "If you start trying to change things, you usually make them worse." The answers suggested the existence in the countryside of considerable conservatism regarding change. Together with the idea that to be willing to try something new, one ought to really know whether it would work, the impression is that the long history of rural conditions had imbued the Korean peasant with at least careful attitude toward change. Whereas great changes can occur in the city environment where economic misfortune may not necessarily mean oblivion, change in the countryside could easily mean disaster for a peasant family hovering just above the subsistence level. Given the rural history of Korea and other peasant countries, such a conservative stance is rational. In light of these results, it might be tentatively assumed that change is possible in the countryside to the degree that peasants can be sure that returns to them are forthcoming and that the danger of failure is remote.

Trust, shown in Table 3.3, assumes an important role in predisposing villagers to working together. One of the barriers to improving the rural environment in some societies is the existence of mutual suspicion and the feeling that any improvement emanating from one's own efforts will not be reciprocated by others, so that it is just as well, say, not to help construct the bridge over the creek. Research in southern Italy indicates that the lack of trust, a syndrome of "amoral familism" in the colorful conceptual term of Banfield, negates efforts toward community development and projects beneficial to the whole village. Trust also plays a vital role in predisposing the peasant to accept on the word of others, e.g., that the growing of a new rice strain, such as IR-667, will be
Table 3.3
Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is not good to let your friends know too much about your life, for they might take advantage of you.</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone in my village tries to take advantage of you.</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people are honest.</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people will repay your kindness with ingratitude.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can only trust people you know well.</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

beneficial. On the other hand, even if this innovation were perceived as possibly beneficial, distrust might lead the peasant to suspect that any increase in his productivity might only mean an increase in the monetary outlay that he must provide for seed, fertilizer, insecticide, and other items. Risk is always involved in adopting an innovation, for the promise of future productivity might not materialize, leaving the peasant worse off than had he relied on time-tested methods. Hence trust in an administrator or extension worker would seem to be important in convincing a peasant to change his techniques. This is, of course, a generalized view of trust, and some of the items included in the questionnaire were focused on particular others, such as fellow villagers. An assumption implicit in some of the hypotheses concerning trust is that coercion is not very effective in increasing productivity in peasant-type agricultural sectors. In part, this argument may be presented as a normative choice—it is morally better to stimulate voluntary effort than to rely on force. Galtung, for example, presents this point of view.® But there is also considerable evidence that coercion without some spontaneous motivation on the part of peasants is ultimately self-defeating. Peasants are past masters at presenting a fait accompli of indifference or noncompliance to regimes in the face of enormous pressures. It is their traditional political modus operandi.

The obverse of trust would be alienation, or personal isolation, the tendency to regard oneself as isolated from others and surrounded by selfishness and self-seeking. At least one study on Korea has revealed the extent of personal isolation existing in a Korean village, contradicting the bucolic idyll of tightknit village communities.9

A dozen items pertaining to personal efficacy, Table 3.4, indicate a person's perception of the ability to control the environment and to get along effectively with others, whether peers or persons occupying a different role. A personally efficacious individual might be expected to accept change, for instance, on his own initiative, or at least to adopt new techniques when these have been convincingly demonstrated to him. If it were feasible to coerce peasants to adopt more modern techniques, it might make little difference whether or not rural
Table 3.4
Personal Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel helpless in the face of what happens in the world today.</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am able to do things as well as most other people do.</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is little chance for advancement in life unless a man knows the right people.</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society.</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions.</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in big cities are cold and impersonal. It is hard to make friends there.</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer.</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it easy to express my ideas to others.</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that most public officials don't care what people like me think.</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The more education a man has, the more he is able to enjoy life.</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like myself can't really understand what's going on.</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

persons felt efficacious. Coercion may have diminishing returns, even though peasants may be relatively powerless to resist coercion over short periods, but in the long run they can stall through inertia any efforts to drastically change the countryside. In Korea, at any rate, some coercive efforts have been made with respect to certain innovations and changes, but much choice has necessarily been left to the initiative of the individual farm family. It follows that those peasants with a sense of personal efficacy would be expected to be most innovative.

The results of the survey indicate that the Korean peasant possessed a fairly high degree of personal efficacy. Thus when compared to a population such as
Chapter 3

that of the United States, the Korean peasant did not seem to be mired in hopelessness. In the classic study The American Voter, done in the fifties, the authors found 35 percent of the respondents reporting low or medium low "sense of personal effectiveness." A study more comparable to a peasant population by Daniel Lerner showed over 50 percent of the populations of Middle Eastern countries reporting "personal impotency." Thus Korean peasants seemed to have a psychological ability to cope with the complexities of the environment and a fairly firm belief that a person could successfully meet present and future challenges. There seemed to be reservations, however, in cases in which the peasant came into conflict with wealthier persons or when he might not have known the "right people." Several of the questions, therefore, probably provided a realistic assessment of peasant attitudes as to what is possible in acting in society. While Korea has not developed the well-structured client relationships that exist in some other countries such as the Philippines, there is certainly some tendency, resting on a firm historical base, to consider influence as a matter of personal relationships rather than personal skills alone. Indeed, the land reform removed the necessity to ply the landlord with gifts in the course of each year, a necessity that caused a considerable drain upon the tenant's resources. With this reservation in mind, the picture that emerged was not of a sense of rural powerlessness. The Korean peasants responding to this questionnaire evinced a fair degree of personal efficacy.

Patricia Bartz has commented on the sense of spaciousness in the Korean landscape that obscures the fact that the country has one of the world's highest densities of population on its arable land. Part of the illusion is also the result of the tendency of Koreans to cluster into villages. Although fields may be distant from the village, a peasant's house is not located to be easily accessible to his lands but to be a part of the village. Many projects proposed by the government in connection with its plans at improving agricultural productivity are essentially projects that both benefit and must be undertaken by the whole village. If river embankments are to be strengthened against floods, it is the villages that must accomplish this. To some degree, the individual villager must be willing to contribute to the community welfare as well as toward his own well-being in order that rural conditions be improved and the rural-urban gap reduced. It is by no means coincidental that the most recent effort to tackle the rural-urban disparities is called the "new village movement." It is just this lack of concern for the community as opposed, in many cases, to the nuclear family that has dogged development efforts in other countries. The psychological syndrome that produces this negative behavioral effect is well delineated in George M. Foster's "image of the limited good," wherein village improvements not directly beneficial to one's own welfare are regarded relatively disadvantageous. Since villages have some importance in the future of rural improvement, it seemed important to posit a dimension that would tap village morale. The items regarded as important in this dimension included several that are suggestive of the village as a good place to live, or an individual's feeling that he is "at home" in his village. These perceptions of village closeness might be associated with village leadership and cooperativeness. Indeed, another cluster, cooperativeness (Table 3.6) was hypothesized that associated items attesting to an individual's willingness to contribute effort to his fellow villagers' well-being, his realization that their well-being was to some extent correlated with his own and, negatively, items exemplifying isolation and individualism.
The impression derived from the respondent's answers to the items in Table 3.5, village morale, is that in general there was a sense of satisfaction with village life. In most cases, however, there was an ample minority that evinced

Table 3.5
Village Morale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My village is very peaceful and orderly.</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost everyone in my village is polite and courteous.</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone in my village tries to take advantage of you.</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my village work together to get things done for the village.</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life is better in villages where you know everybody.</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel very much &quot;at home&quot; in my village.</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my village are too critical of others.</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My village lacks real leaders.</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one seems to care much how my village looks.</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6
Cooperativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is only human nature to be reluctant about cooperating.</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person should be expected to join only those organizations that will promote his own interests.</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each of us can make real progress only when the community as a whole makes progress.</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A community would get along better if each person would mind his own business.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one else cares much what happens to you.</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3

a negative assessment of the village. Obviously, conditions in the village were not bad, but they did not appear to be idyllic either. The possible contribution to cooperation on joint projects within the village and the peasants' sense of village morale seems obvious enough. In the face of this generally high morale, however, there was one strikingly discordant note. A high percentage of respondents seemed to believe that their village "lacks real leaders." If this perception revealed an actual state of affairs in the rural areas, it might suggest why the various movements to improve the condition of the countryside had generally limited results. A later section of this book will compare two villages, one exhibiting improvement and completed village projects and the other with little improvement to boast of. The chief difference between them may well have been the more vigorous leadership in the more progressive village. For this reason, one of the major efforts in the initial stages of the Saemaul movement was to develop village leaders. The problem in accomplishing this vital task has lain in the perceived legitimacy of these leaders among their fellow peasants, and tangible returns to the villagers for their efforts will undoubtedly contribute to this legitimacy.

The responses to questions on cooperativeness, Table 3.6, seemed to indicate that the Korean peasant was not reluctant to cooperate in promoting the good of the community. But with the positive tendency to cooperate, there also appeared some potentially negative responses. There was a sense that others in the village should mind their own business, which might suggest that while not reluctant to cooperate in village improvements, the peasant did not want to be prodded into participating. This would seem to suggest indirectly that if the peasant is to cooperate with others in improving the village, he wants to be sure that the improvements are in fact real ones and not simply wasted industry on his part. That "no one else cares much what happens to you" suggests that the villages may be less than the secure havens of traditional lore. A peasant's fate is in his own hands. Together with some of the responses on the propensity to change, Table 3.2, this response gives rise to the question whether the peasant's propensity to change might be increased if he were able to rely on the aid of others in emergencies. That is, given a feeling of greater security, the acceptance of greater risks might increase.

Responses to questions on personal morale, listed in Table 3.7, yielded rather mixed results. Peasants did not seem to lack skills, including skills of communication, but several responses reflected a negative personal morale. These respondents appeared low on a number of items that might roughly be conceptualized as self-esteem. Since 113 respondents were women, we studied the differences between males and females and found that women were somewhat less likely than men to answer positively some of the questions having to do with personal efficacy, including particularly a tendency to find it more difficult to express their ideas to others. But while women were slightly less efficacious than men, there was no difference on the first three items in Table 3.7. It is natural to suspect that this mutual lack of self-esteem, common to both rural men and women, was the result of a comparison of their peasant status with that of other social groups. There were additional clues suggesting that this may be the case, e.g., the strong perception that their standard of living was not as high as that of other groups in society. Improving the quality of peasant life, one of the chief aims of the Saemaul movement ought also to increase their self-esteem which, in turn, should contribute to the peasants' ability to accept innovation and work for the further improvement of their villages. The results on personal morale
### Table 3.7
**Personal Morale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel I do not have much to be proud of.</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I'm sometimes inclined to feel that I'm a failure.</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wish I could have more respect for myself.</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it easy to express my ideas to others.</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am the kind of person who gets his share of good luck.</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel helpless in the face of what happens in the world today.</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am able to do things as well as most other people.</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were.</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Korea might be compared to studies in the United States where Morris Rosenberg, for example, found in a large sample of respondents some 48 percent reporting high self-esteem, 40 percent medium self-esteem, and only 12 percent low esteem. It is evident that on similar measures the Korean peasant differed markedly.  

While it was not regarded as feasible to use certain standard questions regarding authoritarianism, which may be culturally specific, eight questions were included in the questionnaire that seemed to pertain to authoritarianism. Some additional related questions are listed in Table 3.8 pertaining to the concept of familism. A certain degree of authoritarianism was evident; for example, a sizable percentage of the respondents seemed to agree with the statement that children should not be allowed to disagree with parents. There was, however, a markedly liberal attitude toward leadership; for example, a wife's disobedience would probably have been unacceptable behavior under any circumstances in traditional times. The authoritarianism of the rural areas was probably being eroded with the social change that had taken place in Korea since 1945. There has been some support for hypotheses that authoritarian attitudes are barriers to initiative, trust, and the desire to innovate voluntarily, but it would be difficult to compare the results of this survey with similar surveys in other countries. I would only like to point out that in the United States authoritarianism has been shown to be highly related to education. Among respondents of high education, only 21 percent were found to be "authoritarian" according to one study, while among respondents of low education, usually high school and below, 48 percent could be so characterized.
### Table 3.8
#### Authoritarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes children should be allowed to disagree with their parents.</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things for children to learn.</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good leader rarely has to talk to others when he is making a decision.</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good leader tries to find out what all the members of a group think before he makes a decision.</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The good leader tries to share his responsibility with the other members of a group.</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A leader is a better leader if his men are somewhat afraid of him.</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most young people are getting too much education.</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.9
#### Familism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents should limit the number of children they have.</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person should always consider the needs of his family as a whole more important than his own.</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The family should have the right to control the behavior of its members completely.</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes children should be allowed to disagree with their parents.</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things for children to learn.</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While "familism," Table 3.9 contained some questions also listed under authoritarianism, there were two additional specific questions on the role of the family, indicating the importance of that social institution to the respondents. The peasants were divided, however, on whether the family as an institution ought to "completely" control the behavior of its members. The effect of familism on the propensity to accept innovation is debatable. On the one hand, Banfield specified a strong concern for the family and a corresponding lack of concern for the village as deleterious to cooperation and modernization. Galtung, however, discovered that familism was not detrimental to the propensity to adopt certain innovative practices if these could be perceived as contributing to family welfare.

Two questions in Table 3.10 dealt with an orientation to the future, and the responses attested to the general sense of optimism with which the peasant regarded the future. Such a result is most encouraging since most studies have shown that peasants in transitional or modernizing villages have the highest morale and expectations for the future, while those in backward villages, villages left behind by the course of change, are the most depressed and pessimistic. Not all of the changes witnessed by the Korean peasant since World War II had been pleasant, and thus it was all the more striking to find him so sanguine about the future. The analysis of the data gathered in two Korean villages will provide some further insight into this characteristic.

Table 3.10
Future Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The young man of today can expect much of the future.</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to make plans for one's life and not just accept what happens.</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.11
Attitude to Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe that most public officials don't care what people like me think.</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions.</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer.</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society.</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like myself can't really understand what's going on.</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, several questions in Table 3.11 pertained to the respondents' attitudes to the government, and where these questions specifically related to the government rather than society as a whole, the peasants tended to regard it as fairly responsive. Insofar as these answers represented actual attitudes toward the government, it could be surmised that the peasant would be influenced toward change by such government-sponsored programs as the Saemaul movement. It should also be noted, however, that as many as 20 to 25 percent of the respondents said they were uncertain. This fact gains in significance when compared to responses to all other questions of a political nature; as shown in various tables, such questions elicited the highest percentage of "uncertain" responses in the entire questionnaire. Not enough questions about the government were asked to provide a full picture of the relationship between peasants and the official institutions of society. The questions were limited, first, by the need to keep the questionnaire sufficiently short and, second, by the sensitivity of political topics at the time of the survey. It was a time of uncertainty, anxiety, and hopes. The Yushin constitution had just gone into effect, the reunification talks with North Korea still seemed viable, and political discussions were constrained. Arguments of political issues were subdued even within the tabangs, or tearooms, traditional arenas for political argument, for fear of violating the new restrictions on political discussion, which might bring a prison sentence of three years. Under these circumstances, it seemed best to ask a number of relatively noncontroversial questions about politics rather than risk suspicions about the purpose of the questionnaire.

The Korean peasant is, of course, alert to the risks of certain political attitudes, and questions on politics sometimes elicit almost unanimous approval of what is regarded as the "official position," either because the official position is accepted, which is less likely, or because the official position constitutes the safest answer. Thus several interpretations are possible for the results on the political questions. On the one hand, the positive attitudes toward the government were the result of acquiescence, either because of fear of the consequences of being outspoken or because government propaganda pervaded the countryside. On the other hand, the political aims and preferences of disaffected urban intellectuals, whose opinions were generally those most likely to be heard and heeded by the international news media, may not have fully represented the opinions of their rural counterparts. For example, the village respondents reported on in Chapter 5, when asked how aware urbanites were of village problems, responded "a lot," 16.4 percent, "a moderate amount," 38.6 percent, and "very little," 42.1 percent. Although this question was not asked in the national survey, it may well be that peasants perceived the Park government differently than their urban compatriots.

The percentaged results on the attitudinal portion of the questionnaire provide a picture of a Korean peasant who was neither steeped in traditionalism nor depressed about the future. He seemed to be efficacious and willing to cooperate with other villagers. Some of the authoritarianism of the past still lingered, and the peasants seemed to see their situation more from the point of view of how society might view them rather than from intrinsic shortcomings that they recognized themselves. While there was a tendency toward some conservatism in the face of change, it was certainly not pervasive. The chances for the Saemaul movement to succeed appeared good, provided that it could help the peasants see an improving quality of life.
Rather than being demoralized in the face of the future, these peasants looked forward to the future with a degree of optimism. Their qualities of trust and cooperativeness portended an improving future. This picture fits with results that have come from several studies on villages that were backward, transitional, and relatively more advanced in their acceptance of modernity. They have shown that demoralization occurs in the villages least affected by the impact of the modern industrial world. Thus as a society some distance on the road to eventual economic development and modernity Korea had not produced, according to this survey, a demoralized countryside but, by and large, a rural society that could accept, perhaps initiate, changes that it perceived as economically beneficial to itself.

A Factor Analysis of the Attributes and Attitudes of Korean Peasants

The previous section gave a descriptive assessment of Korean peasants on a variety of attributes and attitudes. This assessment suggested optimism with respect to the peasant's ability to meet the challenges of social change. This section will combine salient attitudinal items with a host of behavioral and other questionnaire items to determine the disposition of the major hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 2. It is, therefore, descriptive to the extent that it presents the pattern of relationships among seventy-eight attributes of the peasant respondents, and the structure uncovered will support or reject the hypotheses concerning innovativeness. The methodology used in this section is fully described in Appendix C.

Cursorily speaking, the factor results were not fully encouraging, for the number of factors extracted was large. This indicated that the structure of interrelationships of the variables and attributes was loose, and a full exoneration of the numerous hypotheses on modernization and the relationship of innovative attitudes and behavior is unlikely. On the other hand, as the analysis of each factor proceeds, it will be apparent that some vindication of modernization theory was obtained. In addition, although there may be some skepticism about factor analysis as a technique, one or two factors, while trivial, made obvious sense. For example, Factor 2 of the rotated matrix might have been entitled an Age Factor, for loaded on (correlated with) this dimension was the variable age which was related to marital status and the number of children. There was also a negative relationship on this factor with membership in 4-H clubs, indicating that this is an attribute of the younger peasants. The attempt to relate physical energy to any other variable failed, but it was heartening to see on the rotated Factor 13 that energetic individuals also experienced little illness. While both these results are in themselves trivial and, as it happened, stillborn in their relationship to any other variables of interest, they do indicate that the respondents were answering questions rationally. These results somewhat supported the less obvious results on some of the more interesting factors that will be discussed. In multivariate analysis the analyst hopes to find certain obvious results, for if these do not appear any less obvious or even untoward results would be dubious. The trivial provides reason to have some faith in the nontrivial.

Preceding each discussion of the chief factors from among those extracted and rotated, the higher loading variables and attributes as well as the size of their loadings will be indicated. Variables that correlated with any factor at 0.30 or above were regarded as significantly related to that dimension or
pattern, although some lower correlations were also reviewed when these seemed at least suggestive. Like the product-moment correlation coefficient itself, the amount of variance each attribute contributed to a factor may be approximated by squaring the factor loading so that a relationship of 0.30 indicated that some 9 percent of that item's variance was associated with the pattern depicted by the factor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 1</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICIAL*</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGLISTEN</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSS</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETING</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAMPHLET</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBER</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITION</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCERN</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBDISC</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPROVE</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONATE</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASTDNTE</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFLUENCE</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGSCHOOL</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For convenience, items are noted by their short designations. The full questionnaire items are given in Appendix A.

**In cases where the signs + and - of the correlation would make interpretation ambiguous, they have been changed to conform with the text. Thus the wording and coding govern the sign of the correlation, and changing the positive or negative sign of the factor correlation simply reverses the direction of the coding.

The most important dimension emerging from the analysis of the major attitudinal and behavioral items of the questionnaire was a cluster of items easily identified as a leadership pattern. This pattern depicts individuals who may have been, or were at the time, officials who were members in several organizations other than the farmers' cooperatives, and who were likely to have held some office within these organizations. Providing credibility to their responses, individuals exhibiting such a leadership pattern were not merely passive officeholders but seemed to have actively engaged in discussing village problems with others. They agreed that they would donate time for village projects in the future and said that they had done so in the past. There is evidence that they were attuned to the media, listening to radio coverage of agricultural problems and reading pamphlets. Although only slightly associated with this dimension, some interest in national affairs was also evident but not any tendency to extend this interest to international affairs. This may not be a fully accurate interpretation, for one of the topics of keen interest in the Korean countryside during the course of this survey was the reunification talks that were still proceeding, though haltingly. These were probably regarded, however, as national rather than international events. These peasants averred...
that they exercised influence in their villages, and they did not seem to de-
sire or perceive a need for increased influence. Finally, there was a tendency,
albeit slight, for the pattern to include the desire for an agricultural high
school education for their children.

Notable in connection with this pattern of leadership was the absence of any
attitudinal variables. Efforts to ally the variables present on the factor with
any of the attitudes toward farming, village life or change were unsuccessful.
Village activists apparently held a variety of attitudes, both pro and con, but
these did not importantly relate to the pattern of leadership. While this re-
sult was disappointing, what was perhaps even more disappointing was the fact
that none of the possible evidences of innovative farming practices entered
into the pattern either. While leadership of this sort could have been vitally
related to the success or failure of village projects, there is no warrant for
assuming that such individuals were better peasants than nonleaders. Nor did
they enjoy through their efforts and association with the farm media any in-
creased output for their crops. While a leadership pattern, such as it appears
to be, would seem to be an important factor in community development, the re-
turns to such an activist were by no means apparent. Perhaps leadership is its
own reward, and there are those who enjoy position without any further return
than prestige. The results did not show that persons rating high on this di-
mension were in fact innovators; while they may have led others in common im-
provements for the village, there was no evidence of their being the more in-
novative or successful peasants. Leadership emerged in this analysis as inde-
pendent of innovative propensities and measures of success as peasants. We
might conclude that in 1973 it was not among leader activists that the causal
patterns for innovative agriculture could be located, even though some of the
pertinent innovative attributes were present on this factorial pattern.

In addition, and in spite of contacts with radio and pamphlets, it is of
some surprise to note that none of the questions concerning the Saemaul move-
ment elicited a response associated with the leadership attributes and variables.
The two factors on which Saemaul responses were loaded saliently contained no
association whatever with other behavioral or attitudinal traits. This would
indicate that the movement had not fully defined itself in the minds of the
peasants, for if anyone were to grasp its messages it would have most likely
been leaders, active in their communities and alert to the national media.
Either the movement had not had time to affect the villages, or it had failed
to stimulate its peasant targets.

