VI

THE INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
JUNE 1933-MARCH 1934

Direct Causes

The period of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement was Prince De's golden age. The movement made him the world-famous leader of his people and also symbolized the unified will of all of Inner Mongolia. This movement, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Mongols and not directed by any alien power, was the most monumental event in the history of modern Mongolia but also the beginning of an historical tragedy. If there had been no Prince De, there might not have been this type of Mongolian nationalistic movement; if there had not been such a movement, Prince De might not have become the leader of the Mongol struggle for self-determination and the hero of this historical tragedy.

Here is a brief review of the historical background to the movement. After the Anglo-French Invasion (also known as the Second Opium War, 1857-1860) and the expansion of Tsarist Russia, the Manchu court began to change its policy toward Mongolia. In order to stem the flow of Russian influence, the court ceased isolating Mongolia from China Proper as a forbidden land and began to encourage Chinese peasants to migrate and fill up the “borderland.” After the number of Chinese settlers reached a certain level, the Manchu court established a Chinese style of political administration to handle Chinese affairs in the territories of the Mongolian leagues and banners. By the end of the dynasty, the court had increased the power of the Manchu ambans in order to draw Mongolia more completely into the Chinese realm. This action backfired and led to the declaration of Outer Mongolian independence in 1911 and its achievement during subsequent decades. Although the policy of the Manchus toward Mongolia had failed in Outer Mongolia, the Republic of China stubbornly continued the Manchu policy toward Inner Mongolia, without change.

In 1928, when China was temporarily unified by the KMT, the Inner Mongols began to oppose the establishment of Chinese-style administrative districts on their territory. This opposition stemmed from the Mongols’ desire to protect their own political and economic privileges. Although the Chinese government did not abolish the Mongolian leagues and banners, it nevertheless neglected the desires of the Mongols and pushed through its benighted policy of sinicization. Later, the government promulgated the Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners to protect the traditional Mongolian political institutions and evenly divide the power between the provinces and xians on one hand and the leagues and banners on the other. However, the powerful frontier authorities ignored this law. Nor did the government fully protect the feudal privileges of the Mongol nobles, and most of the hard-line Mongolian conservatives, including Prince De, resented this.

Ethnic differences between the Chinese and Mongols were reflected and magni-
fied by the existence of two types of administrative frameworks in the same territory. Conflict was, of course, inevitable. Moreover, because the central government usually favored the provinces and xians, the status of the Mongolian administrations became more inferior than ever. And because of provincial obstacles, relations between the Mongolian leagues and banners and the central government were greatly damaged. In addition, the northern warlords, acting as provincial governors, constantly disobeyed the orders of the central government; even if some of the central government’s decisions would have been beneficial to the Mongols, the provincial governors usually ignored these decisions. Thus the situation in Inner Mongolia during the first decades of this century antagonized the provinces and diminished Mongol confidence in the central government.

Ever since the Manchu court began to encourage Chinese migration to and cultivation of Mongolian territory, “Mongolian bandits” had been active in resistance. After the Kuomintang government was established in Nanjing, the Shanxi warlords had Fu Zuoyi (the governor of Suiyuan) and Wang Jingguo (the commander of the Shanxi forces in the Baotou district) carry out by force the policy of military cultivation of Mongolian territory so as to provide livelihoods for the multitude of discharged soldiers and landless, jobless Chinese farmers. The warlords’ attitudes toward the Mongols were no different from those of Feng Yuxiang and Zou Zuohua during the 1920s.

Strong animosity arose between the Mongol herders and the Chinese agricultural settlers. From the Mongol point of view, the continuing increase of Chinese migration and cultivation would eventually reduce the size of the Mongol grazing fields and hurt the Mongols’ livelihood. These Mongol anxieties were intensified by the fact that Chinese cultivation of Mongolian territory usually began on prime pastures with the best grass and water. If these lands were completely occupied by Chinese, then the Mongols would have to retreat to inferior pasture areas. For these reasons, the Mongols regarded the influx of Chinese agricultural settlers as a dangerous threat to the survival of their people.

In 1930, the Mongolian Convention passed the “Resolution for Protection of the Livelihood of the Mongol People,” which states that all Mongolian land unsuitable for cultivation should be preserved as pasture forever, that lands suitable for agrarian use might be put under cultivation only through the consent of the concerned banner(s), and that a portion of this cultivated land should be preserved for the improvement of the livelihood of the Mongols. Even though this resolution passed, the frontier provinces and military governors ignored it, and Chinese cultivation continued as before. Under such conditions, most Mongolian political leaders, intellectuals, and common people wanted drastic change in order to ensure their survival as a people.

The Western imperialist invasions awoke the Chinese people and stimulated the growth of both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism. The Outer Mongolian Independence movement of 1911 greatly excited the Inner Mongolian ruling class and common people, whether they supported it or not. Although the Pan-Mongolian movement advocated by the Buriyad Mongols failed by the end of the First World War, it had considerable impact on Mongol leaders and intellectuals. The call for national self-determination by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points; the emergence of the republics, autonomous republics, and minority areas in the Soviet Union; and especially the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924 immensely gladdened the hearts of Mongol intellectuals. When the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, it had leftist inclinations and propagandized for the unification of the two Mongolias.

The main contact between the Inner Mongols and the Chinese Kuomintang started with the victorious Northern Expedition of 1927. The main KMT doctrine which
The Last Mongol Prince

attracted the Mongols was the fourth article of the *Outline of Nation Building* written by party founder Sun Yat-sen: “Regarding the weak and minority nationalities inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” The Mongols thought optimistically that the success of the KMT would create a new future for Mongolia and bring about self-determination and self-rule. They waited in vain for five years for this promise to materialize. Their disappointment did not, however, deter them in their struggle for self-determination and self-rule; indeed, this bitter disappointment made them even more resolute in their demands.

The Chinese government could not protect the rights of the leagues and banners and the livelihood of the herdsmen. Nor did the government abolish the old feudalistic institutions and push through democracy as it had promised. In fact, the KMT government even continued the Manchu religious policy of using the high lamas to deceive the people. This, not unexpectedly, created distrust and disappointment among both the conservative ruling nobles and the liberal-minded intellectuals.

By 1933, the Japanese had already annexed the eastern half of Inner Mongolia. Their policy toward the western half was to manipulate the old lord-vassal relationship between Puyi and the Mongolian princes and sought alliance with these princes. It was evident that if the Mongols were not able to unify themselves, the result would be catastrophic. At this crucial juncture, many patriotic Mongols concerned with national survival sought a solution to this crisis. Moreover, the top Chinese officials of the frontier provinces, especially Chahar and Suiyuan, continuously pressed forward with Chinese cultivation of Mongolian territory without regard to the Japanese expansion. The confusion and depression in East Asia, the aggression of Japan, difficulties in the Soviet Union, disturbances caused by the Chinese Communists, and incompetence of the Chinese government all inspired Prince De and his followers to take a courageous step forward and advocate political autonomy for Inner Mongolia.

**The Condition of the Leagues and Banners**

The young intellectuals who had gathered under Prince De’s leadership were waiting for an opportune moment to act and realized that this was the best time for them to make a decisive move. Prince De had already established a high reputation for himself, and his name often appeared in the newspapers. Although he was broadly supported by young and zealous Mongol intellectuals, he had still not reached a position of prominence among the traditional-minded local ruling princes. Moreover, after three centuries of domination under the Manchu policy of fragmentation, it was very difficult for a broad based political leader to emerge from among the Mongols themselves. Consequently, the initiation of any new political movement had to have the support and agreement of these prestigious princes and nobles.

Among the *jasags* of the ten banners of the Shilingol League, except for Prince De’s own Sunid Right Banner, he was only able to persuade Prince Rinchinwangdud (of the Sunid Left Banner), Magsurjab and Khorjurjab (two “princes in leisure” of the same banner), Shognodongrob (Prince of the Abaga Right Banner), and Sodnamnuobu (the ruling *beile* of the Abkhanar Right Banner) to support him. Although young Budabala was the Abaga Left Banner’s ruling *jasag*, his father Yangsang, the aged ex-head of the league, still wielded the real power. This old prince was at first sympathetic to Prince De and even tried to pass his post as league head to him in order to block Prince Sodnamrabdan’s promotion to that prestigious position. Later, however, Prince Yangsang came to
believe that Prince De was too ambitious and was always trying to initiate something new. As a result, he turned away from Prince De.

Agdungga, the ruling *beile* of the Abkhanar Left Banner, always followed the directions of Prince Yangsang because of tradition and because his banner was geographically close to Abaga. Other princes, such as Sangdagdorji (of the Khauchid Right Banner), Sungjingwangchug (of the Khauchid Left Banner), and Duke Dobdan (a *tusalagchi* in charge of the *jasag* of the Ujumuchin Left Banner), were all faithful followers of Prince Sodnamrabdan of the Ujumuchin Right Banner, then the head of Shilingol League. Among them, Sungjingwangchug was a good personal friend of Prince So. In other words, even in his own league, the status of Prince De was limited.

In the Ulanchab League, the Dorben Keuked (also known as Dorbob) Banner was close to Sunid geographically, but Pandeigungchab, the prince of this banner, was somewhat mentally unbalanced. Taking advantage of this shortcoming, Fu Zuoyi used him as a political puppet against Mongolian interests. The real power of this banner was in the hands of *tusalagchi* Dewagenden. Fortunately, this man felt goodwill toward Prince De and tried earnestly to find a way to reconcile Wu Heling and Prince De.

The land of the West Gung Banner, located near the Great Bend of the Yellow River, was rich and fertile. By the end of the Manchu domination, Chinese settlers had taken over these good lands backed by the harsh oppression of Mongols by General Yigu, and the Mongols and the Chinese immigrants were in constant conflict. By then, this land had become a political target of Fu Zuoyi and his Suiyuan Provincial Government. These outside influences brought about a split among the Mongols: one faction determined to resist unconditionally, the other wanted conciliation. In general, most of the Ulanchab leaders neither associated closely with Prince De nor had any ill feelings against him. The situation of Yekejuu League was very difficult to predict.1

1 The head of the league, Prince Yondonwangchug, was originally the *jasag* of the Khalkha Right Banner (commonly known as Darkhan Beil). He later retired and made his nephew Gendenjab the *jasag*. Another nephew, Shirabdorji, was the *tusalagchi* of the banner. Shirabdorji’s family was well-known and quite prestigious in this league. Although Prince Yon was a faithful devotee of the Law of Buddha and had no personal political ambition, he was a man of strong determination. Because of his opposition to Chinese cultivation of Mongolian territory, he never compromised with Fu Zuoyi. The well-known Beile-yin sume temple (Bailingmiao) was located at Bat-khaalag, about forty kilometers south of his residence. Muuminggan, the neighboring banner to the southwest of Darkhan-beile, was too small both in population and land to play a large role. The three banners of Urad occupied half the area of the entire league. Of these banners, the Central Banner (commonly known as the Middle Gung) was the largest. The *jasag* Babudorji was quite influential, and his banner well ruled. Both the Right and Left Banners (commonly known as the West Gung and East Gung), had however, suffered from internal power struggles and Chinese oppression for several decades.

2 The seven Ordos banners of the Yekejuu League, located south of the Great Bend of the Yellow River, geographically distant from Shilingol, had very little contact with the leaders of the Shilingol League. The head of this league, Prince Shagdurjab, was originally the *jasag* of the Ordos Right Front Last Banner (commonly called the *jasag* Banner), but he had retired and passed the position of *jasag* to his son Ochirkhuyagtu. Prince Sha rarely traveled and had very little contact with outside people. Nevertheless, in the 1920s, when the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was active in the Yekejuu area, his banner was quite disturbed. He therefore had a very negative impression of Bai Yundi and his group and supported Wu Heling and his Mongolian delegation in their struggle against Bai Yundi and his comrades. In addition, he had no personal friendship with Prince De. The deputy head, Prince Altanwachir (*jasag* of the Ordos Right Rear Banner, commonly called the Khangggin Banner), was a mature politician who, during his visits in Beijing, became
Hohhot, the site of the banner office of Tuned, was also the location of the Sui-yuan provincial government; the Chinese called it the Hohhot xian. Of course, Hohhot became the center of conflict between the Mongol banners and the Chinese xians. Since it was also the power base of Fu Zuoyi, Fu and his followers kept close watch on this area. In Mongolia, the Hohhot Tuned area was extensively sinicized; Mongols under forty years of age from this area rarely spoke Mongolian. Nevertheless, education was more developed in Hohhot than elsewhere, and Mongolian nationalism there was quite strong. Fu Zuoyi was able to put Rong Xiang, the amban of this banner, under his influence, but he failed to enchain the nationalistic youth.

During the Manchu reign, the Chahar Tribe was organized into the Right and Left Flanks, with each flank containing four banners. In addition to these banners there were four pastures. There was no hereditary system for selecting banner heads, who were known as amban. No league was established, and both the banners and the pastures came under the jurisdiction of the governor-general (dutong) of Chahar. In the Right Flank, Damrinsurung, the amban of the Pure Yellow Banner, was the senior. He was quite nationalistic and had a good personal relationship with Prince De. In the Left Flank, Samdanlhungrob, the amban of the Taipus Left Pasture, was also a good friend of Prince De.

acquainted with Prince De. Because his banner was located in the vicinity of Baotou, he had frequent contact with the Shanxi Chinese authorities, such as Wang Jingguo and Fu Zuoyi. The two southern banners of the Ordos Right Front (Uushin) and Right Ordos Central (Otog) both had been bases of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, and so some people in these two banners were influenced by the party’s doctrines. Other people, however, were offended by the party’s campaign and became increasingly conservative. In other words, both Uushin and Otog contained liberals and conservatives within their jurisdictions. Later, after the Chinese Communist occupation of their neighboring northern Shanxi province, these two banners were easily turned into a Communist springboard for penetration into Inner Mongolia. The Ordos Left Central Banner (commonly called the Jun Wang Banner), where the shrine of Chinggis Khan is still located, was traditionally the main banner of the entire league. Its ruling jasag, Prince Tobshinjirgal, was an influential leader of the league but had no personal contacts with Prince De. The Ordos Left Front Banner (commonly known as Juungar), located in the north of the Ordos near the Yellow River, was one of the influential centers of the league. In 1932 the dictator of this banner, the powerful tusalagchi Nasunbayar, was assassinated by a rival. Because the nominal jasag was very young, another tusalagchi, Qi Wenying, was placed in charge of the banner administration. Qi, thoroughly preoccupied with the confusion within his own banner, had no interest in outside affairs. Another section, also in the north near the Yellow River, was the Ordos Left Rear Banner (commonly known as Dalad). Its jasag, Khandadorji, was a playboy who had no concern for the future of Mongolia. Nevertheless, because of their geographic proximity to the Yellow River bend and their fertile lands, both the Dalad and Khanggin Banners had been targeted for cultivation by the Chinese from the end of the Manchu rule until the time of Fu Zuoyi. In short, because the entire territory of the Yekejuu League was located south of the Great Bend of the Yellow River, it easily fell under the shadow of Fu Zuoyi’s power.

