Chapter III: “Yankee, Go Home!”

“Civil” Administration of the Keystone of the Pacific

The renewed United States interest in Okinawa, marked by General Sheetz’ arrival in October 1949, signified a major departure in U.S. occupation policy. For one thing, Sheetz would be guided by the new, far-reaching directive from Washington. He was charged with dual, and apparently contradictory responsibilities, military and civilian, although he said “the United States had more than a strategic interest in the islands. It carries with it the moral responsibility of a Christian people to others.” Still, there was no question as to where the priority initially lay.

By the end of the year, ground had been broken for a “new era” in Okinawa based on the United States commitment to “retain on a long term basis the facilities at Okinawa.” W. Walton Butterworth of the State Department summarized the developments as follows in his memorandum to Acheson, in December 1949:

- There is a new top administration on the islands [under Sheetz] and some of the worst officers have left. Although he has not yet been able to recruit an able staff, General Sheetz, unlike his predecessor [Major General W. Eagles], has taken a strong interest in his military government responsibilities.

- The Department of the Army has sent a proposed new directive, subsequently as drafted in the Department of State, to CINCFE [Commander-in-Chief, Far East] for comment requesting urgent consideration.

- A $73,000,000 construction program, including $22,000,000 for housing, is under way with procurement of materials and services being made as far as possible in the Ryukyus and Japan. Although primarily for military purposes, this will have considerable effect on the civilian economy.

- A revised program has been developed for the expenditure of GARIOA appropriations in the current fiscal year, amounting to approximately $25,000,000, largely for economic rehabilitation and including housing for military government personnel. This latter is basic for the recruitment of able personnel.

- A trade agreement has been made with SCAP under which purchases up to $9,000,000 will be made by the Ryukyus and up to $1,000,000 by Japan.

- An agricultural mission [headed by Raymond E. Vickery] sent out by the Department of the Army has made an excellent report to the Commanding General in late November . . . [which recommended that, to improve the economic (i.e., agricultural) condition] a central native administration be established with responsibility for the entire area, . . . and the necessity to keep land occupancy by the military to a minimum.\(^1\)

- A financial and general economic team from GHQ, SCAP went to the Ryukyus several weeks ago to make recommendations for a coordinated economic and fiscal plan, covering

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\(^1\)See Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, *Agriculture and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus: A Report* (Washington, Department of the Army, 1949). The report caused such “anguish at the Supreme Commanders’ headquarters” that “generals were reprimanded, colonels transferred, civilians dismissed and new policy formulated which called for progressive rehabilitation of the civil economy.” (Kerr, 5-6)
problems of the exchange rate, Ryukyus budget, wage levels, pricing of imports, etc.\(^2\)

Suddenly, a series of new projects and reforms swept Okinawa. With a massive inflow of funds for base development, military housing, procurement of goods and services, a construction boom hit the island: temporary Quonset structures on base were turned into typhoon-resistant reinforced concrete buildings, muddy and bumpy roads were straightened, widened and paved, and joint-use bridges and utilities such as water supply systems were built. The projects provided thousands of jobs to Okinawan construction companies and workers, and helped boost the local economy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in October, and MacArthur formally issued in December, the "Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," which promised a number of political, judicial, economic and social reforms.\(^3\) Stating that Japan's terms of surrender and the "principles of international law governing the rights and duties of the occupying powers" made the United States "responsible for the civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands, south of latitude 29 degrees north," and that the United States' policy was to retain the islands "on a long-term-basis . . . [for] the security of the United States," the directive outlined its administrative guidelines. Responsible for the civil administration was General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, who doubled as "Governor of the Ryukyu Islands," with the Commanding General, Ryukyu Command (RYCOM) serving as Deputy Governor. Their functions remained the same as before, except that the word "military" was purposely dropped from their titles.

USCAR's objectives were defined as first, the "establishment of a standard of living . . . comparable to that existing prior to the war to the extent that GARIOA funds are available" and, secondly, the "establishment of a sound government financial structure." Its third and fourth objectives were "self-government through legislative, executive and judicial organs established with democratic principles, subject to the final authority of the Governor," and "cultural and educational development."

U.S. administration would be "indirect." The directive called for the establishment of native government at the municipal, provincial and central levels, operating under USCAR's "general supervision." The Governor would be supreme, retaining the power to "veto, or to prohibit or suspend the operations of, any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by any of the above governments, . . . order the promulgation by any of the above governments of any law, ordinances or regulations he may deem advisable," and "resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority in the Ryukyus . . ." when he considered it necessary.

Civil and criminal courts would be established with jurisdiction over "controversies involving title to real estate [and] . . . condemnation proceedings." Criminal jurisdiction would extend to "all persons in the Ryukyu Islands" except "members of the occupation forces, persons serving with the occupation forces, and their dependents." Again the Governor possessed the supreme authority. A "court of last resort" would operate with judges "appointed by and serv[ing] at the pleasure of the governor" who would "have the authority in his discretion to review, approve, remand, suspend, commute, remit or otherwise to modify or set aside any decision, judgment or sentence of such court established."

\(^2\)Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, 12 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, 912-913.

“As far as is consistent with the military occupation,” the people would be guaranteed "the basic liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion and the press; and security from unreasonable searches, seizures and deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Free travel and communication to and from the Ryukyus were permitted, again “subject to requirements of military security” and to availability of facilities.

The Governor would “encourage” the establishment of educational facilities, public information facilities and a “program to develop intelligent participation in responsibilities of democratic citizenship.”

The directive also called for a coordinated long-range economic plan, a program for developing local industries, foreign trade regulations, a system of taxation and a banking and currency system. The funds from the sale of GARIOA supplies would be deposited in a counterpart fund. Controlled by the Governor, the fund was to be used provisionally for the operation of the Okinawan central government, for economic rehabilitation, and for “payment of rental for private property used by the United States prior to 1 July 1950 . . . in the amounts determined by the Governor.” The directive absolved the Okinawan people of “any obligation . . . to repay to the United States funds used for the prevention of disease and unrest, for government of the area, and economic recovery (i.e., expenditures from GARIOA appropriations). Appropriations would be requested and made from U.S. government funds for USCAR and for “relief and economic rehabilitation” in the islands when deemed necessary.

Whereas the military’s “pay-as-you-go” policy had ignored land rental and provided “extremely low” wages to Okinawans working on base-related jobs, now the “completion of registration and/or determination of land titles and the establishment of judicial machinery for the settlement of [land] disputes” would receive priority. The directive empowered the Governor to “secure title to any . . . real estate or facilities [other than Japanese government-owned or municipal property] required permanently by the United States Government by purchase from the owners . . . or through condemnation.”

Significantly, the directive had deleted from earlier drafts a clause delegating authority to the Okinawan police, in the absence of military police, “to arrest and detain members of the U.S. forces and nationals of the Allied and associated powers.” Also deleted was a clause providing that “in view of the acute shortage of arable land to support the local economy, the occupancy and use of such land by the U.S. Forces will be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives.”

Elections were held in September on the island chains (gunto) of Okinawa, Miyako, Yaemama and Amami for their respective governors and assemblymen. Tatsuo Taira became the first postwar elected governor of Okinawa-gunto, defeating both Seiho Matsuoka and Kamejiro Senaga. Matsuoka, supported by two parties—one calling for Okinawa’s independence and the other for U.N. trusteeship under the United States—was the favorite of the military government. Senaga was chairman of the People’s Party which was suspected of being communism-oriented. Sokoku futki (administrative reversion to Japan) was a political taboo at a time when the United States still considered itself the cat as opposed to the Okinawan mouse, but Taira, an independent, had many revisionists among his supporters. Fifteen of the twenty assemblymen elected formed a party around him: the Socialist Masses Party would subsequently become the main voice of the back-to-Japan or reversion movement in the 1950s and 60s.

Then, on April 3, 1950, four months after the directive to establish the USCAR was issued, Army Undersecretary Tracy Voorhees told a House appropriations subcommittee
that U.S. forces would remain in Okinawa "indefinitely." It was the first official proclamation to Congress of American intentions regarding Okinawa. One-third of arable land in Okinawa would be occupied by U.S. military installations, he said, but the "prospective indefinite occupation" would help the people to support themselves by selling goods and services to occupation forces. In the same month, military government established the Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund, capitalized from GARIOA resources, to help finance industrial and housing rehabilitation projects such as the construction of sugar mills and refrigeration plants. The currency exchange rate was fixed at one U.S. dollar to 120 B-yen.

Fully aware of the importance of higher education for Okinawan youths, the military government initiated scholarship programs in 1949 to send a number of Okinawan students to various universities in Japan and the United States. In May 1950, the first university in Okinawan history opened on the hilltop ruins of Shuri Castle of the old Kingdom of Ryukyu. The University of the Ryukyus was established by the United States with GARIOA funding to "provide post-high school education in the arts, sciences, and professions" and to "disseminate matters of general information and education . . . furthering, as far as is consistent with the military occupation, the liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion, and the press."

The Korean War and Peace Treaty

These developments took place amid rising tensions in East Asia and as the United States was preparing peace and security treaties with Japan.

The breakout of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 quickly demonstrated the strategic location and importance of Okinawa. Unlike Japan, a secure sovereign country with an anti-war and democratic constitution, Okinawa could be exploited as a key staging area for unrestricted logistical support and air strikes on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. military presence in Okinawa would serve Japan's interests too. It could depend on the United States for its security at a time when Japan itself had to restrain its own rearmament for political and financial reasons.

The Ryukyus Command (RYCOM), part of MacArthur's Far East Command, had at its disposal for combat one infantry regiment, two anti-aircraft artillery battalions and a large contingent of construction troops in Okinawa. Also under its command was the 20th Air Force, which included the 22nd and 307th Bombardment Groups, the 19th Bombardment Wing, and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wings, all at Kadena and Naha air bases. The 19th Bombardment Group had come to Kadena from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and the 307th Bombardment Group came from MacDill Air Force Base in Florida to take part in the war. "Okinawa," as Fisch noted, "was on its way to becoming a major island bastion in the American network of overseas bases."

Truman had ordered elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Philippine and Ryukyuan waters to Japan. And under MacArthur's orders, the two battalions of the 29th Infantry hurried to the battle zone in July. When it became necessary to improve the airfields in Korea, Air Force engineer troops in Okinawa were dispatched; they would be replaced in Okinawa by local laborers. In addition, 200,000 measurement tons of ordnance supplies were transported to Japan from Okinawa during 1949 in what was known as Operation

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4 An Associated Press article by Stewart Hensley, 3 April 1950.
5 Fisch, 165-166.
Roll-Up. 6

Again, to quote Fisch: "The continually enlarging presence of air units in the islands set the priority for construction. In July 1950 Far East Air Forces made $2,500,000 available for expansion of runways and handstand extension and maintenance at Kadena. It also earmarked $2,000,000 for the rehabilitation of Yontan [Yomitan], Bolo, and Futema [Futenma] auxiliary airstrips with the construction of new runways, taxiways, and service aprons."

The Korean war not only spurred base development but also brought to life an important "resource industry" on islands otherwise lacking any resources, and generated an economic boom. Hundreds of tons of scrap metal, a by-product of the battle, had been salvaged from fields and coastal waters. None of it was exported until 1950 because of restrictions imposed by Washington. With these restrictions eased by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, scrap metal became a major commodity item: Okinawa exported 2,550 metric tons in 1951 and 689,560 metric tons in 1953, most of it to Japan. A USCAR proclamation made it illegal for Okinawans to possess or use non-ferrous metals such as aluminum or keep them in custody. Only the U.S. Government was permitted to recover them for its own use through an amendment in 1954. By 1955, ferrous and nonferrous scrap ranked second and third, respectively, behind sugar as the chief export commodity and they continued to be an important resource for the next few years.

