Crucially important in the rise of Cinggis-qan seems to have been his close and continued connection with the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. The connection was significant for him in three ways. First of all, during his earliest years as chief, the frontier zone and the frontier system, established by the Chin dynasty (1125-1234) to secure its outer limits and prevent nomadic incursion into China, provided a backdrop against which his Mongol tribal groupings took shape. Second, as Cinggis-qan's influence expanded, the frontier zone, which he conquered in the face of an eroding Chin position, provided a ready-made power base of great potential, one strategically positioned, like a dagger pointed at the heart of China. Finally, as Cinggis-qan laid the foundations for an empire during the period of rapid Mongol expansion after 1211, the peoples of the frontier zone, mostly mixed societies with mixed cultures based in both the pastoralism of the steppe and the sedentary world of China, provided the experience and expertise needed to get the fledgling structure off the ground. In particular, the peoples of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone were most important vehicles of Chinese influence upon the Mongols. The form of this influence was subsequently to have the most profound impact upon the shape and development of the political system of the Mongol empire.

Frontier Zone and Frontier System

In East Asia the second half of the twelfth century was marked by the apogee of the powerful Chin dynasty, founded by the Tungus-speaking Jürceed of Manchuria after 1125. Under the Chin a level of development unattained in North China since the heyday of Northern Sung (960-1125) was achieved. Population exceeded fifty million, industry was well developed, and agriculture reached new plateaus. In particular, the century of Chin rule witnessed the culmination of a period of broad agricultural penetration of previously non-agricultural or mixed marginal areas in and around China, including much of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. As a result, steppe areas there seem to have been more agricultural in late Chin times than in any period of Chinese history until the coming of the railroads and the great migration of farmers in the late nineteenth century.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, for example, the registered, sedentary population alone of what is now the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region seems to have numbered more than one million persons. The non-sedentary population of the area was generally not included on taxation rolls and therefore not included in our sources either. The total population of the area was thus probably much higher than one million at that time. By comparison, the total population of Inner Mongolia in 1957, after more than a century of massive migration from the Chinese interior and of industrialization, was only slightly
Evidence from available population data for large-scale penetration of the marginal territories of Inner Mongolia by farmers and other non-pastoral people during this period is fully supported by archeological findings. Inner Mongolia is dotted with ruins from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Among them are the remains of many small settlements, towns, and even small cities, contained within the area protected by the remnants of several lines of outer fortifications constructed by the Chin government in the twelfth century to protect the expanded agricultural areas of its subjects from nomads of the deep steppe (see map).9

Perhaps the best example of the type of settlement found is provided by the small city known until recently as 0lon-sūme but now identified with the Önggūt capital of Tenduc (T'ien-te 天德).10 Although no complete excavation has been undertaken, preliminary surveys indicate that the site, which is a walled settlement about 1,000 by 600 meters containing houses, palaces and even a Catholic church, flourished twice, once around 1200 and again around 1600.12 In other words, the city flourished just when agricultural penetration of the steppe reached its high point on the eve of the Mongol invasion and again in late Ming (1368-1644) times as a new period of Chinese agricultural penetration reversed the trend of a declining population loss in these marginal areas.13 Systematic surveys of other sites in the area would most likely reveal much the same pattern.14

To secure this expanded agricultural pale the Chin government, as already noted, undertook the construction of a series of fortification lines reaching far out into the steppe, well beyond the traditional Great Wall line. In conjunction with these fortifications the Chin government set about organizing the frontier zone into a frontier system. By the late twelfth century this frontier system comprised three distinct layers, an inner layer made up by primarily Chinese forces based along and behind the Great Wall line, an outer layer consisting of various groups of the steppe proper allied with the Chin, and a middle layer formed by organizational units containing the various inhabitants of the frontier zone itself.