3 Because of this, when the Chahar and Suiyuan Special Regions were transformed into provinces in 1928, the Pure Yellow, Pure Red, Bordered Red, and Bordered Blue Banners of the Right Flank were placed under the administration of Suiyuan; the Pure Blue, Pure White, Bordered White, and Bordered Yellow Banners of the Left Flank, together with the pastures of Shangdu, Minggan, Taipus Right, and Taipus Left, remained under the administration of the Chahar provincial government. Although the Chahar Tribe was not a league, by long-standing tradition it usually joined with the leagues. In the republican period, Chahar established the Joint Office of the Twelve Chahar Banners and Pastures in Kalgan and recognized the seniority and leadership of the amban of the Minggan Pasture, Jodbajab.
By this time, Samdanlungrub had passed away, and his successor, Serengnamjil, followed his predecessor’s footsteps. Norbujana, the amban of the Taipus Right Pasture, was a friend and follower of the amban of the left. The amban of the Bordered Yellow Banner was the ambitious young Mugdenbnu. Although he was not an intimate acquaintance of Prince De, he supported the Autonomy movement for his own sake. Temurbolod, the amban of the Shangdu Pasture (also known as the Aduuchin Pasture), was quite friendly with Prince De because his banner was geographically close to Sunid. Because the Pure White Banner was the home banner of Prince De’s mother, it continued its friendly ties with Prince De. Nevertheless, relations between Wu Heling and these two Chahar leaders were much more intimate than were their relations with Prince De. Jodbajab’s relations with the latter turned quite sour, especially after the failure of his mediation between Wu and the prince.

Although the influence of the provincial government in Kalgan should not be neglected, heightened educational standards encouraging the rise of nationalism were sufficient to counterbalance the pressure from Kalgan. It became easier to get sympathetic support from the Chahar leaders—especially their intellectuals.

The two special banners of Alashan and Ejine on the west of the Great Bend of the Yellow River were far away from the center of Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, Damzana (also known in Chinese transliteration as Dalizhaya), the ruling prince of Alashan, was well acquainted with Prince De because they usually met in Beiping. Although they were not close friends, they somewhat understood each other. In addition, because of the conflict between the Alashan Banner and the Ningxia Provincial Government, personal relations between Damzana and Governor Ma Hongkui (son of Ma Fuxiang, the former minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission) were very unfriendly. Damzana supported any kind of struggle against the Chinese provinces and xians.

Ejine, to the west of Alashan, was isolated from the outside world. Even so, it also experienced heavy pressure from Ma Hongkui’s provincial government. Su Jianxiao (later an active member of the Chinese Communist Party), the personal representative of Tobshinbayar (the ruling jasag of Ejine), was imprisoned by Ma Hongkui when he came to the Ninghsia Provincial Government to negotiate local tax problems. Of course he lent his full support to the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement.

The distance between Kokonor and Shilingol was great. The leaders of the twenty-nine banners of the two leagues of the Right and Left Flanks of the Kokonor Mongols had almost no contact with Prince De. They were thoroughly subdued under the heavy pressure of the notorious Moslem warlords Ma Bufang, the governor of Qinghai, and his cousin Ma Buqing. No one dared to initiate anything unless it was approved personally by Ma Bufang, and so it was impossible to win open support from Kokonor. Earlier, however, because of Ma Fuxiang’s influence, the two Kokonor Leagues had sent four delegates to Wu Heling’s Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, but two of them were Chinese from Ma Bufang sent to watch the two Mongol delegates. Even these two Mongol delegates had nothing to do with Prince De.

---

4 The Pure Blue Banner during this time suffered from serious internal conflicts and had no interest in matters outside its own territory. The situation of the Bordered White Banner was similar to that of the Pure Blue. By then, Nimaodzar, once the amban of the Minggan Pasture, was the outstanding and prestigious leader among all the Chahar banners and was known as the brains of the elderly Jodbajab.
Preparatory Work

Of course Prince De was well aware of the difficult situations mentioned above, but he also realized that this was the only moment during which he might be able to use the conflict between China and Japan and the complicated world situation to make a breakthrough for Inner Mongolia. Yet he dared not openly advocate this important move without careful consultation with other leaders. Grasping the chance provided by the Panchen Lama’s stay in Ujumuchin, Prince De went there to visit with Prince Sodnamrabdan to discuss the situation.

Although the Ujumuchin Banner had expelled Morishima and his Special Service Office during the previous winter, it was forced to accept Tanaka Hisashi and his office of intelligence the next spring. This led Prince So to have more worries about the insufficient protection provided by the Chinese government and the increasing pressure from the Guandong Army. So when Prince De visited him and suggested that it would be better to unite all the leagues and banners into one body to deal with the Japanese, he responded positively. Prince De argued further that unless this measure was taken, the Mongols would collapse under Japanese pressure or political bribes. Not only did Prince So immediately agree with Prince De’s proposal, he also gave his full support in later struggles. Other important persons who participated in these secret talks were Togtakhu, the senior tuslagchi of Ujumuchin, and Prince Sungjingwangchug (1886-1948) of the Khauchid Left Banner. At this time, Prince So was overweight and in poor health, and the actual administration of his banner was handled by Togtakhu, a man of courageous spirit. Because Prince Sung was a prudent person, he also was involved.

Another great supporter was the Panchen Lama. Prince De’s pretext for visiting Ujumuchin was his desire to pay personal respect to his great master. The Panchen Lama’s opinions influenced Prince So’s decision-making process. This exiled Tibetan religious leader recognized that under such difficult conditions, the only possibility for the Mongols to rescue themselves was to unify and carry out a joint defense of their people and territory. Yet, because of his personal position, he could not express this idea openly.

The final act of Prince So was to write a personal letter to Prince Yondonwangchug (1870-1938), head of the Ulanchab League, and have Prince De go to Ulanchab to discuss this problem face to face with Prince Yon. As head of the league, Prince So invited the jasags of the ten banners to come to his residence for discussions. The former head of the Shilingol League, Prince Yangsang, who was still quite influential, although he disagreed with Prince De’s proposals, remained neutral in order to blunt further Japanese aggression.

After receiving the confidential letter from Prince So, Prince De went to Beileyin sume, the famous temple at Bat-khaalag, under the pretext of making a pilgrimage. From there he sent an envoy to the residence of Prince Yondonwangchug to announce his arrival. Because this was such an important matter, Prince Yon told the messenger that he would like to see the honorable guest at the temple a few days later.  

---

5 The temple was the official monastery of the Khalkha Right Banner (the banner of Prince Yon). Because the original rank title of Yondonwangchug’s ancestor was beile (third-ranking prince), the monastery was called Beile-yin sume, the temple of the beile. In colloquial speech it was called the Beilin-sum, and the Chinese called it Bailingmiao, a phonetic approximation of the Mongolian.
Prince Yon did not immediately invite Prince De to his own residence, for two reasons: first, he himself had never met this new and adventurous young prince from Sunid; and second, he had to handle such important matters with great care and needed some advice from those who knew Prince De better. At this time, the head of the Bureau of Mongolian Affairs of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Bayankhan (also known by his Chinese names as Ba Wenjun or Ba Weisong), came to Bat-khaalag on some official business with the banners of the Ulanchab League. Bayankhan was a Hohhot Tumed Mongol who had studied chemistry at the University of Lyons in France during his youth. While Prince De was visiting in Nanjing, they became acquainted. Although Bayankhan was a sinicized person, he was very nationalistic, and because of his studies in France, he was deeply influenced by the Western doctrine of freedom of thought. Limited by his own circumstances, he had no chance to push through his ideas. When Prince De told him about the purpose of his visit, Bayankhan was moved by his enthusiastic nationalism and volunteered to see Prince Yondonwangchug on behalf of Prince De to explain the need for Mongolian autonomy.

Early in 1911, when Outer Mongolia declared its independence, most of the princes and nobles of Ulanchab were sympathetic to Ulaanbaatar. At that time, Yondonwangchug was already the deputy head of the league and was involved in that movement. Later, circumstances made it impossible for them to join Outer Mongolia, and under the pressure and bribes of Zhang Shaozeng, the governor-general of Suiyuan, they had to express their support for the newly established republic. As a reward, the Beijing government conferred promotion on most of the nobles of the league. Yondonwangchug was promoted from the rank of beile to junwang, or second-ranking prince.

During the period of Chinese warlordism, the Ulanchab League was disturbed by endless civil war and forceful immigration of Chinese farmers to cultivate its grazing fields. Understandably, Prince Yon was greatly disappointed with the Suiyuan Provincial Government. Although he was unable to take any violent measures to stop Chinese encroachment, he never compromised with his Chinese opponents. So when Bayankhan visited him, he asked if the Nanjing government would order Fu Zuoyi to attack the Mongols if they demanded autonomy. Bayankhan responded that under such conditions it would be impossible for the Chinese to intervene militarily. Getting such words from Bayankhan, Prince Yon decided to come to Bat-khaalag to meet with Prince De. In Prince Yon’s banner, both of his nephews—Gendenjab, the jasag, and Shirabdorji, the tusalagchi—agreed to this decision. Nasunochir, the jakirugchi, was comparatively pro-Outer Mongolia, but he still supported Inner Mongolian autonomy.

On July 25, Yondonwangchug and his two nephews arrived in Bat-khaalag and talked with Prince De for two days. Finally, they decided that to increase the strength
applied to a united defense against the pressure from the frontier provinces, to resist
Japanese encroachment, and to maintain the unique traditions of Mongolia it was neces­
sary to request permission for autonomy from Nanjing and to establish a Mongolian gov­
ernment for self-rule. They also agreed to convene a conference of all the jasags of the
banners and the leaders residing outside Mongolia to decide the future of their own peo­
ple. During these talks, Prince Yondonwangchug was resolute. His determination greatly
moved Prince De, and a solid friendship developed between these two leaders. Years
later, when Prince De referred to the Autonomy Movement, which started in Bat-
Khaalag, he always praised the unyielding spirit of Prince Yondonwangchug. In other
words, the movement got under way only after Prince Yon gave his consent. Because of
his prestige, no objection was raised to Yondonwangchug’s decision in the Ulanchab
League—at least not at that moment—and therefore the problem of the six banners of
that league was settled.

The situation in the Yekejuu League was different: the league had to make se­
cret contacts with Prince De first and only then come into the open. Moreover, the loca­
tion of this league was south of the Yellow River and the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad. In
addition, it was cut off from the rest of Inner Mongolia by the two cities of Hohhot and
Baotou, the military bases of Fu Zuoyi. It would have been quite dangerous for Prince De
to go there personally. Just then, it was reported that the deputy head of the Yekejuu
League, Prince Altanwachir, was in Hohhot, so Prince De sent Altangerel, his meiren
janggi (third highest official of the banner), to go there and report to Altanwachir on the
talks between himself and Prince Yon. The response was positive. Altanwachir not only
showed his personal support, but also gave to Prince De the names of the jasags of the
seven banners of the Yekejuu League and told the emissary of Prince De to put these
names on documents to be used during time of need.\(^6\)

After receiving so encouraging an answer from Prince Altanwachir, Prince De
returned to Sunid and sent a messenger to report his success to Prince So. In the name of
all the league heads and jasags, Prince De issued an open telegram announcing the de­
mand for a higher degree of autonomy. He also announced that a Mongolian congress of
all jasags, ambans, and other officials and leaders residing outside the banners would be
convened to discuss autonomy, and that a self-rule government would be established on
September 28, 1933 at Beile-yin sume of the Khalkha Right Banner of the Ulanchab
League.

The reasons for selecting Bat-khaalag as the location for this important confer­
ce, a milestone in modern Mongolian history, were varied: (1) both Prince So and
Prince De tried to avoid arousing suspicion that this movement was being monopolized
by the leaders of the Shilingol League; (2) although Beile-yin sume was not far from the
power base of Fu Zuoyi, it was quite remote from Japanese-occupied territories and thus
might help avoid suspicion of Japanese involvement; (3) it would be easier for the ban­
ners of Alashan, Ejine, and Yekejuu to be involved; and (4) Prince So was a person of no
political ambition; therefore, to help the movement along, Prince So decided to have
Prince Yon of the Ulanchab League be the leader of the movement.

\(^6\) These actions of Altanwachir were emotional and were done without due consideration. Because
he did not discuss these actions with the head of the league and the leaders of the banners, they later
became loopholes that Fu Zuoyi used to prevent the leaders from joining the Bat-khaalag move­
ment. They even made it impossible for Altanwachir to continue his support as he had promised.
A book purporting to be an autobiography of Prince De, a distorted record made during Prince De's imprisonment by the Communists, conceals some facts that can nevertheless be perceived by reading between the lines:

At that moment Sasame, the Japanese agent disguised as a lama and hiding at a temple in my banner, told Han Fenglin [Kokebagatur], "You started the Autonomy movement too early. The time is not yet ripe. It would be better to start the Autonomy Movement when our Japanese military forces arrive." This showed that the Japanese imperialists were not pleased with our demand to the Kuomintang central government for autonomy....

I also sent Han Fenglin to the Japanese Embassy Beiping Branch Office to visit the military attache Shibayama and find out his attitude toward Inner Mongolian autonomy. Han Fenglin returned and reported, "In Beiping I met Shibayama... and asked [them] to give [their] support for the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. His response was, 'There are too many problems between China and Japan, and conflicts occur unceasingly. Even so, diplomatic relations are still being maintained. Inner Mongolian autonomy is an internal problem of China. It would be inconvenient for Japan to interfere.' His tone was cold. It seems that [they] were not interested in Inner Mongolian autonomy."

These words suggest that Inner Mongolian autonomy was not Japan's goal, and that it was not encouraged by the Japanese.

The Immediate Response

Prince De's open telegram was aimed at the Chinese government and the KMT. It tried to explain why the Mongols were demanding a higher degree of autonomy and stressed the Mongol goal of self-protection. It also urged the government to honor the will of Sun Yat-sen, which promised the right of self-determination and self-rule. This will stated that the term "higher degree of autonomy" meant that, with the exception of national military and diplomatic affairs, which were clearly matters to be managed by the central government, the rest of the administration should be handled by the Mongols. Autonomy would be a step toward cooperation among the nationalities, not a separatist movement.