The Korean War also prompted the United States to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. On September 8, 1950, Truman signed the joint State-Defense memorandum (NSC 60/1) stating that the United States and Japan "should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty" and that the treaty must guarantee the United States "exclusive strategic control" of the Ryukyus.

Okinawa's political future was a non-issue, though officials of the State Department occasionally raised doubts about the wisdom of disregarding it. Douglas L. Oliver, adviser on Pacific Islands in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, for example, recommended a review of the NSC decision to "retain" the islands on a long-term basis, "by exploring the possibilities of securing our strategic interests while returning the islands to Japan." 7 William J. Sebald, the senior American diplomat in Tokyo, pointed to the possible rise of a "full-scale irredentist movement [in Japan], particularly if Japan were forced to renounce all claim to sovereignty over outlying islands which the Japanese regard, with some historical justification, as rightfully belonging to Japan." 8

Another high-ranking official commented in November 1950:

The suggestion that the U.S. keep bases in the Ryukyus under the same arrangement as in the main islands has always been met by the military reply that we must be able to count on holding the Okinawa base permanently. Even accepting this position, however, it has never as far as I know been satisfactorily explained why we must control the whole land area south of 29 degrees N. Lat. permanently. Admitting the need for radar stations and the like some distance from the main base, why do we have to control the land and people in between? At most why should we require greater rights than the very broad military rights we will be acquiring in the main islands? ... I believe we should insist that the military

8Sebald to Department of State, 26 October 1950, Department Central Files 694.001/10-2650, XR 794.022.
give us convincing reasons why we should not either (1) seek the same military rights in
the Ryukyus as in the main islands, but on a permanent basis, or (2) seek a 99-year lease of
the particular areas in the Ryukyus that we require, leaving the rest under Japanese owner-
ship and administration.®

Acheson himself took up the issue with Marshall, asking if the Department of Defense
objected to “leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to
the provisions of the contemplated military security agreement [with Japan].” 10 He sug-
gested that a presidential mission to Japan, headed by Dulles, develop arrangements with
Japan such as an agreement concerning U.S. forces to be garrisoned “in and about Japan,
including the Ryukyus.”

But the issue of Okinawa’s disposition had already been closed, for now, by the presi-
dential approval (September 8) of the U.S. policy toward the Japanese. MacArthur dis-
missed Acheson’s suggestion as “highly objectionable from a military point of view. . . .
It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at
United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration.”11
The Joint Chiefs of Staff “strongly disagree[d]” with any relaxation of the terms of its
approved policy (NSC 60/1) toward the Ryukyus. “On the contrary,” they said they con-
sidered that “exclusive strategic control of those islands must be retained by the United
States in order for us to be able to carry out our commitments, policies, and military plans
in the Pacific in peace or war.”12

In early January 1951, Dulles (consultant to the Secretary of State), Dean Rusk (As-
sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) and John M. Allison (special assistant
to Dulles) had a long discussion with General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the peace treaty. They agreed,
among other things, to leave the Ryukyu and Bonin islands under Japanese sovereignty.13

The United States also needed to accommodate different views among the allied pow-
ners regarding the status of the Ryukyu Islands. “Several of the allied powers urged that
the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of
United States sovereignty,” Dulles said. “Others suggested that these islands should be
restored completely to Japan.”14 India, in particularly, was strongly opposed to the U.S.
proposal. “It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration in full of her
sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own

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9Fearey to the Deputy Director of the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs, State Department, 14
12JCS 2190/2, “Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 28
13Secretary of State to Sebald, U.S. Political Adviser to SCAP, 3 January 1951. *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6,
778-79.
14Statement by Dulles, special representative of the President at San Francisco, 5 September 1951.
*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955*, vol.1, 453. Dulles later told Ambassador
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India that the wording was “a compromise between the views of those
countries which wished to see us out completely (i.e., India), and of those who insisted that we
remain as a barrier against the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism (i.e., the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and France).” Memorandum of conversation by Wit-
man, Officer in Charge of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs, Department of State, 14 August 1951,
*FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, 1269.
people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country," an Indian charge d'affaires wrote Dulles in August 1951. "The Ryukyu and the Bonin islands fully satisfy this description. . . . It is apparent to the government of India that such an arrangement [as proposed by the United States] cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East."\(^\text{15}\)

The American answer was "residual sovereignty." "In the face of this division of allied opinion," Dulles continued, "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these people to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority." Besides, the American field manual had authorized the United States to exercise only "some of the rights of sovereignty" over an occupied territory, and not the full sovereignty. "The sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying power," it stated. "The occupation is essentially provisional."\(^\text{16}\)

A memorandum prepared by Dulles in June 1951 explained the basic position the government should follow. Once again referring to "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands, he affirmed that:

1. The United States does not itself desire to acquire sovereignty, for the reason . . . that [it] seeks scrupulously to conform to its January 1, 1942, declaration that it seeks "no aggrandizement, territorial or other."
2. If Japan renounces sovereignty [over the islands] in favor of no one, this would create a chaotic international situation, particularly if . . . the United Nations does not approve the trusteeship agreement we shall propose.
3. The present formula [Article 3 of a draft peace treaty dated June 14, giving the United States the right to all powers over the Ryukyus and their people, pending U.N. approval of a U.S. proposal for trusteeship] fully complies with the provision of the September 7, 1950, joint memorandum [of the Secretaries of State and Defense to President Truman] that the treaty should "secure to the United States exclusive strategic control."\(^\text{17}\)

A State Department internal memo noted that the United States "yielded to India's views regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to the extent of changing the March 28 draft so as to permit Japan to retain sovereignty[ty] over the islands."\(^\text{18}\) On the other hand, John M. Allison, deputy to Dulles in the negotiation of the peace treaty, attributed the concept to Japan's efforts to retain Okinawa. "We were . . . deeply impressed [in 1951] by the Japanese plea for the restoration of the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands," he wrote. "While we could not grant their wishes at that time, I believe it was then that Mr. Dulles conceived the idea . . . that Japan should retain residual sovereignty over the islands . . . ."\(^\text{19}\)

In any case, "exclusive strategic control" was, in Dulles' view, "entirely compatible with residual sovereignty elsewhere, provided the sovereign grants it." The United States, he added, maintained such control over the former Japanese mandated islands and over the Panama Canal Zone. But he admitted that sovereignty was vested in the United States

\(^{15}\)Kirpalani to Dulles, 23 August 1951. \textit{Ibid.}, 1290.

\(^{16}\)Rules of Land Warfare (Field Manual 27-10), 1 October 1940. See Article 273 and 275, Chapter 10 ("Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory").

\(^{17}\)Memorandum by Dulles, 27 June 1951. \textit{FRUS, 1951}, vol. 6, 1152-53.

\(^{18}\)Memorandum by William L. S. Williams, Office of South Asian Affairs, 29 August 1951. \textit{Ibid.}, 1304.

in the case of the former and in Panama in the latter case.

The American proposal rested on feeble grounds. First of all, the Japanese government was not agreeable. It was Tokyo's position that the Okinawans belonged to the Japanese race "beyond any doubt," that they had enjoyed the full rights and benefits as Japanese before the war, and that they were anxious to have their islands confirmed as Japanese territory. "We hope," a memorandum stated, "to be allowed to retain all the islands that always belonged to Japan linguistically and racially."

When the United States proposed at the end of January 1950 that in the peace treaty Japan would "agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands," Yoshida personally requested Dulles that Washington give "reconsideration" of the proposal "in the interest of lasting friendly relations" between the two countries. Specifically, he asked that the islands be returned to Japan "as soon as the need of trusteeship disappears," that the inhabitants be allowed to retain Japanese nationality, and that Japan be made "a joint authority [over the islands] together with the United States."

Dulles acknowledged that there were "strong ties, of a sentimental, economic and political character" between the people in Okinawa and in mainland Japan," which he said "cannot be ignored without creating a permanent state of dissatisfaction, both among the islanders and in Japan proper." A government official feared "antagonizing Japanese public opinion," "doing violence [to] public commitments re no territorial acquisitions," and giving "appearances of outright and irrevocable alienation" of the Okinawan people from Japan. An aide to Prime Minister Yoshida told a State Department official in January 1951 that "it would be a serious mistake, greatly reducing the benefits which may otherwise be derived from a treaty, to transfer title to the Ryukyus and Bonins from Japan. Japan is prepared to give the U.S. all required military rights there for as long as necessary, but the Japanese people will not understand why their peaceably acquired islands, populated ... by people as Japanese as any other, should be taken from them. Such action would be a continual source of bitterness...."

Secondly, the American negotiators themselves had doubts about the validity of their arguments. Dulles himself, as discussed above, rested his concept of "residual sovereignty" on the consent of the sovereign. Thus, if the U.S. proposal for a trusteeship agreement was rejected by the United Nations, he said, "it might be claimed ... that sovereignty was invested in the inhabitants, who could hereafter assert, perhaps with United States backing, a right to oust the United States." Besides, it was questionable whether the United States understood the burdens of administering a trusteeship. "Aside from the problem of close United Nations supervision over the territory which might at some time result in criticism of United States policies in that form, particularly in regard to the pos-

21 Memorandum by Prime Minister Yoshida, n.d. FRUS. 1951, vol. 6, 833-35. The request was made on January 31.
22 Dulles to the Under Secretary of State (Webb), 10 September 1951. Ibid., 1346. Also see DROMFA, microfiche B'-0009, flash 3.
23 Sebald to the Secretary of State, 6 January 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 786. Also see DROMFA, microfiche B'-0009, flash 3.
25 Memorandum by Dulles, 27 June 1951, Ibid., 1152.
sible alienation of land for military purposes,” the consultant to the Secretary of State noted, “trusteeship may raise political difficulties with the inhabitants, the great majority of whom desire that the islands be returned to Japan. Furthermore, the possibility that the area, which is seriously deficient in food, basic raw materials, and industry could ever become self-sufficient, is remote, and the islands will be an economic liability to any administering power.” In any case, Article 3 would not require the United States to seek a trusteeship. Dulles himself told the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1946 that the United States should not “commit itself in the [peace] treaty, but should simply obtain an option to seek a trusteeship.” In addition, Senator H. Alexander Smith expressed concern that, if the United States retained the islands indefinitely, the country might be charged with imperialism.

Thirdly, there was significant opposition to the proposal from among the emerging third world countries. “A number of . . . countries, notably India, have been sensitive” to the [draft] provisions [on the Ryukyu Islands], choosing to regard it as a device to perpetuate Western imperialism,” a State Department official wrote in January 1951. “[I]t is possible that the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations would seek to assure that any trusteeship proposal submitted by the United States not subordinate the welfare of the native population to security considerations.” India, as discussed, believed that the proposed treaty fell short of acknowledging Japan as a fully sovereign state, and would “carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East.” The Egyptian delegate asked that the principle of self-determination and desire of the inhabitants be considered. Burma declined to attend the San Francisco conference because of several provisions in the draft treaty including the one on the status of the Ryukyus.

The same State Department official concluded that the United States should not seek a trusteeship, citing such “liabilities” as “the pronounced feeling on the part of the inhabitants favoring a return to Japanese control, irredentist sentiment in Japan, the depressed economic status of the islands, and the problems which might be raised by continuing full United States responsibility for the administration of the area.”

