Background to the Fall of Hangzhou

Since its founding in 960, the Song dynasty was sporadically plagued by its neighboring states: Tangut Xi Xia (1038-1227) in Ningxia and Gansu, the Khitan Liao (916-1125) in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, the Jurchen Jin (1126-1234) who supplanted the Khitans, and the Mongols who in turn took over Jurchen territory before occupying the whole of China by 1276. Due to the weak military foundations of the state, Song foreign policy from the very beginning resorted to appeasement. Under the terms of the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005, the Song acknowledged the Khitan Liao as an equal state, opened up trade, and submitted annual tribute payments.

A century later the Song collaborated with the Jurchens and crushed

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1. Song foreign policy was a controversial topic among Qing scholars. Wang Fuzhi felt that the external menace should have been nipped right from the start: that is, had the Khitans been dealt with severely, the Jurchens and Mongols would not have had successive turns at invading China. See his Songlun, 15.262. A contrary opinion was expressed by Zhao Yi, who argued in his Nian'er shi zhaji, 26.501, that the Song had been able to survive only by relying on appeasement policies.

2. This peace treaty is only briefly mentioned in the SS annals (SS 7.127). See Wang Gungwu, "Rhetoric of a lesser empire," and Jin Shi. The initial amount of tribute to the Liao was 100,000 ounces of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk, later increased to 200,000 ounces of silver and 300,000 bolts of silk. The Song also sent a total of 255,000 units of silver, silk, and tea to Xi Xia. The Jin first demanded 250,000 ounces of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk; the amounts were later changed to 200,000 and then 300,000 each. Apart from these official amounts, the Jin envoys also received lavish gifts. In 1234 the Song refused to comply with the Mongol request for 200,000 ounces of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk. See Zhao Yi, 26.499.
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the Liao, but in 1126-27 it ceded to them the Liao tribute as well as North China, the nuclear center of Chinese civilization. The ultimate humiliation was inflicted with the capture and abduction to the North of the two Song emperors, Huizong (r. 1101-25) and Qinzong (r. 1126-27), along with some two thousand imperial relatives and three thousand officials and escorts. Huizong’s ninth son, Gaozong (r. 1127-62), escaped and mustered enough support from court officials and military men to bring about a restoration that prolonged the Song house for another century and half (subsequently known as the Southern Song). Yue Fei (1103-41), the legendary patriotic general, regained some lost territory but was stopped short and put to death by Gaozong, who at the time was inclined towards a peace with the Jurchens. As a condition for peace, the border between the Song and Jurchen Jin was drawn more or less along the Huai River. Against the choice of Jiankang (Nanjing), Hangzhou was renamed Lin’an (Approaching peace) and made the seat of the Song court. Although soon established in the rich economic zone of the southeastern provinces, the Song court for the remainder of its existence regarded Hangzhou as merely the temporary residence. Nostalgia for the former capital of Bianliang (Kaifeng) was assuaged by Hangzhou’s meteoric rise to a cultural metropolis rivaling its predecessor, but the desire to recover the Central Plain was voiced fervently by statesmen and patriotic poets. In

1. For the immediate background to this crisis, see John Winthrop Haeger, "1126-27."

2. Despite its removal to the south, the dynasty continued to call itself the Song, but the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols often referred to it as Nanchao (Southern dynasty). A differentiation between Northern and Southern Song was not made until at least the Yuan dynasty.

3. On Yue Fei, see Edward H. Kaplan.

4. For the layout of Hangzhou, see A.C. Moule, Quinsai, 1-53, and Etienne Balazs, 85-86.

5. Lu You (1125-1209) and Xin Qiji (1140-1207) were the foremost patriotic poets who advocated an aggressive policy against the Jin for the recovery of the north and the reunification of China. Xin was a northerner who in his youth brought an army with him to the south. His biography is in SS 401.12161-67; see also Irving Yucheng Lo. Lu You's best-known patriotic poem, "Instructions to my sons," requested his descendants to inform him of the reunification at his grave. For a translation, see Burton Watson, 68.
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1234 a Song-Mongol alliance eradicated the Jin dynasty thus offering the Song final revenge against the Jurchens, but it also removed the crucial buffer state needed to ensure its own security against the Mongols, who annexed the Jurchen territory.

The inherent conflict of interests between these two unlikely allies inevitably precipitated hostilities lasting almost half a century. The Southern Song was ideologically compelled to recover the North, or at least the Northern Song capitals and imperial mausolea. On the other hand, the Mongols were likewise committed to continue an expansionist policy, now directed against the Southern Song itself. Initial skirmishes began when the Southern Song refused to pay tribute to the Mongols and withdraw its forces from former Jin territory, thereby allowing the Mongols an excuse to raid Sichuan, Jing-Hu, and the Liang-Huai regions. These clashes were relatively minor and amounted to the Mongols exploiting and looting territory. However, the second stage of warfare in 1258-60 was executed with more organization and intensity. Interested in both occupying territory and collecting war spoils, Möngke Qaghan (Xianzong, r. 1251-59) led the main force from Qaraqorum to Hezhou in Sichuan. One column branched off to Xiangyang in the Jing-Hu area, and Qubilai (Shizu, r. 1260-94) led a column from Kaiping (later Shangdu, near Tulun) to Ezhou (Wuchang), where he was to join with the army of Uriangqatai (1211-72), which was then advancing north from Jiaozhi (Tonkin).1 Both the Song and Mongol forces were suffering heavy losses at Ezhou when the latter beat a hasty retreat. Möngke had suddenly died and Qubilai immediately hastened north to stake his claim to the throne. Just before this new turn of events, it appears that at the Song fort the general in charge of the Huai region, Jia Sidao (1213-75), had proposed a peace treaty.

In 1260 Qubilai realized that rivalry for the khanate succession and the consolidation of his power would preoccupy him and his army for a long period. He decided, therefore, to delay the Song campaigns and dispatched

1. For Möngke’s Song campaigns, see Yuanshi, 3.51-54 (hereafter YS). See also Allsen. Uriangqatai’s biography is found in YS, 121.2979. The strategy of fighting simultaneously on three fronts was a traditional Mongol policy used by Chinggis and Ögödei in north China. This strategy was repeated in the Xiangyang and Hangzhou campaigns.
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Hao Jing (1223-75) and several emissaries to the Song court.⁠¹ Ostensibly it was a friendly mission to proclaim to the Song his accession to the Mongol throne, to conclude a cease-fire agreement, and to warn Mongol generals at the borders to refrain from looting. Hao Jing was, however, not permitted to proceed to the Song court, in spite of the numerous letters he addressed to Emperor Lizong (r. 1225-65), Jia Sidao, Li Tingzhi, and various government departments threatening Mongol reprisals.⁠² Jia Sidao had by then become chief minister and handed over the administration of the Huai to the veteran general Li Tingzhi. For sixteen years Hao Jing and his companions were detained in Huai territory, allegedly under the irresponsible orders of Jia Sidao. Jia has been accused of conceiving such a foolhardy measure to keep secret an agreement to cede Song territory and annual tributes to Qubilai, and to claim full credit and honors for the retreat of the Mongols in 1259 from Ezhou.⁠³ In a favorable reappraisal of Jia, Franke convincingly dispels this myth on both counts: there exists no evidence of such an agreement, and primary sources indicate that the central government and emperors were well aware of the situation at the front.⁠⁴

Franke, however, does not explain why Jia Sidao insisted on such an ill-conceived and fruitless strategy. I suggest that Li Tingzhi, rather than Jia, played the crucial role during the entire duration of Hao Jing's captivity. Li Tingzhi, the veteran official and general in command of the Huai region in 1260-76, was responsible for reporting to the Song court on developments at the front. It was Li's responsibility to assess Hao Jing's mission and he, therefore, on his own initiative detained the luckless envoy pending an inves-

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1. Hao Jing's biography is in YS 157.3698-3709. For the official statement of Hao Jing's mission, see YS 4.65, 157.3708; Hao Jing, 37.1a. On Hao Jing's relationship to Qubilai, see Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, 70-71.

2. These long letters are found in Hao Jing, 37-39.

3. SS 45.878, 474.13782; Songji sanchao zhengyao, 3.37, 4.4.

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tigation.¹ To Hao Jing's request for an audience with the Song court, Li Tingzhi simply responded that he dared not convey the message. Perhaps through an espionage network which evidently existed on both sides, Li discovered that Hao Jing had previously submitted to Qubilai a plan to conquer the Song and on that basis perceived the mission to be hostile. Below is a summary of Hao's strategy:

There are two ways to conquer countries—by the use of force and by the use of strategy. Although other countries have quickly submitted to our rule, the Song has not been conquered even after twenty years. It is therefore advisable to use strategy in this case, which will require a great deal of patience. The fact that the Mongol army is not skilled in fighting on plains, as well as other reasons, call for a delaying tactic. We should thus buy time and gain the confidence of the Song and request that they cede to us some territory and present us annual tributes of cash. When the time is ripe for the conquest we should then first take the Jing, the Huai, and the Yangzi respectively. The attack should be three-pronged in order to weaken progressively Song fortifications. The Song must be regarded as a powerful opponent: their ruler and ministers are on friendly terms, there exists no current internal chaos, and since 1234 it has been engaged in rigorous recruitment of soldiers.²

Li was also skeptical about Hao's background: he was a protégé of the general Zhang Rou (1190-1268), who had gone over to the Mongols during the Jin collapse.³ Li most likely recommended further detention, and Jia

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¹ See Hao Jing, 37.16b. Li visited Hao and presented him with hortensia flowers (Hao Jing, 1.25b-27a). He also read Hao Jing's essays and commented on his scholarship.

² This was the "Strategy for the eastern campaign" that Hao submitted to Qubilai in early 1255, shortly after he was recommended to his service. See Hao Jing, 37.1a-11b.

³ See Zhang Rou's biography in YS 147.3471-76.
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Sidao concurred. Detaining Hao was actually consistent with Li's suspicion of emissaries in general; later he even doubted Wen Tianxiang, his loyalist colleague, and executed other envoys. Li's name, however, has not been drawn into this event due to the efforts of historiographers to preserve his historical image as an exemplary loyalist.

During his captivity, Hao Jing was not imprisoned in the true sense, nor subjected to ill treatment. He admitted to receiving generous material comfort and food, and he wandered freely in the spacious gardens in the company of his five or six subordinates. He continued to communicate with Li Tingzhi and wrote prolifically.¹

The detention and execution of foreign envoys were not unusual occurrences in the history of Song foreign relations; at times such acts were sanctioned and praised as loyal behavior by the Song court.² The Hao Jing incident has drawn particular censure by Chinese historiographers because it provided the Mongols with a ready excuse to attack the Song, and for the Song with an immediate explanation and scapegoat for the collapse of the dynasty. Had the outcome of the incident been different, the Song and Yuan entanglement would not have been resolved by a friendly pact. Hao Jing's offer of a peace treaty would have ceded territory and cash to the Mongols, and such terms, if concluded, would have amounted to merely a cease-fire, not an end, to the Song conquest. That much Hao Jing made clear in his advice to Qubilai Qaghan. These terms suggested a sort of coexistence the Song

1. The Lingchuan ji contains serious scholarship on the Confucian classics, mostly written during the early years of Hao's captivity; from 1269 to 1276 there exists only one piece of writing dated 1273. By that time Hao had lost hope of ever returning to the north to see his only son. Hao's writings show hatred of the Jin dynasty but passionate sympathy for the Northern Song and for loyal men and women during its collapse. He sincerely wanted to avoid bloodshed, as he tried to convince Li Tingzhi of Qubilai's enlightenment (Hao Jing, 37.13a).