Newspapers printed sensationalistic reports about Mongol demands and created an uproar. During this uproar, I was accepted by Beiping University as a freshman. Both I and other Mongol students in Beiping were overwhelmed; our excitement was indescribable. We rushed to tell each other about this event and gathered to discuss what kind of contribution we should make for this common purpose. All factional disagreement among ourselves disappeared immediately, and we were united in striving for the same goal. Of course the high emotions of the Mongol students in Nanjing were exactly the same as those of the students in Beiping.

The response of Mongolian politicians to Prince De's initiative was positive but complicated. The first group to give Prince De a positive answer was Wu Heling's Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates. At the same time, Wu made contact with both the government and the party and tried to find out whether they would permit autonomy. In so doing, he was able on the one hand to act as a delegate of the Mongolian leagues and banners and, on the other hand, to give his advice to the govern-

---

ment for formulating a policy response to this event. This was Wu Heling’s usual style in Mongolian politics. Although that made it easier for him to establish himself as an important mediator between the two sides, it also created some suspicions among the Mongols that he was an agent of the Nanjing government.

Encouraged by this movement, party officers, students, and some young Mongol staff members in the government gave up their jobs, salaries, and studies, left Nanjing, and went to Beile-yin sume to join the Autonomy Movement. These persons included Oljeitu, Mergenbagatur, and others. From Beiping, Dugurengsang (Bai Haifeng), a Kharachin Mongol who was a first-session graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy and had been educated in both Ulaanbaatar and Moscow, escaped from the supervision of General He Yingqin and fled to Bat-khaalag to join the ranks of the Mongol activists. The Mongols in Nanjing and Beiping who had split in 1928 were now reunified by this call for Mongolian survival and expressed their full support of the demand for autonomy. They were excited and at the same time anxious to see results.

After the newspapers published the Mongols’ demand for autonomy, the movement attracted nationwide attention as well as attention from foreign journalists. The government, however, did not respond immediately, nor did it reply to the open telegram. This did not mean that officials were neglecting this very important matter, but rather that they were preparing to solve the problem. The government hoped to act after emotions had cooled. Also, it was greatly worried that Japan might be involved. The relevant office of the administration was, of course, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; but it had no plans or measures to use to respond to a demand for Mongolian autonomy.

Among the officials of the administration, Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan, and his boss, Yan Xishan, the head of the Shanxi clique, and their group were the most anxious. They decided to mobilize their entire strength to crush the Mongolian autonomy movement. Although Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar Province, was also unhappy with the movement, the conflict between his provincial government and the Mongols was not as bad as was the antagonism in Suiyuan, by comparison with which his attitude was relatively mild. The goal of Mongolian autonomy required a clear division of power between the Mongol administrations and the Chinese provinces and xians. Hence the Mongols viewed Fu Zuoyi and his group as their number-one enemy, not Song and his group.

Prince De and his comrades did not just wait for the answer of the Nanjing government; they also carried out active preliminary work. Prince De convinced Prince Yon to have the abbot of the Beile-yin sume invite the Panchen Lama (who was then in Sunid) to come and conduct the Kalachakra Initiation, the most important religious ceremony of Tibetan Buddhism, at their monastery. Of course, although the high lama clearly understood the intention of this invitation, he accepted it with pleasure. Both Prince Yon and Prince De knew that the presence of the Panchen Lama would attract thousands of Mongols to Beile-yin sume to pay homage and attend the ceremonies, and that would increase the momentum of the movement. Also, the officials at the meeting might not all be dedicated to the goal to the same degree, and they might ask for instructions from their master. Since the Panchen Lama was sympathetic to the Mongolian struggle for survival, he would give them a positive answer. This was a top secret at that moment. The presence of this high lama and his sympathetic attitude had great impact on the decisions of the conservative attendees.

The first step of the counterattack by Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi, and their group was to dispatch their special emissaries to the leagues and banners of Yekejuu, Ulanchab, and Tumed and convince them with threats and bribes not to become involved in this movement. As the result of this pressure, they were able to stop the jasags of the Yekejuu
League from going to Bat-khaalag. They not only forced Prince Altanochir to break his promise but also to express openly his personal opposition to the movement. The promise that Altanochir had made without consulting Shagdurjub now turned out to be a stumbling block for the Yekejuu banners in joining the movement. The plot of Yan and Fu did not, however, work out in the banners of the Ulanchab League because of the prestige of Prince Yon. Yan Xishan even sent his trusted henchman, Shi Huayan, the superintendent of Northwest Cultivation Affairs, as his private representative to visit Prince Yon for discussion, but this attempt also ended in failure.

Influenced by Yan and Fu, Song Zheyuan also sent his top advisor, Xiao Zhengyin, to Sunid to visit with Prince De, but their talks reached no conclusion. Then Xiao went to Abaga to persuade Prince Yangsang to oppose the movement. This aged conservative leader disagreed with the actions of Prince De, but because he wished to preserve the outward unity of the Shilingol League and a tradition that frowned on open political intervention by the ex-head of a league, Prince Yangsang refrained from expressing his personal opinion. From Abaga, Xiao went to Ujumuchin to dissuade Prince Sodnamraban, the head of the Shilingol League. This effort also failed.

The \textit{ambans} of the Chahar Left Flank Banners and pastures were officially under the administration of the Chahar provincial government. Although it was difficult for Song Zheyuan to prohibit them from joining the conference, they had to avoid further conflict with Kalgan. In order to protect themselves and to avoid hurting their relations with all sides, they decided to consult with other \textit{ambans}. Jodbajab and Nimaodzar also decided to contact both the provincial government and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; they also had Mugdenbuu (the \textit{amban} of the Bordered Yellow Banner, who had better relations with Prince De) and Khasochir (a young and adventurous official) go to Bat-khaalag and attend the conference. As for the four banners of the Chahar Right Flank, because of their administrative relations with the Suiyuan provincial government and Fu Zuoyi, they were not able to join the others at Bat-khaalag.

\section*{The Preliminary Committee and the Declaration}

Prince De and his assistants were mindful of these difficulties. After the middle of September, a small minority of the Shilingol attendants gradually arrived in Beile-yinsume.\footnote{The \textit{jasags} and delegates from Shilingol were Prince De himself and his Sunid followers: his good friend Khorjurjab, a "prince in leisure" of the Sunid Left Banner; Shonnudongrob, \textit{jasag} of the Abaga Right Banner; Prince De's father-in-law, Gungsang, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Abaga Left Banner; Sodnamnorbu, \textit{jasag} of the Abkhanar Right Banner; Bazargurda, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Abkhanar Left Banner; Sungjingwangchug, \textit{jasag} of the Khauchid Left Banner; Tubdannima, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Ujumuchin Right Banner; Ichingga, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Ujumuchin Left Banner; and a delegate from the Khauchid Right Banner. From the Ulanchab League were Yondonwangchug himself; Gendenjab, \textit{jasag} of the Khalkha Right Darkhan Banner; Shirabdojri, \textit{tusalagchi} of the same banner; Dewagendon, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Dorbed Banner; Babudorji, deputy head of the league and his son Rinchinsenge, \textit{jasag} of the Urad Central Banner; Erkedoorji, \textit{tusalagchi} of the Urad Front Banner; Juutaibau, \textit{jakirugchi} of the Urad Rear Banner; and Chimedrinchinkhlorowa, \textit{jasag} of the Muuminggan Banner.} Because the attendees were still too few in number, Prince Yon and Prince De postponed the meeting for ten days and had the formal opening session on the ninth of October.

The situation in the Yekejuu League was delicate. Although the league head,
Prince Shagdurjab, was under pressure from Fu, and was unable to express his support openly, in his heart he had no objections. Wu Heling secretly persuaded Prince Sha to have the two delegates of his league, Senggerinchin and Burintogtakh (who were stationed in the Nanjing office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates) leave Nanjing and go to Bat-khaalag to attend the conference. Rong Xiang, the Tuned amban, was in a similar situation. Su Ludai, the delegate stationed in Nanjing, went directly from the capital, and Bayar was secretly sent from Hohhot. The four banners of the Chahar Right Flank under Fu’s strict control were unable to send delegates, but the two amrans, Temurbolod and Mugdenbuu, sent from the Left Flank, were recognized as delegates representing all the Chahar banners and pastures. The representative of the Ejine Banner, Su Baofeng, was the banner delegate stationed in the Nanjing office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, so he went to the conference from the capital. The Alashan Banner and the two leagues of Kokonor (Qinghai) could not dispatch their representatives to join the conference because of time constraints and pressure from the Moslem Ma family warlords.

In addition, there were also delegates from the Japanese-controlled territories. Engkeamur of the Josotu League and Jirgalang of the Jerim League, both of whom had been stationed in Nanjing since 1928, also arrived from the capital. Since Wu Heling had persuaded so many delegates from Nanjing to join the conference, relations between him and his erstwhile political opponent, Prince De, became much more amicable. This move also increased his personal influence among conference attendees.

Also from Nanjing came a representative of the Association of Fellow Mongols in Nanjing, Bai Rui, a Kharachin man who had joined Sun Yat-sen’s Guangdong government years earlier. After the Nanjing government was established, he was appointed a member of the Control Yuan. The Mongols in Beiping sent Keshig, Sainbayar, Ao Yunzhang—all faithful supporters of Prince De—and others as their representatives. By this critical time, the intellectuals gathered at Prince De’s camp also arrived at Beile-yin sume, and they were all ordered to serve as staff members of the conference secretariat.

Since the formal conference could not be convened on September 28, 1933, those who had arrived met as a preliminary committee. The high emotions at this meeting led the persons in attendance to send another telegram to the leaders of the Nanjing government and the KMT. In reality, this telegram should be considered as the real Declaration of Inner Mongolian Autonomy. Its text follows:

This petition is to state that the situation on the frontier has become more serious by the day, and that in order to satisfy the hopes of our Mongol masses, we must organize the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to carry out self-rule, deliver our people from extermination, and fortify the national defenses. Our case follows.

Our Mongolian emperor, Chinggis Khan, put both Europe and Asia under his rule, and the whole universe was pacified. [He] brought justice and peace to China proper and harmony to all the nationalities. [He] expanded the territory of the Middle Kingdom to a degree unprecedented in history and gave glory to all East Asian nations. [This] was recognized by the whole world. Those who have succeeded [him] should faithfully maintain the doctrine that the realm under heaven belongs to the public, that fellow countrymen should be treated equally without discrimination, and that all lands within the four oceans are under one roof. We [Mongols] joined ourselves to the [Manchu] Qing and were treated with
VI: The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement

care and honor. When the republic was established, because of the commonwealth [advocacy] of the five nationalities, we sincerely lent our support and whole-heartedly looked forward to a good government, prosperity, and blessings. Now, under the domination of the theory of evolution and the survival of the fittest, the more civilizations develop, the more their morals decline; the more science is successful, the more human beings will be annihlilated by efficient weapons. If it is impossible for us to rely on ourselves, there will be no justice that we can rely upon. If reform cannot be carried out, there will be no way for us to survive. Under such circumstances, our central government should be aware of the situation, provide brilliant guidance, and remedy shortcomings so as to be on an equal footing with the powerful nations of Europe and America, thereby to enhance the prestige of China and strive for international equality.

Nevertheless, the government has not only neglected to implement such policies, but it even exploits us. At first there was migration and cultivation. Then came the establishment of [Chinese] provinces and xians. The so-called policy for developing [Chinese] national wealth and strength is nothing but a mortal wound for Mongolia. How can we avoid grief and distress while recalling these past pains? In the present world, everybody clearly knows that if the rights of the people are taken away, the destitution of the livelihood of the people and the decline of the race will be the inevitable result. Even so, the Mongols cordially support the nation and do not waver, but rather hope that the central government will formulate sound plans for building a new Mongolia.

Soviet Russia has already imposed agony in Outer Mongolia for ten years, and Japan is currently implementing its traditional aggressive “Continental Policy.” The annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia will be the next step. It is clear that we face a crisis that will determine our future welfare and happiness. If we continue to be lax and waste time, then perilous danger will immediately approach us. If Mongolia is exterminated, then the gateways to North China proper will all be opened [to the Japanese enemy]. The provinces north of the Yellow River will fall as did the provinces of the northeast, and then the splendid territory of China will come under alien tyranny. This would be a galling shame and humiliation to the entire nation of China. In thinking of these matters, how can we refrain from weeping? Our central government has repeatedly suffered from internal disturbance and paid no attention to us. Perhaps we Mongols are considered irrelevant or valueless!

More than a decade has now passed, and our government has made no efforts to recover Outer Mongolia. Eastern Inner Mongolia is now being swallowed up, and there is no way to stop the enemy. These facts cannot be neglected. Under the pressure of our violent neighbor and the neglect of our central government, the leagues, tribes, and banners of Jerim, Juu-uda, Josotu, and Hulun-buir have all been taken over in the twinkling of an eye. How can the leagues and banners of the western frontier, which lack basic strength, confront the aggression of so powerful an enemy? Facing such a tense situation and the approaching disaster, we, the leaders of the leagues of Mongolia, have come to realize that if it is impossible to unite, there will be no way to protect ourselves from disaster. If we do not rescue ourselves, we will have no future. Unity must begin with political unification and the reform of antiquated and inappropriate administrative practices. In order to ensure [our] survival, [we] must establish an organization for self-determination and self-rule and increase the people’s strength.

For these purposes, the heads of the leagues and the jasags [of the banners] have decided unanimously to strive for the accomplishment of [our national] survival. In July of this year, [we] the heads of the leagues, jasags, heads of banners, princes, and nobles gathered at Beile-yin sume of the Ulanchab League. Following [our] discussion, [we] reached the conclusion that bringing about a high degree of autonomy [was the only way] to save the [Mongol] people from extinction and to ensure their survival.

[We have] established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to assume the overall authority of administration in Inner Mongolia in order to stop the insidious propaganda and invasion from the outside; to evenly develop education, economy, military, transportation, enterprise and other works; to carry out organized and orderly politics; to
solve the problems of people’s suffering and their livelihood; to correspond to the will of the Mongol masses; to bring about the unity of soldiers and civilians; and to strengthen the defense of the frontier zone. This will eliminate the central government’s fear of disturbance in [the border areas] and will save the Mongols from fear of calamity.

