When examining the panorama of Central Asian history after 1000 A.D., it quickly becomes evident that the histories of Mongolia and Tibet are significantly intertwined. Both nations have been faced with the unending task of preserving their unique cultures in the shadow of the Chinese giant, and both have been remarkably successful up until the modern era.\(^1\) Sharing a common problem with a common protagonist, Mongolia and Tibet have often joined forces—usually in the form of Mongol political and military might interlocked with Tibetan cultural and religious dynamism—for their mutual as well as particular self-interests.

This examination of the "Mongol protectorate" in Tibet during the mid-seventeenth century is an effort to place this experience within the repeated pattern of Mongolian-Tibetan relations. Always on the horizon is China, so this study must also concern itself with the catalytic role played by concurrent events in the Middle Kingdom. This does not mean, however, that Mongolia and Tibet created their foreign policies solely in reaction to Chinese stimuli. On the contrary, much of the evidence reveals that Mongolian and Tibetan internal politics determined the ultimate direction of their special relationship.

To understand the nature of the special relationship forged between Mongolia and Tibet during the seventeenth century, one must look first at alliances established by Qubilai Qan and the 'Phags-pa Lama and by Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama. In addition, examining the unique example of Mongol-Tibetan cooperation in the person of the Fourth Dalai Lama is vital to comprehend the subsequent events of the seventeenth century in Central Asia. After briefly discussing these three historical precedents, we can then turn in more detail to the establishment and functioning of Gushi Qan's Mongol protectorate in Tibet and partnership with the Fifth Dalai Lama in the 1600s.

**Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama**

Although hit by the shock wave of the Tanguts' defeat at the hands of Chingis Qan in 1207, the Tibetans themselves did not have to contend with the Mongol armies until 1240 when Prince Köden sent a military force from his Kokonor base into Tibet proper as part of the Mongol strategy to outflank the Sung armies. Faced with the sacking and burning of monasteries north of Lhasa, the Tibetans sent the abbot of the Sa-skya sect to negotiate with the Mongol prince. The parties agreed that Tibet would acknowledge Mongolian suzerainty and pay a fixed tribute, and that the Sa-skya leader should become the Mongol representative in Tibet. The Mongols sent tax collectors to supervise the payment of tribute, while the Sa-skya Pandita remained in Köden's camp as a well-treated hostage.
An insurrection by the Tibetan nobility in 1251 was suppressed by Mongol troops, thus ending effective Tibetan armed resistance to Mongol arms. The Sa-skya Pandita's nephew, 'Phags-pa Blo-gros (1235-80), grew up as a hostage and was educated at Prince Koden's Kokonor court, assuming his uncle's place as abbot of Sa-skya in 1251. The newly enthroned Mongol emperor Qubilai, who had met 'Phags-pa Blo-gros in the Koden court years before, made the 'Phags-pa Lama his "national mentor," in 1260. At the Mongol imperial court the 'Phags-pa Lama devised a Tibetan-derived script for the Mongol language and propagated Buddhism among the Mongol nobility. Qubilai bestowed upon him another title, "imperial mentor," and patronized the Sa-skya sect in its power struggles with other Buddhist schools in Tibet.

The Sa-skya sect needed Mongol military assistance to maintain its dominance over rival sects contending for power in Tibet. Like the protectorate of Korea, Tibet proper was never occupied by Mongol troops. Rather, the Mongol army would come in to aid the Sa-skya in specific crises, such as the rebellion at the 'Bri-gung monastery in 1290. The Mongols set up a native government in Tibet to watch out for their interests and to maintain control of internal affairs—a policy the Mongols were to use in many places throughout their empire.