It was against this backdrop that the Department of State was cautious about committing itself to an early decision on the issue. “The Department . . . believes that it would be a mistake to move so promptly on this matter as to inject the Ryukyus into debates on ratification of the Japanese peace treaty either in the United States or in other countries,” a senior official noted. “Further, it would be undesirable to have the Ryukyus come before the present session of the General Assembly. Lastly, it would be undesirable to discuss the administrative agreement and the Ryukyus with the Japanese in such a way as to permit the use of one for bargaining on the other.”

Okinawans were increasingly apprehensive about their political future. In February 1951, the Socialist Masses Party and the People’s Party demanded Okinawa’s immediate administrative reunification with Japan, while the Socialist Party called for a U.S. trusteeship and the Republican Party for Okinawa’s independence. A month later a resolution

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26 Myron M. Cowen to the Secretary of State, 25 January 1952. Ibid., 1119.
27 Memorandum by Robert A. Fearey, 19 March 1951. Ibid., 933.
29 Burmese Ambassador (Key) to the U.S. Secretary of State, 21 August 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 1281.
30 Rusk (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) to Nash (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), 29 October 1951. Ibid., 1387.
passed by a vote of fifteen to three in the Okinawa-gunto legislative assembly requesting reunification. In April, the Association for the Promotion of the Reversion to Japan (Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kisei-kai) and a youth group with the same purpose were established. A campaign conducted by these two groups collected more than 199,000 signatures of eligible voters, or 72 percent of the total in Okinawa-gunto, on a petition for reversion. The percentage was even higher in the Miyako islands where the same campaign was conducted.\textsuperscript{31} The petitions were forwarded to the American and Japanese delegations attending the peace conference in San Francisco.\textsuperscript{32} At the end of August, the Okinawa-gunto governor and assembly cabled Ambassador Dulles of the United States, Prime Minister Yoshida and the president of the conference, petitioning for Okinawa's reunification with their "homeland," Japan, which alone, they said, would bring peace and happiness to the inhabitants.

In Tokyo, the lower house of the Diet passed a resolution calling on Yoshida and his cabinet to "respect public opinion," which "rightfully believed the Ryukyus to be part of Japan historically and ethnically," and to "make special efforts so that the allied powers would give favorable consideration" to the islands' request.\textsuperscript{33} Yoshida himself considered it essential to make such efforts in order to prevent the allied powers from extending their definition of territories which Japan had taken "by violence and greed" to include Okinawa.\textsuperscript{34} To argue that Karafuto (Sakhalin) and the Chishima (Kuril) islands, "to say nothing of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands," were "an inseparable part of Japan historically, ethnically, geographically and economically," his government submitted seven volumes of briefing material on the territorial question alone to the U.S. government. In the course of the negotiations, the government repeatedly conveyed to Washington its wishes that the people in the Ryukyus be treated as Japanese nationals and Japan's economic and other relations with them be allowed to continue as before. At one time, there was even an indication that Japan's request might be respected.\textsuperscript{35}

The peace treaty was signed by the United States and forty-seven other countries and Japan on September 8, 1951. The Soviet Union (which urged that full Japanese sovereignty should be extended to the islands), its satellites, India, Indonesia and a few other countries rejected it. It recognized "the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters" (Article 1) and thereby ended the American occupation of Japan, but allowed the United States to retain its exclusive control over the Ryukyu Islands. Article 3 stated:

\begin{quote}
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanto Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a
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\textsuperscript{33}The resolution was passed on 2 June 1951.
\textsuperscript{34}Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso Ju-nen, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957), 60. Several years after the signing of the treaty, he would "regret" that the situation was "not necessarily satisfactory in meeting Japan's wishes and expectations:"
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 64-65.
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proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

The treaty stopped short of forcing Japan to relinquish its sovereignty over the Ryukyus. The islands ceased to be “enemy territory,” but they were placed under the control of the U.S. Department of the Army. In the words of Ambassador Dulles, the “architect” of the peace treaty, Japan would maintain “residual sovereignty” over the islands.\(^36^\)

It made no reference to the international status of the Okinawans. The Japanese proposition that they be allowed to retain their nationality and, if that was impossible, be given at least an option of choosing Japanese nationality That would have guaranteed the same democratic rights and freedoms as other Japanese and the same right to trade with foreign countries, but even that had been ignored.\(^37^\) As it would turn out, they would be classified as “Ryukyuans” under U.S. administration, making them neither Japanese nor Americans and with the protection of neither the Japanese nor American constitution.

Prime Minister Yoshida expressed gratitude to the United States for allowing Japan to retain “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyus and hoped that “the administration of these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the establishment of world security.” Since Japan had unconditionally surrendered and left the disposition of these and other islands to the judgment of the allied powers, he later told the Diet, “residual sovereignty” was the most Japan could hope for at this time.\(^38^\) To him, the fact that Japan was allowed to retain residual sovereignty was “a success” because this would enable Tokyo to recover the islands eventually, unlike Karafuto, the Chishima islands and Taiwan over which Japan relinquished all its rights and claims. Since “it was clear that the United States had no territorial designs” on the Ryukyus and that its control of the islands was “based entirely on its strategic necessities,” he was convinced that improvement in the international situation would make it possible gradually to achieve the wishes of the Japanese people.\(^39^\)

For their part, U.S. authorities in Okinawa, aware of the reversion movement, had decided to furnish the people with information on “the status of American control” of their islands after the treaty was signed. Although they were cautious not to release speeches or press releases concerning the future of the islands before they received clearance from the Department of State, they had already established a policy. “With the signing of the . . . peace treaty . . . in the next few days,” a USCAR memorandum stated, “only one course of action will remain open as affecting the future of the Ryukyu Islands, namely, the contemplated U.N. trusteeship arrangements.” It suggested that “an explanation of other terms, such as ‘independence’ and ‘reversion’ to Japan, would be unnecessary as a basis for news media [reporting], and further comment on these alternatives would only create confusion in the minds of the people.”\(^40^\) General Robert S. Beightler, the deputy governor

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\(^{38}\)Statement in the House of Representatives, 12 October 1951.

\(^{39}\)Yoshida, 64-65.

\(^{40}\)James B. Shahan, Office of the Deputy Governor,USCAR, “Memorandum for Record: Information on Trusteeship Relative to Publicity Releases,” 6 September 1951.
of the Ryukyu Islands, responded coldly to the petition from the Social Masses Party calling for reversion. "I realize the feeling for continuing your close relationship with Japan is one of sincere and continuous concern to the people of the Ryukyus," he wrote. "However, I am sure that you realize that present world conditions, particularly the continuous threat to world peace by the Russian bloc of nations, make it absolutely essential that all people and all nations sacrifice some of their local and intimate desires for the good of all peace-loving people. To continue the agitation for reversion, with the implications of displeasure to the United States Civil Administration and the attendant ill-will which will be engendered increasingly among both Ryukyuans and occupationaires [sic], will gain nothing and only make both of our positions more difficult." He asked the people to "be patient and for the present work in close cooperation" with USCAR "for the fulfillment of stable world conditions and the rehabilitation of the Ryukyu Islands."

Many Okinawans would remember April 28, 1952—when the treaty went into effect—as the day when the Japanese government and people, having gained their own independence, abandoned them to a foreign military occupation. They also lost their legal basis to press the United States for compensation for the use of their land prior to April 28, 1952, as a result of the treaty terms by which Japan waived all war claims of its nationals against the United States. If the government and people of what Okinawans called "fatherland" and "homeland" had given adequate support to the integrity of their territory and population, postwar Okinawa would have charted a very different path. But there was no such will or support, and so the opportunity to hold the country and people together was lost.

The peace treaty recognized Japan's "right of individual and collective self-defense," to be exercised through a companion U.S.-Japan security pact, signed and put into effect on the same day as the multilateral peace treaty. The security treaty permitted U.S. forces in Japan to remain there until the country could "assume responsibility for its own defense." This was to form part of what Acheson had termed the U.S. "security perimeter," reinforced through similar treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

The United States contended that Article 3 was based on the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, which limited Japanese sovereignty to its four main islands and "such minor islands as we [the parties to the surrender proclamation] determine." In Article 2 of the treaty, Japan recognized the independence of Korea and renounced all claims to Taiwan and the Pescadores, the Kurils, southern Sakhalin and the Pacific islands formerly under its mandate. However, the Ryukyus were not included among these former territories and mandated islands.

The United States was not likely to formally propose to the United Nations that the islands be placed under "its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administrative authority." The trusteeship system had been established "on the principle that colonial territories [and former mandate territories of the League of Nations] wrested from defeated enemies should not be annexed by any victorious nation but should be administered by mandatory or trust power under international supervision in preparation for determining their own future status." In fact, there have been only eleven such trusteeships: Italian Somaliland, the British Cameroons, the French Cameroons, British Togoland, French Togoland, Tanganyika, Samoa, Ruanda-Urundi, New Guinea, Nauru, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Unlike these territories, however, Okinawa had

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41 Beightler to Tatsuo Taira, chairman of the Central Committee, Social People's Party [sic], 16 October 1951.
been a self-governing kingdom for centuries and then a full-fledged prefecture of Japan well before the war. Article 76 held the trustee responsible for promoting "the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." This provision, apparently, was not applicable to Okinawa.

In fact, State Department officials had questioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation for a trusteeship for Okinawa from the beginning. At a meeting on the "disposition of Okinawa," held on April 5, 1948, Dean Rusk of the Bureau of the United Nations Affairs, "referred to the probably legal doubts" which many states would have about trusteeship arrangements "if sought prior to the peace conference." W. Walton Butterworth of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs argued that the JCS were "under some misapprehensions" about "the possible values of strategic trusteeship as opposed to ordinary trusteeship."43 The Department of State and Dulles, on the other hand, believed that an ordinary trusteeship would be "as satisfactory as a strategic trusteeship."44

The JST, too, recognized that U.S. trusteeship would be open to dispute at the United Nations. They told the Secretary of Defense in August 1952 that it would be "subject to challenge" under Article 78 of the Charter of the United Nations when Japan became a member of the world organization. The Article states that "the trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations."

There were other reasons for opposing the trusteeship proposal: possible veto or harassment at the Security Council by the Soviet Union over "strategic use" of the islands under a trusteeship and possible objections by the U.S. Congress to appropriation of funds for the construction of base facilities where long-term tenure was not guaranteed. Returning the Ryukyus to Japan "with base rights agreements or joint sovereignty with Japan would be unsatisfactory, since the bases would be relatively useless in war if Japan were hostile, and might involve difficulties even if Japan were neutral." Annexing them to the United States would be "politically unacceptable in view of the fundamental and frequently expressed U.S. policy of "self-determination." The United States apparently used "trusteeship" as a semantic device to maintain its exclusive military control over the Ryukyus, without formally expanding its territory.

Even more confusing was the term "residual sovereignty."45 The Japanese government took it to mean that Japan "retained" sovereignty over the islands while the United


44 Memorandum of conversation, by John B. Howard, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 7 April 1950. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1162.