Consider the instructions of Mr. Sun Yat-sen: “Foster the weak and small nationalities to make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” We honor these instructions as a golden rule, a precious precept, and an unchangeable model [that should be adhered to] for ten thousand generations. [The purpose of] these instructions is clearly to protect the rights and benefits of the weak and small nationalities. Establishing the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Government under the teachings of Mr. Sun and [the ideal of] humanism will undoubtedly save us from disaster and extinction. This will not only give the Mongols cause to rejoice but will also be a blessing to the entire nation.

If this cannot be achieved, the fallen [Mongol people] will never recover, and there will be no way to save [Inner Mongolia] from the fate of Outer and Eastern Mongolia. [All Mongolian territories] are as closely related as lips and teeth, and they are bound together by their common joy and sorrow. Moreover, the goal of the [KMT’s] “Period of Political Tutelage” is [to help the people] carry out self-rule. In addition, the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was already assented to by the National Congress [Guomin huiyi] in the twentieth year of the republic [1931]. The Preliminary Constitution states that “the Mongolian local institutions should be settled according to local circumstances.”

Therefore, we honestly hope Your Excellencies of the party and the nation will see that our petition will be beneficial to the Mongols and in accordance with the teachings of Mr. Sun Yat-sen. The reasons for the establishment of this government are to satisfy the will of the people and save Mongolia during this [time of] crisis on the frontier. We humbly beg for your consideration [of the material in this petition].

The Beile-yin sume Conference for Autonomy

After ten more days of waiting and preparation, the Mongolian Conference for Autonomy finally convened at the main hall of the Yungrung-shang of the Beile-yin sume on the ninth of October. Togtakhu, the tusalagchi of Prince So, and Duke Dobdan of Ujumuchin arrived at the start of the conference. The morale of Prince De and his followers was greatly increased by Prince So’s open show of support. A total of sixty-eight persons attended this conference. Prince Yondonwangchug delivered the opening address, emphasizing the necessity for autonomy and encouraging the attendants to strive for the success of their common goals. Next, Prince De gave a report on the preliminary work of the conference. Both Prince Yondonwangchug’s address and Prince De’s report were accepted unanimously; Yondonwangchug, Babudorji, Prince De, Gendenjab, and Shungnodongrob were elected members of the presidium.

Prince De and twenty-two other persons were appointed to prepare the draft of the open telegram proclaiming Mongolian autonomy to the central government and the nation. These persons also worked to prepare the draft of the Organizational Law of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. While these drafts were being completed, the conference was recessed for five days. During this recess, Prince Rinchinwangdud, the jasag of the Sunid Left Banner, arrived, along with fifty-eight other members. On October 15, the second meeting of the conference convened, and the drafts of both the open telegram and the organizational law were passed. The Organizational Law of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government contained a preface, four chapters, and thirty-six articles. The main points of this law are extracted below:
VI: The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement

Preface

In response to the exigencies of the present Inner Mongolian situation and in accordance with the stipulations concerning self-determination and self-rule as contained in the Chinese government’s Outline of Nation Building, the senior officials of the Inner Mongolian leagues and banners have convened the Plenary Conference of the Senior Officials of the Inner Mongolian Leagues and Banners, have decided to establish an Autonomous government under the leadership of the Chinese government, and have formulated this Organizational Law of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government.

Chapter I: Autonomous Government

(1) The overall authority for ruling the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes rests with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. (2) The territory under the jurisdiction of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government shall encompass all of the original domains of the Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes. (3) Except for international and military affairs, which are the demesne of the central government, the administration of Inner Mongolia shall be carried out in accordance with the law established by the autonomous government. (4) The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish one commission chairman, two vice-chairmen, and nine to fifteen commissioners. (5) The promulgation of laws and issuance of orders must be passed by a meeting of the government and signed by the commission chairman, the two deputy-chairmen, and the head of the concerned offices. (6) The offices of the autonomous government shall consist of the Secretariat Bureau and the General Affairs Bureau.

Chapter II: The Department of Political Affairs

(1) The Department of Political Affairs shall be the supreme administrative organ of the autonomous government. (2) The department shall have one head and two deputy heads. (3) Subordinate to the department shall be the following bureaus: Internal Affairs, Police Affairs, Financial Affairs, Education, Judicial Affairs, Construction, Industry and Commerce, and Public Relations.

Chapter III: The Legislative Committee

The Legislative Committee shall be the supreme legislative organ of the autonomous government. The committee shall be headed by a chairman, two deputy chairmen, and have seventeen to twenty-nine members.

Chapter IV: The Advisory Council

The Advisory Council shall be presided over by one director, two deputy directors, and have twenty-one to forty-one counselors.

The following is the text of the open telegram sent to the Chinese government:

In recent years, our nation has faced famines and the ravages of war. Our borders on the frontier are being pressed and eroded, and foreign aggression becomes more serious with each passing day. Mongolia, being geographically close to both Japan and Russia, suffers greatly from these calamities. The territory of Mongolia is vast and desolate, and its weak and feeble people are unable to resist aggression and protect themselves. We are currently little more than meat on the chopping block waiting to be hacked to pieces by the aggressors. Within the past ten years, Outer Mongolia has been stripped away by Soviet Russia, and the Jerim League and Hulunbuir have been annexed by Japan. The Josotu, and Juuda Leagues have also recently been swallowed up. Western Inner Mongolia is currently being drawn into these calamities, and northern China is already badly shaken. Our very existence as a people hangs by a thread, and the entire nation is burning with anxiety.

We Mongols are a weak people and have suffered for a long time now. Although the central government is responsible for providing relief and aid, it is continually prevented from doing so by the domestic chaos, and the general course of events seems to be getting worse, not better. The leaders of the central government cannot even provide relief aid for
themselves; how can the central government be expected to accept the responsibility to assist us? After each wartime calamity [the central government] has occasionally sent envoys of comfort and solicitude from afar. This suggests that our relationship [with the central government] is intimate and that we are together in our suffering. We Mongols deeply appreciate these expressions of sincere concern.

If we were so inclined, we could stand idly by and do nothing when the border areas are being encroached upon. All our powerful neighbors have recently followed policies of aggression, and time is not on our side. Our situation now is akin to that of a bird in imminent danger of being caught in a snare; we currently face the ominous prospect of complete extinction as a people. The current situation will not allow us to follow the old path of temporary, expedient peace. We are no longer able to bear our hardships, yet we have no way to rid ourselves of them. If we do not diligently seek to implement self-rule, everything will be destroyed when the powerful enemy arrives. Wherever the power of the enemy extends, the Mongolian territory will be completely gobbled up because of the weak defenses in Mongolian territory. This will worry the central government greatly, and the frontier will be wide open to the enemy.

Extermination of us Mongols would also be a great disaster for the rest of our nation; if one limb is broken off, the whole body will be handicapped. The costs [of the extinction of the Mongols as a people] would be great and the injuries very serious. It is written in the Zuo Zhuan that “a dying deer is not able to find a shadowy place.” Dear fellow countrymen, please put yourselves in our position and consider the Mongols’ situation again and again. Is there any way for us Mongols to survive except by self-determination and self-rule?

We recall Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s herculean struggle for the founding of the nation and his desire to strengthen the foundation of people’s self-government and to foster the weak and minority peoples. These brilliant teachings should be remembered and adhered to for ten thousand generations. Since the central government is occupied by urgent military affairs and cannot possibly manage the affairs of remote areas, why should we Mongols not courageously stand up and follow the teachings of Mr. Sun Yat-sen in order to carry out self-determination and self-rule for self-strengthening and self-defense?

We the heads of the leagues and the jasags [of the banners], with the resolution of the national congress of the twentieth year of the republic [1931] which assented to the autonomy of Outer Mongolia as our precedent, on the twenty-sixth day of the seventh month [September 15, 1933] convened a conference of all senior [Mongolian] officials at Beileyn sume, Ulanchab League. All persons in attendance unanimously called for implementation of a high degree of autonomy and the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, prompt acceleration of unity, and supplementation of the inadequacy of the central government. Through self-determination and self-rule we can save ourselves and protect the land of our nation.

Since this is the common view of the [Mongol] people, we are carrying it out resolutely and are implementing change with great momentum in order to follow the will of the [Mongol] people and to respond effectively to current circumstances. The implementation of autonomy has already been reported by the league heads, the jasags of the banners, and the nobles to the central government for consideration. In this telegram we report on the actual operation of [Mongolian] autonomy.

We sincerely hope that Your Excellencies will realize the true purposes of our autonomy and will understand that it was necessitated by urgent circumstances. Under extremely desperate conditions, we have no choice but to carry out urgently and quickly our self-determination and self-rule in order to avoid our complete extermination. As for military and diplomatic affairs, these are matters connected with the national institutions. Even during ordinary times, we would need more help and support from the central government; at this critical juncture, we can only depend on the central government to deal with foreign countries. We sincerely hope that Your Excellencies will be sympathetic to our helplessness and difficulties and will help and guide us in accordance with the principle of “every-
thing under heaven for the common good." We also hope that you will guide us, supplement us, and teach us how to overcome our insufficiencies and shortcomings, encourage the spirit of self-determination and self-rule, accelerate [our] desire for hard work and prosperity, bring reform of antiquated [Mongolian] tradition, and develop good order and civilization.

In this way, it will be possible for the Mongols to support the central government in making the [entire] country prosperous and well governed. It will also satisfy every Mongol heart that fervently hopes for [peace and] effective government. This will bring about the peaceful coexistence of the five nationalities [Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans] and help them to merge with one another into one great whole, rescue the nation from destruction, and fortify the frontier territory. This will indeed be good fortune for the Mongols and the entire nation. [Senders' names]

The tone and wording of this telegram were much more moderate and relaxed than in the former one, probably because the intervening conference was successful and because the Chinese government responded to the conference's recommendations. The Mongol leaders, knowing that by this time it would have been impossible to ignore the Mongols' demand for autonomy, felt no need or desire to use irritating words to upset the central government. Instead, they gave a clear explanation of their motives; they explained that the movement was to strengthen unity and defense, and that it was absolutely free of foreign involvement of any kind. The Mongol leaders emphasized this lack of foreign involvement because most Chinese newspaper editorialists had expressed some suspicion that the movement had Japanese backing and support. Of course, Fu Zuoyi's propaganda made these unfounded rumors even more widespread. Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian, the Chinese government's two special envoys, were scheduled to arrive precisely during this time of suspicion of foreign involvement in the movement, and this is why Prince De and others at the conference did their best to eradicate these misconceptions and eliminate the obstacles they created.

Foreign journalists arrived at Beile-yin sume during this time, and news of the Mongols' demand for autonomy was soon broadcast to the world. The tone of Japan's newspaper accounts was clearly sympathetic, and this naturally contributed to suspicion of Japanese involvement in the movement and led to even more confusion and misunderstanding. Among the foreign journalists at Beile-yin sume was Owen Lattimore, the famous Mongolist. All Lattimore's reports were sympathetic to the Mongols, and consequently, a long-lasting friendship formed between him and Prince De. Another foreigner at Beile-yin sume was the Swedish merchant Larson, who had received the rank of duke from the Bogda Khan of Ulaanbaatar during the early days of Outer Mongolia's independence and later settled in the Aduuchin Pasture of Chahar. Larson also expressed goodwill and concern toward the Mongols and helped them win the sympathy of foreign visitors.

On October 19, the third meeting was held. During this meeting it was resolved that (1) the budget for the first year would be 320,000 Chinese yuan, to be shared by the banners, (2) all leagues and banners would contribute one-hundred twenty yurts for the temporary office of the autonomous government, (3) one thousand cavalry troops would be conscripted from the leagues and banners to organize an army for the protection of the autonomous government, and (4) no officials and staff members would receive any salary, but their living expenditures would be supplied by the autonomous government.

On October 21, the fourth meeting elected Yondonwangchug as chairman of the autonomous government, Sodnamrabdan and Altanwachir, deputy head of the Yekejuu League, as the two deputy chairmen, and decided that the eleven commissioners of the
government should be elected separately by the leagues and banners. Then, through Prince Yon's nomination, Prince De was elected as head of the Department of Political Affairs; and Nartai (about forty kilometers north of Bat-khaalag) of the Khalkha Banner was selected as the future capital of the autonomous government.

The fifth meeting, on October 24, discussed preparations for the reception of Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian, the special envoys of the Chinese government, and the matters to be discussed with them. In addition, Sainbayar, Temurbolod (the amban of the Chahar Shangdu Pasture), Jiyatai (a Kharachin man and a confidant of Prince Yon), and Suludai (the delegate of Hohhot Turned) were appointed to represent the conference and go to Hohhot to welcome Huang and Zhao and present them with an introductory briefing on the conference and the hopes of the Mongols.

The Arrival of Huang and Zhao

On October 21, the day before Huang Shaohong, Zhao Pilian, the concerned officials of the Kuomintang Central Committee, the Interior ministry, and the general staff left Nanjing by the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, Wu Heling and his Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates held a press conference. In this press conference, Wu expressed his support for Prince De's proposals and explained that in view of the situation in Inner Mongolia, a united autonomous government was the only way to assure defense and survival. He also expressed his support for the ideals of the central government: (1) cooperation between the Mongolian local authorities and the central government, (2) cooperation between the leagues and banners on the one hand and the provinces and xians on the other, and (3) cooperation between nobles and commoners.

The government, Huang and Zhao, and the "stable" Mongolian leaders welcomed these measures. Nevertheless, the Bat-khaalag group, especially the radical intellectuals, did not approve of them. Soon after he made this statement, Wu left Nanjing and went to Beiping, where he gathered some Mongol leaders who agreed with his ideas. He then went on to Bat-khaalag. Although Wu was not welcomed by Prince De and his close followers, the contributions he made to the leagues and banners gave him a large number of supporters, one of whom was Prince Yon. Even so, after his arrival, he was suspected by Prince De and his group of being an agent of the government. Even worse, Chogbadarakh and Khatanbagatur threatened him with pistols while talking with him and demanded that he leave Bat-khaalag immediately. But none of these unfriendly actions could affect a strong-willed person like Wu Heling.

After arriving in Beiping, Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian visited with General He Yingqin, the Head Commissioner in charge of the Beiping Branch of the Military Committee; Huang Fu, the Head Commissioner of the Executive Yuan's Beiping Committee of Political Adjustment; Song Zheyan, the governor of Chahar Province; and the Janggiya Khutugtu, Pacification Envoy for the Mongolian Banners.

