Chapter IV: A Façade or a Showcase of Democracy?

A New “Constitution” for the Ryukyus

Some high-ranking officials at the Department of State were becoming concerned about possible international implications of the “Okinawa problem” and its effect on the American conscience. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, noted in 1953 in reference to the presidential directive under preparation:

If the proposed arrangement is not considered to be reasonably satisfactory to the Japanese and the Ryukyuans, the gravity of the political decision should not be minimized. So far as our relations with the Japanese are concerned, the rapid rise of an irredentist issue over the Ryukyus could seriously entangle U.S.-Japanese relations and undermine the security position of the United States in Japan itself. In the longer run, the attitude of Japan would appear to be infinitely more important to us than our position in Okinawa. As for the Ryukyuans, serious opposition to the arrangement would throw an issue of self-determination before the American people and before the rest of the world in which the United States would be cast in the role of imposing its rule upon several hundred thousand unwilling subjects of another race and culture. Such a situation would cut across the conscience and long tradition of our people and would greatly weaken our influence and relationship with the peoples of Asia, the Middle East and even Latin America. It would provide an issue easily exploitable by the Communists and deepen the impression that the Soviet Union is the principal great power ally of anti-colonial peoples. That the issue would be a false one does not remove its dangers.

To address these issues, McClurkin proposed that a “joint U.S.-Japanese trusteeship of the Ryukyus,” which would make Japan responsible for non-security matters and the U.S. for security, should be submitted to the United Nations for approval. If trusteeship was not acceptable to the United States, McClurkin wrote, the presidential directive should make it clear that the United States would eventually return the islands to Japan, perhaps upon the Soviet return of the Kuriles to Japan and satisfactory settlement of other conflicts in Asia.

Secretary of State Dulles noted, in a letter of June 22, 1956, to the Secretary of Defense, the “unfavorable reaction” in Okinawa and Japan to the Price Report. To allay such opposition, he suggested that the government make a public statement that the United States would only acquire leasehold or easement interests when landowners were unwilling to sell outright, that it would acquire long-term right of use rather than the fee simple title, and that its long-term interests would be held in the name of the Government of the Ryuku Islands for temporary use by the United States.

On August 7, he sent another letter to the Secretary of Defense pointing to “an increase in concern [in Japan]” about the U.S. administration in Okinawa. “Our policies in

1McClurkin’s comments are attached to “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 8 January 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1577-1584.
the Ryukyus have clearly to be considered not only from the standpoint of sound local administration in the Ryukyus but also from the standpoint of our long-term relations with Japan," he wrote. "At the same time it appears that although the agitation within the Ryukyus on the land issue has somewhat subsided, there remain basic underlying dissatisfactions that may rise to plague us again on other issues in the future."^3

Dulles was not changing his basic position on Okinawa. When Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu visited Washington in August 1955, and argued for the restoration of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands to Japan, Dulles said that the United States was not prepared at that time to consider changing the status of the islands. The United States was making large defense expenditures there, he stated, and it would not be in the common interest to "agitater) over their status.4 Once a commitment was made, it must be kept.

But the Department of State was drafting an executive order that it thought necessary to "formalize" the delegation of administrative responsibility over the Ryukyus to the Department of Defense. This document was also expected to serve as a "bill of rights" for the Okinawan people and as evidence of the U.S. exercise of its "stewardship." The draft cleared the Department of State by early 1956. In December, however, it was decided to shelve the matter and to seek "a thorough review of the whole administration setup" in the Ryukyus by the two departments. The Budget Bureau argued for an early announcement of the executive order; in its view, it was "irregular" to place the basis of U.S. authority for its control of the Ryukyus on the presidential Directive of August 1954 alone.6

Executive Order 10713, the de facto constitution for the Ryukyus, was finally issued on June 5, 1957 by Eisenhower both as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. Like the presidential directive of 1954, it reaffirmed that "all administrative, legislative and jurisdictional powers" over the Ryukyus rested with the United States under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, and would be exercised by the Secretary of Defense.

The role of the Department of State in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands was reaffirmed and stated more clearly. The Secretary of State was made responsible for the conduct of "foreign relations" of the islands with the United States and the Secretary of Defense was required to keep the Secretary of State informed of activities affecting these relations.

The order created a "high commissioner"7 to head the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). To be "designated by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State and with the approval of the President, from among the

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^3 Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 7 August 1956. Ibid., 197-198.
^4 Memorandum of a Conversation [on Third Meeting with Shigemitsu]," 31 August 1955. Ibid., 111-114.
^7 This was the usual title for "the chief officer of a colonial territory or dependency" or "the head of the British diplomatic mission (the High Commission) in a Commonwealth country" (Oxford English Dictionary). It was adopted to designate the highest U.S. administrator of the Ryuku Islands. Gordon Warner writes that Dr. Harold Seidman of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, during his visit to Okinawa in March 1953, suggested changing the title of "Governor" to "High Commissioner." He reasoned that "Governor" was ordinarily used to mean "the highest official of a territory" and the "Ryuku Islands are not a U.S. territory." The Okinawa Reversion Story: War, Peace, Occupation, Reversion (Naha: The Executive Link, 1997), 93.
active duty members” of the U.S. forces, the high commissioner would “have the powers and perform the duties assigned to him” by this order. He could “delegate any function vested in him” to USCAR officials of his choice. He would also “carry out any orders or duties delegated or assigned to him by the Secretary of State” under the order. The high commissioner’s exercise of power, particularly in areas that might have bearing on the foreign relations of the United States, would be reported to the Secretary of Defense “who shall inform the Secretary of State.”

The Commanding General of the newly-formed U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USA-RYIS), commanding the IX Corps and the Army troops in the Ryukyus, was appointed as high commissioner. He would also be designated as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINCPACREP), responsible for interservice coordination on the islands. The offices of Governor in Tokyo and of Deputy Governor in Okinawa were abolished.

Major General James E. Moore, deputy governor and the commanding general of the Ryukyu Command and the IX Corps, was appointed as the commanding general of the USARYIS/IX Corps and high commissioner. Brigadier General Vonna F. Burger continued as the civil administrator in the office of the high commissioner (HICOM).

Day-to-day administration would be carried out, as before, by the Government of the Ryukyus under USCAR supervision and a number of other constraints. The elected legislature, for example, could exercise powers “which extend only to all subjects of legislation of domestic application.” It would become the practice for the high commissioner to address the first regular session of each legislature in person, review the past year and propose new legislation.

The chief executive would be “appointed by the high commissioner after consultation with representatives of the legislative body.” It was expected that the high commissioner would only appoint someone acceptable and agreeable, if not totally subservient, to him. Every bill passed by the legislature required the chief executive’s signature before it became law. The chief executive, therefore, had the power of veto, although this could be overridden by the high commissioner.

The Ryukyu courts, too, had only limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Above all, the courts were constrained by the high commissioner’s power to transfer a case from a Ryukyu court to a USCAR court when, in his judgment, it was “of particular importance affecting the security, property and interests of the United States.”

The order gave extraterritorial privileges to members of the U.S. forces (including civilians) and their American dependents, American nationals employed by Washington and their compatriot dependents, over whom the Ryukyu courts had no criminal jurisdiction. Even civil jurisdiction in “cases and controversies” involving the above-mentioned Americans could be transferred from a Ryukyu court to a USCAR court if the high commissioner judged that they could affect “the security of the islands,” “foreign relations” or “the security, property or interests of the United States” or its nationals. Furthermore, the highest USCAR appellate court could review “any case, civil or criminal,” tried not only in lower USCAR courts but also in the highest court of the Government of the Ryukyus: the highest USCAR appellate court was de facto the “supreme court” in Okinawa, and also had jurisdiction to review “a question of United States, foreign or international law, including the interpretation of any treaty, act of Congress of the United States, Executive Order of the President of the United States, or of a proclamation, ordinance or order of the high commissioner upon appeal by any party.”

The high commissioner had supreme power in other areas. He could, if he judged it necessary in order to fulfill his mission, “promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations,”
"veto any bill," "annul any law," "remove any public official from office," exercise the
power of reprieve, commutation or pardon, and "assume, in whole or in part, the exercise
of full authority in the islands."

The high commissioner was restrained only by the provisions requiring him to "pre­
serve to persons in the Ryukyu Islands the basic liberties enjoyed by people in democratic
countries" and to report on his exercise of authority to the Secretary of Defense and,
through him, to the Secretary of State.

Okinawan leaders and the press were disappointed with the Executive Order. It ig­
nored the Okinawan people’s desire for reunification with Japan, as periodically ex­
pressed since 1952 by the popularly elected Ryukyuan legislature including members of
even the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party which was favored by the U.S. authorities.
The Executive Order kept Okinawa under the authority of the Department of Defense
instead of transferring the administration to the Department of State. The high commis­
sioner’s powers were so extensive that they violated not only the fundamental principles
of the American Revolution and the American Constitution, but also contradicted the
very reason for the U.S. presence in Okinawa which was, paradoxically, to safeguard the
free world against the anti-democratic forces of communism. Good government was no
substitute for self-government, but there was not even a reference in the Executive Order
to "good government," which at least required the colonial rulers of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries to restrict the excessive exercise of their powers.

"[The] time has come," a local newspaper editorial stated, "when civilian judgment
might be better than that of the military in the settlement of problems connected with
civil administration." Years later, the New York Post would agree: "The U.S. has no valid
claim to the administration of the Ryukyus and it is reasonable to think that they would
have been returned to Japan long ago if the Pentagon’s demands were not given such
weight in shaping Pacific priority."

The United States had claimed that its responsibilities toward the Okinawan people
“arise in the first instance from our tradition of fair play.” It was most ironic that the spe­
cial subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee had stated in 1955 following
its visit to Okinawa: “Okinawa has become, in its most precise sense, a ‘showcase of de­
mocracy.’ The eyes of the world and particularly the hooded eye of the Communist world
are fixed effectively on our actions in Okinawa, the latter in concentrated study to dis­
cover what can be used as propaganda against us. These two considerations have been
placed in order of priority—morality first, practicality, second.”

There were other Americans who disagreed. Edwin O. Reischauer, future U.S. Am­
bassador to Japan (1961-66), who had written in 1950 that an American trusteeship
would make the Okinawans “economic and political wards of the United States, . . . rele­
gating [them] indefinitely to the status of a colonial people,” would confirm in 1957: “the
Ryukyus are assigned . . . to the status of a colonial people.” In the same year, Walter
S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs would admit that “the
Ryukyus are the only place in the world where the United States can be charged with
colonialism. We should make the Ryukyus a showcase for American democracy in the

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9 Report of a Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee No. 86, 1956, 7658.
10 Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Harvard University Press, 1950), 238-9, and
In such circumstances, it was no wonder that a State Department official had warned against publicizing the Executive Order on the grounds that it would “stimulate reversionist agitation in Japan, which in turn will heighten reversion sentiment in the Ryukyus, thereby decreasing the possibility of achieving our chief objective [i.e., retaining full control] in the Ryukyus.”

He said that the order gave “a façade of democracy and self-government for the Ryukyus which, upon closer examination, becomes a chimera,” adding:

If the Ryukyuans are to develop a democratic form of government, they must be allowed sufficient leeway in which to experiment, develop and, as is unavoidable, make mistakes. The system proposed under the Executive Order has the built-in temptation to substitute our judgment for Ryukyuan judgment at every point. To achieve our fundamental purposes it appears highly desirable that intervention take place only when essential to avoid those consequences related to matters concerning United States security interests. Furthermore, it is likely that the Executive Order may come under attack in Japan on the ground that it is a hypothetical document which pretends to give democratic rights to the Ryukyuans, but in fact does not.