45 As Ambassador Sebald explained: "The term . . . has no exact equivalent in Japanese and has become the subject of much querulous quibbling. This term would appear to be ambiguous in English to the extent that it could refer either to legal title which would remain in Japan for the duration of United States administration and would be entirely divorced from effective control, or to an interest which would come into being at the conclusion of United States administration, as a residual right in property." Sebald to the Department of State, 17 January 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 14, 1090. Historically, one might observe, the Emperor and the Ashikaga shoguns retained residual sovereignty over Japan with what sovereignty they did not delegate to their vassals, but preservation of their dignity apparently hindered coinage of so explicit a term as residual sovereignty.
Democracy Betrayed

States "exercised" the executive, legislative and judicial powers over them.46 The United States, for its part, recognized "ultimate" Japanese sovereignty over them. Acheson had asserted in February 1952 that, according to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, the Ryukyus "would be considered as being under the 'protection' of the United States within the meaning of the Chicago Convention [on civil aviation], and thus would be considered a 'territory' of the United States."47 Although the United States, "at some point in the future . . . may return the Ryukyus to Japan," Acheson noted, it would be only after U.S. strategic interests in the islands were assured by a U.S.-Japan security arrangement. "This possibility," which would consider the Ryukyus as Japanese territory under the above convention, "should of course not . . . be discussed publicly," the Secretary warned.

As U. Alexis Johnson, deputy under secretary of state (1961-64) and ambassador to Japan (1966-71) later recalled, "retaining administrative control over Okinawa . . . had been the price the Joint Chiefs of Staff extracted for going along with the Japanese Peace Treaty."48

The Fukki or Reversion Movement

Consequences of the two treaties for the Okinawan people were that American occupation of their islands would persist for additional twenty years, with the unrestricted freedom to maintain and deploy large armed forces from the islands.

On February 29, 1952, General Beightler issued Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, establishing a central Ryukyuan government to replace the Provisional Central Government.49 The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) "may exercise all powers of government" within the islands, but "subject . . . to the proclamations, ordinances, and directives" of USCAR." While the Legislature was to be popularly elected, the Chief Executive (and the Deputy Chief Executive) would be appointed by the Deputy governor. The chief executive's appointments to administrative departments were also subject to approval by the Deputy Governor. The judges of the Court of Appeals, the highest court, would be appointed by the Governor (MacArthur) and those of the lower courts by the Chief Executive "subject to the prior approval" of the deputy governor.

Like preceding U.S. administrators in the Ryukyus, the deputy governor held supreme power: he reserved "the right . . . to veto, prohibit, or suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any civil government or agency of any such government. He had the power to "review, approve, remand, suspend, commute, remit or otherwise modify or set aside any decision, judgment or sentence of any court." He could "order the promulgation of any law, ordinance or regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority, in the Ryukyu Islands."

At the same time, the proclamation guaranteed the "basic liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of religion, speech, assembly, petition and the press, and security from unreasonable search, seizure, and deprivation of life, liberty and property.

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47"Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion," 1325.
49Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, "Establishment of the Ryukyu Islands", 29 February 1952.
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without due process of law . . . as far as is consistent with the public welfare."

Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68 set forth the geographical jurisdiction of the GRI, "status, duties and rights of the people," organization and operation of each of the three branches of government, and its relationship with municipal government. The Deputy Chief Executive, like the U.S. Vice President in the Senate, was going to be the presiding officer of the Legislature, but a unanimous resolution in the opening session of the body brought USCAR to amend the ordinance; the presiding officer was now to be elected by and from among the Legislature's members.

An Okinawan was defined as "a Ryukyuan," a person "whose birth and name are registered in a family register in the Ryukyu Islands." The ordinance treated Japan as a "foreign state" while at the same time applying an exception to that country: "no person who is a national of any foreign state other than Japan," it declared, "may be registered." Neither the United States nor the U.S. citizenship was mentioned in this regard. Travel documents, issued by USCAR, were required of any Okinawan wishing to travel to Japan. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands was prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs except through USCAR.

The people were guaranteed the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the public welfare." Freedom of religion was guaranteed, but not freedom of speech or of the press.

The double treaties, which had far-reaching implications for Okinawa, agitated its people and put the fukki or reversion issue squarely on their political agenda. The Okinawa-gunto assembly passed a unanimous resolution calling on the U.S. and Japanese governments to carry out "complete reversion" of the Ryukyus to Japanese administration, and requesting that the U.S. administration under Article 3 would, among other matters:

1. permit the people to retain their Japanese nationality and raise the Japanese flag;
2. establish a publicly elected self-government;
3. transfer the criminal jurisdiction over Okinawan people from USCAR to Ryukyuan courts;
4. permit the Japanese government to administer and aid in the cultural and educational fields, as in the other prefectures;
5. permit the Okinawans to live, travel, study and work anywhere in Japan;
6. treat the Ryukyus as part of Japan in its treaties and agreements with foreign countries.

In the March 1952 election for the soon-to-be established Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyus, Kamejiro Senaga of the leftist People's Party which had advocated Okinawa's reversion to Japan since February 1951, received the largest number of votes. The Socialist Masses Party, now also pro-reversion, received fourteen out of the thirty-one seats. The Socialist Party, which had campaigned for a U.N. trusteeship under the United States, was left without a single seat. Most of the other members were elected as independents. When the Legislature opened in April, its first business was to adopt a petition asking the American president and the Japanese prime minister to expedite adminis-

52Nakano, 73.
trative reunification with Japan.\textsuperscript{53}

In a subsequent convention held a month later, the Socialist Masses Party adopted a platform calling for, among other things, full administrative reversion to Japan and the early popular election of the chief executive. In the same month, the Okinawa Teachers’ Association—which would subsequently play a vital role in the \textit{fukki} movement—was formed. One of its resolutions pledged to promote an expedited administrative reunification with the homeland.\textsuperscript{54}

Later in the year, the Legislature passed yet another resolution petitioning for the “immediate and full reversion of the Ryukyus to the homeland” through the non-exercise or rescission of Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Even the pro-United States Democratic Party (formed by the independents and a splinter group of the Socialist Masses Party around the U.S.-appointed chief executive) expressed a “fervent desire” for early and full reunification with Japan. The Deputy Governor, however, refused to forward the resolution to the U.S. President, the Japanese Prime Minister and other addressees—all of whose governments from Argentina to Venezuela were members of the United Nations—for “technical” reasons.\textsuperscript{55}

Six organizations in Okinawa, including the Mayors’ Association, the Teachers’ Association, the Youth Council and the Women’s Association, re-established the Association for Promoting the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to the Motherland (\textit{Okinawa Shoto Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai}; hereafter, the Association for Okinawan Reversion). Describing the present status of the people as “orphans placed under foreign administration against their will,” the association pledged to realize “immediate and full [administrative] reversion to the homeland” through the rescission of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and petitioned the United States and Japanese governments to implement their objectives. Chief Executive Shuhei Higa “emphatically” told an American journalist that Okinawans yearned for autonomy under Japanese administration.\textsuperscript{56}

In mainland Japan, not only the Association for Promoting the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to Japan (\textit{Okinawa Shoto Nihon Fukki Kisei-kai}, formed in 1946) and the Council for the Promotion of the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to the Homeland (\textit{Okinawa Shoto Sokoku Fukki Sokushin Kyogikai}, established in 1953), but the National Association of Mayors and a number of newspapers began to voice an “earnest desire” for early return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. The House of Representatives adopted resolutions urging the Japanese government to negotiate the final disposition of the Ryukyus with the United States.

Such debates and activities in Okinawa and mainland Japan could have been responsible for “rumors” in the United States in 1952 “to the effect that consideration was being given to the ultimate return of Okinawa to Japan.”\textsuperscript{57} “In the event it [such a rumor] contains any element of fact,” the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee went on record as “being unalterably opposed to such a plan. . . . Any action

\textsuperscript{53}For the petition, dated 29 April 1952, see Nakano, 73.
\textsuperscript{55}USCAR to the Legislature, dated 10 September and 8 November 1952, Nakano, ed., \textit{Sengo Shiryo Okinawa}, 113.
which would compromise our continued defense activity on Okinawa should not receive any consideration whatsoever."

Ryoko Nakayoshi, former mayor of Shuri, sent a petition to Senator Robert A. Taft on January 9, 1953 on behalf of the Okinawan residents of mainland Japan, asking him to use his influence with the Eisenhower administration: "We desire that the Republican Administration to [sic] settle once for all . . . the question of return to Japan" of the Ryukyu Islands. "These islands, as you know, will be placed under . . . UN trusteeship . . . . The one million inhabitants of the islands and the whole Japanese nation are intolerable to [sic] see the island area placed under the trusteeship system and they aspire after the re-inclusion of the islands in the Japanese administrative system."

As Secretary of State Dulles noted in 1953, "the administration of Okinawa still carried a heavy wartime flavor and character, with the result that 90 percent of the Okinawans hated the United States. . . . [T]he extraordinary legal rights which had been secured to the United States in the peace treaty with Japan, would eventually prove quite useless unless we exercised these rights in a manner designed to secure the support and loyalty of the Japanese."^58

Ralph Braibanti of Kenyon College wrote in 1953, after having served the previous summer as political advisor to the civil administrator in the Ryukyus, that there were five "alternative solutions" for the disposition of the islands. They were: annexation by the United States, complete independence, U.N. trusteeship, immediate return to Japan, or continuation of the present status. He rejected annexation as "immoral and unthinkable in the face of our renunciation of territorial desires," independence as "impossible because of a deficit economy and the inexperience of the people," and trusteeship and continuation of the present status as unacceptable to the people. "The most widely held view favors immediate return of all of the islands to Japan," he stated. "This is a solution which has great appeal, but is likely to be unworkable in the face of the need for maintaining military strength there." Braibanti suggested that the United States abandon the idea of U.N. trusteeship, return the Amami group to Japan immediately, "contemplate reversion [of the other islands] to Japan in due course, contingent upon Japan's ability to resume responsibility for the islands," and make it plain that it will "retain immediate control until reversion to Japan is feasible." After the declaration of such policies, he added, the United States should allow the Ryukyus to be "re-identified culturally with Japan," preparations should be made for their "integration into the Japanese scheme of government," financial and economic affairs should be "meshed" with those of mainland Japan, and travel between the Ryukyus and Japan should be allowed without restrictions.

The United States, in December 1953, did return the Amami Islands which, lying north of Okinawa, were considered to have little value to American military strategists. Dulles quickly reaffirmed, however, that the United States would "continue to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East" and "remain as custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future."


^60 Dulles made the statement on 24 December 1953, when the two governments signed an agreement concerning the Amami islands. Department of State Bulletin, 4 January 1954. The sentence "The United States Government fully recognizes the long-established cultural, economic, and other
The Okinawan people's hopes were further dashed in November 1953 when Vice President Richard Nixon visited Okinawa and told the press that “the United States will control Okinawa so long as the communist threat exists.” President Dwight Eisenhower in his 1954 State of the Union Address echoed Nixon's remarks: “We shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa.” On behalf of the Japanese government, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting that “we wish the United States to remember that all the Japanese people desire to see Okinawa restored to the status to which it is supposed to return.” Their desire would not be fulfilled for another eighteen years.

Our Land

The *fukki* movement was inspired not only by the Japanese peace treaty which led to the administrative isolation of the people in the Ryukyus from Japan but, increasingly, by a number of other factors. Among the more invidious of these were high-handed American regulations and attempts to suppress people’s political and social aspirations, and the forceful acquisition of land for the military base buildup.

To begin with, USCAR overruled the January 1953 resolution of the elected legislature calling for the popular election of the Chief Executive and setting the date for the first such election; Major General David A. D. Ogden, the Deputy Governor, told the Legislature in a letter that the United States would decide when to call such an election. The Legislature adopted a petition a year later, and several others in subsequent years, for early direct election of the chief executive; they would not enjoy success until 1967.

