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Workers and Commissars: Trade Union Policy in the People’s Republic of China

Merton Don Fletcher

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工人与干部

WORKERS AND COMMISSARS
Trade Union Policy in the People's Republic of China

Merton Don Fletcher

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This study is not an organizational or sociological work on trade unions in China. It is primarily a case study illustrating how changes in Chinese Communist Party political and economic orientations over time have been reflected in the Party's policy toward trade unions.

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branch organs ceased to function in December 1966, victims of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Only in 1973, following the rebuilding of the Party and the subsequent rehabilitation of mass organizations such as the Young Communist League, have trade unions reappeared. Thus, union policy in China continues to mirror broader policy developments.

Much of the work for this study began with my doctoral dissertation, "Trade union in Communist China: A functional comparison with the Soviet Union" (University of California, Berkeley, 1968) under the chairmanship of Professor James Townsend. While preparing the final draft, I received encouragement from Professor Charles Hoffman. Research in Hong Kong was supported by a travel grant from the Government Department, University of Queensland.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACFL  All-China Federation of Labor
ACFTU  All-China Federation of Trade Unions
CB  Current Background, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong
ECMM  Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong
SCMP  Survey of China Mainland Press, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong
URS  Union Research Service, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong
WHP  Wen Hui Pao (Cultural Contact Daily), Shanghai
Chinese labor policy, like any major governmental policy, has resulted from complex interaction between elite priorities and objective conditions. Like the Bolsheviks of fifty years ago and the elites in the emerging nations of the past decades, the Chinese Communists came to power in an underdeveloped country with a relatively small and very immature work force, a low level of technical development and a lack of investment capital. In terms of both industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions in China in 1949 were significantly worse than conditions in Russia in 1917. The Chinese also faced a high ratio of population to arable land and a high rate of population growth. Investment capital would have to come from agriculture, as in the Soviet Union, but the margin between production and subsistence consumption was already extremely thin. The Chinese Communists also came to power committed to "lean on one side" and to look to the Soviet Union as a model for building a national industrial economy. Chinese labor policy therefore shared many characteristics with labor policy in the Soviet Union and other developing countries. The Chinese even copied directly from the Soviets, initially adopting their general industrialization strategy and formal trade union structure. But even these adoptions were soon modified to meet the priorities of China's leaders, especially Mao Tse-tung himself. A study of Chinese labor policy illustrates primarily its uniqueness.

Chinese political and economic policy has differed significantly from the Soviet model. One basic reason for this has been a difference of approach to the problem of simultaneously industrializing, socializing and communizing an underdeveloped country.
For Marx, the proletariat was to be the vehicle of the communist revolution because of its significant position in a capitalist society. The proletariat was that class which had become "proletarianized," i.e., torn from traditional, feudal and familial relations, recruited into an industrial work force, and therefore intensely deprived both objectively and subjectively. When the proletariat's situation became desperate, when it had nothing to lose but its chains, it would overthrow capitalist society and substitute a communist one. For Marx, looking at Western Europe in the nineteenth century, industrialized capitalist society was the given, communist revolution was the predicted consequence.

In China, like in Russia, the communist revolution came before the process of proletarianization. The creation of an industrial work force had barely begun, and the revolution itself was based on the peasantry. The purpose of the revolution was to eliminate the remnants of traditional family and feudal relationships and to replace the existing regime with one committed to industrialization and modernization as a prelude to communism. This meant that the process of proletarianization had to be carried out after the revolution. Thus, potential alienation of the workers by the very process of proletarianization has intensified the problem of national integration and elite legitimization. The regime has attempted to educate the workers to an acceptance of communism as a world view, not only as a prerequisite to achieving communism but also to legitimize the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party itself.

In theory both the Chinese and the Russians have assumed that the communization of man is facilitated by objective conditions, thus the need for socialist industrialization. They have also assumed that the rate of industrialization is directly affected by the level of political consciousness among the people, thus the need for political education and indoctrination. But in practice the two regimes have had different priorities. In Russia Stalin
concentrated on industrialization. Only after their economic base had been secured did Soviet leaders make a concerted effort to combine education with industrialization. Under Stalin communization efforts were largely ignored, and efforts at political socialization were limited to those citizens essential to industrialization, like factory managers, engineers, and model workers. Their socialization was not by political education so much as it was by "economism," the capitalistic method of giving them a material stake in society. The rank and file workers were neither communized nor socialized but were controlled by labor discipline and, ultimately, by fear of the secret police and forced labor camps. In these terms, the Soviet thaw of the fifties consisted largely of extending economism to the rank and file workers.

In China, on the other hand, Mao has seemed to assume that in the final analysis political education holds the highest priority and is itself the primary motive-power for industrialization. This assumption reflects Mao's so-called Yenan thinking, that the Chinese masses, properly educated politically and properly mobilized, can overcome all obstacles. To a large extent, the Chinese have attempted to communize first, and thereby replace Soviet economism and compulsion with active commitment. They have, therefore, attached great importance to various forms of political education, especially participatory forms of political education.

This emphasis relates directly to Mao's redefinition of the concept of class into terms of ideological orientation. In the early fifties, the Party's propaganda emphasized national unity while playing down class struggle. Many Party leaders had not been workers or of worker origin, and the revolution itself was peasant-based. More significantly for the fifties, the Party needed the assistance of the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals. The bourgeoisie as a class, defined in terms of its relation to the mode of production, was destined to disappear, and the proletariat was extolled as the leading class in Chinese
society. But the emphasis on unity was clear. To oversimplify, during that early period all individuals, regardless of class origin, with the correct ideological orientation could be included in the people. From 1956 to 1958 the "transition to socialism" was accelerated, and the emphasis shifted from unity to struggle. During the earlier period, classes in the Marxian sense including a bourgeoisie in private control of most of China's industry still existed, but there was also a need for unification and cooperation to get industrialization underway. By 1957 the bourgeoisie no longer existed in the Marxian sense, but Mao insisted on the need for struggle against bourgeois thinking within the remaining classes and within individual minds. According to Mao, everyone was subject to bourgeois thinking, regardless of class origin. Therefore, contradictions might develop within classes or among the people or in the thinking of individuals.

This is not the place to reconsider all the partial and possible reasons for Mao's change in emphasis. However, two major implications of that change should be noted. First, it changed the relationship between ideology and the Party organization. As Mao's statements during the Cultural Revolution can be reconstructed, if ideology and not class origin is the key, then Mao's thought stands above the Party. Party leadership must be justified by its performance toward realizing Mao's vision of the new China; it cannot be justified in class terms by the Party's definition as vanguard of the proletariat. Party members are, in fact, particularly susceptible to bourgeois thinking because their leadership positions can easily lead to entrenchment and thus to conservatism or revisionism. In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was an expression of Mao's rejection of national integration based on role interdependency and material goal orientations in favor of what might be called integration through ideological agreement created by common struggle. In labor policy this position has been reflected in Mao's preference for political education and struggle over material incentives, and for mass
participation over professionalism, expertise and organizational entrenchment.

Second, the change in emphasis from unity to struggle and the persistent tension between those two emphases have affected and changed the nature of political education. Political education has had two distinct themes since 1949. One theme has been national integration, patriotism, and the like. The second theme has been more ideological, i.e., Marxism-Leninism and, in the sixties, Mao Tse-tung's Thought. The first kind of political education has been directed toward national integration or socialization in the traditional sense, while the second kind has been directed toward the communization of the Chinese people. Ideally, both work toward the same or overlapping purposes, but in practice this has not always been the case. The workers have been a prime target for both types of educational effort, and the differences and changes in emphasis discussed here are therefore conspicuous in Chinese labor policy.

In China trade union activity is a part of the regime's labor policy. In this study, however, an effort has been made to concentrate on the unions. Chinese labor policy has reflected changing circumstances over time, apparent changes in Mao's policy orientations, and the tides of fortune in Mao's conflict with other Party leaders on the issues of ideology versus organization and politics versus professionalism. It has also reflected the development of professionalism among union officials and the Party's response to that development.

The aim of this study is chronological, to offer a general picture of trade union performance as it developed over time. It should be remembered, of course, that the periodization is only approximate and general. The years 1956-1958 have been suggested as a dividing point in the history of the Communist regime, with certain emphases characterizing the two periods before and after that point. But policy emphasis has also oscillated during each
of those two periods. For purposes of analysis the twenty-odd-year history of the Communist regime is divided here into seven periods: an early period of political and economic consolidation and reorganization; the period of China's first five-year plan and adoption of the Soviet industrialization strategy and policy of one-man management; the period from 1955 to 1957, when socialization of industry necessitated and the hundred flowers policy made public a major debate on the role of the unions; the period of the Great Leap Forward at the end of the fifties; a period of recovering from the disastrous effects of that campaign during the early sixties; the Cultural Revolution; and the period since then.

Three major patterns or models of union performance are discernible in those six periods. During three of them Chinese unions have had several functions: 1949-1952, 1955-1957, and 1961-1963. Although production was at the center of their work, they were also actively engaged in political education, administrative work, and communication between the Party and the workers. The second model appeared during the first five-year plan; under the Soviet policy of one-man management union performance was largely limited to the single task of promoting production. The third model characterized the Great Leap Forward and, with modifications, the early part of the Cultural Revolution. During those two periods reliance on political education was greatly intensified, and the unions were functionally supplanted by the Party during the Great Leap Forward and completely supplanted by "revolutionary rebel" groups during the Cultural Revolution. Since the trade unions have reappeared only very recently characterization of the seventh period is particularly tentative. Basically, however, current policy fits the third model.

Since the main presentation is chronological, an introductory note is added here on each of the major functions assigned to the unions: transmission belt between the Party and the workers, political education, production, and administrative functions.6
Chinese Unions as Transmission Belt

The transmission belt role of the unions in Communist countries involves the entire question of Party-union relations. It is therefore at the center of union policy. In the Soviet Union, between 1917 and 1920, the question of union independence was openly debated. Lenin's decision was that the unions not be formally incorporated into the state bureaucracy, but that they be guided by the Party from above and led by the Party from within through the leadership position of Party members:

In its work, the Party relies on the trade unions...which are formally nonparty. Actually, all the directing bodies of the vast majority of the unions and primarily, of course, of the...All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, consist of Communists and carry out all the directives of the Party. Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non-Communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the class and with the masses, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the dictatorship of the class is exercised. Without close contact with the unions...it would, of course, have been impossible for us to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship.7

The Chinese position has been similar, without the initial period of open debate. Unions have been considered a "good lieutenant" to the Party. The Party is considered the highest organ or vanguard of the working class; unions are considered the organizational structure of the working class and a link between the Party and the workers. Therefore, the unions must work under the guidance and leadership of the Party.8 The unions were formally established as workers' organizations with the obligation of defending workers' interests, but workers' interests have been identified with the development and policies of the "workers' state." On the one hand,

It is the duty of trade unions to protect the interests of workers and staff members, to
ensure that the managements or owners effectively carry out labor protection, labor insurance, wage standards, factory sanitation and safety measures as stipulated in the laws and directives, and to take measures for improving the material and cultural life of the workers and staff members.  

On the other hand,  

In order to safeguard the fundamental interests of the working class...(the trade unions must) a) Educate and organize the masses of workers and staff members to support the laws and decrees of the People's Government, (and) carry out the policies of the People's Government in order to consolidate the people's State power which is led by the working class; b) educate and organize the masses of workers and staff members to adopt a new attitude toward labor, to observe labor discipline, to organize labor emulation campaigns and other production movements in order to ensure the fulfillment of the production plans.

A primary instrument of Party control over the unions and other mass organizations, in China as in the Soviet Union, has been the leadership role of individual Party members within the union hierarchy. All of the top officials of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) since 1949 have been Party members of high standing except Chu Hsieh-fan, who before 1949 had led the non-Communist but Leftist Chinese Association of Labor in Nationalist China. Perhaps more importantly, this policy is observed even at the local levels. Control within the union structure itself has been hierarchical, reflecting the leadership principle of democratic centralism. Union members were organized by enterprise or institution, enterprise unions were organized into national unions by industry, and national industrial unions were coordinated under the leadership of a single national congress. The congress was to be convened only every four years, however, and active leadership was to be exercised by the Executive Committee and especially the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Labor (ACFL; renamed ACFTU at the Seventh Trade Union
In fact, no national congress has been convened since 1957.

In practice Party policy on union structure has been flexible, and two distinct organizational structures have been emphasized at different times. One is the vertical organizational structure of the industrial unions, as just described. The other is a regional union organization, horizontal in structure and closely tied to the provincial and municipal Party and government apparatus. When combined with other policies, this duality of organizational structure has had a significant effect on the unions. When the Chinese have emphasized "politics in command," the industrial sector has undergone organizational decentralization, putting effective leadership in the hands of local and regional Party committees rather than central ministries.\textsuperscript{12} The situation within the unions has been similar. During the early years of Communist rule the industrial unions were still weak, and regional union organs had the advantage. The industrial union system was formally established by a new union constitution adopted in 1953; its strength increased during China's first five-year plan, reaching a peak in 1956.\textsuperscript{13} But the unions, along with industry, were decentralized again during 1957, as indicated by the revised constitution adopted by the Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.\textsuperscript{14} The existence of overlapping personnel has modified the differences between the regional union organization and the industrial union organization, but extensive research on union personnel by Paul Harper suggests that significant differences do exist, especially in terms of orientation to China's politics-professionalism or red-expert conflict.\textsuperscript{15} An additional effect of horizontal rather than vertical structure is the emphasis on geographical/institutional units rather than occupational categories or divisions of labor. That is, the emphasis is on the factory as composed of workers, technicians and cadres and its immediate geographical environment rather than on the relationship of workers in different plants through the industry-wide union organization.\textsuperscript{16}
of this emphasis within the broader policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Maoist strategies of the Cultural Revolution will become more obvious in subsequent chapters.

As the term transmission belt implies, a major function of the unions has been two-way communication between the Party and the workers. While the Chinese have periodically attempted to improve the upward flow of information, this has been difficult in practice because of the absence of any real leverage or power at the bottom. In this respect the relation between the unions and the Party has been similar to relations between lower and higher level cadres within the Party. Union officials have been in the middle; they are elected by the workers and theoretically represent them, but as Party members they are also subject to Party discipline. The Party evaluates union cadres and controls all sanctions and rewards; therefore, union officials almost inevitably side with the Party when workers' interests conflict with Party directives.

The major source of information about union performance has been criticisms of the unions published by the Party or by the union leadership. The unions have been criticized for either economism or bureaucratism. Economism has meant over-emphasis on worker amenities and reliance on material incentives rather than political education. Party accusations have associated it with attempts to exploit worker demands to put the unions above the Party, and with economic trade unionism and syndicalism. Bureaucratism has meant preoccupation with production but more with reports, meetings and other office chores to the neglect of contact with the workers. The Chinese Communists have attempted to maintain a balance among several relationships. Production is to be raised by increasing worker enthusiasm through political education, but successful education depends on worker confidence in the unions and the Party, which is in turn contingent on proficient political education but also on the way the workers are treated and remunerated, the general fulfillment of Party promises, the efficacy of the unions,
etc. The key to this balance has been the cadre. Without maximum effort by competent and dedicated cadres the balance cannot be approximated, but competent cadres have been few and their tasks overwhelming.

At the same time, accusations against lower functionaries may also be used to cover mistakes or changes in policy by the Party leadership. When mistakes have been made or policies changed, the onus has been officially directed either at "counterrevolutionary" sabotage or at cadres accused of bureaucratism or economism. The cadres involved may be guilty of the mistakes ascribed to them, but they may have been following Party policy at the time. The corrective for mistakes has invariably been a combination of increased Party control from above and increased mass supervision from below. The two sides of this prescription may appear contradictory, but they are not. The concept of mass supervision provides the Party with a means of enlisting the masses on its side and of criticizing union cadres in the name of the mass line. In a similar way, the prescribed remedy for mistakes by Party cadres has been increased mass initiative together with increased central Party control.

These trends are, of course, not always clear-cut. Economism and bureaucratism are not opposite extremes. At times some unions have been criticized for economism while others have been under attack for bureaucratism or both. Cadres have tended to swing from one deviation to another in response to criticism from above. But the patterns are quite clear. The role assigned to unions makes them consistently susceptible to certain types of actual mistakes or deviations from Party intentions. It also makes them consistently susceptible to playing the role of scapegoat.

Effective performance of the transmission belt function of the unions depends on effective political education. In one direction the unions transmit Party policies and directives to the workers, together with explanations of the broader political significance of those policies within the Party's general line. The
workers are also organized to propagate and implement Party programs for other social groups, like attacks on class enemies.

At the same time, the political consciousness of the workers is an "objective condition" that must be considered in the formulation of policy. It is particularly important in assessing the feasibility of policies involving major social changes or that otherwise depend on participation by the masses. But the Party must lead the masses, not follow them, and must constantly raise their political consciousness.

This relationship is expressed in the leadership concept of the mass line. As an operational concept the mass line depends on three assumptions. First, to fulfill their leadership role successfully, Party leaders must maintain constant contact with the masses. Second, since the Party has superior wisdom and experience as the vanguard of the proletariat, the Party alone knows the long-term, collective interests of the people as a whole. Third, while the Party must use persuasion and education rather than coercion in taking its policies to the masses, it is the Party that must lead. 18 Active mass participation is called for, but it consists of executing rather than formulating or controlling policy. In Mao's words, "we must teach the masses clearly what we have received from them confusedly." 19

Political Education and Production

Political education has permeated all functions of Chinese trade unions. Production emulation campaigns have been the main classroom, but almost all union activities have involved political education in one way or another. While the Party played an increasingly important role in political education after the early fifties, the unions have consistently provided the organizational framework. A major reason for attempting to increase union membership has been that workers outside the union system do not receive the systematic education that can be applied through the union
apparatus.

Perhaps the most important part of the apparatus, in the unions as in China in general, has been the small group. Franz Schurmann has argued that a major organizational contrast between the Soviet Union and China has been the contrast between individuation and collectivization. In his view, the Soviet system tended toward individual atomization suited to control, while the Chinese system has tended toward small-group atomization, suited to persuasion, indoctrination and activization. 20

In addition to daily efforts at practical political education, the unions also conducted courses in the histories of the Party and the Chinese labor movement, Marxism-Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung as part of a major spare-time education program. 21 The schedule of one model factory was published in 1953 as an example for other factories. All workers spent three hours of class time each week studying the current mass propaganda campaign and two hours per week on Marxist-Leninist ideology. 22 It is doubtful, however, that this ideal was often attained on a regular basis in many factories. With the advent of one-man management and concurrent emphasis on labor discipline over political education, practice increasingly deviated from the model. A move to restore the program began in late 1956 and early 1957, only to be interrupted again by the Great Leap Forward. Another attempt to reestablish systematic classroom programs during the early sixties was interrupted by the Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolution during which many hours were devoted to ideological study, but the subject matter had changed to Mao's thoughts.

Even more important than the tension between in-class and "living" or practical learning, but not unrelated to it, has been the tension between the two major themes of political education noted above. On the one hand, political education has been designed to communize Chinese workers to an acceptance of the ideology or world view of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao
Tsetung. On the other hand, political education has also been designed to socialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the Communist regime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals and programs.

Theoretically, of course, the two themes are intimately related, and even in practice they overlap considerably. But during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the potential dichotomy between them became evident when the Party's leaders disagreed over the issue of politics versus professionalism. Much of the divergence stems from the relationship between political education and production. The attempt to industrialize and communize simultaneously creates a conflict over the relative priorities of those two goals insofar as they are incompatible. That conflict has been evident in differences of opinion within the Party leadership. Labor incentive policy embodies the convergence of political education and production mobilization, and therefore also provides a concrete example of that conflict.

Like the Soviets, the Chinese have employed an incentive system in which material and nonmaterial rewards are combined. In basic outline the Chinese wage system has copied the Soviet system of standard wage grades. Wage standards for each grade are centrally determined, primarily on the criteria of establishing incentives for increased effort and skill-attainment, and of total wage funds available for distribution. As in the Soviet Union, the availability of consumer goods has been an important consideration in the total wage bill and the general effectiveness of material incentives.

