Chapter 6

Tang and Korea: Expansion and Withdrawal

While the Turks, as the dominant contemporary nomad power in Mongolia, were inescapably a major concern in Chinese foreign relations until the mid-eighth century, Chinese rulers from Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty to Gaozong of the Tang dynasty were also obsessed with the conquest of Koguryŏ. They launched massive and costly military expeditions against Koguryŏ on a scale unprecedented in previous Sino-Korean relations. The wars with Koguryŏ are a prime example of the use of aggressive force as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. Although ultimately successful under Tang Gaozong in the sense that Koguryŏ was destroyed, the wars were of questionable long-term benefit to China and instead inadvertently contributed to the rise of a unified Korean state which deferred to but was essentially independent of China.

As previous scholars have shown, there were pragmatic as well as ideological reasons for the continued interest of the early Tang rulers in Korea. Pulleyblank holds that the presence of strong separatist sentiments in the Hebei region made the Tang court at Chang'an feel threatened by the possibility of close relations between Hebei and its neighbor, Koguryŏ.¹ Somers considers Tang Taizong's campaigns into the border regions of the Northeast as a necessary step for the extension of imperial rule into the North China Plain and as an important coercive measure for the full consolidation of dynastic power.² Wechsler concludes that Tang feared that Koguryŏ would unify the whole Korean peninsula, and so it wanted to keep Korea divided and prevent its alliance with other non-Chinese in eastern Manchuria and in Japan. He further suggested that Taizong, facing a crisis following the succession dispute of 643, simply wanted to be away from the court during this time.³

¹ Pulleyblank 1955, pp. 76-77.
³ Wechsler 1979, pp. 233-234.
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Korea and Northeast China ca. 650
On the other hand, ideology also played a major role. Wechsler stresses Taizong's dynastic ambitions, his insistence that Koguryō had been a part of the Chinese empire under Han and therefore had to be brought back under Chinese rule. Nishijima Sadao emphasizes more the theoretical pattern of the Chinese world order. According to him, the tribute system and the system of investiture regulating Chinese relations with the Korean states held together the East Asian world as an integrated international order, with China as suzerain at the center. Sui and Tang mounted expeditions against Koguryō in order to punish the latter when it disturbed the system, and it was China's responsibility, as well as in its interest, to maintain the orderly working of the system so as to sustain peace within the East Asian world.

Modern Korean works, understandably reflecting a Korean point of view, consider the Sui-Tang wars with Koguryō as an invasion, a stage in China's grand imperial design to achieve hegemony over all of East Asia. The wars are seen within the context of the competition for control over Southwest Manchuria and as a means to win over other non-Chinese peoples to the north and northeast of China.

Jamieson draws attention to the important role that Silla played in the Tang military campaigns against Koguryō. The three states on the Korean peninsula were often in a state of mutual enmity, with two of them sometimes forging an alliance against the third. During the early Tang period, tensions among the three grew more severe. Silla, which was the most distant from China of the three states, persisted in a pro-Tang policy because of its fierce competition with its rivals, taking the initiative to form an alliance with the Chinese and skillfully maneuvering Tang to assist it in its final unification of Korea during the latter half of the seventh century.

Taken together, much of what these earlier scholars have said is quite convincing in the same way as is the description of the elephant by several blind men in the Indian fable. In what follows we shall see how the various factors they emphasized simultaneously influenced the decision-making process of successive Tang rulers, the extent to which each factor

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4 Wechsler 1979, pp. 233-234.
6 Lee Ki-baik 1984, p. 48.
was important at different stages and how in the end, after succeeding at great cost in saving face by conquering Koguryō and wiping out the disgrace of Emperor Yang’s defeat, Tang had to withdraw from the Korean peninsula, yielding the prize of victory to its ally, Silla.

**Gaozu’s Peaceful Communication with Korea**

While the newly founded Tang regime under Gaozu was largely occupied by the Turkish problems in its frontier affairs, Gaozu maintained peaceful relations with Koguryō and the other two Korean kingdoms. The policy of Koguryō toward China also took a turn for the better. King Yŏngyang died in 618 and his brother succeeded him as King Yŏngnyu. During the eight years of Tang Gaozu’s reign, eight missions from Koguryō arrived in Tang, of which six were tributary. The mission of 624 was to request the Chinese calendar, a gesture implying acceptance of vassal status, and the one in 625 was to study Taoism and Buddhism.

In 622 Gaozu sent a letter, or “edict” in Chinese rhetoric, to King Yŏngnyu, expressing good will, and requesting an exchange of people displaced by the wars. Compared with the edicts issued during the Sui period the tone of this missive was quite different. While insisting on the mandate of the Chinese emperor it expressed the wish to maintain friendly relations, with each side defending its own borders. Gaozu ordered that all people of Koguryō origins inside China should be gathered and sent back to their homeland. As a reciprocal gesture, as many as ten thousand Sui Chinese were returned from Koguryō. In 624 Gaozu conferred on King Yŏngnyu the titles of Supreme Pillar of State (shang zhuguo), Commandery Prince of Liaodong (Liaodong jun wang), and King of Koguryō.

Paekche and Silla continued to maintain tributary relations with China. The king of Paekche received from China the titles of Commandery Prince of Daifang and King of Paekche, and the king of Silla the titles of Pillar of State, Commandery Prince of Lelang, and King of Silla. Supreme Pillar of State was the highest honorific position in the Tang hierarchy, and was equal to rank 2, upper class. Pillar of State was the second highest and was equal to rank 2, lower class. The titles of nobility given to

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9 See Table 2.
10 ZTZJ 190, p. 5976; CFYG 977, p. 11479; 999, p. 11721.
11 JTS 199A, pp. 5320-1; XTS 220, p. 6187; ZTZJ 190, p. 5964.
12 JTS 199A, p. 5321; p. 5329; p. 5335; XTS 220, p. 6187; p. 6199; p. 6203; ZTZJ 190, p. 5976.
the Korean rulers, which were associated with the names of commanderies (jun) in earlier times, were raised from commandery duke (gong) to commandery prince (wang), which was next to prince of a state (guo wang).^13

Gaozu approached the whole business of investiture and the tribute system with clear-sighted pragmatism. He remarked to his ministers in 625:

> Between name and reality there should be a concordance. Koguryŏ called itself subject (chen) of Sui, but in the end opposed Emperor Yang. What kind of subject was that? We respect all creatures and do not wish to be haughty and superior. We only occupy and possess the land, striving to bring peace to all the people. Why should we order Koguryŏ to be our subject in order to acquire for us greatness and honor? You should now make an edict to express this will of mine.\(^14\)

Chief Minister Pei Ju, who had been expansionist policy adviser to the Sui Emperor Yang, and Vice Director of the Secretariat Wen Yanbo were, however, strongly opposed to Gaozu’s idea. Insisting on the principle that “the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm” Wen argued:

> The land of Liaodong (under Koguryŏ) was the state of Jizi in the Zhou period, and the Commandery of Xuantu during Han. Before the Wei-Jin [period], it was as close [to China] as though it was within the territory divided into fiefs [granted by the Son of Heaven]. It cannot be allowed not to be subject. If we allow ourselves to be put on an equal footing with Gaoli (= Koguryŏ), how will the barbarians of the four directions look up to us? Moreover, the Middle Kingdom is, for the barbarians, like the sun to all the stars. There is no reason to descend from superiority to be on a level of equality with those in the barrier zone.\(^15\)

In the face of such opposition, Gaozu had to give up the idea of not making Koguryŏ into a subject territory.\(^16\) We are presented in the above colloquy with an interesting, if briefly stated, reflection of the tension between restoring China’s former frontiers on the one hand, and the exigencies of political reality on the other. The practical-minded Gaozu not only saw no point to insisting on an empty adherence to traditional forms and

\(^{13}\) Nishijima 1983, p. 441.
\(^{14}\) TD 186, p. 992.
\(^{15}\) JTS 61, p. 2360.
\(^{16}\) TD 186, p. 992; JTS 61, p. 2360.
titles supposedly buttressing superficial Chinese suzerainty, but also saw how dearly it had cost Sui to attempt to make such claims stick. He neither wanted to advance such claims nor could he afford to do so, given the political situation in the early Tang. Pei Ju and Wen Yanbo, on the other hand, who were more deeply influenced by the Confucian political ambition to restore the Han empire, could not accept Gaozu's aphilosophical pragmatism. In hindsight we can see that, had Gaozu's ideas been accepted, this would, in fact, have saved the Tang Chinese from much subsequent trouble.

Gaozu's policy towards Koguryŏ at that time was one of peaceful coexistence. He wanted to stake out a neutral position vis-à-vis the continuous conflicts among the three Korean kingdoms, and wanted the Chinese merely to try to maintain a peaceful order.

Taizong's Peace with Korea, 627-640

Before 641, Taizong had mostly followed Gaozu's principle of maintaining peace and continued to preserve a neutral position in the conflicts among the three Korean states. In 626, both Paekche and Silla sent envoys to Tang to accuse Koguryŏ of blocking their way to pay tribute to Tang and to ask for Tang help. The court, by then under Taizong, sent an envoy to mediate between them, upon which, it is recorded, all three sent in an "acknowledgement of guilt." In 627, Taizong's edict to the king of Paekche expressed his hope for a peaceful order on the Korean peninsula.

A sign of distrust between Tang and Koguryŏ appeared in 631, when Taizong sent an envoy to Koguryŏ to bury the remains of the Sui soldiers. The envoy destroyed the "triumphal mound" (jingguan), built by Koguryŏ over the remains of the Sui soldiers in commemoration of the victory of Koguryŏ over Sui, in order to give them a proper burial. This act alarmed King Yŏngnyu, who then ordered the construction of a great wall from Fuyu (in modern Jilin) all the way to the sea. From then until the end of his reign in 642, King Yŏngnyu sent only three tributary missions to Tang. Still, Taizong granted favorable treatment to a mission that came in 640, led by the Crown Prince of Koguryŏ.

The major concern of Taizong had been problems inside China and

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17 JTS 199A, p. 5321; p. 5329; XTS 220, p. 6199; ZZZJ 192, p. 6030.
18 JTS 199A, p. 5329; XTS 220, p. 6199.
19 JTS 199A, p. 5321; XTS 220, p. 6187; ZZZJ 193, p. 6087.
problems on the northern and northwestern borders. He took to heart the disastrous lessons of the Sui. But unlike Wei Zheng who, in the historian's comment in the *Suishu*, implies that Liaodong had not been under the Chinese commandery-district system for a long time and Sui therefore should have left it alone, Taizong seems to have believed that the lesson was not that China should be restrained from extending itself into Liaodong and beyond, but that there should be a well worked out strategy and a solid economy and strong armies before undertaking any such campaign.

**The Decision for War Against Koguryo, 641-643**

Following his conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630, his assumption of the title of Heavenly Qaghan and the establishment of the new administrative system for ruling the Turks who had submitted, Taizong next persuaded the Xi and Shiwei, both formerly subjects of the Turks in Manchuria to submit to Tang. After his successes on the western front Taizong at last turned his attention to Koguryo. From 641 on, Taizong's intention to wage war against Koguryo became ever more clear. An embassy returned from Koguryo in that year. Its mission was ostensibly to return the visit of the prince of Koguryo, but in fact it was to look for weaknesses in that country. On his return the envoy made his report based on the information he had gathered during his stay. Taizong then expressly stated his intention of undertaking military action against Koguryo, justifying his decision with the argument that the territory of Koguryo had been placed under four Chinese commanderies during Han, and was thus part of China.

Taizong had his strategy worked out: Chinese troops would attack Liaodong, and when all the forces of Koguryo went to the rescue, Tang would send its naval force from Shandong to attack P'yŏngyang, thus easily conquering Koguryo. He was only prevented from putting this plan into effect immediately by his judgment that the Shandong region, an important base for the seaborn wing of the military expedition against Korea, had not yet returned to full economic health.

In the following years, up until 644, when Taizong finally declared war on Koguryo, political developments on the peninsula stimulated an increasingly bellicose attitude by Taizong. A coup d'état took place in

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21 *ZZTJ 193*, p. 6082.
22 *XTS 220*, p. 6187; *ZZTJ 196*, pp. 6169-70.
Koguryo in the eleventh month of 642. King Yongnyu was killed by his official Yŏn Kaesomun, who put the king’s nephew on the throne and set himself up as the de facto ruler. The news soon reached the Tang court through the report of the Area Commander of Yingzhou, located close to Koguryo. Concluding that Yŏn Kaesomun’s usurpation challenged Tang suzerainty, since the former king had received Tang investiture, some Chinese officials felt it necessary to punish this unlawful act and suggested a “punitive” attack. In 643, after returning from a mission to Koguryo, an envoy requested an increase in the number of border troops in order to exert pressure on Koguryo. Although Taizong refused to take any action on the grounds that it was not righteous to attack a state in mourning nor to burden the people, since the economy of Shandong was still in bad shape, he nevertheless expressed the view that Tang had more than enough military force and political legitimacy to punish Yŏn Kaesomun, and intended to use Mohe and Khitan troops to do so.

For the time being he followed the suggestion of two of his major advisers, Fang Xuanling and Zhangsun Wuji, to maintain peace. The Chinese duly performed a mourning ceremony for the dead king. This was a regular practice in the tributary relationship. An embassy was next sent to Koguryo bearing imperial gifts. In the first month of 643, Koguryo sent a tributary mission and Taizong conferred the title of king on the new ruler.