There is much to be said for the first alternative, for the movement had been
in existence no more than a year before this survey, but there are other pos-
sible conjectures. It would be easy to hypothesize, for instance, that peasants
have become resistant to national messages, whenever they are left with a choice,
and will not begin to amalgamate messages until they discover some good results
forthcoming. Without tangible benefits connected with a movement such as Saemaul,
a psychological resistance to absorbing new outlooks concerning national goals
will be encountered. It must again be cautioned that this is pure conjecture,
not based on any positive results of this factor analysis, but nonetheless con-
sonant with the negative results and suggestions of programs in other peasant
societies. When a set of opinions and attitudes does not relate to any other
pattern, there are undoubtedly reasons for this result.
This dimension represents a distinct result that has to do with the size of holdings. It will be recalled that by law no peasant may hold more than 3.0 chôngbo of wetland, but within this limit there are variations in the size of holdings. A person with holdings pressing these limits will obviously be less likely than others to have to rely on other work than his farming, as this pattern shows. Moreover, it will be generally those with the larger holdings who will be able and find it necessary to hire others from time to time to aid with the planting, transplanting, and harvesting. It is not so obvious that the size of holdings would have anything to do with the yield, which in the questionnaire was the average yield per majigi and not total yield. Nevertheless, the result is convincing that peasants with the largest legal holdings of wetland obtained the largest yields per majigi. It would probably be spurious in 1973 to have related these larger yields to the planting of Tongil, since that new rice variety did not enjoy the success in increasing yields that had been predicted, both because of inexperience in the techniques of its culture and the inclement weather conditions during the 1972 harvest. There is some corroboration of this conjecture in the fact that this pattern does not include the response of "increased yields." In addition, the pattern includes the response that fields were broken into more than one parcel which, most likely, attests to the fact that these peasants had, on the average, more land than others. Yet fragmentation of holdings is generally regarded as an evil that should be ultimately eliminated by the consolidation of holdings. What does this result indicate? It certainly does not suggest that parcels should be consolidated in all cases. It may suggest that peasants with more than one parcel are likely to have holdings among their parcels that are better than the average of the farmland around their villages. If a single parcel of wetland is a particularly good piece of land, this would undoubtedly raise the overall average yield. If true, one would anticipate some resistance to efforts at land consolidation, although peasants have generally supported such measures.

It is disappointing, in a sense, to discover a dimension related to higher yields of agricultural output but unrelated in this pattern with any of the attitudes and outlooks generally associated with modernization and more effective farm practices. This dimension seems to be physical and economic, rather than a pattern bringing together a variety of behaviors and propensities that would help to explain the higher output per majigi. There is absolutely no contribution to this pattern of any of the forms of village activism, no contributions by attitudes, and no association with any of the innovative behaviors pertinent to farm practices, except for the very small association of planting Tongil. Moreover, there is not even any indication that the apparent well-being and success suggested by this pattern provided any attachment to farming as a way of life; there is no evidence here that sending one's sons to an agricultural school was an aim.
Instead there emerges a bald relationship between the aggregated size of holdings and the relatively higher yield obtained.

Cross-tabulations revealed not only the tendency to raise Tongil as the size of the farm increased, but weedicide was also strongly related to plot size, with smaller plots being more generally handweeded only. Thus the size of the farm was an important consideration in the case of several innovative farming techniques.

It is interesting that in countries practicing extensive farming rather than the intensive agricultural techniques of rice farming, the yield per portion of land likely decreases. It seems that the larger farm areas in Korea, where the limit is approximately the amount of land that can be farmed by a single family, are more productive than smaller plots. Since larger landholdings enable a peasant family to devote itself to farming rather than taking on other work with farming as a part-time occupation, the labor it expends on the land has an obvious payoff. Perhaps the upper limits of landholdings might be increased slightly, although many peasants seemed to feel that two or three chŏngbo was about as much land as they could manage. Some increased productivity could most likely be obtained by amalgamating smaller holdings and increasing the landholdings of some peasants with little land, while other peasants would quit farming and devote themselves full-time to other work. It was in order to make other work available in the countryside that the Third Five-Year Plan called for a decentralization of factories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 6</th>
<th>Debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHOLECOM</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGSCHOOL</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT/INC</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 6 contained a small number of items related negatively with debt and the increase of debt, as seen in the table. The pattern includes the notion that each peasant will benefit and progress only if the entire community does so, an attitude slightly related to the factor; it is the first attitude that has figured into any pattern so far. In Table 3.6 the attitude that "each of us makes progress only when the community as a whole makes progress" was regarded as evidence of cooperativeness. The factor suggests a relatively positive attitude toward farming and optimism concerning the future for young persons. This seems to relate to the tendency to choose the agricultural school over other kinds of education for sons. This attitudinal tendency was apparently related to sound financial standing, as indicated by the negative relationships to debt, but there is no evidence that these persons were any wealthier than their neighbors. It is of some interest to note that other items are missing on the pattern that in other circumstances might have appeared. There is no indication that lack of debt had anything to do with innovations or yield but that it related only with the tendency to stay with farming as an occupation and to see one's sons in the same line of work.
Several associations appear on Factor 7, Dryland, which ought not to be surprising. While Factor 3 showed a slight tendency for peasants having larger wetland holdings also to have larger dryland holdings, the factor here concerned only larger dryland holdings. Holders of dryland would probably specialize somewhat more in commercial crops, as appears here, and might also under some circumstances derive much of their income from work other than farming, since dryland is normally easier to cultivate than wetland rice. The negative relationship, or a tendency not to raise Tongil, is also an obvious relationship because Tongil is a wetland crop. While some peasants with high factor scores on such a pattern were probably associated with the land in a way different from their fellows who farmed mainly wetland, or both wetland and dryland, this seemed to be unrelated to attitudes.20 Peasants in the circumstances of Factor 7 were not attitudinally different in any discernible respect from other peasants. This suggests that while attitudinal patterns may differ among peasants, this difference is unconnected with occupational differences and certain other attributes among villagers. Their common situation as villagers seemed to make their outlooks more or less homogeneous, answering to some extent the query whether villagers not actually peasants or only part-time peasants see themselves as peasants.

Persons who seemed to have some negative attitudes concerning their respective villages--e.g., that others tried to take advantage of them and that no one cared how the village looked--also tended to hold some sort of unofficial position in organizations and not to use at least two types of innovation, namely the most common fertilizer and weedicide. It is somewhat difficult to suggest reasons for these relationships, for the negative attitudes to village behavior apparently did not affect the desire to devote time to the village nor the notion that villages could be improved if everyone tried, but such individual behavior as the use of fertilizer and weeding techniques. There are not enough bridges across other attitudes and behaviors to point to convincing reasons for these associations.

During the summer preceding the administration of this questionnaire, some peasants attended brief Saemaul classes. Factor 9 provides some associations
Attitudes

with this particular experience:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 9</th>
<th>Saemaul School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPAPR</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPAUTH</td>
<td>(-0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOF</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAESCHL</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again it is apparent that the significant findings related to attendance in Saemaul summer classes are disappointing. Why didn't these persons, scoring higher on this factor, also have some strong notions about the materials and teachings imparted by the Saemaul movement? There were no tendencies to assess the movement as successful in imparting any particular form of information. It may be recalled that all of these items appeared on factors unassociated with other items. Moreover, no behaviors seemed to have been affected by this experience. We find that this pattern was related only to the attitude that disagreed with the proposition that the respect for authority is the best lesson that may be conveyed to children.

The item on the nature of the roof suggests that the peasants attending the schools may have been among the more well-to-do in the villages. This may be a good sign, although it had not yet led to any further results by the winter of 1972-1973, because it broke with a long tradition common to many rural communities throughout the less developed agricultural societies. There government-sponsored functions have usually been attended by those pressured by their villages to attend, while the more influential and wealthier opt out of what is most often interpreted as an unpleasant situation. For the same reason villages had donated the labor of the least consequential of the peasants to the old pre-colonial and colonial corvées. Further evidence that Korea broke with this tradition is found in a tendency, albeit slight, to read the news. These were certainly not the least capable villagers denoted in this pattern. Still, there is little doubt that the Saemaul movement had so far failed to effect some of the changes that it had aimed to produce among individuals in the villages. Perhaps it was still too early to discern ultimate changes in the villages and the peasant was still testing the sincerity of the government and the continuity of the new program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 10</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARCELS</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIRE</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRESHER</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOW</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Insofar as the pattern in Factor 10 may be interpreted, it suggests that the consolidation of land parcels made possible the use of machinery, such as the mechanical plow, but that the total size of holdings was not involved in the decision to purchase machinery. In other words, it was consolidation and not
size that was the crucial feature of farmland. The use of equipment apparently related to the occasional hiring of farm laborers to help out in the fields, but it did not relate to any increases in yields nor to any other form of innovation or innovative attitudes and behavior. Perhaps it only served to reduce the peasant's labor.

While several attitudes were aligned on Factor 15, there were no relationships to other attributes. Overall, attitudes and behaviors, whether innovative or not, did not turn out to be closely related in these results. While we have discovered in the last section that attitudes provided some interesting insights about the peasants, the real interest in them must be in their effect on behavior. The results in the factor analysis were disappointing. Factor 16 contained a few items associated with the major loading item, ownership of a working oxen. Although very slight, there was some correlation between the ownership of a working oxen and the planting of Tongil.

This factor portrays peasants who wished to make the decisions in a group, who would have liked more influence than they had and who thought that villages could be improved, provided that peasants cooperated. Since the factor also contains an aspect of innovative behavior, namely the use of insecticides, these peasants might also have had some notion of modern farm techniques. These somewhat more aggressive persons with no official capacities or experience in holding organizational positions might be expected to have been younger peasants, but age did not load on this factor. In fact, age did not figure prominently in any important findings except marriage and numbers of children. The younger generation did not appear to be any more or less innovative than older practicing peasants. While it might be conjectured that modern Korean education, as the common texts used in the elementary and higher schools suggested, emphasized values that relate to achievement and modernization, these were unlikely to have affected the young people's practices and attitudes toward farming. It may therefore be conjectured that so far as farming was concerned, Korean education had not implanted any new values, for if it had, the factor analysis would have uncovered at least some relationships between age, education, and innovative attitudes and behavior. This is, however, not an uncommon situation in other agricultural and less developed nations in which education does not relate directly to the peasants' way of life. Education is an urban influence geared to urban life styles. It had always been so in Korea, although the old sodang, village schools that taught basic literacy and the Chinese classics, might have implanted a basic respect for agriculture.

The results in this study, together with the large number of attributes and attitudes assessed, cannot support Galtung's statement that "we would not be willing to use a measure of modernism that did not show consistent increase with
Attitudes

While the statement may be valid for other societies, there are several reasons why it might not be for Korea. First, Korea has been subjected to innovation propaganda for a long time, ever since the period under Japanese colonialism. Second, what Korean children learn in school concerning modernization is likely to be transmitted to the home. Third, in a literate society with an active press and radio espousing modernization, few peasants are likely to escape the proselytization of new ways. Fourth, the peasants in this survey had attended Saemaul schools where innovative farming techniques were taught. Fifth, in a growing market economy other factors, such as return on investment, are likely to outweigh variables associated with age. Given the large number of possible relationships to age, it is unlikely that none of the attributes and attitudes entered into this analysis were indicators of modernization.

An individual responding to this type of pattern belonged to a village that competed in some ways with other neighboring villages. Although the relationship is very slight, this competition also led to some degree of cooperation between the villages and apparently induced an increased concern about the appearance of the villages. Two kinds of innovative behavior were also displayed through this pattern, the planting of commercial crops and of the new rice strain. This suggests that innovativeness was not simply associated with raising commercial crops, but that it was related to them in a more complex way. In addition, there was a tendency to disagree that villagers do not care how their village looks, which was a possible further outgrowth of competing with other villages. Membership in organizations also tended to be somewhat higher among individuals exhibiting high scores on this pattern. Debt may not figure as an inhibiting factor but may be associated with the relatively innovative behavior of such a pattern. It does cost some money to set up a new system of commercial crops, and it does require some outlay in funds to take on the growing of a new rice strain. While competition of this sort is not unknown elsewhere, socialist systems tend to use it more widely, with competitions between communes or worker brigades encouraged in order to increase production. Competition did not result in increased output in Korea, but there is evidence that it contributed to a style of behavior that may ultimately result in increased production. The initial failures with the new rice strain in 1972 will presumably be followed by increases in productivity. The nature of the factor suggests that competition between villages deserves to be analyzed further.
Chapter 3

Factor 21 is a series of attitudes that depict a negative view of farming, alienation from the community, and a feeling of powerlessness to influence events and to plan one's life. For the purpose of this section the major significance of this pattern was the lack of relationship to any other aspect of behavior or attribute that might have been related to innovation or cooperation. The attitudes appeared to be inimical to any form of cooperative or innovative behavior, and yet not to have any effect on them, positive or negative.25 In Factors 22 and 23, on the other hand, there is at least some evidence of interrelationship between attitudes and specific behaviors and farm practices:

### FACTOR 21

**Shun Cooperation**

- FARMDRDG: 0.22
- SHUNCOOP: 0.65
- CANTINFL: 0.34
- LESSED: 0.36
- PLANS: -0.34
- WHOLECOM: (-0.25)
- MINDBUS: (-0.28)

Factor 22 suggests a slight relationship between a relatively conservative attitude toward change and the nonuse of insecticides before plants were affected or total nonuse. A more emphatic relationship is shown in the next factor between a series of attitudes, all of which might have related to an authoritarian cast of mind, and two innovative practices. This pattern related to the non-use of weedicide and the tendency, albeit slight, against the use of insecticide, or at least prior to insect damage to the plants. In the national sample, this is the only satisfactory evidence so far that identifiable authoritarianism may have existed in the villages and related negatively with some innovative practices. This factor seems to corroborate Hagen's thesis about authoritarianism at the very basic level of peasant behavior. It is also well to note that the authoritarian factor did not relate these attitudes to the actual holding of any office or position. Persons with these attitudes would be expected to make difficult
Attitudes

leaders, but there is no evidence that the pattern related in any way with the holding of office. It could be assumed that such individuals were not popular with other villagers. Yet there is also no indication that the attitudinal set either prevented or encouraged cooperation and the donation of time for village projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 24</th>
<th>Visits to Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DURRES</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWNVIST</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPAPR</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGLISTEN</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBER</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHOLECOM</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 24 tells us little of innovative behavior or farm practices. It seems to relate in a pattern several items suggesting an orientation away from the farm and toward the town. Very slightly, possibly as a result of the somewhat higher newspaper readership, there was a notion that the whole community could indeed work together to improve things for the village. However, this opinion was not necessarily associated with behavior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 25</th>
<th>Good Luck</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITIE</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOEDUC</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOODLUCK</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSECTCID</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UREA</td>
<td>(-0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOPNEIG</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPETE</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationships on Factor 25 are not easy to grasp. The attitudes indicated some amount of attachment to the village, together with a somewhat traditional attitude toward fortune, e.g., the feeling that young persons were too educated and a belief in good luck. But their relationship to the use of insecticide prior to insect attacks and to village competition was not evident. Once again we find competition among villagers associated with cooperation between them. For the present it may be best to leave this factor uninterpreted. The addition of other items in the questionnaire may possibly suggest a bridge between these seemingly unrelated items. Perhaps there are some untested questions that ought to have been included in this research, but it is difficult to guess what these might have been. The fact that other patterns seemed to be readily interpretable suggests the idea that this factor, too, might make some sense if new items were entered into the analysis.
Several tendencies are related on Factor 26 that are not easily explained. This pattern suggests a major interest in following national news but does not positively relate the notion that the village community can be improved. A very slight relationship with a negative attitude toward farming ("farming is drudgery") and a negative behavior (the use of insecticide, with its negative relationship) in farm practice might reveal a pattern of behaviors and opinions that oriented a peasant scoring high on this factor to the national political world rather than to the local level. Such a peasant might have believed, e.g., that he could affect politics and society and enhance his own influence by removing himself from the village sphere. If this conjecture is correct, this pattern does not indicate any consequent loss to village leadership, cooperation, or modernization.

One of several disappointing results in this analysis was the lack of association of physical energy with other items of interest, with the exception of the result in Factor 27 and the obvious result on another pattern that energetic feelings were also associated with absence of sickness. But there is a slight relationship between energy and three items of attitude that suggested a positive orientation to farming as an occupation. The sole result, however, aside from a psychological one, was the propensity to send boys to agricultural school. It might also be expected that such a pattern would include some tendency to innovate and accept new practices, but this is not supported.

The last factor contains the sole item of last-name, or clan, villages (0.80), unassociated with any other variable. This is in itself a somewhat revealing result, for it shows that in villages where most persons had the same name, there was neither more nor less innovation nor a greater degree of cooperation. Some sources suggest that last-name villages might in fact be less ready to innovate because they are more likely to be steeped in tradition, but that is not borne out by this analysis. It might also be posited that such villages would have higher morale or a higher degree of cooperation, but that did not prove to be the case either. Respondents from last-name villages were no different from any other peasants, except that they were from last-name villages.
Attitudes

Having discussed the separate factorial results, we may now attempt to synthesize their major lessons. It should be repeated that these findings pertain only to a group of Korean peasant respondents in 1973, and that under other circumstances or at another time they may have turned out differently. For instance, the Saemaul movement was new, and its potential contribution to the countryside would not yet necessarily have been evident. While some hypotheses have been supported in the findings discussed in this section, the most notable result is that these patterns contain a good deal of amorphousness. A definite pattern of leadership emerged, and it combined concern with village problems, donations of time to village projects, influence, position, and so forth, but it did not bring into the relationship any of the more tangible innovative behaviors practiced by peasants nor any relationship with the Saemaul movement. Contact with the media did figure into the leadership pattern to the extent that agricultural programs were heard over the radio and pamphlets were read. These were very specific contacts with media, indicating a concern with farm problems rather than a diffuse interest in the media as such.

On this and many other patterns, the general conclusion must be that attitudes as such did not play a vital role in agricultural leadership on innovation. The minor exceptions to this seemed to involve the tendency to regard an agricultural education as desirable for children and some tendency for an authoritarian frame of mind to slightly inhibit certain new farm practices. If these data are analyzed in order to discern the antecedents of agricultural modernity, there are few salient hints as to how this might be accomplished. However, it would seem, unspectacularly, that the size of the wetland holdings had something to do with a large output per majigi, regardless of the attitudes or energy of the peasant himself. It also seems to be the case that competition between villages helped as much as any other condition in contributing to such practices as planting the new rice strain and commercial crops.

In the Korean farm context, what with holdings of limited size, type of crops planted, and so forth, the consolidation of parcels might have contributed to the use of farm machinery, but there is no evidence that it increased output. Some attitudinal questions indirectly asked whether it reduced the peasants' workload, but peasants using machinery apparently did not regard farm work as more or less of a drudgery than peasants making less use of machinery.

The results seem to lead to the conclusion that attitudes and practices had generally little to do with increased output. There is also little evidence that attitudes and practices affected income which could be determined by the nature of the roof, whether tiled or not, and by the amount of debt. Furthermore, the results show that the overall structure of the economy did not bring out the patterns that might have been anticipated if the peasants had in fact been innovating and reaping the rewards of their innovations. Leadership patterns were distinctly present in the population, innovative practices were made use of and, as clearly demonstrated in the previous section, there was good village morale and a positive attitude toward farming, but these disparate patterns were not drawn into a network that provided positive feedback to peasants. Positive feedback would have combined, say, attitudes and practices into patterns of behavior contributing, if at all possible given the state of the land and economy, to increased output which, in turn, would have rewarded innovative behavior and drawn into the pattern more attitudes of morale and leadership, until a pattern emerged that combined all of the salient attributes of modernization.
For such a positive feedback system to be established, however, there would have to be ample tangible rewards for the peasants, and at a rate sufficiently large and fast to increase and elaborate such behavior. Needless to say, there had been long periods of negative feedback, a historical training in non-innovation and resignation, particularly during the Japanese occupation and following the military government's decision in the 1960s to channel income into the cities at the expense of the countryside. The results of this decision may quite possibly still prevail in the countryside. If there are modernizing tendencies present, and some of the patterns indicate that these existed in 1973, they are just beginning to develop. Indeed, Lee Man-Gap says that "farmers lost productive incentives because of the low grain price policy in effect until recently [1973]." Time and future efforts will determine whether a condition of rewards to peasants for improved techniques ("positive feedback") can be established in the Korean agricultural sector. This is a common problem of the countryside well summarized on the other side of the world in a statement made to Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz by an old Egyptian farmer, "Why do they buy cotton from us at so much lower a price than they get for it abroad? I agreed to let the cooperative help me, which resulted in my product going up a third. But what's the point?" This is the classic case of unrewarded change ("negative feedback") in the agricultural sector. It is the age-old tradition, contemptuous of the peasant, of mobilizing the wealth of the countryside for the benefit of the city, a practice that Nash likens to the practices of the ancient irrigation empires of the Khmer, the Maya, the Aztec and Pharaonic Egypt.

One of the questions allied to attitudes toward farming, whether to send sons to an agricultural high school, turned up on several factors although it was not salient on any one of them. Certain variables are occasionally associated with a great many separate patterns and factors, bridging all of them because of some central importance; e.g., in factoring forms of international conflict, the variable "threats" is associated with the separate (orthogonal) patterns of war, diplomacy, and belligerency, because it plays an important role in all of them. This may also have been the case with sending sons to agricultural high school. Since attitudes toward farming were a critical hypothesis—they were thought to be of intrinsic importance to innovation, output, and cooperation—it seemed advisable to assess further the desire of peasants to send their sons to an agricultural high school. The results of this specific analysis are the subject of Chapter 4.
I WANT MY SON TO BE A PEASANT: THE IMPACT OF PEASANT ATTITUDES TOWARD FARMING ON INNOVATION AND VILLAGE IMPROVEMENT

A major motive in conducting this survey was to determine whether peasant attitudes toward farming explained any considerable proportion of the variance in decisions to implement certain innovations or to cooperate in village projects. Evidence offered in the preceding chapter in support of this hypothesis has not been overwhelming. Some alternative hypotheses were tried, relating innovation and cooperativeness to religion, physical energy, age, and other factors, but none of these provided adequately positive results. Was it possible that the peasant's attitude toward his daily work did not make a perceptible difference in his behavior? Table 3.1 showed that there was some difference of opinion about farming as an occupation; attitudes in the countryside were by no means unanimous concerning the nature of farmwork.

Although a peasant might not dislike his work and might even think of it as interesting, he might also recognize that there is little or no future to be gleaned from the soil for himself and his family. Especially when in a rapidly developing economy, like Korea's since the 1960s, the status of agriculture tends to remain stagnant despite steadily increasing output, peasants might easily come to believe that they occupied a backwater in the stream of change in their country. Thus regardless of their like or dislike of farming, there is another subtly associated perception that might be critical to the peasants' attitudinal outlook and behavior, namely the perception whether farming had a viable future or not. Fortunately there was one question that related to this issue: "Would you prefer your son (or sons) to attend agricultural high school or a non-agricultural high school?" To interpret an answer to this question somewhat broadly, it might be suggested that a peasant who preferred the agricultural school for his sons was likely to perceive some future in the occupation of farming, while those who did not prefer to send their sons to an agricultural school may have had some doubts about the future of agriculture in Korea, opting for a possible urban occupation for their sons. Alternative interpretations might also exist depending, e.g., on the availability of scholarships, but these cannot be assessed with the present data. Most peasants seemed to have a negative attitude toward the future of agriculture; 60.2 percent of the respondents did not want their sons to attend an agricultural school, against 39.8 percent who did. Seventy-one persons did not respond to this question, some because they read the question literally and had no sons as yet. As in the case of comparing the peasant's standard of living with that of other Koreans, a sizable percentage of the peasants may have doubted the future of the agricultural sector and thus may not have wanted their sons to attend farm schools.

If the responses to this question are interpreted as signifying faith, or lack of faith, in the future of agriculture, the resulting cross-tabulation of
this attitude and other attitudes and behaviors is suggestive and interesting. The preceding chapter showed that sending sons to agricultural schools did load on a number of factors, making it of intrinsic interest as a possible key concept. As a first step, the relationship of the choice to the strong pattern among the other questions regarding attitude toward farming was determined. Not surprisingly, a close relationship was uncovered, as shown in Table 4.1. Peasant attitudes toward farming formed a distinct pattern and were generally unassociated with other attitudes, such as village morale. Since sending sons to agricultural school was associated with such a pattern, the following analysis uses it as an individual indicator, assuming that it contains some meaning associated with the other attitudes in Table 4.1 as well as some variance (association with other variables and attributes) that is unique to itself.