The most important frontier zone inhabitants were what Owen Lattimore has called the "auxiliary peoples of the inner frontier," who as by-products of the total impact on each other of China as a whole and the frontier as a whole . . . were not genuinely rooted in either the economy and society of China or those of the forested Manchurian mountains, the steppes of Mongolia, or the Tibetan plateau.15 They were, however, in spite of their limited absolute power . . . of the greatest relative importance. In passive phases they represented the balance, at any given time, between China and the frontier; but in active phases they were the agents of ferment in frontier relations, causing new adjustments of the balance and preventing it from ever becoming static and permanent.16

In the late twelfth century there were four major groupings of these "auxiliary peoples" in the frontier zone, the semi-pastoral Önggūt, the nomadic Khitan and Tang'ut and the ethnically diverse bodies known collectively as Jüyin people (Jüyin irgen).17
Cinggis-qan and the Frontier Zone

When Cinggis-qan first associated himself with the Chin frontier system is unclear, but this association was certainly an established fact by the 1190s. At that time the Mongol chieftain, then known as Temüjin, was a close confederate of the Kereyid To'oril-qan, the most important Chin ally in the steppe. In 1196 Temüjin and To'oril campaigned at the behest of the court against a group of recalcitrant Tatars led by one Megiijin-se'ultu. As a reward for their successful efforts To'oril was granted the title ong-qan (wang i -qan, "prince qan") and Temüjin was made a ja'ut (sive ca'ut)-quri, a conferral probably expressive of his formal recognition as an allied chieftain by the Chin government. Temüjin seems to have also requested but not been granted the powerful office of frontier military commissioner (chao-t'ao shih 招討使) on the same occasion.

Temüjin's association with Chin frontier organization, in particular his formal recognition as a chieftain by the court, could not have failed to give form and definition to what must have been a rather amorphous following. As a recognized component of the Chin frontier system, Temüjin's following could take on a definite political shape and a more formal "tribal" character just as the institution of the razza, involving the organization of various border communities to fight the enemies of the Faith, greatly helped in the formation of the "tribal" bands of the Seljuq Türkmen. This development recalls the fact that in the view of many anthropologists tribes, as the distinct and self-conscious bodies that we visualize them, were not the natural groupings of primitive societies but came into being only when those primitive societies came into contact with more developed societies. In this view, for example, the Germanic tribes noted by Greek and Roman writers were not the natural political formations of the Germanic world but products of contact between the society of the Roman frontier and the Germanic peoples. Likewise, the American Indian tribes were products of similar contact or even reservation realities. The apparent role of Chin frontier organization in the definition of Temüjin's following would seem to support this view.

The "tribalization," however, of Temüjin's followers was of even greater importance than might be readily apparent since it took place at a critical juncture in the history of steppe-sedentary relations. At the end of the twelfth century, just as Temüjin's followers and, for that matter, his superior, To'oril ong-qan, and the many other steppe allies of the court gained new definition and solidity as part of a well-organized frontier system, relationships within and without China began to undergo rapid and extensive changes.

These changes, as well as their causes, differed from place to place. In China itself the crucial factor seems to have been the traditional dynastic cycle of prosperity and collapse which by 1200 saw the Chin regime past its prime and beset by many difficulties. Not the least of its problems were endemic civil disturbances promoted by acrimonious and lengthy disputes over succession to the throne. One result of Chin preoccupations with such internal matters was a relaxation of its control in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. At the same time, the frontier zone was the scene of increasing conflict which may have been generated, inter alia, by ecological competition between nomadic and sedentary users of the same lands. In any case, unsettled conditions within China went hand in hand with unsettled conditions in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.
In the deep steppe the weakening of Chin influence soon touched off a major power struggle among leaders formerly allied with and dominated by the Chin court. One great prize in this struggle was control over the frontier zone which a nomadic power could use as a base for adventures in China just as the China-based Chin regime had used it to meddle in the steppe.

Temüjin and his ally To'oril ong-qan, as major allies of the court with well-organized followers, soon were primed for this great struggle and, as a result, their power and influence grew rapidly after their victory over the Tatars. In 1201 the two allies fought off a powerful league headed by Jamuqa, a former associate of Temüjin, and gained a momentary position of dominance.