The preamble of an early draft saying that the United States controlled the Ryukyus “pending the establishment of enduring conditions of peace and stability in the Far East” had been changed, presumably in compliance with the request of Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi who wanted to prevent a “general impression of permanency” in American control. The words in the new preamble referring to “Japan’s residual sovereignty” and reaffirming that the United States did not seek permanent possession of the islands were also deleted.

When Kishi visited Washington in the middle of June 1957, therefore, he had little room to negotiate. With respect to Okinawa, he only asked if the United States could “defer” additional land acquisition in Okinawa until a joint investigation by U.S. Congressmen and Japanese Diet members could be conducted, and if it could consider permitting the Okinawans to fly the Japanese flag, and to express a semantic preference for the word “ultimate [sovereignty]” to “residual” in the joint communique with President Eisenhower. On the first point, Secretary Dulles explained that the U.S. President could not delegate foreign affairs responsibilities to Congress and that the military was already being asked to limit its land requirements to the absolute minimum. As to the flag, the Departments of Defense and State agreed that the United States should not concede to this request as yet. On the third point, the President simply reaffirmed in the joint communique that Japan retained “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyus.

Instead of requesting the return of a seized territory, Kishi asked the United States whether it “could assist in emigration” to other countries of the Okinawan farmers whose land was requisitioned for military use, in view of the fact that they had no alternative land in Okinawa. The suggestion was new to Dulles who “jokingly remarked that he

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11Assistant Secretary of State for East Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 513-514.
12Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 24 May 1957, ibid., 318-320.
13Ibid. Kishi was shown a summary of the order in May.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
would like to see some of the Okinawans settle in New Guinea." Two months later, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs reported to Dulles that "[the] question of allowing Ryukyuan emigration to the Trust Territories was under consideration" at the department. These territories included the Marianas, the Carolines and the Marshalls.

Resettlement of Okinawans to other places had been a recurring subject. The U.S. Army's agricultural mission to the Ryukyus, for example, suggested in its report of November 1949 "arrangements for the emigration of thousands of natives" in order to "relieve the economic burden on the United States." The presidential directive of 1954 gave "supplemental instructions" to USCAR to assist the GRI in "the development of a program to resettle Ryukyuans, who have been deprived of land by the requirements of U.S. military forces, within the Ryukyuan archipelago and other suitable areas." General Ogden, as mentioned above, supported lump-sum payments in order to facilitate the resettlement of 3,500 families on sparsely inhabited islands in the southern Ryukyus.

Always short of arable land, Okinawa had been sending out emigrants since the nineteenth century, first to Hawaii, then South America, Taiwan, various South Pacific islands and elsewhere. Pre-war Okinawan settlers in Bolivia had in 1950 established a resettlement organization called "Urume" and purchased 2,500 hectares of land north of Santa Cruz. Washington dispatched James L. Tigner of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, to Latin America to explore the possibilities of shipping Okinawan emigrants there; Tigner espoused Urume's plan to settle 3,000 families (or 12,000 individual settlers) within ten years and recommended that USCAR finance the settlers' travel expenses. USCAR and the Government of the Ryukyus supported the project. In 1954, 400 people, screened from about 2,900 applicants, left for Bolivia aboard two ships.

Life in the colony—the Urume settlement and the adjacent land secured by earlier Okinawan settlers—turned out to be miserable. "All but a few were shocked at and disappointed by the place they were going to make their home," as Kozy Amemiya, who interviewed some of these emigrants in Bolivia in 1997, wrote. "It was covered with thick jungle, there were no adequate roads to the Urume settlement from the railroad or anywhere else, and no bridge over the Rio Grande for access to Santa Cruz. The housing was not finished and, worst of all, there was no potable water nearby." A mysterious affliction, called "Urume disease," would soon kill fifteen of the emigrants and put more than eighty others to their sickbeds. Several months later, the settlement was struck by a serious flood, and then by a plague of rats. "Many of the Okinawans started to wonder aloud whether emigration to Bolivia was a government policy to dump them in the jungle," Amemiya writes, quoting one of them as saying: "I have never been rid of that suspicion. I believe it was indeed a 'thinning policy'."

Meanwhile, on Christmas Day 1956, the voters of Naha elected as their mayor Kamejiro Senaga. To the Americans, Senaga was a dangerous Communist trying to undermine American interests. To many Okinawans, however, he was a folk hero fighting for their cause defiantly and almost single-handedly against powerful foreign authorities. USCAR immediately froze financial assistance from the Bank of the Ryukyus (51 per-

16Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1957. Ibid., 443-46.
cent of whose common stock was owned by the United States) to the municipal government’s city planning program. Some 300 local business leaders also declared non-cooperation with the new administration. U.S. government officials in Washington were apparently embarrassed, while the Central Intelligence Agency, for its part, began funneling money to pro-U.S., anti-Senaga politicians.¹⁹

Defeated in a no-confidence vote by twenty-four to six in the municipal assembly, Senaga dissolved the assembly and, in the subsequent election, doubled his strength in the assembly, with a majority sufficient to keep him in power for the next three years. High Commissioner Moore took action. He amended an ordinance on local autonomy to permit the Naha City Assembly to remove Senaga from office through multiple votes and other ordinances were drafted to disqualify him from holding any public office.²⁰

The legitimacy and chance of success of General Moore’s action were questionable. A study by the Air Force Inspector General’s Office of Special Investigation had found that the People’s Party did not have the capacity to carry out sabotage operations.²¹ Besides, Moore had apparently acted without consultation with Washington.²² Serious consideration, “given on at least two occasions since December 25, 1956” to Senaga’s removal, Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson told his counterpart at Defense, “had led to the decision by General Lemnitzer . . . that the Naha City Assembly should be given the opportunity to solve the problem in accordance with their procedures.” But when the assembly proved unable “to solve the problem,” the high commissioner did not inform Washington of his plans. Robertson only learned from an intelligence source two days in advance, of the possibility that Moore would take action to oust Senaga. He instructed the U.S. Consul General in Naha “to inform General Moore that the Department of State considered it necessary for the action to be reviewed in full [beforehand] by interested Washington agencies,” but this communication did not reach General Moore in time.²³ The Assistant Secretary of the Army had “heard nothing about the matter” either. Finally, General Lemnitzer telephoned Moore and persuaded him to delay action for a few hours “to allow the Departments of State and Defense to read and to evaluate his message [i.e., ordinance].”

The amendments to the city assembly’s powers were announced on November 24; the city assembly followed the new rules and succeeded in voting the duly elected mayor out of office so as to preserve the “eternal peace and prosperity” of the city.

Robertson protested that the high commissioner made it “difficult, if not impossible for the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities” under Section 3 of the Executive Order. Under that section, the Secretary of State was “responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands.” Accordingly, he said “we had thought that there was a clear understanding in the Ryukyus of the Consul General’s responsibility for independent reporting to the Department on development[s] in the Ryukyus and of his need to communicate on such

¹⁹Sarantakes, 112.
²⁰The new ordinance made it easy to put a second vote of no-confidence through a municipal assembly if the first vote failed to win the support of three-quarters of the membership in a two-thirds quorum. On any second vote, a simple majority would now be sufficient to oust a mayor.
²¹Sarantakes, 114.
²³The above memorandum also stated that the Consul General was “under injunction not to transmit any separate communications to the Department on the subject.”
matters to the Department of State."

The American Civil Liberties Union publicly criticized the Department of Defense's "military interference." A letter it had sent to General Charles K. Gailey, head of the Department's civil affairs division, had noted that "it is undemocratic to change established rules . . . just to accomplish a particular end desired by the military" and that "domination by the military over the civilian government of the city of Naha constitutes a violation of democratic principles." It added that only by granting "full self-government" to the Okinawans, subject solely to restrictions by military security interests, can there be a "satisfactory arrangement according with American principles." The system of partial self-government under complete military control, it charged, "gives rise to confusion and grievances."^24

Many Okinawans, in Naha and elsewhere, also reacted angrily to Senaga's removal. One businessman was quoted as saying: "You say you are giving us the vote and if you don't like who we elect you change the laws—this is your wonderful democracy?"^25 The furor immediately spread from Okinawa to mainland Japan. "The expected public reaction, particularly in Japan, occurred. For two or three days stories about the United States' action in ousting Mayor Senaga crowded all other news off the front pages of all newspapers in Tokyo," Robertson stated in his memorandum. "The Japanese press uniformly and vigorously protested the method of effecting the removal of Mayor Senaga. It was called undemocratic and 'dictatorial' and was pointed out as an example of the lack of practice of democracy by the United States." Labor unions issued statements denouncing the U.S. government. The Japanese government, however, made no official comment.

Naha citizens gave United States administrators another slap in the face in the subsequent mayoral election by electing Saichi Kaneshi, running on behalf of a coalition dominated by the People's Party, over Tatsuo Taira, a close friend of Jugo Thoma, the U.S.-appointed chief executive. The results, according to Taira, reflected how outraged the people were at the amended ordinances and how deep-rooted their anti-American sentiments were; he announced his retirement from politics. High Commissioner Moore made no comment other than to state that the voters had elected a mayor through a democratic process and that it was also his own responsibility as high commissioner to carry out his duties based on the same democratic principles. Civil Administrator Burger said the crisis would delay Naha's economic reconstruction. Kaneshi served a full four-year term as mayor.

State-Defense Discord

These political disturbances in Okinawa apparently so shocked Washington that the Departments of State and Defense decided to review United States policies toward the Ryukyu Islands. Maintaining a cooperative relationship with Japan, where a surge of nationalism had begun to threaten such relations, was another consideration. In the course of discussions, differences of views between the two departments emerged once again.

The Department of State had proposed that the government issue a new National Security Council policy paper on the Ryukyus. There was, it argued, "a clear need for coordinated United States Government agency actions" regarding the islands "where we are confronted with a highly complex delicate situation" Besides, Eisenhower's Executive

Order 10713 of 1957, a published document, was "no substitute for an NSC policy paper." But the Defense Department rejected resort to an NSC policy paper. This split was not resolved, with the two departments instead agreeing only to hold the question of a separate NSC policy paper on the Ryukyus "in abeyance pending further study."

The Department of State was "in full accord" with the Pentagon as to the policy of occupying the islands for so long as "conditions of threat and tension persist in the Far East" and retained the view that "the United States' stake is such as not to brook our sharing administrative responsibilities with Japan." The two departments differed sharply, however, in responding to "reversionism," or the movement for Okinawa's administrative reunification with Japan:

The Defense position ... is that only by taking every possible opportunity for actions and statements to remind the Japanese of the exclusive United States administration and control of the islands will the United States be able effectively to reduce reversionist activity in the Ryukyus and Japan. ... The Department of State [on the other hand] believes that unnecessary 'stirring' of Japanese sentiments of this question will increase rather than decrease Japanese agitation and lead to enhanced reversionist sentiment on the part of the Ryukyuans. [It] views reversionism in the Ryukyus essentially as an expression of the desire of the Ryukyu people to belong to a country. It is a basic sentiment that cannot be suppressed. The United States has affirmed to Japan the United States policy that the Ryukyu Islands should be eventually returned to Japan.

"If this position were to be changed and if the Japanese were to be told that the islands would be alienated from them for the foreseeable future," the Department of State thought, "the effects on United States relations with Japan would be unfortunate. Acts performed to demonstrate the long-range character of the American presence in the islands can be expected to create anti-Americanism, unrest, and a sharp increase in Japanese agitation and in reversionist activity in the Ryukyus. ... A calculated policy of 'snubbing' Japan with respect to the Ryukyus could not only seriously impede currently successful efforts to establish close working relationships with Japan but as a consequence might also hurt our military position in the Ryukyus as well as in Japan."