Table 4.1
Desire to Send Sons to an Agricultural High School and the Attitudes Toward Farming*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARMRDG</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDING</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENJOY</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISADVVTG</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVECITY</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNINTST</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARMRINT</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGSCHOOL</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The factor reported in this table is the result of an orthogonal, Varimax rotation of a complete factoring of the national sample of attitudes. Attitudes toward farming were the most salient result, attesting to the reliability and possible validity of this dimension.

In the first place, there was some difference between those who would send their sons to agricultural schools—we will call these peasants the agschoolers—and those who would not in terms of their influence and of their desire to have more influence. The former also seemed to admit to being more energetic, but both groups showed the same high preference for making the decisions of a group. Why the tendency for the agschoolers to feel more energetic? Unfortunately, there were no data supporting a guess that these peasants were healthier. This may possibly have been not only a physical characteristic but also a psychological attribute. Since the agschoolers were also those who tended to like farming, it might have been somewhat easier for them to carry out their agricultural work with greater verve. This explanation becomes more probable as further relationships appear with this attitude.

Attitudinally the agschoolers also appeared to be those for whom farming was a more compatible occupation. While a single percentaged table is reproduced (see Table 4.3), the other attributes characterizing the set of attitudes
toward farming were also related to this attribute, as shown in Table 4.1, and strongly indicated that peasants with some faith in the future of agriculture were among those who liked their occupation best. While in a general sense both groups of peasants believed that people do not shun cooperation, the agschoolers were more specific in their attitudes concerning village morale. It can be seen that they generally got along better within their village milieu than did others. This pattern of relationships was fairly consistent and was related to a series of questions presented earlier on the questionnaire. The agschoolers were somewhat more likely to believe that there was opportunity to improve the villages through mutual cooperation. More importantly, they had been among those who tended to donate more time to such village improvements in the past and, above all, they appeared to be most willing to donate time in the future. A possible conclusion is that if village improvement projects are to be successful in raising the quality of life in the countryside, it is essential that peasants be assured that agriculture has a bright future. It was among these persons who believed in the future of agriculture that the readiest village workers were found. It was among these individuals that the greater percentage was found of peasants who listened to agricultural radio programs. With this evidence, in addition to the evidence that these peasants had probably donated more time in the past to village projects, it becomes apparent that some attitudes might really be critical to the behavior of peasants, a possibility that is most heartening and that has so far received little support in the analysis of this survey.

There is no evidence that these peasants found it any easier than others to express their opinions, which is consonant with the finding that the groups did not differ in their participation in group decisions. However, the agschoolers tended to feel more efficacious. This is a particularly interesting result, given the evidence in Table 4.2 that the agschoolers as a group were somewhat less educated than their counterparts.

Turning to the crucial innovative behaviors, we get mixed results, but where differences existed between the agschoolers and other peasants, they corroborate the hypothesis of the impact of this attitude most encouragingly. The two groups did not differ in the use of weedicide nor in the percentage raising the new rice strain nor was there any indication that the agschoolers might have introduced the new rice earlier. But agschoolers did seem to be more modern in their use of insecticide and in the introduction of commercial crops, and they also reported an increase in the yield of their rice crops, possibly as a result of somewhat better farming techniques.

With the distinction between the agschoolers and other peasants there was also some indication at last that the Saemaul movement may have had a differential impact. The agschoolers tended to be those peasants who had attended Saemaul schools, probably in the summer of 1972. To be sure, this is a slight relationship. As seen by the tables, there were no differences between the groups in some of the aspects of the Saemaul message—both suggested aspects of the Saemaul movement that stressed psychological benefits provided to peasants and methods of management. However, there was a slight difference in opinion concerning the movement's message in terms of economic improvements for peasants. Moreover, the two groups differed strongly over the public usefulness of the movement—the tendency to mention this aspect of the program might have been related to the agschoolers' greater degree of village morale—
Table 4.2
Some Attributes Associated with the Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School
(Unless otherwise indicated, the results reported are statistically significant using a chi-square criterion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>ENERGY</th>
<th>INFLUENCE</th>
<th>DESIRE FOR MORE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myself %</td>
<td>Others %</td>
<td></td>
<td>Want more %</td>
<td>Elementary schooling %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agschool refers to the decision of whether to send sons to agricultural school. The table shows the percentage of respondents who made this decision for themselves and others, as well as their energy levels, influence, and desire for more influence. The education levels are broken down into elementary, junior high, senior high, and higher education categories.
Table 4.2 Some Attributes, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEBT INCREASE</th>
<th>Increase %</th>
<th>Same %</th>
<th>Decrease %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HELD POSITION IN ORGANIZATION (but not government official)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The remaining percentage were not members of organizations and a small percentage did not reply.

Table 4.3

Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School and Association with Selected Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONTCARE</th>
<th>Agree %</th>
<th>Uncertain %</th>
<th>Disagree %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p. < .0001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABLE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p. < .01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FARMDRDG</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4
Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School and Village Attitudes and Cooperativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONCERN</th>
<th>Agschool</th>
<th>Little (%)</th>
<th>Often (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBDISC</th>
<th>Agschool</th>
<th>Often (%)</th>
<th>Not Often (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPROVE</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No, or Don't Know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONATE</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No, or Don't Know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PASTDNTE</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHOLECOM</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p &lt; .01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGLISTEN</th>
<th>Often (%)</th>
<th>Sometimes, Seldom, and Never (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I Want My Son to be a Peasant

Table 4.4 Village Attitudes and Cooperativeness, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VILLAGE PEACEFUL</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VILLAGE COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5

Some Innovative Behaviors Associated with the Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSECTICIDE</th>
<th>Before, or Both (%)</th>
<th>After (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMERCIAL CROP</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YIELD INCREASE</th>
<th>Increase (%)</th>
<th>Same, or Decrease (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the improvement of the local environment. Given these results, it is possible to conjecture that the greatest impact of the Saemaul movement up to 1973 had been among peasants who were convinced of the future of farming. Unfortunately it is impossible to ascertain whether the movement itself had convinced them that agriculture was to enjoy a more respectable future in Korea or whether they had had this attitude prior to their contact with the movement.
Finally, there was a very strong relationship between the two groups on the question whether they would move from the country into the city, provided that they were assured of a somewhat higher income. The evidence here suggests that it was not necessarily the most productive, energetic, or progressive individuals who tended to leave the farms, but those who were less able to succeed. It points to the "push" rather than the "pull" factors, lack of success in and dissatisfaction with farming rather than the attractiveness of urban life that had the greatest effect on who would move from the farm to the city. This evidence corroborates the pattern shown on Table 4.6, but it is also limited since many potential leaders might already have left their farms before the survey was taken.

Table 4.6
Saemaul School Experience and Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attended Saemaul School, Summer</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool Yes</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agschool No</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Helps the Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agschool</th>
<th>Mentioned (%)</th>
<th>Not Mentioned (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increases Public Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agschool</th>
<th>Mentioned (%)</th>
<th>Not Mentioned (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic Improvements for Farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agschool</th>
<th>Mentioned (%)</th>
<th>Not Mentioned (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What was the nature of the agschoolers' optimism about the future? On the attitude concerning the expectations of youth in the future, no differences occurred between agschoolers and others. Both groups showed a high level of positive affect toward a young man's expectations about the future. Unfortunately this perception did not focus attention on a young man's expectations...
about the future as a peasant, which distinction had not occurred to us when devising the questionnaire. However, to anticipate the village data to be reported in Chapter 5, several evaluations were made in that expanded questionnaire using Cantril's ladder technique. The village data, presented in Table 4.8, show that village agschoolers had higher expectations about the future. Given the nature of the ladder assessments, it is likely that villagers did have farming in mind when they evaluated the past, present, and future. As a group, village agschoolers seemed more sanguine about the present and future. The relationship of the village results to the national sample is, of course, moot, but it is interesting that the percentage of village peasants who wanted their sons to attend an agricultural school was about the same for the national sample. They, too, were a minority.

Table 4.7
Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School and Willingness to Move to City for Economic Reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOVECITY</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8
Assessments of Past, Present, and Future by Village Agschoolers and Others, Using Cantril's Ladder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agschool (N=37)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagschool (N=117)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-tests</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>p &lt; .01</td>
<td>p &lt; .003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an addendum to this analysis, it might be interesting to determine whether the agschoolers had more or less self-esteem than their counterparts. We have already mentioned that both men and women seemed to score low on some of the questions intended for this attitude. Both were assessing themselves as peasants rather than distinguishing themselves by sex; if there was an invidious comparison, it was between themselves as peasants against urbanites. Agschoolers and nonagschoolers gave almost identical responses to the statement, "I feel I do not have much to be proud of," agreeing 64.0 and 65.3 percent, respectively. Behind the agschoolers' apparent optimism there seemed to lurk the shadow of a humble self-evaluation.
Although many hypotheses were tested to determine which peasant attitudes or attributes were the most critical in relating attitudes to cooperation and innovative practices, none provided the consistent predicted relationship of the decision to send sons to agricultural school. This was indeed a critical attribute that seemed to underlie many disparate patterns of behavior and frames of mind. While it is not clear exactly what the choice of an agricultural school for one’s sons might have signified, it would seem appropriate to surmise that it indicated at least a faith in the future of agriculture as an occupation. That a minority of peasants seemed to believe this contributes to the realism of this conjecture. A transitional society such as Korea probably provides ample reason to lose faith in the possibility of an adequate quality of life in the countryside. It is the urban environment, changing more rapidly than the countryside, that seems to hold more promise for the future. But it is among peasants most optimistic about the future of farming who are most likely the innovators the village programs are trying to produce. If farming is to have a constructive future, it will be to some degree because of this minority among the rural population.

Both groups seemed able to perceive in the Saemaul movement an effort to affect the peasant’s psychology and the adequacy of his farm management, but it was the agschoolers who tended to perceive the movement’s potential impact on their rural environment, on the peasants as a group, and on the farm economy. This faith in the future was not simply an isolated mental attitude but, as shown in the foregoing analysis, apparently translated itself into actual efforts at improving conditions in the village and in personal efforts at adopting more innovative techniques.

It would seem obvious that such a faith in the future of agriculture must be stimulated by more than slogans. The peasants must enjoy the reality of an increasing quality of life, and their efforts, such as the agschoolers seemed already to have contributed in projects and personal farm improvements, must receive and be perceived as receiving some rewards. The distinction between those peasants having faith in the future of agriculture (some one-third) and those that were more doubtful (the remaining two-thirds) is very eloquent evidence of where things stood in Korea in 1973. The Saemaul movement had a good deal of resistance to overcome, a large degree of proof to offer the peasants, but a fair potential for success in the future.
Part II

THE VILLAGE SURVEY
Chapter 5
TWO KOREAN VILLAGES

Description and Hypotheses

In addition to the national sample reported in the preceding chapters, a survey was made of heads of households in two Korean villages. With the exception of a few families that had reportedly moved from one of the villages in the recent past, this survey was complete. These two villages were selected from among the 34,665 that are scattered throughout the countryside, surrounded by more or less fertile fields of rice or barley. Like individuals, each village has its unique personality and just as the soils on every field must differ somewhat from the soil on every other cultivated field, each village differs from all the others.

However, we did not want to choose just any two villages at random but to select two villages that were somehow representative insofar as any villages could be. Thus fishing villages were not selected because comparisons were to be made to a national sample of peasants. Villages that were too close to major population centers, particularly to Seoul, Taegu, or Pusan, were ruled out because some peasants would have probably become industrial workers in these areas, and we wanted to sample full-time peasants. Villages in the region of President Park Chung Hee's birthplace were ruled out as being possibly too supportive of the Saemaul movement. Villages in areas that had particularly good soils and climate as well as villages that were situated in arid or too mountainous regions were ruled out as possibly unrepresentative of the elusive "norm" of Korean villages. We wanted neither to study exemplary villages nor to focus on the worst possible cases.

With all of these criteria in mind, suggestions were elicited from Korean scholars, and a central region of the country was selected within which to choose two villages. The region had the reputation of being neither progressive nor backward. Innovations had sometimes been introduced here, with the idea that if they worked out well in such a representative region, they ought to succeed elsewhere in Korea. The region is relatively mountainous and drained by the Kum and Han rivers. The major crops were rice and barley, but considerable amounts of tobacco, silk cocoons and, in one village, ginseng for the government monopoly were also raised. The nearest city was a collection center for rice, tobacco, soybeans, and other commodities, and its major industry was food processing and textiles.

Having selected the region, we then determined that of the two villages, one was to be relatively progressive in terms of the projects it was able to complete within the Saemaul movement, while the other was to be a more backward village. Both villages were to be in the same county so as to assure that farming conditions were similar. By assuring the same climatic conditions and, with the advice of the myŏnjang, the same soil conditions, we hoped to control some extraneous conditions, so that those attributes and attitudes of interest in the
national study would be the most relevant remaining factors in explaining the difference between the villages in their innovative progress. The final selection of villages was made on the recommendation of the deputy myonjang, a county official familiar with the villages within the region, who quickly selected the appropriate villages from the county map. A visit to the villages and discussions with the village heads corroborated the choices as most appropriate in terms of the requisite criteria.

We will call the progressive village Nae-il and the backward village Ōje. They are located some thirty miles from the nearest urban area which is one of the smaller cities of Korea. Seoul, with over seven million inhabitants, is the major urban center, but unlike Thailand where Bangkok dominates any other competing urban area, or the Philippines where Manila and its environs is the predominant urban area, there are several urban concentrations throughout Korea with most villages within an hour's ride by bus. This is not to deny, of course, that Seoul is the cultural and administrative lodestone of the nation. As large and bustling as other Korean cities might be, they still have a provincial flavor, reflecting an urbanity and culture generated elsewhere. Yet these other Korean cities--Taegu, Taewon, Kyōngju, Pusan, Kwangju, and Ch'ŏngju--are cities in their own right.

The city nearest our two villages was not the chief service center of the county. The market center and county seat, with some 3,000 inhabitants, had been the closest and most convenient source of entertainment, political discussion, and supplies. Until shortly before our survey, such towns had indeed been market towns, with market days at specified times each month, bringing together villagers from the surrounding countryside to sell produce, to purchase necessities and a few luxuries of late, to drink and gamble, and converse with friends. These market days, however, had been officially discontinued just prior to the survey taken in Nae-il and Ōje, but too recently to have included questions eliciting peasant opinions on this official decree.

It was also not possible to ascertain the opinions of villagers concerning another restrictive law that had come to affect their lives, namely the law limiting expenditures on funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies. According to several sources, these celebrations used to deplete the peasants' resources for they had become socially competitive, and the burial of one's parents had been a matter of such importance that no family wanted to be regarded as unfilial, an attitude not unknown in other cultures. While some peasants may have felt relieved that they could now conserve their meager resources without social disapproval, others may have been resentful at the official tampering with a long-observed custom. These laws that stringently regulated traditional expenditures were passed shortly after these interviews in Nae-il and Ōje were conducted. Thus a most opportune occasion was lost to determine attitudes toward governmental regulation. Political opinions were elicited, however, and these will be reported later in the chapter.

The maps of Nae-il and Ōje on pp. 90-91 show their differences in physical characteristics and cultivation. Both were predominantly rice villages, but they also grew some commercial crops. The shed for drying tobacco was the most salient structure in Ōje, while the new community center and the presence of more tiled roofs distinguished Nae-il. The number of households at the time of the survey in Nae-il was 79; Ōje was slightly larger with 92 households. The survey was conducted by student interviewers from a nearby agricultural college.
Most of these interviewers were from the same region as the villages surveyed. Since the first three months of the year are slack months in the Korean countryside, an effort was made to conduct the interviews before the heavy labors of field preparation and transplanting in April, May, and June. Unfortunately, this was not possible, so that a brief interim period just prior to transplanting in May had to be designated for the interviews. May is a very busy month, what with barley and wheat harvesting, rice transplanting, and silkworm raising, but the interviews were successfully conducted and all household heads were surveyed.

For some of the underlying attribute and attitudinal differences between the villages, several hypotheses will be presented that would seem to appropriately demarcate potential differences expected between an innovative village and one that is much less innovative. These hypotheses are of two kinds, one aiming at substantial differences in traits and attributes, and the other at attitudinal dimensions characterizing individuals in each type of village. In addition to these anticipated differences, a more general approach will attempt to amalgamate the two groups of hypotheses in the next section. Since these hypotheses have already been discussed in connection with the national survey, they will be only very briefly touched on here.

The hypothesis that education has a major effect on innovative behavior may seem generally appropriate but not in a society like Korea where the literacy rate was well over 90 percent. Indeed, as seen earlier in this book, the national survey showed that education played little or no role in peasant attitudes or behavior. Educational differences do not relate importantly to differences in modern beliefs because, as has been suggested earlier, schools do not necessarily teach or inculcate those beliefs that might be appropriate for innovative behavior among a farm population. Even if schools raised through textbooks the level of aspirations, this may contribute only to aspirations toward urban goals. Textbooks used by ghetto children in other countries may very well raise the level of their aspirations, but if no appropriate social clues for the realization of these aspirations are provided, they may lead to effects on belief systems different than initially intended. In fact, the real effect of education may not be to convey substantive content or to develop a modern pattern of attitudes affecting behavior, but to open the media to the newly-educated. Thus if differences are created through education, it may be that these exist between the educated at any level and those receiving no education at all, a situation no longer common in Korea.

With these reservations in mind, we would still expect the young to be more innovative than the middle-aged and the old, partly because they are receiving more education. The young might innovate regardless of the rewards society gives for successful innovation, because they have not yet directly experienced any sense of frustration at unrewarded increases in output. As society changes from a primary-producing economy to an industrialized nation, we would expect the transmission of the more modern attitudes supposedly accompanying such changes to be more frequent among the younger than the older peasants. The results of the national survey, however, suggest that age may not have been a vital attribute in terms of innovation.

Media contact had greatly increased in Korea, and it was a rare peasant who did not have his own radio. In addition, there were many newspapers, over a dozen published in Seoul alone. The Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture also
made use of other media materials, including movies, slides, and pamphlets. It is assumed that as contact with the media increases, so do modern outlooks and innovative and cooperative behaviors. Attendance at meetings where farm problems are discussed should also increase innovative behavior.

Holding some position, official or informal, in an organization ought to contribute to innovative behavior, but some village organizations might not induce innovation. Thus there is no immediate reason why some kyes should be conducive to innovative behavior, although other types of kyes have long been associated with village innovation. There are other indications that in single-name villages, strong organizations of this type may even afford barriers to innovating behavior. Nevertheless, the point here is that any position of leadership, through the experience and responsibility it imparts, is conducive to innovative behavior. A village in which individuals have better opportunities to attain some office will tend to be more innovative than a village in which they have fewer opportunities. While the leadership pattern in the national sample was a complex association of leadership traits and village activities and interest, no major evidence of innovative behavior with respect to farming was associated with this factor, as will be recalled. This dampens the expectations concerning this hypothesis.

We would expect a somewhat superior incidence of ego-strength, personal morale, orientation toward change, village morale, and a positive attitude toward farming in the progressive village and somewhat stronger traditionalism, family orientation, and authoritarianism in the less progressive village. Among these attitudes, those toward farming may be regarded as potentially quite important. Despite their expected impact on the villages, education, the media, and governmental exhortation were deemed less likely to produce any perceptible innovative behavior in peasants if they failed to motivate them to improve their farming, a motivation that would appear associated with a positive attitude toward farming as an occupation. Without such a positive attitude, it would even be more likely that the stimulation of innovative attitudes induces a peasant to move to the city. Even given the potential to innovate, as evidenced by the existence of "right attitudes" or receptive attitudes, there must be some feeling of attachment to the occupation of farming in order to tie these attitudes to innovative behavior. Thus it was assumed that the progressive village would harbor more positive attitudes toward farming than the more backward village. These hypotheses will be explicitly analyzed in the next section.

As in the national sample of responses, innovative individual behavior was determined by the responses to questions concerning such matters as the use of insecticide and weedicide, the growing of a commercial crop, the planting of Tongil and the nature of the roof on one's home. It is, of course, possible though unlikely that individual innovative behavior might be entirely unrelated to behavior of the kind that would provide evidence that an entire village was innovative. For instance, villagers might join in group projects, such as building a community center or constructing bridges, but not personally innovate in their farming techniques. This division in innovative and cooperative behavior between village and individual was, however, not anticipated.

Nae-il appeared to be the better organized village, and the physical evidence suggested that it had almost fulfilled its community projects for the first year of the Saemaul movement; it was on the verge of being redesignated a self-sufficient village. A drainage system through the center of the village, a new
road that ran down to the nearby stream (some villagers had had to donate a small portion of land to this project!), and an impressive community building attested to the labor that had been expended for the benefit of the village. No bridge had as yet been built over the stream to the peasants' fields, but expectations seemed high that it would be shortly completed. The community building had a small hall that was used for gatherings, some of which pertained to innovation and the Saemaul movement—the brother of the *lijang* was the movement leader in the village—but another room housed a wine shop which undoubtably raised village conviviality while contributing little to the Saemaul spirit. Oje, by contrast, had no such projects in evidence. It seemed to be a village at rest. These obvious physical differences indicated that one village was indeed progressive, while the other, like most Korean villages at the time of the survey, was still correctly categorized as "self-preparatory," or backward. This physical evidence was buttressed by organizational differences, with Oje being relatively less organized in a formal sense and its *lijang* imparting less positive leadership to village affairs.

Although the national categorization of Nae-il and Oje indicated that these villages indeed differed in their level of modernization, the modern village might possibly not have harbored innovative practices among its members. Figures on several farm practices, however, showed that the overall progressive-ness of Nae-il was reflected in the practices of individual peasants. Most peasants throughout Korea used insecticides, and this turned out to be also the case in both Nae-il and Oje. The two villages did, however, differ in their use of weedicide which was not so widely used in Korea. Weedicide was used more commonly in Nae-il where only 39.2 percent of the peasants weeded by hand only, while 39.2 percent used weedicide and 11.4 percent made use of both techniques. In Oje some 73.9 percent of the peasants still weeded by hand only, while 17.4 percent used weedicide. The use of urea and phosphate fertilizers was both common and similar in the villages, but calcium cyanamide was somewhat more heavily used in Oje.

Rogers found that subsistence farmers have lower rates of achievement motivation than commercial farmers living in the same village. While nearly all Korean peasants are closely tied to the commercial marketing system through rice agriculture, there are other varieties of crops, such as tobacco or ginseng, classified specifically as commercial crops which are grown solely for the market. Almost half the peasants in Nae-il grew these commercial crops, while somewhat less than a third did so in Oje.

The tile roof is a symbol of departure from tradition and penury and marks the use of resources to somewhat improve the standard of living. In villages along the major superhighway that connects Seoul with Pusan, tile roofs may also be indicative of a government intervention to improve the landscape for the benefit of urban travelers and tourists, but in Nae-il and Oje, lying as they did far from main thoroughfares, the nature of the roof represented a personal choice. It was a matter of pride with the *lijang* of Nae-il that over half the houses (57 percent) had tile roofs, with only 19.0 percent of straw and 24.1 percent of slate or corrugated. In Oje this home improvement was less perceptible, with 22.8 percent of the houses tiled, 39.1 percent of straw, and 38 percent of slate or corrugated.