Silla continued to pursue its pro-Chinese policy. In the ninth month of 643 Silla sent a request for Tang military assistance to defend against the joint incursions of Paekche and Koguryo. The previous year Paekche had attacked some forty towns of Silla, and entered into a marriage alliance with Koguryo, while planning further attacks against Silla. It seemed possible that Koguryo would unify the whole Korean peninsula. This news may have alarmed Tang, in whose own interest it was to keep Korea divided and to prevent any Korean alliance with other non-Chinese

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23 *JTS* 199A, p. 5322; *XTS* 220, p. 6187; *ZZTJ* 196, p. 6181.
24 *ZZTJ* 196, pp. 6181-2; 197, p. 6198.
25 *XTS* 220, p. 6188; *ZZTJ* 197, p. 6202.
26 *CFFG* 974, p. 11442.
27 *JTS* 199A, p. 5322; *XTS* 220, p. 6188; *ZZTJ* 197, p. 6202.
28 *JTS* 199A, p. 5330; *XTS* 220, p. 6199.
states in eastern Manchuria and in Japan. Taizong responded to Silla’s request by suggesting three alternatives to its envoy for dealing with the situation: 1) sending Chinese frontier troops together with the Khitan and Mohe to attack Liaodong, which was part of Koguryō; 2) providing several thousand red uniforms and red flags to Silla to create the impression that Tang troops were being stationed in Silla so as to dissuade the Paekche and Koguryō troops from mounting an attack; 3) sending a naval force to attack Paekche to relieve Silla and, since Silla was vulnerable and easily bullied since it was under a female ruler, Tang could send a royal family member to be the ruler in Silla accompanied by a garrison of Chinese troops. When Silla was again at peace, Silla could restore its own ruler to power.

On hearing these alternative plans the Silla envoy said he could not make up his mind which to choose. His indecision must have been more diplomatic than real. It must have been clear to him that any of the three Tang strategies must have undermined if not directly threatened Silla’s independence.

These three alternatives reveal the essentials of Taizong’s policy towards Korea: the first one was to use “barbarians” against “barbarians,” which might have resulted in an even more direct confrontation between Silla and the other two Korean kingdoms; the second plan could not have been expected to produce much effective relief for Silla and would have set a symbolic precedent for an actual takeover of Silla by Tang forces; the third alternative, which would have been the most effective for dealing with Koguryō and Paekche, was fraught with danger for Silla itself. There was a real possibility that Silla might be conquered by China. No wonder that the envoy from Silla was unable to choose among the three. He and his country were, as the American slang expression so aptly puts it, caught between a rock and a hard place.

As an interim measure, Taizong sent an envoy to carry a letter to Koguryō, in which was contained a threat: if Koguryō continued its incur-

29 Wechsler 1979, p. 233.
30 XTS 220, p. 6188; CfYG 991, p. 11639. CfYG subdivides the third alternative. The attack on Paekche, and the sending of a Tang prince and troops to Silla, are listed as alternatives three and four, respectively. XTS is probably correct in combining these alternatives into one because Taizong probably planned to attack Paekche first, thus opening a route to Silla via Paekche so that Tang could give Chinese assistance to Silla from the sea.
sions against Silla, a dutiful subject of Tang, Tang would be forced to mount a punitive attack the following year. In the second month of 644, the envoy returned from his mission and reported back that Yŏn Kaesomun refused to stop his incursions into Silla. Taizong took the refusal as a *casus belli*. From the Chinese point of view, this was a righteous excuse to launch a war against a disobedient Koguryŏ.\(^{32}\)

In one of the court debates on whether to attack Koguryŏ, Chu Suiliang expressed his doubt that a victory was possible. Later he presented a memorial attempting to dissuade the emperor from taking personal command. Strong support for a war policy came from the Minister of War, Li Shiji. He cited an instance in 641 when Taizong had accepted Wei Zheng’s advice not to pursue attacks on the Xueyantuo, thus losing the opportunity to completely defeat them.\(^{33}\) Another supporter of war was Li Jing. Like Li Shiji, Li Jing had a strong military background and both Li’s were important advisers to Taizong.\(^{34}\)

Taizong himself adopted a bellicose attitude, and stated his intention to take personal command of the campaign. This evoked widespread opposition from both military and civil officials of different backgrounds who remonstrated in memorials or orally in the emperor’s presence.\(^{35}\) In 648, when the war was under way, a palace lady, Xu Hui, presented a memorial opposing the war, for which Taizong duly expressed his appreciation.\(^{36}\)

Finally, a decision was made that Taizong would personally lead a military expedition against Koguryŏ. War preparations of all kinds were started and Taizong consulted experienced military officials for information and advice on strategies.\(^{37}\) He spared no effort to make propaganda through personal remarks and official edicts announced throughout the country to persuade those officials objecting to the campaign and to encourage common people to join his armies. He repeatedly emphasized as a moral justification for the expedition that Liaodong had formerly been part of China and that if Tang failed to act forcefully against this rebellious

\(^{32}\) *JTS* 199A, p. 5322; p. 5335; *XTS* 220, pp. 6188-9; *ZZTJ* 197, p. 6204; pp. 6206-7.

\(^{33}\) *JTS* 80, pp. 2733-6; *XTS* 105, pp. 4027-8; *ZZTJ* 197, p. 6207.

\(^{34}\) *JTS* 67, p. 2481; *XTS* 93, p. 3815; Wechsler 1979, p. 199.

\(^{35}\) *JTS* 59, p. 2334; 62, p. 2390; 68, p. 2500; 69, p. 2515; *XTS* 89, p. 3755; 91, p. 3792; 94, p. 3829; 99, p. 3912; *ZZTJ* 197, pp. 6216-7.

\(^{36}\) *ZZTJ* 198, p. 6254.

\(^{37}\) *ZZTJ* 197, p. 6213.
subject, China itself could not be well disciplined.

His expedition, he claimed, had several aims: to punish Yôn Kaesomun, to save the people of Koguryô from Yôn’s cruel rule, and to save Silla from the danger of invading enemies. Moreover, Taizong claimed that now All-under-Heaven was at peace except for Koguryô. He intended to undertake the conquest of Koguryô personally so as not to leave a source of trouble for his descendants. He held that as suzerain it was his responsibility to punish those who disturbed the order of the East Asian world, which formed an international system centering around China.

As a skillful and experienced war leader, Taizong had some idea of what was disadvantageous and advantageous for the campaign. He recognized the difficulties involved. Yet he was confident of the inevitability of victory on the grounds that Tang had a sound economic basis now, that there was much stronger support from the people than in Emperor Yang’s time, since Tang’s victories over the Turks, Tuyuhun and Gaochang had encouraged people to think that additional rich rewards could be achieved through battles, and that Tang was large while Koguryô was small.\(^{38}\)

The expectation of possible assistance from other non-Chinese, especially from Paekche and Silla, also strengthened Taizong’s confidence. In his edicts to Paekche and Silla in 644, Taizong ordered the troops of the two Korean states to be placed under the command of Chinese generals.\(^{39}\) That same year Silla had 50,000 troops attacking Koguryô from the south and captured a town.\(^{40}\) In the seventh month of 644, before the major expedition began, the Chinese, the Khitan, Xi and Mohe attacked Koguryô in order to reconnoiter the situation.\(^{41}\) In 645, Taizong asked the Xueyantuo to join the Tang force. The Xueyantuo agreed, though as it turned out Taizong did not make use of the Xueyantuo troops. During 644 and 645, Koguryô attempted to bribe the Xueyantuo into alliance but the Xueyantuo did not dare to make any hostile move against Tang.\(^{42}\)


\(^{39}\) Wenguan Cilin 664, pp. 261-5.