The reversion movement itself was suppressed by U.S. authorities who associated it with communism inspired by outside forces. Four days after Eisenhower declared that the United States would “maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa,” Ogden announced that continuing the reversion movement was a “mere waste of labor” and that it would only engender misunderstanding and confusion among the people.* Chobyo Yara, president of the Association for Okinawan Reversion, retorted in a letter to Ogden that the movement was based on the people’s “natural and intrinsic” desire to live as Japanese under Japan’s constitution, which complied with the principles the United States subscribed to through the U.N. Charter, the Atlantic Charter and its own constitution. The movement, he said, requested a change in the U.S. policy toward Okinawa, but it was not inspired by anti-American feelings. He even added that Washington could continue to maintain military bases in Okinawa after reversion because “Japan, our homeland, has a close cooperative relationship with the United States and keeps many large bases in the mainland under the security treaty.” Yara affirmed that the movement would have to continue “until we return to Japan” unless it was proven “not rightful and natural.” General Charles Bromley, the civil administrator, replied on behalf of Ogden:

It is regretted that your continuation of reversion agitation in Okinawa can result only in confusion for Ryukyus and comfort to the communists. The policies of the United States Civil Administration are based on the clear and unmistakable statements made by the President of the United States and the Secretary of State concerning the status of the Ryukyu Islands. Reversion agitation, therefore, cannot be continued with the concurrence of the

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ties between these and adjacent islands, and with Japan itself” in proposed State Department drafts was dropped from the final version. Department of State Central Files, 794C.0221/12-2253.

61 Statement issued on 11 January 1954.

62 Yara to Ogden, 5 February 1954.
civil administration, and your request for USCAR cooperation in reversion activities is ill-advised.*^  

In the same year (1954), USCAR refused to issue a passport to Yara and a colleague who had applied to visit Japan to receive ¥60,000,000 collected in a national fund-raising campaign for constructing school buildings. Soon afterwards, he resigned as chairman of both organizations, and the Association for Okinawan Reversion virtually ceased to exist.

A particular target of the suppression was the leftist People’s Party. Its party organ, The Popular Culture, had been suspended by U.S. authorities in 1950 for an article denouncing a director of the Okinawa Central Administration, a candidate in the Naha gubernatorial election, for taking advantage of his position in the association to usurp power to allocate U.S. rehabilitation funds. Again in 1953, its application to publish another party organ, People, was rejected by the Government of the Ryukyus under instructions from USCAR. Choko Tengan, who with the support of the People’s Party and the Socialist Masses Party, had won massively in a by-election for the Legislature held in the same year, was disqualified by USCAR. It was contended that he had been convicted of embezzlement, an “infamous crime,” in a U.S. military court in 1946. The Okinawan election administration commission ruled that this action could not be defined as an “infamous crime,” but its decision was overruled by the Deputy Governor. The commission called two additional elections to fill the vacancy, but no party ran a candidate; only a third election produced a winner, but without a vote being cast.

When two leftist Amamians active in the reversion movement refused to leave the Ryukyus after receiving an expulsion order from USCAR, U.S. authorities arrested thirty-four sympathizers including Kamejiro Senaga for hiding them or for possessing or putting up a bill appealing for help for Senaga. The leader of the People’s Party, which was the most vocal in demanding fukki to Japan and “protection” of the land from military use, Senaga was sentenced by an American judge to two years hard labor.

May Day celebrations were suppressed in 1954 because, a USCAR announcement said, they were to mark Karl Marx’s birthday, the date on which Communists throughout the world were instructed to conduct demonstrations and embarrass the governments of the free world and their police. It warned non-Communists not to take part. In 1955, USCAR issued an ordinance banning any labor organization unless it was determined that the group’s leadership or activities would “not adversely affect the security” of the U.S. forces in the Ryukyus. The American civil administrator was authorized to terminate all rights and privileges of a labor organization if he later found an elected or appointed official unacceptable and the official was not immediately removed. Vulnerable to USCAR pressure and obsequiously sensitive to its policy, a number of major local corporations, including the Bank of the Ryukyus, threatened to discharge anyone who participated in May Day celebrations.

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63 Bromley to Yara, 24 February 1954. The letter was signed “Charles V. Bromley, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Deputy Governor [sic].”
65 The evidence produced by USCAR said that Tengan, a head of a district, had allowed four gallons of sake to be produced illegally from three bags of spoiled rice rationed to his district, to celebrate the inauguration of Governor Shikiya.
The land issue was explosive. Basically an agricultural people who had toiled on their small plots in their tiny, crowded islands for centuries to grow sweet potatoes, rice, vegetables and sugar, the Okinawans lost a great deal of their scarce land to U.S. naval and air bases, storage facilities, munitions dumps, roads, and other military installations.

Base construction and expansion, while providing thousands of jobs and stimulating the economy, created a number of serious problems. When the U.S. forces invaded the island of Okinawa, they placed the whole area under their control, established stockades and then camps behind the lines, largely in the central and northern parts, and collected most of the civilian population into them. Some people were permitted to return to their own villages as the fighting ended, but a majority were kept in the camps for many months or allocated somebody else's land for a dwelling and farming.

Take, for example, the township of Chatan on the west coast of south central Okinawa. Mostly flat along the coast, with hills in the interior, it had been one of the principal agricultural areas in Okinawa before the war, growing sweet potatoes, rice and sugar cane, with a railway linking the principal villages to Naha. It was on the beaches along the western coast of the township where U.S. forces in amphibian tanks and tractors and gunboats landed virtually unopposed on April 1, 1945, accompanied by tons of ammunition and supplies. There was no sign of human beings; Japanese forces and the 15,000 or so villagers had all evacuated the area. The invading forces immediately advanced to capture the airfield near the village of Kadena, which the Japanese forces had just built and abandoned, and repaired it by nightfall for emergency landings. The 5,000-foot coral strip at the Kadena airfield was reinforced with an additional six inches of coral; by August 1945, another runway had been built and the original strip, initially intended for fighter planes, was extended and improved to accommodate B-29s.

By 1946, the village of Kadena was "now buried in the traffic circle at an important intersection," an American commander noted. "Rubble from the houses contributed to the fill used in the roads. . . . Roads leading through inhabited localities have usually been widened or straightened without regard to the necessity for cutting through existing ruins or through damaged or intact buildings, though the process might wipe out an entire village, as was the case at Hija."

The former residents of Chatan were for some time prohibited from returning from their camps. When they were finally permitted to come back in February 1947, about 10,000 of them were squeezed into a remote hillside strip which fewer than 500 had inhabited before. Ryukyu Command (RYCOM) and other U.S. military facilities had taken the place of the rice paddies and the rich agricultural plain spreading along the coast around the villages of Kuwae and Chatan. The township was cut in two in 1948 when the armed forces blocked off the airfield lying between the principal villages of Kadena and Tobaru.

Base development inevitably affected the people of Goeku, another agricultural area immediately west of, and adjacent to Kadena. When the former residents returned from the camps after the war, they found barbed wire fences around their villages and farms. They and others built temporary shelters, mostly lean-to shacks, close to the military

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67 The history, nature and political implications of the dispute are succinctly summarized from an American point of view by John M. Steeves, U.S. Consul General in Naha, in his memorandum of 21 June 1955, entitled "The Okinawa Land Problem," Department of State, RG59 CDF 1955, Box 3978 F5.

68 Henry Stanley Bennett, "The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians on Okinawa," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 2 (February 1946), 267.
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base. The area, Goya, would rapidly expand to become a major commercial and service center known as Koza, which depended mainly on the base for its development and prosperity.

U.S. forces, of course, did not stop their base buildup with Chatan or Goeku. They proceeded northward to Yomitan where they completed a 7,000-foot medium bomber runway in mid-June at the former Japanese airfield, and southward to Ginowan where they built a long-range strip at the village of Futemna. Like the people of Chatan, the villagers, of whom there were about 16,000 in Yomitan and 13,000 in Ginowan, were mostly farmers formerly growing sweet potatoes, sugar cane and rice. They were kept off their land where military facilities now stood.

In 1949, the U.S. Army’s agricultural mission pointed out that the U.S. forces’ arbitrary taking of farm land “with no regard to its economic value” increased population per acre of cultivated land by more than 60 percent and sharply reduced food production. About one-fifth of the arable land, it said, continued to be in the hands of military units. The mission recommended, among other things, that the “one-mile rule” be immediately modified. U.S. military units should reevaluate their need for agricultural land and keep the areas of occupied arable land “to the barest minimum compatible with military necessity.” The “one-mile rule” referred to a military regulation prohibiting erection of any building within one-mile of any area consisting of dependent housing or billets for 100 or more troops in order “to reduce the hazards of insects, rodents and other menaces to sanitation.”

After a series of powerful typhoons destroyed “temporary” Quonset huts and other facilities, the Korean War reinforced the United States belief in the long-term strategic importance of Okinawa. The United States undertook to build the island into what an American magazine called “Our Gibraltar in the Pacific,” a permanent military fortress. Major General Ogden would give it another, more lasting name: “Keystone of the Pacific,” words which were later to be embossed on every yellow license plate issued by the United States provost marshal.

While the U.S.-occupied area had decreased to 30,500 acres by 1951 from its initial holding of 45,500 acres, it bounced back to 42,000 acres by early 1953, accounting for 14 percent of the total land area of the main island of Okinawa and 41 percent of the farmland. The Army was engaged in a construction program costing roughly $200,000,000 appropriated by May 1952. Colonel T. A. Lane of the Corps of Engineers described the scene at the end of 1952:

The construction program . . . includes twenty miles of primary four-lane highway and 50 miles of paved two-lane secondary roads; the addition of 6-MGD [million gallons a day] water treatment capacity to the existing 4.5-MGD system, and the installation of a permanent distribution system extending over twenty miles of the island’s length; construction of a 46,000-kw steam turbine plant, and twenty-five miles of 69-kva overhead distribution lines; the construction of a harbor to provide an LST basin, small ship berths, and ten large ship berths and dredging for increased project depth; the construction of an island POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] system with unloading pier, permanent storage, and pumping stations; the construction of permanent ammunition storage and rehabilitation facilities to replace the temporary installation surviving World War II; construction of troop and family

housing, community centers, warehousing, and permanent utilities on two air bases, a major Army camp, an island depot... 

Similarly, the Air Force had been authorized $24,000,000 to build, among other facilities, "a radio communications station, telephone exchange, fuel storage, operations building, warehousing, maintenance shops, barracks, bachelor officer and civilian quarters, dependent housing, community and recreational facilities, and utilities," all at Kadena air force base. When the Korean War ended in 1953, the B-29s at Kadena were replaced with F-86 Sabrejets from Korea. In March 1955, the 313th Air Division was activated at Kadena, replacing the 20th Air Force and became the senior U.S. Air Force organization in the Ryukyu Islands.

When, soon after the Korean War truce, tensions rose again in the Korean Peninsula, over the Taiwan straits and in Indochina, the United States even started to deploy nuclear weapons in Okinawa in December 1954. Then, starting in 1956, army, air force, and navy nuclear weapons were deployed to Okinawa as well as to Guam and Hawaii. Of the approximately 1,600 nuclear weapons deployed on shore in the Pacific during the Eisenhower administration, "the lion's share—nearly 800 weapons—were stored at Kadena air base, Okinawa, a base for SAC's [Strategic Air Command] strategic bombers." By 1956, the U.S. investment in the bases in Okinawa had reached nearly $600,000,000.