Progressive elimination of rivals, however, soon strained relations between Temüjin and To'oril, and in 1203 a second league was formed against Temüjin alone, this time with the participation of To'oril ong-qan. Despite initial difficulties, however, which reduced the future Mongol conqueror's fortunes to their lowest ebb, Temüjin soon mastered the situation and in a series of decisive battles eliminated his enemies or forced them to leave Mongolia. By 1206 none of Temüjin's former rivals remained in a position to influence events, and in that year he gained formal recognition of his power and position through his election as qan, with the reign title Cinggis-qan, by a great assembly (quriltai) of his family and supporters convened at the headwaters of the Onan river. With his position in the steppe secure, the new Mongol ruler then set about acquiring the prize for his labors, control over the strategic Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.

The Crisis of 1207

The Mongol qan did not have to wait long for his reward for in 1207, only a year after the formal establishment of his power, a large uprising broke out in the frontier zone, an uprising that was to sweep away the last vestiges of Chin control in almost all the territory lying outside the Great Wall line. The primary catalysts in this great uprising were the so-called Jüyin peoples.

In the Ta Chin kuo-chih 太金國志 the role of Jüyin peoples in the revolt is related in the context of the campaigns mounted against Hsi-hsia and Sung of the previous year:

Before this, in the sixth year of T'ai-ho 太和 [1206], the emperor made a general levy of troops to invade the northwest. The various Jüyin [chiu 靚] and uncivilized fan 在 in fact bordered on the north. They were called the "martial riders" and numbered 30,000. They were totally mobilized. [The emperor] invaded Chiang-nan 江南 [Sung]. Next year the troops were demobilized and peace was reestablished. The various Jüyin were sent back. Because the rewards were not equitable they all revolted and went over to the north.

But in the earlier and probably more reliable Meng-Ta pei-lu 蒙鞑備錄 the revolt is described in connection with the construction of a new line of fortifications, a line most likely intended to cut off the Jüyin peoples from the deep steppe and to facilitate agricultural penetration of their pastures:

Chang-tsung 林 Marr, Cr. 1190-1206 ... then built a new long wall north of Ching-chou 靈州. He garrisoned it with Tang'ut Jüyin people. Their chiefs, because the Tang'ut Jüyin had revolted,
established connections with the Yeh-la tu Jüyin, the Mu-tien Jüyin, the Mien Jüyin, the Hou-tien Jüyin, and others and all revolted. The Chin sent troops to pacify them. The Jüyin people scattered and went over to the Mongols. Here it is specifically the Tang'ut Jüyin, who apparently comprised a major portion of the Jüyin peoples, who are made the leaders of the revolt. But whatever its immediate causes, the uprising led to the Chin court's loss of control over several pivotal and strategically located groupings on its frontiers.

It was apparently in response to the Jüyin uprising that the Chin court attempted a coup against the Tenduc Onggüt, who had long maintained a good relationship with Cinggis-qan without, as far as can be determined, openly breaking with their overlords in the capital of Chung-tu. In 1203, for example, the Tenduc Onggüt prince Alaquis-digit-quri had sent his representative Asan to Cinggis with a gift of sables and squirrels, and later that same year he undertook to warn the Mongol ruler against the plans of his rival, Tayang-qan of the Naiman, who had sought unsuccessfully to establish an alliance with Alaquis. As a result Alaquis was recognized as one of the chiliarchs of the Mongol empire, heading a chiliarchy of some 5,000 of his Onggüt, at the time of the great reorganization accompanying Cinggis-qan's election to supreme power in 1206. Moreover, in the list of chiliarchs contained in the Secret History the Onggüt prince is called son-in-law (guregen), indicating the first of a long series of dynastic alliances between the Onggüt princes of Tenduc and the Mongol ruling house. With the uprising of 1207 the Chin court could no longer afford to tolerate such a close relationship between the Onggüt and Cinggis-qan and undertook direct action to shape events in its interest.