Significantly, the Sa-skya school customarily divided power between the spiritual leader or abbot, e.g. 'Phags-pa, and the secular authority or regent known as the Dpon-chen, e.g. the 'Phags-pa's brother. In theory these two were equal in rank with two distinct functions. The Tibetans took this theory and applied it to the relationship they had just formed with the Mongols. Thus the 'Phags-pa Lama was the spiritual leader of the Mongol empire, and Qubilai or any Mongol emperor was the temporal regent, sharing power equally. In reality, Qubilai and the Mongols saw themselves firmly in control over the entire empire. Nevertheless, the fiction of the spiritual equality of the Sa-skya abbot fit their purposes as rulers over vast populations in East Asia which adhered to one school or another of Buddhism. To be sure, members of the Mongol nobility were committed converts to the Buddhist faith, but the shamanistic Mongols throughout the Yuan court saw significant political gains in maintaining the theory of a Tibetan Buddhist sharing power and thus lending legitimacy to the non-native Yuan government in China. The Mongols did appoint their own Mongol damgaahi with nominal authority over the Sa-skya Dpon-chen to supervise Tibetan governmental affairs. However, the Tibetan Dpon-chen in point of fact governed Tibet for the Mongols instead of his theoretical superior, the Mongol damgaahi.

Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama

With the weakening of Mongol control in China and Inner Asia, reaction set in against foreign domination and the Mongol-allied Sa-skya sect. Rival sects assumed power in Tibet and the Sa-skya, without strong Mongol military support available, lost their position of control. However, the relationship between Qubilai's court and the Sa-skya was to be the model for Altan Qan of the Tumed and Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho, the Third Dalai Lama, at their famous meeting in 1578.

The participants in this new drama were quite different from those of two centuries earlier. The Mongols had lost their empire and been replaced in China by a native dynasty, the Ming. The tribes on the Mongolian steppe, while still an effective military power, were disunited and at war with each other more than
with the Ming enemy. In Tibet, the Sa-skya had declined in political power and was no longer an important force in national politics. Power now lay with the Rin-spungs-pa of Gtsang, who patronized the Karma-pa sect. In the early fifteenth century the reformed Dge-lugs-pa sect, often referred to as the Yellow Hats, was founded by Btsong-kha-pa. By the time of Altan Qan this sect, imbued with evangelistic and political spirit, was competing with the Karma-pa and the many other sects in Tibet for religious and political supremacy. There were military clashes between Dge-lugs-pa and Karma-pa adherents, until with the rise of the kings of Gtsang, Dge-lugs-pa lamas were circumscribed in their activities.

The Tibetan sects of the late sixteenth century were different, yet the antagonism and competition found then was very reminiscent of the situation in Tibet prior to the first Mongol intervention in 1240, and the fundamental problems encountered by Tibet and Mongolia were remarkably similar. In Tibet religious factions struggled for political power, but no sect was sufficiently strong to vanquish its opponents. Concurrently, on the Mongolian steppe various claimants for power still faced the key question of legitimacy. Altan Qan in the latter part of the 1600s sought to reassert the supremacy of the Eastern Mongols over the Qirad or Western Mongols, claiming that he was the legitimate successor of the Chingissids. He, with his grand-nephew Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji of the Ordos, had extended their power over most of Mongolia. Still contentious rivals threatened the establishment of a unified state.

It is recorded in the Erdeni-yin Tobohi that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji invaded Tibet in 1566, sending messengers to the heads of various monasteries "offering to accept their religion if they submitted and threatening to treat them as enemies if they did not." This incident can be interpreted as a raid for empire-building or perhaps a scouting expedition at Altan Qan's behest.