The Chinese system of nonmaterial or contributive incentives has also generally followed the Soviet system of individual and group competitive emulation campaigns and the awarding of honorific titles to individual workers and production groups. The awards are often accompanied by a cash bonus and other material advantages. For example, workers designated as "model," "advanced," and similar
terms receive more liberal insurance benefits than other workers. Also, almost all workers chosen for Party membership and/or promotion to cadre status or administrative positions have been either model workers or worker activists.25

If the Chinese incentive system has copied the Soviet model in outline, however, it has differed in detail and in style. Communist theory posits the superiority of various forms of contributive incentives over the "capitalistic" incentive of individual wages. Ideally, the communist worker contributes his labor freely to the collective and receives from it a stipend adequate to his needs. In practice, both the Chinese and Soviet leaders have deemed individual material incentives necessary. Expressed in theoretical terms, these countries are considered to be in a socialist rather than communist stage of development, and the "correct" wage policy for that stage is remuneration according to labor rather than according to need.26

The Russian answer to the problem of work incentives under conditions of economic scarcity was a combination of material incentives, contributive incentives and compulsion. The essential features of the Soviet system of material incentives--progressive piece wages and very sharp wage differentials--were contrary to the egalitarian wage policy favored by many of the union leaders purged in 1928-1929 and to the assumptions of Marxist theory about the solidarity of the working class under a socialist regime. In addition, the Soviet system of contributive incentives was a modified system at best. It included symbolic rewards and appeals to patriotism and other collective values, but the heart of the system was Stakhanovism and "socialist competition." Both were based on competition rather than collectivity, and both were tied to monetary incentives.28 The entire incentive policy, in fact, focused on "leading groups" of workers, such as the Stakhanovites, who were able to benefit from very steep piece-wage differentials and who were basically rate-busters. Wage increases received by
most workers were more than offset by inflation, so that real wages for all Soviet nonagricultural wage-earners declined steadily from 1928 to about 1950. 28

The Chinese Communists have also recognized the need for remuneration on the basis of work done as long as all Chinese workers are not Communists. During most periods since 1949 they have argued, in fact, that attention to workers' welfare was a prerequisite for effective political education. Only twice, during the Great Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution, have they actually rejected material incentives. But throughout the twenty years of their regime, they have emphasized much more than the Russians the cooperative aspects of emulation and the need to combine emulation with political education. They have also used piece wages on a much smaller scale than the Soviets and have based their emulation programs much more on production groups than on individuals.

These differences from the Soviet model have been consistent, but the tensions and changes in emphasis have continued. There are obvious advantages to an effective system of non-material labor incentives. Under conditions of limited capital and a limited consumer market, it is a valuable supplement to total wage allocations. It may also provide a degree of labor discipline that cannot be achieved by wage incentives. It is especially conducive to quality control because it does not encourage workers to find shortcuts that reduce their own work effort at the expense of co-workers and the whole production process. Most importantly, an incentive policy based on competition for material rewards is of course, incompatible with communist education but rather compatible with political education aimed at traditional socialization and thus conducive to socialization efforts.

The success of persuasive exhortation and other non-material incentives is conditional. It will depend for effectiveness on the workers' view of their own position in society. That view will be influenced by the degree of technical skill and general
education of the work force, the ability of the workers to influence trade union policies, union effectiveness in the society at large, and not least, by the level of worker remuneration.

Contributive incentives are therefore likely to be much more effective for stimulating marginal productivity than as the basic method of creating labor discipline unless a total conversion of worker views on work and remuneration can be achieved. In addition, at some point in the industrialization process labor productivity becomes primarily a function of industrial technology, mechanization and rationalization rather than labor discipline or intensification of labor. In the long run, political education can only supplement but not replace technology. This conflict within the Chinese incentive policy reflects the broader conflicts over Chinese labor and general industrial policy.

Administrative Functions of Chinese Trade Unions

Lenin called Soviet trade unions schools of management and schools of administration, ostensibly looking toward a future when the workers could manage industrial enterprises and even the state itself. This idea was soon abandoned by Stalin, but it has not been entirely abandoned in China. More importantly, the Chinese have been committed to active worker participation in the factories as much for its socialization and political education value as for administrative training. They have, for example, periodically attempted to establish meaningful roles for factory workers' conferences, under the guidance of both Party and union, even if such attempts have been short-lived.

Moreover, the unions have consistently administered industrial welfare programs, taking up much of their time and energy, and have attempted to engage large numbers of worker activists in these programs. The unions have also played a peripheral role in programs for general and technical education for the workers and have performed other administrative roles at various times. The unions
have actively participated in a large variety of administrative programs and also mobilized the workers for participation. This also has served the Party by relieving it of various administrative chores. In sum, there has been in China a desire for active worker participation in the factories and in the state that contrasts sharply with the spirit of control that prevailed in the Soviet Union.

A major task in which the unions did not participate was the allocation of labor, attended to by Labor Bureaus under the Ministry of Labor. In contrast to the unions whose roles and functions were primarily internal to the factories, the Labor Bureaus formally mediated labor-management relations above the factory level and oversaw various labor regulations, such as those pertaining to working conditions. By 1957, however, as industry was socialized and the Party became increasingly committed to complete control over labor allocation, the Bureaus' primary functions were supervision of unemployment and labor assignment policies.
Chapter 11
THE HONEYMOON PERIOD, 1949-1952

The main economic goal of the Chinese Communists has been socialist industrialization, that is, industrialization of the Chinese economy and socialization of industry, handicrafts, and agriculture. The strategy for industrializing the economy adopted by the Party in 1949 and the early fifties was in essence the Soviet program for industrialization. Before China's first five-year plan could be implemented, however, the country had to be prepared.

The years 1949 to 1952 were a period of consolidation for the Chinese Communists. After they had won the civil war in 1949, they faced the task of moving from rural guerrilla centers to the cities and the political consolidation of their victory. In industry, too, this was a period of consolidation, sometimes almost of starting from scratch. China in 1949 was characterized by severe economic scarcity and underdevelopment. The economy had in the forties been ravaged by the Sino-Japanese War, the civil war and the sabotage of retreating Kuomintang troops. The industrial complex established by the Japanese in Manchuria had been stripped by occupying Russian soldiers. Communication and transportation systems and many factories had been destroyed. Inflation was rampant. In terms of both industrial base and reservoir of available skills, conditions in China were significantly less favorable than conditions in Russia after the October Revolution.

Labor policy was influenced by both the flush of victory and the major tasks facing the regime. It was in many ways a honeymoon period for the unions and the workers. The support and participation of the workers was actively wooed, and many were promoted to cadre and administrative positions. A national labor
insurance program was introduced and widely publicized. The unions were assigned many different functions and allowed a degree of independence in carrying them out. The specific tasks assigned to them reflected this general orientation. To the extent that an integrated program of interrelated functions was realized, categorization is somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, various union functions are discussed separately for analytic purposes.

The major administrative tasks of the unions during this initial period were building the unions and recruiting cadres, assisting the Party to recruit workers for cadre and administrative line-staff positions, representing the workers in the factories, and introducing labor insurance and related welfare programs.

**Building the Unions and Recruiting Cadres**

In the early years of the Communist regime the unions played a prominent role, in collaboration with the Party, in building their own organization and in recruiting workers for promotion.

The organization and reorientation of the union structure and the recruitment of union members was, logically and chronologically, the first task of the unions. Union cadres were sent to establish unions where none existed. In enterprises with established unions, teams of cadres were sent in to break the power of gang-labor chiefs and to reorganize the unions. The process of screening workers during this period was, in fact, overly rigorous in many areas. According to Hsü Chih-chen, many cadres committed the error of "closed doorism," excluding workers on the bases of ideological leanings, work ability, and educational level. As Hsü argued, a major function of the unions was to educate the workers to overcome those very disabilities. At the same time, an attempt was made to screen intransigent trouble-makers and "counterrevolutionaries" from union membership and especially from positions of authority.

As in the Soviet Union, membership in unions was not compulsory,
but every effort was made to persuade workers to join. In addition to the personal efforts of union and Party cadres, the press devoted considerable space to publicizing increases in union membership and the advantages of membership. The administration of labor insurance was also coordinated with this effort. According to the ACFTU, workers in "key" industries and cities were "basically organized" by the end of 1950. By the end of 1952 ninety percent of all industrial workers had joined unions. Recruitment became an issue again only in 1958 when the number of workers suddenly increased from nine million to more than twenty-five million as a result of the policies of the Great Leap Forward. Even then the recruitment problem was not major. Many of the new workers were only part-time and thus ineligible for union membership. Also during that period much of the mobilization of the workers was carried out by the Party committees directly, obviating mobilization by the unions.

In 1949 the unions were also assigned the task of assisting the Party branches select and nominate workers for cadre posts and assisting in the promotion of competent workers to administrative positions. In most cases these workers were first or simultaneously recruited into the Party. After these early years the unions were not mentioned in connection with this task at all, and industrial enterprises came to be staffed more and more by Party members who were sent to technical schools on the Party's initiative. But during this early period the assistance of all official and semi-official organizations was necessary. And the unions did continue to provide practical administrative experience and areas for activism through which individual workers could distinguish themselves for promotion.

Representing the Workers

According to Articles Five and Six of the Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China:
Trade unions in enterprises operated by the state or by co-operatives shall have the right to represent the workers and staff members in taking part in administering production and in concluding collective agreements with the managements.

Trade unions in private enterprises shall have the right to represent the workers and staff members in conducting negotiations and talks with the owners of these private enterprises, in taking part in the labour-capital consultative councils and in concluding collective agreements with the owners of these private enterprises.8

As one would expect, however, not only did the nature of this function depend on whether an enterprise was state or privately owned, it was also particularly susceptible to fluctuations in Party policy in both types of enterprise.

Before the general nationalization of industry in the mid-fifties, the state assumed ownership of those enterprises previously owned by the Kuomintang government or by bureaucratic capitalists. A transitional system of factory management was established in state-owned enterprises. Since control and communications networks of the central authorities had not yet been consolidated, practice did not always conform to stated policy, and geographical diversity existed. But the general pattern was as follows. In most areas enterprises were actually taken over by the army's Military Control Commissions. The enterprises were then administered by Factory Administrative Committees consisting initially of top managerial and engineering personnel, local Party cadres, and military commanders. In effect, because the military and Party personnel lacked technical and administrative competence, the managers retained operational direction of the enterprise while the military and Party personnel held ultimate veto power.9

Official policy called for a change in state-owned enterprises to a system of collective or democratic management as soon as possible. What this meant in practice was that the Party committees came increasingly to dominate factory affairs. But the unions also
played a significant role. It was their duty to educate the workers preparatory to participating in democratic management, and they were to organize Staff and Workers Representative Councils which elected representatives to the Factory Administrative Committees. Many of the tasks of the Factotry Committees were, in fact, handled by standing committees consisting of the factory manager, the head of the union, and a third member who was "co-opted by the Factory Administrative Committee."^\textsuperscript{10}

In private industries worker-management relations were to be systematized by the establishment of labor-capital consultative councils. The unions appointed worker representatives to the councils, and the union chairman was an ex-officio member of the council along with the owner or his representative and the manager.\textsuperscript{11} Labor-management relations centered on the adoption of factory collective agreements and the settlement of grievances, but these two issues were important in form only.

Collective agreements in China have followed the pattern established in Soviet industrial relations. The primary function of the agreements has been to publicize the factory production plan established by the state. In China the agreements have also had a second purpose, to establish management's responsibilities to the staff and workers that included the hiring and firing of workers, certain issues related to wages such as overtime pay and bonuses, treatment of apprentices, and equality of wages for men and women, the establishment of working hours and holidays, protection of female and child labor, and welfare benefits pertaining to workers in enterprises with less than one hundred employees and thus not participating in the national labor insurance program.\textsuperscript{12} Policies on these issues differed slightly from one type of enterprise to another, but they were basically defined by national labor legislation.

The unions were also formally designated to represent the workers in consultation with management to settle grievances.\textsuperscript{13}
In practice, however, the Chinese have favored informal mediation and persuasion over formal mediation and arbitration procedures, and formal grievance procedures are almost never mentioned in the Chinese labor press.

The formal worker and union role in the state-owned factories was therefore much greater than in private factories, with equal representation on the Factory Administrative Committees and their own Representative Councils to provide mass supervision of management, "tap the wisdom of the workers," and give the workers a sense of active participation in the enterprise. On the other hand, workers and unions were expected to cooperate more consistently with state managers than with private managers. In sum, this was a period of relatively active participation by workers and unions.

**Welfare Tasks**

Workers' welfare more than any other activity has been the special concern of the unions in China. Primarily, they have had total responsibility for the administration of labor insurance. They have also been responsible for general assistance to the workers (for example, mediating marriage disputes, helping workers budget their incomes, and organizing mutual aid societies), for organizing and administering cultural and recreational facilities, and for certain tasks related to labor protection or factory conditions.

The performance of all these tasks has reflected, once again, fluctuations in general economic policy. During the early years labor insurance was in the limelight. In February of 1951, labor insurance regulations were issued by the Chinese government. Under these regulations, in plants with more than 100 workers the management was to provide insurance benefits for retired, injured, and child-bearing workers. In smaller plants, workers and management were to reach agreements negotiated by the unions. In enterprises regularly covered by the national insurance program the unions managed insurance funds and carried out all duties connected with the collection and distribution of insurance funds.
The unions were also made responsible for establishing "communal labor insurance establishments," i.e., sanatoria, rest homes for the aged, orphanages, and homes for the disabled. Both the ACFTU and local unions sponsored such establishments. In major industrial centers, union councils also opened schools to train labor insurance officials. According to official statistics, 200,000 cadres had been so trained by 1954. 16

During the early fifties the administration of labor insurance reflected other current policies. The unions were attempting to encourage voluntary membership by all eligible employees by pointing out that union members received superior insurance benefits. The unions' major focus of attention was the organization of emulation campaigns for production in which they recommended model workers for special benefits. The regime was also trying to liberate women and bring them into the work force by making insurance provisions for women workers during childbearing.

In the field of cultural and recreational facilities, the unions were to establish clubs, cultural halls or palaces, libraries, and cultural and recreational programs. One of the major reasons for these programs initially was presumably to occupy the workers' spare time and thus control such activities as gambling and drinking. But it was also designed to serve the positive function of conducting both cultural and political education among the workers. By the end of 1955 all factories with more than 100 workers reportedly had their own recreational clubs. 17 Aside from this figure, however, very little was published about the activities themselves during the early fifties. Before they were significantly developed, they were preempted by production efforts with the beginning of China's first five-year plan, and cultural education became temporarily the responsibility of management. 18

Political Education

Political education is discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. During this early period the effort to socialize
the workers predominated. The workers were lauded as the leading class in the state, and improvements in the lives of the workers since "liberation" were emphasized along with the role of the Party in providing those improvements. Another major theme of political education during this period was the patriotic "Resist-U.S., Aid-Korea" campaign. China now belonged to the workers, under Party leadership. Conditions were already better than before "liberation," as evidenced, for example, by the new national labor insurance program. But the major tasks of industrialization lay ahead, and the country was threatened from without. Therefore the workers must also realize their responsibilities as the leading class and sacrifice immediate and partial interests for the overall and long-term interests of the state as spelled out in Party programs and policies.

The attempt to coordinate these lessons is illustrated by the nature of union participation in the "Anti-U.S." movement. In October of 1950, a patriotic emulation or production-mobilization campaign was initiated in the Northeast and soon became nationwide. The thesis connecting the emulation campaign to a broader propaganda movement was that a truly prosperous China could only be built after the defeat of American imperialism in Asia, particularly in Korea at that time, and that the United States could only be defeated in Korea by increased production within China. In addition to the production campaign, the unions were also to organize the workers for related educational programs, demonstrations against the United States, and patriotic donations to the war effort.

Production

In China, as in other developing countries, production has been a central function of the unions. It has been at the center of a relatively unified union policy in which specific tasks relating to production, incentives, welfare, and political education are all closely related. The emphasis in approach to stimulating production during a given time period has reflected Party policy
emphases. Labor emulation campaigns or socialist emulation campaigns have been the cornerstone of Chinese industrial incentive policy. The goal has been continuous participation in some form of emulation by the entire work force. Even by early 1951 an estimated 2.23 million workers had participated in emulation campaigns. By the end of 1953 more than 223,000 people had been designated model workers.

China's early campaigns were similar in many ways to Soviet Stakhanovite emulations. Shock workers or shock brigades, for example, would establish new production records by the "improvement of tools" and the "improvement of work organization," the latter being basically the division of work processes into essential and auxiliary tasks to allow the shock worker to concentrate entirely on the production record, while another worker performed the auxiliary tasks. Since it is often more efficient for the worker to perform his own auxiliary tasks, this approach is appropriate only under conditions of surplus labor and/or for rate busting to establish new records for other workers to emulate.

But early Chinese emulation campaigns differed from Soviet Stakhanovite campaigns in two ways. First, they emphasized workgroup performance rather than individual performance. They tended, therefore, to integrate rather than divide production units. A major part of the publicity connected with the "new records" campaign, for example, was devoted to the Ma Heng-chang shock brigade. The second difference was the emphasis on combining emulation with national mass propaganda campaigns such as the "Anti-U.S." movement.

Transmission Belt

The transmission belt function of the unions is discussed in this study essentially in terms of Party criticism of union performance. This has both advantages and disadvantages. The manner in which the unions serve as a link between the Party and the workers provides an overview of how well they are carrying out other duties, how well they are communicating with the workers, and how their
orientation to their own work differs from Party expectations. It also means that our perspective will be primarily from the top down rather than from the point of view of the workers or even the unions. It also means that the emphasis will be on crises and periods of major reorientations in union-Party relations rather than day-to-day functioning.

The first crisis in Party-union relations came in the early years of the regime and was widely publicized at the Seventh ACFTU Congress in 1953. This attack was directed at the national union leadership which was accused of economism and of seeking independence from Party control.\(^{23}\) The unions had "arbitrarily" stressed the individual interests of the workers as against the overall long-term interests of the state, and the national leadership had led lower union organs away from the Party and had considered the unions the "highest form of organization of the working class."\(^{24}\)

Party priorities and expectations were much different in 1953 than in 1951 when these deviations had taken place. The Seventh ACFTU Congress was held to redirect union activities in preparation for significant changes in economic policy. Party accusations were, therefore, undoubtedly overstated. Union activities, however, had inclined toward independence and economism in 1951 for several causes.

One cause of union independence during 1951 was circumstantial. In theory, the unions were from the outset under the leadership of the Party, but in 1951 the Party was still consolidating its own position. Potential rivals were being eliminated, and the Party was recruiting the cadres necessary to rule the country. This situation had several consequences for the unions. First, the workers and unions could be used to attack the capitalists. Second, worker support was being actively wooed, as evidenced by the strong emphasis on labor insurance and the lack of emphasis on labor discipline during this period. That is, Party policy itself tended to economism during this honeymoon period. The success of the
revolution combined with Party propaganda about the leadership role of the workers must have created very high expectations among the Chinese workers. And, third, the Party did not seem to exercise very direct control over union affairs during this period. The Party issued policies, but they were carried out by the unions in a relatively independent way.

Paul Harper has suggested an additional point in this connection. The functionaries of the old Chinese Association of Labor (CAL) had been absorbed into local unions after CAL was dissolved. Most of these men were non-Communists and had been exposed to the union philosophy of the West. Many of them, therefore, may have been more committed to economic or trade unionist struggle than to political struggle. The relevance of this point would seem to be modified by the fact, not overlooked by Harper, that Party criticism during this period was directed almost entirely at the national leadership and not at local units. At the same time, out of the ten representatives from the CAL included in the top ACFL leadership after the Sixth ACFL Congress in 1948, five were replaced or dropped at the Sixth Executive Committee of the ACFL during 1950-1951.

A second cause of union economism during this period apparently was a reaction to earlier criticisms by the Party. The initial task in the factories in early 1950 had been to restore production. In line with this the unions had worked closely with management. As a consequence, by the middle of 1950 the unions were criticized for over-emphasizing production and becoming divorced from the workers.