In January 1958, Secretary of State Dulles instructed Ambassador Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo to review U.S. policies toward Japan and the Ryukyus on the grounds that "our present posture . . . cannot be continued safely." MacArthur replied that "a major adjustment is required in Okinawa where time is running swiftly and remorselessly against [the] U.S." and made a series of "specific recommendations for changes in our policy and in present administration there." As for Japan, security arrangements needed to be adjusted so that they would become less one-sided and more mutual.

Dulles called President Eisenhower's attention to the Okinawa question on April 1. "I spoke of the situation in Okinawa and the difficulty we had there, particularly with the

27 Memorandum of Discussion at the 340th Meeting of the National Security Council," 17 October 1957, ibid., 516-517.
28 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of Defense for International Security Affairs, 17 October 1957, ibid., 514-516.
29 Department of State to Tokyo, 31 January 1958, Central Files, 611.94/1-3158.
Military High Commissioner who operated on a ‘be tough’ basis,” Dulles recorded. “I said I thought we should explore the possibilities of an enclave, of which we would have permanent or semi-permanent possession, with the administration of the rest of the island turned back to the Japanese.” The President noted that the United States should learn a lesson from what had happened in Cyprus and Algiers, saying “our failure to make with the Japanese an acceptable and mutually agreeable arrangement for the Okinawa base” could “easily develop a situation that would create much embarrassment for us.” He agreed that Okinawa might be divided to establish “an American enclave of minimum size to meet our [security] needs.”

The Japanese minister in Washington told a senior official of the Department of State that he considered the continued United States control of the Ryukyus (and the Bonin Islands) to be the “most important problem” in the relations between the two countries. The Japanese government, in his judgment, would request the immediate return of administrative rights “shortly after the [forthcoming] general election.”

A few days later, the Department asked the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to make “an evaluation of the feasibility and desirability of returning administrative rights in the Ryukyus to Japan” or, more specifically, of seeking “a stable log-term political basis for safe [unrestricted] use of our bases in the Ryukyus.” Ambassador MacArthur wrote that he “fully” agreed with the principle of the proposal, but he had reservations about carrying it out immediately. First take “urgently necessary measures to arrest the unfavorable trend in Okinawa,” he suggested, and then work out a longer-term solution: administrative turnover to Japan “without impairing our basic security interests.”

MacArthur also suggested, among other things, a “new arrangement, preferably in the form of a new Executive Order, “which would give the State Department full and equal voice with Defense, including veto powers over all policies toward the Ryukyus and all actions by the high commissioner.” He said he continued to believe that “it is basically unsound to continue military government in Okinawa” because the Ryukyuan situation was a political, not military problem, as he had noted in his February 1 and March 10 letters to Secretary Dulles.

The Ambassador had apparently been annoyed, as many in the Department of State were, by Moore’s high-handed removal of Senaga from office and his controversial statement on December 15, 1957, that “we will be here ‘indefinitely’ or ‘for the foreseeable future.’ . . . I feel our fundamental need is for an authoritative statement of the minimum number of years during which this subject will not even be discussed. This

31-Memorandum of Conversation with the President,” 1 April 1558, footnote, ibid., 16.
32-Eisenhower, “Memorandum for the Record,” 9 April 1958, ibid., 16-7. The “Cyprus” metaphor would be repeated by Secretary of State Dulles who said in 1958 : “We were tempted to make much of the Chinese Communists plowing up the graves of ancestors but many Okinawan graves had been bulldozed into airplane runways on Okinawa and, if we were not careful, we could have a Cyprus-type situation there on our hands.” (“Memorandum of a Conversation, US-UK talks on Far Eastern Policy,” 17 November 1958, ibid., 61-68).
33-Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 12 April 1958, ibid., 17-18.
34-Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Japan, 11 April 1958. Central Files 794C0221/4-1158: Supplement, footnote, ibid., 19.
35-U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, 15 April 1958, ibid., 19-21.
36-U.S. Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 15 April 1958, ibid., 19-21, and footnote on 21.
must also be accompanied by a basic law under which we can operate. The combination of these acts would remove current doubts and confusion, make clear to Okinawans and others what their status is, and permit them to act and plan on the basis of a more certain future.\(^\text{37}\)

Finally, a temporary solution on the future of Okinawa seems to have been reached on April 18, 1958, at least between Eisenhower and Dulles. In a telephone conversation, Dulles told the President that “the moment was not opportune” to propose an administrative reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan.\(^\text{38}\) In view of the fact that U.S. military dispositions in Okinawa were widely scattered, Dulles also rejected the idea of “limiting our jurisdiction to one or two enclaves.” Dulles suggested that the Department of Defense start on a three-to-five-year program “to facilitate subsequently a return to the Japanese of most of the administrative responsibilities over the Okinawan people.” When the Secretary referred to a report recommending a “wider dispersal in the Pacific of some facilities now on Okinawa,” the President indicated that this was a “sound approach.” The question of Okinawa’s reunification with Japan would, therefore, be held in suspension, pending the discussion on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The land issue was also finally resolved: the United States would abandon determinable estate payments in favor of annual rental payments. Before that, however, Moore incurred President Eisenhower’s wrath in early April following a report that he had asked the Department of the Army for permission to announce a possible change in the lump sum policy. He believed that the change would give the Government of the Ryukyus the authority to handle acquisition of any payment for land.\(^\text{39}\) When Dulles discussed Moore’s suggestion with Eisenhower over the phone, Eisenhower advised the Secretary to “tell him to keep his damn mouth shut.”\(^\text{40}\) In Ambassador MacArthur’s view, Moore’s policy “would compound [the land problem] by trying to get GRI to put into effect on our behalf a plan which will seem substantially equivalent to a discredited lump-sum payment system.”

Moore was replaced by General Booth as high commissioner the following month. Soon thereafter, six Okinawan representatives visited Washington to conduct negotiations with U.S. officials.

Subsequent discussions in Okinawa between local and American officials came up with a mutually satisfactory formula. Rentals would be paid annually: there would be two kinds of lease contracts, one indefinite and another for five years; and annual rentals for farmland, residential areas, commercial areas, and forest land would be assessed every five years by new methods. Lease negotiations would be conducted and concluded by the GRI on behalf of the United States. Only when the landowner refused to conclude a negotiated lease would the United States use the power of eminent domain to expropriate or condemn the property. When the lease expired, the United States would be required to restore the land to its original state.

At about this time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deploying intermediate


\(^{39}\)\textit{Ibid.}, 19-21, and footnote, 20.

\(^{40}\)\textit{Ibid.}, footnote.
range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on Okinawa. A major consideration in the selection of Okinawa," they said, "was the fact that the IRBMs could be deployed and operated from that location without requiring negotiations with any other government." They added: "Since it does not appear possible that the United States will be able to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan in the foreseeable future, the importance of Okinawa as a base for the IRBMs is increased." The Joint Chiefs of Staff even rebuffed as "inadvisable" a State Department request that the Japanese government be consulted beforehand regarding any deployment of IRBMs or any other U.S. military activities in the islands.

The Hungarian uprising (1956), the Suez crisis (1956-57), and the Soviet launching of a multistage intermediate-range ballistic missile as well as the first man-made satellite, Sputnik (1957), renewed tension in the world and alerted the United States to a missile gap. The U.S. had begun deploying nuclear weapons in Europe, Asia and Pacific islands in the mid-1950s. IRBM numbers sharply increased in the decade and early in the 1960s. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists disclosed in 1999 that nuclear weapons and launchers such as the 280mm gun, 8-inch howitzer, Matador, anti-submarine nuclear depth bomb, guided air defense missile (ADM), Honest John and Nike Hercules were all deployed in Okinawa between 1954 and 1959. As for ADMs, supersonic air-intercept missiles such as the AIM-4 Falcon, the AIM-9 Sidewinder and the AIM-7 Sparrow were available in the 1950s for deployment. The radar-guided Nike Ajax could intercept high-flying aircraft at more than twice the speed of sound. A larger version of the same missile, the Hercules, which began to replace the Ajax in 1958, could carry a high explosive or a nuclear warhead at more than three times the speed of sound and hit targets at 150,000 feet. The Honest John, an unguided ballistic rocket, could also be nuclear-armed. The Matador (subsequently Mace) was a ground-launched, subsonic cruise missile designed to carry a 3,000-pound warhead over a distance of more than 600 miles.

Renewed tension, rising particularly in the wake of the Soviet development of a long-range missile, led some Department of Defense officials to suggest a new policy statement by the United States reaffirming its intention to retain Okinawa for a long time. Prior to his replacement, Moore himself had told an AP correspondent that "we will be here 'indefinitely' or 'for the foreseeable future.'" He added: "I feel our fundamental need is for an authoritative statement of the minimum number of years during which this subject will not even be discussed. This must also be accompanied by a basic law under which we can operate. The combination of these acts would remove current doubts and confusion, make clear to Okinawans and others what their status is, and permit them to act and plan on the basis of a more certain future."

Moore hoped this statement "might remove the reversion issue" from an election campaign for legislators to be held for the first time under Chief Executive Jugo Thoma. The ruling Democratic Party was fighting an uphill campaign battle against the Minren, a political group dominated by the People's Party which had won the hearts of many Okinawan voters for its stands on the land and reversion issues. Moore's comments

44 Ibid.
Democracy Betrayed

upset the Department of State and the Japanese Government; Ambassador MacArthur felt it necessary to request authorization to confirm to Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiiyama that there had been no change in U.S. policy. Nor did Moore’s statement help the pro-U.S. candidates in the Okinawan election held soon thereafter: the pro-American candidates’ strength fell to only seven from fifteen in 1956 and their share of the popular vote to 22 percent from 52, while the People’s Party won five seats gaining 11 percent of the total and the Okinawa Socialist Party nine seats and 21 percent.

The U.S. dollar was introduced into Okinawa to replace, first, MPC (military payment certificates) in April 1958, and then the “B-yen” military currency in September 1958. The currency conversion had apparently been under consideration at least since the spring of 1957, when a financial management mission led by Edward W. O’Flaherty, chief of the economic affairs division in the U.S. Army’s office of civil affairs, visited Okinawa to evaluate USCAR’s currency and fiscal management operations and to develop procedures for future currency and fiscal management in the Ryukyus. Subsequently, the mission recommended withdrawing the two military scrip currencies in circulation in Okinawa and adoption of the U.S. dollar as the single legal tender on the islands.

The Army proposed the conversion to the Department of State on the ground that it would bring economic benefits to the Ryukyus and administrative advantages to the United States. The conversion to the dollar was considered necessary in order to attract outside investment and to vitalize the fragile Okinawan economy. Local capital, income from military bases and GARIOA funds had proved insufficient to finance needed development. With the authority to issue money and regulate its value vested in Congress by the Constitution, the Army also had no statutory authority to issue a military occupation currency in peacetime. Apparently, however, this was not one of the Army’s primary reasons for the conversion.

The Department of State was opposed to the conversion as a result of “political considerations,” i.e., that it would be used by “agitators” in Japan “to demonstrate that the United States intends to retain the islands in perpetuity.” It was feared that this could provoke repetition of the kind of angry reaction in Okinawa that followed the announcement of the Price Report on new long-term land acquisition and that “political objections” would “outweigh possible economic advantages.” The Department suggested retaining the B-yen, supported “one hundred percent by United States dollars available in the Ryukyu Foreign Exchange Fund” and replaced by new bills which would not bear the taint of an occupation currency.