2. In 1004 an imperial edict promised that those who killed Khitans would be sheltered and rewarded (SS 7.125). In 1231 the Song killed a Mongol envoy (YS 2.31); in 1275 the Yuan envoy Lian Xixian and his entire party were put to death, although the Song court denied having ever sanctioned the action (YS 8.164). Li Tingzhi also slaughtered a few emissaries who tried to entice him to surrender.
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had with the Liao and Jin states, but coexistence was incompatible with the Chinggisqanide heritage of *tengri*-ordained world conquest.\(^1\) Thus whether Hao Jing returned to the Mongol court with or without a treaty or, as it happened, did not return until sixteen years later, was in the long run inconsequential to Qubilai's resumption of campaigns against the Song after he had settled internal disputes.

During the period of relative calm in 1260-68 there were nonetheless some clashes at the border, with the Song attempting to reconquer lost territory and the Mongols defending their gains. An incident advantageous to the Mongol side occurred in 1261: the defection of a high-ranking Song commander, Liu Zheng (1213-75), and his surrender of fifteen commanderies and 300,000 households in Luzhou (in Sichuan province).\(^2\) Liu Zheng was a northern Chinese who had first defected from the Jin to the Song. Using discrimination by Jia Sidao and southern Chinese generals as his reason for defecting, he divulged military secrets to the Mongols. In particular, he advised them about the strategic importance of Xiangyang and built up the Mongol navy which was at that time inferior to the Song fleet. At the same time, the Song welcomed the defection of Li Tan (d. 1262), who submitted three prefectures in Shandong.\(^3\) He was the adopted son of Li Quan (d. 1231), who forty years earlier had gone over from the Jin to the Song and then defected to the Mongols. In just a few months' time, the Mongol forces crushed Li Tan's army, executed the traitor, and recovered the Shandong region. While

1. Hao Jing's memorial clearly shows that a treaty, if concluded, was to be understood only as a temporary measure. See also Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some remarks," 24, and Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God*, 15.

2. SS 47.877. For Liu Zheng's biography, see YS 161.3785. Liu Zheng was regarded as a victim of both discrimination against northerners by southerners and of the slighting of military men in favor of civilian officials in the Song court under Jia Sidao's influence. See Yao Congwu, "Hubilie ping Song yihou de nanren wenti," 11-13.

3. The biographies of both Li Tan and his father Li Quan are located in the section for panchen (renegades). See, respectively, YS 206.4591-94 and SS 476.13817-477.13851. See also SS 45.880-82; YS 5.82-83; Bi Yuan, 174.4819-177.4824; Chen Bangzhan, *Songshi jishi benmo*, 104.1123-25; Sun Kekuan, "Yuanchu Li Tan shibian de fenxi," in his *Menggu Hanjun yu Han wenhua yanjiu*, 44-78.
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Li Tan's defection gave little lasting advantage to the Song, the efforts of Liu Zheng and other Song defectors and collaborators facilitated the Mongol conquest of the Song.

When the Mongols resumed war with the Song, they first attacked Xiangyang and Fancheng, the cities on the upper and lower banks of the Yangzi in the Jing-Hu region. This strategy took into account the lessons learned in Möngke's disastrous campaign in Sichuan, and aimed to acquire access to the Yangzi River from the Jing and Huai regions before launching a pincer attack on the Song capital, Hangzhou. The Xiangyang fortifications had been rebuilt after the Mongol onslaught in 1234-35, and had then become almost impregnable to enemy forces. After a siege of six years with catapults made by Muslim engineers, the twin cities crumbled one after the other, mostly because the Mongols effectively cut off supplies of food, especially salt and firewood. In spite of some relief measures rendered by Li Tingzhi and the veteran generals Xia Gui (1197-79) and Fan Wenhu (fl. 1260-80), the defending commander of Xiangyang, Lü Wenhuan (d. ca. 1297), surrendered in March 1273 and subsequently fought on the Mongol side. Meanwhile at the Mongol court, Qubilai had firmly eliminated challenges to his position on the throne and surrounded himself with competent Chinese advisers such as Liu Bingzhong (1216-74). Dadu (Beijing) was designated as the capital and in 1271 "Yuan" was declared the official name of the dynasty.

The Song court now had on its throne Duzong (r. 1265-74), and Jia Sidao had dominated the government for fourteen years. In 1273, the court that dealt with the collapse of Xiangyang was not united but divided by personal grievances against state policies. There was a general lack of confidence in the ability of the central government to deal with the Mongol threat. Jia Sidao has been traditionally denounced for being reckless, unconcerned, and inattentive to the Mongol crisis during his entire term in office. He did, however, introduce in 1262 two fundamental measures designed to increase

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1. SS 46.911; YS 8.147; Zhou Mi, Guixin zazhi, bie b.37a-48a. See also Moule, Quinsai, 70-78 for a discussion of Marco Polo's alleged but doubtful role in the Xiangyang battle.

2. On Liu Bingzhong, see Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung." For Qubilai's use of Confucian advisers, see Yao Congwu, "Hubilie ping Song."
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revenues for military defense: the limitation of private landownership and the investigation into embezzlement and other abuses of military generals. The principle behind the first measure, the public-land reform policy, was to prevent private hoarding of grain by the large landowners. One-third of privately owned land exceeding the set quota allowed in accordance with official rank and other criteria was to be converted into state land, the revenues of which were to go directly to the army. The owners of the confiscated land were compensated with cash and/or offers of official ranks. To show his sincerity and personal sacrifice in the matter, Jia surrendered to this scheme some ten thousand mou of his own estates in Zhexi, an example followed by an imperial relative and several prominent men. In spite of loud protest and resentment by the large landowners, who had the most to lose and who were substantially represented among the powerful local elite and central bureaucracy, Lizong repeatedly sanctioned the scheme. In the thirteen years of its implementation, this land reform did indeed generate a considerable amount of revenue.

While the large landowners were the victims of the public-land policy, military personnel were singled out in the auditing regulation policy, a scheme to make individual generals account for in detail all expenditures of previous campaigns. Not a few top military leaders were spending part of their allocated funds in forbidden private transactions such as trade and commerce; some were even drawing extra salaries for fictitious names of nonexistent soldiers. After close scrutiny any amount overspent or spent in an unauthorized manner had to be repaid to the state from the generals' own pockets. This measure ruined some innocent victims, including the loyalist hero Xie Fangde. Although these two schemes were originally conceived to

1. On the public-land reform, see SS 173.4194-95, 474.13782-83; Bi Yuan, 177.4831-32; Xianchun yishi, a.1a-2b; Songji sanchao 3.39-3.41; Franke, "Chia Ssu-tao," 226-28.

2. Xianchun yishi a.1b.


4. SS 425.12688; Bi Yuan, 176.4813.
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strengthen Song defense, they alienated many central and local officials.

To Jia Sidao's credit, as his contemporary critic Zhou Mi admitted, it must be said that when Jia was in power the Song court was not menaced by the abuses of imperial relatives, eunuchs, and university students—a situation that had affected his predecessors. There is also little evidence that he resorted to nepotism: few of his blood relatives and friends obtained high positions in the Song court. Not until 1275 was the court plagued by fierce struggles between the peace and war factions that had characterized and immobilized earlier administrations. While the war faction advocated an aggressive military policy, the peace advocates potentially exposed the Song to renewed Mongol attacks. Nevertheless, Jia was more inclined to favor this passive policy, and from 1259 to 1274 there existed in the Song court no apparent opposition in this regard. Intense criticism of his appeasement policy began only after his disgrace in early 1275. Jia, however, had no illusions about the permanence of the relative peace from 1260 to 1273. It was in anticipation of a protracted struggle with the Mongols that he instituted the two schemes outlined above.

What caused dissent in the Song court may have been the resentment military officers felt against civilian officials. They seem to have encountered some discrimination in dealings with their civilian superiors, especially Jia, who despite his military background, from 1260 acted in the capacity of a civilian official, made high level decisions and handed out rewards and punishments according to merit or demerit. But if Jia had shown preferential treatment to civilian officials, that attitude was consistent with general Song policy to undermine and control the military sector. As a result, military officials sought to overcome their social stigma by emulating the civilian officials in dress and customs, and even aspired to convert their military status to civil

1. Zhou Mi, Guixin zazhi, hou.11a-13b.

2. Shi Songzhi (d. 1256) and Ding Daquan suffered abuses by the students of the three universities. Their biographies are in SS 414.12423-28, 474.13778-79.
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ranks. Although a few officials managed to combine a military and civilian career, as did Jia Sidao, Li Tingzhi, Wen Tianxiang, and Xie Fangde, the majority did not. The military was itself split by internal jealousies affecting their morale. Military and civil officials accused Jia Sidao of protecting his former subordinates like Fan Wenhu, who was not severely punished after his failure to rescue Xiangyang from the Mongol siege. Generals with northern origins like Liu Zheng, who later defected to the Mongols, and the loyalist Zhang Shijie felt discriminated against by the southern generals. The military sector also regarded the auditing regulations, introduced in 1262, as inequitable. Furthermore, the steep demotions and heavy penalties which often accompanied defeat in battle built up resentment with the central government. In 1258 and in 1275, even Jia was threatened with serious punishment for military defeat but the death penalty was mitigated by his long service to the state.

The Song court appears to have recognized these grievances of the military officials, and sought to remedy the situation. To open up channels of communication with the generals at the front, it frequently lavished generous rewards on the top and bottom ranks after each successful battle. Generals were often asked to propose strategies and review maps at the court. These half-hearted measures, however, did not greatly improve military morale.

Apart from the chasm between military and civilian officials, factionalism revolving around Jia Sidao weakened the Song court. Traditional and secondary sources allege that Jia purged anyone who did not support him. Indeed, as soon as he became chief minister in 1259, having been an acting chief minister since 1254, he engineered the disgrace and dismissal of his ri-

1. A recent study of the northern Song military indicates that upward mobility was also possible, as shown by not a few cases of promotion from soldier to general occurring within one generation. Only one-quarter of military families was able to retain the status of general for three generations. See He Guanhuan. It seems that many military families either fell into obscurity or sought status in the civil service. See also Liu Zijian (James T.C.), "Lüelun Songdai," 480-82.

2. SS 44.863, 474.13786.
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vals Ding Daquan (d. 1263) and Wu Qian (d. 1262).\(^1\) Ding is known in Chinese history as a treacherous official in the same category as Jia, and Wu is regarded as a good minister. However, it is not strictly true that Jia monopolized state power, for only in 1261-66 and again in 1273 was Jia the sole chief minister, and even during those years he might have been restrained by at least three acting ministers at any one time, such as Ma Tingluan (1223-89), Jiang Wanli (1197-1275), and Wang Yue (d. 1276).\(^2\) During the other years in power, he actually shared the chief ministership with the just-mentioned acting ministers who were then promoted to chief ministers.\(^3\) Ma, Jiang, and Wang are considered benevolent and loyal ministers and not blamed for the country's misfortune. Their biographies and those of almost every upright official invariably contain the statement that they had opposed Jia and consequently suffered setbacks in their careers. Apart from the protest against Jia's land reform, the details of such dissent are vague and never provided in the biographies—an omission that could well indicate their general tacit support of Jia during his administration. After his downfall, one would be hard pressed to find anyone, or any of his opponents' biographers, admitting to this support. The loyalties shown to Jia by his protégé Liao Yingzhong (d. 1275) and an obscure monk were rare exceptions.\(^4\)

Other than Jia's alleged crimes, a more fundamental problem confronting the Song court during that period was the lack of competent alternatives to Jia and the reluctance of men in high-ranking positions to commit themselves to the state. Reading through the Songshi annals of that period,