A third major cause of union mistakes was presumably a difference of opinion between top union leaders and top Party leaders. According to the Trade Union Law of 1950: "The trade unions have their own nationwide, independent and unified system of organization." This statement was missing from the Revised Trade Union Law of 1953. The ACFL, expanding and consolidating its control over a revamped union structure, also attempted to exert its statutory independence, which invoked a strong reaction from the Party.
These union deviations during 1951 were attributed mainly to Li Li-san. Li, as Minister of Labor and a Vice President of the ACFL, had been the official spokesman on labor and union policy in China since 1948. At the Seventh Congress he made no statement and was not elected to the new Secretariat of the ACFL (renamed the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ACFTU, at that Congress). Although he retained his position as Minister of Labor for two more years, his last major policy speech was delivered in February of 1951. At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 Li offered a vague apology for "mistakes I made when I was working at the All-China Federation of Trade Unions," without specifying the nature of those mistakes. The official version of Li's mistakes and those of other ACFL leaders was that they formulated a series of mistaken views, namely: the administration side should represent the whole and long-term interests, while the trade union side should represent individual and immediate interests; the administration side should represent production, while the trade union side should represent distribution, etc.

The points emphasized here were obviously that the unions were not to be independent of the Party and that union goals were not different from Party goals. Production, not worker remuneration, was the unions' primary consideration. The workers, through the unions, were to be used by the Party against the capitalists. But their conflict with management was as a part of "the people" and not as workers or union members. They were to confront enterprise owners on such issues as obeying state laws and cooperating in state plans, not on the issue of wages.

The union sins of economism and excess independence were ascribed to the central organs of the ACFL. The second attack on the unions was directed at lower-level cadres and concerned mistakes of quite a different nature. By 1952 and 1953 the unions were caught up in the policy changes introduced by the san-fan and wu-fan movements and preparatory to China's first five-year plan. The unions were assigned a major role in the attack on capitalists.
during that campaign. This, of course, changed the task orientation of the unions in private enterprises.

But the unions also came under attack and were reorganized during the san-fan movement. For the unions those campaigns began with a Democratic Reform Movement which was launched in the Northeast in 1951. It was essentially a movement to purify factory-level unions of "bad elements" who persisted in old pa tao practices of taking bribes for obtaining jobs for people. The san-fan campaign, as it applied to the unions, was an intensification of that purification process.

Union cadres were accused of the three general sins of extravagance, waste, and bureaucratic work style from which the movement received its name. They were also accused of inadequately supervising managers and thus of allowing irregularities to occur, of failing to promote workers, of bowing to the technical expertise of retained administrators, and of neglecting the political education of the workers. Some union cadres had allowed themselves to be bribed or corrupted by the owners and managers. In the most serious cases they were accused of gross corruption in their own union work. Lai Jo-yü, the new ACFTU president, and other members of the national union leadership formally confessed to the lesser charges of extravagance, waste, and bureaucratism. Lower-level cadres were subjected to criticism and, in the more serious cases, purged from leadership positions in the unions.

The attacks on the unions at this time were preparatory to policy changes, but they were also intended to "purify" the unions. Most of the union cadres purged during the Democratic Reform Movement and the san-fan movement were from one of two groups: old union officials who had stayed at their posts after 1949 without sufficiently reforming, and cadres from the old Communist guerrilla areas who were "corrupted" by the move to the cities and their new positions of authority. Replacements for purged cadres were recruited primarily from worker activists who proved their merit.
during the san-fan and wu-fan campaigns.

The wu-fan campaign also involved mobilization of the workers. They were organized by the unions to voice grievances and to hold "confrontation meetings" with employers. This served to pressure employers toward the regime's goals and also served to mobilize the workers who, especially in old industrial cities like Shanghai, had remained closely tied to their employers.
Chapter III

CHINA'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE SOVIET
MODEL, 1953-1955

By the end of 1952 the major preliminary tasks of the regime had been accomplished. Social order had been established, and China's industrial base had been rehabilitated. The inflationary spiral had been broken as early as March of 1950, and control over the country's fiscal system established in 1951. The influence of remaining class enemies had been largely eliminated. In 1953 China's first five-year plan began and with it China's attempt at implementing the Soviet model of industrial development.¹ The major characteristics of that model were centralized planning of the economy, including the establishment of production and growth targets for industry, agriculture and other economic branches, the priority of industrial investment over consumption, the priority of investment in heavy over light industry, and organization and control of the economy by large ministerial bureaucracies.²

At the same time a major effort was made to introduce the Soviet system of one-man management in Chinese factories. Even before that time the system was in operation in factories where Soviet influence was prominent, especially the joint Sino-Soviet factories at Dairen and the heavy industrial factories of Manchuria. Its basic feature was vertical command, from a single plant manager to shop supervisor to section chief to production team heads. Managers received directives from, and were directly responsible to, the central ministries. Their jurisdiction within the factory was, in theory, all inclusive. The role of the Party committee was therefore reduced to ideological guidance of the manager, and union-worker participation in management atrophied. In a later criticism of this development concerning worker participation,
Li Hsüeh-feng addressed the Eighth Party Congress as follows:

Conferences and delegate conferences of workers and staff members which in themselves are one of the best ways to promote democracy in the enterprises are often turned into meetings at which the leadership assigns tasks and the masses give their pledges. The mass of the workers and staff members describe such meetings as occasions when "the director makes a report, the Party committee gives instructions, the trade union issues a call, and the masses give their pledges."^3

Formal union functions remained relatively unchanged from the previous period, but introduction of the Soviet model profoundly changed actual union tasks. The pattern of union performance during this period definitely emphasized production and labor discipline, to the neglect of welfare and political education.

The san-fan and wu-fan movements and an "anti-bureaucratism" campaign which followed it in 1953 were the first steps in China's transition from an initial period of economic rebuilding and political consolidation to a period of rapid industrialization and "transition to socialism." An initial problem was to restore production, especially in private industry, since those movements had paralyzed local initiative. The unions were also being structurally reorganized in preparation for an intensified industrialization drive. The unions were to concentrate all their attention on production and political education. They were to "avoid unimportant duties that have little to do with production or the masses," avoid encouraging workers into spare-time activities, and abolish unnecessary committees and reduce administrative overhead. According to Lai Jo-yü, at the Seventh Trade Union Congress, "the most important task of the trade unions is to unite and lead all workers, technical personnel and other employees so that they may consciously and actively develop production."^6

Management was not responsible for production planning and enterprise administration. The Party committee, assisted by the unions and the Communist Youth League, was responsible for
mobilizing the workers for production. Direct Party control of union activities increased significantly as the Party committees were freed from managerial responsibilities. Union functions were oriented away from the rather broad diversity of the previous four years to concentrate on mobilizing workers for production.

Production, Political Education and Welfare

Emulation campaigns continued to be praised as the primary method for increasing production. But the new orientation brought with it an emphasis on labor discipline and individual responsibility that was absent during the early years of the regime. Not only was the honeymoon over, but the system of one-man management itself was designed to function on the basis of factory discipline rather than the production-floor spontaneity of political mobilization by union and Party cadres.

The problem of labor discipline was indeed a serious one. By the end of 1953 the number of industrial workers had more than doubled since 1949, from 3,004,000 to 6,188,000. A major campaign to increase labor discipline was conducted in two surges, in the summer of 1953 and the summer of 1954, in an effort to reduce absenteeism among new workers still closely tied to rural families. They also came at a time of year when heat and ventilation problems exacerbated unfavorable working conditions. The Party's answer to the universal problems of labor discipline in an underdeveloping country, such as the immature and rural nature of the work force, and factory working conditions, had been political education toward workers self-discipline. That solution had been inadequate, and leadership cadres charged with politically educating the workers were severely criticized.

In an effort to strengthen labor discipline, the Party took the first steps. But most of the actual work was assigned to the unions, under Party leadership. The suggested methods for improving the situation were to increase and improve political education, assist management to improve factory conditions, and increase
management control within factories. In fact, improvements in factory conditions were slow to appear, and even political education was often replaced by management control and punishment. According to early pronouncements, continued emphasis on educational persuasion was not meant to rule out punitive action when warranted. Within a short time the "erroneous adoption" of "rash methods of punishment" in place of education was being criticized, but punitive measures "when necessary" continued to be sanctioned.

In the summer of 1954 new labor regulations, similar to those in the Soviet Union, were promulgated, stipulating penalties for absenteeism, tardiness and violations of factory regulations. According to later criticism, management took advantage of the labor discipline campaign to adopt harsh punitive methods and to shift responsibility for accidents onto the workers. The unions themselves had to be warned against punitivism in their own work and to oppose punitivism by management.

To assist in the enforcement of labor discipline, workers' courts were established in major industries. These courts were set up and directed by the People's Courts, guided by the unions, and staffed by workers and employees. Modeled on the Soviet comradely courts, these organizations were established to settle minor discipline cases directed to them by management.

In production work, increased sophistication and professionalism accompanied the Soviet model. Improvements in technique and quality control were added to shock tactics in the emulation campaigns. The propaganda efforts accompanying the campaigns emphasized the need for labor discipline and personal austerity rather than patriotism and working class superiority. Political education was largely replaced by labor discipline, and the hours actually devoted to political study decreased sharply.

Workers' welfare was also neglected. Average wages increased much more slowly than previously and fell far behind increases in labor productivity. Labor insurance coverage was increased
significantly by revisions in the regulations in January of 1953, but even then labor insurance coverage remained relatively small. In 1954 and 1955 increases in labor insurance coverage barely kept pace with increases in the number of workers and employees even though universal coverage had not been approximated.

It is almost impossible to draw precise conclusions from the incomplete and confusing data available on communal labor insurance facilities, except to say that they have consistently been inadequate to serve China's work force and have been limited almost entirely to large factories engaged in heavy industry. Little was also done to protect the workers' safety or to enforce good working conditions, and union responsibility was secondary to that of the Ministry of Labor and its branch bureaus. The unions were assigned the task of assisting and supervising management and mobilizing the workers to do likewise on a day-to-day basis. However, the ACFTU did not convene its first national conference on labor protection until 1955. At that time basic-level unions were instructed to set up labor protection working committees, indicating that this had not been done previously.

Party-Union Relations

In the midst of these changes, the unions were once again criticized for bureaucratism and divorce from the masses in late 1954 and 1955. In many unions, it was charged, all decisions were made by one person or a small group, and meetings were not held, so there was no mass participation or collective leadership in union work. Union cadres considered themselves a "special group" and did not rely on activists. Moreover, they failed to show interest in workers' welfare or to relate political education to the workers' own lives and problems.

There seem to have been good reasons why the unions continued in their bureaucratic ways despite the Party's admonitions in 1953. In this case, the charge of bureaucratism denoted a burgeoning professionalism within the unions, under the impetus of the strict
division of responsibility and professionalism of the one-man management system.

We may also assume that Party leadership also contributed to this trend. Direct Party leadership over union work led the unions to abdicate responsibility for working with the masses. With its mass work largely taken over by the Party committees, the unions would be further motivated to concentrate on their own bureaucratic work. This was always a temptation because the unions' paper work was both prodigious and unavoidable. In addition, while the call in 1953 for Party leadership in union work had been implemented, the verbal emphasis on political education had not been realized in fact. In any case, Party leadership over the unions was very strong by the summer of 1955, but the situation was further complicated by the socialization of private industry.

Trade Unions and the Socialization of Industry

Between 1949 and 1953 the number of private industrial establishments in China steadily increased, as industrialization was encouraged with no corresponding effort to socialize enterprises. In 1954 that trend was reversed; in 1955 the number of private enterprises decreased sharply; and by the end of 1956 almost all enterprises had been converted to joint state-private ownership.

While this change took place primarily in 1956, the unions were being prepared for it during the preceding years. The fact that the unions had a role to play in the socialization process was publicized periodically since late 1953. Before socialization the unions were to educate the capitalists to apply to the government for joint ownership of their factories and to call meetings of workers and office employees "to dispel their fears." After joint management was established, the unions helped state managerial personnel familiarize themselves with factory conditions and assisted in such routine tasks as stocktaking and "arranging personnel." The need to "dispel fears" referred to fears that wages
would decrease in factories being socialized, fears that were apparently well founded.25

As the Party prepared to socialize industry, an attack was initiated against the unions in private factories to correct two different types of problems. The first was the corruption of the unions by capitalists. As an indication of the seriousness of this problem, the results of investigations in Tientsin and Canton were publicized in February and March of 1955 indicating that most factory-level unions were being co-opted.26 The second problem, related to the first, was the failure of unions to supervise management to prevent shock tactics and excessive overtime in production campaigns, leading to an excessive number of industrial accidents, and punitivism in the enforcement of labor discipline.27

A third criticism of union work lay in the opposite direction and was directed at union officials in factories already converted to joint ownership. They were charged with opposing management, continuing the class struggle, and failing to cooperate in production. The change in ownership status changed the nature of labor-management relations and demanded a greater emphasis on production.28

The socialization of industry brought with it a fundamental change in the unions' role in Chinese factories. Before 1953 the Party had relied on mass organizations like the unions to check on managers, landlords, and others, and the power of those organizations had peaked during that period. They had also played a major role in the socialization of industry. Once the Party had replaced private managers, the unions were no longer expected to play quite the same role of opposition to management. This change in relationships was the major reason for the debate over the proper role of the unions from 1955 to 1957.
Chapter IV

SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF UNIONS, 1955-1957

In March of 1955 Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were expelled from the Party in a major purge and policy reversal that marked the semi-official demise of one-man management in Chinese factories. At the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956 the new management policy of collective leadership by the Party committees, already in effect in most factories by that time, was officially adopted. Under the new system, the function of technical or operational management was separated from policy management. The Party committees were to be responsible for overall policy, formulation of enterprise production plans, and negotiations with central ministries and other outside contacts. The managers were to carry out the plans established by the Party committees.

The years 1956 and 1957 saw the collectivization of agriculture, completion of the first five-year plan and the socialist transformation of industry, a small "big leap forward" in industry and a major wage increase, and the Hundred Flowers campaign. In general, the multi-functional or balanced pattern of union performance was reestablished. But it was also a period of intense discussion over the proper role of the unions in socialized industry.

Production, Political Education and Administrative Tasks

Toward the end of 1955 production-oriented union work shifted once again away from labor discipline to emulation. A major campaign was initiated late in 1955, for example, to complete the first five-year plan ahead of schedule. A second emulation movement launched by the unions at this time was called the advanced
workers campaign. The major tasks of the unions in this campaign reflected a renewed emphasis on balancing labor discipline with political education: to call workers' congresses to discuss rationalization proposals, production targets, previous errors, etc.; to educate the workers to the advanced experiences of both China and the Soviet Union; to organize mutual aid and cooperation; and to eliminate conservative thinking within their own ranks.  

With the shift in emphasis back to emulation campaigns, and especially toward the end of 1956, political education reemerged as the prime method to bolster labor discipline. One cause of the recurrence of problems in labor discipline was the large influx of new workers during 1956. They needed political education to overcome their materialism. But the message of political education was still not communist; temporary sacrifice was necessary as an investment in future material abundance.

A second problem demanding increased political education was that the 1956 wage reform had encouraged an "economic point of view" among veteran workers. In addition, emphasis on factory democracy and strengthening the workers' conferences had also contributed to a general relaxation in labor discipline and work attitudes. Finally, the unions were also expected to politically educate ex-capitalists, men who had owned enterprises that were now joint- or state-owned. In most cases, these men were retained in administrative positions and, having become wage earners, were eligible for union membership.

By early 1957 political education emphasized the major themes of the early fifties: current events and international affairs, patriotism, and the Party's current line and leadership role. It also included emphasis on the correct worker attitude toward labor in the new state enterprises.

Union administrative tasks, other than their own organization work, also returned to the forefront, specifically those tasks associated with the workers' conferences, welfare, and non-political
education programs.

Workers' conferences were revitalized in 1956. Union committees were once again charged with convening the conferences and supervising the implementation of conference resolutions between conference sessions as well as the administrative work connected with the conferences. The Party committees were given leadership over the conferences themselves and over the general task of regulating relations between workers and management. Nevertheless, efforts by union leaders to establish a prominent role for workers' conferences were a key issue in the Party-union debate that followed and are discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Welfare work had been badly neglected during the previous years. Because the unions were preoccupied with carrying out production-oriented directives from above, they were not primarily a workers' organization in outlook. They were too busy to check on workers' living conditions or to organize cultural and recreational activities. Moreover, the orientation and preferences of individual union committees had had little relevance because the unions had no power to oppose management decisions. A prime example was labor protection. Despite criticisms in the press during late 1954 and 1955, the imposition of extra work hours, resulting in high accident rates, continued to be common practice in 1956. When union committees opposed this practice, they were accused of economism, and their opposition was overruled in the name of fulfilling production quotas.

In another respect, unions were also relatively helpless to improve welfare conditions. Many of the criticisms of workers' living conditions during this period involved poor housing and deficiencies in insurance and other amenities. The unions had no control over the total funds allocated by the central government for workers' livelihood and welfare, except to report conditions in their area.

A wage reform was carried out in early 1956 to standardize
wage policy throughout the country and to increase wages and emphasize material incentives. Also, labor insurance was now calculated on the basis of wages. A major effort was also initiated during 1956 to alleviate acute shortages in urban housing. The construction of new housing for workers became a publicity item almost as widely exploited as labor insurance had been during the early fifties. The housing problem in China was, however, severe. From 1949 through 1955, per capita urban living space had decreased, especially in rapidly growing industrial centers. Major increases in new construction in 1956 and 1957 barely arrested the decline and were overwhelmed by large-scale migration to urban centers in 1958 and 1959.

Finally, the unions' administrative role in non-political education came into prominence for the first time. Literacy and general education classes for industrial workers have been provided almost exclusively in China by spare-time industrial schools. Technical education to produce skilled workers has been carried out mainly through on-the-job apprentice training. Technical education to produce administrators from the ranks of the labor force has also been through the spare-time schools to some extent, but after the early fifties most potential administrators were sent to full-time schools beyond union influence. Initially, the unions were directly responsible for organizing the spare-time schools and for arranging apprentice-master relations in the factories. Under the system of one-man management these responsibilities had passed to management. After the demise of that system, responsibility became dispersed, with emphasis once again on the unions.

In terms of emphasis and, probably, of long-term effects, the spare-time schools have been the most important method of educating Chinese workers. Nevertheless, the program has had a mixed history. Students and teachers have been poorly qualified, and production demands and political meetings have left little time for study. During the early years of the program literacy classes predominated. Few plants conducted specialized technical courses
until 1955-1956. Education above the literacy level consisted largely of practical demonstrations of basic skills, best handled by experienced workers on the production floor. While more attention was paid to improving and expanding the program in the mid-fifties, new problems were created by the Great Leap Forward and the economic crisis that followed it. Nevertheless, substantial success in eliminating illiteracy among workers has had a major long term effect on the efficiency and general outlook of China's work force.16

Party-Union Relations

By the end of 1955 Party leadership over the unions had been intensified by the union reorganization that accompanied the socialization of industry. Party leadership had become so complete, in fact, that the organizational integrity of the unions was threatened. In September of 1955 an editorial in the Jenmin Jihpao (JMJP) initiated a discussion of union functions and union-Party relations that continued through 1957.

The question was, what role do unions have in socialized industry. In response, a JMJP editorial encouraged Party committees to "bring into full play the supervisory role of trade union organizations over State organs and economic organs." The Party should ensure that the unions carry out Party policies, but not usurp the unions' "concrete tasks."17 An article by Liu Tzu-chiu went even further. The major problem in union work at that time, Liu argued, was "abject reliance" on the Party, manifested in "complete similarity between, and the indiscriminate mingling together of, tasks of labor unions and of the Party."18 Although Party leadership over the unions was necessary, the Party and the unions had separate functions.

This theme was continued by Lai Jo-yü at the Eighth Party Congress. According to Lai, the unions spent most of their time carrying out the policies of the Party and government, and this led to divorce from the masses and to bureaucratism.19 In fact,
two problems were being discussed. On the one hand, the unions were concentrating on carrying out the directives of Party, government and economic organs from above and were therefore neglecting their relations with the workers. Union cadres had begun to consider themselves part of the administrative establishment and issued orders from their offices. Since they were not communicating with the workers, they could not serve as a communication link from bottom to top or carry out genuine political education among the workers. The remedy for this was increased leadership over the unions by the primary Party committees, political education, and prodding union officials to get out of their offices to work with the masses.