President Eisenhower, upon learning of the plan for the first time on May 23 from Dulles in the course of a telephone conversation, was opposed to it and ordered a stop to the move; the United States had never used its dollar in occupied territory. On the same day, local time, Booth called into his office Chief Executive Thoma, Tsumichiyo Asato,

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45Circulated on military bases, they were convertible with dollars.
46Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 2 August 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 437-438, and footnotes thereof.
47The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army had noted that the Army had no authority to issue the B-yen script after the state of war with had ended legally. (Sarantakes, 118, quoting from “Ryukyu Island Fact Sheet, 4, Army,” vol. I (8), Box 2, Alphabetical Subseries, Subject Series, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary.) Also see “Talking Paper: Introduction of U.S. Currency in the Ryukyu Islands,” 12 August 1958. Japan vol. 1 of III (1), Box 8, International Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library.
48Sarantakes, 118, quoting from the memorandum of phone conversation.
the speaker of the Legislature, and Moriyasu Tomihara, the president of the Bank of the Ryukyus, and disclosed the plan to them. Hundreds of tons of dollar bills and coins, in wooden boxes labeled “Toy Horse,” must have departed the United States by this time aboard military vessels; they arrived at Naha Port at the end of May.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, who had heard of the plan from Ambassador MacArthur, one day ahead of Eisenhower, said he understood the economic reasons for the conversion but was concerned that the Japanese would consider it as the first step toward an American annexation of the islands. He asked for a delay of the announcement. The retiring ambassador, Booth, also recommended a delay. Booth told Dulles that Okinawans enthusiastically supported the plan, but also agreed to delay an announcement.

Dulles brought up the subject with Eisenhower again, but the President once more rejected the idea as “one of doubtful wisdom,” for fear that “it would be interpreted in Japan as an expected and nevertheless latent ambition of this country to annex those islands.” He would consider the conversion only if Prime Minister Kishi recommended it because of its favorable effect on the Ryukyuan economy. Under instructions from Dulles, the Ambassador met Kishi immediately. This time, Kishi neither opposed nor supported the move, only asking that the public announcement be delayed until after the Diet went into recess, and repeated a request that the land issue be resolved. Dulles talked to the President again and, this time received his approval.

Booth finally announced the conversion plan on August 23. It would go into effect from September 15. The conversion, he said, was designed to “unify” the currencies circulating in Okinawa. It would promote the Okinawan economy by streamlining the operations of local business activities, encouraging importation of foreign capital, technology and expertise, and enhancing native Okinawans’ ability to make external transactions. He denied that there were any political implications of the conversion. Immediately following the announcement, the high commissioner issued ordinances on foreign investment in the Ryukyus, imposing temporary price controls and making amendments to the Bank Act.

Contrary to the high commissioner’s remarks to Dulles about enthusiastic local support, many Okinawans had misgivings about the currency conversion to the U.S. dollar. Even Thoma, who said he recognized the benefits of using the world currency, was concerned about possible “harmful effects” on the local economy such as inflation and loss in earning power. In fact, the Economic Council of the Government of the Ryukyus had advised the chief executive that conversion would invite “undesirable” foreign investment and squeeze local industry, that it would make way for economic colonization of the islands by foreign capital, and that it would adversely affect people who longed for return to Japanese rule.

The president of the Democratic Party foresaw a substantial degree of confusion among the general public and difficulties for local industry attempting to compete in the world economy. The Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce, too, was opposed; it favored, as the economic council did, a distinct Okinawan currency rather than the dollar which might swallow up the island’s tiny economy. “It was regrettable,” a special committee on currency of the GRI Legislature said, “that people were not asked their views. If the plan is

51Booth to Dulles, May 26, 1958. Ibid.
52President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles, June 4, 1958, FRUS, 1968-60, vol. 18, 31-32.
53MacArthur to Dulles, June 19, 1958, ibid.
to be implemented [regardless of their wishes], the Government of the Ryukyus should be
given all authority on foreign investment and . . . on trade control.” More critical ele­
ments believed that the conversion was to intended lay the economic groundwork for the
United States to reinforce its political control of the islands.

Okinawa officially became a dollar zone market on September 16. Converted at the
rate of one dollar to 120 B-yen, a total of 4,316,107,000 B-yen was exchanged for
roughly $36,000,000 by November 29. The B-yen notes were carried off the coast,
weighed down in drums filled with concrete and committed to the deep some 3,000 feet
down. In spite of the price controls and contrary to the assurance that inflation would not
occur, the conversion drove commodity prices up by 10 percent within one month.

On the eve of the dollar conversion, Okinawans were treated to an event that briefly
united them, at least psychologically, with the people of mainland Japan. In August,
Shuri High School participated in the National High School Baseball Championships
held at Koshien Stadium in Kobe. It was the first Okinawan team to compete in the
“dream” games, an annual summer event that drew the attention of virtually the entire
nation. Much was made of the participation of this team from a former Japanese prefec­
ture now under American military occupation. The sponsoring organization honored the
team by asking its captain to recite the pledge of allegiance to Japan at the opening cere­
mony on behalf of the 660 players. National and local media enthusiastically welcomed
the team, and many Okinawans in the Kobe-Osaka area as well as Okinawan students on
school excursions went to cheer the Shuri nine while people in Okinawa listened to the
game on the radio. The team lost its first game by three-to-zero, but it captured the hearts
of many Okinawans and mainland Japanese when the young players began to put earth
from the ground into their bags. Many saw in this act a symbolic display of their attach­
ment to the Japanese soil. The drama was not over yet. When the ship carrying them
home arrived in Naha, a quarantine officer confiscated the souvenir earth and threw it
into the sea. Japanese soil could not be brought onto the island. The incident aroused still
more sympathy both in Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Civil Rights under Military Rule

Since the primary reason for the presence of the United States in Okinawa is the impor­
tance of its military bases there, any action which might seriously threaten the security of
the base cannot be approved. Therefore, all matters concerning civil and political liberties
must be considered in the light of basic military necessity.

The above was drawn from a confidential memorandum\(\text{54}\) prepared for the Civil Ad­
ministrator, his deputy, the special assistant to the High Commissioner and other high
U.S. officials in Okinawa in anticipation of the visit to Okinawa in mid-August 1959 of
Roger Baldwin, chairman of both the American Civil Liberties Union and of the Interna­
tional League for the Rights of Man.\(\text{55}\) Baldwin’s visit, immediately following the prom-

\(\text{54}\) Memorandum by Irving Eisenstein, Legislative Legal Department, USCAR, 17 August 1959, on
“Issues Which May Be Raised during the Baldwin Visit.”

\(\text{55}\) Baldwin was invited to visit Okinawa by the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of Defense
and High Commissioner Booth. Baldwin to Civil Affairs Division, 22 September 1959. Baldwin
Papers, Box 10, F18.
IV: Façade or Showcase of Democracy?

ulgation of a controversial penal code by the high commissioner, promised to be a very important one. Baldwin had been alerted to the code by the Reverend David Reid of Massachusetts during a round-the-world tour which would include Okinawa.

By its own admission, the USCAR memorandum noted that the United States could be charged in several areas with depriving the Okinawans of "civil rights enjoyed by Americans and Japanese." The first issue addressed in the memorandum was local autonomy. The high commissioner was empowered to appoint the chief executive and override any action of the Ryukyuan government. All Okinawan parties had been calling for popular election of the chief executive. The memorandum said, however, that the chief executive was to be appointed by the high commissioner after consultation with representatives of the [Ryukyuan] legislature as required by Executive Order 10713. "To permit popular election of the chief executive," it stated, "may well result in a completely uncooperative local government, which would require extensive legislative action by the high commissioner in order to carry out his military mission." In other words, having a democratically elected chief executive might be counterproductive to American interests.

The memorandum stated that the high commissioner's legislative and veto powers were limited by the Executive Order "to actions necessary to carry out [his] mission and to the protection of U.S. interests." It admitted, however, that questions had been raised regarding the necessity of maintaining an unelected executive when U.S. authorities exercised the right to veto legislation, and the relevance to U.S. security of the use of the veto over such matters as the introduction of a tax on luxury goods. USCAR ordinances, indeed, extended to everything from the United States land acquisition program to a nursing school and nurse licensing, whaling operations, education, municipal autonomy, typhoon disaster rehabilitation, banking, commodity taxation, workmen's compensation benefits, and control of narcotics and other drugs. USCAR vetoed GRI laws setting a date for the election of the chief executive and high duties on foodstuffs (both in 1953); it revised six bills in 1952 and 1953 alone concerning income tax and "prevailed upon" the chief executive to veto two labor bills.

The second issue concerned travel permits for Okinawans. External travel between Okinawa was regulated by CA Ordinance No. 93 of 1953 ("Control of Entry and Exit of Individuals into and from the Ryukyu Islands"), Ordinance No. 147 ("Control of Travel

56HICOM Ordinance No. 23, "Code of Penal Law and Procedure for the Ryukyu Islands," 13 May 1959. The ordinance was intended to rescind and supersede Civil Administration Ordinance No. 144 of 13 March 1955 entitled "Code of Penal Law and Procedure" (and all changes to it) which itself had rescinded and superseded Military Government Ordinance No. 1, "Codified Penal Law and Procedure of the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands" of 5 July 1949 (and all changes thereto).

57Reid to ACLU, 5 August 1959, with an attached copy of the letter Reid had sent to Senator Hubert Humphrey. ACLU Records, Box 1175, F9. Reid wrote that he based his information on an article in Sekai (August 1959) by one Senaga. The Senaga referred to was Kamejiro Senaga.

58Col. C. W. Nelson to Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army, 24 March 1955, on "Allegations of Japan Civil Liberties Union Against United States Administration of Okinawa." AGJ 014.1 EJ-D, RG 59 CDF 1955-, 3978 F5. When the education, welfare and labor committee of the legislature discussed three labor bills governing labor unions, standards and relations, General James Lewis, the civil administrator, sent its members a letter asking for deferral of action pending further study. The bills were forwarded to the plenary session, which passed two of the three bills and sent them to the chief executive for his signature. Asked by Lewis in a letter not to sign them, the chief executive used a pocket veto. Okinawa Times, ed., Okinawa no Shogen, Vol. 2, 85-93.
to Japan by Residents of the Ryukyu Islands,” and their subsequent amendments. The former ordinance defined “residents of the Ryukyus” as “Ryukyuans,” distinct from the Japanese, and required USCAR authorization for Okinawans hoping to visit Japan or returning from Japan, and for mainland Japanese nationals entering Okinawa. The latter required “residents of the Ryukyu Islands” to obtain a Japan Travel Document issued by the Government of the Ryukyus “by direction of the [U.S.] Deputy Governor” for authorization to travel to Japan or for re-entry into the Ryukyus.

Operational control over the immigration section of the Government of the Ryukyus, a part of its Legal Affairs Department, was retained by the high commissioner and administered by the USCAR public safety department “for military security reasons.” The Ryukyu Travel Unit (later Bureau) in Tokyo, a USCAR agency, processed applications for travel from mainland Japan to the Ryukyus. The memorandum blamed Japanese bureaucracy as “a major delaying factor” for whatever difficulty people in Japan had in obtaining visas to visit Okinawa.