After hearing the opposing opinions of this group, Huang and Zhao began to receive the delegates of the Beiping Association of Fellow Mongols, who supported Prince De and the autonomous movement. By then, the rift in the association had already been mended because of the call for national autonomy. The association submitted to Huang and Zhao the following summary of its opinions: (1) the Mongolian demand for autonomy is a movement for both Mongolian and national salvation; (2) Prince De's activities are based on the will of all the Mongol people; the demand for autonomy did not originate from his personal desires and was not being utilized or manipulated by any for-
eign power, and the central government must distinguish between the public will and personal motives; (3) the officials of the frontier provinces had consistently humiliated the Mongols and currently were engaged again in vicious slander of the autonomy movement; all Mongols resent them, and the central government must ascertain the facts and not only hear one side of the story; and 4) they resolutely opposed the Janggiya Khutugtu’s entry into Mongolia for “pacification.” Monks should not interfere in political affairs.

The Beiping Association of Mongolian Students also sent Ren Pingjun, Bao Yinxi, Kokebagatur (Hu Fengshan), Wu Bailing, and me as student delegates to go to the Grand Hotel in Beijing to visit Huang and Zhao. These two envoys of the government were probably already aware of our demands, and they did not receive us personally but instead had their secretaries meet with us and accept our petition for Mongolian autonomy. This petition stressed (1) the need for Mongolian autonomy, (2) the Mongols’ desire that the Chinese provincial and xian governments stop interfering in Mongolian administrative affairs, and (3) opposition to the government’s continuing use of the Manchu religious-obscurantist policy toward the Mongols. Perhaps this petition was the most strongly worded statement the two envoys received during their stay in Beiping.

Prince Nayantu, the senior leader among the Mongolian princes and nobles in Beiping, was a friend of Wu Heling. Although he could not return to his homeland in Outer Mongolia, he was still quite prestigious and was the nominal head of the Beiping Association of Fellow Mongols. He visited Huang and Zhao personally to express in a moderate way his support for the autonomy movement. Prince Namjilsereng, who was the ex-deputy head of the Jerim League and who fled to Beiping soon after the Japanese occupation in 1931, also followed the common voice of the Beiping Mongols and expressed his support for the movement, though not zealously. Ayulugei, the deputy head of the Japanese-occupied Josotu League, who had been Prince De’s target during his struggle against Wu Heling a year earlier, also expressed his support for the Beile-yin sume convention. He also sent his son Engkeamur, then the Josotu League representative stationed in the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, to go to Bat-khaalag and to join the conference.

While the emissaries Huang and Zhao were still in Beiping, a schoolmate of mine at Beijing University, Wu Bailing, and I were invited to talk to Professor Tao Xisheng, a well-known specialist in Chinese social history who was intimately connected with the ruling party. We talked for the entire night. Professor Tao was quite impressed by our zeal and attitudes and felt that the opinions of the intellectuals should not be overlooked. He immediately phoned He Yangling, a senior staff member of the Kuomintang’s Central Committee, and arranged a time for him and us to talk to Minister Huang. Tao’s request was accepted, and the visit was carried out the next morning.

Huang’s purpose was not to listen but to convince us of the “error” of our ideas. Again and again he expressed deep concern over the autonomy advocated by the Mongols. He explained that political self-rule would not be beneficial economically, and that it might benefit a certain group of people but not the majority of the masses. “It would be better to be realistic and practical than to shout hollow slogans,” he continued. Wu and I seized this opportunity to emphasize that unless the Mongols were able to enjoy political self-rule, they would continue to be exploited by the frontier provinces and xians. We continued by explaining that not only would it be impossible to protect the economic benefits, but there would also be no way to protect the national unity. We also explained our reasons for opposing the activities of the Janggiya Khutugtu. Although Huang did not argue with us, neither did he accept our opinions. Nevertheless, he did not oppose the
separation of religion and politics in principle. Nevertheless this conversation made it evident that the government emissary already had his own prejudices before the talks with the Mongols even began. It was also clear that it would be very difficult to reach any agreeable conclusion at the talks in Beile-yin sume.

On October 27, Huang and Zhao and their entourage left Beiping, going via Kalgan to Hohhot. At Kalgan, both Huang and Zhao met with Song Zheyuan to find a solution to the problems of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. They then met with Nimaodzar and other delegates of the twelve Chahar banners. Sainbayar and other delegates from Bat-khaalag also came to welcome Huang and Zhao. They did not, however, have any time to discuss the problems of the movement. On the twenty-ninth, Huang and Zhao and their attendants arrived at Hohhot and immediately entered into discussions with Fu Zuoyi and his advisors.

Following this discussion, they met with the so-called “Mongolian delegates,” who had been bribed and were under Fu Zuoyi’s complete control. Among these puppets of Fu were Altanochir, the deputy head of the Yekejuu League, who had at first supported the autonomy movement and then defected to Fu’s camp. From these people, Huang and Zhao received the “opinions” that Fu ordered them to give. Huang and Zhao then met with the delegates of the Education Association, the Farmers’ Association, and other Chinese groups to hear their opinions in opposition to greater Mongolian autonomy. These people insisted that if the government allowed the Mongols to carry out self-rule, it should be limited to the banner level, and that any kind of self-rule above the level of the banner should not be allowed. In other words, it was their goal to maintain the banners, abolish the leagues, and put the supposedly autonomous banners under the all-powerful administration of the Chinese provinces.

Later, it was heard that Huang recognized that these opinions, although quite far from representing the opinions of the vast majority of the Mongol people, were useful to him as establishing reference points. The Suiyuan authorities were adamant about not yielding any tax revenues to the Mongols and insisted that in areas where xians were already established, their taxation prerogatives should not be altered by Mongol demands for self-rule. In summary, then, the Mongols demanded that the Chinese provinces and xians not interfere with Mongolian autonomy, while both Chahar and Suiyuan provinces insisted that even if the Mongols could establish an autonomous government, Mongolian territory should remain under the control of the Chinese provincial governments.

Seeing very little chance for meaningful compromise, Huang Shaohong ordered his top adviser, Li Songfeng, to accompany Altanwachir and Wu Heling to Bat-khaalag. There they would attempt to persuade Prince De and other proponents of more Mongolian autonomy to compromise. Wu Heling was sent on this mission because he usually took a stance somewhere between the positions of the Chinese central government and the Mongol leaders. In order to accommodate Fu Zuoyi, Altanochir did his best at these talks to prod Prince De into compromise. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful and achieved results entirely different from those he originally intended. Prince De and his group insisted that the Mongols wanted to establish a unified Mongolian autonomous organization that would not be manipulated by the Chinese provinces. These talks continued for almost a week, but in the end, Li Songfeng returned to Hohhot without having achieved any concrete results.

Both Huang and Zhao had been brainwashed by Fu Zuoyi during their long stay in Hohhot, and Huang had become adamantly opposed to any increase in Mongolian autonomy. On the tenth of November, Huang and Zhao finally arrived in Bat-khaalag, along with Xu Tingyao, commander of the central government’s Seventeenth Army. Xu’s
arrival in Bat-khaalag with his heavily armed troops was ostensibly to protect the govern­ment’s emissaries, but in reality, they were present to intimidate the unarmed Mong­gols. After their arrival, Princes Yon and De, the other attendants at the conference, and the lamas of the Beile-yin sume temple gave a great welcome party. The next day, Huang Shaohong, Xu Tingyao, Zhao Pilian, and their high-ranking attendants all offered incense in the grand hall of the temple and paid a personal visit to the Panchen Lama. On this day, they did not talk about any political matters. Nevertheless, the advisors of both sides had already come into preliminary contact with one another.

November 12 was Sun Yat-sen’s birthday, an occasion which Prince De and his group used as a particularly meaningful day on which to discuss the problems of Mongolian autonomy with Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian. In reality, Huang was the repre­sentative with the real clout. Prince De started his discussion with the fourth article of Sun Yat-sen’s *Outline of National Building*, which states in part, “Regarding the weak and minority peoples inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” By this time, many jour­nalists from foreign countries had arrived. These journalists basically reported what they heard and saw, but occasionally they circulated groundless rumors and put their own analyses into their reports. Other than the foreign papers, only the Chinese *Dagongbao* gave fair coverage of, and commentary on, the event. The rest of the newspapers were merely propaganda sheets for Fu Zuoyi. Of course, this lack of quality newspaper coverage can be blamed to some extent to the language barrier and the shortage of Mongol leaders capable of dealing with the Chinese newspaper reporters.

Even under the pressure of the “public opinion” created by the newspapers and the intimidation by the soldiers and armored vehicles, Prince De held obstinately to his positions. He told the journalists, “I hope that the central government’s policy toward us Mongols will be one of persuasion not force, encouragement, not aggression.” These sincere words provide a good sketch of the actual situation; however, they were reported only in the *Dagongbao* newspaper.

At the first session of the negotiations, Huang Shaohong remained cognizant of the agreement he had made at Hohhot with Fu Zuoyi’s group. Huang expressed his suspi­cions of the autonomy movement and stated that the negotiations must be undertaken in accordance with the policy for altering Mongolian political institutions established by the central government. He stated further that it was necessary to reach a solution that would be acceptable to the central, provincial, and xian governments, as well as to the Mongolian leagues and banners. He then submitted the policy for altering Mongolian political institutions as passed by the Central Political Committee of the KMT on October 18, 1933 as the blueprint for the negotiations.

Huang’s first matter for discussion was the reshuffling of the personnel in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. His second item was the reforming of the Mongolian local administrative system. The third item was the establishment of personnel qualification standards for the Mongolian administration. In other words, Huang’s strategy was to turn the national problems to his own advantage. Huang attempted to pull the rug out from under the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement by bribing prominent Mongols with offers of official position and advancement in rank. These bribes would, he hoped, reduce the desire of the most influential Mongols for self-determination and self­rule. Huang’s policy was no different from Yuan Shikai’s policies for dealing with the Mongols during the first few years of the new Chinese republic.

Prince De responded immediately to Huang by saying that the first and third points of his proposed negotiations blueprint were matters for the central government
itself to decide and that it was not necessary to discuss them with the Mongols. Prince De explained that these were old issues that he had previously discussed with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Hankou and in Nanjing with the leaders of the government. As for the second point, the reform of the Mongolian local administrative system, Prince De submitted to Huang the Organizational Law of the Mongolian Autonomous Government as passed by the conference held on October 15, and asked him to present it to the Chinese government for consideration.

Prince De’s counterparts in the central government had tried to give this ambitious young prince a high-sounding title and remarkable salary in order to win him over to their side. Whenever Prince De received these offers, however, he always rejected them by saying, “I came here to reach a solution for Mongolian problems and not to obtain an official title for myself or others.” Although Huang’s offer was directed at other Mongol leaders in addition to Prince De, Prince De was confident that the Mongols in attendance at this conference would not be bought off by Huang’s offers. He was, therefore, able to decline tactfully the “good will” of this central government envoy and his attempt at bribery. Of course, this rejection was very awkward for both Huang Shaohong and Prince De. It is understandable that this rejection poisoned the entire atmosphere for negotiations between the two.

Ever since the days of his youth, Prince De had been accustomed to being a prince and having everyone go along with whatever he said. Because of this, he had not developed the habit of saying things in an indirect way in order to please the people with whom he was dealing. On unhappy occasions, his words were still more straightforward, even blunt. Prince De’s direct rejection of Huang’s offer made Huang, a minister of the interior, very angry and resentful. Therefore, when Prince De proceeded to hand him the organizational law, Huang responded by saying that it was too far removed from the principles laid down by the central government and refused to accept it. The negotiations started on this negative note.

Huang soon expressed a desire to return to Hohhot, but in reality, he had no intention of leaving without being able to report a success to the central government, because such a failure would have been a stumbling block in his political career. Prince Yon and Prince De also did not want to see Huang and his entourage leave, so they personally went to Huang’s quarters to soften the atmosphere and request that he remain. As a result of these efforts, Huang agreed to stay on in Bat-khaalag, and the negotiations continued for three more days.

Following is a synopsis of the dialogue between Prince De and Huang Shaohong during these subsequent negotiations. This synopsis is based on Tan Tiwu (Huang’s secretary), Nei Meng zhi jinxi [Inner Mongolia Past and Present]; and Huang Fensheng, Nei Meng zizhi yundong jishi [The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement].

Prince De: The central government should allow an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to be established under its direct control and permit it to implement a higher degree of autonomy.

Huang Shaohong: The Inner Mongolian Autonomous organization can only be allowed to exist as a regional administrative framework under the jurisdiction of the provincial government.

Prince De: The government should remember Sun Yat-sen’s teachings and promises as recorded in his Outline of National Building: “Regarding the weak and minority peoples inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.”

Huang: The government should foster the domestic minorities and allow them to carry out
Prince De: Self-rule is the common desire of all Mongols. It is not the personal stance of a few people. Its goals are unification and self-protection. It is not a separatist movement and is completely free of foreign involvement. Outer Mongolia is under total Soviet domination, eastern Inner Mongolia is occupied by the Japanese, and western Inner Mongolia is teetering on the brink of collapse. Unless we can implement self-rule, there will be no way for western Inner Mongolia to protect itself from foreign invasion and maintain its own existence.

Huang: Japan's intentions are to swallow up all of China eventually. Therefore, the entire nation must be unified. If Inner Mongolia establishes some half-hearted autonomous government, it will exist in name only. An autonomous government in Inner Mongolia will not accomplish anything meaningful and will be of no help in resisting Japanese aggression.

Prince De: The region of autonomy should include all land originally under the jurisdiction of the leagues and banners. Provinces and xians in these territories should be abolished and replaced with leagues and banners. In the seventeenth year of the republic [1928], when the central government began establishing provinces and xians in Inner Mongolia, the Mongols opposed this mightily. Because the central government ignored the Mongolian opposition [to the establishment of provinces and xians in Inner Mongolian territory], the present difficulties developed. It is now time [for the central government] to accept the common will of the Mongols by abolishing the provinces and xians and permitting the establishment of an autonomous government.

Huang: The cold, hard facts should not be ignored. In the two provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, the Chinese outnumber the Mongols. The power of the provinces and xians is greater than the power of the leagues and banners. As far as national defense is concerned, the provinces and xians are much more important [than the leagues and banners]. Your demands [if accepted] will split the nation. The central government will absolutely not allow your demands to be implemented.

At this point, both Prince De and Huang realized that their negotiations had reached a deadlock. They saw that it would be better for the consultants or advisors of both sides to engage in exploratory or experimental talks.