While a few more persons in Nae-il used a mechanical plow (11.4 percent to
2.2 percent in Ōje), the percentage of individuals owning certain farm implements such as plows, winnowers, threshers, wagons, hand sprays and water pumps was slightly higher in Ōje. Power sprays and power plows were present in Nae-il, although few were in use. Table 5.1 shows the quantity of various capital resources in both villages. For most items, Ōje was as well as or better off than Nae-il. It must be remembered, however, that Ōje had a larger population.

Table 5.1
Village Capital, in Absolute Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Nae-il</th>
<th>Ōje</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clocks</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing machines</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working oxen</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-working oxen</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical plows</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnowers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshing machines</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand wagons</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand sprays</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power sprays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water pumps</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power plows</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tongil, the new rice strain, has been described previously; it is the government's eventual goal to stimulate its growth wherever appropriate. In the 1972 harvest season, some 200,000 acres were sown to Tongil, making it still experimental and somewhat risky to use. Tongil rice was introduced in 1972 in both Nae-il and Ōje, but in keeping with their somewhat more progressive stance, 13.9 percent of the peasants in Nae-il had planted Tongil while only 3.3 percent had planted it in Ōje.

With some reservations, induced by the somewhat higher incidence of ownership of certain farm implements in Ōje, we may conclude that the categorization of Nae-il as a self-sufficient village also generally reflected certain innovative practices on a sub-village level. Nae-il seemed to be a more innovative village inhabited by somewhat more innovative peasants. It may be interesting to review some other differences between the two villages to see whether they support hypotheses advanced earlier.

The two villages differed greatly with regard to debts. Some 63 percent of the respondents in Ōje, compared to only 26.6 percent in Nae-il, admitted to being in debt. Among those in debt, some 26.1 percent of the respondents in Ōje said that their debts were increasing, while the figure for Nae-il was 6.3 percent. This may be a major reason why some 43.5 percent of the respondents in Ōje said that they would like to move to the city, compared to the somewhat smaller figure of 35.4 percent of the respondents in Nae-il. These figures for
both villages were low compared to the national sample where to a somewhat dif-
ferently worded question 53 percent responded that they would move to the city
for financial advantage. When asked why they would like to move, only nine
persons in Nae-il but thirty-one persons in Oje gave financial reasons or "a
better life." The peasants of Nae-il cited educational expenses and the small
size of the farms as the chief reasons for being in debt. Other reasons in-
cluded the low price of farm products. In Oje, too, educational expenses and
farm size were highest on the list of reasons for debt, but unspecified "other"
reasons were also mentioned frequently. It was obvious that peasants in both
villages did not regard ceremonial expenses as among their major problems.

Among other basic differences between the two villages was age. There were
almost twice as many respondents in Oje than in Nae-il between sixteen and twenty-
five years of age, but only about half as many were twenty-six to twenty-nine
years old. The older age bracket was somewhat underrepresented in both villages,
possibly because of the draft which recruits men in this age grouping. Thus
some young men, who would otherwise be heads of households, may have been absent
from the villages. No immediate reason was apparent, however, for differences
between the two villages in representation in the various age categories. Oje
seemed to be underrepresented (14 percent to 26.6 percent) in the 30-39 year
group, but slightly more represented in the 60-year-and-over group (19.6 percent
to 8.9 percent). While it might be thought that age differences could be part
of the explanation of some of the differences between the progressiveness of one
village and the relative backwardness of the other, it should be borne in mind
that in the national analysis age turned out to be a category indifferent to
modernity.

While nearly all questions were answered by most interviewees, many peasants
did not respond to either the education or religion questions. Those who did
respond to the education question had mainly elementary school training. Although not differing greatly from Oje, Nae-il had somewhat more respondents with
at least a junior high school education. Small as the villages were, there were
a few persons who had attended college, and most of them were in Nae-il, as
expected if education is to have some part in explaining village progressive-
owness. In view of the results on the national analysis, however, it would be
difficult to see education as an important factor in village differences.

Birth control, being generally accepted throughout Korea, did not have an
appreciable correlation with change, morale, or attitudes toward farming in the
national survey; most Koreans apparently agreed at least verbally with the prac-
tice of birth control. While agreement with the attitude was similar in both
villages, the mode (the category with the highest figure, as distinguished from
the average) for the number of children was four in Nae-il and five in Oje.
This may bear a relationship to some of the age difference, although it was
Nae-il that had a higher representation of persons between thirty and thirty-
nine years of age. It might also be conjectured that the number of children
may have contributed somewhat to the relative difference in debt between the
two villages.

Age differences between the two villages may also explain why over half of
the respondents in Nae-il had military service but only 29.3 percent in Oje.
Military service would be expected to expand the peasants’ cultural and social
horizons, although it is no longer difficult to travel extensively and quite
cheaply as a civilian in Korea. To the degree that military service might have
contributed to innovative attitudes and behavior, Nae-il was once again favored. However, the analysis in the national returns did not suggest any contribution of military service to innovation.

Dryland holdings were rather alike, the mode being 1,501 to 3,000 pyŏng for both villages, but wetland holdings tended to be somewhat larger in Nae-il where the mode was six to eight majigi as compared to three to five in Oje. This difference may be one reason for Oje's greater incidence of debt. The villages also differed markedly in yields of rice. While the mode for Oje was only five sŏk per majigi, that for Nae-il was 11 to 20 sŏk. This big difference suggests that there may have been a significant relationship between innovativeness and farm output. To be sure, Rogers comments on the difficulty of relating innovativeness to output because it is very difficult to obtain output figures directly from peasants. In the case of Korea, however, peasants may be better aware of their outputs and maintain more adequate records; they certainly do so in the case of family finances. That the rice yields were higher in Nae-il was also indicated by the answers to another question, to which 67.1 percent of Nae-il respondents said that their yields had increased, while 21.1 percent claimed that their yields had not changed. In Oje some 45.2 percent said that their yields had increased, while 31.5 percent stated they had remained the same. Thirteen percent claimed a decrease in Oje but none in Nae-il.

Possibly as a result of the somewhat higher educational level in Nae-il, 22.8 percent of its peasants read a newspaper daily, as compared to a mere 10.9 percent in Oje, and for those who read once a week it was triple, 15.2 percent. Some 61.5 percent of the respondents in Oje, in fact, claimed to read a paper seldom, while in Nae-il this figure was a little over 50 percent. We can assume from these figures that peasants attending Saemaul winter schools were somewhat more sophisticated than the average peasant, and the "no responses" on educational level seem to support this assumption. Unlike many of the newly independent nations, Korea is a highly homogeneous culture, with no important ethnic or linguistic minorities. The vital role of radio in producing a national consensus may therefore not be as important as in other countries, even though radios and radio-listening are ubiquitous in Korea. This fact was evident both in a national sample and in the two villages. Nae-il surpassed Oje in contacts with media other than radio. More persons in Nae-il listened to agricultural programs on the radio, and many more of them had seen movies or slides, a quantitative difference that was quite striking. Some 57 percent of the villagers in Nae-il claimed a subscription to an agricultural magazine compared to 21.7 percent in Oje. Even discussion of village problems was more frequent, according to the respondents, with some 50.6 percent of persons in Nae-il saying that they often discussed village problems as against only 30.4 percent in Oje. Many more persons in Nae-il attended meetings, and many more read pamphlets distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture. It is indicative of the stronger and more immediate influence of the media in Nae-il that 12.7 percent of these respondents claimed to have heard first of the Saemaul movement by way of the newspaper, 70.9 percent on the radio, and 2.5 percent through pamphlets. By contrast, 5.4 percent of the respondents in Oje said that they had first heard of it through the radio, and none that they had first read of it in pamphlets. Some 7.6 percent had heard of it through friends, but only 2.7 percent in Nae-il, and 31.8 percent had learned of it through officials, compared to 10.1 percent in Nae-il. It is apparent that in Nae-il villagers were more media-oriented than their neighbors in Oje. In seeking advice about farming, both villages indicated that
the popular sources of information were the banjang (a head of a neighborhood), the lijang, and the farm village guide. The same persons and the leader of the Saemaul movement served as sources of advice for problems concerning both villages.

Besides being more involved in media contact, more persons in Nae-il belonged to organizations; in fact the percentage was double that of Ŭje, with some 35.4 percent as against 16.3 percent being members of at least one organization. Together with this greater involvement in organizations, more persons in Nae-il had some experience in officering organizations, with some 24.1 percent having held an official position of some kind, while only 7.6 percent had in Ŭje. There was apparently more opportunity or more motivation to attain some degree of leadership in the progressive village. This may have led to a greater communicativeness about village problems, with 10 percent more peasants stating concern for their village problems and discussing these problems with others.

Thus some real differences in backgrounds and some forms of behavior seemed to exist between the two villages, and these differences can be seen in all cases to support the expectations suggested by the innovation and cooperation hypothesis. However, peasants in both villages overwhelmingly agreed that something could be done to improve their respective villages and, although somewhat less overwhelmingly, that they would personally be willing to donate time to the improvement of their village. While it may have been somewhat naive to ask a question of this nature, the response was more favorable in the two villages than in the national sample. These differences suggest the existence of a village culture that distinguished Nae-il from Ŭje, creating a more media-oriented and communicative village population. In addition to the major distinction between the Great Culture and the Little Culture, the urban and the rural, there were sufficient distinctions among the two villages that made each of these an unique cultural environment. This quality of uniqueness in village life has obviously not been overlooked by the anthropologists who first posited the Great and Little cultures, but it is well to acknowledge here the individuality of villages.

More contact with the media and greater communicativeness may explain the significantly greater knowledge of political leaders in Nae-il, including those representing the district in which these villages were located. Table 5.2 shows that villagers in Nae-il were considerably better informed than those in Ŭje. We might also point out in passing that they were also better informed than Americans. A typical Gallup poll, taken in 1967, showed that fewer than 31 percent of Americans could name their senator, although they did better in naming the mayor (57 percent in ages 21-29, 72 percent in ages 30-49 and 73 percent in ages 50 and over). These figures indicate that the villagers in Nae-il were well attuned to the political system.

On the other hand, it is puzzling to find that the notion that it is the officials' duty to serve the public, as opposed to performing favors, received overwhelming support from the villagers of Ŭje. Studies of civic cultures have shown that persons who regard themselves as citizens are usually better informed, participate more at all levels and are generally more capable than those who regard themselves as subjects. One explanation for the surprising finding in Table 5.3 is that increasing political efficacy and more information in the Korean political context resulted in the realistic assessment that the peasant was, in fact, a subject who operated politically not by stressing his rights but by
obtaining favors. If this were true, we would expect that aside from having more political information, the villagers of Nae-il also regarded themselves as more efficacious politically than their neighbors in Ìje. According to Table 5.4 this was certainly the case. In a peasant culture political efficacy is dependent on playing with the right rules of the political game. Apparently the political culture of the village dictated that officials be regarded as extending favors rather than according villagers their rights. Whether this perception was objectively accurate or not, many of those who held it regarded themselves as more politically effective. Any hypothesis based on these village results would be that the Korean political culture is subject-dominated.

### Table 5.2
Percentage of Correct Responses on Political Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nae-il (%)</th>
<th>Ìje (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American president</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese premier</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of Korea</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District representative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Min Ki-Shick, DRP)</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District representative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lee Min-Woo, NDP)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myonjang</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.3
Is it the duty of public officials to provide services to people like myself, or is it a personal favor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Duty (%)</th>
<th>Favor (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ìje</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.4
Perceptions of Political Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. An ability to influence government decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ìje</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Government and politics seem too complicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ìje</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, to prelude the findings of the next section, some 32.9 percent of the villagers of Nae-il, the progressive village, preferred to send their sons to an agricultural high school, which compared favorably with the results in the national sample. In Oje, however, this figure dropped to a meager 12 percent. This difference on a question that the national survey results showed to be so critical is quite interesting.

Responses to questions on energy and illness were in keeping with the hypotheses presented on the national sample. Forty and one-half percent of the villagers in Nae-il reported they were "often tired" as compared to 53.3 percent in Oje, while only 7.6 percent were "sick often" as compared to 22.8 percent in Oje. This difference between the progressive and backward villages was anticipated. It is unfortunate that these perceptual findings could not have been supplemented with direct medical evidence, but experience in the area suggests that one cause for the difference might have been parasitical infection. Another cause may have been the larger percentage of persons over 60 in Oje.

We have discovered that in the progressive village, existing differences were generally in the direction hypothesized, and it would seem safe to conclude that these differences had a bearing on innovativeness. Although this in itself does not establish that these factors, such as newspaper readership or membership in organizations, caused villagers to be more progressive, our hypotheses have not been refuted. There were certainly more clearcut distinctions here than among the patterns of the national sample. While not denying the thesis that village progress must ultimately rely on a supra-village level of organization, these results tentatively indicate that the village environment itself can contribute significantly to village progress and innovativeness.

Finally, the lijang's vigor and pride in the accomplishments of his village must be noted. He and his brother, head of the Saemaul movement in Nae-il, undoubtedly contributed much to the community spirit.

**Discriminating Between Two Korean Villages**

The purpose of this section is to determine those characteristics of Nae-il and Oje that best discriminated between them. Discriminate functions analysis uses independent variables to allocate individuals, in accordance with their scores on these variables, into two or more groups. This technique helps us to ascertain whether the variables pertinent to innovation and cooperativeness are in fact salient discriminators, as they ought to be, between the progressive and the backward village. If a variable were a perfect discriminator, it would infallibly predict whether a person was from one village or the other. Thus the single attribute "race" could easily allocate individuals into an African village on the one hand and a Korean village on the other, although this would hardly be an interesting result and would certainly not assess those attributes germane to developmental progress that are of theoretical interest. Since we tried through choice of villages to control for what might be such extraneous affects, our allocation through discriminate functions ought to be more interesting than this.

Some sixty-six attitudinal responses collected from the heads of households in Nae-il and Oje have already been reviewed in several ways. Some of the responses may, as these analyses suggest, distinguish more readily than others...
on the basis of differences of means between the responses aggregated for each village. A process of elimination was employed to obtain the ten best attitudinal discriminators from among the attitude schedule. The success of these discriminators was not impressive, but a degree of discrimination was achieved that would have been statistically significant if the assumptions of a significance test had been met. The confusion matrix in Table 5.5 shows that discrimination was achieved. The attributes of individual villagers differed sufficiently to allow their allocation into the progressive or the backward village with a fair degree of accuracy.

Table 5.5
Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Oje on the Basis of Ten Attitudinal Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Villagers</th>
<th>Predicted Villagers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>Oje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oje</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of correctly classified villagers: 79.5
Chi-square with ten degrees of freedom, p < .001

As hypothesized, there were some differences in the attitudinal climate of both villages, and most of these differences, shown in Table 5.6, were in the predicted direction. A major difference between the two villages, and one in which there should be some interest, was in the category of attitudes toward farming, which were more positive in Nae-il than in Oje. The evidence on personal efficacy and personal morale was somewhat more ambiguous than the attitudes toward farming. There are several items in which Nae-il seemed to evidence a higher degree of personal morale (pride, efficacy in politics, efficacy against those richer, and finding friends), while Oje did not tend toward personal isolation and "resignation." The cause of these attitudes is unascertainable through this analysis alone, but it might be conjectured that the differences in personal morale were related in some degree to attitudes toward farming, which could have been the chief difference between the villages. Certainly a peasant's disaffection with farming means a dissatisfaction with the major role in his life and, as we will see, has ramifications in other critical areas of attitudes and behavior.

It is also interesting that there was generally a more positive attitude toward education in Oje than in Nae-il. There may be some cogent reasons for this result which is contrary to the original hypothesis. For instance, education might have been viewed in Oje as an opportunity for youth to escape the village for better opportunities elsewhere, while peasants in Nae-il may have felt that remaining in the village still afforded good prospects for their young. Indeed,
as noted before, the educational systems of most lesser developed countries provided, for historical and social reasons, little or nothing in the way of practical instruction in farming techniques. In Korea, as in other countries affected by the Confucian tradition, education was not an accompaniment to an agricultural career but was looked on as an escape from the village into the city. It is possible that peasants actually perceived the irrelevance of much education to their immediate interests as peasants. The previous section made the point that many more peasants in Nae-il than in Ŭje preferred to send their sons to an agricultural high school, which tends to support the argument here.

Table 5.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some Major Attitudinal Differences Between Nae-il and Ŭje*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm work is drudgery. Nae-il disagrees (more than Ŭje)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming reduces one's social standing. Nae-il disagrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel I do not have much to be proud of. Nae-il disagrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one else cares much what happens to you. Nae-il agrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education. Nae-il disagrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions. Nae-il agrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer. Nae-il disagrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life and to be content with what comes your way. Nae-il agrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most young people are getting too much education. Nae-il agrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were. Nae-il agrees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*It might be of interest to provide here the standardized discriminant function coefficients which distinguish villagers from the two villages. In this predictor function a minus sign indicates attitudes on which Nae-il inhabitants are in more agreement than are villagers living in Ŭje. The positive coefficients occur when Nae-ilians tend to disagree.

FARMDRDG 0.18
STANDING 0.17
Proud 0.26
CARES -0.43
DEPRIVED 0.19
INFGOV -0.32
PROTECT 0.20
CONTENT -0.21
TOOEduc -0.25
FINDFRND -0.19
Ten attitudes generated a discriminate equation, shown in the note to Table 5.6, which distinguished villagers sufficiently to attain a result that would have been statistically significant were these respondents a sample from a population. While not spectacular, the results are nonetheless encouraging in suggesting the possible pertinence of attitudes, a pertinence that has not always emerged clearly from other studies of the factors contributing to modernization in villages.

But while a fair power of discrimination may be attained by means of peasant attitudes, it is also of interest to compare the efficacy of these variables to other distinctions that existed among individual peasant attributes, for which purpose another discriminate function analysis was carried out. Beginning with thirty-three variables, we gradually eliminated those less capable of discriminating the two groups until we had eight discriminators that allocated the villagers according to Table 5.7. The result was somewhat superior to the use of attitudinal variables alone insofar as fewer predictors distinguished equally well among the villagers. Once again a statistical test indicated a sizable relationship, significant if the respondents had been a true population sample. The salient discriminatory variables are shown in Table 5.8

### Table 5.7

**Second Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Oje on the Basis of Eight Attitudinal and Other Individual Responses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Villagers</th>
<th>Predicted Villagers</th>
<th>Nae-il</th>
<th>Oje</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oje</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of correctly classified cases: 81.9
Chi-square is 106.8 for eight degrees of freedom, $p < .001$

### Table 5.8

**Eight Discriminating Variables that Distinguish Between Nae-il and Oje**

- How many children do you have? Somewhat higher for Nae-il
- How many times during the past year have you seen a government movie or slides on agriculture? Greater for Nae-il
- Besides the 4-H Club and the farmer's cooperative, do you belong to any other organizations? Greater for Nae-il, Greater for Oje
- Farm work is drudgery. Greater for Oje
- Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer. Much higher for Oje
- Are you in debt? Higher for Oje
- Would you prefer your son (or sons) to attend agricultural high school or a non-agricultural high school? Higher for Nae-il
The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions. Higher for Nae-il

*As in Table 7.2, the standardized discriminant function coefficients are shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHILD</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVIE</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBER</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARMDRDG</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECT</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGSCHOOL</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFGOV</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the complex network of relationships, causing morale to be higher in Nae-il than in Oje, the smaller families in the progressive village may have played an indirect role. Two behavioral variables were in the hypothesized direction: one, that villagers in Nae-il seemed to belong to more organizations other than those to which all villagers belonged, such as the agricultural cooperative; and the other, that they had also been more exposed to government slide and movie presentations on farming, which may indicate that the government's efforts had had some effect. Three attitudinal variables were also in the direction hypothesized for the more progressive village: Nae-il had more peasants who were efficacious, who liked farming more, and who saw enough future in farming to send their sons to an agricultural high school.

It is quite remarkable that far more villagers in Oje than in Nae-il reported being in debt. The higher mode for children in Oje might have been partially responsible for some of this debt. Other reasons most frequently cited by villagers in both Oje and Nae-il were educational expenses and insufficient farm size. An effort to reduce the problem of rural debt was made a month following these interviews. The government passed Draconian measures against spending on ceremonial or funeral occasions. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine the villagers' attitudes concerning this law, which affected rural customs of long standing, or to determine whether the law had any effect. While there were some respondents attesting to the effect of such customs on their financial resources, they were not numerous in either village, possibly because some ceremonial expenses occurred only rarely and some villagers may have forgotten their impact.

The results of the discriminant function analysis have by and large vindicated many of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and in the previous section of this chapter. Certain distinctions hypothesized there have served to distinguish peasants of a progressive village from those living in a more backward village. The individual attributes of villagers did differ predictably within villages categorized according to overall progressiveness. Oje was certainly closer to the classic backward peasant village as portrayed by Rogers, Foster, and others. Evidence for this backwardness did not lie in the lack of farm machinery—Oje was as well off as Nae-il in this respect—but rather in the apparent lack of cooperation in village projects.
Could the roots of this problem have lain in the attitudes of the villagers of Oje? Let us examine this possibility more closely. One striking aspect about Oje was that its inhabitants seemed to be more withdrawn from the course of national events. This conclusion is supported by the numbers of visits to town made in the previous year: while seventeen peasants in Nae-il reported ten or fewer visits into town, fifty-five Oje villagers so reported, and while thirty-two of the peasants in Nae-il made over fifty such trips, only nine villagers in Oje made as many visits. Other support comes from the answers to two attitudinal questions. Whereas 45.6 percent of the Nae-il peasants found it difficult to meet people on the farm (38.0 percent disagreed), 67.4 percent of the villagers in Oje found this difficult (21.7 percent disagreed). Likewise, asked whether it was just as easy to make friends as it used to be, peasants in Nae-il agreed 57 percent, those in Oje only 37 percent, with 25.3 percent and 45.7 percent, respectively, disagreeing. Still further support for this conclusion is found in the Oje peasants' fewer media contacts, their lesser interest in national and international events and their lower level of political knowledge. This lack of knowledge apparently extended even to the myonjong—fewer of the Oje villagers knew his name. This suggests fewer contacts with public officials at any political level, even though the officials were chiefly responsible for conveying knowledge of the Saemaul movement to the villagers. It is as though the knowledge of the new movement had to seek them out. The peasants of Nae-il may have been more aggressive in their contacts with government officials, which might explain the somewhat odd result that they regarded an official's acts as a favor—they knew how the system worked.

What was the source of this difference among peasants of a progressive and
Two Korean Villages

a study of representative villages over a fairly long period of time. The most appropriate recorder of the events conducive to change or backwardness would be a Korean peasant charged with the fruitful task of compiling a detailed village history.

As was done in the national survey, a factor analysis was run on attributes and variables involving 171 peasants in the two villages. Included in the factoring was the distinction between villages (LI) which was to distinguish those factors, if any, that were particularly descriptive of one village or the other. The 27-factor matrix was rotated to a Varimax solution which, like the result in the national survey, was not parsimonious. Variance tended to be scattered over a large number of uncorrelated factors, some of which will now be interpreted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 1</th>
<th>Education, Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATE</td>
<td>0.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWNLIVE</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPAPR</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAMPHLET</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBER</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITION</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFLUENCE</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOREINFL</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINDBUS</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGSCHOOL</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>(-0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONGIL</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAESCHL</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**As in the factor results for the national sample, some correlation signs have been changed to conform with the interpretation.