Particularly controversial was a 1957 change in the regulations which required an applicant for travel authorization not only to provide a fingerprint but submit additional information when “deemed necessary” by the authority. Kamejiro Senaga, whom the U.S. administration labeled as a communist,59 was repeatedly denied travel outside Okinawa; Chobyo Yara, president of the Teachers’ Association and the Association for Okinawan Reversion, had his passport suspended in 1953 while his deputy, Shinei Kyan, had his application refused. A number of Okinawan students studying in mainland Japan came home temporarily, but never returned to their classes after USCAR refused to permit their re-exit. Many others lived in the shadow of a “Big Brother” interfering with their lives, kept their mouths shut, or risked their future and employment. Labor leaders, academics and civil rights activists in mainland Japan were also barred from Okinawa, ostensibly for security reasons.60

The USCAR memorandum acknowledged that “the long form” travel permit asked “more detailed questions on communist affiliations than normal U.S. or Japanese travel applications.” Then it justified the “USCAR position,” stating that the long form required “no more information than is customarily requested by most countries before issuance of an immigrant visa.” Baldwin might assume that the long form was “an attempt to trap perjurers rather than obtain necessary information for travel.” But, it continued, “merely because the short form is more favorable to Ryukyuan travelers [it] does not establish this form as a standard nor does it indicate any oppression as a result of use of the long form.”

Referring to a 1958 court decision that the U.S. Department of State could not deny passports on ideological grounds, overruling the Department’s 1950 revocation of the passport of Paul Robeson, an African-American actor, singer and pro-Soviet political activist, the memorandum said that the ruling was used as a complaint against the long form “despite the fact that no one who has filled out the long form has been denied a travel document.” In a way, it was true. When Chairman Kamejiro Senaga of the Okinawa Peoples Party, then mayor of Naha, applied for a visa to travel to Japan in 1957 to request Japanese government funding for the rehabilitation of Naha and the restoration of compulsory education, USCAR required him to complete the long form. Essentially an

59Senaga denied at the time that he was a communist, but in 1972, he was elected deputy chairman of the Japan Communist Party.
60Okinawa Jinken Kyokai (Okinawa Human Rights Association) “Jinken Kyokai 20-Nen no Ayumi to Tembo (roundtable discussion),” Jinken Yogo no Ayumi, No. 11 (20th Year Anniversary Issue), 1981, 1-20.
affidavit, it asked, among other things, whether the applicant had ever been a communist; if so, why; and whom he planned to see while in Japan. The applicant was then required to take an oath that he would have no objection to being arrested and jailed if any of his answers was found to be false. Senaga refused to complete the form and take the oath. As a result, he was to be denied a passport sixteen times altogether. He was finally allowed to visit Japan in 1967, two years after he filed a complaint with the Okinawa Human Rights Association, and the Okinawa Reversion Association decided to take legal action in a Tokyo court.

In 1960, the GRI Legislature passed a resolution calling for immediate recission of Ordinance 147, which it said ran contrary to the United Nations Charter and violated the Executive Order. Since Okinawans were treated in Japan as Japanese people under its constitution, the long form requirement for certain Okinawans was an infringement of their fundamental constitutional rights.

The memorandum added: “The recent Supreme Court decision upholding [the] State’s refusal to give newsman William Worthy a passport to Red China tends to downgrade this problem.” Worthy, a former correspondent in the Soviet Union for CBS News and the Baltimore Afro-American, was denied a new passport after slipping into China in 1956-57 in defiance of the U.S. government’s travel ban. Worthy was jailed after traveling to Cuba without a passport, but a federal appeals court ruled the travel restrictions unconstitutional in 1964.

The memorandum admitted that it was a “frequent complaint” that most Okinawans had to apply for a travel permit for each trip. This practice was often used to restrict travel by those whom USCAR regarded as undesirable, as in the case of the aforementioned university students who could not return to their campuses, and served to intimidate people with the slightest resentment against United States administration of their islands. The USCAR position, it said, was “that multiple entry permits are granted when the need therefor is shown, e.g., for businessmen.”

Another complaint was that “Okinawans traveling overseas on a USCAR travel document gained the protection of neither the U.S. nor Japanese consular services, and that the validity of the document is questioned in many countries.” The memorandum dismissed this complaint as “wrong.”

Third, the memorandum listed eight categories of Okinawan complaints about courts and the legal system: extensive jurisdiction of USCAR courts, disparity of sentences between Ryukyuan and USCAR courts, detention before trial, a dual legal system, the high commissioner’s power to transfer cases from Ryukyuan to USCAR courts, the absence of rights to counsel of choice and the right of appeal, and “automatic” conviction in USCAR courts. With regard to the first point, USCAR courts during most of the 1950s had jurisdiction over larceny, unauthorized possession and issuance of military base passes, dealing in stolen property, drunken or unlicensed driving, assault, prostitution, black-marketing, vehicle offenses, explosives and firearms, breaking and entering, interference with utilities, trespass on U.S. government installations, illegal entry and departure, and conspiracy. The memorandum asserted, however, that “the recent transfer of offenses to GRI

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62 CA Ordinance No. 147, “Control of Travel by Residents of the Ryukyu Islands,” 7 March 1960, provided for a “certificate of identity” to be issued by direction of the high commissioner in lieu of a passport for traveling to areas other than Japan.
jurisdiction has eliminated this complaint." Indeed, jurisdiction over all traffic offenses committed by Okinawans was relinquished and transferred to the Ryukyuan courts in 1957-58; jurisdiction over other minor offenses affecting "the property, security and interests of the United States," was also delegated to the Ryukyuan courts in September 1958. The jurisdiction of USCAR courts was now limited to forty specific offenses "deemed of particular importance" to the security, property, and interests of the United States. Larceny, assault, dealing in stolen property and breaking and entering could be considered such offenses, as well as possession of counterfeit currency, illegal possession of arms or explosives, unauthorized possession of military base passes, passport violations, trespass on U.S. government installations, espionage, and conspiracy.

The fourth area of concern related to restrictions of various labor rights. The memorandum acknowledged the existence of wage differentials on military bases. Indeed, Filipinos earned five times as much as Okinawans, Japanese eight times, and Americans twelve times. It argued, however, that these figures were not proof of racial discrimination; critics had simply failed to consider the "technical capabilities" of the Okinawan workers. It noted USCAR efforts to upgrade their skills and, hence, pay scales.

Furthermore, the memorandum acknowledged that Ordinance 116\(^{63}\) governing labor relations between U.S. government agencies, their civilian employees and contractors and members of the U.S. forces, and their Okinawan employees had been criticized for restricting various labor rights. The ordinance set out to declare a "Bill of Rights of Labor," guaranteeing every worker "the right to associate himself with other workers in labor organizations," "the right to select representatives of his choosing," and "the right to work" regardless of race, nationality, creed, or social status, etc. At the same time, however, it prohibited "Category 1" employees—those directly paid by U.S. government appropriated funds—from participating in any strike. No one "who engages in a strike against the U.S. government or who is a member of an organization of government employees that asserts the right to strike against the U.S. government, or who advocates, or is a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or violence" would be hired as a Category 1 employee. Anyone willfully violating these provisions would be subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment, or discharged immediately for joining a strike, although an affidavit could be used to absolve the person of any such offenses. Likewise, strikes were made illegal in the case of employees in such "essential industry or activity" as a public utility, transportation and communications, with violations punishable by fine or imprisonment.

Every officer of a labor organization whose members work for the military was expected to sign and submit an affidavit that "he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member nor supports any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods."\(^{64}\) The labor organization was also prohibited from making any political contributions.

In addition, Ordinance 145 ("Approval of Labor Organizations")\(^{65}\) provided that "no organization or individual shall be recognized as a labor or trade union . . . unless it is determined by the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands that such representation will not adversely affect" the security of the U.S. forces in the Ryukyu Islands. USCAR


\(^{64}\)The U.S. Constitution, of course, did not apply to the Okinawan people.

\(^{65}\)The ordinance was promulgated on 18 March 1955.
would approve or disapprove of the applicant labor organization on the basis of its leadership and activities; it would also determine whether officials elected or appointed in the newly authorized organization were acceptable. The organization would lose all its rights and privileges if USCAR found an elected or appointed representative unacceptable and the organization did not immediately remove him from his leadership position.

The USCAR memorandum justified restrictions on military employees' labor rights on grounds of "military necessity, e.g., a strike against the government could not be tolerated." It acknowledged that Ordinance 116 required anti-communist statements and other similar documents from union leaders and that it did not recognize collective bargaining and the right to strike for Okinawan workers in military installations. "[T]he lack of these rights plus an alleged fear of discrimination against union organizers," it stated, "are cited as an effective barrier" to the on-base workers organizing unions.

The memorandum then referred to the recent dismissal of an Okinawan employee by the U.S. Air Force on the ground that he was a member of the Okinawa People's Party "whose aims were inimical to the interests of the U.S." It noted that other political parties regarded the action as "a potential threat to all political parties," pointing out that the OPP was a "recognized political party registered with USCAR, and with legally elected representation in the legislature." It also recognized a frequent criticism that regulations such as Ordinance 145 abused "security" as a guise for USCAR intervention while "the organization of Okinawan labor in the private sector has no connection with the security of military bases."

The fifth area involved Ordinance 23 ("Penal Code of the Ryukyu Islands") and pre-treaty claims. This highly controversial ordinance made "any person" punishable "by death or such other punishment as a Civil Administration court may order" if he or she:

1. "bears arms" against the United States or its armed forces;
2. "willfully and unlawfully kills, or ... in the course of committing a felony causes the death of, any U.S. forces personnel or security guard employed by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof;"
3. "commits an act or acts of espionage, sabotage, or sedition in the employ or in the interest of any foreign country, nation, or government, or any agent, agency or representative thereof;" or
4. "rapes, or assaults with intent to rape, any female U.S. forces personnel."

Other "offenses against public safety" also carried heavy punishments. Any person:

1. who has unforced sexual intercourse with any female U.S. forces personnel under the age of sixteen, other than his wife: a $5,000 fine or ten-year imprisonment at the maximum;
2. who "assaults any U.S. forces personnel, and any person who assaults, resists, op-

66 A person was defined as "any [Okinawan] individual, partnership, corporation, unincorporated firm or association and/or responsible official or member thereof." Americans were subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the USCAR Penal Code. Only in November 1960 was the ordinance revised to broaden the term to include U.S. forces personnel.
67 They included members of the U.S. forces, American civilians employed by the U.S. government or any of its agencies, American contractors with the U.S. government, non-Ryukyuan (and non-Japanese) employees of the American Red Cross, dependents of the above, non-Ryukyuan (and non-Japanese) contractors with the U.S. government, and non-Ryukyuan (and non-Japanese) representatives of foreign governments.
68 Per capita income in 1960 was $202.
poses, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any security guard employed by the U.S. with a dangerous weapon: $2,500 or ten years in prison;

3. who "by spoken words makes a public statement," or who "publishes, circulates, broadcasts . . . any printed, written, filmed, recorded, taped or such matter," which is [opposed to the] Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands: $1,250 or five years in prison;

4. who makes a public statement or disseminates any matter which is "designed and/or intended to foment public unrest, disorder and/or hostility directed toward the United States, or its Civil Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands": $500 or two years in prison;

5. who "enters into or departs from . . . the Ryukyu Islands without a [written] permit," any person who "violates any of the conditions placed upon an entry or departure permit by direction of the high commissioner," or any person who "knowingly gives false information" to acquire or maintain such a permit: $500 or two years in prison;

6. who flies or displays any flag other than that of the United States from "government buildings or premises," or at "public gatherings or processions of an official or political nature" without the specific approval of the high commissioner: $125 or six months in prison;

7. who "breaks and enters into a dwelling house of U.S. forces personnel in the night time with intent to commit a felony": $2,500 or ten years in prison;

8. who, as a member of "a company, association, group, party, club, union, or like organization" not registered as a political party, "engages in political activity" in the name of or on behalf of the organization: $500 or two years in prison;

9. who as a member of any of the above organizations, makes or intends to make false statements that might be construed to be "derogatory to or contemptuous of the United States or its Civil Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands": $500 or two years in prison;

10. who might "possess, or operate any radio, television, or wire broadcast (group broadcasting) transmitting apparatus without a valid license": $1,250 or three years in prison.