The other problem was that in some cases Party committees had "taken everything into their own hands without making use of the unions as an organization." If the unions became organizationally indistinguishable from the rest of the administrative establishment, that also would preclude the unions from effectively carrying out their work of implementing Party policies in light of the concrete circumstances in their own factories. Unless increased Party leadership over the unions was applied in the proper manner and spirit, it could increase the problem rather than solve it.

A similar situation had developed in union relations with enterprise directors. In the process of changing enterprises from private to joint state-private ownership, various forms of class struggle had been intensified. Once the change was made, however, the relationship was also to change. The new relationship was to be one of cooperation and mutual help to accomplish common goals. At the same time, the unions retained the function of protecting the workers against bureaucratism by management, especially over-emphasis on production to the neglect of workers' interests. Workers' interests were to be protected by mass supervision of management by the workers' conferences. In the last analysis, workers' interests were defined as increased production.
In that context, protecting workers' interests meant supervising management to prevent the violation of Party policies and state laws, not to maximize immediate worker remuneration. Nevertheless, union leaders were arguing that the unions and the managers still had different work and different approaches to problems and that the unions ought to provide a forum for worker opinions. In fact, Lai Jo-yü argued that the conferences should provide a vehicle for major decentralization in factory management, that is, direct worker participation in factory decision-making, with the unions playing a major role. The workers' conferences, Lai argued, should have equal status with management.

This entire discussion on the functions of the unions reached a new level in 1957 with the introduction of the Hundred Flowers campaign. By September of 1956 it was evident to Party leaders that the first Chinese "leap forward" in agriculture was a relative failure, due primarily to peasant resistance to collectivization but exacerbated by bad weather during that summer. According to Mao, opposition to the collectivization program was still strong in the winter of 1956-1957. This failure was officially blamed on lower-level cadres. In the press and in many reports and speeches to the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956, cadres were criticized for commandism, dogmatism, and blind optimism. A rectification campaign was launched to improve cadre work style. In this case, however, the rectification was to include criticism by groups outside the Party, distinguishing the Hundred Flowers campaign from earlier rectifications.

Mao called for "a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred schools of thought to contend" as early as May of 1956, but the Hundred Flowers campaign did not actually begin until 1957. The idea of letting all schools contend appeared in the union press as early as May of 1956, for example, but all of the criticism of union work that appeared during 1956 was issued by the national union leadership. In February of 1957 Mao reissued his
invitation in his famous speech on contradictions among the people. In the factories union cadres were instructed to mobilize the workers for a major rectification campaign in five stages. The first stage was to be a period of contending and blooming on the mission of the unions. Later stages were to focus on the organizational structure of the unions, systems and procedure work, personnel, and the livelihood and wages of union cadres. The first three stages were still being "consolidated" through the end of 1957, and the five-stage program was never completed.

The first task of the unions in the campaign was to overcome resistance by cadres who did not want to be criticized and by workers who feared retaliation after the campaign was over. This fact in itself was indicative of the general state of affairs. To encourage worker participation in the campaign, a JMJP editorial admitted that several labor disturbances, that is, unauthorized strikes, had occurred in the recent past. The editorial even argued that these disturbances had their "good side" because they exposed cadre errors.

The most dramatic response to the call for blooming and contending in union work was a report on an 8,000 li tour made by Li Hsiu-jen, deputy director of the ACFTU General Office. Li's report and letters of personal experience by other union cadres written in response to the report were published in most of the Chinese press. The unions, these critics argued, did fail to support worker demands and even defended administrators against the workers.

But the reason for this was not only the failings of particular union cadres. The unions were caught between the workers on one side and the administration and Party on the other side. As Party members, union cadres were subject to Party discipline which often conflicted with worker desires. In their relationship to management they were given no support by other organs and were helpless to oppose unreasonable regulations or demands for extra
working hours. If they did resist such demands, they were accused of economism and their opposition was overruled. The lack of mass participation in union work and the failure of workers to attend meetings was caused not only by the bureaucratic work style of individual cadres but also by the fact that the workers had lost respect for the unions.

These criticisms were supported by Lai Jo-yü in an interview with the Kungjen Jihpao (KJJP) that appeared on the same day that Li's "8,000 li Tour" appeared in the JMJP. These reports called for increased union independence, albeit under Party guidance. They also echoed the analysis made earlier by Liu Tzu-chiu, namely, that over-reliance on the Party, as it was developing after the state assumed control of industry, inhibited the transmission belt function of the unions in both directions. It would also seem that this position had support from within the top Party leadership outside the ACFTU. According to Li Hsiu-jen, he had made his 8,000 li tour accompanied by a "responsible comrade" from the central government to secure support for the unions from the central leadership.

During the Cultural Revolution Liu Shao-ch'i was accused of being the actual instigator of the trip although he was also accused, of course, of instigating all other erroneous or succeeded union policies. Liu's remarks at the Eighth Party Congress were more guarded but in the same direction as those by Lai Jo-yü: "A system of leadership which combines collective leadership with personal responsibility, with the Party as the nucleus should be set up in all enterprises...all day-to-day affairs should be handled according to the principle of division of labor and fixed responsibility." The openness of the call for operational independence for the unions was no doubt encouraged by the general Hundred Flowers policy. Its reversal came with the reversal of that policy. One reason for Mao's speech had been to encourage criticism of cadre performance. Once the initial reluctance to "blooming and contending" was overcome, the response far exceeded his intentions,
attacking the "dictatorial" leadership of the Party itself.

When Mao's speech was finally published in June of 1957, it signaled a reversal of the rectification campaign. Included in the June version were six criteria by which "blossoms" could be distinguished from "weeds." Cadres guilty of various errors, especially criticism of the Party's leaders, remained under attack, and future criticism was to be limited to individual cadres. An anti-rightist campaign was also initiated against those who had abused the Party's invitation to criticize and had "attempted to undermine" its leadership role.

In the unions the anti-rightist campaign began with public refutation of some of the criticisms expressed during the Hundred Flowers period. Beginning in June, workers in some areas were organized to "detect rightist weeds" and to refute the claims of "rightist" intellectuals that welfare and working conditions in Chinese factories were not improving. In October and November a series of articles in the KJJP indicated that the policy reversal had been accomplished. Many of the welfare demands previously submitted by workers were characterized as unreasonable, and criticism that the unions "breathed through the same nose" with administrators and did nothing to help the workers was now considered to be incorrect or erroneously one-sided. Suggestions that the unions be abolished or limited to the administration of welfare programs were also rejected.

The unions definitely had a function, these articles argued, and should not be abolished. They were a link between the Party and the workers and did most of the concrete organizational work related to welfare, education and production. Union work could not be limited to welfare work because welfare, political education, and production were all related. Unions should be active in all three fields, "taking production as the center." The earlier policy of recognizing the good side of labor disturbances was also reversed, and union leaders accused of encouraging disturbances
were expelled from the Party and relieved of their union positions during September and October.  

In late November an article by Lai Jo-yü acknowledged the new line, at least by implication. This article continued to recognize that the administration and the unions had differences of view and that the union position was a difficult one. For the solution of these problems, however, Lai merely rejected the old stand-bys of increased discussion with the masses and increased reliance on Party leadership.

One of the main indicators of the reversal was a subtle but significant change in Lai's emphasis. During 1956 and early 1957 Lai had argued that the Party must exercise political leadership over the unions, but that the unions must retain their independent organizational role and the Party must not usurp the unions' concrete tasks. In mid-1957 Lai began to argue that the unions must not disappear and must have tasks separate from the Party's but not ideological independence from the Party: "The Party platform is the trade union platform."  

In May of 1958 Lai Jo-yü died, and he was succeeded as President (now Chairman) of the ACFTU by Liu Ning-yi at the second meeting of the Eighth ACFTU Executive Committee in August of 1958. Preceding that meeting, a rectification conference was held "under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party." This conference acted to purge three close associates of Lai from the top echelons of the ACFTU: Tung Hsin, a member of the ACFTU Secretariat, Wang Jung of the ACFTU Presidium, and Ch'en Yung-wen, editor-in-chief of the KJJP. While Lai himself was not posthumously attacked in public, he was attacked in an unpublished report by Liu Ning-yi for opposing the Party and for building a rightist faction within the ACFTU.

The attack on Ch'en Yung-wen was the most detailed of those published. His major crime was writing an article called "Notes on a Trip to the West," appearing in the KJJP over several days.
during 1957. In that article he had advocated the organizational independence of the unions and union opposition to Party one-sidedness. His trip to the West was in fact to Yugoslavia, and the views expressed in his article gave de facto support to the idea of strong workers' conferences. He was also accused of encouraging a discussion in 1957 in the KJJP on the "crisis of trade unions." In 1955 he had counteracted a JMJP editorial entitled "Any Accident Must be Seriously Examined and Handled" with an editorial in the KJJP titled "Oppose the Trend of Punitivism" (see Chapter III, note 14). As early as 1951 he had been one of those found guilty of economism. In addition, he had consistently refused to publish Party propaganda and had collected stories about "cases of injury and death [of workers]," and the "discharge of workers," that is, careless or arbitrary acts by factory management.

This purge at the top was preceded by purges of union leaders at the provincial level for their part in labor disruptions during the summer of 1957. Leading union officials in Hopei and Liaoning, in particular, were accused of attacking Party leadership over the unions and of demanding union independence and of stirring up worker unrest on the basis of welfare issues. Under the "guise" of "protecting workers' interests," they had "fooled" and "corroded" the workers into attacking the Party and Party leadership over the unions.

Despite a number of revelations during the Cultural Revolution, it is exceedingly difficult to get a clear picture of exactly what went on in China during this period. Much of the detail and nuance is simply not available. The information made available during the Cultural Revolution is systematically distorted to discredit the losers, and official Communist jargon further obscures detailed understanding. It is tempting to see the issue in terms of a sympathetic union organization battling for the workers against managers and Party administrators. But that, I think, would be a mistake and not just an oversimplification, even though the issue of union independence did involve the issue of reliance
on material incentives, which many workers presumably favored. Union activity was only one area affected by broader issues.

One of those issues was the bureaucratism and commandism of lower-level cadres. To achieve the political goal of communization the cadres had to orient their work with the masses toward conversion in general and persuasion and education in particular cases. To achieve the economic goal of industrialization they had to get the job done, thus the temptation to issue orders and coerce the masses into following them, the very essence of bureaucratism and commandism. As early as 1956 Mao was making a major effort to resolve this conflict by accelerating the pace. The "leap forward" in agriculture in 1956, including accelerated collectivization, was intended not only to remove economic bottlenecks but also to provide a practical educational experience that would overcome mass resistance to changes in world outlook and orientation. Success on that front would also result in accelerated economic advance, based on the new attitudes of the masses. At the same time, constant political education of the cadres was also necessary.

It is now clear that Mao faced opposition among the top leaders of the Party over his entire approach to industrialization and socialization. In this context, the discussion of the role of the unions becomes more understandable. Before the socialization of industry there existed some doctrinal justification for distinctions among the Party view, the management view and the union/worker view within factories. After socialization there was a tendency for these distinctions to disappear, replaced by a single view embodied in the Party. The argument for union independence from the Party was that even in socialized industry there would be conflicts, or what Mao was to call nonantagonistic contradictions, and that the unions therefore had a distinct role to play.

But the question of union independence related directly to the disagreement over the direction of major policy. The unions had become increasingly professionalized, increasingly a part of
an entrenched administrative elite. An independent union organization would be free from the "politicizing" influence of lower-level Party committees and would become an administrative bureaucracy. Therefore, union independence had to be defined very carefully.

The issue was resolved for the unions by decisions at a higher and broader level. By the time of the union purge in 1958, the Maoist policy of the Great Leap Forward had already been adopted and partially implemented. The basis of the Great Leap Forward strategy in the factories was an emphasis on political mobilization as against the strategy of reliance on material incentives, increased welfare benefits, and technical expertise. While theoretically one task of the unions was political education and mobilization of the workers, this was an activity in which the Party itself had always taken the lead and for which the Party generalists were better suited than the relatively professionalized and specialized union cadres. Thus, one tactical component of a Great Leap strategy would be increased Party leadership over the unions, not increased union independence.

Lai Jo-yü and some of his close associates had attempted to maintain union independence from the Party and were caught in the rapid policy changes in 1957 and 1958. Lai's successor, Liu Ning-yi, did not suffer the same fate. The issue was further complicated by a long-standing competition between Lai Jo-yü and Liu Ning-yi for leadership of the ACFTU. The first president of the ACFTU after 1949 was Ch'en Yün. But Ch'en was one of the inner core of Party leaders with other important posts, and his leadership of the unions was mainly titular. When he relinquished that title in 1953, his logical successor was Liu Ning-yi, a veteran union organizer who was also close to the top Party leadership. Li Li-san had been the main spokesman on labor policy beginning in 1948-1949 but had also been the major victim of the union purge in 1951. In fact, Liu Ning-yi had replaced Li as major spokesman for the unions after 1951. However, Lai Jo-yü was elected ACFTU president at the Seventh Congress, apparently because he had been
a Party generalist not specifically connected with the unions. He was brought into the unions as a Party man to correct the trend toward "trade unionism" both in the form of economism and in the form of organizational professionalism. By 1957 Lai himself was analyzing problems from the perspective of the unions.

Another question still not entirely answered is the degree of influence Lai was able to maintain during his illness in early 1958. The general policy reversal came in mid-1957 and was partially reflected and acknowledged in Lai's later addresses. Lai and his supporters had clearly been caught on the wrong side in 1957. By the time of the Trade Union Congress, policy changes were already being implemented. Decentralization of industry had been discussed at the Third Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in September and October of 1957 and began to be implemented in November. At the Trade Union Congress itself, the union constitution was amended to change the structural principle of the unions from strictly industrial (vertical) lines to both industrial and local area (horizontal) lines, thus facilitating control of union organs by corresponding Party organs. But the purge did not come until after Lai Jo-yü's death, at the rectification meeting prior to Liu's election as ACFTU chairman in August of 1958. At the Eighth Trade Union Congress, Lai had been reelected ACFTU Chairman, and Liu Ning-yi was not even reelected to a vice-chairmanship. According to T'an Hsin-wen, after Lai's death in May "the internal strife for the post [of chairman] was very keen."43

One possible explanation for this sequence of events, offered by Paul Harper, is that the purge had been postponed to allow an amiable front at the Eighth Trade Union Congress and then further postponed until the death of Lai who was critically ill in early 1958.44 Perhaps another possibility is that as long as Lai was alive, he was able to protect himself and his faction, especially if he had support from within the top Party leadership. Also, if T'an Hsin-wen is correct, the Lai faction may still have been able
to offer some resistance up to the time of the rectification conference.
At the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1956 the Chinese reassessed their application of the Soviet industrialization strategy to their own situation. While industrial development was advancing well, the Chinese were disturbed by imbalances in their economy. The Soviet strategy involved the diversion of agricultural resources into heavy industry with little or no reinvestment in agriculture. The Chinese Communists had inherited no grain surplus, as the Bolsheviks had, but did inherit a large and rapidly growing population. Since there was no agricultural surplus to be exploited, agricultural output would have to be increased if a high level of industrial investment was to be continued.

By late 1957 the Party leaders were formulating a new economic strategy for their second five-year plan. The strategy adopted was to increase output in both sectors simultaneously. Heavy industry was to retain priority in investment allocation, although agricultural investment did increase slightly. Output in agriculture and light industry was to be increased on the basis of reducing waste and inefficiency and increasing labor productivity and labor production. At the center of this strategy was the maximization of human effort by ideological incentives and political mobilization.

The general change in economic strategy introduced at this time was accompanied by administrative decentralization of light industry to the provincial level, effectively removing control from the central ministries and placing it in the hands of provincial Party committees. At the same time, the enterprise Party committees assumed complete control over operational as well as policy-making management functions in the factories.
With the assumption of complete enterprise leadership by the Party, reference to the independent organizational role of the unions ended. The new relationship between the Party and the unions was epitomized in a KJJP editorial:

Trade unions are mass organizations of the working class and trade union work forms a part of the mass work of the Party. They are assistants of the Party in carrying out its work among the broad masses of workers. Therefore, trade union organizations must not only be politically and ideologically dependent upon the leadership of the Party, but also in organizational and business matters. Trade union organs at all levels must carry out their work under the leadership of Party committees of corresponding levels.

To facilitate this change the unions underwent administrative decentralization from the provincial level down. Provincial unions delegated to the next lower levels powers of financial administration, organization, cultural and business administration, and authorization of administrative expenditures. The effect was to decrease vertical control within the union structure, and increase horizontal control by corresponding Party committees.

The unions retained no organizational independence after mid-1958 and therefore had no independent functions. Their role was to carry out Party tasks, under Party leadership, in cooperation with the Communist Youth League. Until mid-1959 even the unions' routine tasks were neglected. Union cadres were to assume the routine duties of Party committees, allowing those committees to concentrate on mobilizing the workers for production and the re-organization of labor to support agriculture. At the same time the Party committees also assumed complete direction of the workers' conferences. It was precisely this organizational change that Lai and his associates had apparently tried to avoid.

Following the major rectification campaign of 1957 the ACFTU had called on the unions to organize a production upsurge motivated by an "unprecedented increase in labor enthusiasm" resulting
from the rectification campaign and a socialist education campaign which had followed it. This introduced the industrial production phase of the Great Leap Forward. Its basic strategy was the maximization of human effort, motivated by ideological incentive and political mobilization, to increase output without increasing capital investment. The tactics were: (1) to mobilize all potential sources of labor, e.g., housewives, students and teachers, soldiers, merchants, and underemployed peasants; (2) to raise work attendance among regular workers; (3) to improve productivity among regular workers through socialist emulation, improvement in the organization of labor, that is, reduction of personnel not directly participating in production, increasing workers' skills, and technical innovation; and (4) to reorganize labor throughout the country.  

Thus, within industrial enterprises labor productivity would be increased by technical innovations, and actual production output would be increased by mobilizing everyone available into labor-intensive campaigns. It would then be possible to reallocate part of the industrial work force to participate in agricultural production and in newly formed small industries in rural and suburban areas. This reallocation or reorganization of labor was the first phase in the so-called worker-peasant system which survived into the sixties and will be discussed in Chapter VII. 

The key to production efforts during this period was neither labor discipline nor emulation campaigns as such. It was the mass production movement, somewhat similar to organizing the entire industrial work force into emulation campaigns within emulation campaigns and differing from earlier campaigns in three ways.

First, they were based almost entirely on political mobilization rather than material incentives. In the second half of 1957, with the beginning of the anti-rightist and socialist education campaigns, political education increasingly dominated union attention and shifted increasingly to the theme of class struggle. 

During the Great Leap Forward itself, political education was taken
over almost entirely by the Party committees, and political educa-
tion gave way to fervent exhortation. Wage levels were lowered
and piece wages were largely eliminated as obstacles to effective
political education. At the end of 1956 excesses in the wage
and bonus increases adopted earlier that year were adjusted, and
early in 1958 wages at the bottom of the industrial wage scale
were reduced to bring them into line with rural wages. In part
this reduction in lower-level industrial wages was to discourage
migration to the cities. But the general freeze in workers' wages
from 1958 through 1960 was a reflection of the "politics in com-
mand" philosophy of the Great Leap Forward. But during the Great
Leap period, unlike the Cultural Revolution, the marathon mobil-
ization of energies was still rationalized in terms of essentially
material rewards; the Great Leap was to be a leap to a strong and
prosperous new China.

Second, the mass production movement was much larger and more
inclusive than earlier campaigns. Third, it was characterized by
frantic activity with few organizational or regulatory guidelines.
Since 1953 the trend had been toward increasing the planned organi-
zation of emulation campaigns and replacing shock tactics and
quantitative output with technical innovation and quality control.
These trends were now reversed. Regulations concerning work pro-
cedures were abandoned. Labor protection work did not receive any
public notice until April of 1959 when prolonged overwork and fail-
ure to repair machinery began to seriously affect production.
Technical innovation was officially an important part of the pro-
duction movement, but in November of 1959 the JMJP was still calling
for emulations based on innovations to supplement emulations based
on "hard work."