\(^{40}\) JTS 199A, p. 5335; XTS 220, p. 6203.

\(^{41}\) XTS 220, p. 6189; ZZTJ 197, p. 6209.

The Three Campaigns Against Koguryo, 644-648

There is little evidence of a hostile attitude on the part of Koguryo. From 642 until Taizong's death in 649 Koguryo sent six tributary missions to Tang. In the ninth month of 644, before the Tang campaign started, Yǒn Kaesomun sent envoys to Tang carrying silver as tribute and asking to be permitted to send fifty officials to be Imperial Bodyguards. Taizong refused the present and imprisoned the Korean officials.43

In the winter of 644, Tang armies were mobilized to attack Koguryo by land and by sea. The Tang court ordered Silla, Paekche, the Xi and Khitan to join the attacks.44 Taizong took personal command. Stopping in Yingzhou (near present Chaoyang, Liaoning) on his way to the front in 645, Taizong tried to win over the Khitan tribal leaders. By 648 all the Khitan were brought under Tang command.45

In the 645 campaign the Chinese troops pushed as far as Anshi town in Liaodong, but Taizong met with a humiliating failure when he was unable to capture the town before he had to retreat due to lack of supplies and the cold weather. The achievements of the campaign included the taking of ten walled towns in the Liaodong area, the capture of 60,000 households and two generals-in-chief, 3,500 aristocrats and officials.46 Taizong regretted his assumption of personal command, saying that if Wei Zheng were still alive he would have prevented him from going.47

The submitted people of Koguryo were incorporated into the Chinese empire. Tang set up three prefectures in three captured towns.48 Unlike the case of the Turks, where there were many objections to the idea of settling the nomads inside the country, the Chinese did not hesitate to resettle seventy thousand Koreans inside China.49 Taizong conferred titles on Korean generals, aristocrats and officials who were resettled in China.50

The year 646 saw Tang military activity concentrate on the Xueyantuo in the northwest. That year King Pojang and Yǒn Kaesomun sent an

43 XTS 220, p. 6189; ZZTJ 197, p. 6212.
44 JTS 199A, pp. 5322-3; XTS 220, pp. 6189-90; ZZTJ 197, pp. 6214-5.
45 JTS 199B, p. 5350; XTS 219, p. 6168.
47 XTS 97, p. 3881; ZZTJ 198, p. 6230.
48 XTS 43B, p. 1128; ZZTJ 197, p. 6221; 198, p. 6223; THY 95, pp. 1705-6.
49 ZZTJ 198, p. 6230; THY 95, p. 1706.
50 JTS 199A, p. 5325; XTS 220, pp. 6192-3; ZZTJ 198, p. 6226.
embassy to Tang to “acknowledge guilt.” Yet, unlike Emperor Wen, Taizong did not consider a sincere submission sufficient. He issued an edict stating that Tang would not accept tribute from Koguryō, clearly the equivalent of a previous declaration of war being reaffirmed. The court planned a major expedition using the excuses that Yŏn Kaesomun had become more arrogant in his behavior, as witnessed by the insolent manner he had displayed to the Tang envoys and had continued his incursions into Silla.

The Chinese armies resumed their attacks in 647. This time Taizong did not go in person. At the end of the year, King Pojang sent his son to pay homage to Tang carrying an offer of “acknowledgement of guilt.” Nevertheless, in 648, Tang carried out a third expedition by sending a naval force of 30,000 men to attack Koguryō. However, the Tang troops retreated in the autumn without having won any decisive success.

Taizong then decided to launch a fourth expedition the next year so as to crush Koguryō with one decisive campaign. He believed that Koguryō had already been brought to a state of exhaustion, but what he failed to see was that China had also been disturbed by the wars. Even Sichuan, a region remote from the northeast, was involved in and had its economy upset by ship building for the war. The non-Chinese Liao people in the southwest rose in revolt when the Chinese officials imposed corvée on them to build ships to be used in the campaigns against Koguryō. The Chinese of Sichuan also suffered hardships from the ship building. Hard pressed by the local officials to pay for the labor involved, people had to sell their houses, land, and even their children. We are told that the price of grain jumped greatly and disorders arose.

Aware of the troubled situation, the senior Chief Minister Fang Xuanling was unable to keep silence, especially because at that time few people dared to object openly to the campaign. His approaching death gave Fang the courage to urge the emperor to abandon the war. He argued in his memorial that Taizong should halt any further expansion since Tang

51 JTS 199A, p. 5326; XTS 220, p. 6194.
52 XTS 220, p. 6194; ZZTJ 198, p. 6241; CFYG 996, p. 11696.
54 JTS 69, pp. 2518-9; 199A, p. 5326; XTS 94, p. 3832; 220, p. 6195; ZZTJ 198, p. 6252; p. 6256; p. 6261.
56 XTS 220, p. 6195; ZZTJ 199, pp. 6261-2.
had already achieved enough prestige and territory, that the people of Koguryŏ were but "barbarians" of a low sort, neither worth being treated with benevolence and righteousness, nor capable of being held responsible for their conduct. Fang did not think that the war was justified, arguing that Koguryŏ had not failed to perform the duties of a subject, had made no incursions into Chinese territory, posed no long-term danger to China, and that it was not worthwhile to distress China just to wipe out the shame of a former ruler within and take revenge for Silla without. But Taizong did not alter his course of action.\(^{57}\)

During this period the situation on the Korean peninsula became more difficult for Silla. While Tang and Koguryŏ were engaged in warfare, Paekche did not keep its promise to assist Tang against Koguryŏ. Instead, it initially captured several walled Silla towns, and in 648 took thirteen more. It also stopped sending tribute to Tang.\(^{58}\)

To deal with the threat from Paekche, Silla first tried to obtain assistance from Koguryŏ,\(^{59}\) and failing that it decided to turn to Tang. In the year 648 alone, Silla sent three missions to Tang, the third of which was led by Kim Ch’unch’u (the future King Muyŏl), hoping to obtain Tang military intervention.\(^{60}\) To strengthen relations with Tang, Silla agreed to adopt Tang’s reign title and Chinese official dress.\(^{61}\) The Korean history says that in return Taizong promised Kim to send 200,000 Chinese troops under the command of Su Dingfang.\(^{62}\) The Chinese sources do not mention this promise. However, as seen above, in 648 Taizong did send a navy to fight against Koguryŏ, but not under the command of Su Dingfang.

Finally, on his death bed, Taizong left an edict ordering abandonment of the campaign against Koguryŏ.\(^{63}\)

The Conquest of Paekche in 660

At first, Gaozong did not attempt any direct attacks against Kogu-

\(^{57}\) JTS 66, pp. 2464-6; XTS 96, pp. 3855-6; ZZTJ 199, p. 6260.

\(^{58}\) JTS 199A, p. 5330; XTS 220, p. 6199; ZZTJ 199, p. 6261.