Why Altan Qan invited the Dge-lugs-pa leader, Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho, to Mongolia is not clearly understood. Traditional Buddhist histories credit this event to Altan Qan's conversion to that religion in 1571. The qan's first invitation to the Dge-lugs-pa head in 1574 was declined. Two years later Sagang Secen indicates that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji visited Altan Qan and reminded him that "for the well-being of this and the future life," religion was necessary. Mention was made of following the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama. Therefore a second embassy was sent to the Dge-lugs-pa Lama which he accepted. At the meeting between these two men in Mongolia in the summer of 1576 titles were exchanged, i.e. Altan Qan conferred the title Dalai Lama on Bsod-nams Rgya-rtsho, and the conscious emulation of the Qubilai-'Phags-pa Lama precedent was emphasized. Zahiruddin Ahmad has compared the account of Sagang Secen and Altan Qan. Sagang Secen states that Bods-nams Rgya-mtsho claimed that Altan Qan and he were reincarnations of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama. These sources appear to reveal Altan Qan's motivations for the invitation to the Third Dalai Lama. Altan Qan and his grand nephew, Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji, were seeking to prove their right to re-establish the Mongol empire, for if the 'Phags-pa Lama had been reborn in the Third Dalai Lama, Altan Qan then was the reincarnation of Qubilai. As for Bsod-nams Rgya-rtsho's motivations for accepting the invitation, surely missionary zeal was a factor, but the political
realities of the Tibetan scene lead me to conclude that he wanted to attract a Mongol patron to guarantee his own success at home.

The "alliance" created by Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama drew the Mongols directly into the religious politics of Tibet and likewise expanded the religious struggle between the Dge-lugs-pa and the Karma-pa sects into the new arena of Mongolia. Because his patron, Altan Qan, had died in 1582, the Third Dalai Lama visited Mongolia a second time to strengthen his ties with other members of the nobility as well as to propagate the faith. Upon the death of the Third Dalai Lama in 1588, the Chahar princes, who had been converted to the Dge-lugs-pa sect and retained their Tibetan contacts, found it politically expedient to have the Dalai Lama line reincarnated in the family of Altan Qan.

The Fourth Dalai Lama

The Fourth Dalai Lama, Yon-tan Rgya-mtsho, was Altan Qan's great-grandson. Born February 15, 1589 in Kokonor, he was confirmed in his selection by a large Tibetan contingent of Dge-lugs-pa monks who traveled to Mongolia and met with the Chahar Mongol princes to strike a blatantly political deal. The Fourth Dalai Lama remained in Mongolia until he was about twelve years old. During his brief reign (d. 1617), he traveled around central Tibet to gain support for the Dge-lugs-pa. However, warfare again broke out in the Dbus region in 1612 and by 1616 Gtsang forces had occupied the whole territory of Skyid-sod and large sections of Dbus in central Tibet.

The brief and rather unsuccessful reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama was especially important as a political model, because it represented the ultimate mesh of the \( ' \text{Phags-pa Lama-Qubilai relationship.} \) The Mongol representative or regent, if you will, was in the person of an individual who at the same time was the head of Tibetan and Mongol spiritual and political power. Nevertheless, the Fourth Dalai Lama never claimed temporal authority over Mongolia, even though as a member of the Altan Qan family he could theoretically do so.

We already noted the gap between reality and theory during imperial times. Then theory held that the Tibetan \( ' \text{Phags-pa Lama was the spiritual leader of the empire, but in practice the Mongols never shared any power, not even spiritual power.} \) During the reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama, theory presupposed Mongol predominance in the new alliance. But there was no empire left and Mongol disunity on the steppe precluded any temporal power for the Fourth Dalai Lama in Mongolia. Furthermore, in Tibet the Dge-lugs-pa sect and its Mongol patrons did not have the power to ensure the Fourth Dalai Lama's spiritual, let alone temporal, ascendancy.

The failure of the Chahars to successfully support militarily the Dge-lugs-pa was evidenced by the king of Gtsang, a Karma-pa supporter, attacking Lhasa and expelling the Mongols in 1605. The failure of the Tibetan-Chahar alliance was due in large measure to the strategic problems of military support from Chahar to Lhasa in the face of less than effective control of the intervening Mongolian steppe. For both Mongolia and Tibet, the fusion of their powers in the person of one ruler with temporal and spiritual authority in both nations just did not prove workable in the temporal realm, and they could see that the alliance was mutually unprofitable. Notwithstanding, because of the continued ascendancy of rival Western Mongol tribes, the Chahars, now led by Ligdan Qan,
were still faced with the problem of legitimizing their claim as heirs to Qubilai's empire. In addition, they needed an ally to outflank their Oirad enemies, and thus they kept hoping for an alliance with some Tibetan sect.

