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Review of: Emerging from Meditation

Michiko Yusa

Western Washington University, michiko.yusa@wwu.edu

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that the order of judicial decisions does not lie so much in a body of doctrines, but rather in a relationship between these decisions and the social construction of which they are a part. The qādi’s discretion turns out to be far more limited than might at first appear, albeit in different ways than we are familiar with from Anglo-American common law, European civil law, or Roman canon law. Although the emphasis of Islamic law is on the individual, the way in which individuals are legally constituted is important and quite distinctive. The aim of the qādi is to get people back into the process of negotiating their own social arrangements without exceeding divine rules. Although pragmatic considerations clearly come in here, it would be a mistake to regard Islamic law as less logical in organization than any other legal system. It is just that the emphasis of its systematization lies in maintaining the rules of everyday life rather than internal structure.

Rosen’s argument is exceptionally interesting and well-constructed. Although his main thesis is quite simple, he uses it to try to make sense of a great variety of detail about actual cases, and he continually compares the decisions of his qādi in Morocco with those of other legal authorities in other systems. This is the first detailed and contemporary analysis of the workings of an Islamic court. It sheds light on many of the theoretical discussions of Islamic jurisprudence with which those interested in Islam are acquainted, and it brings out nicely the way in which judges seek to balance social and religious aims. It is often said that these aims go together in Islamic societies, but Rosen’s painstaking analysis of the role which ethnic and political differences play in Moroccan society suggests that it is not enough to expect state and religion to be reconciled through the decisions of the qādi. He is operating in a highly complex and diverse context, and Rosen is careful not to try to pigeonhole the character of his decisions with undue precision. The main thesis that the decisions of the qādi are far from arbitrary is well demonstrated in this book. We are reminded through both books that there is an intimate relationship between law and society, and we cannot investigate one without also concerning ourselves with the other.


This volume contains an English translation of Okina no fumi (Writings of an Old Man) (1746) and Shutsujō-kōgo (Emerging from Meditation) (1745), by Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–1746), preceded by the translator’s Introduction and followed by a Note on the editions used, the Conventions adopted in translation, a Bibliography, and Indexes of writings and characters for titles of writings and other names.
Pye's translation assertively brings onto the Western academic stage a free and critical thinker, Tominaga Nakamoto—an unexpected but by no means unusual product of Tokugawa Japan, as Pye makes clear in his Introduction—who has hitherto been given very little attention by the majority of modern scholars both in Japan and overseas. Tominaga was what we today call a historian of religions and ideas, and a highly controversial figure of his time. He approached Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto (and, to a much lesser extent, Daoism) with his theory of historical development of religious traditions, which he called kajō, “adding to the existent tradition” and superceding [lit.] “that which those who preach a moral way and establish a law of life ... tried to emerge above those who went before,” as aptly quoted by Pye (p. 3).

In the Introduction, Pye applies a “pratitya-samutpādic” or “geosocio-economic-historical” approach to the investigation of ideas, an approach buttressed by an awareness that ideas, just like everything else, are radically interrelated and interlocked in their given space and time. Following the discussion of the prominent aspects of Tominaga’s historical method and his theory of the relative nature of language (pp. 1–7), his biography (pp. 7–13), and the intellectual context of his time (pp. 13–18), Pye carefully sketches the socioeconomic background which made it possible for free thinkers such as Tominaga to appear in the commercial town of Osaka in the first half of the eighteenth century in Japan (pp. 18–24). He then demonstrates the lack of Western (that is, European) influence on the formation of critical and rational thinking in Japan at the time Tominaga was writing (pp. 24–30). Pye’s analytical skill shines forth as he turns to the East Asian intellectual tradition at large and demonstrates that it had sufficient reasons of its own to prepare the way for the birth of critical and rational thinking (pp. 30–38). Following his discussion of the influence of Tominaga’s works on his contemporaries and the subsequent generations of Japanese thinkers (pp. 38–47), Pye assesses the significance of Tominaga’s thought in terms of “the history of ideas in general” in that it “arrived at an intellectual attitude ... markedly parallel in its main principles to that of the European Enlightenment,” while Tominaga’s thought is “organically related to Asian intellectual traditions.” These two Japanese and European “intellectual worlds,” however, remained entirely autonomous (p. 46). Pye’s observation shifts the perspective from a Eurocentric one to one of a more global scope.