It was March of 1960 before a major technical innovation cam-
paign was actually launched, and the emphasis remained on political
education even during that campaign. In any case, sophisticated
technical innovation was largely precluded by the fact that many
managers and engineers were sent down (hsia fang) to work in rural
areas as part of the reorganization of labor and to allow the Party committees and workers freedom to "assault" production problems.
Chapter VI

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND SOCIALIST EDUCATION,
1961-1965

Although most of China's heavy industry had been excluded from the Great Leap Forward, by the end of 1960 that campaign's policies had precipitated a crisis throughout the entire economy. The lack of coordinated planning, characteristic of the Leap period, had led to a chaotic situation. Misallocations of investment resources, including human resources, was perhaps the most damaging error. Natural disasters and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance exacerbated and climaxed the growing crisis. Decreased agricultural production reduced the supply of raw materials for light industry, and shortages in food and clothing reached major proportions in the winter of 1960-1961. Malnutrition and disease significantly affected attendance and productivity in all factories. The millenial enthusiasm which the cadres had been able to inspire in the workers during the Great Leap Forward was followed by disillusionment and apathy. ¹

The policies of the Great Leap Forward were being reversed during 1960, and this tendency was formally endorsed at the Ninth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in January of 1961. New or restored policies were adopted at all functional levels. In terms of overall industrialization, strategy resources were re-allocated to emphasize agriculture.² Planning was reinstated, and the central ministries regained some of the authority they had lost. Factory managers and technical experts were recalled, and the "production units" themselves, that is, the restored factory managers, gained a degree of autonomy.³ In effect, the system of factory manager responsibility under collective Party
leadership was restored, with the emphasis on the manager, "a sys­
tem of unified administration over production by the factory mana­
ger, so as to centralize leadership over all the production manage­ment activities of an enterprise." 4

Also during this period, the emphasis was once again on mater­
ial incentives. Initially justified as a counter to absenteeism
and lack of work enthusiasm, material incentives increasingly took
the form of piece work wages and bonuses, first for work groups
and later for individuals. 5 The first general wage raise since
1956 was announced in December of 1963. 6

At the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Committee in Sep­
tember of 1962, this general orientation was partially reversed to
emphasize class struggle, ideological indoctrination, and the po­
litical campaign or mass movement. Most of the earlier policies,
however, remained in effect. Moreover, there was significant
opposition among upper- and middle-level Party cadres and offi­
cials to a repetition of the Great Leap Forward. 7

Transmission Belt

Beginning in the middle of 1959 the unions were directed to
resume their routine tasks, but the rehabilitation of the unions
was a slow process. They had atrophied organizationally, and
through 1961 their first task remained to strengthen their own
"organizational construction." They were also called on to devel­
op initiative in carrying out their own work; union cadres were to
overcome the attitude that "there is work when there is assignment
from the Party, and there is no work when there is none." 8

This was not a return to organizational independence by any
means. The unions were to continue to operate under Party leader­
ship organizationally as well as politically. Union cadres were
to be trained in Party work by the Party cadres so that routine
union work could be integrated with the "focal tasks" of the Party,
and the Party committees were to continue to investigate union
work. But total neglect of routine union tasks was now recognized as an error. In its usual manner of shifting the blame downward, the Party leaders attributed this "error" to "new branch secretaries in the workshops."9

To assure improvements in union performance, the pre-1958 system of vertical supervision by higher-level organs was reintroduced in 1961,10 but this applied only to internal administrative supervision. The dual structure that included both vertical and horizontal responsibility and facilitated Party leadership over local union councils remained in effect.11 The list of functions specifically assigned to the unions in 1961 was essentially the same recurring list of routine tasks that had been assigned to them since 1948-1949: administrative work concerning the ongoing organization of the unions themselves; workers' livelihood, particularly during this period running the workers' mess halls and dormitories and generally responding to workers' "small difficulties"; organizing workers' congresses; administering cultural and educational facilities; and mobilizing the workers for production.

Production and Political Education

Production campaigns directly reflected the changed policies of the early sixties. While the press continued to refer to the possibility of combining strict scientific management with mass production movements, the emphasis changed to careful planning, taking the problems of individual workers into account, and the emulation of work techniques, as opposed to labor intensity and quantity output.

The unions did not reenter the field of political education in a big way until after the tenth plenum of the Party's Central Committee in September of 1962 which launched a Socialist Education Movement to intensify class struggle and anti-revisionism and to revolutionize China's youth in preparation for the death of the old elite. The unions were to refocus all their work to emphasize political education, utilizing their cultural and recreational
facilities as "sharp tools" for political education. Three major themes emerged from the many but often vague and tangential directives given to union cadres during this period: class struggle, self-reliance and hard struggle, and putting the collective interest above personal interests. Even after 1962, however, great efforts were made to avoid the excesses of the Leap period in production campaigns. In detailed discussions of how to conduct those campaigns, the emphasis continued to be on quality, realism in setting targets, "down to earth" technical reforms, respect for the opinions of technicians, and proficiency in basic work skills.

In 1965 the Socialist Education Movement was intensified to oppose continued passive resistance. Union organs had still failed to convince some of their cadres that mass political movements did not hinder production. Similarly, many union cadres were continuing to argue that routine union functions left no time for political work, and that union participation in political work was unnecessary since it was already being carried out by Party committees and by the newly instituted political departments. The main opposition to the intensification of political work in the factories, however, seems to have been based on a fear that the excesses of the Great Leap Forward would be repeated.

During the production upsurge of 1965 emphasis on political education was once again intensified, and the unions were directed to be more active in mobilizing the workers. The caution of previous campaigns, however, continued. The unions were to continue to emphasize industrial techniques, basic skills, and technical cooperation; to establish models and pace-setters; to include concrete summing-up work and assessments and comparisons; to base emulations on practical, down-to-earth experiences and the assignment of specific tasks to individual workers; and to avoid the fabrication of production figures to enhance the apparent performance of their factories. All of these points referred to excesses that contributed to the chaos of the Great Leap Forward.
Welfare

During 1961-1962 union work focused on assisting the workers to alleviate the disastrous effects of the Great Leap forward on their own lives. Welfare expenditures were not increased, but union cadres were to spend more time organizing the workers and workers' families for self-reliance and frugality. In 1962 welfare work was incorporated into the Socialist Education Movement in the factories. An austerity campaign, advocating self-reliance and putting collective interests above personal interests, was designed to control spending in 1963 when the economy was beginning to recover from the three hard years and commodities were beginning to reappear on the market.

More inclusively, an effort was made to replace welfare funds with political education of the earlier, socializing type rather than the frantic exhortation of the Great Leap Forward. With the Socialist Education Movement political education work was integrated with the general welfare function of going among the workers to understand their problems and showing concern and "class affection" for them. Assisting the workers with their small problems was increasingly emphasized as the key to effective political education. Part of this program was the effort to get full-time union cadres to participate in productive labor and to visit workers at home, culminating in the movement to relocate union offices in the "red dormitories" in which Party and union officials lived with workers. In rural areas, where one focus of union work had been agriculture, union cadres were sent to specific locations in the countryside to live and work with the peasants and the workers in the agricultural machinery sub-stations. While these programs were not entirely new in the sixties, it would appear that they were applied with more success during this period than they had been previously.

A second part of this program was reliance on activists to carry out union work at the basic levels. By 1956 the Chinese unions had recruited over three million activists, and by 1958 the
number was over three and one-half million. By comparison, there were an estimated 60,874 full-time union cadres in primary-level unions in 1957. While the number of activists declined in 1960 and 1961, the effort to recruit them was renewed in 1962. This extensive use of activists allowed the regime to greatly expand union welfare services and also integrated large numbers of workers into an official national organization for active participation and administrative education.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution climaxed the conflict between the Maoist line and other policy lines in China discussed in the Introduction to this study. It should be remembered, however, that our knowledge of the rapid and complex changes after 1966 is still far from complete.

During the sixties the unions had once again become increasingly professionalized as they had up until 1956-1957. This development corresponded with other tendencies in Chinese society during the early sixties. Union structure had become dual again in 1961 with the restoration of vertical responsibility within the union hierarchy. More importantly, the Party had become increasingly bureaucratized and professional, necessitating Mao's use of the Red Guards and, finally, the army to attack the Party itself. While the unions at various levels remained largely under the guidance of corresponding Party committees, changes in the Party itself allowed union resistance to the new line.

The Maoist labor policy, in contrast, can be summarized from his "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company," originally written in 1960, largely ignored during the early sixties, and reasserted beginning in 1965: politics in command, Party leadership, emphasis on the mass movement, interchanging of tasks among cadres and workers, elimination of inhibiting rules and regulations, close cooperation among workers, technicians and functionaries, and technical innovation. The similarity to the Great Leap Forward is obvious. Even technical innovation had been part of the formal strategy of the Great Leap Forward, even if largely ignored in practice. The basic difference was that during the Cultural Revolution
Mao and Mao's thought effectively replaced the Party as the basis for leadership and the contents of political education.

The implementation of this policy began in the factories in 1965 when the unions were called on to "promote democracy in production." As this tendency increased, worker organizations once again came increasingly under Party control. With the advent of the Cultural Revolution, democratic worker organizations took their lead from Mao himself and were divorced from both the Party committees and the unions, actually replacing the unions in many factories in the form of revolutionary rebel groups. Before 1966 these processes evolved slowly. During 1965 Party leadership was emphasized in only one official union pronouncement, a KJJP editorial commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the inauguration of the ACFTU. Even that editorial had not returned to the language of 1958-1959. But by 1966 public directives to union cadres hardly mentioned Party leadership at all; they referred instead to "Mao's works" as more important for successful union work than knowledge of union work itself. ¹

The shift from "politics in command" to "the thought of Mao Tse-tung in command" was formalized at the sixth session of the eighth executive committee of the ACFTU in April of 1966. Since the beginning of the Socialist Education Movement the unions had been referred to by Lenin's phrase, "schools of communism." Now they were to become "a school for the flexible study and application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung." In addition, this communique introduced other aspects of the Maoist policy; union cadres were to continue participating in productive labor, intensify mass supervision of their own work by workers' conferences, and downgrade material incentives. They were also to build a "large industrial army" in which distinctions between workers and peasants would be eliminated.

On June 9, 1966, the ACFTU issued a notice to union organs at all levels to direct all their attention to the Cultural Revolution.
They were to organize the workers to study Mao's thought, participate in criticizing anti-Maoists already under attack, and expose anti-Maoists in union organizations. This was the last communique issued by the ACFTU, although articles did continue to appear over the name of various revolutionary rebel groups within the ACFTU. New committees were established in some factories in early 1967 to take the place of the unions. In the Shanghai Glass Machinery Plant, for example, a "Revolution and Production Committee" was elected and put in charge of "political, production and trade union work."

The unions were eliminated partly because of their opposition to the new line and partly because the new line called for new organizational structures untainted by past policies. On December 26, 1966, a JMJP editorial announced the extension of the revolution to industrial and mining enterprises as a new stage in the Cultural Revolution. In January of 1967 a group called the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebels issued a "message to all Shanghai people" announcing the seizure of Shanghai factories by revolutionary rebel, that is pro-Mao, groups. The Red Guards, however, met serious opposition within industrial enterprises. The workers, unions, and management perceived a common interest in opposing the disruption of production and intrusion into the factories by the rebels. The level of violence which resulted threatened production, and in March of 1967 army units entered many factories to restore order and maintain production.

Initially at least, the major concerns of most workers seem to have been potential personal loss due to disruptions in production, acceptance of the authority of Party officials, most of whom were hesitant to abandon their factories and their fate to the Red Guards, and resentment against young students "barging into" the factories. Workers seem almost unanimously to have opposed or avoided participating in Red Guard activity until November and December of 1966 when the Cultural Revolution was officially extended to the factories. When the workers did assume leadership of the Cultural Revolution at
the bidding of one of Mao's "latest directives" in August of 1968, that event seems to have signaled a turning point away from student "ultra-leftism" and the beginning of the end of the Cultural Revolution.\footnote{12}

According to Japanese and Czech correspondents, the ACFTU was replaced on December 26, 1966, by the All-China Rebel General Group of Red Laborers.\footnote{13} While no organization continued to function consistently under that title, the date corresponds to the formal introduction of the Cultural Revolution into the factories. According to refugees from Canton and Shanghai, union dues were not collected after early 1967.\footnote{14} The ACFTU also abandoned its usually heavy international program and was not represented at international Communist labor meetings after December of 1966.

According to one analysis, the old organization was initially maintained in name, and Liu Ning-\-yi was retained as chairman for international purposes only.\footnote{15} However, although Liu Ning-\-yi was subsequently attacked by the Red Guards he received significant promotions in the Party hierarchy in both 1965 and 1966, presumably on the basis of his loyalty to Mao on domestic issues.\footnote{16} His subsequent disappearance from the ranks of China's elite resulted from the position he took in 1966 on China's foreign policy.\footnote{17}

The ACFTU itself came under heavy attack early in 1967. China's previous labor policy was entirely ascribed to Liu Shao-ch'\-i's influence, and that policy was criticized on three counts.\footnote{18} The first was that the unions had been welfare trade unions. Routine welfare amenities, the policy of concentrating on solicitude for the workers, and the awarding of prizes were all condemned as "sugar-coated arsenic." This was an aspect of Liu's economism.

The second general criticism was an attack on the unions as production trade unions. They had concentrated on production, engaging the workers in a constant series of technical courses, lessons in basic work skills, and other production-oriented activities that took them away from studying Mao's works. The third general
criticism was directed at the concept of a trade union of the entire people. The unions had accepted for membership reformed ex-capitalists, landlords and other bad elements, when in fact they should have performed as tools of class struggle.  

A fourth criticism was introduced in 1968, namely, that in 1958 Liu had been forced to change his line and had therefore resorted to a new trick, advocating the role of docile tools for the unions to facilitate his own control over them. Essentially a description of labor policy during the Great Leap Forward, this criticism was, ironically, later used by rebellious workers who argued that their own initiative in "making revolution" during working hours, helped the workers' organizations from becoming docile tools.

The Cultural Revolution was an extreme attack on previous industrial management systems and the Party structure itself, and in that context the total demise of the ACFTU is not surprising. Union opposition to the Cultural Revolution can be taken as prima facie evidence for the correctness of the Maoist attacks. Also, the theoretical principles of Mao's thought as expressed during the Cultural Revolution are in sharp contrast to the implicit theory on which union work in China had been conducted, whatever the precise role of Liu Shao-ch'i.

The basic assumption of that theory was that industrialization was prerequisite to political communization of the people. It was also assumed that attention to workers' livelihood would facilitate successful political education. In practice, a third assumption was employed, namely that in the case of individual workers or work groups, production effort was a relatively valid indicator of political consciousness. Since political education and production were so intimately related in all union activities, and individual unions were evaluated on the basis of plant production records, it would have been very difficult for the unions not to adopt this assumption for practical purposes. During 1965 union cadres began to receive warnings that production achievement was not necessarily
a sign of good political thinking, and that politics should be put first before production.21

Despite some confusion on this point, generated by claims for the magic of Mao's thought for increasing production, this point was also a central theme early in the Cultural Revolution. Union cadres were also warned at that time not to confuse solicitude and solving livelihood problems with "penetrating ideological work," as they "had in the past."22 Ideally, both the communization of the people and industrial production would occur. "Grasping revolution" would enhance production, but revolution came first. "Our political work is not simply for guaranteeing the success of production; it is first of all for the success of the ideological revolutionization of man."23

From the point of view of internal consistency, the logic of the attack on the unions during the Cultural Revolution was unassailable. Production effort might well be a function of material reward-seeking and thus be antithetical to, rather than indicative of, Communist political consciousness. The disagreement, however, was a result of policy changes in the mid-sixties, centering on the content of political education. Previously the dominant message had been that present deprivation was necessary for the realization of long-range material interests, and Party programs seemed to support that message. That type of political education could also approximate the function of minimizing the alienating effects of proletarianization. That is, political education had been designed primarily to secure worker support for the regime, and the presentation of Party programs and goals had emphasized the material and patriotic benefits eventually accruing to the workers from Party leadership.

In this context the working assumptions prove true. Improvements in livelihood and welfare seem to support the political message received by the workers, and acceptance of the political message induces the workers to work harder and accept temporary sacrifices. Thus, whatever Liu's role in formulating union policy, that policy was susceptible to the charges of economism and production in command.
The unions had also always been a "trade union of the entire people." As early as 1953 Hsu Chih-chen had spoken for the regime against closed doorism in union recruitment. With the nationalization of industry in 1955-1956, many former owners were kept on as salaried factory managers and, having become wage earners, were eligible for union membership. The difference between earlier periods and the Cultural Revolution was once again based on the nature of political education. The function of the unions had been to socialize all employees except hard core counterrevolutionaries to a position of general support for and cooperation with the regime, and only on special occasions to act as tools of class struggle. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution that conception of socialization was replaced by the attempt to both integrate and revolutionize China's youth and workers to Mao's vision by struggle against specifically designated class enemies.

The new message of political education was, very roughly, that political self-cultivation, through studying Mao's works and Mao's thought, would create a nation of communist men, selfless and devoted, who would work harder and desire no personal remuneration in return. A massive upsurge in production would result, but it would be achieved by concentrating on Mao's thought, not by concentrating on production skills. Moreover, it would be achieved without the sugar-coated arsenic of even the relatively limited personal amenities dispensed in the past so as to avoid contaminating the ideological transformation of men's minds.

It is not difficult to understand why many cadres resisted attempts to apply Mao's vision. It fundamentally threatened Party and other functionaries whose positions and working modes had become increasingly related to technical skills. It appeared as an extreme form of the Great Leap Forward which had precipitated economic chaos and disaster. It also posed a direct and obvious threat to China's workers in its attack on economism.

In practice, the policy involved programs which included an
overall reduction of workers' amenities. The most obvious was the substitution of material incentives with politics in command. A second example, more indicative of the complexities of the Cultural Revolution and policy implementation in general, was the peasant-worker system. In April of 1966 the KJJP reported on the decisions of the sixth session of the eighth executive committee of the ACFTU, instructing the unions to create a large industrial army in which distinctions between workers and peasants would be eliminated. The closest actual policy to this instruction was the peasant-worker system, in which peasants were contracted for temporary factory work and permanent workers rotated places with peasants. This system had also been widely employed in 1958-1959 in a reorganization of labor policy associated with the Great Leap Forward. The system had been in the news since 1962, and large-scale experimentation had begun in 1964. By 1966 the establishment of a permanent rotation system in some industries, such as mining and lumbering and similar rural and suburban operations, was apparently under consideration.

A major advantage of the system was utilization of peasants in industrial roles during slack farming seasons and part-time use of peasants in rural factories as it obviated permanent overstaffing to accommodate emergencies and "heavy days," such as periodic cargo unloading.

In addition to its advantages for allocating resources, the system complemented Mao's plan of geographically dispersing small industry and introducing the peasants to industrial life gradually. It was also ideologically consistent with Mao's efforts to minimize distinctions between workers and peasants, factories and the countryside. However, those employees who were still concerned with individual wages must have seen the system as beneficial to the government at their expense. Temporary workers and contract workers received lower pay and fewer fringe benefits than permanent workers. They were not eligible for union membership or for labor insurance benefits unless they were employed for a certain number of days.
during the year. Since they were primarily day workers, they re-
quired no sleeping quarters from the factories. They did not bring
dependents with them, but they did bring food rations from their
communes, helping to alleviate the problem of urban food shortages.
Permanent workers could also be rotated out to communes to avoid
payment of pensions. Moreover, by the sixties many of those
serving as temporary and contract workers were not otherwise peas-
ants but were urban unemployed.