Disappointed by the experience of the Fourth Dalai Lama and sensitive to the realities of the 1610s, various Eastern Mongol princes sent out invitations and presents to the Karma-pa sect, then in ascendancy. Even so, a grand-nephew of Altan Qan, who in 1610 extended a feeler toward the Karma-pa, came to the aid of the Dge-lugs-pa in Dbus in 1621, according to the *Annals of Kokonor*.

The 1620s and early 1630s in Mongolia and Tibet were hectic years. The Dge-lugs-pa were challenged by the new king of Gtsang, who ascended to the throne in 1621, in central Tibet while the king of Beri, a Bon follower, was persecuting all Buddhist lamas in his land. On the Mongolian steppe Ligdan Qan's dream of empire dissolved. His one staunch ally, Tsoghtu Taiji of the Khalkhas, remained with him until the end and finally by the 1630s was driven out by other Khalkha tribes to the Kokonor region. This was also the period of the dissolution of Ming power in China and the rise of the Manchus to the northeast. The Ming, which had even extended an invitation to the Fourth Dalai Lama to visit Peking, had always exhibited a watchful eye over events in Tibet while playing a key role in Mongol steppe politics. During these years, however, its own internal difficulties prevented the dynasty from exercising effective control in the border areas.

**Gushi Qan and the Fifth Dalai Lama**

Tsoghtu Taiji had seized Dge-lugs-pa's ally Qorchi of the Tumed in Kokonor and established his own power base there. He apparently made some type of alliance with the powerful king of Gtsang and was forcefully attacking the Dge-lugs-pa in Kokonor. He even urged Ligdan Qan to join him in this area, likely to conduct a joint campaign in Tibet with the king of Gtsang. However, shortly after his arrival in 1634, Ligdan Qan died suddenly.

In that same year the *Annals of Kokonor* record that the Dge-lugs-pa requested from La-mo Chos-skong an oracle. The oracle predicted that "a northern leader, one with a sash having snake designs, will be able to conquer the enemy." With this oracle in mind, they sent representatives to the Chahar, Oirad-Qoshod, and the Dzungars. The latter group was based in Tarbagatai under Qaraqula, usually known by his title Baatur Qung Taiji, and had been successfully conquering other Oirad tribes in the area. The Chahars were contacted because of the ties created between Mongolia and Tibet by the Third and Fourth Dalai Lamas. The Oirad-Qoshod tribes were approached because they represented the rising political forces in Kokonor who were friendly to the Dge-lugs-pa sect's interests.

Gushi Qan of the Qoshod responded to the plea for help and thus was associated with the leader mentioned in the oracle. He, together with Baatur Qung Taiji of the Dzungars and Úrlük of the Törgöö, had by the following year concluded a pact with the Dge-lugs-pa. In response to this new alliance, Karma-pa and the king of Gtsang sought aid from Tsoghtu Taiji. Tsoghtu Taiji sent his son Arslan with 10,000 soldiers "to persecute the high lamas of the Dge-lam-pa in Dbus and Gtsang and to destroy monasteries, religious schools, and places of meditation." The *Annals of Kokonor* state that Gushi Qan in the guise of a pilgrim proceeded to Tibet to intercept Arslan. At this conference which is
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not mentioned by the Fifth Dalai Lama in his autobiography. Arslan had a change of heart about the Dge-lugs-pa, so the Mongol prince returned to his home base. If in fact he did confer with Gushi Qan before entering Tibet, Gushi Qan likely offered him political concessions for the betrayal of his father's cause. Arslan thereupon journeyed 700 miles to Tengri Nor. The Karma-pa, unsure of his intentions, chose to flee rather than to resist Arslan's entrance into Lhasa. Arslan divided his army into three wings and at Yar-'brog, located between Dbus and Gtsang, he fought a successful battle with a Gtsang army.

