Chapter V: Japan, the U.S. and the High Commissioner

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

The 1960s marked another turning point for Okinawa. If the 1950s had been a highly restive period of conflicts between military requirements and Okinawan struggles for justice, civil rights and self-government, the 1960s saw what seemed inevitable concessions by the Americans and the beginning of an era leading toward eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration.

The decade opened, symbolically, with the signing of the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, and public demonstrations against President Eisenhower during his brief visit to Okinawa. The revised treaty, signed in Washington on January 19, 1960, “marked the end of the postwar period as far as Japan’s diplomacy was concerned,” according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aichihiro Fujiyama.1 The original treaty, drafted during the Korean War and signed in 1951 along with the peace treaty, contained many provisions that reflected the unequal relationship between the two countries at the time. The treaty granted the United States the right to station its military forces in and around Japan, potentially including nuclear weapons in their armories, and the complete freedom to deploy them in regional conflicts. Japan also agreed not to grant similar rights to a third power without U.S. approval. Strictly speaking, the United States had no obligation to defend Japan from any foreign enemy. It was nevertheless authorized to intervene to control domestic disturbances in Japan. U.S. assistance was extended to the Japanese defense forces while U.S. units, except for air detachments and naval bases, were gradually transferred to Okinawa.

In the 1950s, Japan achieved a spectacular economic recovery. Steady and then explosively rapid industrial growth brought not only full employment and such economic benefits as washing machines and TV sets in every home, but a renewed self-confidence. Riding high on its economic and military partnership with the United States, Japan nevertheless came to see the old security arrangements as too unequal for an independent country.

The 1957 joint communiqué by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi had declared that the United States “welcomed” Japan’s plans for the buildup of its defense forces and would “substantially reduce” the numbers of U.S. forces in Japan “within the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all [its] ground combat forces.” The United States also promised that it would make “still further reductions as the Japanese defense forces grow.”2

In the words of an Associated Press article, the new treaty “ended the last traces of Japan’s occupation status as a defeated World War II enemy.” Nonetheless, it granted the United States the use of land, sea and air bases and committed the United States to guaranteeing Japan’s peace and security in case of attack on “territories under Japanese administration.” It committed both sides to “meet the common danger in accordance with

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1 Quoted in the Japan Times, 1 January 1960.
2 The joint communiqué, issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi, was released in Washington on 21 June 1957.
[their] constitutional provisions and processes." In a separate exchange of notes between Christian A. Herter, the Secretary of State, and Prime Minister Kishi, the United States agreed to "prior consultation" whenever there were major changes in the deployment of forces to Japan, in their equipment (including the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country), or in the use of Japanese bases for combat operations elsewhere in the Far East. Washington pledged that it "had no intention of acting . . . in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government." The provision on "prior consultation," it was believed, was added to allay the fear among some Japanese that the bases might embroil Japan in a war, in particular a war against China.

Officially, the question of the status of Okinawa "was not made a subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations."^4 The treaty applied only to areas currently under Japan's administration. The Ryukyu Islands were not included, although they would automatically come under the treaty's provisions upon their return to Japanese sovereignty.5

The Okinawa issue was discussed. An initial draft prepared in February 1958 at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, for example, defined the treaty area as "all territory under the administrative control of Japan and the island territories in the Western Pacific which are referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and which are under the administrative control of the United States."®

Though the term "island territories" referred to the Ryukyus and the Bonins, Foreign Minister Fujiyama told Ambassador MacArthur that he and Prime Minister Kishi had decided to limit the treaty area to Japan's home islands. The reasons were that Japanese socialists argued against the inclusion of the Ryukyus and the Bonins since that would bring Japan into multilateral treaties with the Republic of China, South Korea and the Philippines, and commit it to hostilities with China. Some influential members within the ruling party, too, were opposed for their own reasons, he said. Fujiyama told the ambassador that inclusion of the Ryukyus would raise constitutional questions and would be approved by neither public opinion nor the Diet.6

On the U.S. side, Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific, supported exclusion of the Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the United States, which in any event retained administrative and other controls over these islands, "would gain nothing" by their inclusion while inclusion would be "useful to the Japanese as a

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3The United States agreed in 1955 to have prior consultation with Japan to gain its approval on such occasions. See R. Sneider, U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: A Historical Perspective (Columbia University Press, 1982), 25.
5In Okinawa, Chief Executive Thoma and his Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party called for the inclusion of Okinawa in the treaty to insure its eventual reversion to Japan, while opposition parties were either against the security treaty itself as a potential threat to world peace or in favor of reversion ahead of the conclusion of the new treaty. The Association for Reunion of the Okinawan Islands with Japan, an organization of Okinawans living in mainland Japan, petitioned the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo for inclusion, on the grounds that Okinawa was "a part of the inherent territory of Japan" and that it would pave the way for the administrative reunion.
6MacArthur to Secretary of State Dulles, 18 February 1959. Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2-1258, published in FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 18, 8-10.
7MacArthur to the Department of State, 28 November 1958. Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11-2858 published in ibid., 100-104.
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political lever toward reestablishment of Japanese administrative control" over them. 8