The first translated text, Writings of an Old Man (pp. 48–70), is short, concise, and easy to read. No doubt, Tominaga had the wider general audience in mind when he wrote it. In this work, Tominaga puts to his historical criticism Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto. His aim in part seems to recover their original teachings—or the timeless truth contained within them. This is none other than what he calls the “way of truth” (makoto no michi), of which he was a follower, rather than these three established traditions (see p. 52). This “way of truth,” Tominaga

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誠の道
describes, “is simply to perform our evident duty in everything, to give priority to the tasks of the day, to maintain an upright heart and correct conduct, to be restrained in speech and bearing, and, if we have parents, to serve and honor them well” (p. 57). Clearly emphasized here is the moral conduct of individual persons. Section 10 of the Writings (pp. 61–64) contains his critique of the Buddhist tradition, and this in fact is a brief summary of his earlier and much more extensive work, Emerging from Meditation.

The second translated text in this volume, Emerging from Meditation and then Speaking (pp. 71–183), is a detailed, technical discussion of the historical development of Buddhism and its various teachings, in twenty-five chapters. Tominaga views the historical development of sects, streams, and various teachings of Buddhism in terms of the principle of “adding and superceding” (kajō). In this connection, he maintains a pluralistic hermeneutical stance which admits that various teachings need not necessarily be harmonized, for they are varying interpretations, all viable, arising from the process of the attempt by human beings to approximate the Buddha’s teaching (see p. 147). With his historical perspective, Tominaga demythologizes many claims, such as the Mahāyāna sūtras containing the direct words of Śākyamuni Buddha (chap. 3). He sees the date of the Buddha’s appearance to be uncertain (chap. 23), the theory of eight consciousnesses to have arisen out of mistranslations of the six consciousnesses (chap. 12), the Zen claim for the lineage of the transmission of the Dharma to have been something that got started with Chiko (Zhiju, 534–606), a compiler of records of Zen masters (chap. 20), and so forth. Another marked feature of Tominaga’s approach is his concern for the practical. He criticizes the legalistic tendencies that developed through the course of history, such as the prohibition of meat-eating (chap. 16), a hypocritical attitude toward marriage found in the scriptures (chap. 15), and a strict verbatim observance of the precepts (chap. 14). Nakamura Hajime’s observation that Tominaga was a warm-hearted humanitarian merits our attention (see Nakamura Hajime, Kindai Nihon no hihanteki seishin [Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1965], pp. 202–205).

After reading the texts, especially Emerging from Meditation, one cannot help but wonder what modern Buddhologists would have to say about the scholarship of Tominaga. Unfortunately, the translator does not discuss this point. “Accuracies and Inaccuracies of Tominaga’s Understanding of Buddhism” and “Tominaga’s Textual Sources” would have been helpful discussions to be included in the translator’s Introduction.