1. Wu Qian's biography is in SS 418.12515-20.
3. SS 214.5632-53.
4. See Bi Yuan, 181.4959, and Zhou Mi, Guixin zazhi, hou.21b-22b. In the 1290s Deng Mu met an old Buddhist monk, formerly patronized by Jia, who still wept for Jia's tragic death. Deng remarked that this monk's gratitude was sufficient to shame the eminent statesmen who had previously been helped by Jia but who abused Jia immediately after the latter's disgrace in 1275. See Deng Mu, "Traveling from Taoshan to Yunmen," Boya qin, buyi.2b-3a.
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one is struck by the numerous requests from almost all top civilian and many military officers to retire on pension, citing old age or illness as the reason.\(^1\) Except in a few cases (such as that of Ma Tingluan who was genuinely ill), most of the reasons were pretexts and did not reflect Confucian humility appropriately associated with declining high appointments. Even Jia many times pleaded to be relieved of his duties, but he alone was accused by his critics of faking modesty while secretly bribing censorate officials to memorialize against his resignation. Nor should such pleadings for retirement be equated with the Confucian practice of withdrawal in adverse times, for the Song emperors were considered beyond reproach by being frugal themselves but generous to officials. For some, the reasons for seeking retirement was the desire to lead a life of leisure; for others, it was due to anxiety and uncertainty about the future in the wake of the Mongol crisis. But in all cases, there was great envy for the ideal life of the upper middle-class official in retirement. This life was replete with wine and women, shared in idyllic settings with friends and traveling companions while they composed poems and made excursions to historical and scenic sites. In essence this life-style reflected extravagance and frivolity in everyday life shared by both the well-to-do and the lower strata of society. It was a by-product of economic prosperity and cultural attainments of a highly urbanized society in the last years of the Southern Song. This pleasure-seeking life was blamed for selecting Hangzhou, a city endowed with spectacular landscapes, as the capital, against the choice of Jiankang, a city which was better fortified against invasions.\(^2\) A Hangzhou contemporary felt that the beauty of the city made scholar-officials forget about the urge to recover the North. In fact, however, this life-style was highly popular and familiar to even loyalists such as Zhou Mi in Hangzhou and Huzhou, and Wen Tianxiang in Jizhou.

The surprisingly calm and unperturbed society of Hangzhou just prior to the Mongol crisis was possible because military disturbances over the last

\(^1\) SS 42-46.807-916, et passim.

\(^2\) Liu Yiqing, preface. 1, 1.3.
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forty years had taken place far away from the southeast. Moreover, a sense of deceptive security had been strengthened by the prosperity of the region. In spite of occasional outbursts of panic, the scholar-officials, like the lower classes, had learned to live with sporadic military incursions at the borders, feeling that the dynasty, although long threatened, could not really be in immediate danger of total conquest.

It was during this period of apparent peace that Li Tingzhi reported the fall of Xiangyang to the court. The first reaction was panic, followed by the sudden realization of the irretrievable state of affairs. For individuals and the court, the vulnerability of the capital and nearby cities was truly experienced for the first time. The imperial court immediately canceled scheduled festivities for a forthcoming state occasion and directed the savings to be used for the defense of the Yangzi River. The Huai region was alerted to possible attacks by the Mongols, and the court issued strict warnings to border generals to hold their defense posts, promising rewards and punishments in accordance with individual performance. It also invited officials and commoners from both the central and local ranks to present strategies of defense. To raise morale, immediate and posthumous rewards were generously bestowed on individuals who distinguished themselves in the Xiangyang battles. The generals responsible for the direction and course of the lost battles—Li Tingzhi, Fan Wenhu, and Xia Gui—were merely demoted a rank or two. The strict policy of penalizing defeated generals, as was the rule from the 1230s to the 1260s, no longer applied because the court wanted to retain their support rather than alienate it. Even the relatives and friends of Lü Wenhuan, who surrendered Xiangyang, were reassured of the throne’s confidence in their loyalty. If the Song court expected gratitude to motivate the

1. For a description of this life, see Gernet, *passim*.

2. *SS* 46.912.

3. One response came from the eminent Confucian scholar Jin Lüxiang (1232-1303) who proposed to dispatch a naval force along the seacoast to Hebei in order to relieve Xiangyang. Later the Song defectors and pirates Zhu Xuan and Zhang Qing used this plan to help the Mongols conquer the Song. See Jin's biography in *YS* 189.4316.
relatives to remain loyal, it was to be greatly disappointed. Lü's nephew Lü Shikui (d. ca. 1300), his cousin Lü Wenfu (d. ca. 1300) and his son-in-law Fan Wenhu—all three top-ranking generals—soon thereafter defected to the Mongol side.¹

To raise the morale of the troops and generals, Jia repeatedly requested to be allowed to lead a force to the front, but was dissuaded by Emperor Duzong.² Instead, an ad-hoc department was set up to handle the abuses of the Bureau of Military Affairs, security leaks of campaigns, and delays of reports from the front.³ At the front, propaganda was stepped up to encourage northern Chinese to defect to the Song side and to counteract Song defections to the Mongols. The measure was successful in winning over many defectors, but while the Mongols appointed defectors to important military positions, the Song government offered only modest sinecures. Consequently, it failed to attract high-ranking defectors. The Song did not make use of informers and defectors from the Jin and Yuan, who consequently did not play a key role in the campaigns against their former commands.⁴

These minor changes did not amount to an overhaul of the military after the Xiangyang collapse. In the civil service, however, there was a definite turnover in key personnel, if not in policy. Jia Sidao was still in the limelight, but by 1274, resignations by Jiang Wanli, Ma Tingluan, and others had been accepted by the court. Wang Yue, Zhang Jian (d. after 1276), and Chen Yizhong (d. after 1285) now held the reins of government.⁵ Jia's policies were by and large continued, and rewards and honors were bestowed on those who showed valiant loyalty in defending cities against the Mongol army. The new ministers also had to cope with the natural disasters which co-

1. SS 46.913-14. The two Lüs had earlier submitted their resignations to the Song court in anticipation of their guilt by association when Lü Wenhuan surrendered.
2. SS 46.912.
3. SS 46.912; Zhou Mi, Guixin zazhi, bie b.48a-49a.
5. SS 46.916-18.
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incided with the Mongol advances: the floods in Hangzhou and Wuzhou, and the drought in Fujian province.

In August 1274 Emperor Duzong died, and his four-year-old son Xian came to the throne with Empress Dowager Xie (Lizong's empress) designated as regent.¹ Xian, posthumously known as Gongdi (r. Aug. 1274-Feb. 1276), was actually younger than his brother Shi, but was chosen as successor because his mother, née Quan, was the empress. Advice was sought from retired veteran officials, but none responded. In the same month at the Mongol Yuan court, Bayan (1237-95) and Shi Tianze (1202-75) were appointed to the general command of combined forces to liquidate the Song.² Bayan was assisted by high-ranking officers such as Uriangqatai’s son Aju (1234-87), Arigh Qaya (1227-86), Dong Wenbing (1217-78), and Zhang Rou’s son Hongfan (1236-80), in addition to the defectors Lü Wenhuan and Liu Zheng. The major campaigns were planned for the Jing-Hu and Hangzhou areas, while a less intense battle was to be fought in Sichuan under Li Dehui (1218-80).³ In October, Bayan assembled land and naval forces, some 200,000 strong, in the newly conquered Xiangyang for a three-pronged attack.⁴ The main force was led by Bayan along the Yangzi River; an eastern wing advanced from the Huaixi region; and a third unit fought in the Jingnan area.

From the start the Mongols had prepared for a difficult campaign, and indeed the first attack on Yingzhou was fraught with difficulties, for the Song had garrisoned this city with over 100,000 men. Quite unexpectedly, Bayan

1. SS 47.921-22; Bi Yuan, 180.4926-27.
2. YS 8.156; Bi Yuan, 180.4928-29.
3. On the Sichuan battles, which were separate from Bayan’s campaigns, see the biographies of the Yuan general Li Dehui in YS 163.3817-19 and the loyalist general Zhang Jue in SS 451.13280-84.
4. SS 47.922-24; YS 8.157; Bi Yuan, 180.4929-34. For a laudatory account of Bayan’s role in the conquest of the Song, see an official contemporary source: Liu Minzhong, Ping Song lu. This work is the principal source for Bayan’s biography in the YS which has been translated by Francis W. Cleaves, "The biography of Bayan."
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abandoned this siege for the time being and moved along the Han tributary, taking possession of Shayang and Xincheng after crushing prolonged local resistance. The next important battle took place at the Yangluo fort and Hangyang, both of which protected Ezhou. After a siege of ten days, the Song defender Cheng Pengfei (d. after 1303) surrendered in January 1275 and joined the ranks of the Song defectors. At this point Bayan's forces crossed the Yangzi and moved with relative ease from city to city along the river.

The fall of Ezhou and the crossing of the Yangzi by the Mongols forced the Song to undertake several measures. In order to generate revenues for the army, the property and estates of the imperial relatives, the aristocracy, monasteries and temples were taxed. The court next followed popular demand for Jia Sidao, as commander-in-chief of the empire's forces, to halt the Mongol advance along the Yangzi.\(^1\) Confidence in Jia Sidao's military ability as demonstrated twenty years earlier in the Huai seems to have remained strong even at this time. The army led by Jia was 70,000 strong with many generals recruited from the capital reserves. As a result, the defense of the capital was much weakened, leading Empress Dowager Xie to promulgate an empire-wide appeal to raise armies for the defense of the emperor (qinwang). In particular, the edict appealed to the general populace to rise against total foreign conquest.

The late emperor [Duzong] has died, and the successor is but an infant. [In spite of] my old age and decrepitude, I reluctantly took charge of state affairs from behind the curtain . . . . How infuriating are these ugly caitiffs who have trespassed the Yangzi River! Bypassing our barricades and reaching our hilltops, they seduced our recalcitrant subjects and violated the obedient. Since ancient times there has not yet been an age of total barbarian conquest. How has it come to this present state that deviates from the constants of Heaven and Earth? . . . . Three hundred years of virtuous rule--surely that has made an

1. SS 47.924.
impression on the people. The souls of 100,000,000 pray for the protection of Heaven. In profound grief, I proclaim this edict in order to reverse the precarious state of the country. I have esteem for, and rely on you civilian and military officials, who having received the benefits and generosity of the late emperors, will presently not shy away and try to escape from this plight. Those worthy men with loyal livers and righteous galls [i.e., hearts], come forth and combat the forces that plague the throne and submit your skills. The country must exist before the family can exist. Mutual protection leads to the protection of all. I now proclaim these intents as ordained by Heaven, to raise the banner for the various circuits to rise to the salvation of the emperor. Be encouraged by fine strategies and illustrious names; nobility and rewards will be bestowed generously. This edict is thus proclaimed to reassure the empire. I trust you will understand it all.\footnote{Wen Tianxiang quotes this text in full in his \textit{Ji\=nian lu}. See Wen Tianxiang, 17.10a-b.}

Simultaneous with the direct appeal to both officials and private citizen to come to the assistance of the empire, veteran generals were appointed to coordinate the \textit{qinwang} armies raised in each of the nine circuits.\footnote{Liu Yiqing, 6.8; \textit{Songji sanchao}, 4.53.} Information and details about the armies recruited were to be reported to the court, which would confer ranks and offices on the leaders and communicate to them whether they should await orders from the local centers or proceed directly to the capital. The edict made no provisions for financial resources, but the \textit{qinwang} units did not appear to have been short of funds. The sources are vague about the details of recruitment but are emphatic about the immediate response by veteran officials and newcomers alike who offered their services to the country. In Hu-Guang, Li Fei (d. 1275) organized 20,000 men; in Yangzhou, Ruan Kesi (d. 1276) under Li Tingzhi’s command mobi-
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lized 30,000; Wen Tianxiang in Jizhou and Ganzhou brought together 10,000; and Xie Fangde in Raozhou and Xinzhou, and many others in various parts of the country assembled troops ranging in size from handfuls to thousands. 1 By March 1275, a few months after the edict was issued, at least 200,000 men had been recruited.