\(^{59}\) SGS 5, pp. 2-3; 41, "Biography of Kim Yusin, Part I;" see also Miike 1974, pp. 107-8.

\(^{60}\) The Chinese sources record only two missions, see Table 2. The Korean source records three, cf. SGS 5, p. 5.

\(^{61}\) XTS 220, p. 6203; ZZTJ 199, p. 6265; SGS 5, p. 6.

\(^{62}\) SGS 41, "Biography of Kim Yusin, Part I;"

\(^{63}\) ZZTJ 199, p. 6268.
ryŏ. For its part Silla made continuous efforts to strengthen its ties with Tang. Its court started to wear Chinese official dress in 649 and in 650 it adopted Tang Gaozong’s reign title—Yonghui. In 650, Kim Pŏmmin (the future King Munmu) went to Tang as an envoy to report Silla’s victory over Paekche, and presented an ode “In Praise of Peace” embroidered on brocade, which attributed the victory to the glory and majesty of Tang. In 651, when Paekche resumed its tributary missions to Tang, Gaozong urged Paekche to make peace with Silla and threatened a military attack if Paekche refused and if Koguryŏ assisted Paekche.

Military encounters with Koguryŏ resumed in 654, when Koguryŏ attacked the Khitan, who were then under the *jimi* system. In the following year, when Koguryŏ joined Paekche and Mohe to capture more than thirty Silla walled towns, King Muyŏl (Kim Ch’unch’u) of Silla sent a request to Tang for assistance. In response, Gaozong despatched his first expedition against Koguryŏ. The Tang-Silla alliance was thus formed on the initiative of Silla but for the benefit of both states.

The Chinese launched more attacks against Koguryŏ in 658 and 659 with some success. In 660, Silla requested that Tang troops be directed against Paekche after Silla had once again been invaded by Paekche and Koguryŏ. It may be that Silla talked Tang into implementing the plan to attack Paekche, but as mentioned above, it was also Taizong’s intention, expressed in 643, to make such an attack.

In any event, this proved to be a strategically crucial plan, for it eventually led to the conquest of Koguryŏ once Paekche fell. The Tang court sent a huge navy of 100,000 under Su Dingfang across the Yellow Sea to the coast of Paekche. Silla troops joined the campaign by land. After all attempts to resist failed, the Paekche King and Crown Prince Yung finally surrendered.

The Korean sources show that even during the conquest of Paekche

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64 SGSG 5, p. 6.
67 ZZTJ 199, pp. 6286-8.
68 ZZTJ 200, p. 6309; p. 6319; CFYG 985, p. 11577.
69 Jamieson (1969, pp. 44-5) says that Silla persuaded the Chinese that the first step for the conquest of Koguryŏ was to subdue Paekche but he fails to notice a plan to conquer Paekche in the Chinese sources for Taizong’s reign.
70 JTS 199A, p. 5331; p. 5336; XTS 220, p. 6200; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6320-1.
signs of strain appeared in the alliance between Tang and Silla. In the Korean history *Samguk Sagi* we read that in 660, during the war with Paekche, when Silla troops were late for a battle, the Chinese commander Su Dingfang decided to execute a Silla general, but had to change his mind when another Silla general threatened to attack Tang.  

Another chapter of the same work says that after the conquest of Paekche, Su Dingfang suggested that the land of Paekche be divided up among three Silla generals as rewards, but the three refused, on the grounds that it was not righteous for them to accept such an offer. The Korean work goes on to say that the Chinese then made a plan to invade Silla, but had to give it up since Silla was too well prepared. When Su Dingfang returned to the Tang court Gaozong supposedly asked him why he did not attack Silla, to which Su replied that Silla was under a good government and therefore it could not be subdued even though it was a small country. 

The Chinese sources, however, make no mention of the confrontation over a delay in the arrival of the Silla troops, or anything about an intention to attack Silla immediately after the conquest of Paekche in 660. The Chinese sources do indicate that Tang had considered, at least for a while, giving up the land of Paekche, as mentioned below.

The Chinese sources state that after the conquest of Paekche in 660, the Tang court decided to establish Chinese supervision in the area by setting up in former Paekche five area commands which were further divided into administrative regions. A Chinese official was appointed the Area Commander of Xiongjin (Korean Ungjin) and pro-Tang local chieftains were assigned to other posts. To prevent further problems, Tang transferred members of the royal family, including the King of Paekche and Prince Yung, ministers and commoner men, amounting altogether to more than ten thousand people, to China as captives. The King soon died and an official title was conferred on Prince Yung.

The Chinese commander, Su Dingfang, withdrew from Paekche and then started a major campaign against Koguryō in 661. Gaozong even decided to assume personal command of the expedition but was dissuaded by Empress Wu and his ministers. The Tang armies penetrated as far as

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71 *SGSG* 5, pp. 9-10.  
72 *SGSG* 42, “Biography of Kim Yusin, Part II.”  
73 *JTS* 199A, p. 5331; *XTS* 220, p. 6200; *ZZTJ* 200, pp. 6321-2; *CFYG* 986, pp. 11577-8.  
74 *XTS* 220, pp. 6195-6; *ZZTJ* 200, pp. 6323-4.
the capital, P'yŏngyang, which was an unprecedented success, but had to retreat without any result early the next year due to the severe winter weather.75

The quick withdrawal of Su Dingfang with some of the Chinese troops made possible a restoration movement in Paekche. It was led by a former Paekche royal family member named Poksin and a monk, Toch'ım, who sent for Prince P’ung of Paekche from Japan and established him as king. They were determined to fight, knowing that Tang and Silla both had ambitions to take over Paekche.76 When the revived Paekche forces were successful in isolating the Chinese and in driving back the Silla troops, the Tang court decided to withdraw from Paekche altogether.

Gaozong instructed Liu Rengui, then acting Prefect of Dairejangzhou, who remained in the former territory of Paekche, to retreat to Silla or even to China, since the Tang army had withdrawn from P’yŏngyang, and therefore there seemed no point in staying in the town of Ungjin which was the only place in Paekche still under Tang control. However, Liu Rengui decided to stay, for he had made a clear assessment of the situation: if Tang wanted to conquer Koguryŏ, it should maintain a military base in Paekche.

At Liu’s request, Gaozong sent reinforcements across the sea. In 662, with the assistance of Silla, Liu Rengui opened up a supply route from Silla. Then a conflict broke out within the ruling group of Paekche pitting the king against Poksin, who had previously killed Toch’ım. The king sent envoys to Koguryŏ and Japan asking for military assistance. In 663 the joint forces of Tang and Silla fought fiercely with the Japanese and won four major battles at the mouth of the Kum River. The Paekche state was finally destroyed.77 Had Liu obeyed the initial order of Gaozong, the result would have been that either Paekche restored its state or that Silla would have taken over Paekche’s territory.