The fullest account of the Chin coup against the Onggüt is contained in the Ta Chin kuo-chih:

Also formerly there was those Tatars neighboring Chin boundaries. Their chief was established as prince of Pei-p'ing. He was killed. His younger brother succeeded him and was established as prince. The elder brother's son was Po-ssu-p'o and was just two years old. The Great Chin took him up and brought him to the capital. He was brought up in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui. In the spring of ting-mao, the seventh year of T'ai-ho of Chang-tsung, the younger brother of the former prince of Pei-p'ing presented tribute at Huan-chou. The Chin took advantage of his carelessness and killed him while he was drunk. They reestablished Po-ssu-p'o as prince and sent him back to his country. Before, when Po-ssu-p'o was in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui, he had seen Hei-shui's daughter and liked her. At this point he wished to marry her. The capital did not allow it. Po-ssu-p'o was grieved and angry and revolted and went over to the Mongols. They were all the stronger because of this and gradually brought under their control the lands of the various peoples. They consequently mobilized troops to attack Ho-hsi and the people of Ho-hsi were crushed by them. They got a false imperial princess of the Hsi ruling house and departed. The Hsi people, on the other hand, served them as tributaries.

A textual note then adds that this account refers to the "White Tatars" or Onggüt.
The information in the *Ta Chin kuo-ohih* is supplemented by other sources. From the Persian historian Rashīd-ad-Dīn we learn that the younger brother of the prince of Pei-p'ing killed by the Chin was Alaqus-digit-quri:

The leader (*moqaddam*) and amir of the Onggiit during the time of Cinggis-qan was a person whom they called Alaqus-digit-quri... He secretly had partiality and inclination towards Cinggis-qan... When Cinggis-qan made an attempt upon China Alaqus-digit harbored a grudge against the Altan-qan [of Chin] and therefore yielded Cinggis-qan entry [through the frontier walls]. For this reason Cinggis-qan showed great favor to Alaqus and ordered that a daughter be given him. Alaqūs said: "I am old but I had a brother, Binui by name, who was ruler (*pādişah*). When he died the Altan-qan of China took his son, Śenkui by name, to China as a hostage. Perhaps you should give this daughter to that one so that it may be that he will come. Cinggis-qan instructed that it would be possible. Alaqus-digit sent a message secretly to his nephew that he would come. He came and when he had reached Kenduk [i.e., Tenduc], which was near to that place, the amirs of his uncle and father sent a message to him saying: "It is not advisable for you to come since your uncle Alaqus would kill you. You keep away until we have destroyed him. Šenkui halted and the amirs of Alaqus-digit killed him. Later Šenkui arrived and entered into the service of Cinggis-qan. In Rashīd-ad-Dīn's account of the assassination of Alaqus the Po-ssu-p'o of the Chinese sources is called Šenkui, nothing more than a Persian transcription of Po-ssu-p'o's Chinese title *chen-kuo* "fortifier of the dynasty," but the description is clearly of the same events narrated in the *Ta Chin kuo-ohih.*

In Rashīd-ad-Dīn's account of the assassination of Alaqus the Po-ssu-p'o of the Chinese sources is called Šenkui, nothing more than a Persian transcription of Po-ssu-p'o's Chinese title *chen-kuo* 鎮國, "fortifier of the dynasty," but the description is clearly of the same events narrated in the *Ta Chin kuo-ohih.*

To summarize, in the spring of 1207 the Chin court, alarmed by the great Jüyin uprising that apparently took place during the earlier part of that same spring and the rapid growth of Mongol power in the steppe and probably aware of the Onggiit prince's duplicity, assassinated Alaqus-digit-quri with the active collaboration and cooperation of a faction from within his own followers. But this last-ditch effort on the part of the court in Chung-tu to regain control of the situation on its northern frontiers soon founded on the unwillingness of Alaqus-digit-quri's nephew and successor Po-ssu-p'o, alias Šenkui, to be the tool of his Chin overlords. He, too, became an ally of Cingiss-qan in that same year of 1207 when "Alaqa-beki [daughter of Cinggis-qan] was given to the Onggiit" to be the wife of Po-ssu-p'o. Thus in this one crucial year of 1207 Cinggis-qan gained control over two pivotal groupings resident in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, the so-called Jüyin peoples and the Tenduc Onggiit, and with them dominance over almost the entire frontier zone.