In Lhasa Arslan met with the Fifth Dalai Lama in what was the Fifth Dalai Lama's (1617-1682) first major initiative in foreign policy. The king of Gtsang sent another army to Tengri Nor and Arslan's army returned to do battle. Legend says that Arslan was driven crazy by magic practiced by the Gtsang people so the Mongol army delayed fighting. Arslan's minister Tha'i-chin and a Karma-pa representative sent with the knowledge of the king of Gtsang a messenger to Tsoghtu Taiji at Kokonor detailing Arslan's disobedience to his father's wishes. Consequently, Tsoghtu Taiji ordered his son killed. The order was swiftly carried out, and the Khalkha army apparently returned to Kokonor.

Gushi Qan's attack on Tsoghtu Taiji in his home region was a military necessity to prevent his rival from entering and completely subjugating Tibet. Shakabpa sees Gushi's alliance with Baatur Qung Taiji in the campaign as a consequence of Gushi's lack of troops. In any case, the result was complete success from Gushi Qan's viewpoint. He had eliminated a major rival in Kokonor and prevented Tibetan politics from being dominated by an antagonistic coalition opposed to him and the Dge-lugs-pa. Tibet itself, although wasted somewhat by the war, was not controlled by the Karma-pa sect and its agent the king of Gtsang, even though these parties remained powerful.

Gushi Qan then traveled to Lhasa to meet with the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1637-8. Titles were exchanged, harkening back to the Qubilai-'Phags-pa Lama relationship. According to the Tibetan sources, the new allies first sent out a diplomatic feeler to the Manchus in the Mukden court of the Ch'ung-te Emperor (1636-44) in late November 1637. At about the same time the king of Gtsang also sent a missive to Mukden with his plea for recognition or alliance. The texts of the Manchu emperor's reply to the two requests are presented below:

To the king of Gtsang:
"Your letter (to Us) speaks of the blessings brought to Our Country by the religion of the Buddha. We are sending an envoy bearing a letter. We have recently heard that you have suffered defeat at the hands of Gushi, Beile of the Oelot, but We do not know the details of it. We are consequently sending you this letter bidding you henceforth to devote yourself unceasingly to good works. Whatever you may stand in need of We ought to send you. We now bestow on you one hundred taels of silver and three pieces of gold brocade."
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To Gushi Qan:
"We hear that some have heen guilty of disobedience and rebellion against the religion (of the Buddha), but you have already re-established order. We reflect that from the time when the ancient Holy Kings established government, the religion of the Buddha has endured without interruption. Now We wish to show Our great respect for the Eminent Sages among the Tibetans, so We are sending envoys with the Ilakviksan Hutuketu to all alike, regardless of the colour of their robes, whether they be red or yellow, seeking everywhere for the religion of the Buddha for the protection of the Empire. This you should know. We are sending you with this letter a complete suit of armour."29

The two letters quite obviously differ in tone. The letter and large gifts to the king of Gtsang indicate Mukden's support.30 The Manchus indicate they are up-to-date on the military situation in Tibet. The pro-Gtsang attitude is perhaps best explained as a divisive strategem and an anti-Oirat measure. Gushi Qan and his Dzungar ally Baatur Qung Taiji rivaled the Manchus for the loyalties of the Eastern Mongols. It is natural, therefore, that the Manchus should not sanction their rivals' increasing domination over Tibet.