In describing these events the Chinese sources pay much less attention to the role played by Silla than do the Korean sources, which have detailed accounts of Silla’s part in the conquest of Paekche, in the sup-

75 ZZTJ 200, pp. 6325-7; CFYG 986, p. 11578.
76 JTS 199A, pp. 5331-2; XTS 220, p. 6200; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6323-4. For a detailed study of the restoration movement see Ikeuchi 1960, pp. 97-245.
77 JTS 84, pp. 2790-4; 199A, pp. 5331-3; XTS 108, pp. 4082-3; 220, pp. 6200-1; ZZTJ 200, pp. 6323-4; pp. 6329-30; 201, pp. 6336-8. For Japan’s encounter with the Chinese, see Yu Yousun 1957.
pression of Paekche’s restoration, and in the campaign against Koguryo in 661.  

Over and above Silla’s role, whatever it may have been, it was due to the persistence of Liu Rengui that Tang maintained its base in Paekche. Liu then made efforts to restore the local economy in order to enforce Tang control in the area as a basis for the later conquest of Koguryo. In a memorial to Gaozong, he reiterated the importance of the Tang garrison in Paekche: if Koguryo was to be destroyed Paekche should not be abandoned, for Prince P’ung was waiting in Koguryo, and another prince was in Japan. Either one or both would menace China’s position, if Japan or Koguryo should make an alliance with Paekche.

The court agreed with Liu and in 664 it appointed the Paekche prince, Yung, who was in Chang’an, as the Commandant of Xiongjin in order to win over the remnants of Paekche.

The Conquest of Koguryo in 668

Now that Tang had a strong hold in Paekche, it could direct its forces against Koguryo. In 666, Yon Kaesomun died. His death proved decisive in changing the situation in favor of Tang. It not only ended two decades of powerful military rule, but also caused dissension within the ruling group. When his son Namsaeng succeeded to the throne, the other son, Namgon, rebelled. Namsaeng sent his son to Tang with a request for assistance. Yon Kaesomun’s brother offered to surrender to Silla. Taking advantage of this excellent opportunity, Tang launched a massive campaign led by the esteemed commander Li Shiji, in alliance with Silla. After a series of battles in which Koguryo was attacked both overland from China in the north, and from the southern part of the peninsula by Silla and Liu Rengui’s troops, P’yongyang fell into the hands of the Chinese in the

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78 *SGSG* 5, pp. 9-12; 6, pp. 1-2; 7, pp. 1-8; 42.
79 *ZZTJ* 201, p. 6337.
80 *JTS* 84, p. 2795.
81 *JTS* 84, pp. 2792-5; 199A, p. 5333; *XTS* 108, p. 4084; 220, p. 6201. *ZZTJ* (201, p. 6342) records that Yung was appointed “commandant” (*duwei*), instead of “area commander” (*dudu*) because Liu Rengui was the area commander.
82 *ZZTJ* 201, p. 6347; Ikeuchi (1941, pp. 703-11) is of the opinion that Kaesomun died in 665.
83 *XTS* 220, p. 6196. *XTS* does not say clearly to whom Yon Kaesomun’s brother surrendered. The *SGSG* says that he offered Silla 12 towns, 763 households and 3,543 people, see *SGSG* 6, p. 5.
ninth month of 668. King Pojang and Namgŏn were captured.\textsuperscript{84}

Tang transferred the captured Korean nobles to China. The king and others were given official titles while Namgŏn and the former Paekche Prince P’ung, who had taken refuge in Koguryŏ, were exiled to the far south of China. To consolidate Tang control over the newly conquered area the Protectorate of Andong, one of the six major protectorates, was set up in P’yŏngyang. It was manned by 20,000 troops, with Xue Rengui as the Protector-general, supervising nine area commands, forty-two prefectures, and a hundred districts. The area commands and prefectures set up for Koguryŏ had both Chinese officials and local chieftains in their administration.\textsuperscript{85} In 669, a large number of Koguryŏ people were resettled inside China. These arrangements were intended to dissolve any remaining sense of the country’s unity. To permanently eliminate any possibility of reviving Koguryŏ even many of the Koguryŏ farmers were put to work in agriculture inside China.\textsuperscript{86}

Though Gaozong was much less capable than Taizong, and had no experience in military affairs, he was carried onward by the momentum of the military conquests begun by his father and finally achieved his father’s long cherished goal of the conquest of Koguryŏ. Using a strategy of indirection, he first attacked Paekche and backed Liu Rengui’s persistence in the face of initial failure there, and this proved decisive in achieving the final success.

More fundamental factors promoting the Tang success, however, were the suicidal power struggles within Koguryŏ and the Chinese alliance with Silla. Silla joined in all the major campaigns in the conquest of Paekche and Koguryŏ. It was also responsible for the logistical support without which Tang troops could not have survived much less prevailed so far from home.\textsuperscript{87}

**Tang’s Withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula in 676**

By this time it seemed that Tang had finally succeeded in rebuilding the same degree control over the peninsula as enjoyed by the Han dy-

\textsuperscript{84} ZZZ\textsuperscript{J} 201, pp. 6347-8; pp. 6350-6.
\textsuperscript{85} JTS 199A, p. 5327; XTS 220, p. 6197; ZZZ\textsuperscript{J} 201, pp. 6356-7. XTS 220 says that Fuyu Long (Korean Yung) was exiled. Long should be Feng (Korean P’ung). Hino 1984, pp. 26-7.
\textsuperscript{86} Hino 1984, pp. 56-64.
\textsuperscript{87} Details see SGSG 5-6.
nasty. The success, however, soon degenerated into a series of troubles. In 670, when Xue Rengui was sent on a campaign against Tibet, a revolt in Koguryo took place which installed the former king’s grandson, Ansǔng, as king. Only in 673 did the Chinese succeed in crushing the revolt.88

A more serious problem from the Chinese point of view was that Silla ceased to be a Tang ally. It not only despatched troops to support Koguryo’s revolt and provided shelter to Ansǔng,89 but also conferred on him the title of king in 670. Eventually, so as to win the allegiance of the remnants of Koguryo, Silla established him in a dependent kingdom known as Minor Koguryo (to be distinguished from the Minor or Lesser Koguryo in the Liaodong area, see below) in the southwest of the peninsula, on the former territory of Paekche. Minor Koguryo was eliminated by Silla around 684 when it rebelled against Silla.90

Signs of conflict of interest between Tang and Silla appeared soon after the conquest of Paekche, but both maintained the alliance to achieve their common goal—the conquest of Koguryo. Once this was accomplished, the allies became rivals. For their part the Chinese wanted to bring all non-Chinese into submission. In 663, Tang established the Superior Area Command of Jilin (Korean Kyerim) in Silla with King Munmu as the Superior Area Commander.91 Silla was thereby treated as a Tang subject. Two years later, Tang sent the former Prince Yung of Paekche back to Paekche as the Area Commander of Xiongjin, and ordered him to conclude a covenant establishing a boundary with Silla. Silla, of course, resented this, considering it to be the restoration of its former enemy and a check on its own expansion, which may, in fact, have been the intention of the Chinese. This arrangement, however, did not go well since Yung was too timid to coexist with so strong a neighbor as Silla and returned to Chang’an.92

Silla, for its part, now took as its goal resistance against Chinese expansion into the peninsula and unification of Korea. Samguk Sagi contains a letter written in 671 by the king of Silla to the Tang Protector-