11. who "publishes or prints any newspaper, magazine, book, pamphlet, or circular" without prior registration: $250 or one year in prison;

12. who "imports . . . any printed, written, filmed, recorded, taped" materials derogatory to or contemptuous of the United States or its agents: $250 or one year in prison;

13. who "photographs, draws, sketches, maps or plots any land or sea area, object or scene which is wholly or partially within any restricted United States government installation or area" without authorization and anybody who possesses them: $500 or two years in prison.

14. who "engages in unnatural carnal copulation with a member of the U.S. forces personnel of the same or opposite sex": $1,250 or five years in prison.

The ordinance also provided for somewhat puritanical action against "offenses against morals." Prostitution with U.S. forces personnel, for example, would be subject to $250 or one year in prison. The same penalty would be imposed on anyone acting as a pimp or a panderer between a prostitute and U.S. forces personnel, maintaining a house of prostitution serving them, or preparing or participating in "any lewd, obscene, indecent, or immoral show" intended for U.S. servicemen. Those who knowingly "persuade, induce, entice, or procure any girl under the age of eighteen years, with or without her consent, to engage in prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral practice" would be fined $2,500 or less or imprisoned for a maximum of ten years.

"Offenses against economic and financial policy," which included those relating to

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69There was no law prohibiting prostitution between Okinawans.
currency, custody of property, commercial transactions, and fraudulent tax returns, failure to file an income or corporate tax return punishable by a $500 or two years in prison at the maximum.

The ordinance was criticized in mainland Japan by major newspapers, various civic organizations, and the opposition parties. In their letter of protest to President Eisenhower and USCAR, leaders of the Japan Committee for Peace said that the penal law, regarding Japan as a foreign country, is “designed to suppress the Okinawan voice for reversion and make the Japanese people’s demand for full independence of the country punishable by death.” The Association of Okinawans in Tokyo sent a similar letter protesting that “espionage,” “sabotage” and obstruction of public security were so ambiguously defined that they could be interpreted broadly, and that the reversion movement could possibly be suppressed as a consequence. In his article in Sekai magazine, Kamijiro Senaga wrote that capital punishment might be imposed on anyone who urged Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, since anyone who “agitat[ed] for the benefit of a foreign country” might be punished by death and a foreign country was defined as any country other than the United States or the Ryukyus.

Civic organizations such as the Okinawa Teachers’ Association and the Council of Government Employees’ Unions protested that the ordinance violated Executive Order 10713, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Charter. Section 12 of the Executive Order required the high commissioner to “preserve [to the Ryukyuans] basic liberties . . . including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion and press.” Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone “the right to life, liberty and security of person,” while Article 1 of the U.N. Charter requires member states to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

In a petition for rescission or change, addressed to the high commissioner, USCAR and the GRI Legislature, they questioned the definition and scope of words like “hostile activities,” “assaults with intent to rape,” “espionage,” “unlawful assembly,” and “slander.” They asked why Okinawans—who were outside the protection of the U.S. constitution—should be subject to the death penalty for espionage, why simple participation in demonstrations was to be punished so harshly, why the Japanese flag should be banned from public buildings, and why the original text of the code was issued in English. They asserted that adjudication of offenses against Okinawans should be transferred from USCAR to GRI courts.

In essence, they complained that the ordinance retained many characteristics of Proclamation No. 2 (“War Crimes”) issued by Admiral Nimitz in 1945, in an attempt to protect American interests arbitrarily in peacetime at the cost of the civil and political rights of the Okinawans. The proclamation made provision for dealing with offenses subject to punishment by the military government.

Any individual enemy who “bears arms” against the U.S. forces, “kills or assaults with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm” on any member of those forces, “rapes or assaults with intent to rape” any nurse or other woman serving the forces, “serves the enemy as a spy or harbors or aids the enemy,” “has in his possession” any unauthorized weapons, ammunition, or explosives, or “incites” any Okinawan “to insurrection against military authority” would be liable to a maximum penalty of death. Any person who “assaults” any American serviceperson, “displays” the Japanese flag, who “publishes or circulates” any printed or written matter “hostile, detrimental or disrespectful” toward the

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military government, who "utters" any speech or word of that nature, or who "participates" in any authorized public demonstration would be punished by fine or imprisonment or both. These provisions were carried over to Military Government Ordinance No. 1 ("Codified Penal Law and Procedure of the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands") of July 1949, the original penal law promulgated before the Japanese peace treaty went into effect, CA Ordinance No. 144 ruled, and then Ordinance No. 23.

Like its predecessors, Ordinance No. 23 contained no provisions on offenses by U.S. forces personnel—members of the U.S. forces in the Ryukyus, civilian employees of the U.S. government, or contractors of the U.S. government; the Government of the Ryukyus could claim no criminal jurisdiction over them. By contrast, courts in mainland Japan had, under the status of forces agreement which had been in effect since 1953, jurisdiction over American military personnel accused of crimes committed while off duty, although the Japanese government voluntarily relinquished jurisdiction in most instances.

The Government of the Ryukyus police, the USCAR memorandum stated, "had authority to arrest American offenders." As it acknowledged, however, the Okinawan police could arrest servicemen in 1959 only "if they [were] caught in the act." The police had no authority to question suspects and they had to turn them over to the military police immediately. Since military installations were strictly beyond the jurisdiction of the Ryukyuan government, local police had no power to pursue investigations involving U.S. forces personnel.

The USCAR memorandum noted that Okinawans frequently complained that "U.S. service personnel involved in acts of violence against [the] civilian population are shipped off the island rather than punished by court martial." This feeling had been reinforced, the memorandum observed, by "the practice of not announcing court-martial sentences." From this people could surmise the USCAR courts were giving "extremely light sentences for serious crimes."

The memorandum claimed that the Government of the Ryukyus, "at its request [was] presently periodically advised of the results of courts-martial." Besides, it added, "frequently, military sentences are more severe than those in GRI courts for similar offenses." Few Okinawans, however, had cause to believe this. In February 1963, a military truck carrying Marines ran over and killed a junior high school student crossing Highway No. 1 at a designated crosswalk showing a green signal allowing pedestrians to cross. The driver was charged with homicide, but a special court martial—made up of five jurors, two prosecutors and two counsel, all from the same battalion as the driver—found him innocent on the grounds that he could not recognize the red traffic signal due to the reflection of sunlight off the wall of a building. The accident, they concluded, was therefore beyond his control. There was no building in the area which could have created such a distraction, and eyewitnesses had testified that other vehicles had stopped for the red light. The Marine finished his term of service in Okinawa soon after and returned to the United States in spite of a demand by various Okinawan groups for a retrial. U.S. forces paid $3,333 to the bereaved family as a token of condolence.

The observation in the USCAR memorandum that "[personal] assaults by Americans are now an infrequent occurrence and are severely punished" also ran contrary to the general Okinawan perception. Criminal acts by military personnel against Okinawans did occur more or less constantly. The Government of the Ryukyus listed 315 Okinawans killed, 145 of them in traffic accidents, and 760 others injured by members of the forces
IV: Façade or Showcase of Democracy?

or their dependents prior to April 28, 1952.\textsuperscript{71} GRI statistics also showed that 115 women had been raped, four of them later murdered, by Americans during this period. It is believed that many more women were raped in the 1940s and 1950s,\textsuperscript{72} but most of them failed to report the incidents out of shame (as is often the case even in the U.S.), well-founded that the criminal would not be appropriately punished or for other reasons. USCAR reported 695 "known offenses against Ryukyuans by members of the U.S. forces" between October 1958 and September 1959, including four rapes, two attempted rapes, twenty-four robberies, eighty-nine assaults and eighty-four aggravated assaults, and 199 cases of vandalism.\textsuperscript{73}

In virtually all of these cases, no token money,\textsuperscript{74} much less compensation, was paid. Moreover, since Okinawan courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over offenses by American military personnel, the victims or their bereaved next of kin often had no way of knowing how or even whether justice was done. Many doubted that courts-martial acted in the spirit of Ordinance 23 or Ordinance 144 ("Code of Penal Law and Procedure") in judging offenses by "fellow members" of the U.S. forces. The sergeant who raped and killed a six-year-old girl in 1955 was convicted of first-degree murder at a court-martial and deported to the United States. Okinawans later learned in the newspaper that he was condemned to death but the sentence was later commuted to forty-five years in prison with hard labor. A serviceman charged with strangling a twenty-three-year-old bar hostess in 1959 was sentenced to only three years in prison. In 1960, a fifty-five-year-old woman collecting expended brass shell casing on a firing range was shot dead by a serviceman from less than twenty yards, allegedly because he had mistaken her for a wild boar. Yet another serviceman shot and killed a seventy-three-year-old man at close range, allegedly mistaking him for a bird.\textsuperscript{75}

The USCAR memorandum acknowledged that "the potential threat [to] freedom of speech in the articles on libel and slander, and specifically the article on sedition, the seeming separation of Okinawans from other Japanese nationals, the array of death penalties, the seeming absence of penalties for American wrongdoers, and the feeling that most offenses in the penal code should be covered by GRI law" had caused objections to the ordinance. These, it said, "add up to the possibility that a detailed explanation of penal


\textsuperscript{73}USCAR, \textit{Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, VII: II} (1 October 1958 to 30 September 1959), 142.

\textsuperscript{74}It is important in Japan to express one's sympathy or condolence regardless of whether legal culpability could be proved.

\textsuperscript{75}When Army Specialist 3/C William S. Girard shot dead a Japanese woman collecting brass scrap on an American firing range near Mt. Fuji in 1957, it caused such an uproar in Japan and such a controversy in the United States that it developed into a major diplomatic issue and even "spurred Eisenhower to reexamine the security pact with Japan." (Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 128). Girard was tried in a Japanese court which gave him a three-year suspended sentence on the charge of "causing bodily injury resulting in death," and expelled him from Japan. The U.S. Army subsequently discharged him.
code provisions may have to be provided” to Baldwin.

Confronted with protests from opposition parties and civic organizations both in mainland Japan and Okinawa and the Government of the Ryukyus, USCAR put off the effective date of the ordinance from June 5 to August 15, and then to “a date to be subsequently announced by the Civil Administrator.” It was never implemented. In the meantime, CA Ordinance No. 144 of March 1955 and subsequent amendments to it (the ordinance was amended twenty-five times), remained in force, complete with provisions on “offenses against safety” “offenses against economic and financial policy,” and “offenses against morals.”

“Pre-treaty claims” referred to demands for compensation for land used by the U.S. forces prior to April 28, 1952, when the peace treaty with Japan went into effect. Article 19 of the treaty absolved the United States of any obligation to grant compensation for occupied lands or for damage done to property during occupation. Neither would the Japanese Government accept responsibility for those payments. General MacArthur ordered Major General Robert B. McClure, his deputy in the Ryukyus, to pay rent for private property used by U.S. forces before July 1950 and to acquire a twenty-year lease on land already occupied. The landowners refused the deal. The United States did in fact pay the landowners through the Chief Executive of the Ryukyuan government. The rentals for the period from July 1, 1950, to April 28, 1952, amounted to a little over $1,000,000 for some 40,000 acres. The Ryukyuan Land Federation retained Noel Hemmendinger, a Washington attorney, who pressed the Departments of State and Defense for early settlement of the claims.