In 1639 Gushi Qan gained further temporal power in Tibet with his successful eighteen-month campaign against the king of Beri in Khams. The Fifth Dalai Lama in his autobiography writes that he sent a message to Gushi Qan to subdue Beri and then return to his own country.31 When Gushi Qan approached central Tibet in 1641, the Fifth Dalai Lama maneuvered unsuccessfully for him to return to Kokonor. Gushi Qan fought a major battle with the son of the king of Gtsang, and the victorious Mongols proceeded to take over all of Gtsang, capture its king and sew him up in leather to die. The Fifth Dalai Lama further relates that he attempted to stop the fighting through negotiation via the Panchen Lama, because he was afraid the ruler of Gtsang could perhaps defeat Gushi Qan and thus destroy the Dge-lugs-pa.32 But the Dalai Lama's chief attendant Bsod-nams Chos-'phel worked to thwart any possible negotiations and actually joined Gushi Qan's forces, providing them with food and supplies. In a final great battle in early 1642 the Gtsang capital Shigatse and the Karma-pa monastery Tashizilnon were captured together with the entire royal family of Gtsang.

Gushi Qan thereupon invited the Dalai Lama to Shigatse where, with the latter's sanction, he "ascended the throne of Tibet with dignity and grandeur" in an elaborate ceremony on April 13, 1642.33 In a hall with three thrones Gushi Qan and Bsod-nams Chos-'phel sat a little lower than the Dge-lugs-pa hierarch. Gushi Qan presented a series of offerings to the Dalai Lama, one invoking Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama.

The Mongol-Tibetan relationship thus created harked back to the model of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama, the same model which had inspired Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama. The alternative model exemplified by the Fourth Dalai Lama was rejected. Also during this time Bsod-nams Chos-'phel was installed as regent, sde-srid, to handle civil administration, with functions similar to the Dpon-chen of Mongol imperial days. This regent was the Mongol-supported administrator for the still young Fifth Dalai Lama. It was not the custom of the Dge-lugs-pa school to divide authority between a spiritual leader or abbot and secular regent, as was the Sa-skya practice. However, Gushi Qan in 1642 created such a division of power by invoking the precedent employed by the Sa-skya.
In 1642 not only did Gushi Qan control the Fifth Dalai Lama, but even the "Great Fifth's" chief minister Bsod-nams Chos-'phel had actual temporal authority over him. Nevertheless, the Fifth Dalai Lama's spiritual supremacy over the two others was never questioned. From the political point of view, this relationship favored the Qoshod Mongols. Gushi Qan, while in fact holding the reins of political power in Tibet, did not govern Tibet as part of his empire. This is why Tucci has correctly called Gushi Qan "une sorte de protecteur du Tibet." Following the example of Qubilai Qan, Gushi Qan had in effect enfeoffed the Dalai Lama and his sde-srid to rule Tibet as they pleased, so long as their actions did not conflict with Gushi's interests. Until his death in 1654, Gushi spent most of his time not in Lhasa but on the steppe north of Lake Tengri or in Kokonor, wrapped up in Mongol internal politics. It is incorrect to maintain that Gushi Qan gave Tibet to the Dalai Lama. Rather, this formal act must be viewed from the traditional Mongol practice of enfeoffment which is a quid pro quo relationship subject to revocation.

This approach to the relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushi Qan underlines the difficult position the Tibetan leader faced in 1642. The Fifth Dalai Lama's greatness lay not in the fact that he re-established a strong tie with the Mongols—because he actually had little to do with delineating the nature of this relationship and was himself controlled by his own regent—but rather in the manner in which he used the theory of his spiritual superiority to gain real political power after Gushi Qan's death.

Conclusion

This has been a study of the special relationship between Mongolia and Tibet during the seventeenth century. The nature of the relationship created in 1642 by Gushi Qan and the Fifth Dalai Lama ultimately resulted in a Dge-lugs-pa government in Tibet with temporal and spiritual authority that remained in power until the Communist Chinese conquest. This relationship can, however, only be understood by examining the two models for alliance known to both nations—the first established by Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama and the second established by the Fourth Dalai Lama and the Chahars. The first model proved successful for both parties but collapsed with the waning of Mongol imperial power. This fact in itself speaks for the predominance of the Mongols in the relationship. The second model, which attempted to fuse a spiritual and temporal leader into one Mongol person—the Fourth Dalai Lama—was neither very successful nor enduring. This was because the Mongols could not sustain the military obligations of the relationship and force Tibet to accept their agents, the Dge-lugs-pa.

Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama had sought to revive the first model, but Altan's death brought a quick end to that attempt. When Gushi Qan and the Fifth Dalai Lama again reached back to the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama, they consciously were rejecting the experiment attempted via the Fourth Dalai Lama.

Throughout its history, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship was always much more profitable politically for Tibet, even though the Mongols held military superiority. In striking contrast to the fate of the Sa-skya sect is the Dge-lugs-pa school's success in acquiring temporal power in Tibet in the face of the dissolution of Mongol military might. When Mongol power ebbed during the imperial
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period, the Sa-skya in turn lost control over the Tibetan political scene. The Dge-lugs-pa sect, on the other hand, masterfully entrenched itself so well in Tibet that when a power vacuum was created, it could step in. Thus the Dge-lugs-pa school, led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, used the Mongol-Tibetan connection to create a strong theocracy modeled on the precedent of the Fourth Dalai Lama but personified this time by a leader of Tibetan blood. This theocracy survived not only the breakup of the special relationship developed with the Mongols, but even withstood later political crises with the Chinese, Indians, and British. Meanwhile in Mongolia the institution of the Jebtsundamba Qutughtu grew to fill the spiritual loss incurred by the breakup of the seventeenth-century Mongol-Tibetan alliance while still exhibiting spiritual obeisance to the Dalai Lamas.

Notes

1. In October 1950 Tibet was invaded by Chinese Communist troops and the nation subsequently was incorporated into the People's Republic of China. Mongolia has fared somewhat better. Although "Inner Mongolia" has been broken up into three provinces within the PRC, "Outer Mongolia" has maintained its independence since 1911, although securely within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence since 1921.

2. During the Yuan period there were other uprisings in Tibet against the Sa-skya and their Mongol patrons, such as the 1290 'Bri-gung uprising. This and other skirmishes were, however, easily controlled.

3. His pro-Mongol attitude was very irritating to the Tibetan nobility which in that same year (1251) had unsuccessfully revolted against the Mongols and the Sa-skya school.


7. Op. cit., p. 88. However, Ahmad cites no sources to justify his opinion. He suggests that the Dalai Lama did not go to the Mongols on the first invitation because he feared them. Since we do not know enough about the political situation in Tibet, perhaps the Dge-lugs-pa leader was not able to travel to Mongolia safely.


10. Supposedly the Third Dalai Lama established a diplomatic outpost at Tongkhor, also known as Lusar, where representatives of both the Lama and Altan Qan would remain to channel intercourse. Tongkhor was about halfway between Lhasa and the outpost area of Chahar. The Fourth Dalai Lama on his trip to Tibet also stopped at this place. See Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 96-97.


13. In 1615 the Fourth Dalai Lama refused the invitation from the Shenzung Emperor of Ming China. "Because of his responsibilities at the Drepung and Sera monasteries, the Dalai Lama had to decline the invitation; however, he agreed to bless the temple from his monastery in Tibet, which he did by praying with his face towards China and scattering barley grain into the wind." Shakabpa, p. 99.

14. There is a certain amount of controversy in the sources about how Ligdan Qan died. Mongolian sources indicate he died of smallpox, but Tibetan accounts usually record his death as a just one at the hands of a Dge-lugs-pa champion, Gushi Qan of the Qoshod. Perhaps Tibetan accounts reflect the bitterness the Dge-lugs-pa felt over what seems to be a sudden anti-Dge-lugs-pa attitude on the part of Ligdan. However, it must be noted that there is speculation that the anti-Buddhist accusation leveled against Ligdan during his final days may have been a Ming Chinese smear against his reputation. Perhaps this issue can be better understood if Ligdan Qan's change of religious affiliation is viewed from the standpoint of political motives, since Tsogtlu Taiji, his one remaining ally, was strongly allied with Gtsang.