88 ZZTJ 201, pp. 6363-4. For details of these events, see Ikeuchi 1960, pp. 267-393.
89 ZZTJ 201, pp. 6363-4; 202, pp. 6370-1.
90 SGSG 6, pp. 8-10. For details regarding the family background of Ansǔng and the establishment of Minor Koguryo, see Murakami 1974, pp. 153-84.
91 JTS 199A, p. 5336; ZZTJ 201, p. 6335; THY 95, p. 1711. XTS (220, p. 6204) records its establishment as as having occurred in 661, which may be mistaken.
92 JTS 199A, pp. 5333-4; XTS 220, p. 6201; ZZTJ 201, p. 6344; SGSG 6, pp. 4-5.
general of Andong, Xue Rengui, who had demanded that Silla withdraw from Paekche and cease its protection of the remnants of Koguryŏ. The letter states that on the occasion of Kim Ch’unch’u’s mission to Tang in 648, Taizong had promised that when Tang had subdued Koguryŏ and Paekche, the territory south of P’yŏngyang and the land of Paekche would be given to Silla. The Chinese sources nowhere refer to Taizong’s alleged promise, nor do they refer to Silla’s letter of 671 or its contents. Whether or not Taizong ever made such a promise, as a strong and virtually independent state, Silla would naturally struggle to expand and try to eliminate Chinese control of any kind on the peninsula.

Silla was at the peak of its ability to carry out expansion on the peninsula. Within a few years after the revolt of Koguryŏ Silla had control of all of Paekche and much of southern Koguryŏ. Considering Silla to be a rebel against Tang suzerainty, Gaozong dismissed King Munmu from his throne in 674, and sent his brother, who had been kept as a hostage in Chang’an, to replace him. “Punitive” troops led by Liu Rengui were despatched and inflicted a severe defeat on Silla. In 675 King Munmu offered “an acknowledgement of guilt” as well as tribute. Gaozong thereupon restored him to his post. The Tang court planned another expedition in 678, but then gave it up after Chief Minister Zhang Wenguan rose from his sickbed and went to see Gaozong. Zhang opposed the campaign on the grounds that there was a more immediate danger of a Tibetan invasion on the western border, and that Tang could not afford to fight two enemies at the same time.

Tang had in fact stretched itself beyond its ability to exert effective control. In 676, the seat of the Protectorate of Andong was moved all the way back from P’yŏngyang to Liaoyang in Liaodong, a more secure place, but well removed from the peninsula. All the Chinese officials formerly in Koguryŏ withdrew as well. The Area Command of Xiongjin was moved to Jian’an (in modern Liaoning). A year later, the Protectorate of Andong was moved again, this time to Xincheng (modern Fushun in Liaoning), thus completing the Tang withdrawal from the peninsula and its de facto recognition of Silla’s expansion and its unification of most of Korea.

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94 XTS 220, p. 6204; THY 95, pp. 1711-2.
95 XTS 220, p. 6204; ZZTJ 202, p. 6372; p. 6375.
The reasons for the withdrawal are not hard to find. In the first place, the Chinese had to deal with a more acute border problem, one caused by the Tibetans in the west. In 670, Xue Rengui was sent off on a campaign against Tibet. His departure from the Protectorate of Andong must have weakened Chinese control there, for in the same year the revolt in Koguryo took place. Second, it was impossible to supply a military colony on the peninsula when Silla could no longer be relied upon as a logistical base. As a Chinese official pointed out in 661, Tang efforts at conquering Koguryo were doomed, for if Koguryo was to remain conquered, Tang had to station troops there. Tang’s dilemma was that if the number of the troops was small, China would be unable to exert enough force to retain control, but if the number was large China would be exhausted trying to supply that force.

With the seat of the Protectorate of Andong moved to Liaodong, Tang decided in 677 to transfer the surrendered Korean royal family members and their people who had settled inside China back to their former land. It was probably hoped that they could impose a check on Silla’s expansion. However, Prince Yung of former Paekche was still too much afraid of Silla to go back to the former territory of Paekche and remained in the north. King Pojang of former Koguryo went to Liaodong, but once he arrived there, he made contact with the Mohe, and prepared for a revolt. He was recalled and sent into exile in the southwest.

98 JTS 83, pp. 2782-3; XTS 111, p. 4142; ZZTJ 201, pp. 6363-4. Hino Kaizaburō holds that the Protector-general of Andong, Xue Rengui, left P’yŏngyang for Xincheng as early as 669, while the official seat remained in P’yŏngyang. The seat was moved to Liaoyang in 670 as a temporary expedient and formally moved there in 676. It was finally moved to Xincheng in 677. The reason for this, Hino speculates, is that Xue Rengui had a different opinion from that of the central government: the court wished to control the whole of the peninsula, and so tried to maintain the seat in P’yŏngyang, whereas Xue did not believe that Tang was capable of maintaining its control over the peninsula. Xue decided that it was best to have the seat in Xincheng where it could both defend against Silla’s northern expansion and watch over the Mohe people to head off any possible alliance between them and the Turks. The court’s final decision to retreat from the peninsula represented an implicit agreement with Xue’s opinion. See Hino 1984, pp. 29-32. We do not, however, have much evidence to show how Xue Rengui evaluated the situation as a whole.


100 XTS 220, pp. 6195-6.

101 Some accounts record the title given to them as Commandery Prince, see JTS 5, p. 102; JTS 199A, p. 5328; p. 5334; XTS 220, p. 6198; p. 6201, while some give it as King
Chapter 6

The Protectorate of Andong faced a great threat in 696 and 697 when the Khitan rose in revolt against Chinese control, attacking the Protectorate and adjacent Chinese territory. In 697, Di Renjie, who had been dealing with the Khitan rebellion first as Prefect of Weizhou and then as Area Commander of Youzhou and was now a Chief Minister, suggested in a memorial the abolition of the Protectorate and the appointment of members of the former royal family of Koguryo to take over the defense of Andong.102 A year later, the Protectorate of Andong was abolished and the Area Command of Andong was established. Pojang’s son became the Area Commander.103

The Protectorate of Andong was restored in 704, but its seat was withdrawn further from the peninsula to near the present Beijing and its function was changed from supervising non-Chinese on the peninsula to frontier defense. It was finally abolished in 758 during the An Lushan rebellion.104

Silla managed to maintain its independence of Tang. During King Munmu’s reign (661-681), Silla sent no regular tributary missions to Tang, except on two occasions: one was in 665, when Silla sent officials to Tang to join in the Feng and Shan ceremony;105 the other was the mission of 675 mentioned above. Munmu’s successor resumed peaceful contacts with Tang. In 692 Empress Wu sent an embassy to Silla, requesting that Silla abandon the title T’aejong used by their late King Muyo (r. 654-661), since T’aejong means Taizong in Chinese. Even though Silla did not take any action along these lines, Empress Wu did not insist on the demand.106

For the better part of a century, the Chinese made persistent efforts to establish their administration on the Korean peninsula. After bloody
battles and at a cost of countless lives and economic resources they finally gave up the attempt. The final winner in these wars was Silla, which established the first unified Korean state.