The Frontier Zone as Base

After 1207 the whole relationship between the steppe and China changed since it was now the Mongol qan who increasingly assumed a position of dominance and pushed his own organizational system deeper and deeper into the sedentary world just as the Chin court had formerly expanded its own influence and its frontier system far into the steppe world.

The first expression of the changed relationship was the Mongol advance against the Hsi-hsia capital in 1209-1210 but the following year the great raids against the Chin heartland began. They ended in the first Mongol siege of Chung-tu in
1214 and the subsequent removal of the Chin court south to K'ai-feng 開封 and the comparative safety of the Yellow river, an event marking the virtual abandonment of almost the entire northern portion of the Chin empire to the steppe conquerors. Most raids and campaigns of these years were mounted from or through the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, and it was Mongol possession of this strategic area, more than anything else, which forced the Chin to move their capital.65

By 1214 the conquerors felt strong enough not only to raid but also to begin a piecemeal conquest of North China with the former Chin capital of Chung-tu itself which fell in the spring of 1215 to a force comprised largely of local allies of the Mongols.66 During the years of conquest the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone continued to play a most important role.

As I have shown elsewhere,67 throughout much of its existence the Mongol empire was structured and ruled as a gigantic tribal federation. Its various provinces, including Mongol China, first emerged as little more than regional outgrowths of this great tribal structure, as branch federations of the main federation of the steppe.

To rule such branch federations certain chiliarchies of the Mongol levy were associated with various reliable local elements to form a tanma, "nomadic garrison force,"68 and stationed in or as near to the territories of the branch federation as possible. In the case of Mongol China, the tanma, organized in 1217 or 121869 under Muqali,70 was centered in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone which thereby became, and remained for almost the entire period of imperial rule, the military and organizational center of Mongol domains in China.71

But the frontier zone was more than just a physical and logistical base for Mongol power in China. Imposition of a tribal system of rule did not preclude or prevent development of bureaucratic elements as well. As time passed the utility and productiveness of local methods for governing and exploiting a given local area became all too clear for many influential Mongols. For China and other more developed portions of Mongol domains, local methods were generally local bureaucratic methods. This fact, coupled with the effects of changes taking place within Mongol society itself, soon gave rise to a gradual but definite "bureaucratization" of Mongol rule that ultimately culminated in the largely bureaucratic administrative structures of the various successor qanates after the breakup of empire.72 The process of "bureaucratization," however, created problems for the comparatively primitive Mongols who lacked adequate sources of the new kind of administrative talent within their own ranks and were forced to turn to the conquered peoples to provide the bureaucratic administrators necessary for ruling themselves. In China, the various nationalities of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, with their experience in both the pastoralism of the steppe and the sedentary traditions of China, proved culturally and politically a particularly acceptable and reliable source of talent for the conquerors. Consequently, as conquest continued inhabitants of the frontier zone performed an increasingly important function in the day-to-day administration of the areas brought under control.

Typical of the many administrators from the frontier zone in Mongol service during the early years of the empire, although in his special case the association was by reason of ancestral culture rather than of actual residence, was the Khitan Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 易律楚材 (1189-1263).73 Entering Mongol service in the aftermath of the fall of Chung-tu and the virtual collapse of Chin authority
in much of the Chin empire, he first held office as a court astrologer, in which
capacity he created a Chinese-style calendar for court use, then as state sec­
retary (bigikoi)\(^7\) for Chinese affairs in the imperial chancellery and finally
under qan Ögödei (r. 1229-1241), son and successor of Cinggis-qan, as head of
the imperial tax system for occupied China that was largely organized in accord­
ance with the Khitan's own proposals to the qan.\(^7\)