By this time, however, the military crisis had reached an irreversible point, and Bayan and his forces were increasingly helped by the surrender of Song generals and the rapid erosion of Song morale. Huangzhou, Qizhou, Anqing, and Chizhou were taken by the time Jia Sidao arrived with his forces to halt the Mongol advance. 2 Just before cannons were fired and arrows shot, Jia sent an envoy to negotiate with Bayan for peace, but the latter quickly rejected the offer. In the ensuing battles at Dingjiashou (near Wuhu), Bayan inflicted a crushing defeat on Jia's army and naval forces. Jia then hastened to Lugang, where Xia Gui, the commander of Huaixi, had already fled without even engaging in battle. Jia's entire force was dispersed, and over two thousand ships, along with supplies, maps and seals were captured. 3

To obtain immediate relief from the Yuan onslaught, the Song then released the long detained Hao Jing and sent him home with proper protocol. 4 But Bayan continued his attacks through Jiankang and Zhenjiang. There, he left behind forces to safeguard the gains along the Yangzi, and after instructing the eastern circuit army to continue campaigns in the Huai region, he departed for Dadu and Shangdu to deal with Qaidu's (d. 1301) uprising. He did not return to supervise the Song conquest until November 1275. 5

1. In Songji sanchao 4.56, an imperial relative who was a student memorializes against the transfer of the capital, suggesting that the large size of the qinwang armies was strong enough to oppose the Mongols.

2. SS 47.925-26 and 474.13785-86; YS 8.160-63; Bi Yuan, 181.4940-42.

3. SS 47.926; YS 8.162; Bi Yuan, 181.4942-43. The figure of 130,000, given as the size of Jia's army (Songji sanchao 5.55), is most likely an exaggeration.

4. SS 47.926; YS 8.163; Bi Yuan, 181.4945.

5. Liu Minzhong, b.1a-2b.
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During his absence, the Song restored control over Changzhou and several other cities, and the Huai region continued to hold out under the intrepid Li Tingzhi.

Meanwhile, in the Song court the vilification of Jia Sidao began almost immediately after his defeat at Dingjiazhou and Wuhu. Memorials from commoners, National University students, and all ranks of officials flooded the court demanding that Jia and his supporters be executed. Reluctantly Empress Dowager Xie finally bowed to public pressure and demoted Jia, revoked his honors, confiscated his property, and exiled him to the remote South. In October 1275 Jia was violently murdered in Fujian by a minor official acting on his own initiative. By then Jia had been accused of crimes ranging from wrongly possessing an imperial gift to inviting the Mongols to conquer the Song. His former friends did not hold high military and political positions, yet they were stripped of all ranks and at least one of them committed suicide.¹

The crushing blow on Jia's large and well-equipped armies increased panic at the Song court and the rate of desertion. Even well-respected and high-ranking officials such as Zhang Jian, Wang Yinglin and Wen Jiwen (1236-91) deserted the court.² The problem was so acute that a rescript was issued chastising central government officials who fled without permission and local officials who abandoned cities under their charge. The edict stipulated that those remaining in office would be promoted two ranks, while those who deserted would be investigated by the censorate and their names posted for ignominious conduct.³

Among the officials who remained at the court were Chen Yizhong and Wang Yue, the chief ministers now promoted to commanders-in-chief of

1. SS 47.927, 927-35; Zhou Mi, Guixin zazhi, hou. 13b-14b and hou. 21b-22b.
2. SS 47.935-37; Liu Yiqing, 7.8. However, many of these officials (e.g. Chen Wenlong and Xu Zongren) shown by the SS to have fled the court in fact went to join the loyalist movement. Zeng Yuanzi did not flee the court, but had in fact been exiled to Leizhou for being implicated in Jia Sidao's proposal to transfer the capital.
3. SS 47.928. See the full text of the edict in Liu Yiqing, 7.8; Bi Yuan, 181.4950.
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the army and navy. They did not get along well, and while Wang Yue's activities did not go beyond criticizing Jia, Chen Yizhong emerged as the most forceful personality at the Song court. Chen, in fact, now brought about a shift in policy in the civil service for the first time since the Jia Sidao administration. Chen's policies were essentially motivated by the obvious need to unite dissident factions and to regain support for the Song house in the face of alarmingly large defections to the Mongols. To placate the large landowners, he abolished the public-land reform that had been in effect for thirteen years. Land forcefully bought by the state was returned to the landowners on the condition that they lead their tenants into battle.\footnote{\textit{SS} 47.927.} To win the financial support of merchants and overseas traders, he restored less rigorous regulations on the tea and salt monopolies and the commission of ships and overseas trade. In the armed forces, he injected new enthusiasm for the qinwang campaigns and dispatched envoys to generals who had surrendered to the enemy in an effort to win back their loyalty. He acknowledged that they had cause for discontent under Jia's administration and promised to absolve them of their crime of surrendering if they would return to the Song. The court would then reappoint them to their former posts; those who reconquered a lost prefecture or county would be offered its administration, with rewards promised to everyone from the generals to the enlisted men.\footnote{\textit{SS} 47.928. For the letter to and reply from Lü Wenhuan in regard to his return to the Song, see Liu Yiqing, 8.3-5.} Chen also ordered Jia's dispersed troops to return to their duties and instructed local magistrates to provide cash and rice to soldiers and civilians passing through, in return for a suspension of taxes. An amnesty was proclaimed for all but the most dangerous criminals, including military and civilian officials who had been banished and their property confiscated.\footnote{\textit{SS} 47.926.} Chen even urged bandits and rebels to join forces with the central government in repelling the Mongol armies. All these measures, however, were conceived too late and implemented in too short a time to regain support for the Song state.
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In August 1275 Chen Yizhong left the capital for his native prefecture, Wenzhou, in Zhejiang province. When he returned in October, the Song defenses were in ruins and his own position at the Song court was challenged by Zhang Shijie and Liu Mengyan (1219-99), the newly appointed chief minister. In contrast to the incompetence and confusion of Song defense, Bayan coordinated a cautious and highly successful strategy in Zhejiang where he had returned from the North in November. This strategy, to advance simultaneously on three fronts as earlier applied in 1274 from Xiangyang, now aimed for Hangzhou as the point of convergence. The western wing under Ajirghan (d. 1282) proceeded rapidly to Jiankang and attacked the Dusong pass, while the eastern wing under Dong Wenbing and Zhang Hongfan sailed to the mouth of the Yangzi and advanced along the seacoast. The central army led by Bayan pushed through Changzhou and Huzhou.

In a month, Changzhou, the Dusong pass, and Pingjiang (Suzhou) had fallen in rapid succession. Changzhou had been taken by the Mongols before, but during Bayan's absence had reverted to Song control. To punish the city for its obstinate resistance and dubious loyalty, Bayan had the entire population massacred. If he had intended to intimidate Hangzhou into quick capitulation by instilling terror, he was immediately successful, at least as far as Empress Dowager Xie was concerned. She was determined at all costs to avoid actual fighting in the capital, and offered increasingly more concessions in suing for peace, but in each case the Mongols turned a deaf ear. In one mission, the Yuan envoy Lian Xixian (d. 1275) was murdered, but the Song court disclaimed responsibility and blamed unruly generals and bandits. In January Lu Xiufu headed a Song mission to have the Song emperor relegated

1. SS 47.934, 418.12530. Both Chen Yizhong and Wang Yue had recommended this appointment (SS 47.931).
2. SS 47.934; YS 8.170; Bi Yuan, 182.4966. See Ajirghan’s biography in YS 129.3147-49.
3. SS 47.935; YS 8.170; Bi Yuan, 182.4968; Liu Minzhong, b.2b-3a.
4. SS 47.935-36; Bi Yuan, 182.4970. The Song had also killed several other Yuan envoys in 1275 (YS 8.165).
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to the inferior status of nephew to the Yuan emperor, and to promise annual
tributes. When this offer was rejected, the Song court sought the lower status
of grandson, but that too was turned down. Then the empress dowager
agreed to surrender as a vassal on the condition that a piece of territory be
granted to ensure the perpetuation of the Song imperial family. This message
and the official seals were sent to Bayan, who by then had pressed on to the
Gaoting mountain, just thirty li northeast of Hangzhou. Bayan was still not
impressed by this proposal for conditional surrender. In January 1276, to fur­
ther demonstrate her genuinely good faith in seeking negotiations, the em­
press dowager issued edicts to Wen Tianxiang and other generals to cease
fighting and disband recruited units.¹

The Song court was not unanimous in supporting peace negotiations
with the Mongol authorities, and this dissent not only confused the generals
at the front, but seriously undermined the credibility of Song proposals to the
Mongol side. In seeking appeasement at all costs the empress dowager played
a personal role: she was not manipulated, but only supported, by officials
such as Wu Jian (d. after 1276), Xie Tang (fl. 1260-80) and others who were
soon promoted to ministerial ranks. Contrary to traditional accounts which
identify Chen Yizhong with the faction advocating surrender and single out
Wen Tianxiang as the one strongly opposed to the move, a close examination
of the sources indicates a different situation. I suggest, and will later show,
that Chen Yizhong and Zhang Shijie represented the faction that advocated
continued hostilities with the Mongols and even made preparations in the
event that the capital collapsed.²

In February 1276, the empress dowager's peace negotiations were
leading to unconditional surrender, and a few days before that event Chen
Yizhong, Zhang Shijie, Lu Xiufu, and Chen Wenlong (d. 1276) took their
forces and left the capital.³ Gongdi's brothers Shi and Bing had just been ap-

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1. Liu Yiqing, 8.10.
2. Chen Yizhong and Zhang Shijie, despite their differences, apparently planned the escape
route of the refugee court from beginning to end.
3. SS 47.937-39; YS 9.177; Bi Yuan, 182.4978, 4982.

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pointed pacifying commissioner of Fujian in charge of Foochow and administrator in charge of the Court of Imperial Relatives in the South, respectively. The two princes were escorted out of the capital by their maternal uncles and headed for Wenzhou, where they were to be met by Chen Yizhong, Zhang Shijie, and Lu Xiufu.

At about this time, Wen Tianxiang returned to Hangzhou after an aborted attempt to defend the Dusong pass. The court was then virtually deserted by the departure of those who accompanied the two princes to the southeast and by the extensive evacuation of civilian officials to their native homes. In the absence of veteran officials, Wen, despite his relatively junior status, and Wu Jian, despite his old age, were appointed chief ministers and dispatched to resume peace negotiations with Bayan.1 In this mission, Wen was one of five or six envoys sent by the empress dowager, the others being Jia Xuanweng (1213-98), Xie Tang, Jia Yuqing (d. 1276), and Liu Ba (d. after 1280). Rather than completing the details of the surrender, as had been the empress dowager's instructions, Wen reviled both the Yuan generals and the Song defectors in Bayan's camp. While the other envoys were permitted to return to report to the Song court, Wen was detained.

Altogether, the negotiations for surrender extended over three months, from December 1275 to February 1276. This protracted period was responsible for the unhurried and rather orderly submission of the capital. Fighting was avoided in the city itself, concurring with Empress Dowager Xie's firm determination not to have the Changzhou massacre of the entire population repeated. On February 21, 1276 the young Song emperor assembled the few remaining officials to make obeisance to the North, the direction of the Yuan capital. The final unconditional surrender statement pleaded only

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1. SS 47.938; YS 9.177. When he was asked by Qubilai in 1276 why he was still chief minister despite his old age, Wu Qian replied that no one else was willing to assume the post (Liu Yiqing, 9.15).
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for the lives of the people of Hangzhou and the Song house. Concurrent with the statement were edicts issued to the entire Song empire to cease fighting. One edict was addressed to Li Tingzhi ordering him to surrender all the Huai commanderies and prefectures; another was dispatched to return the two young princes in flight.