The new situation required the United States to revise its directive for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. Approved on August 2, 1954, the presidential directive, which reaffirmed the "critical importance [of the Ryukyus] to the security of the free world" and kept the islands under the control of the Department of Defense. The Department of State would now be responsible for the Ryukyus' relations with foreign governments and international organizations.

As before, the United States would administer the islands through the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) under a military governor in Tokyo and, his military representative in Okinawa with the title Deputy Governor. The governor would be appointed by the President upon nomination by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State (General John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, the Far East, was re-appointed as Governor). USCAR's mission was defined as "to insure that this strategic area will contribute effectively to the peace and security of the free world."

USCAR would continue to govern through an indigenous Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

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75Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense,” 28 July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1684. For a draft directive, see Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1954, in ibid., 1763-1682. The new directive had been classified and had not been announced or implemented as of February 1955, according to an internal Department of State memorandum (Footnote in ibid., 1684). In any case, the directive would be replaced by an Executive Order Providing for Administration of the Ryukyu Islands in 1957.
Islands (GRI), made up of an elected legislative body, a chief executive appointed by the Governor, and a system of courts. While given "basic objectives" to promote "democratic tendencies in governmental, economic and social institutions" and "the development of an effective and responsible government, based on democratic principles," USCAR retained the power to "veto or suspend laws or any other acts" of the GRI, "promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations; review or otherwise modify any decision, judgment, or sentence of the courts; [and] remove officials from office." It could exercise, "in whole or in part, full authority in the Ryukyus" if deemed necessary for security reasons.

Inevitably, the renewed U.S. interest in Okinawa as a strategic keystone in the Pacific also required the United States to pay more attention to the land that it already held and other land it sought to acquire in addition. But the land was so essential to an overcrowded people dependent on agriculture that United States forces and their commanders would soon discover that they could not always have their way.

Although "most military government officials were sensitive to Okinawan attitudes toward the land and to the inevitable feelings of rootlessness experienced by Okinawans displaced by the base development program," Arnold Fisch writes, the requirements of military units remained the priority over civilian use. "Headquarters, Island Command, had no intention of discussing compensation for such land usage since the American point of view held that such land had been taken as an act of war and that under the Rules of Land Warfare no compensation was required." Public lands and unclaimed personal property was the responsibility of the Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian at Headquarters, Ryukyu Command.

The "Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands" from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned above, allowed the (military) Governor to "secure title to any additional real estate or facilities required permanently by the United States Government by purchase from the owners ... or [if the owners refuse to sell at reasonable terms or to negotiate] through condemnation." The Governor was further authorized to "requisition or rent such property as is required temporarily by the United States Government or pending the purchase of property."

The problem was that the people who (involuntarily) "leased" their lots to displaced fellow Okinawans could claim rental payments as early as mid-1947, while those whose land was occupied by U.S. forces, many of whom had to live on rented land, received no compensation. Their claims developed into a political issue in 1950 when various parties raised the question of compensation in the election campaign for the Okinawa-gunto governor. Furthermore, the gunto legislative assembly in its first session adopted a resolution calling for early payment of rentals for the occupied land.

The landowners organized themselves to negotiate such payment and the return of unused areas. In August 1951, they expressed their plight in a petition to the U.S. Deputy Governor, the Governor of the Okinawa-gunto government and the speaker of the Legislative Assembly:

Fisch, 171, 173. Article 53, Section III ("Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State") of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, one of the bases of authority (along with the Geneva Convention of 1949) for the United States administration of the Ryukyus, however, provided: "An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the state, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and generally, all movable property belonging to the state which may be used for military operations." (Original underlined by the author.)
With our land, which has been acquired through the strenuous efforts by our ancestors and ourselves and which is our . . . only property, having been turned into military sites, we have been forced to resettle in non-military areas. . . . But [ever since a USCAR directive prohibited landowners from removing resettlers from their plots in April 1951], we have been required to pay rental fees for the land for housing and farming, and we have been living with the fear that we might be asked to leave. . . . [On the other hand] our right to own and use our land has been suspended.

The petition moved the Okinawa-gunto legislative assembly to urge USCAR to expedite compensation. USCAR agreed and, in May 1952, proposed a contract covering 53,699,036 tsubo or roughly 43,820 acres for twenty years starting from July 1, 1950.

The announcement dumbfounded and infuriated the landowners: the proposed rent per tsubo\(^\text{77}\) averaged only 1.08 B-yen, when a Coca Cola and a pack of cigarettes cost about 10 B-yen each, one pound of rice 35 B-yen and one pound of soybeans 40 B-yen. It also revealed that forestland, wasteland and public land would be rented for 10 B-yen per field, regardless of their sizes. Apart from the derisory rental payments offered by USCAR, the twenty year lease period was too long for most landowners. A further announcement a month later explaining that the annual rental for each individual tract would be computed at 6 percent of the appraised value as of July 1, 1950, that the appraisals would be based on the going rate as of the time of initial U.S. acquisition and that they would not be affected by subsequent rental changes, only intensified landowners' grievances.

USCAR then took steps to try, \textit{post facto}, to legalize its land holdings. It issued a series of ordinances directing the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus (GRI) to enter into individual leases for the United States and to receive rental payments for the landowners. The ordinances also provided for an acquisition procedure, with "just compensation," of such interests as required by Washington. The United States paid approximately \$1,060,000 to the Chief Executive as rentals for the 1950-1952 period, calculated on prescribed terms; almost all landowners had received the payments by August 1955.

Military land issues, however, remained far from resolved. In 1953, the U.S. forces began to use, when necessary, condemnation procedures to force out non-complying landholders from their villages. Such action was based on the 1950 directive, prohibiting new construction for housing, farming or commercial facilities in designated areas and indicating possible future removal of the existing houses and farmers from these areas for military purposes, and on the 1953 ordinance (Ordinance No. 109) specifying land acquisition procedures. For most of the farmers who had just returned to their villages from refugee camps and begun to scratch a living, it was an outrageous blow.

First, acquisition orders were issued immediately after the proclamation of Ordinance No. 109 for several, mostly farming, areas in the vicinity of Naha. Ten days later, bulldozers were there to take over the land without due process. "On December 5, 1953, troops of the United States army on Okinawa were called out to suppress what the army termed a communist uprising on the island," wrote the Reverend Otis Bell of the World Conference of Christianity, a former resident of Okinawa.\(^\text{78}\). "The ‘trouble-makers’ were an unarmed group of Okinawans who were protesting the use of their land by the occupation forces without agreement and without payment. To the army this was a riot instigated by communists; to the Okinawans it was a stand for personal rights to land legally

\(^{77}\)One \textit{tsubo} equals roughly 36 square feet; one acre totals 1,224 \textit{tsubo}. In 1953, an average Okinawan farm family owned less than 900 \textit{tsubo}, compared with about 1,700 \textit{tsubo} before the war.

registered in their name. . . . Less than 2 percent of the owners have agreed to the rent offered by the army. Thus, according to the army's own figures, 98 percent of the landowners do not feel that they are being given a square deal. . . . Now Okinawa is definitely not a communist country. One would expect to find a small percentage of the people affected by communist propaganda, but in a country that has been occupied by the U.S. army for eight years one would not expect to find 98 percent of the landowners communists or sympathetic to communism." In Toguchi, the site of the first U.S. landing, all 153 families were ordered to vacate their village and adjacent areas. The stunned villagers, who had already been moved four times, put up some resistance, laid out terms for evacuation, but were finally forced out.

Similar takeovers, mobilizing "bulldozers and bayonets," occurred in Isahama in central Okinawa and on Ie-jima, the islet off the Motobu Peninsula in northern Okinawa on which American war correspondent Ernie Pyle had been killed by a Japanese bullet in 1945. As Chojo Oyama, chairman of the special land committee of the GRI Legislature, would later testify to a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held in Naha on October 24 and 25, 1955, of the Isahama land seizures:

In July 1954 an order prohibiting the planting of aquatic rice was given which affected the 110 acres of the paddy fields around this settlement. The reason was that mosquitoes would appear carrying encephalitis. But this land is the granary as well as the staff of life not only of Isahama but of [the] neighboring [villages of] Kiyuna, Aragusuku and Aniya, the total population of which is more than 2,300 with 500 households. If they lose their land they will lose their means of living too. So they petitioned for the revocation of the order, insisting that they would prevent such mosquitoes from appearing. However, the military then gave another order asking them to evacuate the site. Presuming that this well-cultivated paddy field would be turned into land covered with sand and stone, the people felt they could never leave their land no matter what the risk. Therefore, they desperately petitioned that some measure be taken.

The military would not listen to them. Instead, [the military] hotly urged them to leave whether they were willing to go or not, for the military plan could not be modified. At last the people said they could move if they were compensated. After several rounds of negotiation, they were able to receive compensation, but the amount was too small for necessary reconstruction. Well, they can live somehow, because they have received 50 percent of the current price for compensation for their houses and old lumber supplied by the military. It is also said that the military will furnish them with provisions for 200 days. But, how will they maintain their living thereafter? . . . But the military rejected their appeal saying that there was neither budget nor law covering the matter. Thus, compulsory land acquisition came into practice. The sight of the compulsory acquisition was a fearful one, which did not appear democratic. Bulldozers and cranes destroyed fields being guarded by armed soldiers. In such a stormy atmosphere, the villagers were compelled to remove themselves. 79

The situation on Ie-jima, he said, was even worse. "Houses were plowed up by bulldozers or set afire," he told the subcommittee. "The people were disappointed and accommodated in tents temporarily built. From March up to this date, they have lived miserably in those tents. Villagers whose water tanks were destroyed are so hard up for clean drinking water that they have to find and use roadside puddles."80

80 For the land seizures in Ie-jima, see the Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 October 1954 and the Okinawa Times, 16 October 1954. One farmer is quoted as having told members of the special land committee of
The rice paddies in the Isahama area were transformed into part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster), the site of the Marine Corps Base Headquarters. On 16, U.S. forces built a ground firing range after evicting four families, and then demanded evacuation of an additional 152 families for expansion of the range. When negotiations with the villagers failed, U.S. forces drove in stakes and bulldozed down thirteen houses despite farmers’ protests. The Government of the Ryukyus subsequently provided the thirteen families with tents, food, water, and a daily allowance of twenty B-yen per person, the cost of two bottles of Coca-Cola. When the government cancelled the allowance several months later, the farmers entered the firing range to work the farms, only to be driven away by American troops.

While these developments agitated and angered many Okinawans, the United States further provoked the already uneasy islanders in December 1953 when it proclaimed its intention of “indefinite” continued use and occupation of all existing military areas and confirmed such use and occupation as an “implied” lease. Proclamation No. 26 provided for the registration of “a certificate of confirmation and rental deposit” to complete acquisition of the land, noting that the certificate would remain effective indefinitely. Most of the 57,000 owners of military land were resigned to the condemnation with compensation policy but sought recourse with an appeal to the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission, made up of representatives of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and USCAR, for four to thirteen-fold raises in rent.

As the appeals were awaiting public hearings, the Army again dismayed many Okinawans with an announcement that it would make lump-sum rental payment for land to be used indefinitely. Deputy Governor Ogden reportedly stated in Washington that, with the annual rental (computed at 6 percent of the estimated free market value) generating so little capital, he proposed lump-sum payment in order to ease the discontent. The full payment and additional appropriations for building roads and schools, he said, would enable 3,500 families to move to two sparsely inhabited islands in the southern Ryukyus.