By April, U.S. Ambassador MacArthur could report to the Department of State that the Japanese have withdrawn all ‘tentative’ suggestions . . . and have in fact agreed to every point of substance in the U.S. position.” The treaty area would now be limited to the main Japanese islands. He added, cunningly: “However, [I] have maneuvered this so it is Japanese who propose exclusion of these islands, which should help [high commissioner] Gen. Booth in Okinawa.” 9 Secretary of State Dulles noted that “objections mentioned by Japanese appear [to] be most appropriate arguments for us to use against [the] inclusion of Article III islands.” 10

Remarkably, it appears that neither Kishi nor Fujiyama ever discussed the administrative return of Okinawa as a possibility or a subject to be negotiated with the United States. “[Fujiyama] said neither he nor Kishi wished to raise return to Japan of administrative control,” Ambassador MacArthur told the Department of State. “Neither Kishi nor Fuji­yama wishes to handle this matter [treaty area] in a way which would oblige GOJ [Gov­ernment of Japan] publicly to request return of administration of Okinawa.” 11 A commu­nity of interests of sorts seemed to exist between the leaders of the two governments.

Okinawa was thus referred to only in an agreed minute to the treaty, in which the Japanese representative “emphasize[d] the strong concern of the government and people of Japan for the safety of the people of these islands since Japan possesses residual sover­eignty” and both governments promised to consult each other in the event of an attack against Okinawa and to take measures to promote the welfare of the people.

Consequently, the new treaty made Japan more independent of the United States at the cost of excluding Okinawa from Japan’s territorial and, therefore, constitutional jurisdiction and keeping it under U.S. control. The United States required such control so long as tensions and threats remained in the Far East, while Japan needed U.S. bases there to protect its own security and maintain good defense and economic relations with AmMiBa. of the ground troops were pulled out of Japan before the revised treaty was signed; still remaining were some logistical and support units destined for the Korea garrison, as well as a number of air bases and two naval repair depots. The size of the American bases in mainland Japan decreased from 33,400 acres in 1952 to only 8,300 acres by 1960. The number of troops dropped from 260,000 to about 45,000 during the same period. The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) took over many of the functions previously performed by the U.S. forces and occupied their installations. The SDF, cre­ated in 1954, increased to around 240,000 personnel in the 1960s, a level it has since maintained.

Many of the units in mainland Japan, including the Third Marine Division, were re­moved to Okinawa, from Tachikawa (Tokyo), Ashiya (Fukuoka), Itatsuke (Fukuoka), Asagaya (Saitama) and other places. In August 1959, F. A. Bantz, Acting Secretary of the Navy, had to request an increase in appropriations for the construction of an additional electric power station in Okinawa because, he said, “the Navy and Marine [electric

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State McElroy, 1 December 1958. NARA, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS.92 Japan (12-12-50), in ibid., 104-105.
9 MacArthur to the Department of State, 29 April 1959. Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/4-2595. Ibid., 126-127.
10 Dulles to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 24 January 1959. Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/112-2458. Ibid., 119-121.
11 See, for example, MacArthur’s telegrams to the Department of State on 7 December 1958, FRUS, ibid., 108-110), and 1 May 1959, ibid., 161-162
power] requirements . . . will continue to grow directly as these forces are withdrawn from Japan [to Okinawa] in accordance with the spirit of the Eisenhower-Kishi communiqué . . . ."\(^{12}\) While Navy and Marine installations in 1959 consumed only 10.5 percent of the power generated by the integrated power system operated by the Army, he predicted the share would rise to 12 percent in 1960 and 16.5 percent in 1961 "as construction of important Marine facilities is completed."

As a result, military installations in the Ryukyus, which had expanded from 30,500 acres in 1951 to 42,000 acres by early 1953, further grew in size to more than 75,000 acres (including 16,500 on arable land) by 1960. The U.S. forces numbered more than 30,000 by 1960, with an additional 15,000 dependents. Virtually all bases were concentrated on the main island of Okinawa where the United States occupied roughly 20 percent of the land space. The bases and the civilian areas became so contiguous with each other that General Paul W. Caraway would write in 1969: "The United States does not have bases on Okinawa. Okinawa is the base. It is not possible to sieve out the military areas of functions . . . and separate them from the civilian areas or functions. The roads, the water system, and other utilities, and ports and harbors, the labor force, the business enterprises, the air fields, and the areas designed and used for the purely military purposes are all integrated into a single net."\(^{13}\) By 1970, American bases made up nearly 90,000 acres, or 14.8 percent of the entire area of the island chain under U.S. control; military bases had by this time come to occupy a little over 27 percent of the island of Okinawa. The prefecture, comprising 0.6 percent of the total land space of Japan, was burdened with 75 percent of the military installations used exclusively by the U.S. forces in Japan.