This factor contained limited evidence that attendance at a Saemaul school contributed to a modernizing set of attributes. Since education obviously preceded attendance at a Saemaul school, it is uncertain whether this experience affected any other attributes, such as a desire for more influence. It is more likely that individuals attending the Saemaul schools tended to be the more influential members of these villages in the first place. In any case, it was probably education that "caused" exposure, as shown here, to certain media through reading of newspapers and pamphlets, and interest in national affairs. According to the loadings of variables on this factor, these individuals likely considered sending their sons to an agricultural school; it was not necessarily the more influential peasants who wanted their sons to quit farming. There is evidence, albeit rather slight, that these individuals were not in debt and that they may have had some tendency to adopt the new rice strain Tongil. As members of organizations other than the 4-H clubs, these persons may well have felt that they had some influence in the village, and they desired more. They
had also the experience of holding some sort of leadership position within these organizations. One remarkable aspect of this factor is the relative absence of any attitudinal variables. While it might be assumed that these persons were doers and had influence, we cannot assume anything concerning their attitudes toward farming, modernization, or their villages. There was only a slight tendency to believe that persons ought not simply to mind their own business. The first factor contains some of the attributes that marked the leadership factor in the national sample.

**FACTOR 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WETLAND</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRYLAND</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIELD</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARCELS</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCROP</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOF</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OX</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOW</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRESHER</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The associations in Factor 2, Land, seemed to have something to do with relative wealth, although there had been no great disparity in the Korean countryside since the land reform of 1950. Peasants with larger land holdings, in this case mainly wetland (although apparently also correlated with holdings of dryland), seemed to obtain a larger yield from their farms. These larger yields did not seem to have much to do with peasant attitudes since no salient attitude was related to this pattern. Possibly because these persons had larger land holdings, they also had more farm machinery, like plows and threshers, as well as oxen. They were not in debt and had somewhat better dwellings, as suggested by the nature of the roofs. This was a well-to-do type of pattern, but it did not apparently combine any modernizing attitudes nor did it provide evidence of any great interest or activity within the village. Commercial crops might be an aspect of modernizing attitudes, although in this survey they appeared unconnected with any modernizing outlook, perhaps as evidence of relative village opulence. It is interesting to note that the number of parcels tended to be greater than usual, which is probably explained by the size of the land holdings and by the holdings in both wet and dry land. It will be recalled that this was also the case in the national results. It does not appear, therefore, that land fragmentation inhibited yields, although without fragmentation these peasants might have further increased their yields. Fragmentation seems to serve a function in Korean villages in that it increases the probability of some land being fertile; a single parcel might be very fertile or it might be quite barren. Fragmentation also provides the obvious possibility of a peasant's expanding production into certain commercial crops while remaining fundamentally a rice grower. In the national sample yield was also associated with the size of holdings, but that sample showed no evidence that greater mechanization was induced. The village results are more complex and more encouraging from a theoretical standpoint.
Factor 3, LI, is most clearly related in the factor analysis to one or the other village. It indicates that peasants in Nae-il tended to visit the town (probably the nearby market town and county seat) more often, suggesting that they were more cosmopolitan, i.e., more attuned to supra-village affairs, and that they saw more movies or slide presentations about agriculture. There is slight evidence of more attendance at meetings. There was the jarring note that "no one else cares much what happens to you," a salient attitude that has been difficult to interpret in the discriminatory analysis. Insofar as innovation is concerned, there was the peasant's tendency to use weedicide and to perceive an increase in their farm yields.

Factor 4, Verbalization, is interesting because of the nature of the attributes that it contains. Persons with high factor scores on such a pattern seemed to be verbally active, discussing issues and listening to agricultural radio programs. They felt that they exercised some influence and liked to make decisions when possible, although there is no direct evidence here that these respondents were influential either through wealth or official position. It is not fully evident how much of an impact this communication might have had on innovations, although commercial crops do load slightly on this factor. The articulateness of these individuals and their perception of influence and participation in decisions may have explained their tendency to have attended Saemaul schools. Peasants attending these schools may have served as conduits of information, as well as patriotic symbols, to those peasants who did not attend the schools.
Factor 5, Debt Increase, seemed to be a somewhat debilitating pattern indicating a sense of powerlessness and a lack of participation in the making of decisions, although concern about village matters was expressed. Moreover, the general attitude was that farming as an occupation is drudgery. These peasants might have been the same individuals who evinced a desire to leave the village, but there is no proof of this. This factor is somewhat akin to the concept of fatalism, analyzed by Rogers and others. Except for a slight tendency not to want to donate time to village projects, there was no evidence that this pattern was inimical to innovation.

Factor 7, Luck, suggested a slight association with youth and with a lack of influence on the government, which may have also been associated with youth. These peasants apparently had little desire to attend the Saemaul schools. The failure of age to be of vital importance to modernization has been puzzling in both the national and village surveys which yielded quite comparable results. Since an ample number of variables and attributes were provided in the analysis, the unimportance of age, which seems to refute common sense is particularly distressing. Can Korea be an unique case, or are these results also found among peasants in other countries as far along in development as Korea?

A somewhat odd pattern emerged in Factor 10, relating some attributes indicating an interest in village improvement and a willingness to donate time for
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village improvement with a tendency to perceive an increase in crop yield. There was also a touch of conservatism in the notion that new things should be tried only when one is fairly sure that they will work; was this possibly why these peasants did not turn to Tongil? The slight loading by the education attitude takes issue with the idea that children received too much education. By itself this pattern would indicate that attitudes had something to do with increasing yields, but it is nowhere evident how this came about.

Factors 11 and 21 were interesting only because they contained assessments of the Saemaul movement. They indicated that the movement had failed to capture the imagination of the modernizers or those who had obtained increased crop yields. The movement had had only a light effect by 1973 and seemed to be perceived by most peasants as disembodied slogans, unassimilated as yet with any other pattern of attributes. Factor 12 had the attitude of moving to the city, but it was unrelated to any other salient attitude. It did not even seem to correlate with debt or with the notion that farm work was drudgery! This probably means that migration to urban areas is a complex and highly individual set of motivations.

**FACTOR 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>OFFICIAL</th>
<th>COMCROP</th>
<th>AGSCHOOL</th>
<th>YIELDINC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 13, Official, is a small factor that suggests that officials tended to innovate insofar as they had turned to some commercial crops. They also perceived an increase in their crop yields. At the same time, they evinced a slight tendency to steer their sons through education into occupations other than farming. An official or former official may have had aspirations for his sons that extended beyond the villages. Factor 16 related membership in a 4-H club to age but not to any innovation variables nor did it seem to predispose former members to participate more than others in village improvement. This is another result that corroborated the national findings.

**FACTOR 19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>ENERGY</th>
<th>SICK</th>
<th>PAMPHLET</th>
<th>DONATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 19, Military, is interesting not only for what it says but what it does not say. Military experience, which under certain circumstances enhances modernizing attitudes, apparently did not have that particular effect in Korea.
While these peasants were not more attuned to most media than others, they did tend to read more pamphlets. The attribute of energy might have been an aspect of youth, but it might also suggest that better hygienic habits were taught in the military service. One result hypothesized earlier did show up slightly here: former soldiers were slightly more willing to donate their time to the improvement of the village.

Finally, in Factor 25, there is a hint that listening to agricultural broadcasts may have predisposed peasants to make greater use of fertilizers. They owned few parcels, but this may have been related to the small amount of dryland held by these persons, for dryland is separated from the wetland for rice farming.

Considering the results of the various predictions that have been made about Nae-il and Oje, it is probable that the peasants of Nae-il rated the present and future somewhat higher than did the peasants in Oje. To test this hypothesis, a ladder, with rungs numbered from 0 (lowest) through 10 (highest), was shown to each respondent, and it was explained that "this ladder represents levels in life. The position marked '0' shows the worst possible level you could imagine yourself to be on. The position marked '10' shows the best possible position you could imagine. Now, looking back about five years, where would you place yourself on this ladder? . . . . Where on this ladder do you think you are today? . . . . Where on this ladder do you expect to be about five years from now?"

As anticipated and as shown in Table 5.9, peasants in Nae-il rated the present and the future perceptibly higher than did villagers in Oje. This is an important result because it signifies that the progressive peasants anticipated returns for their modernity. They had made many of the contributions called for by the government through the Saemaul movement, and the time had come to fulfill their expectations of an improved quality of life. It is also probable, in light of such evidence, that the efforts to make Nae-il a progressive village were offered voluntarily for the purpose of a brighter future. In addition, as other studies have shown, it is the progressive villages, not the more backward ones, that have higher hopes and greater optimism in the face of change.

This ladder technique was also used by Hadley Cantril in his cross-national survey among persons of several nations, and it is of some interest to compare our results with his (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10) even though the two are not entirely comparable. The Koreans were certainly not as depressed in their assessment of the past and present as peasants in the Dominican Republic, and they were certainly much more sanguine about the future, both in Nae-il and Oje, than rural Indians. Nae-il came closest in the assessment of well-being to rural persons in Egypt. The very slight distinction made in Oje between the
past and the present and the relatively moderate expectations for the future resembled rural responses in the Philippines and Panama. Neither village rated the past and the present as high as farmers in the United States, but Nae-il certainly had higher expectations for the future. These results seem to fit rough and impressionistic assessments of conditions in these various countries at the time of the survey, with Egypt experiencing under the impact of a modernizing leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the kindling of hopes for further improvements, while conditions in the Philippines did not seem quite so fortunate or rewarding for the future to peasants. This seems to make some sense and helps to place Oje and Nae-il in an international context.

Table 5.9
An Assessment of Personal Well-being on Cantril's Ladder Scale of 0 to 10, Nae-il and Oje

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5 years ago</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>5 years hence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nae-il</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oje</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences between Nae-il and Oje for the present and the future are statistically significant according to t-tests.

Table 5.10
Assessment of Personal Well-being on the Ladder Scale in Several Nations (Rural Respondents)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5 years ago</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>5 years hence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From Cantril, *Pattern of Human Concerns*, Appendix D, pp. 365-375, rural respondents only.
Before generalizing from the conclusions reached in the course of our analysis, it would be well to dispose of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. There were twenty-three of these specifically enumerated, although not all of the propositions subsequently presented and analyzed were included.

(1) Age was not related to either innovativeness or cooperativeness.
(2) Education was not correlated with innovativeness nor cooperativeness but was present on factors related to leadership qualities.
(3) Religion bore no relationship to innovativeness nor cooperativeness.
(4) Military service was not associated with personal innovativeness and only slightly associated with cooperativeness.
(5) Contact with urban environments was not associated with personal innovativeness nor with cooperativeness. The village result, however, had a small relationship with innovativeness, and a lack of such contact seemed to mark the backward village.
(6) The amount of land farmed was associated with yield and, to a small degree, with innovativeness. Commercial crops were also associated with the size of dryland holdings. Fragmentation was not important, although fewer parcels did relate to the increased use of farm machinery.
(7) Health did not relate to innovativeness nor to cooperativeness.
(8) Contact with the media did not relate in any important way with innovativeness nor cooperativeness.
(9) In the national survey, memberships, meetings, and official positions did not generally relate to innovativeness nor to cooperativeness, although these, along with media contact, were related to leadership factors. In the village survey, however, the progressive village showed more organizational activity than the backward village. Most disappointing was the lack of relationship of 4-H membership with any important attribute or attitude.
(10) Influence and the desire for more influence did not make individuals more likely to cooperate.
(11) A positive attitude toward farming was not itself of major importance. However, the closely related decision to send sons to agricultural high school seemed critical, certainly to cooperativeness but in many ways to innovativeness as well.
(12-20) Attitudinal hypotheses fared poorly in the analysis of the national data. The village analysis, however, indicated some evidence that personal efficacy and village and personal morale distinguished the progressive from the backward village. Authoritarianism and conservatism may have slightly inhibited innovativeness. On the whole, propensity to change, trust, alienation, and future orientation were not strikingly related to cooperativeness and innovativeness. There was important evidence in the village data, however, that optimism about the future was much higher in the progressive village.
(21) Peasants in the progressive village seemed to have a more positive attitude toward government, in the sense of effectiveness, although they also had a subject orientation. Otherwise, these attitudes were only slightly related to cooperativeness and innovativeness.

(22) Debt did not figure importantly in the national data but emerged as an important distinction in the two villages, with the progressive one reporting less debt.

(23) Clan villages had no effect on innovativeness nor cooperativeness.

Finally, the Saemaul movement seemed to have little or no direct effect. It did, however, figure in a relationship with the decision to send sons to agricultural high schools, which in turn was an important attitude.

That age and education were not important factors in the modernization of Korea is indeed an unanticipated result. The relationship of attitudes to innovativeness and cooperativeness was generally disappointing in the national sample but received more striking verification in the village study. Perhaps peasants do not tend to interrelate their attitudes and behaviors, except in special circumstances to which the two-village study supplied a clue. It is also possible that the relationships of attitudes to the various kinds of innovation are so complex that each innovation might merit its own separate study. Thus the causal relationships of attributes and attitudes to concomitant innovations might be different for each innovation.

The study also disproved the assumption that some behaviors, such as birth control and religion, might be crucial in the sense that once such change is accepted, other innovative behavior would be more readily adopted. Peasants seemed to think and act in segregated categories, and mental bridges were not always apparent. We might thus conclude that changes in one category of behavior did not easily affect other categories of behavior. This compartmentalization of behavior was possibly a defensive mechanism developed over the long centuries of peasant history. The peasant is a person with few resources, likely to encounter innumerable obstacles to any consistent pattern of behavior that he adopts, so that success in one behavioral area does not easily suggest to him the possibility of change and ensuing success in another behavioral area. How a peasant would behave if he were to be consistently rewarded for his efforts cannot be fully answered here, but the progressive village provided a good hint as to what might happen in such an event.

While the formal and logical constructions of modernization theory had mixed results, there were some encouraging notes in the Korean rural scene. Neither the national sample nor the village study provided general evidence that at this important time in Korean history, the period approaching the take-off toward an industrial society, the peasant occupied a demoralized backwater within the historical flow of events. The results showed that some peasants were capable of optimism, cooperativeness, and innovativeness, and that village competitions seemed to have stimulated their concern with village conditions. The latter point should be of some interest to those involved in community development. Many peasants were more closely in touch with national politics than had been anticipated. In fact, as the village study showed, inhabitants of the progressive village were well attuned to the media and rather optimistic about the peasant's future in Korea. There seemed to be no lack of personal efficacy among the peasants; as shown in Chapter 3, a large majority of them generally felt as able as others in the population.
At the same time, self-esteem was generally low. It was apparently not the result of any other discernible characteristic. A number of separate analyses were made of several other attributes; e.g., men were compared with women, and both seemed to have equally low self-esteem. Nor did self-esteem seem to be strongly associated with education, debt, age, or personal efficacy. It must be concluded that its lack was a general attribute of the peasant as peasant, because he was probably not comparing himself to other peasants within his village, but to all other Koreans who were not peasants. In this comparison he found himself at the lower end of the scale of social prestige. Moreover, as the almost unanimous response to the relevant question strikingly demonstrated, the peasant knew that his low prestige was based, at least in part, on the objectively lower quality of rural life.

This ambiguity in our results points to a major lesson to be learned from this study. Like most questionnaire surveys, our study was largely focused on the individual. This level of analysis is evidently not fully sufficient for transitional and rapidly modernizing societies such as Korea. In such societies, every effort should be exerted to tie the individual aspects of attitude and behavior to more general institutional structures and relationships at the provincial and national levels. Illustrative of the type of question that might accomplish this connection between the individual and his structural environment is the question asked in our village survey as to whether officials provide services as a favor or as a duty. Mattei Dogan and others have shown that a sufficiently extensive questionnaire can do the job of supplying situational and structural variables which, in turn, could bridge the kind of gaps among attitudes and behavior so frequently noted in our study. It is also true, however, that such an extended questionnaire technique is adaptable only to a democratic polity in which expressions of political discontent carry no punishment. Even if the questionnaire were circulated and the usual anonymity honored, a major problem in the present Korean polity would be the acquiescence to certain sensitive items.

In the remainder of this chapter I would like to say a few words about the implications that some of the results of this study have for the peasant's future in Korea. The proper starting point for this speculative excursion lies with the peasants' rising hopes and expectations, as repeatedly demonstrated in this study. In 1973 village morale was generally high and attitudes toward farming generally positive. The crucial test of social commitment, however, seemed to be whether or not the peasants would want their sons to attend an agricultural school. Those who did were among those who in several other ways espoused innovation, village morale, and cooperativeness. If there was any single factor that contributed to the optimistic and modernistic outlook of these peasants, it was this particular attitude. Thus Chapter 4 was a veritable vindication of hypotheses of community cooperation and innovativeness, all of them correlated in some way with the decision to send sons to agricultural schools. This decision was evidently more crucial than a positive attitude toward farming alone. It also, incidentally, pointed to the need for more research on its causes and ramifications.

Hopes were probably greatest among those peasants who were the most innovative and who had contributed to the progress of their villages. Judging from the national results, in which attitudes played a very minimal role in causal relationships with cooperativeness and innovation, such relationships might not develop as easily through individual efforts as in the context of a community enterprise. As they improve, whole communities may well raise further the hopes
and expectations of their inhabitants. In 1973, such concatenations of progressiveness and expectations for the future were probably present here and there, scattered like islands across the countryside. These islands of optimism may well expand, but they might also disappear from the face of Korea because, as the factor results have revealed, there are other, negative tendencies present in rural Korea. The outcome of the contest between these two tendencies will rest to some degree in the hands of the planners of the Saemaul movement which will not easily be forgotten by peasants who have once again decided to opt for a better life through their own efforts.

It will probably require a number of years of continuity, consistent planning and, above all, rewards in the form of higher prices for farm products and an increased ability for the peasant to enjoy some fruits of his labors before the Saemaul movement can begin to generate enthusiasm and become a direct causal factor in innovation and cooperativeness. At the time of our study there was not yet any direct evidence tying the movement to progressive attitudes, but the factor analysis and the results in Chapter 3 seemed to show that there is ample opportunity for it to catch on and, ultimately, to transform the countryside. There were already obvious physical improvements, many of which could be attributed to the Saemaul movement, and the Korean peasant's living standard has continued to improve.

But the peasant will also increasingly feel a need for participation in public decisions that affect him, as was already noted in the national survey. The media contacts of peasants in Nae-il, their interest and knowledge of national events, showed that the peasant, much more than in the past, had become a member of the nation as well as of his own village. This extension of his sphere of interest is both affected by and affects his heightened expectations for the future. Thus, wherever attitudes can be translated into behaviors that provide material and psychological rewards, there is likely to develop some increased connection between attitudes and behaviors. Since our study showed this connection to be tenuous at best in 1973, the structures and institutions of society had probably not yet provided such rewards in a systematic way, but there is a possibility that with the kind of continuity and consistency noted earlier, the Saemaul movement could eventually effect such a connection. A key requirement for success, however, is that the political system becomes increasingly participatory. The Saemaul movement at the time of its initiation was patently authoritarian and if it does not fundamentally change, the peasant's attitudes and behaviors toward the political system will tend to remain inchoate.

Aristotle held that the constitution of a state must fit the history and traditions of a people, and Rousseau and many other political philosophers have accepted this notion for centuries. But it is also appropriate to posit desirable changes and goals for a polity changing from one constitutional form to another and its people developing new skills, new strengths and new purposes. Samuel Huntington has delineated with clarity and insight the tremendous difficulty of accomplishing this transition, and it might be well to quote one of his apt passages that seems to fit closely recent Korean political experience:

The distinctive social aspect of radical praetorianism is the divorce of the city from the countryside: politics is combat among middle-class urban groups, no one of which has reason to promote social consensus or political order. The social precondition for the establishment of stability is the appearance in politics of the social forces dominant in the countryside. The intelligentsia has the brains; the military have the
guns; but the peasants have the numbers, and the votes. Political stability requires a coalition between at least two of these social forces. Given the hostility which usually develops between the two most politically articulate elements of the middle class, a coalition of brains and guns against numbers is rare indeed. If it does come into existence, as in Turkey during the Ataturk period, it provides only a temporary and fragile stability; eventually it is overwhelmed by the entry of the rural masses into politics. A coalition between the intelligentsia and the peasants, in contrast, usually involves revolution: the destruction of the existing system as a prerequisite to the creation of a new, more stable one. The third route to stable government is by the coalescence of guns and numbers against brains. It is this possibility which offers the military in a radical praetorian society the opportunity to move their society from praetoriansm to civic order.2

The problem of the Korean government, therefore, is to accept new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing institutional integrity.3 It should also be noted in passing that the revolutionary coalition of middle-class intellectuals with the peasantry has often resulted in the elevation of the power demands of a segment of the middle class at the expense of the natural desires of the peasant.

The Saemaul movement, if successful, will inevitably increase the Korean peasant's expectations of political influence. But as I see it, the Yushin constitution does not seem likely to meet the new demands growing out of a successful Saemaul movement. The nature of this movement and the personal qualities that it intends to engender are contradicted by the logical effects of the constitutional changes of 1972. This may well be another reason why in 1973 the Saemaul movement had not yet interrelated itself with progressive attitudes and behaviors. Self-direction and voluntary motivation toward self-help may not develop easily in an unfavorable political climate.

If genuine political initiative were to remain closed to increasingly progressive and nationally oriented peasants, intense dissatisfaction is likely to develop in direct proportion to the degree of success of the Saemaul movement. Insofar as the movement and the constitutional reforms of 1972 accomplish their manifest but contradictory objectives, a situation of potential turmoil might be a predictable outcome. Huntington posits as a necessity for political change in countries such as Korea the broadening of political participation which, as he clearly shows, need not be in the form of Western-style democracy. While recognizing that the road to an increasingly participatory political system is a rough one—and Korea has had little or no experience with such a system through its long history—I also believe that a variant of political democracy in the Western sense would seem the appropriate ultimate goal of the personal autonomy that modernization and progressiveness produce.

Much remains, therefore, for the future to determine. Our study of the Korean peasant has sketched the situation as of 1973. The peasant's hopes and accomplishments have been delineated and, to some degree, fitted into a context of hypotheses about modernization and innovation. It is important, however, that the reader be left with the idea that these industrious peasants, rarely favored by history, are capable of great accomplishment, largely through their own industry and with some small aid from the government and the urban elite. Above all, they deserve a future that provides more material abundance and the opportunity
Conclusion

to enrich their cultural existence. In spite of centuries of experience with oppression and insincerity, many peasants are willing to try again. It is depressing to conjecture what might happen if their expectations for a more rewarding future were to be disappointment again.
Appendix A (1)

SOME BRIEF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE (SAEMAUL) INSTRUCTOR

The purpose of this questionnaire is a scholarly one. There are for most of the question no "right" or "wrong" answers, and the farmer should fill out the questionnaire by himself. If a (Saemaul) student should ask the meaning of a question, of course the instructor may explain it to him. But no indication should be given as to which is the "correct" answer. This would defeat the purpose of the study.

An effort has been made to design this questionnaire so that it may be answered in an hour or less. In fact, the more rapidly it is filled out, the better. Most questions can be answered by checking an appropriate phrase. For example, question 23 on a farmer's land parcels might be checked as follows:

23. Are these parcels

| far apart       |     | not so far apart | ✓ | near one another |     | adjacent to one another |     |

A few questions require a brief list, and these should be answered, again, as quickly as possible. Only questions 57 and 58 require an answer that is really "right" or "wrong," and the farmer should answer these, of course, without help.