15. The Annals of Kokonor, p. 34.

16. Baatur Qung Taiji was the title given to him by Gushi Qan in 1637. The Chinese name is Bogatir Kontaisha; Qaraqula was also known as Khotokhotsin; see Ahmad, ibid., "Genealogical Table II: The Jungar," and Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1812) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 265-266. Tibetans use the name Gu-shri. His Chinese name was Ku-shih Han Guosi, in the Shara Tudzi, ed. N. P. Shastina, 1957, pp. 99-100.

17. This Gushi is a title derived from the Chinese t'ai-kuo-shih. Gushi Qan's given name was Töru Baiqu (Bariqu?) Guosi, in the Shara Tudzi, ed. N. P. Shastina, 1957, pp. 99-100.


21. Loc. cit. Yang identifies this place as the upper branch of the Yangtze River (note 86). For the Fifth Dalai Lama's account see Ahmad, pp. 114-115.

22. Loc. cit. The text of a similar story in the Fifth Dalai Lama's autobiography is given in Ahmad, p. 115.

23. The Annals and the Fifth Dalai Lama's autobiography differ on the order given by Tsogtlu Taiji. The Dalai Lama's account (Ahmad, p. 115) says: "Kill him by alluring him (into a trap)," while in the Annals of Kokonor, p. 36, it reads "kill him by (all) means." The Annals of Kokonor, p. 37: "Because two mountain spurs became reddened by blood, they are now known as the great and small U-lan Hosho, the red promontory.

25. Dayan Ochir Qan in Chinese is 達顏鄂齊爾汗.


27. Gushi Qan received the title Bstan-'dzin Chos-kyi-rgyal-po (The Upholder of the Teaching, the King according to the Faith; Dharmaraja in Sanskrit). In the Annals of Kokonor, p. 37 there is an alternate form of the same title: Bstan-'dzin Chos-rgyal (Religious-King-Who-Maintains-the-Teachings). Gushi bestowed upon the Dalai Lama's ministers various titles. At this time Baatur
Qung Taiji acquired this title from Gushi Qan.

28. A certain Gushi Secen Chos-rje of the Oirad tribes (sometimes mistaken for Gushi Qan—see Ahmad, p. 121 for a long discussion on this individual) was sent or he in turn sent an envoy (our sources conflict) to the Mukden court of the Ch'ung-te emperor (1636-44) in late November 1637. Problems arise because Chinese records indicate the presence of Ilaghughsan Qutughtu, who was this same Gushi Secen Chos-rje, in October 1642 (Ahmad, p. 121 quoting from the Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 大清逆朝實録). There may in fact have been two missions. Tibetan records cited by Li Tieh-tseng show that in 1637 three Khalkha ans suggested to the Manchu emperor that he send envoys to Gushi Qan, as temporal ruler of Tibet, that he send envoys to Gushi Qan, and the king of Gtsang send their responses with tribute via Ilaghughsan Qutughtu to Mukden. See Li Tieh-tseng, Tibet Today and Yesterday (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 34. See also his notes 4-6 on pp. 234-35. The Tibetan sources Li cited may have doctored the record to make it appear that the Manchus humbled themselves to the Fifth Dalai Lama and sent an invitation first. However, the accounts of Sagang Secen and the First Panchen Lama's autobiography place the diplomatic initiative in 1640. There is still no reso­lution to the problem over the 1642 date in the Chinese records.


30. The tone of the letter to Gushi Qan and the relatively simple gift bestowed on him compared to that given the king of Gtsang appear to refute Tibetan sources which detail an elaborate welcoming reception for the Ilaghughsan Qutughtu as proof of Manchu support.


33. Ahmad, p. 134. He indicates this is from the Annals of Kokonor, but this is not in Yang's translation, see p. 39.

34. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls (Rome: Libreria dello stato, 1949), vol. 1, p. 70, says of Gushi Qan's successors: "Greatly inferior to him in political wisdom and personal prestige, suspicious of one another and interested, over and beyond Tibet, in the events which were beginning to take shape in Mongolia."