In all his various roles Yeh-liü Ch'u-ts'ai was instrumental in introducing
Chinese administrative practices and Chinese institutions among the Mongols,
thereby considerably enhancing the overall effectiveness of Mongol govern­
ment at all levels. Clearly the Khitan was one of the most important cultural medi­
ators between the Mongols and China and the early decades of Mongol rule there.
Significantly, however, the Chinese administrative practices and institutions
which Yeh-liü Ch'u-ts'ai, and many others like him, transmitted were not passed
on unchanged. Rather they reflected the particular cultural environment peciuliar
to the transmitters themselves, namely the mixed, semi-Sinified environment of
the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.\(^7\)

In conclusion the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone was very important for the
Mongols. It began as the backdrop against which the Mongol tribes of Cinggis-
qan took shape and it later became the springboard for the Mongols' conquest of
China. Finally, when the process of conquest itself was complete the people of
the frontier zone became important cultural intermediators guaranteeing rule just
as Mongol arms guaranteed conquest.

Notes

1. Mongolian names and terms are given in their Middle Mongolian forms tran­
scribed according to the system employed in Igor de Rachewiltz, Index to the
Secret History of the Mongols, Uralic and Altaic Series, v. 121 (Bloomington,
1972).

2. By Sino-Mongolian frontier zone I am referring to an area approximately
equivalent to contemporary Inner Mongolia. See map.

3. By "tribal grouping" or "tribe" I am referring to what Sahlins calls a
"chiefdom." See the discussion in Marshall D. Sahlins, "The segmentary lineage;
an organization for predatory expansion," American Anthropologist 63 (1961),
pp. 322-345.

4. For a survey of Chin history see the study by M. V. Vorov'yev, Chahuroshsheni
i Gosudaretstvo Tszin' (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

5. On the population of China at the time of the Mongol invasions see Ho Ping-
ti, "An estimate of the total population of Sung-Chin China," in F. Aubin, edi­

6. According to figures given in the Chin shih 金史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-
chü 中華書局 , 1975; henceforth CS), chuan 24, pp. 557-569, there were ap­
proximately 150,000 families or about 850,000 persons, assuming an average
family size of 5.5, registered in those parts of Hsi-ching lu 西京路 outside
the present Great Wall line and in the frontier portions of Pei-ching lu 北京路
at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feng-chou</td>
<td>22,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching-chou</td>
<td>5,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huan-chou</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of persons inhabiting those portions of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone controlled by the Tangut of Hsi-hsia is not known with certainty, but if population densities in the Hsi-hsia border areas were approximately the same as those in Chin domains, about 20,000-30,000 families or 110,000 to 165,000 persons lived in the Hsi-hsia portions of the frontier zone. We may thus estimate the total registered population of the frontier zone to have been about one million at the turn of the thirteenth century.

7. On the basis of Chin population registration see Ho, op. cit. That tribal population was generally not included in the 1207 canvass (the basis of the CS figures) is clear from such things as the low total (578 families) for Huan-chou, an area known to have a large Khitan, i.e., tribal, population. The so-called Minggan-muke census of 1187 recorded a total of some 127,544 persons within the jurisdictions of the Juyin units (see the discussion in Ho) and it is unlikely that any of these appear in the figures from the 1207 canvass.

8. This figure for 1957 is from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, People's Republic of China: Atlas (Washington, 1971), p. 37. It is an estimate based on the results of the 1953 census. Ho, p. 51 gives a total population of about 110,000,000 for China in 1200.


13. On Ming attitudes towards their northern frontiers see the discussion in Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government; The Evolution of Dual Capitals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 86 ff. and passim. However, to a large extent, the growth in the number of cultivators in Inner Mongolia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was more a reflection of growing Manchu rather than Ming influence. On this period see Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942).


17. On the Juyin peoples see Wang Kuo-wei, "Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih chih

19. Under the Chin there were four chao-t'ao shih, each assigned the duty of subduing rebels and resisting external assault in a given jurisdiction.