The section of statements for agreement and disagreement has three possible choices for each answer. If a farmer feels that there is no reason he can think of to disagree with a statement, he will want to choose the "agree" response. If there seem to be as many reasons for disagreeing with a statement as for agreeing with it, the "uncertain" choice would be appropriate. Thus, if a farmer believes that farm work is not drudgery, but he can also think of a number of tasks that he really does not like to do, he might answer question one as follows:

1. Farm work is drudgery.

| Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |

Thank you for helping to administer this questionnaire. We hope that the results of this study will in some way contribute to improving the life of farmers in Korea.
Appendix A (2)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SAMPLE OF KOREAN FARMERS

Part I

We would like to ask you a few questions about yourself and how you feel about certain things. Don't spend too much time on any of these questions, but answer them as rapidly as you can.

Please do not put your name on the questionnaire. We want to know how Korean farmers in general feel about things.

Thank you for your cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>1. Are you</th>
<th>Male_____ Female_____</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIZERES</td>
<td>2. Where do you live?</td>
<td>Gun_______ Myon_______ (eup)_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATE</td>
<td>4. What is the highest school grade which you completed?</td>
<td>Elementary________ Middle school________ High school________ College________ Post graduate________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARITAL</td>
<td>5. Are you single_____ married_____ divorced_____ widowed_____?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDBOY</td>
<td>6. How many children do you have?</td>
<td>Boys________ Girls________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDTOT</td>
<td>Boys________ Girls________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGION</td>
<td>7. What would you say is your religion?</td>
<td>Confucian_____ Buddhist_____ Confucian and Buddhist_____ Protestant_____ Catholic_____ Ch'ondokyo_____ Other (specify)_______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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National Questionnaire

RELIMP 8. How important is religion in your life?

- Extremely important
- Very important
- Important
- Not very important
- Not important at all

MILITARY 9. Have you served in the military?

- Yes
- No

DURRES 10. How many years have you lived in your present village?

- 

TOWNLIVE 11. Have you ever lived in a large town or a city, say larger than an eup?

- Yes
- No

DURTOWN 12. If you have lived in a large town or city, how long were you there?

- 

TWNVISIT 13. In the past year, how many times have you gone to a large town or city?

- 

WETLAND 14. What is the approximate size of your farm, or the farm that you work on?

- Wetland
- Dryland

DRYLAND

15. In your village, how large is a majigi?

- pyŏng

YIELD 16. What is the average yield in rice of your majigi?

- sok

PARCELS 17. How many parcels is your land divided into?

- 

DISTPAR 18. Are these parcels

- an hour or more walk apart
- between a half an hour and an hour apart
- less than a half an hour walk apart
- adjacent to one another

OTHERINC 19. About what percent of your income last season would you say came from farm output other than your rice crop?

- About percent

ENERGY 20. Do you generally feel energetic when you begin to work in the morning, or do you feel somewhat tired?

- Energetic
- Often tired
- It varies
21. About how often would you say you were sick?

I am sick fairly often
Sick seldom in a year
Almost never sick

22. Have you ever been a local official or held any official position in the village, li, myŏn (such as myŏngjang, lijang, or myŏn sogi)?

Yes No

23. When you are in a group, do you prefer to make the decisions yourself, or do you prefer to have others make them?

Myself Others

24. Do you read a newspaper?

Daily
At least once a week
About once a month
Seldom

25. Do you own your radio?

Yes No

26. How often do you listen to radio programs on agricultural or rural development?

Often
Sometimes
Seldom
Never

27. How many times during the past year have you seen a government movie or slides on agriculture?

28. How often in the last year would you say you entered into a discussion with other farmers on ways to improve your farming?

Often
Occasionally
A few times

29. How many times have you attended a meeting about agriculture by the department of agriculture or the farmer's cooperative in the past year?

30. How many times have you read a pamphlet by the government on farming in the past year?

31. Were you (or are you) a member of the 4-H Club?

Yes No
32. Besides the 4-H Club and the farmer's cooperative, do you belong to any other organizations?

No________ Yes, one other_______ Yes, two others_______ Yes, more than two others_______

33. Have you held any office in these organizations?

Yes_______ No_______

34. How often do you think about community problems in your daily life?

Not at all________ Not often________ Once in a while________ Often________ Very often________

35. How often have you seriously discussed local community problems during the past year with people?

Often________ Once in a while________ Not at all________

36. Do you think it is possible for people to come together to do something to improve the village or area in which you live?

Yes_______ No_______ Don't know_______

37. Would you be willing to give four or five hours a week to do something to improve your village?

Yes_______ No_______ Maybe_______

38. Have you done so in the past?

Yes_______ No_______

39. In your village, would you say that you have a lot of influence, about average influence, or very little influence?

A great deal of influence_______ More influence than most people_______ About an average amount of influence_______ Less influence than most people_______

40. Would you like to be able to have more influence in village affairs than you now have?

Would like more influence_______ Satisfied with present influence_______

41. Some people seem to follow what is going on in politics all of the time; others have less interest. How often do you follow what is going on in national politics?

Most of the time_______ Some of the time_______ Now and then_______
INTNATON 42. And how often do you follow what is going on in international affairs?

- Most of the time_______
- Some of the time_______
- Now and then_______
- Hardly at all_______

AMERPRES 43. Can you write down the name of the present President of the United States?

PREMJAP 44. Can you write down the name of the present Japanese Prime Minister?

PRESKOR 45. Can you write down the full name of the present President of the Republic of Korea?

Part II

The following are a list of statements that a person might agree or disagree with. Go through the statements as rapidly as you can, and check whether you agree, are uncertain, or disagree with the statements.

FARMDRDG 1. Farm work is drudgery. AGREE  UNCERTAIN DISAGREE
FARMSTNG 2. The standard of living of farmers is below that of most other persons in Korea.
RELLYWOR 3. I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be willing to try it.
FRNDADVT 4. It is not good to let your friends know too much about your life, for they might take advantage of you.
LUCK 5. Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.
VILPEACE 6. My village is very peaceful and orderly.
SHUNCOOP 7. It is only human nature to be reluctant about cooperating.
WORRY 8. A farmer has more worries than do persons who do other kinds of work.
STANDING 9. Farming reduces one's social standing.
CHANGE 10. If you start trying to change things, you usually make them worse.
PROUD 11. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
CARES 12. No one else cares much what happens to you.
POLITE 13. Almost everyone in my village is polite and courteous.
DISAGREE 14. Sometimes children should be allowed to disagree with their parents.
ENJOY 15. Work on the farm is really enjoyable.
Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education.

I feel helpless in the face of what happens in the world today.

I am able to do things as well as most other people.

There is little chance for advancement in life unless a man knows the right people.

Everyone in my village tries to take advantage of you.

A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.

The disadvantages of farming outweigh its advantages.

I would move to the city if I knew for sure that I could earn more money there.

It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society.

I'm sometimes inclined to feel that I'm a failure.

The young man of today can expect much of the future.

People in my village work together to get things done for the village.

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things for children to learn.

Farming requires less education than most other work.

Life is better in villages where you know everybody.

The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions.

I wish I could have more respect for myself.

A person can learn more by working three years than by going to high school.

I feel very much "at home" in my village.

Parents should limit the number of children they have.

Farming is uninteresting work.

People in big cities are cold and impersonal. It is hard to make friends there.

Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer.

The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life and to be content with what comes your way.

I find it easy to express my ideas to others.

People in my village are too critical of others.

A person should always consider the needs of his family as a whole more important than his own.
The farm is the best place for children.
A good leader rarely has to talk to others when he is making a decision.
I believe that most public officials don't care what people like me think.
It is important to make plans for one's life and not just accept what happens.
The more education a man has the more he is able to enjoy life.
A person should be expected to join only those organizations that will promote his own interests.
Farming offers little opportunity for meeting other people.
A good leader tries to find out what all the members of a group think before he makes a decision.
Most people are honest.
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like myself can't really understand what's going on.
Most young people are getting too much education.
Each of us can make real progress only when the community as a whole makes progress.
I think that farmers are an interesting group of people.
The good leader tries to share his responsibility with the other members of a group.
Most people will repay your kindness with ingratitude.
I am the kind of person who gets his share of good luck.
My village lacks real leaders.
A community would get along better if each person would mind his own business.
You can only trust people whom you know well.
Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were.
No one seems to care much how my village looks.
One of the important lessons of life is that people put their own interests first.
A leader is a better leader if his men are somewhat afraid of him.
The family should have the right to control the behavior of its members completely.
Part III

HIRE 1. Did you hire people to work for you last year?  
Yes_____ No_______

WEED 2. Last season did you weed by hand or did you use weedicide?  
By hand_______ Weedicide_______

INSECTCID 3. Did you use an insecticide before or after your plants were attacked?  
Before_______ After_______

UREA 4. What kind of artificial fertilizer did you use last season?  
(Check more than one if it applies.)
   Urea________
   Fused phosphate________
   Calcium cyanamide________

PHOSPH 5. Have you engaged in growing a commercial crop?  
CALCYN Yes_______ No_______

COMCROP 6. Do you use a motor-powered thresher?  
Yes_______ No_______

ROOF 7. Is your house tiled, straw-thatched, slate-covered, or corrugated?  
   Tile_______
   Straw-thatched_______
   Corrugated_______
   (or slate)

AGSCHOOL 8. Would you prefer your son (or sons) to attend agricultural high school or a non-agricultural high school?  
   Agricultural high school_______
   Non-agricultural high school_______

MUDANG 9. Do you call in a mudang or a medical doctor in case of serious illness in your household?  
   Kut_______ Doctor_______ Both_______

YIELDINC 10. Would you say your rice yields have been increasing or decreasing over the last five years or so?  
   Increasing_______ Decreasing_______ About the same_______

OTHRWORK 11. About what percent of your family income came from work other than farming last year?  
   About_______ percent

OX 12. If you own an ox, how old is the ox?  
      ______________________________

PLOW 13. Do you use a mechanical plow?  
   Yes_______ No_______
14. Are you in debt?  
Yes_______ No_______

15. Is your debt increasing, decreasing, or about the same over the last five years or so?  
Increasing_______ Decreasing_______ No change_______

16. Did you plant Tongil rice last season?  
Yes_______ No_______

17. In what year did you first plant Tongil rice?  

18. Is your village mostly composed of same-last-name families?  
Yes_______ No_______

19. Does your village cooperate with a neighboring village in any way having to do with farming?  
Yes_______ No_______

20. Does your village compete with neighboring villages in the quantity and quality of output sponsored by an official institution?  
Yes_______ No_______

21. Did you attend a Saemaul school this summer?  
Yes_______ No_______

22. How did you first learn about the Saemaul movement?  
Newspaper_______ Radio_______ Pamphlet_______ From a friend_______ From a government official_______ Other_______

23. What are the most important problems in your village you think the Saemaul movement will help solve? Would you please list these:

This is the end of the questionnaire. We hope that you have enjoyed answering it. Thank you.
Appendix A (3)
KOREAN TRANSLATION OF NATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE

농민의 관행과 태도에 대한
질 문 서


윌라드 D. 카일
펜실바니아 대학 정치과 교수
연세대학교 정외과 출부라잇트 교환 교수
제 1 부

우리는 여러분 자신에 대하여 그리고 여러분께서 어떤 일에 대해서 어떻게 느끼고 계시는지에 관해서 물어보고자 합니다.

이 느 질문에 대해서나 너무 많은 시간을 소모하지 마시고 가능한 한 빨리 답변 주시면 고맙겠습니다.

질문서에 자기 이름을 쓰지 마십시오. 우리는 다만 대체적으로 한국의 농민들이 몇 가지 사항에 대해서 어떻게 느끼고 있는가를 알고자 하는 것 뿐입니다.

협조해 주셔서 감사합니다.

1. 귀하는? 남자 ______ 여자 ______
2. 귀하는 어디 사시니가? 
   군 ______ 면 ______ 또는 (읍 ______)
3. 귀하는 지금 몇 살입니까?
   16-25 ______ 26-29 ______ 30-39 ______
   40-49 ______ 50-59 ______ 60세 이상 ______
4. 귀하는 어느 학교(국민학교, 중학교, 고등학교, 대학교, 대학원) 몇 학년까지 다니셨습니까?
   국민학교 ______ 중학교 ______ 고등학교 ______
   대학교 ______ 대학원 ______
5. 귀하는 어디에 해당됩니까?
   미혼 ______ 기혼 ______ 이혼 ______ 혼인 후 사별 ______
6. 자녀는 몇이나 됩니다?
   아들 ______ 딸 ______
7. 귀하는 어떤 종교를 믿고 계십니까?
   유교 ______ 불교 ______ 유교와 불교 ______ 기독교 ______
   천주교 ______ 천도교 ______ 기타 ______(종교 이름을 기입하십시오.)
8. 귀하는 생활에서 종교가 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하십니까?
   지극히 중요하다 ______
   매우 중요하다 ______
   중요하다 ______
   별로 중요치 않다 ______
   전혀 중요치 않다 ______
9. 귀하는 군복무를 했셨습니까?
   네 ______ 아니오 ______
10. 귀하는 지금 살고 계신 마을에서 몇 년이나 살았습니까?
11. 귀하는 송(邑)보다 더 큰 시나 대도시에서 살아본 적이 있으십니까?
네 ______ 아니오 ______

12. 살아본 적이 있다면 거기서 얼마나 오래 사셨습니까?

13. 지금까지 몇 번이나 시나 대도시에 가 본 적이 있습니까?

14. 귀하가 소유하고 있거나 또는 임하고 있는 농토의 크기는 얼마나 됩니다?
농 ______ 마지기 ______ 발 ______평

15. 귀하가 살고 계신 마을에서는 한 마지기를 몇 평으로 계산하십시오?
_____평

16. 귀하가 갖고 있는 논 한 마지기에서 쌀이 평균 얼마나 수확됩니까?

17. 귀하의 농토는 몇 군데로 나누어져 있습니까?

18. 서로 나누어져 있는 농토는?
   1시간 정도의 도보 거리 ______
   30분 내지 1시간 ______
   30분 이내의 거리 ______
   서로 인접해 있음 ______

19. 작년 수확기에 쌀 수확 이외에 다른 농작물에서 들어온 수입은 얼마나 됬습니까?
   약 _______%

20. 귀하는 보통 아침에 일어나서 일을 시작할 때 기운이 왕성하게 느껴집니까?
   왕성하다 ______
   매때로 피곤하다 ______
   이럴 때도 있고 저럴 때도 있다 ______

21. 귀하는 대략 얼마나 자주 빙에 걸림니까?
   평 자주 빙이 나는 편이다 ______
   거의 일 년에 한 번도 빙이 없는 편이다 ______
   몇 년간에 걸쳐서도 빙 나는 일이 드물다 ______

22. 귀하는 지방 공무원으로 또는 이장, 면장 또는 면서기와 같은 직책을 가졌던 적이 있습니까?
   네 ______ 아니오 ______

23. 귀하가 어떤 모임의 일원일 때 귀하는 그 회의에서 토의하는 문제를 귀하 스스로 결정하기를 좋아합니까? 아니면 다른 사람들이 결정하도록 내버려 두고 싶습니까?
   나 자신이 ______ 다른 사람들이 ______
11. 귀하는 음(음)보다 더 큰 시나 대도시에서 살아본 적이 있습니까?
네  _____  아니오  _____
12. 살아본 적이 있다면 거기에 얼마나 오래 사셨습니까?
13. 지금까지 몇 번이나 시나 대도시에 가 본 적이 있습니까?
14. 귀하가 소유하고 있거나 또는 임하고 있는 농토의 크기는 얼마나 됩니까?
논  _____  마지기  _____  밭  _____  평
15. 귀하가 살고 계신 마을에서는 한 마자기용 땅 폭으로 계산하십니까?
_____ 평
16. 귀하가 갖고 있는 논 한 마자기에서 쌀이 평균 얼마나 수확됩니까?
_____ 석
17. 귀하의 농토는 몇 군데로 나누어져 있습니까?
18. 서로 나누어져 있는 농토는?
  1시간 정도의 도보 거리  _____
  30분 내외 1시간  _____
  30분 이내의 거리  _____
  서로 인접해 있음  _____
19. 작년 수확기에 쌀 수확 이외에 다른 농작물에서 들어온 수입은 얼마나 됩니까?
약  ____________________ %
20. 귀하는 보통 아침에 일어나서 일을 시작할 때 기운이 왕성하게 느껴집니까?
왕성하다  _____
매일때 피곤하다  _____
이럴 때도 있고 저럴 때도 있다  _____
21. 귀하는 대략 얼마나 자주 병에 걸립니까?
왜 자주 병이 나는 편이다  _____
거의 일 년에 한 번도 병이 없는 편이다  _____
몇 년간에 걸쳐서도 병 나는 일이 드물다  _____
22. 귀하는 지방 공무원으로 또는 이장, 면장 또는 면서기와 같은 직책을 가지고 본 적이 있습니까?
네  _____  아니오  _____
23. 귀하가 어떤 모임의 일원일 때 귀하는 그 회의에서 토의하는 문제를 귀하 스스로 결정하기를 좋아합니까? 아니면 다른 사람들의 결정하도록 내버려 두고 싶으니까?
나 자신이  _____  다른 사람들이  _____
24. 귀하는 신문을 읽습니까?
   매일 읽는다
   최소한 일 주일에 한 번
   대략 한 달에 한 번
   거의 읽지 않는다

25. 귀하는 라디오를 가지고 있습니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

26. 귀하는 라디오에서 농업 발전이나 농촌 개발에 관한 프로를 얼마나 자주 듣습니까?
   자주 _____
   때때로 _____
   거의 듣지 않는다 _____
   전혀 듣지 않는다 _____

27. 귀하는 작년 한 해 동안 몇 번이나 농사 일에 관한 정부의 영화를 보았습니까?

28. 작년에 귀하는 귀하의 농사 일을 더욱 개선하고자 하는 문제를 농과 다른 농민들과 서로 토의하는 포럼에 얼마나 자주 나간 것 같습니까?
   자주 _____
   때때로 _____
   몇 번 _____

29. 작년에 귀하는 농림부나 도, 군, 면 농림 담당 부서 또는 농협에서 여는 회의에 몇 번이나 나가 보았습니까?

30. 귀하는 작년에 정부가 발행한 농사 일에 관한 책자를 몇 번이나 읽어 보았습니까?

31. 귀하는 「4예취」클럽의 회원이었거나, 현재 회원입니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

32. 「4예취」클럽이나 농협 이외에 교회 단체나 사천회, 계 등 다른 단체에 가입해 있습니까?
   아니오 _____ 네, 한 단체에 _____ 네, 두 단체에 _____
   네, 둘 이상의 단체에 _____

33. 귀하는 위에서 말한 조직이나 단체에서 직책을 맡고 있습니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

34. 귀하는 일상 생활에서 귀하가 살고 있는 지역의 문제에 관해서 얼마나 자주 생각하고 제안니까?
   전혀 생각하지 않는다 _____ 거의 생각하지 않는다 _____
가끔 한 번씩
자주
매우 자주

35. 귀하는 작년에 귀하가 살고 있는 지역 사회(아, 민, 음) 문제들을 친구들과 함께 얼마나 심각하게 토론해 보았습니까?
자주 이야기 했다
가끔 한 번씩
전혀 해 보지 않았다

36. 귀하는 귀하가 살고 있는 마을이나 지역을 개발하기 위해 여러 사람들이 함께 모여 어떤 일이고 할 수 있으리라고 생각하십니까?
네 ______ 아니오 ______ 모르겠다 ______

37. 귀하는 마을의 환경을 개선하기 위해 일 주일에 4시간이나 5시간 정도를 나 가서 일할 용이가 있습니까?
네 ______ 아니오 ______ 아마 가능할 것 같으나 __________

38. 귀하는 과거에도 그렇게 했습니까?
네 ______ 아니오 ______

39. 귀하는 마을에서 어느 정도 영향력이 있는지요?
대단히 많다 ______ 보통 이상이다 ______
보통이다 ______ 별로 영향력이 없다 ______

40. 귀하는 마을 일에 대해 현재보다 더 영향력을 가지고 살아 ______
더 많은 영향력을 가지고 살다 ______
현재에 만족하다 ______

41. 어떤 사람들은 언제나 나라의 정치가 어떻게 되어 가고 있는가에 대하여 관심을 가지고 있는 것 같고, 또 어떤 사람들은 별로 관심이 없는 것 같으나. 귀하는 나라(국가)의 정치가 어떻게 되어 가고 있는지에 대해서 얼마나 자주 관심을 가지고 있습니까?
거의 언제나 ______ 비교적 자주 ______ 가끔 ______

42. 국제 문제에 관해서는 얼마나 자주 관심을 가지고 있습니까?
거의 언제나 ______ 비교적 자주 ______
가끔 ______ 거의 관심이 없다 ______

43. 미국 대통령의 이름을 쓰 주실 수 있겠습니까?
이름 ______

44. 일본의 수상 이름을 쓰 주실 수 있겠습니까?
이름 ______

45. 대한민국의 대통령 이름을 쓰 주실 수 있겠습니까?
이름 ______
제 2 부

다음은 응답자가 동의할 수도 있고 반대할 수도 있는 질문들입니다. 가능한 한
편리하게 응답하시면 됩니다. 각 질문에 대하여(정적으로 동의, 반대, 또는
전적으로 반대하는 것을) "그렇다, 잘 모르겠다, 그렇지 않다" 등으로 표시하여 주십시오.