The actual transfer of power to the Mongol forces also turned out to be a regulated process in the gathering of war spoils, transfer of administration, and pacification of the population. This was in stark contrast to the arbitrary massacres and rampant looting of earlier Mongol campaigns that took place in other cities. Dong Wenbing was first sent inside the city walls to take inventory of the troops, civilians, cash and food supplies. Only then did the Mongol party enter the palaces and collect the seals, art objects and valuable treasures. In the government offices and ancestral temples, appointment notices and government seals, sacrificial and archive material were assembled. The important items were selected for immediate shipment to Dadu, while other pieces were stored in trunks and left temporarily outside the respective offices.

1. SS 47.937-38; YS 9.178; Liu Yiqing, 8.11-12, record the edict ordering the surrender: "The roots [i.e. Hangzhou] have already been pulled out, and even if the various cities continue to resist, how the population will [become] innocent victims! As soon as this edict arrives, surrender immediately and the population will be spared of calamity." The surrender statement of Empress Dowager Xie might have included an inventory list of court treasures in addition to official records on the landmarks of the capital. Marco Polo (1254-1324) claims to have seen a copy on which he based his account of the Song capital. His version of the Song conquest and the Song emperor and empress is strikingly inaccurate, indicating that the facts of the conquest were not clear to foreigners in the empire. For Marco Polo's account, see A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, Marco Polo, 139.309-13, 152.326-27.

2. See SS 47.938-39, 421.12602, and Liu Minzhong, c.1a-b. Empress Dowager Xie and Gongdi both addressed edicts to Li Tingzhi, urging him to submit and spare the population from further bloodshed. Li burned the edicts and slew the messengers.

3. For example, Changzhou, Chizhou and cities in Sichuan.

4. YS 9.179-80; Liu Minzhong, b.7a-9a. A decade later, Zhou Mi visited the former Song imperial library and found paintings stored in big trunks, an indication that much of the material never reached Dadu. See his Yunyan guoyan lu, 3.6b-7a, and R.H. van Gulik, 201-2.
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Soldiers, in general, were not permitted to enter the city, but patrols kept peace inside the former Song capital. Wen Tianxiang's volunteer troops were disbanded and told to go home, while the regular Song forces were incorporated into the Mongol army. Weapons were confiscated from everyone not allowed to carry them. All Song offices and departments were dissolved and imperial guards dismissed, but many former civilian and military officials subsequently offered their services to the new administration, which was proclaimed as the Regional Government of Zhedong and Zhexi, under the control of Fan Wenhу and Mangqutai (d. 1290). The Pacification Bureau of Zhedong and Zhexi was provisionally set up to attend to affairs relating to the former Song government. Following the Yuan practice of conciliation, Song officials who had surrendered and collaborated were assigned to head the bureau.¹

In spite of the orderly change of administration, the anticipation of Hangzhou's collapse nevertheless created restless apprehension at all levels of society, from the imperial family to the common people. Local bandits took advantage of anarchy to plunder and loot. The Mongol temporary government was not able to prevent unruly generals and soldiers from demanding sahua (bribes).² The surrender notice was circulated extensively to inform the public of the change of administration and to curtail speculation about Mongol intentions. Soon Qubilai sent an edict to former officials, clerks, civilians, and soldiers of the Song. It ordered all social and economic classes to continue with their normal professions and refrain from arousing unnecessary suspicion and fear. An amnesty was declared on criminals who had committed offenses prior to the submission of Hangzhou. Former Song officials were reassured that they would not be punished, and archival material, court sacrificial and musical instruments, genealogies, astrological charts and geo-

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¹ YS 9.178-79, 9.182-83. In June 1276 the pacification bureau was dissolved, but the regional government of the Zhedong and Zhexi remained under the control of Mangqutai (biography in YS 131.3186) and Fan Wenhу. A month later, the provincial government (xing zhongshu sheng) was set up in Ezhou and Hangzhou.

² On the Mongols demanding sahua, see Zheng Sixiao, Xinshi, 123, and "Drunken song," in Wang Yuanliang, Shuiyun ji, 13b.
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graphical maps were collected for safekeeping. Descendants of Confucian sages and virtuous men, illustrious Confucian scholars, medical experts, Buddhist monks, Daoist priests, fortunetellers and shamans, astrologers, and recluse in the mountains and forests were required to register their names with officials in Hangzhou. Famous mountains, great rivers, monasteries and temples, as well as sites commemorating distinguished men were to be preserved. Widows, orphans, and the disadvantaged were to be assisted with public funds.¹

The edict also informed the people of Hangzhou that the Song house, in accordance with precedents set by defeated rulers, would be required to go to the Yuan capital. In essence, this meant that the Song imperial family was taken into captivity and abducted to the North. Two main entourages journeyed to Qubilai’s court, one consisting of chief ministers (the "mercy-begging officials") and the other of members of the Song imperial family. The first one left on February 25, 1276, a few days after the surrender of Hangzhou, and included Wen Tianxiang (who escaped after three weeks), Jia Xuanweng, Wu Jian, Jia Yuqing, and Liu Ba. Altogether there were about three hundred former officials and clerks, and three thousand carriers and escorts of gifts and war spoils.² The purpose of this journey was to submit seals and the surrender statement to the Yuan emperor. After entering Dadu, the gifts were acknowledged and the gift-bearers rewarded with positions in the Yuan government. Jia Yuqing died shortly upon arrival and an accompanying official, Gao Yingsong (d. 1276), starved himself to death;³ the remaining former Song chief ministers awaited the arrival of the imperial entourage which had left Hangzhou on March 28, 1276.

The imperial entourage was escorted by Bayan and consisted mainly

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¹ For the surrender notice and the text of Qubilai’s proclamation to the conquered people of Song, see YS 9.178-79; Liu Minzhong, b.7b.

² SS 47.938; YS 9.178; Bi Yuan, 182.4979-90. The diary of one Yan Guangda, a member of the chief minister’s entourage, provides a day-by-day account of the journey to the Yuan capital. See Liu Yiqing, 9.1-15. It has been translated in Moule, "Hang-chou to Shang-tu, A.D. 1276." 

³ See Gao Yingsong’s biography in SS 454.13347; see also Bi Yuan, 183.4985.
of Gongdi, his mother Empress Dowager Quan, his grandfather Prince Fu, princesses and imperial concubines and relatives. Empress Dowager Xie left Hangzhou several months later due to serious illness. Palace maids, former officials, and students from the three universities also formed part of the large retinue. Some officials volunteered to accompany the imperial family hoping to acquire positions in the new dynasty, but it appears that the students were compelled to embark on the journey. Included in the former category was Liu Mengyan, the former Song chief minister who later reached high ranks in the Yuan bureaucracy; in the latter category the National University student Xu Yingbiao (d. 1276) committed suicide with his family of three rather than witness what he described as the shameful capitulation of the imperial family in the Yuan capital.

When the imperial entourage arrived in Yangzhou, the loyalist general Jiang Cai (d. 1276), under the orders of Li Tingzhi, attempted but failed to rescue the hostages. In a little over two months the entourage arrived in Dadu, where the Song family joined the chief ministers to proceed to Shangdu, Qubilai’s summer residence. There, they were received at court by Qubilai and his empress in a grand feast, and the young Gongdi was formally stripped of his title of emperor and given the title Duke of Yingguo. The Duke of Yingguo and the two empress dowagers were each granted tax-free property in Dadu, where they subsequently lived. Compared to the hardships to which the Jurchens subjected Huizong and Qinzong in the takeover of

1. YS 9.180-81; Bi Yuan, 182.4981.
2. YS 9.180; Bi Yuan, 182.4981; Songji sanchao 5.62-63. While the last source states that there were several hundreds of students, the YS (9.182) indicates that only forty-six arrived at Dadu; Zhou Mi records ninety-nine. In 1278 only eighteen were left, each of whom had been appointed instructor in a prefecture (Guixin zazhi, xu b.9b-10a).
3. SS 451.13277; Bi Yuan, 182.4981.
4. SS 451.13268; Bi Yuan, 182.4982.
5. YS 9.182; Bi Yuan, 183.4985. The generosity of Qubilai towards the Song imperial family has been praised, for example, by Zhao Yi. See Zhao Yi, 30.634-37.
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North China in 1126-27, Qubilai's treatment of Song royalty was strikingly compassionate. Empress Dowager Xie died in 1282 and Empress Dowager Quan entered a monastery soon after. In 1288 the Duke of Yingguo set out for Tibet to become a Lama priest; it seems that in 1323 he was ordered by Shidebala (Yingzong, r. 1321-23) to commit suicide. Some palace ladies accompanying the imperial family on the journey hanged themselves rather than sacrifice their virtue by remarrying; those remaining were married off to craftsmen in the North. Imperial relatives, officials, and students who were part of the imperial retinue were given positions in the government.

Arriving in Shangdu, Bayan also had an audience with Qubilai in which he presented a laudatory address about the surrender of the city to proclaim the conquest of the Song to Heaven, Earth, and his ancestors. Arrangements were also made for the traditional Chinese sacrifices to the sacred mountains and rivers to indicate the legitimate succession of the Yuan to the Song, again only by proxy, as Qubilai, like his predecessors, did not wholly subscribe to the traditional Chinese concept of legitimate succession. These sacrificial rituals nevertheless show that as far as the Mongols were concerned, the conquest of the Song was completed in February 1276 with the fall of Hangzhou. Likewise, many Song generals and officials undoubtedly thought the Song had perished when news of the Hangzhou collapse reached them. Thus following many other Song commanders, Xia Gui, the veteran general in Huaixi, and Fang Hui (1227-1307), the prefect of Jiande, immedi-


2. Bi Yuan, 183.4985; Wang Yuanliang, Shuiyun ji, 19a-b.

3. See Liu Yiqing, 9.9-10, for offices awarded to members of the ministers' entourage. Of these men, only Liu Mengyan rose to high office in the Yuan bureaucracy.

4. YS 9.182.

5. Franke, From Tribal Chieftain, 32-33.
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ately halted their operations and surrendered to the Mongol forces.¹ The general opinion in 1276 was that the Song had ended: the Song court had disintegrated, the imperial family had been taken captive, and edicts had been issued ordering the entire empire to capitulate.²

Bayan’s role in the surrender of the Song imperial family has been overwhelmingly praised in Yuan official sources. He was commended for following Qubilai’s instructions to exercise mercy and strategy rather than rely on force and killing,³ and to a certain extent Bayan did avoid some bloodshed by attracting many defections. He applied firmly the policy of conciliation, which rewarded lavishly those who capitulated and punished harshly those who resisted. The surrendering officials were, in turn, effectively used as envoys to persuade their friends and relatives to cross over to the Mongol side. Destruction was thus not arbitrary nor total in some cities, but elsewhere there were indeed acts of violence and ruthlessness, ranging from cutting off the enemies’ ears and displaying them at the city gates to exterminating the entire population of Changzhou.⁴ Loyalist writings may have exaggerated or even fabricated stories of Bayan putting diehard Song loyalists in boiling water to extract oil and grease for catapults.⁵ But, when Yuan sources report that “when the troops were sent to occupy the city [i.e., Hangzhou] and when the imperial family was dispatched to the North, the people

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¹ SS 47.938; YS 9.179; Bi Yuan, 182.4980.
² Ming efforts to rewrite Song and Yuan history resulted in treating the period from 1276 to 1279 as part of the Southern Song.
³ YS 8.156 and other sources quote Qubilai’s instructions to Bayan to follow the precedent of merciful conquest as exemplified by Cao Bin in the reign of the founder of the Song dynasty, Taizu (r. 960-76).
⁴ Liu Minzhong, b.3b, et passim.
⁵ For accounts of these atrocities, see Songji sanchao 5.60; Bi Yuan, 182.4968; Wang Yinglin, Siming wenxian ji, 5.14b.
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did not even know,"¹ the poetry of the captives speak otherwise of the huge piles of stinking bodies and the heart-rending weeping of bystanders watching the imperial family embark on the journey to the North.