In 1959, the issue concerned, in the words of the above memorandum, “rental prior to 1950, restoration rights on land used prior to the peace treaty, and torts.” The memorandum noted that “reference to Article 19 of the peace treaty” would not satisfy Baldwin, “especially in the case of land restoration and tort claims.” It added: “this issue poses many political questions which are being actively considered” by USCAR and the high commissioner.

Actually, pre-treaty claims were not limited to property. They also involved compensation for Okinawans killed or injured prior to April 28, 1952, in accidents or crimes. When bombs exploded on Ie in August 1948 while being loaded onto a military transport ship, killing 106 Okinawans in the immediate area, injuring seventy-six others, destroying or damaging fifteen private houses, four public buildings, one vessel and three wooden fishing boats, the U.S. forces paid 7,000 B-yen (roughly $58) for the death of each of the eleven Okinawan laborers employed by the military unit stationed on the island, but none for the other casualties. In 1947, an American military guard shot and killed the wrong man during a robbery, but no compensation was paid. In 1951, a fighter plane dropped a gasoline tank on the doorstep of a house in Naha, burning it down and killing six people. Military authorities expressed condolences, but again failed to offer compensation.

Coastal fisheries also suffered severe damage before the peace treaty, caused by bombing, shooting, landing and other military exercises. Restrictions or prohibitions on fishing operations and devastation of resources drove many fishermen into hardship, but they received no compensation.

Sixth in the USCAR memorandum came education. As the USCAR memorandum pointed out, “the passage [in 1958] of the basic educational law which included the phrase ‘education as Japanese nationals’ has served to dispel most objections in the field.” From the Okinawan perspective, it had taken years of frustrated efforts for them to obtain an educational law of their own.
The field of education, predictably, carried political overtones from the outset in postwar Okinawa. Teachers began to organize themselves in 1946 and established, under the auspices of the U.S. civil administration, an island-wide Okinawa Association for Education in 1947 for the promotion of education, the improvement of their living conditions, and the cultivation of mutual aid and friendship. Some union members became politically active, as well, being elected as mayors and municipal councillors. Chobyo Yara, appointed the first director of the Department of Education in the Okinawa gunto government in 1950, called a meeting of the principals of elementary, junior and senior high schools and expressed a determination to enact laws and regulations on education.

The meeting adopted a petition calling on the United States Ambassador in Japan, the Speaker of Japan’s House of Representatives, the President of its House of Councilors, and the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs to align educational administration in Okinawa with that in mainland Japan and place it under the Japanese Ministry of Education. Under Yara’s directorship, the government laid down three sets of provisional educational regulations or guidelines.

Significantly, after having heard a report on a spectacular recovery in the mainland in the field of education, the third meeting of the principals adopted in January 1952 a resolution calling for Okinawa’s reversion movement to campaign for incorporation of the islands’ schools into Japan’s education system. Yara emphasized in his speech the belief that education in Okinawa needed to be aligned closely with that of Japan “which held residual sovereignty over us and to whose administration we would eventually return.” Okinawan children must be educated as Japanese citizens, he said.

Ordinance No. 66 (on education), issued in February 1952, inspired the opposition of education directors of the four gunto governments to several provisions such as those on an appointive central education board and education taxes. Above all, the ordinance lacked any constitutional support and any reference to “nation” or “nationality.”

When the Okinawa Association for Education changed its name to the Okinawa Teachers’ Association (OTA) in April 1952, Yara was elected as its president. At its first general rally in May, the association declared that it would seek, among other objectives, administrative reversion to Japan. Yara—and the association—would henceforth act as the main pillar of the fukki movement. The association was instrumental in establishing the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa to the Fatherland in 1953 (with Yara as its first president), held a fund-raising campaign across mainland Japan for reconstruction of school buildings and a campaign to spread display of the Japanese flag to individual homes and schools so as “to promote the education of children as Japanese nationals.”

These campaigns, inevitably carrying political implications, did not please the U.S. administrators. E. Earl Diffenderfer, USCAR Director of Civil Information and Education, warned at a Central Board of Education meeting in January 1954 that “the mission of educators is to teach children and not to engage in politics. I hope there will be no need for the issuance of further ordinances for this control.” In February, General Bromley told Yara that “there is no place for the teacher in reversion activities or in active politics. The
teacher is hired to teach the children of the people, not to create confusion in the minds of
the young, or to pit himself against the population and the established government." He
was also critical of the OTA’s involvement in the USCAR school reconstruction pro­
gram. In response to a letter from Yara expressing appreciation for the additional funding
to the program, Bromley described the objectives of the program and stated that “they
were formulated without consultation with your association” and that they would be pur­
sued “with or without” its cooperation. In the same year, as mentioned earlier, USCAR
cancelled a passport already issued to Yara who had applied to visit mainland Japan to
accept donations for school reconstruction.

When the OTA, with a membership of about 4,000, tried to transform itself into a
teachers’ union in the wake of the GRI’s enactment of three labor laws establishing basic
worker rights for the first time in postwar Okinawa, Deputy Governor Ogden’s attacks on
the association’s reversion campaign and other political activities were so “vehement” that Yara resigned from the post of OTA president in order to “save” the organization. He
also stepped down as the president of the reversion council. Several weeks later, the OTA
general meeting unanimously re-elected Yara.

In 1956, the GRI legislature adopted the fundamental provisions of the Education Bill
and three related educational bills, which were based on the principle of “education of
Okinawans as Japanese nationals.” Chief Executive Higa, however, vetoed all these bills
ostensibly on the grounds that the proposed board of education as an agency independent
of the Government of the Ryukyus would constitute a fourth branch of government and
thus violated Ordinance No. 68 (“Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyus”) which
had provided for three branches. The real reason, it was generally believed, lay in US­
CAR’s refusal to approve the words “education as Japanese nationals” in the bills. The
bills were resubmitted more or less in their original form several months later after a gen­
eral election, but were again vetoed under instructions from USCAR.®

The USCAR memorandum noted that questions were being asked regarding how the
education of school children interfered with the security of the military base. It was the
USCAR’s policy, it stated, to “avoid political issues in this field and . . . continue the
improvement of an educational system of which everyone can be proud. Japanese
administration of the schools would be a long step toward reversion and would result in
serious political complications which might jeopardize the U.S. military mission.”

In an effort to ensure this agenda was followed, USCAR issued in 1957 its own Edu­
cation Code (Ordinance No. 165). It upheld the principles of the basic equality of “all human[s] . . . before the law” and parents’ “grave responsibilities . . . to raise, nurture,
guide and educate” children properly, children’s “correlative duties of respect and obedi­
ence,” and “the dignity of honest labor.” The ordinance then prohibited any political ac­
tivity by teachers, principals and superintendents “in behalf of any party or political can­
didate,” and introduced one-year hiring contracts for teachers until they achieved tenured
status. It required teachers to sign new employment contacts after the effective date of the
ordinance and limited the sizes of classes to a maximum of forty children at the element­
ary level and thirty-five students at the senior high school level.

The ordinance immediately met opposition from the OTA. The one-year contracts, it
said, placed tremendous psychological pressure on teachers, and the number of available
qualified teachers and classrooms would not allow for reduction of class sizes. There

78 Bromley to Yara, 24 February 1954.
80 Yara, 142.
should be references to “[good] citizenship,” “constitutional protection of educational rights” and “education as [Japanese] nationals.” The goals of education should be to develop “students interested in world affairs and languages,” “adults fully competent to understand and participate in the processes of government,” and “qualities necessary for the individual to become a participating member of society,” instead of bringing up people subservient to the authorities.

Although the Director of Education warned that the prohibition of political activity would apply to a public rally against Ordinance No. 165, the OTA proceeded to hold a meeting calling for the director’s resignation, abolition of the ordinance and enactment of a GRI educational law.

It was against this backdrop that the GRI Legislature reconsidered the four educational bills in 1957 and passed them for a third time. This time, High Commissioner Moore acquiesced and the new chief executive, Jugo Thoma, signed them. The Fundamentals of Education Act declared: “As Japanese nationals and based on the universal principle of mankind, we must build a democratic and cultured nation and society, and contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of mankind.” Three months later, USCAR rescinded the controversial education code.

In addition, the USCAR memorandum conceded, there were “complaints [against] the system of university approval of faculty publications and of the agenda of student meetings” at the University of the Ryukyus, “security clearance for textbooks” and “an education system inferior to what [Okinawans] would have under Japanese administration.”

Another popular complaint, the memorandum said, was that it was “difficult for an Okinawan to proceed against an American in a personal grievance case. Because of these difficulties, few court cases have been submitted and even fewer disposed of.” The memorandum argued, however, that “GRI courts are available for civil suits against Americans. Claimants have been so advised. In addition, claims arising out of military activities are now handled promptly and fairly” as exemplified, it said, by how the claims resulting from “the Ishikawa disaster” had been processed.

Once again, the USCAR argument rang hollow with most Okinawans. The fact remained that the Okinawan court system—consisting of the magistrate courts, the circuit courts and the court of appeals—had been established by CA Proclamation No. 12, and their civil and criminal jurisdiction was subject to high commissioner ordinances. The judges of the court of appeals or the highest Ryukyuan court were appointed by the high commissioner “to serve at his pleasure,” and the judges of the other courts by the U.S.-appointed Ryukyuan chief executive “with prior approval of the high commissioner.”

Furthermore, as mentioned elsewhere, the USCAR Appellate court could review “any case, civil or criminal” decided by the court of appeals. When the high commissioner determined that a case or controversy had “particular importance affecting the security, property or interests of the United States,” he could order such a case to be transferred from a Ryukyuan to a USCAR court “at any time in the proceedings.” If the high commissioner decided that a case involving a member of the U.S. forces, an American em-

81. The ruling party regarded the political activities of the teachers to be so menacing, however, that in 1963-64 it tried in vain to restrict them through legislation. This last attempt was again thwarted in 1966-67 after bitter opposition by the Teachers’ Association left the legislature paralyzed for three months.
82. CA Proclamation No. 12, “Ryukyuan Court System,” proclaimed 2 January 1952.
ployee of the U.S. government or a dependent of either of them had an important “direct or indirect” impact on the “security of the islands, on the foreign relations or the security, property or interests of the United States or [its] nationals,” he could also transfer such a case to a USCAR court. Under these circumstances, many Okinawans chose to abandon cases involving personal grievances against Americans.

Victims of rapes and other crimes, wives or common-law wives and children deserted by U.S. servicemen, workers dismissed by the U.S. forces or their contractors often had to swallow insults and injuries, leading them to believe that they had no possibility to gain redress. It was not known how many “Amerasians” had been born to men in military service and Okinawan women in or out of wedlock. Frequently, the men returned to the United States without their legal or common-law wives and their babies, leaving the children not only fatherless and subject to various prejudices but also stateless.

“The Ishikawa jet crash disaster,” cited in the memorandum as a good example of fair and prompt handling of claims, occurred on June 30, 1959, when a jet fighter crashed into Miyamori Elementary School in central Okinawa shortly after takeoff from Kadena Air Base, killing seventeen persons (eleven of them school children), injuring 210 (156 of them school children) and causing extensive property damage in and near the school. The pilot ejected to safety.