20. These events are recounted in the following terms in the Secret History (ahuan 134): "Cinggis-qahan and To'oril, the two of them, went to meet Ongging-cingsang saying that they had killed Megiijin-se'ulte. Ongging-cingsang, rejoicing greatly after he had learned that it had turned out that they had killed Megiijin-se'ulte, when he gave the title ja'ut-quri to Cinggis-qahan he then gave the title ong to To'oril of the Kereyid. The title ong-qan thus arose from Ongging-cingsang's title giving. When Ongging-cingsang spoke he said: 'Your attacking and killing of Megiijin-se'ulte has been a very great assistance to the Altan-qan. I wish to report to Altan-qan this assistance of yours. The enhancement of the title greater than this for Cinggis-qahan, the giving of the title jeutaub chao-t'ao to him, Altan-qan must see to.' After that Ongging-cingsang immediately returned, rejoicing. Cinggis-qahan and the Ong-qan, the two of them, having made captive, divided and carried off the Tatar together, returned to their yurts and camped." The Ongging-cingsang, or Wan-yen ch'eng-hsiang, the Chin official in charge of frontier operations during the campaigns against the Tartar. On the campaigns themselves see the discussion in Wang Kuo-wei, "Ta-ta k'ao" in his Meng-ku shih-liao ssu chung (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1962), henceforth Wang 1961, pp. 584-600.


26. The Qüjin uprising of 1207, discussed below, was only one of many similar revolts. In 1201, for example, the Khitan Yeh-t'ui Te-shou led his people, numbering several myriads, against the Chin overlords who mobilized an even larger force in suppressing the rebellion (see Yu-wen Mou-chao, Ta Chin kuo-chih, Kuo-hsiieh wen-k'u, henceforth TCKC, chuan 20, p. 14). See also Wang 1961, pp. 581 ff. for a recitation and discussion on Chin involvements on and beyond its northern frontiers.


30. The Ta Chin kuo-shih purports to be a private history written by the Jūrced scholar Yu-wen Mou-chao and presented to the Chin court shortly before the fall of the dynasty. In its present form, however, the work is clearly a product of the period after the fall of K'ai-feng to the Mongols in 1234. Whatever the history of the text, the Ta Chin kuo-shih contains much useful material on the rise of the Mongols and the last years of Chin rule, much of its information drawn from sources now lost.

31. On the equivalency of chiu and the Jūyin of the Secret History see the discussion in Wang 1927.

32. Fan has two meanings in texts of the period. One is simple "barbarian tribes" but the other is specifically "Tang'ut barbarian tribes." The word is possibly used here in its second sense, probably in reference to Tang'ut allies of the Chin not included among the Jūyin.

33. TCKC, chuan 21, pp. 22-23.

34. The Meng-Ta pei-lu is an account of a Sung mission to the Mongols of 1220 composed the following year by one Chao Hung 趙珙, a member of the mission.

35. On the Chin frontier walls see above and note 9.

36. The character tu which means, among other things, "chief," may be interpreted here to mean that this Jūyin had a controlling role with respect to the others. The Yeh-la, incidentally, were the former royal lineage of the Khitan.


39. This name possibly represents the Islamic Hasan.

40. Secret History, chuan 182. All citations of the Secret History, henceforth SH, are to the de Rachewiltz edition in de Rachewiltz, op. cit.

41. SH, chuan 190. See also the account of these events in the YWL, chuan 23, p. 20, and in Rashíd-ad-Din's Jamʿ al-Tawārikh, edited by A. A. Romaskevicha, A. A. Khetagurova and A. A. Ali-zade (Moscow, 1968), henceforth JAT, p. 309.

42. On the significance of the chiliarchy and the chiliarch for the early Mongol empire see the discussion in Buell 1977, loc. cit.

43. SH, 202. Note the variable size of a "chiliarchy."

44. The history of the marriage alliances between the house of Alaquis and that of Cinggis-qan is complicated. See the detailed discussion in Buell 1977, pp. 45 ff.

45. "Tatar" was used in texts of the period in reference to a variety of Altaic-speaking peoples. These "Tatar," of course, were Önggüt.

46. For the Huan-chou of the text read Huan-chou 漢州, the more common form of this place name.

47. To distinguish between the various "Tatar" the Önggüt were sometimes called "White Tatar" and the Mongols and their like "Black Tatar."
48. Chou and chün were obsolete administrative units. They are used here simply in the sense of "territories."