Another myth perpetuated by Yuan sources is the ease with which the conquest was carried out: "Taking Xiangyang and the Huai was as easy as picking up mustard seeds, and pacifying south of the Yangzi was as easy as turning the palm."² This misrepresentation is refuted by the fact that the conquest took over forty years, the last two requiring the Mongols' total armed forces in China. Among the 123 generals who received rewards and honors for meritorious service³ were many Song defectors who subsequently distinguished themselves in inflicting defeat on the Song forces as well as in luring over defectors.

Both Song and Yuan official sources abound in anecdotes and records of loyalist deeds of Song military and civilian officials in the face of impending defeat. Jiang Wanli, a former Song chief minister, drowned himself when the Mongol army entered his native place of Raozhou; his brother Wanqing and son also perished.⁴ Zhao Maofa (d. 1275) of Chizhou and Li Fei of Tinzhou killed themselves and their families rather than surrender.⁵ After Jia Sidao's defeat in early 1275, Wang Lixin (d. 1275) searched for an "uncontaminated plot of Song soil" on which to die.⁶ There were numerous others who refused to capitulate, citing their debt to the Song as the reason; others declared in a most uncompromising manner: "Alive, I am a subject of the

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1. This passage is in Liu Minzhong, b.10a. For differing accounts by the captives, see, e.g., Wang Yuanliang, Hushan leigao, 2.1a.

2. Liu Minzhong, preface.1a.


4. SS 418.12525.

5. See the biographies of Li Fei and Zhao Maofa in SS 450.13255-60; see also Bi Yuan, 182.4972-73.

6. See Wang Lixin's biography in SS 416.12475-76.
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Song; dead, I will remain a ghost of the Song." In fury some killed the envoys sent to persuade them to surrender and berated the enemy until their tongues were cut off. These examples of martyrdom and endurance for the Song cause and for preserving honor in the family continued to be emulated among resistance circles in 1276-79. No longer receiving the sanction of the abducted Song imperial family and court, the loyalists operated independently in the southeastern provinces where the Mongol forces had not fully penetrated.

Loyalist Resistance in 1276-79

In spite of Empress Dowager Xie's edicts ordering the total submission of the Song empire, fighting did not cease in parts of Huai, Sichuan, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong. Remnant Song forces were soon joined by newly recruited armies to engage in militant resistance to the Mongols. The rise and sustenance of this movement can be attributed to two important events: the qinwang edict promulgated in January 1275 and the flight of the two Song princes to the southeastern provinces just days before the young Song emperor formally capitulated in Hangzhou. The qinwang edict had immediately led veteran officials and commoners alike to volunteer their assistance to the emperor by raising armies. For some, the summons was interpreted as a personal appeal to save the dynasty from total conquest. By the middle of the year, combined efforts by officials and commoners had recruited a total of over 200,000 men, with operations in the Huai region under Li Tingzhi and Ruan Kesi, in Jiangxi under Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde, in Hunan under Li Fei, and in Sichuan and elsewhere. However, these new armies had hardly begun to fight when Empress Dowager Xie ordered their disbandment in De-

1. Liu Minzhong, a.5a; see also Fan Tianshun's biography in SS 450.13250.

2. For example, Zhao Liangchun (d. 1275) of Huzhou (SS 451.13266) killed some Yuan envoys. Another loyalist had his tongue and nose cut off when he would not yield (SS 454.13343).

3. I am indebted to Paul Buell for making available to me his working paper, now published as "The Sung resistance movement, 1276-1279." Buell's central focus is on the local perspective of the resistance movement in the southeastern provinces.
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cember 1275 and January 1276, during which time she was deeply involved in peace negotiations with the Mongol Yuan forces. This order was largely ignored and even when the capital surrendered, a substantial part of the *qinwang* forces was still intact and recruitment was continuing. These units were still under the control of local leaders and scattered throughout Song territory. It remained an immense task for the loyalist leaders from the central Song court to rally their support and organize, assimilate, and administer the armies as a single massive force.

While the *qinwang* campaigns provided the military base, it was the presence of the two young Song princes, Shi and Bing, that gave the resistance movement the legitimacy, credibility, and popularity it received in Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong.¹ Traditional accounts unanimously credit Wen Tianxiang with the initial conception and leadership of the movement, but evidence suggests that Chen Yizhong and Li Tingzhi played the primary roles in both the evacuation of the two princes from Hangzhou and the assembling of loyalist forces at Wenzhou. In 1275, while Empress Dowager Xie and some officials were suing for peace, contrary to traditional views Chen Yizhong advocated continued hostilities towards the Yuan and even considered alternative plans to restore the Song state should it perish. From April 1275, after Jia’s disgrace, Chen’s main effort was to reverse Jia’s policies in order to restore the government’s confidence and to strengthen its defenses. Jia at that time had memorialized the throne to transfer the capital from Hangzhou to a less vulnerable location, but Chen in an effort to dissociate himself from Jia, executed Jia’s messenger who had conveyed the proposal.² While agreeing with Jia and even making preparations to transfer the Song court, Chen pretended to concur with general public opinion not to

¹. In early February 1276, Shi (Prince Ji) became Prince Yi, and Bing (Prince Xin) became Prince Guang. In June, Shi was enthroned (posthumously Di Shi and Duanzong); Bing became Prince Wei (SS 47.937, 940). The *YS*, Wen Tianxiang’s *Wenshan xiansheng quanji*, and other sources are in accordance with the *SS* titles for the Song princes. However, the *Songji sanchao* (6.65-75) erroneously refers to Shi as Prince Guang and to Bing as Prince Wei (both titles, in fact, belonged to Bing). Shi is given an alternative reading of Xia in *Cihai*.

². This was Han Zhen (d. 1275); see SS 47.927.
relocate the capital on the grounds that the army had just been replenished with qinwang forces and that the Mongol army could well pursue the fleeing Song court. In August 1275, he left for his home in Wenzhou. This departure is inadequately explained by the sources as the outcome of the power struggle between Chen and Wang Yue, whose son criticized Chen in a petition. Evidence indicates that Chen’s trip to Wenzhou from August to October 1275 was intended to investigate the prefecture as a possible temporary capital or as a base for military operations.

Chen was in a position to plot with Li Tingzhi, the veteran military and civil official in charge of the Huai region. Li at that time had been given ministerial ranks and often came when summoned to the Song court to report the situation at the front; thus ample opportunities existed for the two men to have consulted each other. Li’s connection with the Hao Jing affair has earlier been discussed, and now his more elusive role was most likely to supply Huai troops to support Chen’s evacuation plan. Indeed, Huai troops were conspicuously present among the loyalist forces. Li also provided Chen with the able supporters Lu Xiufu and Su Liuyi (d. 1279), both of whom had been his own protégés in the Huai region and who later became central personali-

1. This opinion was voiced by a student who was an imperial relative. See Songji sanchao 5.56.

2. Liu Fu’s biography (SS 405.12249) states that Chen Yizhong had planned to take the two princes to seek refuge in the sea via Wenzhou. According to traditional accounts, Chen Yizhong, Zhang Shijie, and other high-ranking officials disagreed among themselves and simply fled the court at the same time that the two Song princes departed from Hangzhou. The presence of Chen, Zhang, and the others in Wenzhou, where the princes also arrived, is then seen as coincidental. Chen is portrayed as irresponsible and untrustworthy, always disappearing at crucial moments, as in 1275 from a meeting with Bayan and in 1277 from the loyalist court. In one unreliable anecdote, a summons had to be sent to Chen’s mother to persuade him to return to the Song court. Another unlikely story has Zhang Shijie order the coffin of Chen’s mother to be carried with the refugee court to make Chen take part in the loyalist resistance. Chen’s absence from the Song court in August to October 1275 is naively explained as hurt pride! My reconstruction of this event attempts to explain the Wenzhou and Li Tingzhi connections. In the next chapter I shall deal with the role of Wen Tianxiang in the historiography of the event.
ties in the resistance movement. Li was later summoned as chief minister at the enthronement of Prince Shi in June 1276, an indication of his importance at the initial planning stage of the restoration.

The original plan might have been the total evacuation of the Song court, but as Empress Dowager Xie wavered and until the last days of surrender refused to leave Hangzhou, the flight of the two princes was substituted. In order not to arouse the Mongols' suspicion, the plan was to depart by different routes and to reassemble in Wenzhou. This prefecture, apart from being Chen's home, had ideological significance as the temporary refuge of Gaozong's restoration of the Song dynasty a century and a half before. Wenzhou was also in close proximity to Foochow and Quanzhou, which could potentially serve as naval bases for the loyalists and obtain support from the imperial clansmen based in the two prefectures.

A day or two before the official surrender of Hangzhou, Chen Yizhong, Zhang Shijie, Lu Xiufu, Chen Wenlong, and other supporters took their forces and fled from the court as planned. At the same time, the princes' maternal uncles and imperial relatives escorted them to Wenzhou via Wuzhou; they were followed by a rearguard sent by Chen Yizhong. The two princes were accompanied by their mothers, a sister, and other relatives. As soon as Bayan was notified of the two Song princes' flight, Yuan forces were alerted but the princes managed a narrow escape. Less than two months later, all parties arrived in Wenzhou: Chen Yizhong came from his home in Wenzhou with some land forces; Zhang Shijie descended from Qingyuan (Ningbo) where he had just attacked in vain the Yuan occupation forces; and Lu Xiufu and Su Liuyi arrived along other routes. At the Jiangxin monastery on a chair on which Gaozong had once sat, Prince Shi was proclaimed com-

1. Li Tingzhi and his "little court" of talented protégés are dealt with in Chapter 4.

2. Foochow and Quanzhou were respectively the seats for the Western and Southern Courts of Imperial Clansmen. See SS 164.3889.

3. SS 47.939-40; Bi Yuan, 182.4982. The rearguard was led by Zhang Quan, who had been protected by Chen Yizhong but criticized by Wen Tianxiang after his defeat at Changzhou in December 1275. An imperial son-in-law, Yang Zhen, attempted to decoy the Yuan forces to allow the princes to escape. He was later taken captive to Dadu.
mander-in-chief of the empire's infantry and cavalry, and Prince Bing his assistant. An appeal to revitalize support for the Song princes was directed specifically at territories that had not yet surrendered to the Mongols. Several Song clansmen in the retinue were sent into Fujian to reassure its officials and people, as well as to drum up support from other clansmen. Response to these appeals was instantaneous; many prefectures and counties about to surrender in Fujian, Guangdong, and Sichuan quickly reversed their decision, and some places which had already submitted reverted to loyalist control. Pressured by Mongol generals, Empress Dowager Xie recalled the two princes, but Chen Yizhong ignored her instructions and drowned her envoys. He then sailed along the coast to Foochow with the two young princes and most of the loyalist forces.

In June 1276 Prince Shi (posthumously Di Shi) was proclaimed successor to the abducted Gongdi, and his mother, Imperial Concubine Yang, was appointed regent. A xingchao (refugee loyalist court) was formed with Chen Yizhong as commander-in-chief and chief minister of the Left, Li Tingzhi as chief minister of the Right, Chen Wenlong and Liu Fu (d. 1276) as assistant ministers, Zhang Shijie as vice-commissioner of Military Affairs, Su Liuyi as attendant of Palace Affairs, and Lu Xiufu as signatory official of Military Affairs. Among other central government officials who rallied to the enthronement were Deng Guangjian (1232-1302) and Chen Zhongwei (1212-83), who later wrote eyewitness accounts of the resistance. The generals Wu Jun, Zhao Jin, Fu Zhuo, Li Jue (all died 1277), and Di Guoxiu (fl. 1275-90, who later defected) were dispatched to various circuits to recover

1. SS 47.939-40; Bi Yuan, 182.4982.
2. SS 47.940. Some of these cities were Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Tingzhou.
3. SS 47.940; Bi Yuan, 183.4984-86.
4. Deng wrote Wen Tianxiang's biography (extant only in fragments, in Wen Tianxiang, juan 17) and the biographies of Wen's followers (in ibid., 19.42b-52a). Chen Zhongwei wrote the Erwang benmo, which became juan 6 of Songji sanchao.
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Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and the Huai region from Mongol control.¹ This group of officials and generals who withdrew from Hangzhou may be said to have constituted the faction in favor of continuing hostilities with the Mongols, a course of action that Empress Dowager Xie had opposed since 1275.