There were developmental advantages to the peasant-worker sys-
tem, and many of its worst aspects were due to abuses of the system
rather than inherent flaws. Nevertheless, both temporary and perma-
nent workers had grievances against the system as well as its abuses.
As a political issue it was manipulated during the Cultural Revolu-
tion by Maoists and anti-Maoists in efforts to woo first temporary
workers and then permanent workers. It was finally abolished by
the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking and condemned as an exploi-
tative scheme of Liu Shao-ch'i and Labor Minister Ma Wen-jui.
Chapter VIII

THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE TRADE UNIONS, 1973

Trade unions reappeared in Chinese factories only in 1973, well after the Party had resumed its primary role in China and months after the rehabilitation of the Communist Youth League. At the national level, the ACFTU had survived in name but had received virtually no mention for years; it has still not publicly reappeared, references having been limited to factory and provincial-level unions. Even the role of representing Chinese workers internationally has been played by Chinese Workers' Delegations rather than the ACFTU. Much of this chapter is, therefore, devoted to outlining the context of factory/labor policies in which the unions have reappeared.

The main provisions of the Anshan Constitution were listed in the previous chapter to indicate basic features of the Maoist line in industry: Party leadership, politics in command, mass movements, elimination of rules and regulations, interchangeability of tasks, technical innovation, and close cooperation among workers, technicians and cadres. Some of those policies could be realized only after the Cultural Revolution ended. Most important, of course, was the need to rebuild the Party and then to strengthen its leadership role. Others were modified or consolidated, beginning especially in 1970, by restoring "good" rules and regulations and strengthening the role of management and accounting in the factories, emphasizing the role of veteran workers toward younger workers, attending to product quality as well as quantity, and increasing the role of experts in technical innovation to reach a cooperative balance. Nevertheless, politics remained in command.

To facilitate analysis, the various characteristics of the
Anshan Constitution will be discussed in terms of the interrelations among political education, production, administrative education, and transmission belt—the four activities or functions around which earlier chapters have been organized.

Political Education and Production

In Chapter VII conflict over union policy was analyzed in terms of alternate approaches to political education. The policy of politics in command since the Cultural Revolution has meant the primacy of political education over production and worker amenities, with class struggle as the focus of political education. Production would follow automatically but could not be pursued successfully for its own sake:

Under socialist conditions, workers should of course work hard because engaging in production and developing the socialist economy with greater, faster, better and more economical results is very important for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, defeating capitalism and supporting the world's people in their revolutionary struggles. But, the struggle for production cannot be isolated from class struggle in class society. If we bury ourselves in work to the neglect of political line and class struggle, production can never be run well.3

One must "grasp revolution, [to] promote production."

In terms of our earlier differentiation between nationalistic and communistic political education, however, Rensselear Lee has observed that those two themes have been combined in Chinese discussions about technology. The Chinese bourgeois expert relies on foreign technology and is therefore identified with foreign economic exploitation.4 The workers' self-reliance furthered the class struggle because it obviates relying on bourgeois experts, and it is patriotic because it is perforce indigenous.

Earlier in this study, incentive policy was discussed primarily in terms of material versus nonmaterial incentives. Politics in command means emphasizing political education over material
incentives, and the Chinese press has not emphasized wages in recent years. The exceptions have tended to stress the absence of large wage differentials in Chinese factories. Additionally, the Maoist line assumes that political education will replace external incentives, non-material as well as material, with internal or self-motivation.

The success of this effort is perhaps even more dependent on worker perceptions of their role in society and in the factories than the successful use of non-material external incentives, as discussed in the introductory chapter. In this sense, incentive policy reflects the interrelatedness of various aspects of the Maoist line. One factor in worker perceptions is the privileged position of workers in Chinese society. Even when material incentives are not emphasized, improvements in general living standards are not neglected. Moreover, although efforts to minimize the gap between urban and rural income have been more successful in China than in other countries, Chinese workers are materially better off than the peasants. Perhaps more significantly, the wage differential between workers and those in more lucrative vocations is far smaller than in other countries.

Wage differentials between workers and other factory personnel is most directly relevant to this argument. Visiting thirty-eight firms in 1966, Barry Richman found that "at a majority of the enterprises surveyed, the ratio between the top pay and average enterprise pay was less than 2.5 to 1." Riskin, after visiting some of the same firms in 1972, suggests that this ratio has probably been reduced even further. It is additionally significant that the average wages of workers are about the same as the average wages of technicians and cadres in the same factories.

In less material terms, the workers are also lauded as the leading class in Chinese society, a theme reemphasized again after a period of Red Guard and army prominence during the Cultural Revolution. The workers' perception of their role in Chinese society
may also be influenced by the prominent pioneering role they have played in developing new small industries at the hsien level, emphasizing once again the themes of self-reliance and indigenous technology.  

The workers' perceptions of their position in the factory may be influenced by wage differentials within each factory, as noted above, and three policies relating to participation and involvement in factory life. One such policy during this period has been the effort to encourage collective cooperation in work groups rather than individual competition among workers. A second policy has been the general informality in Chinese factories, encouraging workers to interact freely with staff, discussing production problems, etc., without regard to hierarchical chains of command.

A third policy involves the issue of worker participation in technology and in management. Worker participation relates directly to the interaction between political education and production insofar as it actualizes the political ideology and creates self-motivation toward production. It is a form of political education.

Worker participation, however, has two additional purposes. One is to train successors, that is, to prepare the workers to administer industry and society. This is a traditional Communist goal similar to what Lenin meant when he called the trade unions schools of administration. The other is to realize Mao's assumption that tapping the wisdom of the people will produce better results. Not only will participation enhance worker consciousness and technical ability; workers already have sufficient political insight and practical wisdom to contribute substantially to both factory management and technology.

As indicated above, perspectives on this issue have shifted during the past four years away from the extremes of the Cultural Revolution to the view that experts as well as workers do have a role to play in technological innovation and that clear divisions of responsibility have a place in factory management. At the same
time, efforts to strengthen Party leadership have enhanced the role of Party committees in politically educating the workers. These shifts also mean more attention to formal efforts to educate workers for the tasks ahead. It is at this point that political education and administrative education come together, and the topic of actual worker participation will be deferred.

**Political Education and Administrative Education**

With politics in command, administrative education comes closer to political education than in other periods, since political consciousness is seen as the major prerequisite for successorship. During the past few years, great emphasis has been placed on training successors among Chinese workers. Technicians and veteran workers are being encouraged to share their technical knowledge with others. The major vehicle for technical education, however, has been the July 21 worker schools and colleges, instigated by a directive by Mao on July 21, 1968. While many of these schools are part-time, several of them offer full-time two-year programs.

The political aspects of administrative education have emphasized class struggle and have centered around three major movements or campaigns: (1) to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought; (2) to criticize revisionism and rectify work style; and (3) to learn from the well-publicized model of the Tach'ing oil fields. Various policy aspects overlap in these campaigns. Organized as mass campaigns by the Party committees, the first two combine to emphasize class struggle through studying Mao and repudiating revisionism. The campaign to criticize revisionism and rectify work style predominated in 1973, one factory reporting fourteen large criticism meetings since 1972. This movement also linked class struggle and political education to production by mobilizing workers to rectify their own work style. The campaign to learn from Tach'ing extended this linkage to both production and factory relations by advocating the application of Mao's thought within an integrated model for industry, a model overtly representing the Maoist
line as opposed to the Liu Shao-ch'i line. In this way, the three campaigns complement one another and reflect Maoist priorities concerning the interrelationships among class struggle, intrafactory relations, and production.

In another sense, however, in the seventies the emphasis on class struggle has had unity as a major theme as well: "Unite, don't split." On the one hand, some role for experts in technology and management has been advocated. On the other hand, presumably increased technical knowledge and raised political consciousness would prepare the workers practically and psychologically to cooperate with technical, engineering, and managerial staff on an equal rather than subservient basis, thus facilitating cooperation. One manifestation of this possibility has been the so-called three-in-one combination of workers, technicians, and cadres into functional groups for such endeavors as technical innovation.

Worker Participation

The provisions of the Anshan Constitution assume that political education, technical innovation, factory management, and production should be integrated aspects of a single undertaking, with minimum role differentiation among workers, cadres, and technicians. In practice, worker participation in technology and management takes two forms: participation by the workers as a whole, and the selection and preparation of individual workers for promotion to technician or cadre status. The July 21 schools, discussed above, are designed to train workers to be technicians, and a significant number of workers have been promoted to technician status in recent years. Perhaps the major form of worker participation in technology, however, has been the three-way combinations involved in technical innovation.

First introduced in 1965, the three-in-one approach has gone through three stages. Initially, technicians seem to have played the major if underpublicized role. During the Cultural Revolution, emphasis on worker initiative and self-reliance accompanied
class struggle against experts and professionals. During the seventies the role of experts has reemerged. The present line is summarized by Hung Ch'i as follows: Technical innovation must continue to rely on the masses and on worker initiative through the three-way combinations to "wipe out the pernicious influence of 'operation of factory by experts.'" Technicians must participate, but they will need guidance to avoid conservatism: "Technicians must be encouraged to engage in technical innovation and scientific experimentation boldly...[they must be used and] asked to transform themselves at the same time." Like many of the policies discussed in this chapter, the three-way combinations for technical innovation combine the themes of class struggle and national integration, political education and intra-factory cooperation.

The emphasis has been the reverse with respect to worker participation in management, with promotion of workers to cadre status predominating over direct participation in management by the workers as a whole. As evinced throughout this study, no sustained efforts have been made to institutionalize direct worker participation in management. As Paul Harper has also argued, breaking down the boundaries between workers and staff has been achieved primarily by cadres and technicians spending time in the workshops participating in productive labor.

The period since the Cultural Revolution has been characterized, however, by a major campaign to recruit workers into cadre positions, comparable in scope perhaps to the time shortly after 1949. In major industrial cities like Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, twenty to forty thousand promotions since the Cultural Revolution have been reported, while similar figures have been reported for some provinces. These figures are not broken down and presumably include promotions to technician status. Many of them seem to be promotions to membership on factory Revolutionary Committees and, more recently, factory Party and trade union committees. Within factories, the theme that workers are now the masters of their own enterprises has meant that now most officials are also production workers or
ex-workers.

There has also been a corresponding increase in recruitment of workers for Party membership.\textsuperscript{28} At the highest level, the numbers of production workers or ex-workers elected to the Party's Central Committee seems to have increased along with the decrease in military representation from the Ninth to the Tenth Party Congresses. Most significant, and publicized, was the appointment of Wang Hung-wen as a vice-chairman of the Political Bureau and major figure among the top leadership. Two additional workers, Wu Kuei-hsien and Ni Chih-fu were elected alternate Political Bureau members. The list of new provincial trade union chairmen elected in 1973 includes a very high proportion of Central Committee members, most of whom seem to have emerged during the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{29} The new union committees at local levels seem also largely staffed by workers.

**Party-Trade Union Relations and Trade Union Tasks**

Trade unions have reemerged in a context of Party committee leadership in Chinese factories. The Party committees make major decisions concerning political line, ideology, and production.\textsuperscript{30} The Revolutionary Committee in each factory is responsible for day-to-day administration of policy. In the absence of trade unions, Workers Representative Congresses had assisted the Party committees organize and mobilize the workers for study, discussion about production, recreation and welfare activities, and working with female workers. The reconstituted unions are inheriting these tasks.

Party committees organized the elections of the renewed unions and carried out preparatory rectification and education programs. The reports from the conferences at which various provincial union committees were elected all stressed the need for strengthened Party leadership over the unions and the role of unions as assistants to the Party, providing an organizational link between Party and workers.\textsuperscript{31} The new unions are being admonished not to repeat past errors such as neglecting class struggle and emphasizing livelihood
and production over ideological work. Under Party leadership they are to organize and unite the workers to carry out class struggle.

Under this general heading and in this general spirit or overall orientation, more specific union tasks are emerging. Political education is the key, especially the organization of workers to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought and criticize revisionism. Still more specifically, the unions are assuming a role in training successors like running factory schools and participating in worker promotion, that had previously been assigned to Party committees.

In addition to education, the unions are also resuming their major role in the administration of workers' welfare, including decisions about welfare distribution, women's work, visiting workers to demonstrate their solicitude, and recreational activities. They are also to see that production work is done well, organizing the workers to exercise self-reliance and hard work, and to grasp revolution and promote production. Finally, they are to participate in supervising cadres to follow the Party line and Party policies.

In summary, the unions have reemerged to perform a relatively balanced functional role under close Party leadership, albeit with ideological work rather than production or welfare still publicized as the key. Possibly the reemergence of the unions at this time is itself indicative of the more balanced orientation in Chinese factories during the past few years which seems to reflect a reconsolidation of the Maoist line after the ideological surge of the Cultural Revolution.
Chapter IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study, Chinese Communist union and labor policy has been divided into seven periods. It can also be analyzed in terms of three models.

The First Model

During three of the six periods up through the Cultural Revolution, Chinese unions have had several functions. Although production was at the center of their work, they were also engaged in transmission belt, political education, and administrative activities.

The first application of this model came during 1949-1952 when the regime was consolidating its victory. The unions were more independent of direct Party control and more versatile in the range of tasks performed than during any other period. But they experienced no early period of confusion and open debate on the relationship between Party and unions, as the Bolsheviks had. The Party came to power with an established organizational infrastructure relatively prepared to control the entire country politically, and with a pre-established policy of Party leadership over the unions. Political education during this period emphasized national integration, to wit, the necessity for active participation in production to transform China into an industrialized nation, respect for the working class as the "leading class" in society and the resulting responsibilities of the working class, reference to specific benefits accruing to the workers since the Party came to power, such as the labor insurance program, patriotism, especially in connection with the Korean War, characterization of the Party as the only leadership group capable of creating a strong industrialized China,
creation of a high degree of élan, a spirit of all working together to build the new China.

The unions were a transmission belt for Party policies and were used by the Party for attacks on capitalists during the san-fan wu-fan movement as well as for general overseeing of capitalist activities. As "schools of administration," the unions administered worker welfare programs and literacy education, organized new unions, and participated in the massive promotion of workers to cadre and industrial line-staff positions. To "defend workers' interests," they organized active, if controlled, worker participation in conferences and councils and organized the workers for "mass supervision" of management.

The second application of this model came during 1955-1957 with the reinstitution of collective leadership in Chinese factories. Emulation campaigns emphasizing political education returned to prominence. Workers' conferences were restored, and new efforts were made to increase the number and role of worker activists. Also, the wage reform of 1956 brought with it increased attention to welfare functions. It was overtly argued that successful political education depended on looking after the workers' welfare and livelihood.

From 1961 to 1963, the first model reappeared in a slightly different form. During the Great Leap Forward, the unions had been weakened organizationally by a reduction in union administrative tasks and by the performance of political education and production-mobilization tasks directly by the Party. In 1961 the unions began to rebuild, to "strengthen their organizational construction," and to resume their routine tasks, that is, the various tasks assigned to them during 1949-1952 and 1955-1957. The "three hard years" of 1960 to 1962 precluded a wage reform until finally a minor one was instituted in 1963. To compensate, new emphasis was placed on assisting the workers with their personal difficulties and being solicitous of workers' welfare. In this same direction, union
cadres were to work and live with the workers, creating a spirit of common effort.

The Second Model

The second model of trade union performance appeared during China's first five-year plan. Chinese factories copied the Soviet one-man management system, and union functions were curtailed as they had been in the Soviet Union under that system. While the various union functions were not entirely eliminated, union activity focused almost exclusively on production. Workers' conferences atrophied, and management control was strengthened for the application of strict labor discipline. In general, this model is comparable to the pattern of union performance in the Soviet Union under Stalin.

The Third Model

The Great Leap Forward introduced the third model which is characterized by extreme reliance on political education to increase production. Work rules and material incentives alike were downgraded as the application of political education was transformed into personal exhortation and "shock" mobilization in which the unions were largely by-passed in favor of direct Party contact with the workers. Both workers and cadres worked on the production floor, and both cadres and workers "managed" from the production floor. Political education, however, retained an "economistic" tint, by stressing that this was to be a Great Leap Forward to material abundance.

This model reappeared during the Cultural Revolution. Material incentives were downgraded, and even production was no longer the focus of factory and union life. Political education, now defined as Mao's thought, took command once again.

Concluding Evaluation

The Stalinist response to the problems of industrialization
under the second model has seemed inappropriate to China. It emphasized resources that the Chinese have not had, especially technical expertise, and negated China's major potential assets of labor power, the creative power of ideological or political mobilization, and the Party itself. While the Chinese have attempted to create a large body of technical experts, it has been a very slow process. This model also relies heavily on control and coercion and thus precludes voluntary participation and successful political education for most workers. Since it has been rejected by China's leaders since the mid-fifties, it need not detain us here.

With the exception of that period, Chinese trade union policy has alternated between the first and third models. Those alternations have mirrored broader political-economic conflicts between Mao and other Party leaders. It is tempting, therefore, to see one of them as the Maoist model. It is, however, more fruitful and, I think, more correct to see the first and third models in a dialectical relationship.

In the first place, there are limits to the degree of control a single leader or a group of leaders can exercise over an entire policy area. Beyond that, however, Mao has expected and attempted a pattern of political intensification and relaxation or a "leap forward" followed by consolidation at a higher level as changes occur, for example, in China's technology and the political consciousness of her leaders and people. It would also appear that Mao's own views on policies for industry and labor have changed with experience. In this sense, the third model can be viewed as a necessary but temporary application of extreme policies to correct imbalances. Moreover, some of the extremes of the Great Leap Forward can be attributed to inexperience, not only on the part of local cadres but also Mao himself, while some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution can be attributed to the gravity of the overall situation as Mao perceived it.

In this perspective, the last few years can be seen as another
period of consolidation in a continuing process or as walking on two legs at a dialectically higher level. Trade unions have not been reestablished long enough to allow analytical perspective on this period. Looking primarily at the orientation of factory policy, however, it appears to fit the first model, with the major exception that to date, at least, political education continues to be emphasized over production.

As detailed in the previous chapter, this period seems characterized by a multi-functional policy that focuses on a kind of political education that combines ideological education with technical innovation, class struggle with national self-reliance, and class struggle with unity and cooperation. In addition, the Party is once more in command but presumably rectified by the Cultural Revolution and mass recruitment of workers for Party membership and into leading factory positions. The following evaluations should be informed by that perspective.

The extreme politics in command response to the problems of industrialization has had major limitations. The almost total abandonment of technology, regulations, and statistical control during the Great Leap Forward resulted in economic disaster, and although a major effort was made to avoid those errors during the Cultural Revolution, an inherent incompatibility is evident.

In terms of labor policy, an attempt to create Communist workers by short-term ideological exhortation seems unrealistic. Mobilization for common action is possible only when common interests are evident, necessitating a prolonged process of education and experience. Even over the long run, it has seemed to many observers that the industrialization process itself depends on the efficiency provided by a division of labor and routinization of role performance, in addition to technology, mechanization, and rationalization. This view, however, is no longer universally held even in the West.

Unmodified applications of the first model have also involved at least two problems. One is that successful implementation has
been difficult even when this model has been the official policy. The other is Mao's critique of what this model has led to in the past, even when it was successfully implemented. The two are closely related since a number of the practical difficulties seem to be inherent in the policy itself, at least in the China of the fifties and sixties.

In practice it involves a delicate balance of spontaneity and control that has been difficult to maintain with an unsophisticated work force, a very limited budget for consumption and incentive purposes, and cadres with tendencies toward self-entrenchment and concentration on their own prerequisites. The major threats to that balance have been posed by the Party's insistence on exercising effective power in all areas of Chinese life and by the fact that production has been at the center of union work.

The Party has consistently acted as a central elite allocating duties but no political power to other elite groups and organizations such as the unions. The ACFTU as an organization has played little if any role in China's central economic planning. Any effort by the unions towards organizational independence has met the Party's almost pathological fear of syndicalism. At lower decision-making levels the pattern has been similar. For example, during periods like the Great Leap Forward when workers' councils have been prominent, it has been the Party committees and not the workers that have actually been in control.

In performing the transmission belt function, union cadres have consistently been caught in the middle. Lack of union independence or leverage has made it extremely difficult for the unions to communicate up to the center. Carrying out directives from above to the neglect of representing the workers has caused union cadres to lose the workers' respect and thus inhibited their ability to communicate down effectively. In avoiding economism and its logical corollary, syndicalism, the unions have had a continuing problem with bureaucratism and with abject reliance on the Party and
general ineffectiveness.