1. 농사는 험중고 따분한 일이다.
2. 한국에서 농무들의 생활 수준은 대부분의 사람 생활
수준보다 낮다.
3. 나는 무엇이든 해 보려고 마음먹기에 앞서 그것이
실제로 잘 될 것이라고 믿고 싶다.
4. 누군가 자기 친구들이 자기의 생활에 관해서 너무
많이 말하지 않게 하는 것은 좋다. 왜냐하면 그 친구
들은 자기를 이용하려고 모르기 때문이다.
5. 성공은 농력보다는 운에 뒤섞이는 경우가 더 많다.
6. 내 마음은 아주 평화스럽고 절서 정연하다.
7. 다른 사람들을의 협조를 꺼리는 것은 인간의 본성이다.
8. 농부는 만 종류의 일을 하는 사람보다 걱정이 많다.
9. 농업은 사람의 사회적 지위를 낮춘다.
10. 어떤 상태를 바꿔 보려고 하다 보면 처음보다 오히려
더 일이 꼬여진다.
11. 나는 자랑할 만한 것이 많지 않다고 느낀다.
12. 자기 이외에는 어느 누구도 자기가 당할 일을 심히
열려해 줄 사람은 없다.
13. 내 마음 사람들은 모두가 정밀고 예의가 바르다.
14. 자녀들은 가끔 부모들의 뜻에 동의하지 않아도 된다.
15. 논밭에서의 일은 일로 줄기운 것이다.
16. 농촌에서 사는 아동들은 교육을 받을 기회가 적다.
17. 나는 오늘날 세계에서 일어나고 있는 일에 대해서
속수 무책이라고 생각한다.
18. 나는 대부분의 다른 사람들과 마찬가지로 일을 잘
할 수 있다.
19. 영향력 있는 사람이 모르고서는 생활의 방침을 얻을
기회가 별로 없다.
20. 내 마음 사람들은 모두가 나를 이용하려고 하고 있다.
21. 훌륭한 아내란 항상 남편에게 복종하는 여자이다.
22. 농업은 이점보다 불리한 점이 더 많다.
23. 나는 만일 도시에서 더 많은 벌이를 할 수 있다고 확신하면 도시로 이주할 것이다.
24. 인간이 사회의 모든 일에 어떤 협을 가할 수 있다고 믿는 것은 오로지 소망일 뿐이다.
25. 나는 내가 별로 성공한 일이 없다고 느껴질 때가 가끔 있다.
26. 지금 나이가 어린 사람은 행복한 미래를 기대할 수 있다.
27. 내 마을 사람들들은 마을을 위해 함께 일을 한다.
28. 복종과 권위에 대한 존경은 어린이들이 배워야 할 가장 중요한 것이다.
29. 농업은 다른 일보다 교육이 더 필요하다.
30. 상호간 안녕이 깊은 사람들이 살고 있는 고장이라면 살아가기가 더 좋다.
31. 나와 같은 평민도 정부의 결정에 중요한 영향력을 가질 수 있다.
32. 나는 내 자신을 더 존경할 수 있기를 바란다.
33. 사람은 고등학교에 가는 것보다는 3년간 일함으로써 더 많은 것을 배울 수 있다.
34. 나는 내 마을에서 단단히 안락한 기분을 느낀다.
35. 부모들은 자녀의 수를 제한하지 않으면 안된다.
36. 농업은 홍미가 없는 일이다.
37. 대도시에 사는 사람들은 병목하고 비인간적이며 거기서 친구를 사귀기는 어렵다.
38. 우리 자신들의 이해 관계가 우리보다 잘 사는 사람들의 이해와 마찬가지 있을 때 나와 같은 사람들에게는 이를 보호할 수 있는 기회가 별로 없다.
39. 평복의 비결은 생활에서 너무 많은 것을 기대하지 말고 자신이 맡기는 일에 만족하는 것이다.
40. 나는 내 생각을 다른 사람에게 표현하기가 쉬운 것 같다.
41. 내 마을 사람들들은 다른 사람에 대해 너무 비관적이다.
42. 사람은 가족 전체의 필요를 자기 자신의 것보다 저중요에게 생각하여야 한다.
43. 농토가 있는 시골은 자녀들을 위해 가장 좋은 곳이다.
44. 훌륭한 지도자라면 어떤 결정을 내릴 때 타인에게 별로 말할 필요가 없다.
45. 나는 대부분의 공동원들이 나 같은 사람들이 무엇을 생각하고 있는지를 상관치 않는다고 생각한다.
46. 닥히는 일을 그저 받아들이지 말고 자신의 생활을 설계하는 것은 중요하다.
47. 사람들은 많은 교육을 받을 수록 인생을 더 즐길 수 있다.
48. 사람은 자기 자신의 이익을 즐겁게살 수 있는 단체 예만 가입하여야 한다.
49. 농업은 다른 사람을 만들 수 있는 기회를 별로 주지 않는다.
50. 훌륭한 지도자라면 결정을 내리기 전에 집단원 모두가 무엇을 생각하고 있는지를 알려고 노력한다.
51. 대부분의 사람들은 정직한.
52. 가끔 나라와 정치가 매우 복잡하기 때문에 나 같은 사람을 무슨 일이 진행되고 있는가를 정확히 이해할 수가 없다.
53. 대부분의 청년들은 너무 많은 교육을 받고 있다.
54. 지역 사회 전체가 발견할 때만이 우리들 각자가 진정한 발전을 이룩할 수 있다.
55. 나는 농부들이 제미있는 사람들의 모임이라 생각한다.
56. 훌륭한 지도자는 집단의 다른 구성원과 책임을 분담하고 노력한다.
57. 대부분의 사람들은 친절에 대하여 배운 맛직하게 보답한다.
58. 나는 운이 좋은 사람이다.
59. 내 마음은 건설적인 지도자가 부족하다.
60. 각자가 자기 자신의 일에만 전념한다면 그 지역 사회는 더욱 훌륭히 발전할 것이다.
61. 사람은 자기가 잘이는 사람들을 믿을 수 있다.
62. 진정한 친구들은 과거와 마찬가지로 오늘날에도 찾기 쉽다.
63. 아무도 내 마음의 현실 문제를 열려하는 것같지 않다.
64. 세상의 중요한 교훈 중의 하나는 사람들이 자신이 자신의 이익을 내세우는 것이다.
65. 부하들이 지도자를 다소 두려워 한다면 이 지도자는 더욱 훌륭한 지도자이다.
66. 가장은 식구들 각자의 행위를 완전히 통제할 권리를 가져야 한다.
제 3 부

1. 귀하는 지난해에 귀하를 위해 일할 사람을 고용하였습니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

2. 지난해 귀하는 순으로 제조하였습니까? 제조체(농약)을 섭음내가?
   순으로 _____ 제조체 _____

3. 귀하는 작물이 피해를 입기 전 또는 후에 살충제를 부트음내가?
   전 _____ 후 _____

4. 귀하는 지난해에 어떤 종류의 화학 비료를 사용하였습니까?
   (해당되면 하나 이상도 표시하십시오)
   요소 _____ 인산 비료 _____ 칼슘 아마이드 _____

5. 귀하는 특용작물 재배에 종사해 보셨습니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

6. 귀하는 동력 탈@section>록기를 사용합니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

7. 귀하의 짐은 기와질 또는 함식(스바트 포함)을 던졌습니까?
   기와 _____ 질 _____ 함식(스바트) _____

8. 귀하는 아들(들)이 농업고등학교와 비농업고등학교 중 어느 곳에 다니기를 원하신가?
   농고 _____ 비농고 _____

9. 귀하는 가정에 심한 질병이 났을 경우 곡을 하십니까? 또는 의사를 부르십니까?
   곡 _____ 의사 _____ 둘 다 _____

10. 귀하의 국식 수확은 지난 5년 동안 증가되어 왔음내가 또는 감소되어 왔음내가?
    증가 _____ 감소 _____ 변동 없음 _____

11. 지난해 귀하의 가족 수입 중 농업 이외의 일에서 얻은 소득은 어느 정도나 되었음내가?
    억 👮‍♂️(퍼센트)

12. 소를 가지고 계시다면 그 소가 몇 살쯤 되었습니까?

13. 귀하는 경운기를 사용하십니까?
    네 _____ 아니오 _____

14. 귀하는 빗을 지기도 있음내가?
    네 _____ 아니오 _____
15. 지난 5년 동안 빗은 계속 늘었음니까? 계속 줄었음니까? 또는 변하지 않았음니까?
   증가 _____ 감소 _____ 비슷 _____

16. 귀하는 지난해 통일비를 심으셨음니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

17. 어느 해에 통일비를 처음 심었음니까?

18. 귀하의 마을은 대개 동성 가족들로 구성되어 있음니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

19. 귀하의 마을은 농사 일을 위해 어떤 방식으로든지 이웃 마을과 협동을 할까요?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

20. 귀하의 마을은 정부 기관의 후원 아래 생산하는 산물의 질과 양에 있어서 이웃 마을과 경쟁을 함니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

21. 귀하는 금년 여름 세마을 학교에 다녔음니까?
   네 _____ 아니오 _____

22. 귀하는 처음 세마을 운동을 어떻게 아셨음니까?
   신문 _____ 라디오 _____
   신문책자 _____ 친구 _____
   공무원 _____ 기자 _____

23. 귀하의 마을에서 세마을 운동이 해결해 끝 수 있다고 생각되시는 가장 중요한 문제는 무엇입니까? 순서대로 적어 주십시오.

이것으로 질문은 끝났습니다.
줄기운 마음으로 응답하였으리라 믿으면서 귀하의 협조에 감사합니다.
APPENDIX A (4)

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE VILLAGE QUESTIONNAIRE

In Part I

14a. Was there any change in the area of farmland which you have farmed during the last five years?
   No__________
   Increased______
   Decreased_____

14b. Would you like to farm more land than you do now?
   Yes__________
   No__________

New 25. Do you subscribe to an agricultural magazine?
   Yes__________
   No__________

25a. Which of the following do you own?
   Clock__________
   Sewing machine_____
   Radio_________
   Bicycle_________

35a. Which two or three persons do you actually ask when you want advice about the type or amount of fertilizer, insecticide, or new types of rice to use in your field? (Please specify their position or relationship to you.)

36b. Which two or three persons do you actually see if you wanted to talk over what should be done with regard to problems in the village?

36c. Have you recently advised anyone about improving his farming?
   Yes__________
   No__________

37d. Have you recently advised anyone concerning village problems?
   Yes__________
   No__________

37e. How much do city people know about the problems of farmers?
   A lot__________
   A moderate amount__________
   Very little__________
42a. In your opinion, which of the following statements is correct? (Please check the correct one.)

- It is the duty of public officials to provide services to people like myself. 
- It is a personal favor when public officials provide services to people like myself.

46. Can you name the representative from your district in the National Assembly?

47. Can you name the myǒnjang?

In Part III

7a. Does your dwelling have electricity?

Yes___________ No___________

7b. What do you usually use for fuel?

- Wood___________
- Charcoal briquets___________
- Kerosene___________
- Other (specify)___________

15a. What do you think are the reasons for your debt?

- Farm prices are too low
- Too many ceremonial expenses (weddings, funerals, and so on)
- Educational expenses
- Illness
- Cost of farm improvements
- Farm size is too small
- Other (specify)

15b. Would you move away from your village and into a city if you had the chance?

Yes___________ No___________

15c. (If "yes" to previous question.) What would be the main reasons you would leave, if you could?

13a. Which farm tools and equipment do you own?

- Plow
- Carts
- Winnower
- Threshing machine
- Hand wagon
- Hand spray
- Power spray
- Water pump
- Power plow
A New Part IV

The first question in this new Part IV was a semantic differential based on the concept SAEMAUL. It was not reported on in this book.

2. This ladder represents levels in life. The position marked "0" shows the worst possible level you could imagine for yourself. The position marked "10" shows the best possible position you could imagine.

   Now, looking back about five years into the past, where would you place yourself on this ladder? 

3. Where on this ladder do you think you are today? 

4. Where on this ladder do you expect to be about five years from now?
Appendix B

A KEY TO CONCEPTS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire which is reproduced in Appendix A is an extensive instrument intended to tap a multitudinous attitudinal and behavioral space for each of the respondents. Aside from the usual socio-economic background variables, which are generally a part of all questionnaires, the concepts intended to be tapped by this questionnaire are as follows:

Part I

Demographic background questions:
- Sex (item 1)
- Size of residence (item 2)
- Age (item 3)
- Education (item 4)
- Marital status (item 5)
- Number of children (item 6)
- Religion (item 7)
- Military service (item 9)
- Duration of residence (item 10)

Economic status
- Wetland, Dryland (item 14)
- Number of parcels (item 17)
- Distance of parcels (item 18)
- Other income (item 19)
- (the following items are from Part III of the questionnaire):
  - Hire (item 1)
  - Roof type (item 7)
  - Other work (item 11)
  - Ox (working) (item 12)
  - Debt (item 14)
  - Debt increase (item 15)

Urban contact (items 11, 12, 13)
- Media contact (items 24, 25, 26, 27, 30)
- Political interest (items 41, 42)
- Political knowledge (items 43, 44, 45)
- Concern with farm problems (items 28, 29, 34, 35)
- Memberships and leadership (items 22, 23, 31, 32, 33)
- Health (items 20, 21)
- Influence (items 39, 40)

Part II

Attitude toward farming (items 1, 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 29, 43, 49, 55; and from Part III, item 8)
A Key to Concepts

Propensity to change (items 3, 10, 33, 35, 39, 46)
Trust (items 4, 20, 51, 57, 61, 64)
Personal efficacy (items 5, 17, 18, 19, 24, 27, 31, 38, 40, 45, 47, 52)
Village morale (items 6, 13, 20, 23, 27, 30, 34, 41, 59, 63)
Cooperativeness (items 7, 12, 40, 54, 60, and from Part I, items 36, 37, 38)
Personal morale (items 17, 18, 25, 32, 40, 58, 62)
Alienation (items 12, 23, 37, 40, 48, 60)
Authoritarianism (items 21, 24, 28, 44, 50, 53, 56, 65, 66)
Future orientation (items 5, 17, 25, 26, 46)
Familism (items 21, 24, 28, 35, 42, 66)
Attitude toward government (items 24, 28, 31, 45, 52)

Part III

Output, yield (in Part I, item 16; Part III, item 10)
Innovation (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 16, 17)
Clan village (item 18)
Saemaul movement (items 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27)
Appendix C

A BRIEF NOTE ON FACTOR ANALYSIS

Seventy-eight variables and attributes entered the factor analysis, consisting of all the items chosen to depict modernizing behavior, items indicating exposure to the media, items pertaining to the Saemaul program and opinions about it, and the major attitudinal items that loaded most highly on orthogonal (uncorrelated) dimensions of attitudes. This factor analysis of the sixty-six attitudinal items alone is not reported here.1 The technique chosen for this multivariate analysis was factoring. The seventy-eight items were recoded in order to reduce ambiguities, such as extraneous categories. A component factor analysis was chosen2 and the factor matrix obtained was then rotated in accordance with the Varimax criterion, so that an orthogonal factor matrix of twenty-eight dimensions was derived, each factor uncorrelated with the others.3 To readers not familiar with the statistical technique of factoring the process may appear complicated. However, factoring can greatly simplify an analysis of innumerable attributes and variables. From the 78 x 78 matrix of correlations, the mathematical technique operates, first, to select those variables with the largest degree of combined variance (or variance in common) to depict the first factor, deriving successively the uncorrelated (orthogonal) patterns or factors with the next largest degree of common variance, and so on until a cutoff point is reached at which no factor will contain more variance than might be contributed by a single variable; second, to rotate this structure to provide the clearest possible patterns, on which a variable will tend to correlate highly with no more than one or a few of these factors. To interpret the loadings of variables or attributes on each factor, these may be treated as correlations between the attribute and its factor. The squared loading times 100 will indicate roughly the percent of variance contributed to the factor by the attribute. The ease of interpreting possible patterns among a large number of interrelated variables is the chief contribution of factor analysis.4
<table>
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<th>Conversion 2</th>
<th>Conversion 3</th>
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<td>chǒngbo</td>
<td>3,000 pyǒng</td>
<td>9924.1 square meters</td>
<td>2.451 acres</td>
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<tr>
<td>kok</td>
<td>10 tu</td>
<td>147.627 liters</td>
<td>39 gallons</td>
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<tr>
<td>majigi</td>
<td>a field wide enough to be planted with one mal of seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mal</td>
<td>1.6 bushels</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.03 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pyǒng</td>
<td>3.306 square meters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sǒk</td>
<td>176.206 liters</td>
<td>46.55 gallons</td>
<td>5 bushels</td>
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<tr>
<td>tu</td>
<td>10 hop</td>
<td>14.76 liters</td>
<td>3.9 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tanbo</td>
<td>10 chǒngbo</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

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GLOSSARY*

I. Historical Persons Mentioned in Text

Cho Pong-am
Chông Cho
Chông Yag-yong
Hô Pu
Kang Younghill
Kim Il Sung
Kim Yuk
Kim Yun-sik
Kojong, King
Park Chung Hee
Rhee Syngman
Sejo, King
Sejong, King
Sŏngjong, King
Tan-Gun (-wanggom)
Yi Kyu-gyŏng
Yi Sŏng-gye

II. Other Proper Names

banjang
changwŏn
Cheju Province

*I am deeply indebted to Professors Jong-Hae Yoo and Suk R. Hwang for their assistance in the preparation of this glossary.
Glossary

Ch'olla, North
Ch'olla, South
Ch'ollima
ch'ôngbo
ch'ŏnjang
Ch'ŏngju
Ch'ungch'ŏng, North
Ch'ungch'ŏng, South
Han River
Kangwŏn Province
Kimje
kok
Koryŏ Dynasty
Kum River
kunsu
kut
Kwajŏn-pop
Kwangju
kye
kyŏl
Kyŏnggi Province
Kyŏngju
Kyŏngsang, North
Kyŏngsang, South
li
lijiang

선라부도
전라남도
전 리 마
전 보
전 장
전 주
충청북도
충청남도
한 강
강 원도
강 제
곡
고려시대
금강
군 수
옷
파전법
광주
게
결
경기도
경 주
경상북도
경상남도
리
리 장

全羅北道
全羅南道
千里馬
町曳
田莊
清州
忠清北道
忠清南道
漢江
江夏道
全堤
斜
高麗時代
錦江
郡守

料田法
光州
契
結
京畿道
慶州
慶尙北道
慶尙南道
星
里長
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<td>平壤</td>
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<td>새마을 운동</td>
<td>新村运动</td>
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<td>首爾</td>
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<td>시족</td>
<td>氏族</td>
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<td>Silla Dynasty</td>
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<td>新羅時代</td>
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<td>서방</td>
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<td>동학</td>
<td>東學</td>
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<td>tongil</td>
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Glossary
Glossary

won
wu kye
yangban
Yi Dynasty
Yushin

원
우계
양반
이조시대
유신

園
右契
兩班
李朝時代
維新
Chapter 1


2. Hereafter the term Korea will refer to the Republic of Korea, or South Korea.


6. Hatada, p. 43.
9. Han, p. 291, and Henthorn, pp. 140-141.
10. This section, with the accompanying translation on conditions at the time of Kim Yuk, is taken from Ching Young Choe, "Kim Yuk (1580-1658) and the Taedong-bop reform," *Journal of Asian Studies* 23 (1963), pp. 21-35.

11. James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea*, pp. 68-29. The rural upper classes were of course also taxed, but they used influence and bribes to keep their lands off the tax registers, shifting the tax burden all the more onto the peasantry; Palais, pp. 58-59.

12. Palais, pp. 100, 232-233. Some attempt at reform followed this rebellion. The grain loan system, which was rationalized as a means of increasing the welfare of the peasants but which had really become a means of fleecing the peasantry, was reformed. But nothing basic changed; Palais, p. 132.

13. Joe, pp. 422-423. This decrease in population is also recorded by Hoon K. Lee, *Land Utilisation and Rural Economy in Korea*, p. 41 who provides a figure of 647,580 for the decrease in population from 1807 to 1852. From 1852 to 1904 the population dwindled about 13 percent, a condition attributed to maladministration, epidemics, and famine. However, Palais, p. 64, seems to disagree on the decline of population.


17. While Japan became a colonizing power, China's position relative to Korea, Vietnam, and other bordering states was more difficult for the Westerner to interpret. See Melvin Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia*. Some insight into what Japanese colonization meant to the Koreans may be gleaned in Younghill Kang, *The Grass Roof*, especially Chapter XI.

26. Lee, *Land Utilization*, pp. 34 and 256. Over 80 percent of Korea's total trade was with Japan.
36. Hatada, p. 126.
39. There is some indication that most of the fertilizer used by Korean peasants was not artificial fertilizer but the traditional night soil, manure, wood ashes, and compost. Fish and seaweed were used where available, while green manure and mud were preferred for the rice fields. The effective use of legumes was long known in Korea, and soy beans were plowed under in dry fields. See Heydrich, p. 42. Fertilizer was often applied to the individual plant rather than to the soil generally. Osgood found in early post-World War II Korea that ammonium nitrate was generally not liked, for too much would burn up the crop, while tricalcium phosphate "requires too much time." Ammonium sulphate was not readily available after commerce with the North ceased in the 1940s. Osgood, pp. 76-77. Artificial fertilizers are now known and used everywhere.
44. Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution*, pp. 46-47. This is a major theme of Migdal's book.
45. Geographical details of the Korean peninsula may be found in the excellent coverage by Patricia M. Bartz, *South Korea*.


49. Specific information on these reforms is from McCune, pp. 128-139. The assessment on success must be subject to some reservations, for some lands were exempted from the three chǒngbo maximum, for example, in cases of special crops, such as orchards or mulberry trees. Moreover, there is some surreptitious tenancy making a reappearance in the countryside, although its extent is difficult to determine. The interpretation of the effect of the land reform is therefore controversial. One assessment by the Land Economics Research Institute revealed 28.4 percent of farms had reverted to tenancy by 1965, either in whole or in part. See Bartz, p. 66; also Young Bok Koh, "A review of post-war social change in Korea," *Asian Pacific Quarterly* 3:2 (1971), p. 12.

50. Bartz, p. 70.


55. Rossmiller, p. 41.

56. Bartz, p. 59.


59. Hazan, p. 207. It was about 17.3 percent by 1976, in spite of the annual growth rate of the sector of about 7 percent. See *Korea Annual*, 1977, p. 146.

60. Chung, "Industrial progress," p. 450, provides a statement of this classic situation.


62. Ibid., p. 95.

63. Voting studies for the United States done at the University of Michigan suggest the generally slight knowledge and interest of American voters. I heard some peasants' assessments about their vote that are at least as sophisticated as many in urban America: "In Nae-il we voted for former General XXX, thinking that through knowing the president personally, he could improve conditions for our county."

64. Rossmiller, p. 100.

65. Hazan, p. 53. Hazan points out that the dramatic rise of the world price of rice in 1973 almost eliminated the difference with Korea's domestic price.

66. *Korea Annual*, 1977, p. 145. The purchase price of barley was also increased by 18.5 percent over the previous year.


69. For a description of this, see Cole and Lyman, p. 209.


73. Cole and Lyman, p. 167.
76. Kim Il Sung, Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Korea, p. 2.
77. Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, Development Reconsidered, Chapter 4 and p. 86.
78. Ibid., p. 110.
80. Bartz, p. 76. Korea has lately been the world's largest exporter of silk products.
82. Rossmiller, p. 102.
83. Economic Survey, 1971, p. 12, and Rossmiller, p. 16. There were 2,488,000 rural households in 1970 and a rural population of 15,589,000, a decline of 7.4 percent from the previous year, according to the Economic Survey, p. 37. By the end of 1973 there were 2,336,000 rural households with an estimated farm population of 12,785,000; see Korea Annual, 1977, p. 146.
84. Tongil, "new rice," is one of the results of the experiments at Los Baños in the Philippines. The goal of the experiments in Korea was to introduce a high-yield, high protein, early-maturing, short stiff-strawed, lodging resistant, fertilizer-responsive rice variety. In addition to these characteristics Tongil, IR 667, was also intended to have resistance to cold, disease (blast), and insects such as the leaf hopper. The product of the Los Baños "miracle rices" crossed with Japanese varieties in order to adapt it to a temperate climate, IR 667 was expected ultimately to increase yields by at least 30 percent. In 1970-71 Tongil was cultivated in some 500 areas under strict government supervision. These demonstration plots provided seed for planting the new rice on some 200,000 hectares of the total 1.2 million hectares of riceland in Korea. This planting was partially controlled by the government, but the disappointing results (well documented by our data), partly a result of inclement weather and breaking and shattering, caused the Ministry of Agriculture to make planting Tongil fully voluntary, while strongly recommending its planting. Some 450,000 hectares of riceland may ultimately be planted in Tongil. Besides the agronomical problems encountered, Korean consumers had not yet accepted the taste characteristics of Tongil. Because of taste preferences, Korean peasants raise about eighty varieties of rice, which might surprise some Westerners for whom "rice is rice." See Rossmiller, p. 43; Economic Survey, 1971, pp. 45-6; Bartz, p. 70; UN Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, p. 57; The Korea Times, January 25, 1973.
86. Most of the foregoing information has been taken from "New Community Movement." Hahm, Chapter V, provides several tables showing the organization of the program.
87. There was also some evidence of coercion. The Korea Times, April 27, 1973, reported the arrest of a village chief and a Saemaul movement leader who had allegedly beaten an uncooperative villager. Some fourteen other villagers were implicated in the incident. Saemaul savings drives required villagers to deposit money into a savings account when purchasing motor tillers, pumps, and the like, albeit at an annual interest of 11 percent. See The Korea Herald, February 19, 1973.
88. Hahm, p. 168.
89. Events such as farm improvement programs are not likely to achieve the drama necessary to penetrate the foreign news media, but one article by Richard
Notes to Chapters 1 and 2

Halloran, "South Korean farm wife finds her life is improving a little," *New York Times*, October 15, 1973, did appear, suggesting, by detailing the life of the village of Dabne-Ri, twenty-five miles from Seoul, that the program could show positive effects, although conditions were still not easy for the peasants. Into this backward village some improvements were penetrating, and some villagers were better off. This portrayal seems representative of many Korean villages.