The presidential directive of August 1954 further made USCAR “responsible for the acquisition of real estate and other facilities in the Ryukyu Islands required for the use of United States Government agencies.” Such property would be “acquired by purchase or lease,” the GRI negotiating with its owners. In addition, “use of certain property for so long as it may be needed by the United States may be procured by the acquisition of easement interests,” with full compensation. If the owners refused to negotiate such purchases and easements, however, the GRI should acquire for the United States the necessary leasehold or easement interests in the property by exercising “the right of eminent domain in condemnation proceedings,” subject to compensation. USCAR was instructed to “give full consideration to the effect [of the acquisition] on the economic and social life of the Ryukyuan people and give adequate respect to the property rights of the individuals concerned.”

As Chief Executive Higa told the above-mentioned subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee:

The US Army’s proposal of establishing long-term easements and making lump-sum payments to the extent of the land value appraised by the US forces has caused much com-
plaint from the landowners. The landowners consider lump-sum payment of rental unfavorably because there is no distinct difference between . . . such payment and the sale of their land. Furthermore, it is believed that the lump-sum payment received will not be utilized or invested wisely. The dispossessed farmers who lack experience in non-agricultural fields will face difficulties in starting new businesses among keen competition.81

Chief Executive Higa noted that while agriculture constituted the basic industry in Okinawa, the average farmer cultivated less than an acre after the United States forces had acquired more than 40,000 acres of land, including farmland. “These farmers are not only deprived of such valuable land, but they are also deprived of equitable compensation for its use,” he argued. “Hence, the livelihood of the people who have been affected has been reduced to one of extreme poverty.”82

Another witness, Legislator Choko Kuwae, told the subcommittee of the Okinawan farmer’s devotion to his land:

In Okinawa, land truly represents family inheritance—the benefit of which should be equally enjoyed by the descendants. Its loss in one generation in return for cash is considered to be practically a gross betrayal of trust to the family land. . . . For Okinawans, land is the resting-place of the soul and reflects a man’s character. Even those who have migrated to North America and Hawaii do not want to sell their land [in Okinawa] but [want to] keep it for their families.83

Okinawan people, as Robert Trumbull of the New York Times reporting from Naha would have it, displayed a “fanatical attachment to their land that is akin to religion.” Land had been so central to their social organization as well as their livelihood that it was rarely transferred from one person to another before the war. “No way has been found to compensate for this love of land.” Americans, however, tried to turn the island, with a “population density about twenty-two times that of the United States,” into a little America, not only with huge military bases but with “an 18-hole golf course . . ., beach resorts with cottages where families may spend leaves, a selection of 25-cent movies, and a choice of luxurious clubs where meals are cheap and drinks are a quarter apiece and the orchestra from Manila [played] rock ‘n’ roll.”

Besides, the article continued, many service families—those of officers, higher-grade enlisted men and civilian employees of the U.S. Government—lived in “attractive concrete houses” and paid “one or more maids around $20 a month to do the cooking and other housework.” In contrast, wrote Trumbull, the average Okinawan lived in a “crowded cluster of thatched one-room shacks lacking running water and elementary sanitation. Chickens wander among the littered huts, a pig squeals from an enclosure of

81 Ibid., 3.
82 Ibid., 2. U.S. officials were not unaware of the strength of feeling on the part of the landowners against the appropriation of their ancestral lands. John M. Steeves, American Consul General in Naha, said in a memorandum to the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in June 1955: “The resistance [to land acquisition] is not based on economic considerations and is probably not dictated by political considerations as often as some suppose. The reluctance to part with land which has been passed on from father to son for untold generations is characteristic of people’s attitudes in areas where the economic status is low and primarily agrarian. There is a sentimental and emotional attachment to the small or large parcel of land which the average Asian looks upon as the symbol not only of security but as assurance of a dignified place in society.” Department of State, RG 59 CDF 1955, Box 3978 F5.
83 Ibid., 21.
A little over ten years later, another New York Times correspondent would write on the same theme comparing “Okinawan Okinawa” and “an American Okinawa”: “Okinawan Okinawa, [is] an area of farms and forests, with neat, moderately prosperous towns and pockets of hamlets where life goes on almost as rhythmically as before World War II, when all of Okinawa was a quiet, neglected backwater of Japan, the poorest of all the empire’s 47 prefectures. . . . American Okinawa is much like United States military establishments anywhere else in the world, with offices, schools, clubs, barracks and neat bungalows surrounded by lawns—the whole enclosed behind high wire fences patrolled by sentry dogs.”

The reasons for the development of such unjust allocation of land were clear from Kuwae’s later testimony to the subcommittee. The relocated households in one district were paying an annual rental averaging 55 B-yen (equal to forty-five cents) per tsubo (thirty-six square feet) while receiving only 5.4 B-yen annually for the land requisitioned by the U.S. forces. The Okinawa Housing Corp. paid an equivalent of $612 per acre annually for the land it used to provide housing for military personnel while the farmers received only one-twelfth of that amount for adjacent land where the Army had built a hospital.

The rentals for the military lands had been determined arbitrarily by the district engineer without negotiating with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or the landowners. Meanwhile, dispossessed farmers were forced to live in destitute conditions and no effort had been made to guarantee them employment or resettlement. The United States had refused to compensate for losses on the lands and other properties incurred prior to April 28, 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty went into effect, despite the great losses that the work of base construction had caused during the first seven years of U.S. occupation.

Kuwae also noted that, contrary to the old principle of “Kanchi-Minboku” (the land belongs to the government, but the trees used for lumber, firewood or charcoal belong to the people) on land formerly owned by the Japanese government, people in northern Okinawa were ordered not to go into the forest whenever the military conducted maneuvers, which was 327 days per year in the case of the village of Kin.

Darley Downs of the National Council of the Church of Christ of America told the subcommittee that all the Protestants, Roman Catholics and Jews in the United States “desired a settlement of this vexed land problem on the basis of President Eisenhower’s often reiterated principle of respect for human dignity.” “America,” the clergyman, long-time resident in Japan, declared, “stands for liberty, democracy, human dignity, and the basic human rights set forth in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. I fear the handling of the Okinawa land problem, so far, has done much to hinder the achievement of this basic objective.”

The renewed and accelerating acquisition of land and the proposal for lump-sum payment and, by implication, for indefinite U.S. military presence on Okinawa added a new dimension to the land issue. It became a major irritant and stirred bitter anti-base, anti-American sentiments. An island-wide protest movement was to ensue, with inevitable political implications.

Following an appeal from the newly formed Okinawa Military Landowners Federation, the GRI legislature unanimously adopted a resolution calling for settlement of the

issue based on four principles. The “four principles” soon became a public cry: opposition to lump-sum payment, just compensation for use of land, adequate and prompt indemnity for loss or damages to land, property or the person caused by the U.S. forces or their personnel, and release of unnecessary areas with no new acquisition of land.

In mainland Japan, the respectable Asahi Shimbun newspaper awakened the public to the “reality” of the U.S. administration in Okinawa in January 1955 when it carried a major article on the findings of the Japanese Civil Liberties Union (JCLU) made up of 3,000 lawyers and legal authorities. Acting on a request from Roger N. Baldwin, chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) the previous February, the JCLU had interviewed Okinawans visiting mainland Japan and discovered serious problems regarding military land rentals, wages of base employees, human rights, and the authority of the U.S. Army over Okinawa.

The U.S. Far East Command in Tokyo denied the union’s charges. It also rejected Baldwin’s statement in his letter that the U.S. Army was using charges of communism to divert attention from the problems but, at the same time, said the landowner, hardship was “being cleverly exploited by communist elements.”

Subsequently, Baldwin made inquiries of the Department of the Army concerning JCLU’s allegations. Among the points he raised were:

1. Although Okinawa is held by the U.S. only while tension lasts in the Far East, any advocacy of reunion with Japan is treated as Communist propaganda.
2. Mayors who favor reunion get little or no help from the United States.
3. The bank is not permitted to finance industries whose leaders favor union.
4. It takes three or four months for Okinawans in Japan to get a passport from U.S. security officers to return to Okinawa, even in the case of death or illness of relatives.
5. Trade with Japan is treated as with a foreign country.
6. Although the Japanese flag was allowed to wave in the islands it was banned in the schools in January 1955.
7. The full power of the government in Okinawa is in the hands of the U.S. The Okinawans are puppets. The U.S. military has dissolved the legislature and refused enforcement passed by it.
8. The discriminatory wage raises put Americans down first, Philippine [sic] next, Japa-
In a memorandum rebutting Baldwin’s charges, Col. C. W. Nelson at CINCFE pointed to Baldwin’s “misapprehension as to the international status of Okinawa” and his arguments based on that misapprehension: contrary to the provision in Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, he apparently assumed that Okinawa was “an undisclosed part of Japan and should, for all practical purposes, be so treated.”

Ernest Angell, chairman of ACLU’s board of directors, and Baldwin, head of its international civil liberties committee, followed up with a letter to Major General William F. Marquat of the Defense Department listing ten suggestions for the department’s consideration. Among them were: to make the system of native administration as close as possible to “what it would be when the islands are returned,” reduce military control over local self-government and extend to the Okinawans “the same rights and liberties which they would enjoy under Japanese law,” permit the popularly elected legislature to name the chief executive, “removable . . . [only] in the event that security considerations alone should justify it,” and appoint “a civilian deputy” to the military governor. The letter also urged that the Defense and State Departments exercise a “continuing check-up” on the “control of policy” in the Ryukyus, instead of leaving it entirely in the field.

The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations conducted a similar survey in early 1955. It, too, pointed out a number of human rights violations: forcible leasing of land for military purposes, discriminatory and unreasonably low wages paid Okinawans working on bases, questionable trials of Americans in accidents and crimes involving Okinawans as victims, and restriction of freedom of speech, publication and collective bargaining.

Reflecting the general American sentiment at the time, U.S. authorities in Okinawa tended to view everything in black and white terms through an overly simple ideological prism. Ogden, in a farewell message to the Okinawan people, could thus warn them to “recognize enemies of freedom for what they are.” In an obvious reference to the Okinawa People’s Party, he said: “They do not call themselves the Communist Party everywhere; they generally take on a name which most disguises their true intent.” At the same time, he noted that the political, economic, social and cultural improvement had been such during his two-year assignment that Okinawa “may be held up as a model to countries all over the Free World.”

It was in this context that, in May 1955, a delegation of the Government of the Ryukyus, headed by Chief Executive Higa, visited Washington and appealed to the House Armed Services Committee to settle the land issue according to the earlier established four principles. The committee compromised by shelving the Army’s proposal for lump-sum payment and decided to send a congressional fact-finding mission to Okinawa later in the year. With acquisition orders for land spreading to other villages, many Okinawan leaders and farmers placed their hopes on this mission.

The special subcommittee, led by Congressman Melvin Price, visited Okinawa in Oc-

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90 ACLU memorandum of 14 February 1955, ACLU Records, Box 1173, F32.
94 The Communist Party, prohibited in Okinawa, was legal in Japan.
III: “Yankee Go Home”

October and spent three days inspecting several villages and holding public hearings, as mentioned above. Its findings and recommendations were submitted to the House Armed Services Committee, which approved them in June 1956.

A series of incidents, such as one in which a six-year-old girl was raped and murdered by an American and another where the mother of three small children was shot dead on entering a munitions dump to collect scrap, had caused further outrage in Okinawa in the interim. But they apparently had no impact on what became the “Price Report.”

The report took note that continued U.S. rule and the absence of any belligerent political movement “allow us to plan for long-term use of a forward military base, subject to our own national policy.” In Okinawa, “there are no restrictions imposed by a foreign government on our rights to store or to employ atomic weapons.” Thus, it stated, in the event of U.S. military withdrawal from Japan, “the importance of maintaining Okinawa as a military base in peacetime increases.” The problem of acquiring land for military bases, was “not only for the present alone and for the immediate future, but one with a relative permanence which cannot be disregarded.”