The U.S. forces promised early and satisfactory compensation, but an initial proposal so disappointed the aggrieved victims and bereaved families that many of them appealed to the wider community for help. Twenty organizations, including the Teachers’ Association, the Council of Government Employees’ Unions, the Federation of Women’s Associations and the Association of Mayors formed a joint council to support and promote the demand for full compensation. A meeting of representatives of the U.S. Civil Administration, the GRI Legislature, the GRI executive branch, and the victims and the bereaved failed to make any progress. In February 1960, the frustrated Legislature passed two resolutions, one calling on USCAR to settle the claims expeditiously and another asking the Japanese government to press the United States for an early settlement.

On May 15, 1960, roughly a year after the crash, the U.S. Air Force Claims Commission delivered the formal awards: $2,525 flat for the death of each school child. Although USCAR emphasized “the fairness of the procedures” and the “generosity of the payments,” the amounts were again considered far from satisfactory. Further campaigns and appeals forced the claims commission to add $2,000 to each award and death claims were finally settled in June. Claims for serious injuries were settled a few days later: the victims were awarded $2,322 to $5,915 per person. Air Force representatives announced that the amounts were in accordance with the wishes of the Secretary of the Air Force that the awards be just and generous, and that the United States would provide medical treatment to the injured, including plastic surgery. Two injured children received plastic surgery in Japan, with the expenses reimbursed from donations by Okinawans. Settlement of claims for minor injuries had to wait until a year later.

Before he left Okinawa, Baldwin told the press that he “sympathize[d] with the universal desire of Okinawans for return to their motherland” and urged U.S. forces, while in control of Okinawa, to “extend greater liberties” to the Okinawans and to “conform to the laws and practices of a Japanese prefecture.” He continued:

The major problem in Okinawa is to reconcile democratic liberties with the needs of se-

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84 CA Proclamation No. 9, “United States Civil Administration Civil Court: Establishment,” 21 July 1958.
curity as interpreted by the military. A long experience shows that the military tend to in­
terpret security broadly and liberty narrowly. But it is significant that in Okinawa, despite
stringent laws, not a single case has arisen of espionage, sabotage, sedition, libel or slander
of the authorities.

Despite the absence of prosecution under the security provisions, many measures have
been taken to restrict what are regarded as communist activities and associations. So far as
they are related to connections with the international communist movement directed from
the Soviet Union, they may affect security in cold war terms. But the tendency is to expand
the concept, and it apparently includes all members of the People’s Party which has five
representatives in the legislature. They are subject to restrictions in employment, licenses
for publication and travel. The party is legal, and whatever may be the political attach­
ments of some of its leaders, surely they are not shared by all its members. Guilt by associa­
tion is not an American doctrine. The Army, so unfairly attacked on just that ground by the late
Senator McCarthy, should know that. The present restrictions should be liberalized. 85

Nevertheless, Baldwin said he “urged the Okinawans to turn their attention to practical
issues, to expand their civil rights, rather than to insist upon an impossible change of
status. I repeated that to the Okinawans in Japan and to my Japanese friends.”

Two and a half months later, Baldwin sent a four-page memorandum to the Depart­
ment of Defense, suggesting several changes in the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus.
These included:

1. Democratic government: Steps should be taken to realize public election of the chief
executive. Judges, now appointed by the high commissioner with some consultation
with local officials, should be appointed by the chief executive upon approval by the
legislature. It would be “preferable” to appoint a civil administrator who is a civilian
and speaks Japanese and “desirable” to appoint a civilian aide to the high commis­
sioner or have closer liaison between the State Department and the high commis­
ioner.

2. Law: The pre-1945 Japanese law in effect in the Ryukyus should be replaced by more
democratic postwar Japanese law as “this would enable the Ryukyuan courts to con­
sider much more enlightened provisions, and also more effectively prepare the Ryu­
kyus for later integration as a prefecture.” All offenses “not involving security”
should be transferred from the USCAR courts to the Ryukyuan courts. Americans
and Okinawans should be treated equally for offenses and penalties in ordinary
criminal cases. In view of the lack of a clear system of appeals from civil courts be­
yond the high commissioner, a civilian advisory review board within the Department
of Defense, with the right “to review any appeal from an act of the high commis­
sioner or from any final judgment of either the GRI or USCAR courts,” should be
considered. Provisions in the penal code affecting sedition, libel, slander of the U.S.
forces “go beyond anything in American law” and, thus, “should be all removed in
favor of the concept of ‘clear and present danger.’” The Japanese flag “should be
freely exhibited in private places, indoors or outdoors.” The designation “Ryu­
kyuans” should be changed to “Japanese nationals (Ryukyuan).”

3. The right to travel: “Communist and other propaganda agents hostile to American in­
terests in the base must be excluded along with their agents” but, otherwise, all con­
tacts between Japan and the Ryukyus “which do not affect security” should be en­
couraged.

4. Civil liberties: Penal code provisions violate the principle of freedom of speech, press

85 See ACLU press release, 25 August 1959. ACLU Records, Box 1175, F5. Also see Baldwin to
Booth, 21 August 1959, ACLU Records, Box 1175, F9, and Baldwin to Civil Affairs Division,
Department of Defense, 23 September 1959, Baldwin Papers, Box 10, F18.
and association guaranteed by the Executive Order. While membership of the People’s Party, a legal political organization, now disqualifies members for employment on U.S. bases and for travel documents, they “should be treated on a personal basis, not by association.” The licensing system for associations, publications and public meetings should be abolished.86

Predictably, the paper received harsh criticism from the Office of the High Commissioner. “To a great degree,” Colonel Eugene A. Salet, executive officer, wrote in a lengthy memorandum prepared for the Department of the Army Office of Civil Affairs, it “accepted almost without question a considerable portion of the statements and allegations made by those who would have the union [ACLU] take a lead in condemning the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands.”87 At the same time, however, he conceded that the report contained some valid points.

Salet acknowledged, for example, that a chief executive appointed by the high commissioner “cannot be said to fully represent the inhabitants,” but rejected popular election of the chief executive. “Subjected as they are to the continuous bombardment of communist distortions and propaganda from internal as well as external sources, Radio Moscow and Radio Peiping [sic],” Salet stated, “the possibility exists that an intensified campaign might result in an election victory for a pro-communist sympathizer or even a party member as chief executive.” One might argue that this was unfounded alarmism in view of the fact that the pro-U.S. Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party had won the 1960 general election by 22 to 7 and it would continue to win majorities in 1962, 1965, 1966 and 1968. Salet conceded that this subversion was not likely to happen immediately, but added that there would be such a future possibility “so long as free elections are conducted.” Besides, he warned, a politician running in a public election would inevitably make reversion a major plank in his platform and make it a political issue of “unmanageable proportions” in both the Ryukyus and mainland Japan.

The ACLU contention that a civilian instead of a military civil administrator “would carry more weight, and a weight more appropriate to his function” was brushed aside as “a matter of individual judgment.” To Salet, it was the “personality and ability” of the particular person that was “considerably” more important than whether or not he was in the service. “Any change in the status of the civil administrator from military to civilian must inevitably result in a local interpretation that the change is made in preparation for the immediate return of administration to Japan,” he warned. “Such an understanding may also result in far greater difficulty in long-range planning and implementation of proper administrative processes than is presently the case.” Moreover, argued Salet, 92 percent of the civil administration staff already consisted of civilians.

On the most contentious issues of “offenses against safety,” Salet justified the Penal Code provisions of the U.S. mission in Okinawa:

It is not believed that present provisions of the USCAR Penal Code concerning speech, press and assembly violate the express provisions of Section 12 of the Executive Order but

87”Comments on Memorandum on Democracy and Civil Rights in Okinawa,” 22 January 1960, HCRI-LO 1-10060.
IV: Façade or Showcase of Democracy?

It is submitted that these offenses must be read in the light of the latter provision which constitutes the criteria for their enforcement. The subject provisions of the code are not and never were intended to deny the basic democratic liberties but rather to provide a means of punishing and deterring abuses which are of such gravity as to seriously hamper or undermine the U.S. capability for accomplishment of objectives.

It is asserted that the provisions contained in the code respecting sedition, libel and slander go far beyond anything in the American law and that they should all be removed in favor of the concept of “clear and present danger.” In this regard, it should be borne in mind that it is basically fallacious to apply U.S. standards of peace-time legislation to the USCAR Penal Code in the Ryukyus since the prevailing conditions, objectives and historical background of the two are in no sense comparable.

The Salet memorandum denied that the code demanded of Okinawans “loyalty to the U.S.” or treated Japan as “a foreign country.” Such “misconceptions,” it claimed, “have without notable exception been advanced for ulterior purposes by dissident elements seeking to distort fact for political ends. . . . No misconception with respect to such matters exists among the literate, non-Communist elements of the local citizenry and . . . such misconceptions as may exist among the illiterates have been deliberately instilled by intentionally distorted propaganda emanating from hostile sources.”

At the same time, it acknowledged that “flying foreign flags including the Japanese flag” is prohibited, justifying it as a “political rather than a legal question.” The name “Ryukyuan,” it added, is “purely one of convenience adopted for the purpose of distinguishing authorized residents of the Ryukyus from those of Japan proper.” The memorandum blamed “a variety of anti-U.S. and communist elements and sympathizers both in the Ryukyus and Japan”—who called for free travel between the two “since neither area is foreign to the other”—for “much unwarranted irresponsible criticism.” But it conceded that travel restrictions between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan did exist: “a small percentage of the applicants have been denied travel or have themselves imposed a ban on travel by refusal to fill out required application forms in order to secure travel documentation.”

As noted already, the regulations had placed a number of applicants in a no-win situation. Some refused to complete the long form out of principle. Others knew that, since they were persona non-grata to the U.S. authorities because of their past activities, the authorities could hold them up so long as to force them to cancel their travel plans if they had filled out the form truthfully, or they might risk a heavy penalty if found to have lied in order to obtain the permit. The United States, the memorandum said, should not be “in a position to force reluctant individuals into completing forms for travel documentation if they do not desire to act voluntarily while at the same time complaining of travel restrictions to the Union.” But the fact that the U.S. authorities refused a permit to the likes of Chobyo Yara demonstrated the invalidity of USCAR’s arguments.

The memorandum confirmed that 225 applications for entry into the Ryukyus from mainland Japan were rejected in 1957, the year when it said “a large number of anti-U.S. and pro-Communist sympathizers sought to strengthen the Senaga regime in Naha City.” It also had a ready answer to Baldwin’s criticism of the low wages paid to Okinawan military base workers: their productivity was “far below that of Japanese workers.” It also justified the low per capital income in Okinawa by noting that there were eight prefectures in Japan which had a lower income level than the Ryukyuan average.

Baldwin’s persistent interest in civil rights in Okinawa and his visit to the island in 1959 encouraged Okinawan people, gave an added impetus to their fukki movement and apparently helped spur Washington to review its policy toward the island fortress. The reversion movement also received support in influential segments of the United States,
most notably the *New York Times* which had advocated in an editorial prior to Baldwin's visit that Washington "relinquish political control over the Ryukyus." In November 1959, a study prepared by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations called for a "balance between military desirability and political liability" and suggested an inquiry "into the possibility of shifting limited war forces to Australia or to some other area where they would be welcomed."

The so-called Conlon Report, prepared by Conlon Associates, Ltd., at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, further urged an "integration of political and military requirements," "civilianization" of the U.S. administration, and public election of the chief executive. The report suggested the "gradual and ultimate reversion of Okinawa to Japan," for "immediate reversion . . . is neither necessary nor feasible" and "the reversion issue can be delayed somewhat if American policies in Okinawa are progressive and successful."

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90*United States Foreign Policy in Asia*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1 November 1959, 104-109.