Given China's economic situation, it has no doubt also been unavoidable that union performance has been evaluated primarily in terms of production output. This characteristic is shared with other developing countries. It has, nevertheless, forced the unions to neglect other duties such as educating the workers, maintaining safety rules, and upward communication. It has also led to professionalism at the expense of an orientation to political education. Union cadres have, of course, been led to professionalism by their own task orientation, but the professionalism of preferring techniques, skills and material incentives over political education to achieve the production quotas demanded from above has also reflected the practical realities of the industrializing process, reinforced by the economic disaster resulting from the Great Leap Forward.

This tendency toward professionalism has also been encouraged by the unions' administrative tasks. After production, welfare and other administrative tasks have been the most consistently observable activities of Chinese unions, despite limitations on the availability of welfare funds and despite periodic attacks on material incentives for ideological reasons. Administration of workers' insurance has always been entirely in the hands of the unions. They have assisted the Party in recruitment and promotion programs, especially during the early years of the regime, and union activist work has been a significant route for promotion into the Party and/or line-staff administrative positions. Chinese unions have also consistently been assigned a role in the administration of spare-time education and apprenticeship programs, and the number of workers participating in these programs has been extremely large.

For these reasons, union cadres have been ever present in the lives of the workers and have played a major role in urbanizing and integrating them into industrial society. But by demanding so much of their time, administrative tasks have also led the unions into bureaucratism and professionalism. This, in turn, has affected the
kind of political education the workers have received.

We have repeatedly noted that professionalization has conflicted with political education. Moreover, the function of political education has involved its own internal conflict between the two goals of socialization and communication. As used here and defined in Chapter I, socialization means political education designed to socialize the Chinese workers to an acceptance of the Communist regime and its nationalistic and industrialization goals and programs. Communization means political education designed to educate Chinese workers to an acceptance of the ideology or world view of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung. Before the Cultural Revolution, both socialization and communization were attempted simultaneously, with the emphasis on socialization except during the Great Leap Forward.

Theoretically these two goals are not inconsistent, and in practice they are interrelated in many ways. But the potential for conflict between them is also high. The attempt at socialization has been closely related to the question of worker amenities. A major basis for integration into the society has been the ability to demonstrate to the workers that the Communist regime and its programs are advantageous to the workers in a concrete way. Its effectiveness has been directly related to the professional orientation toward technical skills and material incentives that has seemed most successful in advancing Chinese industrialization in general and workers' welfare in particular. Communization, especially in its extreme Maoist form, depends on a reorientation of men's desires away from material benefits and is therefore antithetical to a system of material incentives.

The evaluation above is concerned principally with problems of implementing the labor policy designated here as the first model. The Maoist critique of that model has focused on its inherent limitations. At the concrete level this has meant political education rather than material incentives and concentration on production
skills, and Maoist ideology rather than political socialization. That topic is discussed next, followed by a brief exploration of the broader issues involved in the Maoist alternative.

The practical argument for a professional approach to increased productivity would seem to be that increased productivity depends on labor discipline. Labor discipline can be created by nonmaterial incentives. The effectiveness of contributive incentives, however, is conditional and will depend in large measure on the workers' view of their own position in society. Wage levels, the degree of technical skill and general education of the work force, and the degree to which the workers are subjectively integrated into society will all be relevant to that view. Thus, the effectiveness of contributive incentives will depend on effective socialization. This is an argument for political education as socialization.

Finally, labor productivity is a function not only of labor discipline or intensification of labor but also and even primarily of industrial technology, mechanization, and rationalization. Insofar as this argument is correct, it also supports the professional approach. This approach will also be pushed, of course, by those with an interest in the establishment of professional or performance criteria rather than political criteria to protect their own favored positions.

The ideological objection to the professional approach has already been simply stated: Communization depends on a reorientation of men's desires away from material benefits and is therefore inhibited by reliance on material incentives and skill quotas. It is also inhibited by professionalization in a broader sense. This view assumes that the ultimate aim in China is concerned with relationships among people. In order to maintain a Communist economic structure, China must industrialize. But if the means of achieving industrialization lead one on the revisionist path of the Soviet Union, then achieving Communism will be precluded. If, on the other hand, the means to industrialization can be communistic
then Communism can be achieved.

This objection to the professional approach has a positive side also. An effective policy of wage incentives depends on the availability of consumer goods without which monetary wages are not meaningful. At the same time, contributive incentives are most effective as marginal additions to an effective monetary incentive policy. The Maoist answer to this dilemma would seem to be that contributive incentives are indeed marginal and conditional. They are, in fact, inadequate to the tasks of industrialization without advances in technology and in the ability to simultaneously provide strong material incentives.

Communization, on the other hand, does not depend on a concurrent system of effective material incentives. Labor discipline is achieved because of successful communization, and the communist man is impervious to the absence of material incentives. It will include, for example, internal or self-motivation. At the same time, communization in the broader sense, represented by the attack on the Party and the professionals during the Cultural Revolution, will improve social and political conditions for successful political education by sweeping away an entrenched bureaucracy. This act will itself change the workers' view of their role in the society by resolving or at least continuing to deal effectively with the distinctions between top and bottom and between bureaucrats and workers. Thus, in addition to its superiority in achieving the goal of a communist society, communization may also be more effective in achieving an industrialized society.

At a broader level, this is part of Mao's resistance to the assumption that industrialization depends on a sharp division of labor, role distinctiveness, and routinization and that industrialized societies must be integrated on that basis. According to the Maoist view, those characteristics will in fact lead to differentiation between leaders and followers and, in the factories, between managers and workers, with major consequences for personal relations
and perceptions. Managers and cadres, on the one hand, and workers, on the other hand, will be unable to relate as communist or socialist brothers. Contradictions between top and bottom will intensify and become entrenched. Different groups will also perceive differently the stakes of what should be a common undertaking. Managers will seek highest output at lowest cost, filling and overfilling quotas with least interference and least expenditure of energy and personal risk. The workers will attempt to maximize their pay and minimize their work effort. Under a piece wage system, for example, they will sacrifice quality to quantity, and with standard wages they will cut corners to minimize their own work regardless of consequences to the products or overall production except to meet formal or informal minimum standards. These examples are from the factory but have their homologues in the national political arena.

As an alternative, Mao has insisted on integration through ideological unity. To achieve that unity he has looked to common struggle and to interchanging role performance, both reminiscent of the practical necessities of the Yenan period. The common enemy to be struggled against has been either ideologically defined class enemies or economic bottlenecks, and the military terminology during production campaigns has been deliberate. Interchanging role performance aims at common understanding and assumes that perceptions are conditioned by role assignment. The tasks that a person is responsible for in a society or enterprise, program, or process will strongly condition his perceptions and orientation to that institution or activity. The worker-peasant system, the factory policy of having cadres share in productive labor and workers participate in technology, and the hsia-fang program are all attempts to eliminate rigid role differentiation and encourage common understanding.

In a similar way, a case can be made for Mao's general industrialization strategy on both political and economic grounds. The major characteristic of that strategy has been geographically dispersed enterprises under a system of bureaucratically decentralized
economic planning and emphasizing intra-factory self-reliance. Bureaucratic decentralization of planning is an approach to resolving problems of information gathering and processing in a complex economy that seems appropriate to China's priorities and present stage of development. Intra-factory self-reliance is not simply a necessary concomitant to geographical dispersal. It also facilitates active worker participation in technical innovation, decreases the need for capital intensity in major portions of the industrial sector, and potentially introduces all factory personnel to modern technology in a more profound way than importing techniques and equipment from abroad.

The potential advantages of geographical dispersal are also more inclusive than the publicized military pose involved in regional self-sufficiency. Building industrial plants in the interior, close to raw materials, may or may not be less economical than transporting materials to established industrial complexes on the coast. Many of the small industries primarily involved in this dispersal, however, directly serve agriculture, and there is, therefore, value in locating them in rural areas. Moreover, it serves the political goal of breaking down the differences between urban and rural areas by introducing the peasants to industrial culture as well as facilitating part-time use of peasants in small industries during off-seasons. Finally, this latter advantage can be realized without the debilitating effects of an excessive rate of urbanization or population migration to urban centers.

The Cultural Revolution is now over although its effects will be felt in China for years to come. A new effort is underway to find a labor policy that will integrate both technology and worker initiative, that will accelerate industrialization without the revisionist side effects that for Mao characterize Soviet experience, and that will integrate "the three revolutionary movements of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment." It may be that Mao's attempt to create and maintain ideological unity is a populist dream, inappropriate to industrialized society, but thus
far he has been unwilling to give up either goal, ideological unity or industrialization.
## APPENDIXES

### A. Trade Union Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Union Membership</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2,373,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,170,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>12,229,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>12,454,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>13,720,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>16,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>17,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>20,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>20,800,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: 1949-1954: Chinese Workers March Toward Socialism, 14.*


### B. Work Force and Trade Union Membership

(in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade Union Membership (1)</th>
<th>Industrial Workers (2)</th>
<th>Non-Agricultural Employees (3)</th>
<th>Workers and Employees (4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3,004</td>
<td>26,267</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>30,314</td>
<td>10,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7,297</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>34,730</td>
<td>12,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>4,939</td>
<td>36,752</td>
<td>15,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>12,229</td>
<td>6,188</td>
<td>39,116</td>
<td>18,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>12,454</td>
<td>6,408</td>
<td>39,750</td>
<td>18,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>38,864</td>
<td>19,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>13,720</td>
<td>8,626</td>
<td>39,366</td>
<td>24,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>9,008</td>
<td>39,667</td>
<td>24,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>25,623</td>
<td>56,867</td>
<td>45,323</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (1) Appendix A; (2) Ten Great Years, 128; (3) Emerson, "Employment in Mainland China," Table A-1; (4) 1949-1958: Emerson, "Employment in Mainland China," Table A-2; 1959-1960: Chen, Chinese Economic Statistics.
### C. Activists and Outstanding Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Emulation Participants (1)</th>
<th>Outstanding Workers (2)</th>
<th>Outstanding Groups (3)</th>
<th>Activists (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>683,000</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2,380,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2,820,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>80% of staff and workers</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
<td>234,000*</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>2,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,259,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,078,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>3,482,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,441,000</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td>3,490,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>


In comparison with the figures of 3,482,000 or 3,890,000 trade union activists in 1957, the number of full-time trade union cadres that year was 60,874 in local, industrial and primary level unions. "China's workers and employees: Some figures," *Shihshih Shout'se*, No. 8 (April 21, 1957), in *ECMM*, No. 88.
D. Workers Promoted

A. Promotions to cadre status

1. 1950-1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and
government organs totaled 107,000; workers promoted to trade
union organs above the basic level totaled 111,000. "Opening
address by Liu Ning-i," Seventh All-China Congress of Trade
Unions.

2. 1953, workers promoted to cadre positions in Party and govern­
ment organs and trade union organs above the basic level
totaled 12,434. "Marked success made by Chinese workers on
production front in first year of five-year plan," NCNA Peking,
April 30, 1954, in SCMP, No. 806.

3. 1954, workers promoted to cadre positions:
a. 3,600 to Party organs
b. 7,600 to government organs
c. 1,850 to trade union organs above basic level
d. 1,400 to Youth League committees
e. 7,080 to other organizations

"China's trade union organization makes rapid expansion during
the past year," NCNA Peking, April 29, 1955; "The development
made in China's labor movement in 1954," KJJP, April 29, 1955;
both in CB, No. 363.

B. Promotions within industrial enterprises

1. Directors
   Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
   b. 1954: 1,300. "Development made in China's labor movement
   c. 1955: 1,100. "280,000 outstanding workers in China,"
   NCNA Peking, April 28, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1280.

2. Industrial enterprise staff (shop managers, engineers, tech­
nicians, etc.)
   a. 1950-1953: 124,000. "Opening address by Liu Ning-i,"
   Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions.
   b. 1954: 17,650, 7,200 of whom were shop chiefs. "Develop­
   ment made in China's labor movement in 1954," op. cit.
   c. 1955: 4,300 shop managers. "280,000 outstanding workers
   in China," op. cit.
E. Labor Insurance Coverage (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Insurance Coverage</th>
<th>Workers and Employees</th>
<th>Industrial Workers</th>
<th>Trade Union Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>600</td>
<td>8,004</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>2,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>10,239</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>12,815</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>9,008</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>13,779</td>
<td>45,323</td>
<td>25,623</td>
<td>17,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Insurance Coverage: Ten Great Years, 149. For the sources of the other figures, see Appendix B.
NOTES

1. Introduction

1. Alexander Eckstein has estimated that Soviet national income in 1928, on the eve of the Soviet first five-year plan, was 17% above that of China in 1952 and that per capita income was four times that of China. "Moscow-Peking axis: The economic pattern," in Boorman et al., Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains. For an even higher estimate of Soviet superiority, see Zauberman, "Soviet and Chinese strategy for economic growth," International Affairs, XXXVIII (July 1962), 339-352.

2. Industry was essentially socialized by the end of 1956; by 1958 the communes and the Great Leap Forward policies had been adopted by the Party. The period 1956-1958 is used here as a dividing point, with the explicit caveat that all such pinpointing is inexact and somewhat arbitrary.

3. The literature elicited by the Cultural Revolution is voluminous. See, e.g., Chalmers Johnson, "The two Chinese revolutions," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969) for a view emphasizing the influence of Sino-Soviet relations.

4. Policy positions often develop slowly, and changes in emphasis are difficult to pinpoint. They are, in addition, subject to geographical diversity because of deliberate experimentation, usually in Manchuria, level of Industrial development, and the degree of central control in various regions of China.

5. Arguments for consolidating the periodization of the Communist regime into three periods, although along similar lines, are presented by Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's twenty years: A periodization," China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969). The usefulness of the additional subdivisions for my study is evident in the following discussion.

6. Lenin assigned the unions four tasks also: transmission belt, schools of communism (political education), schools of administration, and defense of workers' interests. Discussion of the union role of defending workers' interests was soon dropped in the Soviet Union, and promoting production has long been a recognized task of the unions in both countries. In China the task of defending the workers is subsumed under the transmission belt function.

7. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an infantile disorder," Selected
Works, 871 (his emphasis). On the debates, see Margaret Dewar, Labour Policy in the USSR 1917-1928.

8. This theme runs throughout Party writings on Party-union relations. See especially Chapter IV.


10. Ibid., Article 9.


12. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Chapter IV.


14. See Hsü Chih-chen's speech on the revised constitution, in Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions.


16. A different labor system with extreme implications in that direction is that of Japan. See, e.g., Chie Nakane, Japanese Society, 24-25.

17. "Do not bend with the wind," JMJP, October 11, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1400.

18. For Chinese Communist discussions of the mass line, see Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Report on the Rectification Campaign; Yen Ling, "What is the Party's mass line?" Chengchih Hsuehhsii, No. 6 (1955), in ECMM, No. 11 (October 24, 1955). For the best secondary analysis, see James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China.


the small group in union work, see Kung-hui hsiao-tsu chang kungtso (Work of the Trade Union Small Group Leader); and KJJP, August 6, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3525.


25. The general distinction between model worker and worker activist is that of production excellence versus political activity. A union activist is a full-time worker who does union work in his spare time.


27. For one discussion of why "socialist competition" is a contradiction in terms, and of Marx's opposition to piece wages, see Isaac Deutscher, "Socialist competition," Foreign Affairs, XXX (April 1952).


29. On the allocation of labor in Communist China, see Christopher Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949-1957, especially Part Two: "Employment Policy and Administration."

II. The Honeymoon Period, 1949-1952

1. The Marxist-Leninist doctrinal advantage of socialization is that it eliminates class divisions within society and thereby maximizes the production potential of each individual. The realization of that potential also depends on the reflection of that socialization in the political consciousness of all the members of society, i.e., it depends on all members of society becoming good socialists and ultimately good communists. The practical value of socialization of the means of production is that it allows centralized distribution of resources and
production in accordance with economic planning and priorities.

2. Industrial apparatus valued at more than two billion dollars was taken from Manchuria by the Russians. Arthus G. Ashbrook, "Main lines of Chinese Communist economic policy," in Economic Profile of Mainland China, 18.


5. KJJP editorial, January 1, 1951, in SCMP, No. 44; NCNA, March 6, 1951, in SCMP, No. 80.


7. During the period 1949-1952, 135,600 workers were promoted to cadre positions in the Party, the government and other organs and 124,500 were promoted to administrative and technical positions in enterprises. NCNA, April 24, 1953, in SCMP, No. 559. In 1949 there were almost no industrial workers in the Party; by 1956 there were over one-and-one-half million. J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Transformation in the Chinese Communist Party," in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism, 89; Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, 108. By the end of 1952 a total of 450,000 union members had become Party members and another 650,000 had joined the Communist Youth League. NCNA, April 24, 1953, in SCMP, No. 559.


9. Li Li-san, How to Manage a Factory; Chen Yung-wen, "Democratic management in public enterprises," People's China, 1, 9 (May 1, 1950). See also Schurmann, Ideology and Organization; Schurmann, "Organizational Contrasts Between Communist China and the Soviet Union."


15. "Labor insurance regulations" and "Explanation of some points in the labor insurance regulations," NCNA, March 24, 1951, in CB, No. 66.


17. JMJP, May 1, 1955, in CB, No. 363.


19. "Resist-U.S., Aid-Korea movement to be integrated with production improvement," report by Chen Shao-min at the third plenary session of the first National Committee of Textile Trade Unions, August 21, 1951. NCNA, September 14, 1951, in SCMP, No. 178.

20. NCNA, April 21, 1951, in SCMP, No. 97.


22. A series of articles is translated in SCMP, No. 87 (March 22-24, 1951) and No. 117 (June 15-16, 1951). See also Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, March 22, 1951, in CB, No. 99. As a point of interest, the Ma Heng-chang brigade has been mentioned again recently. Ma himself is now a chief engineer and his team of lathe turners has reportedly overfulfilled its quota every year for the past twenty-four years. "Outstanding team of lathe turners maintains record in China," NCNA Harbin, October 13, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5482.


26. Ibid., 175.
27. Lai Jo-yü, "Report on trade union work in China," in Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions; KJJP editorial, January 1, 1951, in SCMP, No. 44; "Notice on the question of rectifying the work style of trade union organizations and trade union cadres," issued by the ACFL on August 11, 1950 and reprinted in Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, August 15, 1950; KJJP editorial and accompanying article on the subject of the second plenum of the ACFL Sixth Executive Committee, February 11, 1953, in SCMP, No. 513.
29. "Explanation of some points in the labor insurance regulations," NCNA, February 27, 1951, in CB, No. 66. The main spokesman for the ACFL during the san-fan and wu-fan campaigns, for example, was Liu Ning-yi.
30. "Speech by Comrade Li Li-san," in Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, II, 255. See also G.L.V. Hooton, "The Future of Trades-Unionism in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, XVIII, 24 (June 16, 1955). At the same time it should be remembered that Li had suffered disfavor in the past and had been a personal rival of Mao's for the Party's leadership in its earlier years so that Li's role as a scapegoat is possible. Nor did Li disappear altogether. He retained his position as a member of the Party's Central Committee and its Standing Committee; in 1956-1958 he was deputy director of the industrial committee of the Central Committee; in 1962 he became secretary of the North China Regional Bureau. Directory of Chinese Communist Officials, 1963, 1966. Reportedly, however, Li came under attack again during the Cultural Revolution and committed suicide. See "Thirty-three leading counterrevolutionary revisionists," March 1968, in CB, No. 874.
31. KJJP, February 11, 1953. See also NCNA, February 10, 1953; both in SCMP, No. 513.
32. San-fan was a campaign against extravagance, waste, and bureaucratic work style. Wu-fan was directed more specifically against capitalists, and it derived its name from the five sins of bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of state economic information.
33. Lai Jo-yü, Report both on trade union work in China," in Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions, 50.
34. E.g., JMJP, May 11, 1952, in SCMP, No. 339. See also Hankow
1. A coordinated five-year plan was not actually submitted to the National People's Congress until July of 1955. But the official policies that concern us assumed the changes in economic orientation symbolized by the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1953.