And, describing the request of the Government of the Ryukyus for just compensation as “unreasonable” and the hitherto position of the U.S. government “unrealistic,” the committee endorsed the lump-sum concept while suggesting payment of the “full fair value of the property.” This was “the only way,” it said, “in which a landowner can receive an amount of money truly adequate to make him whole, and sufficient for him to move to another area—perhaps another Ryukyuan island—to support himself while adjusting to another method of earning his livelihood, or to emigrate to other countries . . . .”

The committee also recommended that land without any immediate military use be returned to its owners “expeditiously,” that the military continue to make as much arable land under its control as possible available for farming, and that any additional land acquisition of land be “kept to an absolute minimum.”

The subcommittee called the earlier military decision to deploy two-thirds of a Marine division in Okinawa “correct” and “well-justified,” and suggested that the use of two airfields be further studied. The 1,800-acre Futenma airstrip was “used only in marginal fashion by the Air Force today” although it had “a specific planned utilization for the future.” The 630-acre Yonabaru naval airstrip was unused and could be utilized only with the acquisition of additional land.

The recommendations of the “Price Report” so disappointed Okinawan leaders that the director of the GUI’s executive branch responsible for military land issues immediately handed in a letter of resignation in protest.

95 During the previous two years, eighteen Okinawans had been killed or wounded by gun fire for entering forbidden areas, according to a resolution of May 1955 by the GRI Legislature calling on the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy commanders on the island to enforce regulations on use of weapons.


97 Some American observers also considered its recommendations discriminatory and legally questionable. Helen Mears, for example, analyzed the Price Report and concluded that, as a whole, it “raises serious questions about our government’s policies and attitudes—and suggests that in considering the problems of ‘backward’ peoples, and in confronting the basic problems of freedom, democracy, and human dignity, our leaders have serious blind spots.” In “Our Blindspot in Asia,” The Progressive, 18. Patrick Murphy Malin and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union told Congressman Price: “We had hoped that your committee might have taken into account
of the GRI, its Legislature, the Council of Mayors and the Federation of Military Landowners Associations adopted a joint statement asking Major General James E. Moore, the deputy governor, to inform Washington of the “grave determination” with which they would deal with the issue in the event that the United States forced through the recommendations. Soon, Chief Executive Higa, Deputy Executive Kotaro Kamimura and nine other senior executive officials, all fifty-three mayors, all twenty-nine legislators, and the senior officials of the Federation of the Military Landowners’ Associations vowed to resign if the United States did not reconsider the land acquisition question. The speakers of the municipal assemblies followed suit.

Many organizations, such as those of teachers, women, social workers, businessmen, parents, young people, labor unionists, students and wounded war veterans pledged to fight for the “four principles” and against the Price Report and to mobilize public protests against the report’s recommendations. Even the Police Department of the GRI announced its alliance with the general public in support of the four principles. On June 20, 1956, mass rallies and meetings were held throughout the island with a reported turnout of 200,000 to 300,000 people, or roughly a one-fifth to one-third of the whole population. They were followed by massive meetings and demonstrations in Koza and Naha five days later. In mainland Japan, the parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs told the Nippon Times (subsequently renamed the Japan Times) that the land policy in Okinawa was “unfair” and discriminatory. Kunio Morihisa said Japan should ask the United States to correct the situation and also return administrative rights over the island. Several newspapers criticized the land policy in their editorials.

U.S. officials were persistent. President Eisenhower sent Chief Executive Higa a letter describing the Price subcommittee report as “both sympathetic and constructive in character.” General Moore told representatives of protesting groups that the Price Report was “the final position of the U.S. government.” He called it “reasonable” and advised the delegation: “This is not a time to listen to men who for political reasons, subversive reasons or reasons of personal gain, whip up agitation on the part of the people.”

The land issue, or people’s anger over it, reopened a can of worms: it rekindled their desire for administrative reunification with Japan and removal of military bases, and made the fukki and anti-base movement increasingly vocal and militant. The demonstrators pledged not only to push through the four principles but also to protect their right to fight for self-determination. The defiant tone was echoed at similar rallies in mainland Japan. Students of the University of the Ryukyus and several high schools went out on the streets, chanting “Yankee, Go Home.” At the same time, incidents such as the one in which the six-year-old girl was raped and murdered in September 1955 by a U.S. Marine provided a constant reminder of some of the more extreme human rights implications of military occupation.

U.S. authorities on the island countered such public grievances with oppressive measures. They threatened to administer the population directly should the legislators and the chief executive resign. They declared “camp towns” in central Okinawa “off-limits” to American servicemen and dependents, ostensibly to prevent confrontation with Okinawans; they refused to recognize the council of five organizations as a legitimate body. The University of the Ryukyus was notified that its funding would be suspended, partly

American principles of due process and democratic consultation in recommending land policies.” Malin and Baldwin to Melvin Price, 23 July 1956, ACLU Records, Box 1173, F34.
because some of its students had participated in "anti-American" demonstrations. The people were expected to support the "free world's" cause, and the reversion movement, which undermined the U.S. mission, could not be tolerated.

The pressures worked, at least for the time being. In view of the fact that the Okinawan economy depended heavily on the bases, Higa asked the people to calm down and not to alarm USCAR and the U.S. forces by injecting the land issue into campaigns against military bases, for administrative reversion and against cooperation with the United States. The executive office withdrew from the alliance, forcing its disintegration. University students were persuaded by operators of bars, nightclubs and restaurants catering to military personnel to call off a demonstration march which had been planned in Koza, the "GI town" in central Okinawa. The mayor of Koza expressed regrets at having inadvertently tripped off the off-limits regime, thereby causing trouble for Koza's citizens. The municipal government also declared that it would not recognize two prominent leaders of the People's Party, Kamejiro Senaga and Saichi Kaneshi, as representatives of its citizens.

Moore soon lifted the ban on Koza. The neighboring towns of Ishikawa, Gushikawa and Kadena were also reopened to their American clientele after they publicly promised not to authorize anti-U.S. activities.

Meanwhile, the foundation which funded scholarships and loans to students of the University of the Ryukyus decided to cut off its financial assistance to 175 students. It could not continue the assistance program so long as students participated in anti-U.S. activities, the foundation told the university, because anti-communist American individuals and organizations had provided the fund's money. The university's president and board of directors "reaffirmed" their opposition to communism, "apologized" to "all Americans" in Okinawa and elsewhere for the students' anti-U.S. demonstrations, placed several students on probation, and banned student participation in any activities unauthorized by the university. Civil Administrator Brigadier General Vonna F. Burger, however, considered the punishment too lenient, and even suggested that it might be better to abolish the university if it were to become a hotbed of individuals who aimed to promote undesirable influences on Okinawa. A week later, the President and the Board of Directors expelled six students.

As tempers cooled, the United States expropriated some 630 acres of land—forests, uncultivated fields, and cultivated fields—in northern Okinawa in December 1956. As it turned out, the landowners agreed to yield their property, almost worthless in a remote, undeveloped area, on fee-simple (i.e., absolute possession), paid for in five-year lump-sum payments, with military construction of a reservoir, purchase of locally grown vegetables, preferential employment of local workers, supply of surplus electric power and drinking water, and other amenities. Several organizations protested against the new land acquisition, but to no avail. The Henoko area on the Pacific coast became the Third Marine Division's maneuvering ground, complete with ferro-concrete barracks and ordnance depots. A thriving entertainment district, nicknamed "Apple Town" after the USCAR official who helped to establish it, soon emerged near its main gate to serve the marines.

General Lyman (Louis) Lemnitzer, visiting Okinawa in January 1957 as Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, stated that Washington "has no desire to deprive a single citizen of the Ryukyus of the use of his land." Lemnitzer also announced that he had directed making "a comprehensive review of all military requirements for land in the Ryukyus," 99

with a view to reducing our existing requirements wherever possible and of limiting new acquisition to the absolute minimum." Yet, the findings of the review brought little comfort. "We have found on one hand that it may be possible in the near future to release substantial amounts of land," Lemnitzer said, "but on the other hand we have also determined that some additional land will have to be acquired for military purposes."

The general outlined "principles of a comprehensive, just, and practical program for the settlement of our land problems" in Okinawa which, he said, "provides a generous and equitable method for satisfying the legitimate hopes and rights of all Ryukyuan landowners."

- The United States is prepared to give landowners, in lieu of annual rentals, a cash payment a great many times more than the annual rent for the full use of their property... as long as it may be needed.
- In case of land of which the United States requires only partial use for an indefinite period and which the owner is permitted to farm, [it] proposes to acquire appropriate easements, for which suitable payments will be made.
- Every landowner may use his payment as he wishes (for example, depositing it in a government fund that is being developed).
- For those who wish to continue farming or to return to farming... there are considerable areas of arable land on Okinawa and in Yaeyama Gunto [island-chain] which are not under cultivation. The United States Civil Administration is prepared to assist in building roads and public facilities which will make it possible to use these lands.

In mid-1957, the U.S. Civil Administrator filed "a notice of intent and declaration of taking" to acquire determinable estate interest for the Naha military port area, the Kume Island Air Base, Torishima air range, the Miyako Island Air Station, Camp Kue [Kuwae], the Machinato service area and portions of Kadena Air Base. The areas covered 3,400 acres. A determinable estate interest was also acquired for portions of the site for special anti-aircraft units, special storage areas, the Voice of America transmission area, and a housing site at Kadena. An estimated 21,450 acres of Japanese government-owned forest land in northern Okinawa was also allocated in November for use by the Marine Corps as a training area. The Civil Administrator also issued an ordinance authorizing him to permit officials of the U.S. Army Engineer District to enter upon lands for investigation and survey purposes where the owners or occupants had refused to give voluntary authority.

In addition, Washington announced in May 1957 a plan to build eight missile launching sites in Okinawa. The announcement touched off a series of petitions and protests from the Council of Municipalities, the GRI legislature, and other organizations against the construction of nuclear weapons bases in Okinawa and the introduction of such weapons into the island. Regardless, a leasehold interest was soon acquired for the launching sites. The latest surface-to-air guided missile, the Nike Hercules, could carry a high-explosive or a nuclear warhead at more than three times the speed of sound to targets some 5,000 miles away.

As part of the Defense Department's plan for world-wide changes in U.S. command structures, General Lemnitzer declared that CINCUNC (Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command) would be moved to Seoul while CINCFE would be absorbed by CINC PAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), with a subordinate command structure in Tokyo. All

United States forces in the Far East, including the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS), were unified under CINCPAC, headquartered in Hawaii, in July 1957.

A Defense Department memorandum dated August 19, 1957 indicated that by early 1957, the estimate of total U.S. land requirements had been reduced from more than 56,000 acres to less than the 52,088 acres already authorized by Congress. More than 300 acres were returned to the owners; of the estimated 7,505 acres held by the United States that remained arable; farming was permitted on 6,389 acres. The Yonabaru airfield site would be used as a Marine helicopter installation instead of as a Naval airfield, thus making it unnecessary to acquire additional land at Yonabaru. As a result of reappraisals of the land situation, the landowners were receiving "a cash payment a great many times more than the annual rent for the full use of their property." These measures corresponded to the recommendations made in June 1956 by the special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

This, however, hardly settled the land issue, with all its social, economic, political and military implications. It would remain a major source of conflict for many years to come.