Wen Tianxiang was not a key member of this faction at the time. Prior to the qinwang campaign, he was virtually unknown among decision-makers of the Song court; furthermore, he was in the Song capital only for brief periods in August 1275 and January 1276, hardly long enough to have made his presence felt.² Wen might have been aware of the evacuation plan and even expressed agreement in principle with the removal to the South of the two princes, but he was neither involved in nor entrusted with the details of the flight.³ Instead, a day before the official surrender of Hangzhou, he found himself in the company of the other envoys in the Mongol camp, detained and forced to make the journey to the North with the ministers' entourage. During the trip Wen struck up a close relationship with Jia Xuanweng and declared his antiforeign sentiments to Wu Jian.⁴ After twenty days, with the help of eleven followers, he made a desperate escape at Zhenjiang, after which the Mongol forces launched an extensive search for him.⁵ But in the Huai region he was not welcomed by loyalist forces under Li Tingzhi in Yangzhou, who was convinced that Wen was a collaborator who wanted

¹ SS 47.940; Bi Yuan, 183.4986.

² In January 1275 Wen Tianxiang raised troops in his native province of Jiangxi, arriving at the capital only in September. In October he was sent to Pingjiang, and in December he was in Huzhou defending Dusong Pass (SS 418.12534-36).

³ Traditional and secondary accounts, however, credit Wen with first proposing the evacuation of the two princes. But even Wen on one occasion admitted to only helping Chen Yi-zhong plan for the transfer of the imperial family (Wen Tianxiang, 13.1a).

⁴ On Wu Jian, see Wen Tianxiang, 13.13a-b. Jia Xuanweng is said to have refused to sign the surrender statement, thus earning Wen's praise. Jia also bought and freed Wen's younger sister after she was enslaved by the Yuan government. See Jia's biography in SS 421.12598-99.

⁵ SS 47.940; YS 9.180; Bi Yuan, 183.4983-84; Wen Tianxiang, 13.23b-28b, 17.18a-b.
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them to surrender to the Mongols. Distressed at Li's instructions to have him killed and despairing over the death and defection of his followers, Wen heard about the arrival of the Song princes in Wenzhou and hastened south to join the loyalist court.¹

After a failed attempt to rescue the entourages of Gongdi and his mother passing through Zhenjiang, Li Tingzhi, accompanied by Jiang Cai, also set out for Wenzhou to assume the chief ministership at the refugee Song court. But while passing through Taizhou, both were captured by their subordinates who surrendered Huaidong the moment they departed. Unflinching in their loyalty to the Song, the two men were executed in September 1276.² After his death Li's influence on Song resistance continued to be felt through his protégés Lu Xiufu and Su Liuyi, who remained with the refugee court to the end.

In June 1276 Wen Tianxiang reached Wenzhou and continued on to Foochow, where the loyalist party had moved. Because Li Tingzhi was captured and did not assume the chief ministership, Wen was appointed to take his place but did not accept. His companions Du Hu (d. 1277) and Lü Wu (d. 1277) were dispatched to Wenzhou and Jiang-Huai respectively to recruit local bandits and ruffians.³ Almost immediately after Wen's arrival, discord arose over personal and strategic issues. As discussed earlier, Wen Tianxiang was relatively new to the court, and did not participate in decision-making until 1275, whereas the other loyalist leaders had been in the political lime-

1. Wen Tianxiang, 13.30b-57a and 17.18a-b; Bi Yuan, 180.4983-84. Li Tingzhi was suspicious of Wen because the latter's signature was forged on the pacification statement sent to persuade Li to surrender. Wen thought that the Mongols had fabricated and circulated a story that a certain Song chief minister (presumably Wen) was about to request Li to submit to the Mongols. Li simply could not be convinced that Wen was able to escape his Mongol guards with eleven followers. Wen was alerted to Li's intention to kill him and helped to safety by Miao Zaicheng, the defense general of Zhenzhou.

2. See the biographies of Li Tingzhi and Jiang Cai in SS 421.12602, 451.13268-69; YS 9.183-85; Zhaozhong lu, 26.

3. SS 47.940; Bi Yuan, 183.4986.
light since the 1250s and some even earlier. Wen was arrogant, blunt and overbearing, and simply could not get along with the other officials of the refugee loyalist court. His sharp criticism threatened their position in the loyalist movement, and even Lu Xiufu, a rather mild-mannered personality known for his integrity, would not take sides with him. Lu Xiufu himself was incompatible with Chen Yizhong and was soon exiled to Chaozhou and writing to Chen Wenlong for reinstatement. To further complicate matters, Zhang Shijie and Chen Yizhong also disagreed with each other. Chen was suspicious of Zhang, who many years earlier had defected from the Mongols to the Song. To contain Zhang's power, he put him in control of troops which were not Zhang's own, and in charge of naval forces although his expertise was in land warfare. Instead, the naval expert Liu Shiyong (d. 1277) was assigned to land operations.

Strategic considerations, however, finally turned all the other loyalist leaders against Wen Tianxiang. Both Zhang Shijie and Chen Yizhong considered it most important to take the coastal regions and secure a strong fleet, but Wen insisted on restoring the interior province of Jiangxi (where he was a native) as the base of loyalist power. No compromise could be reached in

1. In the SS annals, Wen is mentioned only once before 1274, as top graduate of the 1256 examination. Li Tingzhi, Xie Fangde, Chen Yizhong, Chen Wenlong, and Lu Xiufu appear much earlier and more frequently before 1276 (SS 45-47.871-920, et passim).

2. Immediately after his arrival at the loyalist court, Wen antagonized both Chen and Zhang by his criticism of Chen's irresponsibility and Zhang's inadequate forces. See Zhaozhong lu, 19.

3. Lu Xiufu, 2792-93; Bi Yuan, 183.4987.

4. SS 418.12531. Liu Shiyong later died of excessive drinking caused by grief over the irretrievable state of the Song. His biography is attached to that of Zhang Shijie, in SS 451.13274-75. Chen's suspicion of Zhang was responsible for rejecting a strategy conceived by both Zhang and Wen in December 1275 (SS 451.13273). Zhang was a relative of Zhang Rou, who had defected from the Jin to the Mongols. Thus Zhang Shijie and his counterpart from the Yuan camp, Zhang Hongfan, were related.

5. Bi Yuan, 183.4990; Zhaozhong lu, 19; Wen Tianxiang, 16.20a. On the dispute over strategy, see also Buell, 151.
this regard, and in August 1276 Wen left for Nanjian prefecture in Fujian province to recruit men and recover Jiangxi. From that point on Wen's xing dudu fu (mobile military government or military headquarters) more or less operated independently from the refugee court of the two Song princes, which was controlled by Chen Yizhong and Zhang Shijie. Wen was not permitted to join the refugee court during the next three years of loyalist resistance, and thus there existed in fact two major components of the movement: the refugee court which took with it all the loyalist forces rallied by mid-1276, and Wen's mobile headquarters which in August 1276 did not yet have a substantial army. Virtually no communication and coordination occurred between the two.¹

Apart from the loyalist court and Wen's headquarters which operated in the southeastern provinces, there were at the time other pockets of resistance, the most significant being in Sichuan under the stubborn general Zhang Jue (d. 1279), who did not surrender until 1278.² In fact, Sichuan was not totally subdued until shortly before the Yaishan defeat in March 1279.³ Although Zhang Jue and other centers had sent assistance to the refugee court, because of the collapse of the south-central region following the fall of Hangzhou, communication was completely cut off from Chen Yizhong, Wen Tianxiang, and the other leaders.

The loyalist resistance suffered severe leadership problems but, curiously enough, there was no evidence of financial difficulties. Both the refugee court and Wen's military headquarters had sufficient funds to pay the large number of mercenaries and to reimburse the local people for food and

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¹ Wen blamed Chen for spoiling plans for Tongzhou to join in the resistance by not trusting Wen's earlier arrangements with the defense general there. See Wen Tianxiang, 16.19b.

² See the biographies of Zhang Jue and Li Dehui, the Yuan general in charge of Mongol campaigns in Sichuan, in SS 451.13280-84; YS 163.3815-19. See also Zhaozhong lu, 28-29.

³ Hezhou surrendered only in February 1279 (YS 10.208).
supplies. Money was also liberally used to bribe informers.\(^1\) After the final defeat of the loyalist movement, the Mongols still found large sums of gold and treasures in the defeated Song fleet. The sources are unclear about the financial aspect of the resistance, but a great amount of wealth was brought to the South by the two princes. In addition, loyalist leaders and participants contributed their family fortunes to the cause; the local population also provided resources.\(^2\)

In Nanjian prefecture, as soon as the word spread about Wen's recruitment efforts, his former subordinates who had dispersed at the Mongol takeover of Hangzhou flocked back with renewed enthusiasm.\(^3\) There were numerous new personalities who swiftly raised troops and joined forces with Wen. In four to five months' time Wen amassed tremendous support, and thus moved the headquarters to Tingzhou where he could supervise more directly the operations to recover Jiangxi. From April to August 1277, he brought under loyalist control Meizhou, Xingguo county and Yudu, while his generals reconquered Ji and Gan counties. Loyalist response was also overwhelming from Hengshan and Fuzhou.\(^4\) Initial victories were, however, short-lived as Yuan forces soon caught up with the loyalist movement. By September all of Wen's troops again disintegrated, as did those of his subordinate generals Zou Feng (d. 1277) and others. At Kongkang, a locality between Jiangxi and Fujian, his family and almost all of his followers were captured, and some were put to death after torture. With the help of a follower who impersonated Wen and got captured, the real Wen fled to Xunzhou in

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1. YS 10.208-09. For example, Wen Tianxiang offered large sums of gold to a crew member and a Mongol soldier, among others, to help him escape in March 1276. See Wen Tianxiang, 13.22a, 23a.

2. For example, Wen and Xie Ao donated entire family inheritances to the cause. Ma Nanbao was a local magnate who also contributed financial support. On Ma, see Wan Sitong, Songji zhongyi lu, 7.15-17.

3. Wen had first considered Guangzhou as his headquarters, but when that city was occupied by the Mongol forces, he decided on Nanjian as an alternative. See Wen Tianxiang, 16.20a.