2. K.C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese industrialization strategies," in Treadgold, Soviet and Chinese Communism; Wu Yuan-li, "Planning, management and economic development in Communist China," in Economic Profile of Mainland China, 104-105. On the distinction between heavy and light industry in China, Schurmann states: "It is important to note that the distinction is not economic (that is, between producer- and consumer-goods industries), but political. What the Chinese call heavy industry consists of industries strategically important for the development goals of the regime; whatever remains falls into the category of light industry." Ideology and Organization, 80.


5. JMJP editorial, August 19, 1953, in SCMP, No. 635.


7. On the coordination of Party, Communist Youth League, and union work, see the series of articles in JMJP, April 11, 1954, in SCMP, No. 794. A qualification should be made, however,
concerning the changes in enterprise leadership. According to Schurmann, opposition to the one-man management system by Party officials began almost as soon as it was widely introduced in 1953, thus inhibiting its consolidation. Ideology and Organization, 272.


11. KJJP, June 3, 1953, in SCMP, No. 605.

12. KJJP, August 12, 1953, in SCMP, No. 647.


14. "Oppose the trend of punitivism," KJJP editorial, January 21, 1955, in SCMP, No. 986. This is one editorial referred to in charges against the editor, Ch'en Yung-wen, during the union purge of 1958; see Chapter IV.


16. Yuan Feng, "The ratio of increase between labor productivity and wages," Hsin Chienshe, No. 12 (December 3, 1956), in ECMM, No. 71. According to Perkins, however, "marginal productivity of unskilled and semiskilled laborers was well below their average productivity and, while the average increased each year, it is doubtful that there was any rise in marginal productivity at all, owing to the constant excess availability of unskilled workers. Thus the average wage in China was higher than necessary from the point of view of allocative efficiency. This was partially and somewhat indirectly recognized by the reduction in lower-grade wages in 1958." Market Control and Planning in Communist China, 149-150.

17. Labor Insurance Regulations, Revised, January 1953; Comparative Chart of Provisions of Original and Revised Labor Insurance Regulations, both in CB, No. 225. The Chinese claimed that the
new regulations would increase insurance expenditures by about twenty-five percent. JMJP, January 9, 1953, in CB, No. 225. Statistics in Ten Great Years indicate that the number of workers and staff members covered by insurance increased by more than forty-five percent from 1952 to 1953. See Appendix E.


19. Data must be collected from various sources some of which give data only on sanatoria, some on sanatoria and rest homes combined, some indicate the number of institutions, others only the number of beds, some give data on "spare-time" or overnight facilities provided by enterprises for the exclusive use of their own employees and some do not. The largest single collection of data is Ten Great Years, but the category used is the number of beds available in both sanatoria and rest homes combined and is thus incomparable with the data from any other sources.


25. Wages in private industry apparently were generally higher than wages in public industries. "Reform the new joint public-private enterprises' wage system" Hsinhua panyueh-k' an (November 21, 1956), 107, as cited by Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Communist China, 148. See also, "Trade unions' new role in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, XVI, 1, 26 (June 30, 1955).


IV. Socialization of Industry and the Role of the Unions, 1955-1957


5. E.g., JMJP, January 21, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1466.

6. JMJP editorial, November 30, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1433.


8. See especially the series of articles in URS, III (1956), 5.


10. The wage reform was formalized by the Minister of Labor, Ma Wen-jui, at the third session of the First National People's Congress, June 29, 1956. See his "Wages, labor conditions and employment," NCNA, June 29, 1956, in CB, No. 405. On the importance given to material incentives, see Tientsin Ta Kung Pao editorial, May 22, 1956, and JMJP, June 3, 1956, both in SCMP, No. 1314. "Summary description of articles on the question of combining the individual interest of laborers with the public interest of society," Hsüehhši, No. 10 (October 2, 1955), in ECMM, No. 17; Wang Ching-cheng, "On egalitarianism," Hsüehhši, No. 11 (November 2, 1956), in ECMM, No. 67; Huang Wei, "Is there any contradiction between the development of production and the betterment of living?" Chan Wang, No. 48 (December 15, 1956), in ECMM, No. 67.
11. For an explanation of calculation procedures for welfare funds, see Wei Li, "The system of wage allowances should be radically reformed," Chihua Chingchi, No. 5 (May 9, 1958), in ECMM, No. 135.

12. The statistics are once again tentative. For two general sets of figures, see Kang Chao, "Industrialization and urban housing in Communist China," Journal of Asian Studies, XXV, 3 (May 1966), and The Construction Industry in Communist China; and William Hollister, "Trends in capital formation in Communist China," in Economic Profile of Mainland China. For arguments supporting Chao's figures and detailed information on Shanghai, see Christopher Howe, "The supply and administration of urban housing in Mainland China," China Quarterly, No. 33 (January-March 1968).

13. According to Wen Yu, 5,400,000 out of 5,600,000 newly skilled workers, cumulative to 1960, were trained by apprenticeship and the rest in spare-time technical schools. "The new generation of skilled workers," China Reconstructs, IX, 8 (August 1960).


20. Ibid., 246.


22. "Trade union leader on democracy in factories," NCNA, November 29, 1956, in SCMP, No. 1423; "Trade union president on factory
democracy," NCNA, January 9, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1449.

23. Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.

24. Mao's first invitation, delivered on May 26, 1956, was not published but was officially interpreted by Lu Ting-yi, "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend!"

25. Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.


27. KJJP editorial, September 24, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1631.


29. Reported by Li Feng, "On an 8,000-li tour of hurried observation," JMJP, May 9, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1551; KJJP, May 21 and 22, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1552. One li is about one-third of a mile.


33. NCNA, June 14, 1957, and JMJP editorial, June 10, 1957; both in SCMP, No. 1566.

34. KJJP editorial, November 12, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1660; KJJP editorials, October 22 and 24, 1957, and Hsiao Liang, "Workers must take into account the interests of six hundred million people," KJJP, October 9, 1957, both in SCMP, No. 1641.


38. NCNA, August 11, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1833.


40. "Trade union organizations must carry out the rectification campaign to the end," JMJP, August 12, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1837; "Rightist Ch'en Yung-wen exposed by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions at the rectification meeting," KJJP, August 13, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1849.

41. Tientsin Hopei Jihpao, June 4, 1958, and KJJP, June 27, 1958, both in URS, XIII (1958), No. 23; Lushun-Dairen Lü-Ta Jihpao (October 26, 1958), in SCMP, No. 1925.


43. T'an Hsin-wen, "Labor union movement."

44. Harper, "The Party and the unions in Communist China."

V. The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960


2. E.g., Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth, 43.


4. KJJP editorial, July 1, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1814 (emphasis in original). See also KJJP, July 23, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1828;


8. Ch'eng Hsi-hai, "How was labor organization overhauled in Huinan municipality?" Hefei Anhwei Jihpao, March 15, 1959, in SCMP, No. 1993; Sung Ping, "Worker-cum-Peasant is a very good labor system," Hsuehhsii, No. 10/11 (May 31, 1958), in ECMM, No. 135.

9. E.g., Wang Li and Tsao Heng-kuei, "Pay constant attention to workers' political education," Hsuehhsii, No. 6 (March 18, 1957), in ECM, No. 83.

10. On the wage reductions, see "Message of greetings delivered by Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," in Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions; Shih Kuang, "How to deal with the welfare problem during the rectification campaign," Chungkuo Ch'ingnien, No. 22 (November 16, 1957), and Yang Po, "The ratio of consumption accumulation in the use of the national income," Hsuehhsii, No. 20 (October 18, 1957), both in ECMM, No. 116; Sung Ping, "Why is it necessary to introduce a rational low wage system?" Hsuehhsii, No. 23 (December 3, 1957), in ECMM, No. 118; Hsu Yi et al., "Distribution based on labor and the wage policy," Hsin Chienshe, No. 5 (May 1958), in ECM, No. 137; Perkins, Market Control, 152-153. On welfare reductions, see especially Wei Li, "The system of wage allowances should be radically reformed," Chihua Chingchi, No. 5 (May 9, 1958), in ECM, No. 135. On the elimination of piece wages, see KJJP, August 29, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1862; Hsu Chin and Yin Chen, "They don't want piece wages," Chungkuo Ch'ingnien, No. 19 (October 1, 1958), in ECM, No. 150; CB, No. 537 (December 5, 1958).

11. On the use of shock tactics, see, e.g., NCNA, September 29, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1866. According to this article, workers were staying at their posts around the clock, some of them putting in twenty or more consecutive hours at work. On the lack of organization, see, e.g., KJJP, August 12, 1959, in
SCMP, No. 2089. On lack of technical innovation, see, e.g., JMJP editorial, November 4, 1959, in SCMP, No. 2139.

12. On work regulations, see Liu Ning-yi, "Chinese workers forge ahead under party leadership," JMJP, October 1, 1959, in CB, No. 606. On lack of safety measures, see, e.g., Tientsin Hopei Jihpao, April 9, 1959, in SCMP, No. 2036; KJJP editorial, June 9, 1959, in SCMP, No. 2041.


14. Liu Ning-yi, "Raise high the Mao Tse-tung banner, take heart, aim high, and struggle for a better leap forward in 1960!" NCNA, March 4, 1960, in SCMP, No. 2214.


1. For eyewitness accounts, see Charles Taylor, Reporter in Red China; Lorenz Stucki, Behind the Great Wall; Hugo Portisch, Red China Today; and Frederick Nossal, Dateline Peking.


3. E.g., Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, Chapter 4; Perkins, Market Control, Chapter 6; E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism. Also, e.g., Hsü Hsin-hsüeh, "Further strengthen the responsibility system in industrial enterprises," Hung Ch'i, No. 22 (October 16, 1961), in SCMM, No. 286; Wang Hsin-yuan (Vice-Minister, Papermaking Industry) at national conference for the papermaking industry on March 1, 1963, "Strengthen management of enterprise, centering on the production-increase and economy campaign," Chungkuo Ch'ing-kungyeh, No. 4 (April 13, 1963), in SCMM, No. 365. On the reemphasis on the role of technical personnel, see, e.g., "Further develop the role of technical personnel in industrial enterprises, JMJP editorial, November 7, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2635; "Strengthen the technical management of industrial enterprises," JMJP editorial, April 8, 1963, in SCMP, No. 2967.


5. On the arguments concerning absenteeism, see, e.g., Wang Yu-ch'ang et al., "Attend to the livelihood of workers: Report No. 1 on an investigation into the attendance rate of workers in Ch'eng-tzu colliery, Ching-hsi," JMJP, May 19, 1961, in


8. JMJP, August 31, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2575; also, KJJP, September 19, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2602.


12. The closest to a summary in translation is Ku Ta-ch'ün, "Intensify socialist education for the working class," Hung Ch'i, No. 1 (January 4, 1964), in SCMM, No. 402.


18. KJJP editorial, April 2, 1961, in SCMP, No. 2490; KJJP, October 6, 1962, in SCMP, No. 2845.

19. Mo Fei, "Be mindful of the practice of thrift when observing the spring festival," KJJP, January 24, 1963, in SCMP, No. 2921; KJJP, January 6, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3385; and a series of articles from KJJP, April 5, 8, and 12, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3219.


22. Yang Chun-t'ien, "How to arrange trade union work at the hsiang or chen level, with support for agriculture as the main point," KJJP, November 25, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3357. The significance of "fixed points" was that earlier in the program cadres had commuted between office and check points and thus did not really get to know the workers.

23. According to one article, "as far as our trade union cadres are concerned, to do this involves a revolution in the ways of thinking and work." See Liu Fang-sheng, "A complete understanding of man is the basis of success in doing ideological work in work groups," KJJP, January 7, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3385.

24. See Appendix C.


VII. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

1. "Two diametrically opposed lines in building the economy," JMJP, August 25, 1967, as reprinted in Peking Review, No. 37 (September 8, 1967). These policies, especially emphasis on political education and downgrading material incentives, were publicized mainly in "learn from Tachai" (in agriculture) and "learn from Tach'ing" (in industry) campaigns; see, e.g., Hung Ch'i', No. 13 (December 6, 1965), in SCMM, No. 505, on the Tach'ing oil field model.

2. KJJP editorial, April 30, 1965, in SCMP, No. 3467.
3. KJJP editorial and article, March 22, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3674.
4. KJJP editorial and article, April 27, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3693.
5. KJJP, June 10, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3734.
7. This was no doubt due in part to Liu Shao-ch'i's traditional close association with the unions. However, as argued below, the criticisms of union behavior launched by the Cultural Revolution were accurate in fact if not always in spirit.
11. For one first-hand account emphasizing particularly the confusion that must have dominated the earliest periods of the Cultural Revolution, see Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal. Hunter details, for example, Party complicity in the activities of the Scarlet Guards, an organization of moderate workers constituting the most important opposition group to Shanghai's Rebels (Red Guards) (pp. 169-170). This complicity, also involving factory managers, led to such activities as paying bonuses to workers and issuing them travel vouchers and funds, triggering the Cultural Revolution Center Group's major attack on economism. For a similar description of initial worker hesitancy to join the Red Guards in a Peking factory, see Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China, 125-129.
12. "Chairman Mao sends treasured gift to Peking's worker-peasant Mao Tse-tung's Thought propaganda team," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 9, 1968); "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's latest directive," Peking Review, No. 34 (August 23, 1968); Yao Wen-yuan, "The working class must exercise leadership in everything," Hung Ch'i, No. 2 (August 1968), in SCMM, No. 625. For the strongest argument of this interpretation, see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the
New Left: At Home and Abroad; see also, e.g., Richard Baum, "Year of the mangoes," Asian Survey, IX, 1 (January 1969).


16. In 1965 Liu Ning-yi was elected a Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Secretary-General of the National People's Congress. CB, No. 752 (February 1, 1965). In 1966 he seems to have continued to advance in the Party hierarchy. See the post-eleventh plenum ranking of top Party leaders in "Quarterly chronicle and documentation," China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December 1966), 186.

17. Uri Ra'an, "Peking's foreign policy 'debate,’ 1965-1966," in Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, II. One NCNA release on the ceremonies for the eighteenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China in 1967 listed Liu as ranking twentieth among the top leaders, but another more comprehensive NCNA release did not include his name. CB, No. 838 and SCMP, No. 4037. Although he was seen at public receptions in Peking on January 1, 1969, he has not been seen in public since, not even during May Day activities. He was not reelected to the ninth Central Committee of the Party in 1969.


19. NCNA, December 1, 1967, two articles, in SCMP, No. 4073.


23. CB, No. 905 (March 29, 1970).

24. At that time the political education of ex-capitalists was listed as a major union assignment. See, e.g., the various speeches by Lai Jo-yü during 1956 and 1957.


26. See Chapter V. The article "Sources of labor discontent in China," erroneously states that the system appeared for the first time in the sixties, apparently following the implications to that effect in Chinese articles on the subject, especially Peking Review, IX, 3 (January 14, 1966), "Across the Land" section.


28. See, e.g., "Participation in both industry and farming work is an important reform in the labor system," Chungkuo Fangchih, No. 1 (January 10, 1965), in SCMM, No. 465; Chang Ho-wei, "The worker-peasant labor system in finance and trade departments," Hsin Chienshe, Nos. 1-2 (February 20, 1966), in SCMM, No. 534.


30. It might be overly cynical to suggest this as a purpose of the system; nevertheless, efficiency suggested rotating workers to the countryside after a number of years in certain types of factory work. "For example, the age bracket for spindle workers in the cotton textile and silk-reeling enterprises should range from 18 to 26, and periodic rotation can be enforced once about every eight years. This is because female workers in this age bracket are most efficient in this type of work and when sent back to the countryside at 26, they are still able-bodied labor power." "Participation in both industry and farming work is an important reform in the labor system" (cited in note 28 above). In addition to the question of pensions and the generally higher standard of living enjoyed by workers than by peasants, the threat of rotation to the countryside may itself have biased many urban workers against the system.

Revolution and was not reelected an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1969.

VIII. The Reappearance of the Trade Unions, 1973

1. According to Chin Fu-yao, cultural officer of the People's Republic of China's embassy in Australia, the unions had continued to exist but had been inactive. Personal communication.


3. "Strive to fulfill the historical mission of the working class," Hung Ch'i, No. 9 (September 3, 1973), in SCMM, No. 760.


5. E.g., "Living standards in China improve," Peking Review, No. 40 (September 30, 1971). A more recent article makes the explicit point that workers' output, quality and rejection rates are publicly posted "to draw attention to outstanding work for others to emulate, not as a 'material incentive.'" "Socialist industry--The workers are the masters," Peking Review, No. 28 (July 13, 1973).


9. Riskin, "Maoism and motivation."

10. Meisner, "Report from China." According to Meisner, workers averaged 64 yuan per month, state cadres and technicians 60 yuan per month. A number of articles in the Chinese press emphasize that the Party chairman may or may not earn slightly more than skilled workers and that Party committee members
earn less than veteran skilled workers. E.g., "Socialist industry--The workers are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).

11. This reemergence is discussed in the previous chapter. For a discussion of this change as reflected in Chinese literature, especially the role of veteran workers, see my "Heroes and villains in Chinese literature, 1968-1972," World Review, forthcoming.


13. In an extreme form, work groups may be remunerated on the basis of group output, with autonomy to decide each worker's share on the basis of such criteria as work effort, need, cooperation, etc. As Riskin indicates, however, application in this form has been limited in factories because a policy of time wages rather than collective bonuses has been in effect. Riskin, "Maoism and motivation."

14. On this general theme, see, e.g., Wang Hung-wen's remarks to the Tenth Party Congress. On this general theme applied to workers, see, e.g., Wu Kung-wen, "Training worker-cadres is a task assigned us by history," JMJP, July 10, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5422; KMJP, May 13, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5382. See also Take the Road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in Training Technicians from Among the Workers.


17. In 1971 revisionism was criticized by repudiating Liu Shao-ch'ı; in 1973 revisionism was attacked in general until after the Tenth Party Congress when Lin Piao was singled out. For 1971 see, e.g., "Motivation behind heroic deeds," Peking Review, No. 50 (December 10, 1971); "Fourth five-year plan: First year's success," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 7, 1972). On the intensified campaign to study Mao and Marxism in 1973, see Chang Fu-heng, "We workers must strive to study revolutionary theories," Hung Ch'i, No. 5 (May 1, 1973), in SCMM, No. 753; "Dockers in central China port study Marxism-Leninism," NCNA
Wuhan, October 20, 1973, in SCMP, No. 5486.


21. Jen Wen, "Road of training technicians from among the workers," (cited in note 16 above); "Socialist Industry—The workers are the masters" (cited in note 5 above).


24. See also Lee, "The politics of technology in Communist China." This kind of cooperation is potentially facilitated by the organization of Chinese unions as plant unions.


27. Meisner reports that in the Shenyang transformer factory he visited in 1972, the Revolutionary Committee was established in 1968 and that sixteen of twenty-eight members were "from the masses." Meisner, "Report from China." According to a recent Peking Review article on the Shanghai Watch Company, the Party committee is entirely composed of workers with the exception of the Secretary (concurrently chairman of the Revolutionary Committee), and the Revolutionary Committee is entirely composed of workers except for one engineer and the chairman. "Socialist industry—The workers are the masters," (cited in note 5 above).

28. "Over 5,000 new party members of Anshan Iron and Steel Company," [among workers, cadres and technical personnel] KMJP, June 29, 1973; "Large number of new Party members among Shanghai workers," [33,000 since the Ninth Congress in 1969]
IX. Summary and Conclusions

1. The entrenchment of higher political officials in China before the Cultural Revolution is well documented and is explicit in Mao's speech on contradictions among the people as well as the Cultural Revolution itself. For an interesting view of efforts by "the people" to maximize their individual and personal interests by learning to use the developing rules of the game in Chinese society, see Michel Oksenberg, "The institutionalization of the Chinese Communist revolution," China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December 1968).

2. On the Maoist strategy, e.g., "China's road to socialist industrialization," Peking Review, No. 43 (October 24, 1969);
for perhaps the most enthusiastic Western scholarly description, see E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce MacFarlane, *The Chinese Road to Socialism*.


The major source for this study has been the English translation series released by the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong Kong; items from that series and articles from such Chinese publications as Peking Review and China Reconstructs are not listed separately in the bibliography.

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