49. The we 爲, "false," of the text implies the illegitimacy of the Hsihsia ruling house.

50. TCKC, chuan 22, pp. 27-28. An almost identical account is found in Li Hsin-ch'uan 李 心傳 Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao yeh ts'ao-chi 建元以来朝野雜記 collection B (i-chi 乙集), Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng 政書提要 (Shanghai, 1936), chuan 19, pp. 591-592, except that there the younger brother is made the murderer of the elder brother, whose name is given as She-shu, and the date of the murder is given as 1190. None of this additional information conflicts directly with the testimony of the TCKC or that of other sources with the exception of the name assigned the elder brother, given as Binui in the JAT, p. 310. Quite likely, however, She-shu is not a name but a title since the younger brother, whom we know to have been Alaqus, is also called She-shu in Li Hsin-ch'uan's version of the events.

51. See note 47.

52. TCKC, chuan 22, pp. 27-28.

53. In Rashid-ad-Din's usage an amir was usually a chiliarch or some such similar potentate.

54. This was the Mongolian name for the Chin ruler. On altan, "golden, imperial," see Henry Serruys, "Mongol altan 'gold' = 'imperial,'" Monumenta Serica 21 (1962), pp. 357-378.

55. In Rashid-ad-Din the Önggüt are made guardians of the frontier walls for the Chin and their name is connected with a hypothetical Önggüt, "frontier wall." See the discussion in Doerfer, pp. 152-153. In fact, this conception is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of Chin frontier defenses at that time which nowhere had the solidity or completeness of the Great Wall of Ming times, for example. Nonetheless the tradition does do justice to the strategic importance of the Önggüt whose territories could be an important base for nomadic assault or a first line of defense against nomadic incursions. The campaign mentioned here, however, was not directed against the Altan-qan of Chin but against Hsi-hsia, first raided by the Mongols on a large scale in 1205. For a history of Mongol raids and wars against Hsi-hsia see Ye.I. Kychanov, "Mongolo-Tangutskiye voiny i gibel' gosudarstva Si Sya," Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1977), pp. 46-61.

56. Note the careful distinction made between Alaqus' position among the Önggüt and that of his elder brother Binui. Quite probably Rashid-ad-Din's informant did not recognize Alaqus as legitimate ruler of the Önggüt.

57. The manuscript tradition favors "Kenduk" but this is clearly an error for Tenduc.

58. Something has fallen out of the text at this point since the "place" in question is not named. Reference is probably to some other Önggüt city where Alaqus had his (seasonal?) residence at that time.

59. JAT, pp. 308-310.

60. This is the title under which Po-ssu-p'o occurs in the YS (chuan 118, p. 2924) and the YWL, chuan 23, p. 21.

61. The date of the Juyin uprising is not given exactly and our sources only record that it was in the year after 1206. Most Juyin elements, if not all, however, were exclusively pastoral and it was easiest for pastoralists to go on campaign during the slack season of late autumn and winter when work was light and reserves of food readily available. The spring, on the other hand, was lambing time, demanded intensive labor and was a period of tight food supplies
and frequent famine. If the Juyin people were mobilized in 1206 it was most likely during the autumn and their demobilization probably took place during the early spring of the following year, in time for lambing. Their revolt must have taken place at about the same time, when environmental pressures were greatest.

62. SH, p. 239.
63. See the discussion in Buell 1977, loc. cit.
64. On the Mongol campaign of 1209-1210 against Hsi-hsia see Kychanov, op. cit.
68. See the detailed discussion of the tarma as an institution in Buell 1979.
69. There are two dating traditions, a Mongolian and a Chinese. It is uncertain which is correct.
70. On Mubali see his YS biography in YS, chuan 119, pp. 2929-2936.
71. On the organization and history of the China tarma see Buell 1979.
72. See the detailed discussion of this thesis in Buell 1977.
75. For a discussion of this tax system and the role of the Khitan minister in its creation and administration see Buell 1977, pp. 82 ff.
76. See the detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Buell 1977.