90. According to Rossmiller, pp. 56-7, the Korean Electric Company served 19.6 percent of Korea's farm villages, while 1.2 percent generated their own electricity, although Nae-il was expecting a power line in the near future.


94. Hahm, pp. 94-5.
95. Information on the new constitution has been checked with the text given in Edward Reynolds Wright, ed., *Korean Politics in Transition*, pp. 357-383. This book also contains a number of fine essays providing a background for Korean politics.


Chapter 2

1. There are rare exceptions to this unrelieved picture. Hubert H. Tiltman, *Peasant Europe*, draws a less depressing picture of the Croatian peasants between the two world wars.

2. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, pp. 123-124. Marx is incorrect in stating that science cannot be applied on peasant holdings, and anthropologists might disagree with the statement that the village offers no variety of talent or wealth of social relationships. Nonetheless, as a broad explanation of the political powerlessness of the peasantry as a group, the statement is trenchant.


4. This is not to say that this is an inevitable condition with the peasantry. Long before modern communication systems, Buddhism spread throughout the Khmer countryside, a genuine grass-roots movement in contrast to the official doctrine of Hindu cosmology, through face-to-face contacts of proselytizing monks. Anarchism was preached in certain areas of Spain in the nineteenth century by means of itinerant speakers and was successful in raising some rural demands to a manifest level; on this, see E. J. Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels*, pp. 88 ff. In Indonesia the Communist party led by D. N. Aidit articulated peasant demands, although the party center itself was not a peasant organization, and its ultimate goal was the aim of a collectivized agriculture, an aim seldom emanating from the peasants themselves. This is, of course, an issue of great controversy, and Communist regimes have always taken pains to stress the spontaneous enthusiasm of the peasant "masses" at the prospect of collectivization. There is probably some real support here from agricultural laborers, perhaps from some tenants, but probably from few landowning peasants, whatever the size of their holdings.
It is significant that collectivization as proposed, for instance, by Mao Tse-tung, always proceeds through stages, the first of these generally being land reform in the sense of land redistribution to the peasants; see Mao Tse-tung, "Different tactics for carrying out the land law in different areas," Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 193-194.

5. Recent research conducted on monkey brains shows the effect of nutrition on the development of the brain. The ability to conceptualize in humans is based on areas of the brain in which cells continue to proliferate at various stages of human growth up to about the age of eleven or twelve. In cases of malnutrition, the growth of these areas is stunted, resulting in a permanent mental incapacity. The devastations wrought among Korean peasants during the annual spring famines, described in the Introduction, must have made it appear that they were indeed in certain generations a truly different race of mankind. It must have been difficult to imagine reforms that would raise their standard of living and cultural accomplishments as a group. Information on the monkey experiments is based on personal communications.

6. "Based on my observations, the farmers in the Korean agricultural economy are behaving in accord with the principles of economics; namely, the individual resource holders in the Korean agriculture are trying to utilize the limited resources for the best alternatives," according to Jin H. Park, "Effects of increasing commercialization on resource use in semi-subistence farms in South Korea," in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, p. 208.

7. Guy Hunter, Modernizing Peasant Societies, p. 137, says "In discussion of developing farm practice ... discussion as to whether farmers are economic men is not necessary: peasants have repeatedly proved as good or better economists than those who advise them--and not unnaturally: their life depends on it."

8. On the whole, the questions posed on the questionnaire were not difficult for peasants, although discussion with some of them indicated that they found the attitudinal section to be the most difficult, for the nature of these questions were novel to them. This must be borne in mind as a possible disadvantage of the questionnaire technique.


11. The Ministry was asked to distribute questionnaires to winter schools throughout Korea in "as random a fashion as possible." Evidence in the returned questionnaires indicated that the Ministry complied with our request. However, the sample of 1,430 returned questionnaires cannot be considered a true, independent random sample. The reported statistics must, therefore, be regarded as only illustrative. Work with the data and comparisons with other studies convince me that these data are representative of Korean peasants. Reservations about representativeness are mentioned in connection with village data in Chapter 5.

12. There is at least one cogent argument that statistical tests used in surveys are never technically sound. I do not accept the full implications of such a position, however, and am more in agreement with the rejoinder by Leslie Kish. For this instructive interchange see Hanan C. Selvin, "A critique of tests of significance in survey research," pp. 94-106, and Leslie Kish, "Some statistical problems in research design," pp. 127-141, in Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, The Significance Test Controversy.

13. The original questions were translated with the help of Mr. Won-taek Han, a graduate student at Yonsei University. Several consultants were of great help in improving this original translation, including Professors Chung-Hyun Ro, Jong-Hae Yoo, Tae-Dong Chung, and Suk-Bum Yun. Another critic familiar with rural
conditions and opinions was consulted with regard to the final draft of the ques-
tionnaire.


15. Among several helpful general sources for questions were Ki Hyuk Pak, Woong Bin Han, Ki Hong Lee, Jin Hwan Park, Kee Chun Han, A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea; Clifford Kaufmann, a questionnaire for the study of lower income respondents in Mexico City; Joseph A. Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism; David Horton Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A comparative socio-psychological measure of individual modernity." These authors have been quite influential in this area of research, and their work has recently been more fully presented in Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries; Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment, Frances C. Madigan, The Farmer Said No; Public Opinion Quarterly 22:3 (Fall 1958), the entire number of which is devoted to problems of survey research in modernizing societies; International Social Science Journal 15:1 (1963), another volume on problems of surveys in developing countries; Everett M. Rogers, Modernisation Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication; Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes; John Williams, a questionnaire designed to study peasant agriculture in Malaysia; and Yasamada Kuroda, a questionnaire designed to study urban Japanese.

16. There is at least one article on this topic in political science, Robert B. Stauffer, "The biopolitics of underdevelopment," Comparative Political Studies 2 (1969), pp. 361-387.

17. Richard Rutt, Korean Works and Days, p. 46, where a perceptive observer of Korean village life calls attention to the importance of pharmacists and self-administered patent medicines.

18. John C. Williams, in conducting research among villagers in Malaysia, found that the peasants there preferred the three-category scale rather than the extended Likert scale. His advice on this matter is appreciated.

19. Some of these questions for village and personal morale elicit the type of responses associated with the concept of self-esteem. For a recent discussion of this concept see L. Edward Wells and Gerald Marwell, Self-Esteem, Its Conceptualization and Measurement.

20. The conditions under which the survey was conducted made it desirable to construct an instrument that would take approximately one hour for the respondents to complete. This was accomplished.

21. That village cooperativeness is also intertwined with the fabric of the larger society must also be borne in mind in the course of the analysis. Sociologists point out that the level of activity of any group is contingent upon the requirements and constraints of the external system, which for the peasant would be the urban Great Society. Studies by Homans show the disintegration of American communities that have become "bedroom communities" or satellites of larger communities. As the requirements of villages decrease, that is, as more and more services are provided by the urban sector, sociologists would predict the decline of levels of activity, friendship, and interaction. There is little doubt that more and more of the former functions of the village community are being provided by the environment external to the village. For this argument, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction, p. 137.


24. Ibid., p. 132.

25. See, e.g., The Canonical Textbook of Won Buddhism, pp. 35-36.
27. Rogers, *Modernization Among Peasants*, pp. 150 and 158-159. Like Rogers, I have also included ample attitudinal aspects of cosmoiplitanism, such as some of the questions on village morale, and some behavioral aspects, such as media questions.
28. A *majigi* is a field wide enough to be planted with one *mal* (3.9703 gallons) of seed. It is a common description of field size.
29. Some land rearrangement has already been carried out in Korea. An interesting map showing the effects of rationalizing land arrangements in the counties of Kyungsan and Yungchun is in Shao-er Ong, *Developing the small farm economy in Asia,* in *Asian Agricultural Survey,* p. 646.
30. Rogers, *Modemizing the Peasantry,* p. 181. Celia Castillo, "A critical view of a subculture of peasantry," pp. 140-141, warns that nonacceptance of innovation may simply imply a lack of resources. This point has been taken to heart, and a number of resource questions, such as size of land holdings, have been included.
31. There is documentation on this; see Gerald Gordon, *Role Theory and Illness.*
34. This point is made in *Popular Participation in Development,* p. 22, in speaking of rural development, "Equally important is the revolutionization of rural occupations so that young people can have reason to want to engage in rural pursuits and be proud to be so occupied." Galtung, *Two Worlds,* pp. 190-191 and 210-211, provides the argument that successful peasants are also likely to be among the movers. The national and village data will provide a test of this finding.
35. See Alonzo M. Myster, "Further validation of the Wert-Myster farming attitude scale," *Rural Sociology* 9 (1944), pp. 226-232. The scale is reproduced in Shaw and Wright, pp. 120-123.
36. As opportunities arise elsewhere, even Taiwanese peasants who do earn a good living from the land want their sons to move toward other occupations, according to Bernard Gallin, "Chinese peasant values toward the land," in *Peasant Society,* p. 374. An Italian survey, taken in 1948, found only 14 percent of Italian parents wanted their sons to be agricultural workers, Joseph Lopreato, "How would you like to be a peasant?" in *ibid.* p. 427.
42. Hoon Lee, p. 98.
43. Some items for the scale of familism were drawn from D. A. Bardis, "A familism scale," reviewed in Shaw and Wright, pp. 416-418.
44. Ki Hyuk Pak and Sidney D. Gamble, *Three Clan Villages in Korea,* *A Study of Rural Life in Transition* (in manuscript, 1969) discusses several types of villages. The questionnaire distinguished only between single-name and other villages.
45. Osgood, p. 39.
46. For comments on this point, see Michael T. Hannan, *Aggregation and Disaggregation in Sociology,* p. 7.
Notes to Chapters 2 and 3

47. The lijiang is selected by the government, but the Saemaul leaders are popularly elected men and women, subject to replacement by the village assembly; William W. Boyer and Byong Man Ahn, "The New Community Movement ("Saemaul Undong") in South Korea," p. 57.

48. Hoon Lee, Land Utilization, p. 255. Palais notes that kyes were organized in the Yi Dynasty to equalize taxes; see Palais, pp. 99-100 and note 5 in Chapter 5.

49. See Lee, Land Utilization, pp. 52-53.


51. Thus this study attempts to redress the omission mentioned by Rogers of studying innovations rather than farm production. The problems of accuracy of these reports remains, however. See Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, p. 260, n. 26.

52. I noted one group of Koreans awaiting a bus in Kyongju outside an antique store that featured old coins and bills. One of the group began to simulate a limp, and this brought a gale of laughter from his companions. One of the bills had a portrait of Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Japanese minister plenipotentiary to China, who was injured by a bomb planted by Korean revolutionaries in the 1930s. The memory of this minor victory against Japan still elicited an enthusiastic response over thirty-five years after the event.

53. A far cry from a 1931 survey of 1,256 farm households that found only 5.9 percent of the homes tiled and the remainder thatched. See Hoon Lee, p. 207. It might be thought that any program for the improvement of village homes and family amenities was irrelevant to economic development. Arthur T. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving, p. 109, argues the impact of raising the hopes of villages for a better life on increased agricultural production.


Chapter 3

1. Portions of this section are based on a factor analytic study of attitudes in Willard D. Keim, "The attitudes of Korean peasants."

2. Somewhat earlier than this research, the proportion of the peasants' crop marketed was estimated to be 38 percent. Although profits were slight, observers remarked on the market orientation of Korean peasants. See Bartz, p. 66.

3. Joel S. Migdal, "Why change? Toward a new theory of change among individuals in the process of modernization," World Politics 26 (1974), pp. 189-206. Michael Armer and Allan Schnaiberg, "Measuring individual modernity: a near myth," American Sociological Review (1972), pp. 301-316. This is certainly one of the reasons Mosher, p. 175, argues that planning should be directed at increasing the profitability of farming more than at increasing production. The economist T. W. Schultz emphasizes economic stimuli almost to the exclusion of other social and cultural factors. For an argument against this overemphasis, see Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, pp. 312-313.


5. Myster, pp. 226-232. The scale is also provided in Shaw and Wright, Scales for Measurement of Attitudes, pp. 120-121.
6. Some findings from one such survey were conveyed to me by Mr. Sang Kyu Lee, a participant observer in a poor district of Seoul while a student at Yonsei University.


10. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter, p. 517. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 100, Table 9, provides the following interesting result:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Transitional</th>
<th>Modern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, since the same questions were not used in these studies and in the Korean study, the results may not be strictly comparable.

11. Bartz, South Korea.


13. Relationships with some of these variables will be tested in the next section. For an interesting discussion of self-esteem, see L. Edward Wells and Gerald Marwell, Self Esteem, especially pp. 14-35. These findings on self-esteem are somewhat like those Brandt found among the villagers of Sokp'o; Brandt, A Korean Village, p. 14.


16. A major study that contains this theme is Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Corroboration of this conclusion may be found in other sources, such as Yosinaru Huzoka, "Rorschach test in farming villages of North Thailand," Nature and Life in Southeast Asia, Vol. III, pp. 139-174, and our own village study, for which consult Table 5.5.

17. Readers familiar with factor analytic results may be disappointed in correlations at the level of 0.30. Analysis of aggregated data of a census and economic type almost always uncovers higher correlations and more coherent patterns. It is the nature of the data that makes this difference.

18. Jyung Han Rhi laments the fact that the cooperatives had to be organized, like the Saemaul movement, from above although there seemed to be no alternative initially. The old agricultural cooperatives were merged into the agricultural bank in 1961 to create the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation which by the following year had a membership of 2,197,000, or about 94.4 percent of the heads of farm households. See Jyung Han Rhi, "The present and the future of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of Korea," Koreana Quarterly 4:2
Notes to Chapter 3

(1962), pp. 45-47. The NACF has been the largest supplier of credit in the agricultural sector, and it has from time to time supplied most of the productive inputs to the peasants, such as fertilizer and other farm chemicals. By controlling the prices of inputs and affecting the prices of outputs through price support or stabilizing schemes, the NACF and the Ministry of Agriculture have had a strong effect on farm income and rural change. See Cole and Lyman, p. 198; Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, p. 59; Rossmiller, Sector Analysis, p. 33. Membership in the NACF was not assessed for it is nearly universal, as these figures show.

19. Most peasants certainly do not regard the upper limit of three chŏngbo as restrictive. The optimal farm size for one family may be about 27 tanbo; since 10 tanbos equal one chŏngbo, this would mean somewhat less than a three chŏngbo holding. Ki Hyuk Pak et al., A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea, p. 473.

20. It had been assumed, of course, that the growing of commercial crops would be specifically related to acceptance of innovations, behaviorally and attitudinally. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving, p. 83, says that the past record of agricultural development clearly shows that peasants accept innovation in their cash crops more readily than in crops grown for home consumption. Peasants, he suggests, are more willing to spend money for these if they are to be used in producing a crop that brings in money. Rogers also found (see "Motivations, Values, and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers," in Wharton, p. 120) that subsistence farmers have lower rates of achievement motivation than commercial farmers in the same villages. But there is a blurring of these distinctions in Korea, for while certain crops are commonly designated by the peasants as commercial crops, rice is also grown commercially, with over a third of the crop on an average marketed. This may be the reason that no hypothesized findings were strongly associated with the growing of the designated commercial crops, such as tobacco and ginseng, in the factor analysis. However, DECISION did show a relationship to COMCROP in cross-tabulation results, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>COMCROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myself</td>
<td>Yes: 52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Yes: 45.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was also a comparable relationship between raising commercial crops and listening to agricultural programs on the radio, similar to the above percentages. This indicates that the raising of commercial crops is related to some form of prior innovative behavior, but it may not stimulate any further innovations of itself. Listening to agricultural radio programs also was related to growing Tongil, with about the same strength of association in the table above.

21. This attribute was dichotomized as follows: 1) Use insecticide before plants are attacked, or both before and after; 2) use insecticide after plants are attacked.

22. While it is hoped that this tentative conclusion is wrong, there are historical and social reasons that buttress it in Korea. For centuries education was oriented to the civil service, an escape from the rural environment rather than a factor in its improvement. This attitude is still embedded in the curriculum. The student who gets his lessons well may be able to attend the university and not remain a peasant.

23. For some suggestion of this, see Rutt, pp. 86-89.

24. Two Worlds, p. 129.
25. This may be because "fatalism" permits the possibility of innovative success as well as failures, as Rogers suggests, *Modernization Among Peasants*, p. 277.

26. This factor reveals an identifiable pattern of cosmopolitanism (familiarity with national affairs) among Korean peasants. See Rogers, *Modernization Among Peasants*, pp. 162-163. Like Rogers, we found a relationship to exposure to mass media, but there was no identification with other facilities of modernization.

27. More significant results concerning physical well-being will be forthcoming in the village analysis, Chapter 5.

28. I am skeptical about some conclusions presented by Pak and Gamble, *Three Clan Villages*, as a general principle about modernization.

29. Yet commercial fertilizer use did become almost universal as early as the 1930s under the Japanese. The point is that innovation *per se* did not gain in dignity during the colonial era.


Chapter 4

1. Nash, p. 119, suggests that the vast and unnecessary upheaval in the lives of peasants in the process of economic change is caused by just this perception of themselves as passive agents, "as expendable material in economic plans."

Chapter 5


2. While the national study had the cooperation of the Ministry of Education, the two-village study relied on the cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Having learned of the area in which the villages were to be selected, the personnel of this Ministry recommended other areas as more representative and, indeed, as more progressive in farming techniques. When these suggestions were declined, however, no barriers were set up to prevent the free choice of villages within the chosen region. In fact, all the personnel of the Korean government were most cooperative, although the interviewing and visits to the village were made without official sponsorship. This was to prevent possible bias in responses that might have been produced by the presence of a member of the bureaucracy.

3. Rutt, pp. 196-197, comments on the expense of funerals and ancestral sacrifice.

4. The training and direction of the field interviewers were very competently handled by Mr. Lee Kwang-Joo.

5. August is generally not so busy, but harvests run through September and October, after which the fields must be cleared. For a clear and detailed account of rice culture in Korea in the 1930s, which was not so different than in 1973, see

6. This point is made by Galtung, p. 132.

7. However, it will be recalled that in the national sample, this did not prove to be the case, clan villages forming a pattern all to themselves. The anticipations concerning clan villages are based on several sources, e.g., Pak and Gamble, *Three Clan Villages in Korea*. Since neither of the two villages was a clan village, our interest was in memberships *per se*. The *kye* is "a pattern of experience shared by most Koreans," according to Gerard F. Kennedy, "The Korean *kye*: Maintaining human scale in a modernizing society," *Korean Studies* 1 (1977), pp. 201-202. The modal type of *kye* is the mutual aid society which assesses an equal amount of voluntary aid at the time of a marriage or funeral among members. In addition, there are money making, industry (irrigation or reclamation), public welfare (public works projects), and social or friendship *kyes* Kennedy, p. 216, remarks that the *kye* is a high-risk commitment based on mutual trust. He also warns against accepting uncritically the official opinion that *kyes* are unproductive.

8. The *Korean Herald*, November 19, 1972, provided a definition of the government's categorization of villages. The *Herald*, by the way, is the government's English-language paper and should be interpreted accordingly.


10. Responses on education were forthcoming in the national sample, but villagers seemed reluctant to respond. Both surveys encountered a lack of response to questions about religion, possibly because of the very complex religious background of Korea. The interviewers for the village data were agricultural students from the college in the nearest city. Perhaps the villagers did not wish to reveal a lack of education to students many of whom were younger. With this exception, responses were quite complete; the students themselves, being from the same region, had similar rural roots, and presumably were empathetic to village problems.

11. Interesting case studies of family finance may be found in John E. Mills, ed., *Ethno-Sociological Reports of Four Korean Villages*.


13. This brief depiction of citizens and subjects is drawn from Almond Verba, *The Civic Culture*.

14. A point made by Owens and Shaw, p. 22.

15. Discriminant analysis has been of interest in the fields of marketing and education. For a clear discussion, see the articles on the technique in David A. Aaker, ed., *Multivariate Analysis in Marketing: Theory and Application*, Section C. The program used in this chapter was the stepwise procedure of the SPSS discriminant program.

16. As in previous chapters, significance is used only in an illustrative way, since these villagers were not a sample from a larger population. Moreover, since responses were obtained from all heads of households, we may be said to have tapped the entire village population, so that in a sense any difference is significant.

17. Thirty-five factors had originally been selected. The twenty-seven factors actually used contained approximately 73 percent of the total variance and were rotated to determine the patterns among variables.

18. This most useful device was adapted from Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns*. It was not used in the national sample for fear of burdening the Saemaul teachers with too many instructions and making the questionnaire unwieldy.
Chapter 6

1. This is especially well brought out in the essays contained in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences*. In addition, conversations with Mattei Dogan on a projected survey in France show that the questionnaire survey can be more multi-leveled than is usually the case.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 240-241. This book is one of the most astute texts on the problems of political choice in the developing polities. Indeed, it is my guess that advisors to the Korean government are thoroughly familiar with its principles, and it is easy to see in this quotation one role that the Saemaul movement was intended to fulfill.

3. Ibid., p. 22.

Appendix C

1. It is reported in detail in Willard D. Keim, "The attitudes of Korean peasants," pp. 65-100. The results of this analysis provided attitudinal items that were representative of several dimensions or patterns and relatively separate, or uncorrelated, among themselves.

2. The first step of the factor analysis is a correlation matrix. For a small matrix of correlations among twelve or so variables, I recommend a common factor analysis, i.e., the extraction of common variance alone rather than common together with unique variance. But in a large 76 x 76 correlation matrix there is little difference in the results of the two types of factoring.

3. The program selected for the analysis was the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences component analysis and rotation. The results were then reviewed against a comparable analysis carried out with the BMD-X72 program which was, within rounding errors, very similar. The SPSS results are discussed here. An oblique rotation, when compared to the orthogonal results, did not contribute significantly to the clarity of interpretation.

4. The best complete discussion of the technique for the social scientist is R. J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis*. Also good is Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis*. The logic of rotation is well explained in L. L. Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis*. For a short introduction to interpreting factor results, see R. J. Rummel, "Understanding factor analysis," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11 (1967), pp. 444-480. A basic discussion of the number of factors to extract is provided by R. B. Cattell, "Extracting the correct number of factors in factor analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 18 (1958), pp. 791-837. The criterion used in this analysis was the eigenvalue 1.0, a cut-off point that substantively means factor removal so long as the variance on any single factor is at least equal to the variance expected from a single variable.
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Willard D. Keim was born in Fairbury, Nebraska in 1932. His first trip to Korea occurred in 1953-54, in the first bleak year following the war on that peninsula. He received an undergraduate degree in political science at Northwestern University in 1958. Following several years as an editor in the social sciences for an encyclopedia, he received a fellowship to the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West from 1963 to 1965. In 1969 he received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Hawaii. Professor Keim returned to Korea in 1972-73 as a Fulbright lecturer at Yonsei University. He presently teaches political science at Hilo College in Hilo, Hawaii, focusing on international relations, foreign policy, and political analysis and methodology. His hobbies include chess and chang'gi 🧳.
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