Curbing the Parhae State

Silla’s independence was reinforced by the emergence of another state situated between itself and Tang. This was Parhae, at first called Zhen (Korean Chin), established by Tae Choyŏng, who was of Mohe origin and became Koreanized by the end of the seventh century. The Parhae state established relations with the Turks, who had restored their second empire in 682. Parhae expanded to occupy a large area from modern Jilin down to the 39th parallel on the Korean peninsula. By filling much of the space separating Silla from Tang, Parhae reduced Tang concern about Silla’s northern expansion. More significantly, Parhae constituted a new element in the international balance of power, a force that could threaten both Silla and China because it had the potential to become an ally of the Turks.

Tang adopted a policy of preventing Parhae from making incursions and from forming an alliance with the Turks. In 712 Chinese official titles were conferred on the Parhae ruler, Choyŏng, and his territory was given the jimi title of Huhanzhou. From 713 to 755 Parhae sent forty-eight missions to Tang.

In 719, Choyŏng died and his son Muye took the throne. Muye adopted a more independent attitude towards Tang: he honored his father with the posthumous title King Ko, adopted his own reign title, and engaged in territorial expansion. In 726, when the Mohe of the Amur Valley to the north of Parhae sent envoys to Tang and the Chinese set up Heishuizhou with a Chinese administrator to supervise them, Muye decided to strike first at the Mohe, to head off any joint attack by the Chinese and Mohe. However, his brother Munye, who had earlier been a hostage in Chang’an, opposed this anti-Tang act. Dissension arose in the ruling group

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107 This is according to Hino 1984, p. 176. The origins of Tae Choyŏng and the ethnic group to which the majority of the people of Parhae belonged (whether they were from the Mohe, or Koguryŏ, or composed of various peoples) remain controversial questions, see Sun Jinji 1987, pp. 151-65.
108 ZZTJ 210, p. 6680.
110 ZZTJ 212, p. 6735.
and Munye fled to Tang. Though the attack on the Mohe did not proceed, in 732 Muye crossed the sea to Shandong and attacked Dengzhou. This was supported by the Turks.

In retaliation, Xuanzong sought and obtained an alliance with Silla. The two sides again joined forces to battle against Parhae. Silla’s own strategic interest led it to compete with Parhae to prevent its expansion. In his letter of 735 to the king of Silla, Xuanzong acceded to Silla’s request to establish garrisons as far south as the Daedong River at the narrow waist of northern Korea so as to resist the attacks of Parhae. In 736 Silla sent envoys to express appreciation for Tang’s help.

It is generally considered that this shows Tang’s final and formal renunciation of opposition to Silla’s claim over the peninsula. From then until the end of Tang, the two countries maintained peaceful relations. China had to be satisfied with unified Silla as a tributary state which explicitly acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, performed tributary duties, but maintained its de facto independence, ruling its own state without Chinese interference in its internal affairs.

The problems presented by Parhae seem to have subsided when Bilgä Qaghan of the Turks died in 734 and when the Xi and Khitan turned to the Chinese. These developments left Parhae isolated as the only potential member of any anti-Tang alliance. As a consequence, Xuanzong did not have to contemplate launching any further costly wars. Moreover, with the death of Muye in 737, his son Hummu succeeded him and changed to a pro-Tang policy, although maintaining his own reign title for the calendar. In response to the new situation in East Asia, Parhae found it advantageous to change its policy. In compensation for the change, it could at least begin to learn from Chinese culture and develop trade with Tang. In 762, after the An Lushan rebellion, an edict was issued by Tang recognizing Parhae as a state, and Hummu as its king.

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111 JTS 199B, pp. 5360-1; XTS 219, pp. 6180-1; ZZTJ 213, pp. 6774-5.
112 JTS 199B, pp. 5361-2; XTS 219, p. 6181; ZZTJ 213, p. 6799.
113 ZZTJ 213, p. 6800.
114 Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji 9, p. 51; CFYG 971, p. 11410; SGSG 8, p. 11; Puller 1955, p. 21.
115 For a detailed study of the conflicts between Tang and Parhae, see Furuhata 1986.
116 Hino 1984, pp. 164-5.
Located in proximity to both agricultural China and the nomadic steppe land, Liaodong and southern Manchuria had long been an area of instability. During the Qin-Han period, the Liaodong area and part of the Korean peninsula were organized under Chinese administration, but when Chinese power weakened, this administration collapsed. The reunification of China under Sui and Tang fundamentally changed the region’s balance of power, and tempted the Chinese rulers to reassert the active hegemony that had been exerted by Han.

Different rulers, constrained by the circumstances of their times and by their own personalities, handled the Korean issue with different policies. During Tang, Gaozu took an openly pragmatic attitude toward relations with the Korean states, seeing no need to pretend to be superior to the non-Chinese, but when his opinion was opposed by his ministers he had to abandon it. Taizong’s three campaigns against Koguryō were partly motivated by considerations of frontier security. At least in his imperial edicts, he emphasized security as justification for military campaigns. On the other hand, like Emperor Yang of Sui, Taizong also demonstrated a desire for military glory, perhaps influenced by his northwestern aristocratic and military background as well as by his ambition to build a universal empire. He was not satisfied when Koguryō offered a nominal submission. The ideological component, a need to tailor events to fit his ideal of empire, made him insist on actual submission and led him to try to reestablish Chinese administration on the Korean peninsula. He failed to conquer Koguryō due to the practical difficulties of waging war in a harsh climate at a distance, and because he mis-assessed both China’s own strength and that of Koguryō.

Tang Gaozong succeeded in conquering Paekche in 660. This proved to be a crucial step in the final conquest of Koguryō in 668, after which Tang established the protectorate of Andong in P’yŏngyang. A decisive factor that contributed to the victory was the alliance with Silla. Silla joined Tang forces in conquering both Paekche and Koguryō. What made the alliance possible was their short-term common goal of achieving the conquest of Koguryō and Paekche. The alliance could last so long as the interests of the two did not conflict, but it was bound to break down in the long run because the Chinese goal was to bring all non-Chinese into submission no matter in which “barbarian” state they lived, while for Silla,
the initial goal was to defeat Paekche and then Koguryo and later to expand into their territory.

Once it lost Silla’s crucial cooperation, Tang had to withdraw its administration from the peninsula. Once it withdrew, the final winner in this costly series of wars was Silla, whose hard struggles for unification pushed the Chinese off the peninsula and established the first unified Korean state in history. China thereafter had to be satisfied with having Korea merely as a tributary state which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, performed tributary duties but maintained its independence, ruling its own state without Chinese interference in its internal affairs.

After Parhae was founded at the end of the seventh century, even though it too posed a potential threat, the Chinese treated it pragmatically, eventually also accepting a tributary relationship with it and launching attacks only defensively. The Chinese rulers were never as aggressive against Silla as their predecessors had been against Koguryo during late Sui and early Tang. This change may in part have reflected the lesson that the Tang rulers had learned from the Korean war.