On the night of the sixteenth, the delegates from both sides met in a yurt at the temporary residence of Prince Yon and began their discussions. The Mongolian delegates drew up an eleven-article outline of Mongolian autonomy and proposed that it be used as the basis for discussion. The first article provided for the establishment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government in Inner Mongolia under the direct administration of the central government, and the abolition of the provinces and xians that had been established in Mongolian territory. Li Songfeng said that this article was unacceptable. The negotiations collapsed, and all the delegates left angrily. The following are the eleven articles as

---

10 Huang appointed Li Songfeng (a high-ranking official of the interior ministry), Liu Puchen (a Shanxi man and a commissioner in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Kong Qingzong (a counselor in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and an extreme Han chauvinist, later appointed as a special commissioner in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and stationed in Lhasa, whence he was expelled prior to the Chinese Communist takeover), He Yangling (a higher member of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters), and E Qiguang (a Mongolian Eight Banner man and a section head of the Beiping office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and the official interpreter of Huang's group) as his representatives. Princes Yon and De appointed Wu Heling (actually appointed by Prince Yon), Sainbayar, Su Lutai (the Tumed Banner's delegate in Nanjing), Kang Ren (Mergenbagatur, a Tumed student at Beijing University), Chogbagatur (Chen Shaowu, a Kharachin Left Banner man and a student at the Kuomintang's Political Academy in Nanjing and Prince De's secretary), and Khasochir (a young Chahar official) as delegates from the Mongolian side.
drawn up by the Mongolian side.

1. In Inner Mongolia, a unified supreme autonomous organization should be estab­lished under the name of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government and should be di­rectly under the administration of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese government. This or­ganization should handle the administrative powers of the Inner Mongolian leagues, ban­ners, and tribes. Its expenditures should be supplemented by the central government.

2. The ruling and administrative powers of the Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes should remain unaltered.

3. From now on, there should be no further establishment of *xians* or preliminary *xi­ans* within the territory of the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes. The *xians*, pre­liminary *xians*, and other lower-level political units [in Inner Mongolian territory] should be abolished.

4. The Inner Mongolian territory currently not under cultivation should be designated as Mongolian pastoral zones and should never be put under cultivation. Isolated pockets of farmland in the midst of Mongolian pasture lands should be eliminated.

5. The taxes in the Mongolian pastoral zones should be assessed by the Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization according to a detailed and uniform tax code. The tax collection stations established by the provincial and *xian* governments in the pas­toral zones should all be eliminated.

6. Land already under cultivation in Mongolia should be regulated according to an appropriate method. The temporary income and the annual tax should be evenly divided by the Inner Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization and the provincial govern­ments.

7. Before the Mongolian land already under cultivation is regulated, it should be managed in the manner described below.
   A. The Mongolian banners shall have complete authority over the income derived from ex­ploitation of their land, mineral deposits, forests, and rivers and lakes.
   B. When the provinces, *xians*, and preliminary *xians* already established in Inner Mongol­ian territory collect tax and rent from the land, mineral deposits, forests, rivers, and lakes [of Inner Mongolia], the Inner Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization should dispatch officials to collect the revenue together [with the provincial and *xian* officials], and all revenue should be evenly divided [between the two sides].
   C. The original private rents of the Mongolian offices and people should be guaranteed as in the past.
   D. The obligations of the Mongol people shall be toward their own banners, and the prov­inces and *xians* shall not increase the burdens of the Mongol people.

8. In the territory of the Mongolian banners, beside the provisions for land already mentioned above, all tax collection offices in Mongolian territory established by the prov­inces and *xians* should cooperate with the officials sent by the Inner Mongolian supreme autonomous organization in collecting the tax and immediately dividing it in an even manner.

9. When legal cases involving both Mongols and Han Chinese arise, the Inner Mon­golian supreme autonomous organization should dispatch special officials to the judicial organizations already established in Inner Mongolian territory to sit together with Han Chi­nese judges.

10. All revenue of the Inner Mongolian supreme autonomous organization should be designated as funds for [the improvement of] public health, education, industry, and com­munication and transportation.

11. The Inner Mongolian supreme autonomous organization should establish an office for liaison work at the locations of the concerned provincial governments.
A Breakthrough in the Talks

To use the failure of the negotiations to split up the Mongols and to put pressure on Prince De, Huang Shaohong again indicated his desire to leave and ordered his attendants to prepare for departure. At this moment, though Prince De remained as obstinate as ever and refused to compromise, Prince Yon and the leaders of the Ulanchab League recognized that the failure of the negotiations might possibly draw greater oppression from Suiyuan province. So to alleviate tensions, it was necessary to reach an agreement at the negotiations. Wu Heling also urged that the negotiations not be permitted to end in failure. He submitted his ideas to both Prince Yon and Prince De. Finally, Prince Yon asked the Panchen Lama to mediate and to detain Huang and convince him to continue the negotiations. Huang realized a possibility of compromise on the Mongolian side, so he himself did not want to return to the capital without having achieved any concrete success at the negotiations. Consequently, he decided to remain and take advantage of the Panchen Lama’s mediation.

By this time, the Mongol leaders in attendance at the conference could not avoid a split of opinion. Prince De and the youths under him insisted from the beginning to the end that the Mongols not compromise with Huang. Nevertheless, the cooler heads under the leadership of Prince Yon realized that this type of emotional commitment to principle was of no use. Wu Heling was a pragmatic man of affairs, and seeing that Prince Yon was supporting his proposals, he suggested that it would be better to strive for a conclusion of the negotiations and demand self-rule but not concentrate on the abolition of provinces and xians. Prince Yon agreed with Wu’s opinions, and thought that the failure of these negotiations would also increase the possibility of drawing Japanese pressure into Mongolian politics. Under these circumstances, even if Prince De disapproved of these proposals, he had to compromise with the suggestions of Wu Heling. After Prince Yon’s reconciliation of the two, Prince De and Wu drew up a plan and an alternate plan for dealing with the problems of Mongolian autonomy. The next day, they submitted the following two plans to Huang for consideration:

Plan A

1. **Titles:** The titles [of the governments] shall be designated as the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region, and so on.

2. **Territory:** The Shilingol League and the banners of the Chahar Tribe shall be organized under the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues and the banners of Tumed, Alashan, and Ejine shall be organized under the Government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region. The other leagues and banners shall also be organized according to this pattern. Jurisdiction over all the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions should be directly under the administration of the Executive Yuan. Matters relating to the provinces should be discussed and resolved through consultation with the concerned provincial governments.

3. **Functions:** The governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall administer all the administrative affairs of all leagues, tribes, and banners within their own regions.

4. **Budget:** Expenditures of the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions should be met monthly by the central government.

5. **Liaison:** A joint conference shall be established between the governments of the
Mongolian autonomous regions to negotiate and decide on matters common to the autonomous regions.

**Plan B**

A unified Mongolian supreme autonomous organization known as the Mongolian Autonomous Committee shall be established directly under the Executive Yuan for administering the affairs of the leagues, tribes, and banners. Expenditures should be met by the central government each month.

Huang felt that the method for establishing the first and second autonomous regions in Plan A was quite close to the central government guidelines. If the eleven articles submitted to him earlier were amended so that there was more than one autonomous government, these articles could be presented to the central government for consideration. The two sides finally agreed to the draft of the following eleven articles.

1. **The Organization of Mongolian Autonomy**
   A. **Titles:** The titles shall be designated as the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region, and so on.
   B. **Territory:** The Shilingol League and the banners of the Chahar Tribe shall be organized under the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues and the banners of Tumed, Alashan, and Ejine shall be organized under the government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region. The other leagues and banners shall also be organized according to this pattern.
   C. **Jurisdiction:** Over all the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be directly under the administration of the Executive Yuan. Matters relating to the provinces should be worked out with the concerned provincial governments.
   D. **Functions:** The governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall administer all the affairs of all leagues, tribes, and banners within their own regions.
   E. **Budget:** Expenditures of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be met monthly by the central government.
   F. **Liaison:** A joint conference committee shall be established between the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions to negotiate and decide on matters common to the autonomous regions.

2. The ruling and administrative powers of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners should remain unaltered.

3. From now on, there should be no further establishment of xians and preliminary xians (she-zhi-ju) within the territory of the Inner Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners. Inadequate xians, preliminary xians, and other lower-level political districts should be abolished.

4. The Mongolian territory that is currently not being cultivated should be designated as Mongolian pastoral zones and should never be put under cultivation. Isolated pockets of farmland in the midst of Mongolian pastoral areas should be eliminated.

5. Taxes in Mongolian pastoral zones should be assessed by the Mongolian autonomous government according to a detailed and uniform tax code. The tax collection stations established by the provincial and xian governments in the pastoral zones should all be eliminated.

6. Land already under cultivation in Mongolia should be regulated according to an appropriate method. The temporary income and annual tax [on such land] should be evenly divided by the Mongolian autonomous government and the concerned provincial governments.

7. Before the Mongolian land already under cultivation is regulated, it should be managed in the manner described below:
   A. The Mongolian banners shall have complete authority over the income derived from exploitation of Mongolian land, mineral deposits, forests, and rivers and lakes.
   B. When the provinces, xians, and preliminary xians which have already been established...
in Inner Mongolian territory collect tax and rent from the land, mineral deposits, forests, rivers, and lakes, the Mongolian autonomous government should dispatch officials to collect the revenue; all the revenue should be evenly divided [between the two sides].

C. The original private rents of the Mongolian offices and people should be guaranteed as in the past.

D. Other than the Mongols’ obligations toward their own banners, the provinces and xians should not increase any burdens of the Mongolian people.

8. In the territory of the Mongol banners, beside the provisions already made above for land, all tax collection offices in Mongolian territory established by the provinces and xians should cooperate with officials sent by the Mongolian unified supreme autonomous government in collecting the tax and immediately dividing it.

9. The Mongolian Autonomous Government should dispatch special officials to all of the judicial organizations of all degrees already established in Mongolian territory to judge together on legal cases between Mongols and Han Chinese.

10. All revenue of the Mongolian Autonomous Government should be designated as expenditures for [the improvement of] public health, education, industry, and communication and transportation.

11. The Mongolian Autonomous Government should establish an office for liaison work at the locations of the concerned provincial governments.

Of the eleven articles agreed to by both sides, articles two to eleven were the articles that had already been advocated by the Mongolian side in their original demands. The main point of these eleven articles was to alter the phrase “Inner Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization” to “the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions.” In other words, this was the result of a compromise made on both sides. All through the negotiations, Wu Heling acted as a mediator between the two sides.

The problems of resolving Mongolian autonomy claims that had existed for almost half a year were solved. Both sides were able to save face. The central government, of course, had to recognize Wu’s ability to persuade the Mongols to compromise. On the other hand, cool-headed leaders also recognized that Wu was a capable person who could persuade the central government to accept the Mongol proposals and was a man able to protect the practical interests of the Mongols. However, from the point of view of Prince De and the radicals under him, Wu was an opportunist prepared to sacrifice the cause of Mongolia. Prince De thought that even though this result could not be recognized as a complete failure, it could also not be recognized as a complete success. Only article two, which stated that the ruling and administrative powers of the traditional Mongol political units were to remain unaltered, was a relative success in his opinion, because article two was similar to the points in the Regulations of Mongolian Treatment as issued by the Beijing government in both 1913 and 1919.

Prince De argued earlier against Wu Heling’s great accomplishment (the Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners that had been issued by the Nanjing government in 1931), because it did not offer solid protection of Mongolian rights as the old regulations had. Nevertheless, Prince De insisted that the provision in the Regulations of Mongolian Treatment stating that “the ruling power of the Mongol princes should remain unaltered” be retained. Prince De now changed his mind and no longer emphasized or insisted on the feudalistic privileges of the princes and nobles. This change of mind was probably the result of his long interaction with the young Mongol intellectuals.

From the beginning of the Autonomy movement, Ao Yunzhang had been the behind-the-scenes advisor for Prince De. He was involved in formulating plans and drawing up all important declarations relating to the Mongolian autonomy movement. He
never once went public or claimed merit for doing these things; he was certainly not seeking recognition or fame for himself. Several years ago, a man [Chogbagatur] in Inner Mongolia wrote his memoirs and in them falsely claimed to have been the person who drew up all the declarations and plans of the autonomy movement. The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement happened over half a century ago, but I still feel an obligation to Ao Yunzhang, who was and is an unsung hero of the autonomy movement, and must at last be given his just credit before the bar of history.

The Last Mongol Prince

The Machinations of Huang Shaohong and Fu Zuoyi

The acceptance of the Mongolian proposals, although conditional, was a matter worthy of celebration. Therefore, before Huang Shaohong, Zhao Pilian, and their group left Beile-yin sume, Princes Yon and De carried out a great party of celebration and farewell. Among the celebration activities were traditional Mongolian wrestling and horse-racing. According to the Mongolian custom of keeping one’s word, the Mongols trusted the words of the emissaries from the central government and did not put this agreement into written form for signatures. No Mongol in attendance at these negotiations foresaw that this agreement would eventually be altered beyond recognition by the emissaries of the central government. Later, even after experiencing failure with these Chinese emissaries, when Prince De negotiated with the Japanese, he still followed the Mongolian tradition and did not put the Japanese promises into writing or sign and exchange documents. This created many regrettable results for him in the future. His behavior should be recognized as derived from the Mongolian tradition of simplicity and trust and Mongol ignorance of the practices of modern diplomacy.

While the celebrations were being carried out, Princes Yon and De and the members of the presidium of the Mongolian conference representing the officials and people of the Mongolian leagues and banners sent a telegram of thanks to the KMT party and the government in Nanjing and reported to them on the resolution of the problems associated with achieving Mongolian autonomy:

To Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Chinese government, the Executive Yuan, the Military Committee, the Interior Ministry, and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission:

The public advocacy of Inner Mongolian autonomy by the heads and officials of Inner Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners is aimed solely at preventing external encroachment and strengthening the struggle for existence and national defense. Fortunately, the central government has realized that we are sincere and honest and has dispatched Minister Huang and Deputy Chairman Zhao to come to Mongolia for observation. After their arrival in Beile-yin sume, they truly opened their hearts and held open and honest discussions with us. Through the guidance and persuasion of the Living Buddha Panchen and through several sessions of negotiation and discussion, [they] followed the established

---

11 In 1911, Outer Mongolian delegates went to St. Petersburg to discuss their independence with the Russian prime minister and high-ranking officials and to win an agreement for Russian assistance to Mongolia. After independence was declared, however, the Tsarist Russian government in 1912 dispatched Ivan Korostowetz as a special emissary to negotiate a Russo-Mongolian agreement with the Ulaanbaatar government. This emissary utterly neglected the earlier agreement and promises by his government to the Mongols. He could get away with this because the Mongols trusted the words of their Russian counterpart and did not prepare and sign a document and exchange copies of it.
principle of the central government, took public opinion into consideration, and agreed to designate the banners of the Shilingol League and the Chahar Tribe as the First Mongolian Autonomy Region, the banners of the Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues and the Tumed Alashan Ejine Banners as the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region, and established governments in each region. Other leagues and banners will also follow this precedent. A combined office will be established among the autonomous regions to carry out public affairs. As for halting cultivation of pasture land and the division of local tax revenue, it was also agreed that efforts would be made to arrive at a suitable solution. Thus, the former shortcomings and overly brief agreements will be eliminated and a [bright] road for [the future of] Mongolia will be opened. We are grateful for the fostering mercy of the central government and the accomplishments of the two Excellencies, Huang and Zhao. We are encouraged by our favorable treatment and are greatly pleased. From now on, we will struggle more resolutely for the defense of the nation. Therefore, we hereby telegraph and express our thanks and hope that you will see fit to receive this telegram.