4. See Wen's biography in SS 418.12537-38; Wen Tianxiang, 16.20a-22b.
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Guangdong province.¹

Wen continued within Guangdong to Chaozhou and Huizhou in March 1278; in Huizhou he again set up his military headquarters, beginning with only a few survivors. He pleaded desperately to join the refugee court but, although granted honors for his resistance efforts, was again turned down.² Left on his own, Wen nevertheless soon received renewed support from freshly enlisted troops. He also subdued the local bandits, Chen Yi (fl. 1270-1300) and his four brothers, and earned the gratitude of the local population which had long been plagued by banditry.³ Chen Yi had been recruited earlier to join the loyalist effort, but shortly after this clash with Wen he turned into an informer and led the Yuan general Zhang Hongfan to wipe out the newly recruited armies in January 1279. After fighting in various parts of Guangdong, Wen was finally defeated at Haifeng. He quickly swallowed poison to avoid being captured alive but did not die; he was then abducted to Yaishan, the final site of loyalist resistance.⁴

Meanwhile, from mid-1276 the refugee court and the two Song princes were relentlessly pursued by Yuan forces. The Mongols had expected some resistance in the southeastern provinces which had not submitted, and as early as February 1276 Bayan had invited the Muslim Pu Shougeng (d. ca. 1296), commissioner of Overseas Trade and Ships in Quanzhou, to surrender, but Pu did not immediately reply.⁵ In spite of some initial successes, the loyalist units sent to Zhedong and Zhexi met with disastrous reverses. In December 1276 the refugee court and its forces were forced to sail from

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1. S$S$ 418.12538.
2. Wen thought that Zhang Shijie had spoken against his request (Wen Tianxiang, 16.22a).
3. S$S$ 418.12538.
4. S$S$ 418.12538-39; Wen Tianxiang, 16.23. The poison that Wen took cured him of constipation and eye trouble instead of killing him.
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Foochow to Quanzhou.\(^1\) Upon arrival, Pu Shougeng invited the loyalist forces to land, but Zhang Shijie suspected Pu's intentions and rejected the offer. Pu then refused to supply Zhang with grain and ships, after which Zhang confiscated Pu's property and vessels. Pu retaliated by a massacre of Song clansmen, officials, and Huai soldiers in Quanzhou. He also formally surrendered to the Mongol forces in January 1277.\(^2\)

As Foochow and Xinghua collapsed, the refugee court lost an important leader, Chen Wenlong, who starved to death after capture.\(^3\) It then sailed south along the Fujian and Guangdong coast to Chaozhou, Haifeng, and Guanfu (Qianwan, Hong Kong). Parts of Guangdong were then recovered by local loyalist efforts.\(^4\) In August 1277 Zhang Shijie left Chen Yizhong and Lu Xiufu to guard the imperial retinue, and himself launched an attack on Quanzhou while his generals recovered Shaowu. The Huai troops in Foochow which were loyal to Zhang Shijie mutinied and attempted to kill Wang Jiweng (d. 1285), the Foochow administrator who defected to the Mongols. They were, however, totally annihilated by Mongol forces. By October Zhang Shijie had suffered utter defeat, as the Mongol army arrived to relieve Pu Shougeng; Shaowu was also recaptured. Returning to Qianwan by December 1277 and moving to Xiushan, Zhang Shijie found the refugee court divided over the next course of action. Chen Yizhong could not obtain a consensus to transfer the refugee court and the two Song princes to Champa in Indochina and subsequently left with some forces to first investigate the feasibility of such action. Perhaps because the entire loyalist movement was soon obliterated, Chen never returned to the refugee court; he died in Thailand a few years later.\(^5\)

Meanwhile Zhang Shijie continued to steer the imperial retinue away

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1. SS 47.942.
2. Ibid.
3. Chen Wenlong's biography is in SS 451.13279-80.
4. SS 47.942-44.
5. Chen Yizhong's biography in SS 418.12532.
from incessant attacks: they reached Jing’ao in January 1278 and Gangzhou (southwest Guangdong province) in April. In the months immediately before Yuan forces massacred the populations of Chaozhou and Guangzhou in order to punish them for their prolonged resistance. At this time the refugee court was joined by a former Song official, Zeng Yuanzi (d. 1285), who had been exiled to Leizhou (near Gangzhou) in early 1275 after having been implicated with Jia Sidao.1 In May 1276 Di Shi nearly drowned during the flight at sea; he soon died of fright. The remaining officials and generals of the refugee court were about to disperse, but Lu Xiufu convinced them to continue the resistance. The younger Song prince, Bing (posthumously Di Bing), was then enthroned as the successor to Di Shi.2 In July 1278, Zhang Shijie took all the loyalist forces to Yaishan in Xinhui county, near Guangzhou. Yaishan was situated on the sea between two mountains; its highly inaccessible harbor impressed Zhang Shijie as strategically important: it could camouflage the loyalist fleet and at the same time prevent the enemy from entering.3 For the next few months the refugee court prepared the Song fleet for naval warfare. Temporary lodgings were built for the imperial retinue and accompanying personnel and troops, an operation that involved a large number of local inhabitants.4

By late February 1279, however, the Mongol army had forced all remaining loyalist forces and the refugee court to retreat to the sea. Zhang Shijie now made preparations for the Song fleet to withstand a long siege. One thousand large loyalist vessels were tied together in the form of a long line, in order to stiffen morale and prevent desertion.5

In early March 1279, the Yuan generals, Li Heng (1236-85) and

1. SS 47.944.
2. SS 47.944, 451.13276.
5. SS 47.945, 451.13274; Wen Tianxiang, 16.9a-10b; Zhang Yi, 15a-20b; Zhaozhong lu, 34-36; Bi Yuan, 184.5025-28.
Zhang Hongfan with Wen Tianxiang as hostage, reached Yaishan from opposite directions. Together they had at their disposal only five hundred vessels, which were smaller and swifter than the Song fleet. The Yuan crews were unfamiliar with naval warfare and suffered from seasickness. Anticipating this disadvantage and wishing to avoid a violent confrontation, Zhang Hongfan ordered Wen Tianxiang to persuade Zhang Shijie to surrender without fighting. Wen refused and replied with a poem that has since become famous: "... In this life since antiquity who can escape death / Better to preserve a pure heart to illuminate the pages of history."¹

For three weeks the Mongol forces encircled the loyalist fleet and effectively blocked off food supplies and fresh water. Many soldiers in desperation drank sea water and became incapacitated. On March 19 Li Heng took advantage of the low morning tide to attack the northern tip of the loyalist fleet, and in the high afternoon tide Zhang Hongfan blasted the southern end. The loyalist soldiers were soon tired out and could fight no longer.² After one boat lowered its banner to surrender, virtually the entire loyalist fleet followed suit. The battle was lost for the loyalist forces in less than a day—quite a surprise for both sides—as Wen Tianxiang, who witnessed the fiasco, wrote about the collapse:

Suddenly this morning the sky darkened and the
wind and rain manifested evil,
Catapults and thunder flashed; arrows descended.
Only yesterday morning the Song vessels decked the
Yaishan sea,
Today only the Mongol boats remain!
Last night ships on both sides drummed and clanged,
But today all the boats snore lazily away.³

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2. SS 47.945, 451.13274.
Chapter Two

The young emperor's boat was the largest vessel and securely attached to the entire loyalist fleet, and therefore could not break out of the Mongol encirclement. Realizing that the end had come, Lu Xiufu forced his wife and children to jump off the boat before he threw himself and the young Di Bing into the sea and died. The body of the last claimant to the Song throne, Di Bing, was discovered the next day loaded with gold and official seals to help him sink. Many imperial relatives, officials and soldiers are said to have drowned as well. The Mongol forces rescued some of these men, including Deng Guangjian (1232-1303), who subsequently became Zhang Hongfan's family tutor. Zhang Shijie managed to escape and land with sixteen vessels and some remnant forces. Imperial Concubine Yang also survived the fiasco but upon hearing that Di Bing, her son, had drowned, ended her own life. Zhang was still determined to reorganize the dispersed loyalist forces and seek another Song imperial clansman to enthrone. But a hurricane capsized his boat and he drowned, dashing any hopes of joining up with Chen Yizhong in Champa. Su Liu yi, another survivor of Yaishan, also attempted to restore the resistance with Zeng Yuanzi and a remnant force; however, only Zeng reached Annam because Su was soon captured and executed.

The Yaishan battle thus ended with the annihilation of the refugee court and loyalist forces. Over 100,000 lives out of an estimated total of 200,000 were wiped out in this confrontation alone, and over the last three years of resistance greater numbers of men had been mobilized and killed. Damage to the society, economy, and landscape of the Southeast must have been devastating, in view of the fact that some cities changed back and forth

1. SS 451.13276; Zhang Yi, 19a-b; Bi Yuan, 184.5027.
2. Wen Tianxiang, 14.14a-b; see also the biography of Zhang Hongfan in YS 156.3682-83.
4. Wen wrote that Su Liuyi and his son had rescued Zeng Yuanzi from the ocean, all of whom afterwards sailed to the south (Wen Tianxiang, 16.11b-12a).
5. SS 47.945; Bi Yuan, 184.5027; Buell, 167.
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from loyalist to Mongol control. Whole families were involved in the resistance, and whole families died one way or another. Popular loyalist accounts of the recruitment and composition of the loyalist forces are vague and tend to generalize. The participants, leaders, and the people are too often seen as keenly aware of the country's predicament and as taking it upon themselves to salvage the situation. The facts were considerably less glorious.

The loyalist forces had consisted of two major components: the residual Song regular forces that had been brought to the Southeast by Chen Yizhong and Zhang Shijie, and the qinwang units that were continuously augmented during the three years of resistance and mostly comprised Wen Tianxiang's forces. The qinwang forces were sometimes regarded as volunteer corps, but that is not entirely correct. One large group of these forces were aboriginal peoples, the Yao and the She, who inhabited the interiors of Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces. Together with the Huai soldiers, they were essentially mercenaries. A third group was formed by local bandits who were persuaded to join forces with the loyalists. One such unit was led by Xiong Fei (d. 1278) of Dongguan who fought the Yuan forces until his death. Many soldiers had already been in local defense units, and were reorganized by local leaders and presented as a single force to the loyalists. Some units were formed by civilians and tenants forcibly abducted by gentry members; many more were tricked by local leaders posing

1. The exact role of the She and Yao peoples is unclear, as references to them in loyalist writings are sparse. For a brief note on the loyalist connection with the Dan people, see E.N. Anderson, Jr., 250. For background studies of the Dan, Yao, and She people, see Xu Songshi, 143-53, et passim; He Ge'en; and Jiang Bingzhao. See also Buell, 140-41.

2. Wen ordered his subordinate Chen Jizhou to mobilize adventurers of the district and to join up with the aboriginal people; see Wen's biography in SS 418.12534. The Zhaozhong lu (p. 34) states that many boats belonging to the She people were involved with Zhang Shijie's forces at Yaishan. Wang Yanwu's funerary inscription to Wen Tianxiang records that the Huai troops were mercenaries; see Wang Yanwu, 4.1b.

3. Xiong Fei was persuaded by an imperial clansman, Zhao Bixiang, to attach his unit to Wen and avoid being labeled as bandits. See Chen Botao, 1a.1b-2a.
as merchants recruiting for labor. Some of these leaders praised in their biographies as loyalists who organized armies for the Song cause were opportunists. They responded to Chen Yizhong's promise that if they led their tenants into battle, their lands which had been confiscated during Jia Sidao's land reform would be returned to them. Thus many so-called loyalists were merely tenants and slaves forced into the barracks by their landlords and masters. Of other participants in the resistance, some admired righteousness and wanted to emulate the heroes; some simply wanted to collect material rewards and titles. Still others were town ruffians and adventurers whose sole aim was to loot.

In sum, among the loyalist troops few had responded from an innate sense of culture and ethnicity. Such disparate elements could hardly be expected to remain together without constant leadership and reinforcement of morale. Indeed, after each battle, these troops dispersed, but once summoned, they reassembled again. In particular, the She aboriginals and bandits proved to be unreliable. During the later months of the resistance they were easily enticed to join the Mongol forces. Wen Tianxiang's capture was facilitated by the defection of some bandits whom he had earlier recruited. After the defeat at Yaishan, some of these forces rebelled against the Yuan; ironically, these revolts have been later viewed as loyalist uprisings. As a combat force, these troops were almost useless because they were incompetent, poorly trained and inefficient. The people's heroic support of the Song cause, presented in local traditions and folklore as history, thus turns out to be closer to myth. This reappraisal of the last years of the Song has also shown that such myths include depicting Wen Tianxiang as the key organizer of the resistance and undermining the integrity and importance of some of his colleagues such as Li Tingzhi and Chen Yizhong.

1. SS 193.4822.
2. Wang Fuzhi, 10.194.
3. For these uprisings in the early 1280s by men who had submitted to the Yuan, see Huang Qinglian, 51-52, 85-86.