As for the translation, it is generally accurate, and Pye’s commentary by way of footnotes is helpful (see p. 48 n. 4, and p. 147 n. 134). One only wishes that his commentaries were more extensive. Typographical and other minor errors are few: “Murgōyi” (p. 76, line 23) should read “Muryōgi”; “Laṅkāvatāra” (p. 139, line 12) should read “Shuryōgon”;
“After The Buddha-dharma” (p. 141, line 25) should read “After the Buddha-dharma”; and “Hayashi Chūho, surnamed Shi Ryō” (p. 153, line 4) should read “Hayashi Chūho, given name Shiryō” (the given name is most likely pronounced not “Shiryo” but Mitsuyoshi, Kazuyoshi, Noriyoshi, or Moroyoshi). “Farce acting” (p. 70) should be rendered “Nō play,” as the original reads sarugaku and not kyōgen (sarugaku was a term used by Zeami to refer to the art of Nō). Regarding the translation of Confucius’ saying (bottom of p. 144), the insertion of “Good and evil are” distorts the original. It should read “human nature is alike; by practice it becomes far apart” (The Analects 17.2). To translate the Japanese “ushū” as “Sarvāstivāda” in wholesale fashion is questionable (p. 114 and also p. 141, at the head of chap. 17). On page 82, the word “ushū” indeed corresponds to the Sarvāstivāda, but it is also a word of generic reference to those schools which stood against the schools of “emptiness,” and it seems that the latter was meant on pages 114 and 141.

A final word on the convention of translation of proper names that Pye has adopted: it would have rendered the finished English texts much more smooth if Chinese proper names had been written in pinyin or some other accepted romanization system instead of transliterating them according to their Japanese pronunciations. Pye notes that “An exception is made for well-known names such as those of the Chinese Buddhists Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang” (p. 188), but a question remains: “‘Well-known’ to whom?” (Moreover, I noticed a few cases of inconsistencies in the handling of proper names—Xun Zi, for instance, is given as “Junshi [Hsun Tzu]” on p. 144, and as “Hsun Tzu” on pp. 65, 69, 137.) Similarly, Sanskrit words would have been better-off re-Sanskritized. Pye is careful to give his reasons for not doing so: “for this would have been alien to the flavor of Tominaga’s works. It would also have been contrary to the principles expressed in Writings of an Old Man!” (p. 188) (Pye is referring to the view advocated by Tominaga, which, to put it somewhat simplistically, is: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”). Indeed, by keeping Tominaga’s eighteenth-century Japanese scholarly conventions, the translator has successfully managed to retain the flavor of an old-fashioned scholarship, but at the price of obscuring the text unnecessarily for a contemporary reader of English. I do not think that Tominaga, who was critically aware of linguistic conditions (that a word has a semantic scope, changes with time, and is used in accordance with the intention of a person—see pp. 120–123), would have opposed writing Chinese and Indian names and terms in a way that would have been in accordance with today’s conventions. Otherwise, why did he ridicule the Shintoists of his day, who adhered to what appeared to him to be antiquated customs? (see p. 56). If I understand Tominaga’s spirit correctly, he would have been the first to say: “Be expedient and practical, my colleague!”

In conclusion: Professor Pye has brought to our attention an impor-

Troy Organ is a distinguished scholar of wide experience in Indian educational institutions and in American colleges and universities. This is his tenth book and a successor to his work on Indian philosophy of the self. Organ has been a true seeker of wisdom and brings to light new opportunities for Westerners and Indians to develop their sensitivities in personal ethics. In the forty-two years I have known him he has shown an experimental attitude toward life and has refused to be satisfied with any shibboleths of the ethical life.

The book has six chapters, each one dealing with human beings as vibrant choice-makers. They deal with the human being as philosopher, speaker, knower, self-knower, as a student of theories of the self, and as an agent of self-realization.

Organ is especially sensitive to the problem of understanding the East. To this end he has given many hints through the words of students of Eastern philosophy who also know something about the West. Wing-tsit Chan is quoted as pointing out that the main thrust of Chinese philosophy is humanism. Since the Renaissance, Western philosophy has been more or less dominated by man’s attempt to understand and control the external world. Domination became a major theme in Western practice as we have seen in the age of imperialism. A major absence in Organ’s work is its Eastern-like evasion of political questions. By searching the inner man, the East has largely closed its eyes to the devastating effects of nations exploiting each other and their own inhabitants. This is also a criticism of Aristotle despite his awareness that ethics is a branch of politics. Hegel points out that Aristotle was so enmired in his establishment that he seemed to think that everything worthwhile had to be done through individual effort within the establishment.

On the other hand it is a great relief for us to glide along in the canoe