[Signed],

Members of the presidium:
Yondonwangchug, Demchugdongrob, Babudorji, Gendenjab
Shonodondub

Officials and delegates of the
leagues, tribes, and banners

Nineteenth day [of November]

On November 19, Huang, Zhao, Xu Tingyao, and their high-ranking attendants left Beile-yin sume and returned to Hohhot. They also dispatched several of their attendants to the banners of Ulanchab and Shilingol for observation and alleviation of tensions. After the departure of the government delegates, Princes Yon and De discussed matters with some other leaders and decided to send a delegation to Nanjing to express their sincere thanks to the Chinese government and to continue the negotiations with the government in an effort to resolve as yet unsolved problems.

This delegation was headed by Nimaodzar, who was not only the leader but also the spokesman for this delegation. The delegation arrived in Nanjing by January, 1934. They immediately visited with Wang Jingwei, head of the Executive Yuan; Shi Qingyang, chairman of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; and other members and officials of the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang and of other ministries and committees. The delegates expressed the Mongols’ gratitude for the acceptance of their requests for autonomy. They also urged the Executive Yuan to implement the eleven articles that were agreed to by Huang Shaohong and the Mongols. These delegates were welcomed by both party and government officials. Because Huang and Zhao were still in Hohhot and had not yet returned to the capital, the government did not voice any objections to this delegation. Thus the delegates felt quite reassured. No Shilingol delegates joined the delegation. This suggested that Prince De and his radical group did not agree with the eleven articles negotiated through the endeavors of Wu Heling, and so Prince De refused to dispatch delegates in order to show his disapproval of the articles.

After their arrival in Hohhot, Huang and Zhao again met with Fu Zuoyi and negotiated for a long period. Ostensibly, Huang and Zhao were waiting to join a Mongol-Chinese Goodwill Conference under the direction of Fu Zuoyi to show that Mongol-Chinese relations in Suiyuan were friendly and that there were no conflicts and no need to implement autonomy. Of course, the goal of this performance was to create a false perception among the Mongols and manipulate public opinion. After attending this conference, Huang and Zhao went to Taiyuan at Yan Xishan’s invitation. In Taiyuan, Huang and Zhao consulted with Yan Xishan on how to complete the eleven articles.
After Huang and Zhao returned to Nanjing, they reported to Wang Jingwei and submitted to him the version of the eleven articles they had ingenuously worked out in Hohhot with Fu Zuoyi and in Taiyuan with Yan Xishan. Soon these “Eleven Articles for the Solution of Mongolian Autonomy” were discussed and passed by a conference of the Executive Yuan and forwarded to the Central Political Committee of the Kuomintang, the supreme policy-making organ at that time. These “Eleven Articles” were passed by the 392nd meeting of the committee on January 16, 1934, with only a few minor changes in wording. The following is the text of Huang’s misleading eleven articles.

The Resolution on Mongolian Autonomy

1. **Limitations on Inner Mongolian Autonomy** Plan A, the final position of the Mongolian delegates on the establishment of regional autonomous governments, is in accordance with the principles formulated by the central government and is therefore acceptable. Issues of territory, jurisdiction, organization, power and functions, and expenditures shall be decided according to the resolutions below and shall be established as law and ordinance.

2. **Agenda for Implementing Mongolian Autonomy** Before the regional autonomous governments are established, preliminary offices shall be established. However, it is necessary that officials be sent by the central government to supervise these thoroughly, or else the governor of the concerned province will be appointed as a superintendent by the central government. Regulations for the dispatched persons shall be established separately.

3. **Territories of the Mongolian Autonomous Regions** The organization of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be limited to the territories where the xians are not yet established. In both Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, two regions shall be established. The titles [of these two regions] shall be the First Mongolian Autonomous Region of the Republic of China, the Second Autonomous Region, and so forth. But if the two autonomous regions of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces are willing to unify into one region, then this might be submitted to the Interior Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission by the provinces in question and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval [by the ministry and commission]. As for the regions where xians are already established in Chahar and Suiyuan and are completely under the jurisdiction of the provinces, and where the xians and Mongolian territory interlock, detailed division shall be surveyed [and determined] by the provincial government and the regional [autonomous] government and reported to the Interior Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission for submission to the Executive Yuan for approval. As for the two banners of Ejine and Alashan, which were originally under the jurisdiction of Ningxia province, they should not be designated as being within the autonomous regions.

4. **The Organization of Autonomous Regional Governments**
   A. The members of the autonomous regional governments shall consist of five to fifteen persons. Among them, one shall be chairman and two shall be deputy chairmen. They must be persons native to the particular areas [they represent] and must be appointed by the central government.
   B. Sections shall be established within the regional governments to aid in administration.
   C. In order to solve the common matters among the autonomous regions, a joint conference of the autonomous regions may be summoned by a special appointee sent by the central government.
   D. The autonomous regions shall consist of two divisions: regions and banners. In each region and banner, people’s autonomous organizations shall be established, the regulations of which shall be determined by law and ordinance.
   E. The central government shall approve the location of the regional government.

5. **Jurisdiction Over the Autonomous Regional Governments** The autonomous re-
6. **The Powers of the Autonomous Regional Governments** The authority to direct military affairs and matters of diplomacy in the autonomous regions of Mongolia shall be uniformly wielded by the central government or by such provincial governments as the central government shall designate. Other matters recognized as having special characteristics shall also be delegated by the central government to the provincial governments as circumstances dictate. Administration of Mongolian banners not delegated to the provincial government by the central government shall be administered by the regional governments. The regional governments may promulgate ordinances for the regions and special regulations within limitations if they do not conflict with the laws and regulations issued by the central government and the concerned provincial governments. Limitations on the freedom of the people and increases in the people's duties shall not be implemented unless authorized by the Chinese government.

7. **Relations Between the Provincial Governments and the Autonomous Regional Governments** As for the administration of Mongolian banners inside Mongolian autonomous regions in which the central government has already granted the power to administer these matters to the provincial governments, these administrative powers shall remain with the provincial government. Powers not granted the provincial governments shall be retained by the regional governments according to the direction of the central government. Matters concerning administration of the provinces shall be discussed with the provincial government, which shall reach a decision. In areas where *xians* are already established, the administration of Mongolian banners and the entanglements between the Mongols and Chinese shall be handled by the provincial government. In times of need, a special committee shall be established to solve problems between the provinces and the autonomous regions. The central government may commission the provincial government to represent the central government in directing the Mongolian regional governments in carrying out local autonomy.

8. **Administrative Expenditures of the Governments of the Autonomous Regions** The budgets for expenditures by the governments of the autonomous regions should be drawn up first and then authorized by the central government, which will then grant supplementary funds. All tax revenues must be allocated in accordance with the guidelines established by the central government and must be divided into national tax and local tax. National tax revenue in the territories where *xians* are established should be collected by the provincial governments. In areas where *xians* are not yet established, taxes shall be collected by the autonomous regional governments.

9. **The Problems of Expenditures of the Autonomous Regions** In areas where cultivation has been undertaken and *xians* are established, all original Chinese and Mongol land rights should remain as currently constituted. In Mongolian banners where uncultivated land exists and there are no *xians*, animal husbandry shall be carried out as the main economic activity, with farming and cultivation as supplementary activities. There shall be no discrimination against the people of the Republic of China, and anyone who lives in the territories for one year shall enjoy the rights to both husbandry and cultivation. The regional governments, when recognizing the necessity to cultivate land inside the autonomous regions, may petition the central government at any time for authorization to open it to both Mongolian and Chinese cultivation. In uncultivated areas, domestic animals shall be improved through breeding, and epidemic prevention stations for animals shall be set up, together with branch stations for vaccination of the animals, all to benefit the domestic animals and to promote their health. The forests and minerals belong to the nation and shall be developed and exploited by the Ministry of Industry. In order to develop the monetary organizations, the Ministry of Finance shall develop branches of the Central Bank in the autonomous regions.
ough and concrete draft for solution shall be worked out by the Ministry of Education and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.


The Final Resolution

When this resolution appeared in the newspapers, the Mongolian delegation (which had been sent to express appreciation) and the Mongols in Nanjing were shocked. Cheated by the ministers of the central government, they resented the government’s duplicity in dealing with them. When this news reached Bat-khaalag, the people waiting for a positive answer from the central government were greatly surprised. They marveled that the representatives of a government, the ministers of interior affairs, could be such unfaithful and disingenuous people and cheat both the Mongol people and the central government. The reputation of the Nanjing government dropped greatly in the eyes of the Mongol people. Even in later days, when the government’s reputation was restored, this incident still left many Mongols bitter. At this time, Prince De swore to his radical intellectual followers that no matter what kind of situation Mongolia might face, his decision to sacrifice his life and family for the Mongol people would never change. This decision was the main factor that placed him in the position of a tragic hero of his time.

According to Huang Shaohong’s eleven articles, not only did the Mongols fail to achieve a higher degree of autonomy, but the guarantee of the original power and rights of the Mongol leagues and banners was also jeopardized. This solution aimed to eliminate the leagues, put all banners under the control of the provincial governments, and encourage Chinese cultivation of Mongolian pastoral land. It would have destroyed the pastoral base of the Mongolian economy. This solution not only made it impossible to divide the tax revenues but even put the original rights of taxation into the hands of the provincial and xian governments.

On January 18, the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates and the delegation from Beile-yin sume joined to protest to the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and the Chinese government against the resolution for Mongolian autonomy as passed by the Kuomintang Central Political Committee and to petition to change this resolution. On January 19, a telegram of inquiry was sent to Huang Shaohong in the name of Prince Yon, Prince De, and other members of the presidium of the Mongolian conference. On January 24, all the Mongols in Nanjing—officials, students, young, and old—mobilized and took to the streets with posters to demonstrate. They went to the Kuomintang Central Headquarters, to the Chinese government’s Executive Yuan, and other organizations to protest. They also explained in a press conference the reasons why they could not accept the resolution of the Central Political Committee. They also gave an account of their betrayal by Huang Shaohong.

When these protesters arrived at the Kuomintang Central Headquarters, the Fourth Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Central Committee was convening, and all party and government leaders were in attendance. Among them were the Mongolian members Engkebatu, Bai Yunti, and Keshingge. Most of the Mongol demonstrators were blocked from entering the gate. Only a few people, such as Wu Heling, Nimaodzar, his delegation, and Mongols with higher official positions (for example, Bai Rui, a member of the Control Yuan) were allowed to enter.

During their discussion, Bai Rui, who had earlier gone to Bat-khaalag and joined
VI: The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement

the Mongol conference as a private supporter of the movement, became highly agitated and shouted, "At the beginning of the republic I was elected a member of the parliament. From that time on, I followed Mr. Sun Yat-sen and went to Guangdong and joined the revolutionary activities under Mr. Sun's leadership. After twenty years, now I see that there is a minister of Interior Affairs in the government who is cheating the Mongols, and the central government and the party have believed his words. [Under these circumstances] it would be better for me to die than remain alive!" Having uttered these words, Bai Rui rushed to the railing of the building's balcony and attempted to jump off, but several people prevented him from doing so. At the same time, Khaso chic, a young member of the Beile-yin sume delegation, also became agitated and attempted to jump, but he was also restrained.

A riotous disturbance ensued, and the top leaders in the meetings immediately reported this matter to higher authorities. Word soon came back from these higher authorities that the protesters should go home in peace; an investigation would begin immediately. Wu Heling, seizing the opportunity, privately told the responsible members of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters about the seriousness of this problem. The next day the Nanjing newspapers reported the Mongolian protest in blazing headlines. This attracted the attention of most citizens of Nanjing.

Following this event, Fu Zuoyi, again in the name of the ruling princes of the banners of the Yekejuu League, sent out a public telegram stating that the ruling princes did not attend the meeting at Beile-yin sume and had no desire to join with the other leagues and banners in forming one autonomous region. This misleading telegram brought great antagonism toward Fu Zuoyi among the Mongols in Nanjing. In response, the Yekejuu delegates in Nanjing issued a declaration pointing out the false statements made by Fu Zuoyi.

Realizing the seriousness of this problem, Wang Jingwei, the head of the executive yuan, summoned a meeting to discuss the situation. At first, Wang Jingwei emphasized the continuing, consistent policy of his government toward the weak minorities, and said that if the Mongols, in their requests for increased autonomy, were inclined toward the central government, they would be nurtured according to Mr. Sun Yat-sen's will and teachings. On the other hand, Wang continued in a somewhat threatening tone, if this movement were separatist in nature, it would certainly be suppressed.

This attempt at intimidation did not stop the Mongols from protesting. Bai Yunti, Wu Heling, Nimaodzar, Rong Zhao (a Tumed Mongol educated in the Soviet Union) and others spoke one after another in protest. Rong Zhao's protests were the most virulent. He emphasized that the Mongols' demand for autonomy was a purely indigenous movement free of interference or assistance from any foreign country, and that the demands for autonomy were based on the teachings of Mr. Sun Yat-sen. He further explained that the movement was inclined toward the central government and was not a

12 Persons in attendance from the government included Yu Youren, Head of the Control Yuan; Dai Chuanxian, head of the Examination Yuan; Ju Zheng, head of the Judicial Yuan; Shi Qingyang, Minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian, the two special envoys sent to Mongolia; and other important government and party officials. From the Mongolian side, Bai Yunti, Keshingge, Li Yongxin, and other Mongolian officials in the Kuomintang Central Headquarters attended. Wu Heling and the delegates of the Nanking Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, Nimaodzar and the delegation sent from Beile-yin sume, the Mongolian officials in the offices of the government in Nanking and Mongolian college students all attended the conference.
separatist movement; the nation and Mongolia would both benefit from such autonomy. A greater degree of autonomy for the Mongols, he continued, was the desire of all Mongols, not simply the personal goal of Prince De.

Rong and the others also pointed out that all the information issued by Fu Zuoyi was propagandistic fabrication. They also demanded that Huang Shaohong explain why he cheated the Mongols by altering the contents of the original eleven articles and brought shame upon the government in doing so. The meeting ended on a very awkward and tense note.

Wang Jingwei soon summoned Wu Heling for a personal consultation, and Wu gave detailed answers to all of Wang’s questions; he used a map to illustrate the original territories of the leagues and banners and the subsequent establishment of provinces and xians which created a conflict within the dual system of political administration. In accordance with the doctrine of jurisdiction based on ethnicity (shurenzhu), Wu explained, the leagues and banners ruled over the Mongols and the provinces and xians ruled over the Chinese. Violation of this traditional precedent created conflicts in judicial matters. Wu explained further that the provision in article three of Huang’s eleven false articles which held that “the organization of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be limited to the territories where xians are not already established” meant that most of the Mongolian districts and people could not enjoy self-rule. The effect of the provision for tax revenue in Huang’s eleven articles, Wu continued, meant that the Mongols would get nothing. Therefore, the Mongols could not accept the eleven articles passed by the Central Political Committee. Moreover, this kind of unfaithfulness on the part of the central government would bring bad results in the future.

Wu continued by giving Wang a very detailed explanation of the eleven articles that both sides had agreed to at the negotiations in Beile-yin sume. Wu also emphasized that unless the central government allowed the Mongols to establish a unified autonomous organization, it would be impossible to satisfy their hopes. Wang said that a reasonable and practical resolution should be quickly reached and demanded that Wu draw up a draft of a solution for his (Wang’s) personal reference.

After receiving Wang Jingwei’s instructions, Wu Heling consulted with Nimaodzar and his delegation and drafted an eight-article method for achieving Mongolian autonomy. The next day, he brought this draft to Wang. After reading it, Wang felt quite satisfied but said, “I cannot make a decision on a matter as important as this by myself. This must be approved by Mr. Chiang [Kai-shek] himself.” He then told Wu Heling, “The Central Committee has already adopted a solution. A change [in this resolution] is necessary. It would be best for you to visit several influential members and secure their cooperation.”

Wu soon went to visit with Zhang Ji, Dai Chuanxian, and others to explain the need to alter the resolution for Mongolian autonomy as passed by the Kuomintang Central Political Committee. These people expressed their willingness to consider his requests, offering no objections to the changes he proposed. Wang Jingwei made a few changes in the wording of Wu Heling’s draft and sent it to the Headquarters of the Military Committee in Nanchang for Generalissimo Chiang’s approval. Chiang did not make any changes in Wang’s revision other than adding the word “local” between the words “Mongolian” and “autonomy.” After receiving this response from Chiang Kai-shek, Wang summoned Wu Heling again, showed him the document, and said happily, “This autonomous problem is now resolved, for the most part, according to the wishes of you and your people.”

After receiving Chiang’s agreement, Wang Jingwei commended in his own
name and in the name of Chiang Kai-shek the "Principles of Mongolian Local Auton-
omy" to the 397th meeting of the Central Political Committee held on February 28, 1934. There was no opposition; the resolution passed unanimously. Thus the Mongolian auton-
omy problems eventually were resolved in a manner acceptable to both the central gov-
ernment and the Mongol people. Following are the Eight Articles on Mongolian Auton-
omy as passed by the Central Political Committee.

1. A Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be established at an
appropriate locality in Mongolia. The said council and its administration of the political af-
fairs of the leagues and banners shall be under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan
and the guidance of concerned offices in the central government. Persons appointed as
chairman and members of the said council are to be Mongols. The budget of the council
shall be provided by the central government. The central government shall station a high-
ranking official at the locality of the council to provide guidance and mediate in disputes
between the [Mongolian] leagues and banners and the [Chinese] provinces and xians.
2. All league offices shall be converted into league governments, and banner offices
into banner governments. Internal organization of these offices-turned-governments are to
remain unchanged. Expenditures of the league governments shall be subsidized by the cen-
tral government.
3. The Chahar Tribe shall be classified as a league in order to put it on an equal footing
with the other leagues. The administration and organization of the Chahar Tribe shall re-
main unchanged.
4. The jurisdictions and ruling powers of the leagues and banners are to remain un-
changed.
5. The current cultivation of the pasture lands shall cease. Henceforth, local [Mongol-
ian] economic development shall be based upon improvements in animal husbandry and
growth of related industries. (In instances where leagues and banners give their consent,
cultivation shall be permitted.)
6. The integrity of all taxes and rents of the leagues and banners, as well as of private
rents of the Mongol people, shall be ensured.
7. A percentage of all local taxes collected in league and banner territories by the prov-
inces and xians shall be returned to the leagues and banners for allocation as construction
funds. Decisions concerning the allocation of tax revenues shall be made separately.
8. There shall be no additional xians or preliminary-xians established in league and
banner territories. (Even when exigencies dictate otherwise, the establishment of additional
xians and preliminary-xians must still be approved by the concerned leagues and banners.)

Nimaodzar and his delegation telegraphed this good news to Princes Yon and
De and also expressed their gratitude for and acceptance of the resolution to the Central
Political Committee. At the same time, they personally expressed their sincere thanks to
Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek. The Mongols in Nanjing threw a party at the Central
Hotel to celebrate the success of the autonomy movement. The delegation returned to
Mongolia immediately; less important matters were referred to the Nanjing Office of the
Mongolian League and Banner Delegates.

After Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian left Beile-yin sume, Prince De also re-
turned to his residence in Sunid. At the time when Huang and Zhao were fabricating their
false eleven articles and the Nanjing Mongols were protesting against these articles,
Prince De thought that the autonomous movement had ended in failure. He did not, how-
ever, forsake his determination to struggle to the end. The intellectuals around him also
did not disperse or lose hope. This unyielding insistence encouraged the Mongols in
Nanjing to continue the struggle against the machinations of Huang Shaohong and Fu
Zuoyi. Eventually, the hopes and yearnings of the Mongols were realized. The establish-
ment of a unified autonomous organization was especially satisfying to the supporters of the autonomy movement. Nevertheless, they had some regrets that their goal of Mongolian autonomy was changed to "local autonomy." The Mongol efforts in Nanjing and the formation of a unified Mongolian autonomous organization somewhat restored the affable relationship between Prince De and Wu Heling. It also decreased Prince De's suspicions of Wu.

Since the Mongolian side expressed its willingness to accept the Eight Articles on Mongolian Local Autonomy, on March 7, the 398th meeting of the Central Political Committee passed the Provisional Outline of the Organization of Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council, and the Preliminary Regulations of the Office of Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy. The following are the contents of these two documents.

**Provisional Outline of the Organization of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council**

**Article I**
The Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be organized according to the principles of Mongolian Local Autonomy as issued by the Chinese government.

**Article II**
The said council shall be under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan and shall accept the directions of the concerned organizations in the central government and the superintendents dispatched by the central government. Matters pertaining to the provinces shall be carried out through negotiation and consultation with the provincial governments.

**Article III**
The location of the said council shall be Beile-yin sume.

**Article IV**
Members of the council shall be nine to twenty-four in number. Members shall be presented by the Executive Yuan to the Chinese government for appointment. One chairman and two vice chairmen shall be appointed from among the members.

**Article V**
The council shall hold a meeting every two weeks. If it is necessary, a preliminary meeting may be held. All meetings shall be chaired by the chairman. When a member is unable to attend a meeting, a representative shall be sent in his behalf to attend the meeting with no voting rights.

**Article VI**
The chairman of the council shall carry out the resolutions of the meetings as explained in the former article and he shall also administer the affairs of the council and supervise the other officials and organizations under the jurisdiction of the council. In the event that the chairman is unable to carry out his functions, one of the vice-chairmen shall act as chairman in his behalf.

**Article VII**
The council shall establish the following departments, bureaus, and commissions for separate management of the council's various affairs:
- **The Department of the Secretariat** shall administer the documents, archives, records, statistics, translations [of documents], accounting, and general affairs of the council.
- **The Department of Consultation** shall draw up and examine the plans, bills, and ordinances of the council.
- **The Civil Affairs Bureau** shall administer civilian affairs.
- **The Peace Preservation Bureau** shall administer affairs pertaining to the preservation of the peace.
- **The Industrial Affairs Bureau** shall administer affairs pertaining to industry in general.
The Bureau of Education shall administer education and related matters. The Financial Commission shall administer financial affairs and concerns. For each bureau, a bureau head [shall be appointed].

In the Financial Commission there shall be a chairman, and six to ten members shall be appointed by the council chairman from among the secretaries, consultants, and counselors. All heads of the bureaus shall be members of the Financial Commission.

There shall be from twelve to sixteen section heads for the departments, bureaus, and commission.

Forty to sixty clerks shall be in the departments, bureaus, and commission.

The council may appoint specialists of all kinds and employees [as needs dictate].

The aforementioned departments and bureaus, with the exception of the Department of Consultation, shall be divided into sections for carrying out their functions. The council may, as needs require, establish additional bureaus and commissions upon approval [of the central government].

Article VIII

The following officials shall be appointed in the departments, bureaus, and commission of the council:

one secretary general
four secretaries
one chief consultant
four consultants

honorary counselors, one from each banner, with renewable terms of one year.

Article IX

Members of the council shall be Mongols only. The officials of the departments, bureaus, and commission shall be appointed through selection by the Executive Yuan from among those who have special knowledge of Mongolian affairs.

Article X

The regulations of the meetings and the administration of the council shall be passed by the council and presented to the Executive Yuan for approval.

Article XI

This outline shall be carried out from the day of its promulgation.

The following is the text of the Preliminary Regulations of the Office of the Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy.

Preliminary Regulations of the Office of the Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy

Article I

The Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy shall direct the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council and intervene in confrontations between the [Chinese] provinces and xians and the Mongolian leagues and banners in accordance with the principles of Mongolian local autonomy as issued by the Chinese government and ordered by the Executive Yuan.

Article II

One superintendent and one vice superintendent shall be appointed by the Chinese government through the recommendation of the Executive Yuan.

Article III

The senior counselors shall be appointed by the Executive Yuan through the recommendation of the superintendent.

Article IV

Appointment of other officials of the Office of the Superintendent shall be decided separately.

Article V

At the meetings of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council, the
superintendent and the deputy superintendent may dispatch the senior consultant for supervision.

**Article VI**
All documents of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council presented to the Executive Yuan and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission shall be presented simultaneously to the office of the superintendent.

**Article VII**
If the management and orders formulated and issued by the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council are recognized by the superintendent as being inappropriate, he may correct or eliminate them.

**Article VIII**
Expenditures of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be provided for through the Office of the Superintendent.

**Article IX**
These regulations shall be carried out from the day of their promulgation.

In the same meeting, the important personnel of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council and its superintendent were selected and appointed by the Chinese government.\(^{13}\)

In comparison with the eleven articles negotiated between Huang Shaohong and the Mongols, these eight articles passed by the Central Political Committee provided more gains and smaller losses to the Mongols. Because of this, many Mongol leaders recognized that the attitudes of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and the leaders in the Chinese government toward the Mongols and the national minorities were quite fair. However, hindered by the powerful officials of the border provinces like Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi, implementation of these policies was impossible. Because of this, the Mongol leaders still had to contact the central government over the heads of the borderlands provincial officials and warlords. But in so doing, they only brought upon themselves more obstruction by and animosity from the provincial governments. This situation in Inner Mongolia continued until 1949, when the Chinese government withdrew to Taiwan.

\(^{13}\) Chairman of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council: Yondonwangchug (head of the Ulanchab League); vice-chairmen: Sodnamrabdan (head of the Shilingol League) and Shagdurjab (head of the Yekejuu League); members: Demchugdongrob (deputy-head of the Shilingol League), Altanwachir (deputy-head of the Yekejuu League), Babudorji (deputy-head of the Ulanchab League), Nayantu (Prince of Khalkha and a senior advisor in the Executive Yuan), Yangsang (ex-head of the Shilingol League), Engkebatu (member of the Chinese government and of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee), Bai Yunti (member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Keshingge (alternate member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Wu Heling (head of the Nanking Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates and member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Jodbajab (superintendent of Peace Preservation of the Chahar Tribe), Gonchograshi (*amban* of the Chahar Border White Banner), Damzana (*jasag* of the Alashan Banner), Tobshinbayar (*jasag* of the Ejine Banner), Rong Xiang (*amban* of the Tumed Banner), Nimaodzar (*amban* of the Chahar-Minggan Pasture), Yi dechin (military consultant in the Chinese government), Khorjurjab (a "prince-in-leisure" of the Sunid Left Banner), Togtakhu (*tusalagchi* of the Ujumuchin Right Banner), Pandeigungchab (*jasag* of the Dorben Keuked Banner), Namjilsereing (deputy-head of the Jerim League), and Ayulugei (deputy-head of the Josutu League); superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy: He Yingjin (Minister of Military Affairs and In Charge of the Chairman of the Beiping Branch of the Military Committee); and vice superintendent: Zhao Daiwen (Counselor-General of the Taiyuan Office of Pacification).
The Nanjing government realized that in order to satisfy the Mongols, it would be impossible to put them under the supervision of the provincial governments and that an autonomous region extending into the areas of several provinces under the direct jurisdiction of the central government had to be established. However, because this would evoke great opposition from the provinces, it was necessary to appoint a person whose authority was above that of the provincial governments to bear the title of superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy and to mediate conflicts between the Mongols and the provinces. Unfortunately, this was not done, so the conflicts remained.

The goal in establishing and appointing members to the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council (hereafter abbreviated as the Mongolian Political Council) was to include in one organization all the Inner Mongolian territories except those areas under Japanese occupation. The Council would unite influential Mongolian nobility and outstanding commoner leaders to work for the good of Inner Mongolia and to resist Russia and Japan. Hence the Khalkha Prince Nayuantu, the Jerim League Deputy Head Namjlisereng, and the Josutu League Deputy Head Ayulugei were appointed as members.

For years, the aim of Chahar, Hulunbuir and Dahur Mongols had been to change their tribes into leagues. Not until this time did they achieve this goal. Unfortunately, the Japanese had by then occupied the territory of both the Hulunbuir and Dahur Mongols.

From 1928 (when the Inner Mongolian leaders formally established contact with the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and the Chinese government) to 1934, this was the only harmonious moment in relations between the Chinese central government and the Mongolian leaders. Perhaps this was one of the reasons why from this time onward Prince De retained a good impression of the Chinese government. However, because of Fu Zuoyi's harassment and the Japanese military advances, this honeymoon period did not last long. Prince De had to change his course of action and once again assume more risks to his life.