It was not the size of the bases alone, however, that made Okinawa uniquely important after the new security treaty. The United States maintained complete freedom of action in Okinawa, unlike mainland Japan where it now faced severe restrictions and a highly vigilant and powerful public opinion. As U. Alexis Johnson, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, noted:

> Because we controlled Okinawa we could use our bases for storing nuclear weapons and mounting operations outside Japan . . . . These were rights denied to our bases in Japan proper, under the 1960 Security Treaty, without "prior consultation" with the Japanese government. The Pentagon did not want to give up these very useful rights, the likely price of having Tokyo regain control.\(^{14}\)

Unrestricted by the security treaty, the United States could store not only nuclear weapons but chemical weapons in Okinawa as well. Okinawa was now also home to the 313th Air Division based at Kadena, complete with B52 Stratofortresses, F105 Thunderchief fighters, F101 reconnaissance planes, KC135 Stratotankers and C141 Starlifters; the 30th Artillery Brigade with Mace, Hercules and Hawk missiles; the Second Logistic Command; units of the U.S. Seventh Fleet comprising more than 120 warships and 600 planes; the Seventh Psychological Operations Group; and the Third Marine Corps stationing an estimated 20,000 members in Okinawa with extensive mountainous training areas.

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in northern Okinawa. The commander of the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, not only commanded the USARYIS (the 9th Army) but acted as “coordinator” among the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps units on the island, all of which belonged to the U.S. Pacific Command.

Okinawa would be so vital a logistic support, training and staging base for the United States during the war in Vietnam, that Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, was quoted as having declared in December 1965, that “without Okinawa we couldn’t continue fighting the Vietnam war.”

Eisenhower visited Okinawa on June 19, 1960, the day the new security treaty went into effect. The National Security Council, under his direction, had just settled the differences of views on Okinawa between the Department of State and the Department of Defense (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and adopted a statement of new U.S. policy toward Japan.

The inter-agency disagreements over Okinawa, as of May 20, concerned two paragraphs in National Security Council draft paper (NSC 6008), titled “U.S. Policy Toward Japan.”

In Paragraph 51, the majority position was to “maintain the present degree of control over the islands . . . so long as it is essential to our vital security interests.” The Defense-JCS position was to “maintain the present degree of control over the islands” while “the international tensions in the Far East created by the Communist threat” continued, “in view of their essentiality to our vital security interests.”

In Paragraph 52, the Department of State and the JCS agreed that the United States should “take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures in Japan and the Ryukyus, recognizing that . . . administration of the Ryukyus is a continuing politically sensitive issue in U.S.-Japanese relations.” The Department of State wanted the next sentence to read “Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus in such areas as trade, cultural relations, provision of economic assistance and the interchange of nationals should be acceded to” as long as they were reasonable and consistent with “U.S. security interests in the area.” The JCS, on the other hand, took a position saying that such Japanese requests “should be considered sympathetically consistent with U.S. security interests in the area.”

In the words of J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, the majority position on paragraph 51 left “the door open” for the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan “when they are no longer required from a security viewpoint,” while the position of the JCS was “to foreclose [the return] indefinitely.” Regarding paragraph 52, he pointed to “a basic difference of viewpoint” between the two departments, in spite of the similar language. “Defense,” he said, “has only reluctantly agreed to Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus. For example, this year they have refused to continue a program of sending a few Japanese teacher-consultants to the Ryukyus although such assistance is needed and is desired by the Ryukyuans. We feel that failure to permit the Japanese to assist the Ryukyus in this very limited manner, which will not affect our security interests, will only lead to increased reversionist pressures and serious strains in United States-Japanese relations.”

17Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 27 May 1960. Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6008 Series. FRUS, ibid., 312-14.
In the end, however, the views of the JCS more or less prevailed after the National Security Council consulted President Eisenhower at its meeting on May 31.\(^\text{18}\) Paragraph 51 in the final version now read: “Maintain the degree of control over the islands . . . deemed by the President to be essential to our vital security interests,” while “taking into account the Communist threat in the Far East and the new security arrangements with Japan.” Paragraph 52 was changed to read: “Take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures . . . To this end Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus . . . should be considered sympathetically . . .” At the President’s suggestion, a footnote was added to the text, explaining that the term “considered sympathetically” should be interpreted to mean that “a positive attitude will be taken toward Japanese requests.”\(^\text{19}\) Paragraph 53 directed that the United States “conduct [its] administration of the Ryukyus so as to promote political stability, economic advancement, and reasonable satisfaction with U.S. retention, and so as to enhance our prestige in the eyes of the local population and other Asian peoples.”

Eisenhower’s visit, the first by a U.S. president to the island, took place amid confusion. Chief Executive Seisaku Ota had extended an invitation to him in February to visit Okinawa in the course of his Asian tour scheduled for June. In the same month, Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin had raised the possibility of the President visiting Okinawa or meeting Ota in Tokyo.\(^\text{20}\) Having learned of this possibility, Ambassador MacArthur cabled a message to Irwin, saying that he thought a visit by the president to Okinawa “would be unwise in extreme” because it “would be construed by both friendly and unfriendly elements in Japan as [a] move to emphasize [the] point that Okinawa to all intents and purposes is and will remain U.S. territory.”\(^\text{21}\) The ambassador’s request was overruled. In the meantime, the U-2 incident on May 1 forced the President to call off his visit to the Soviet Union and Japan’s domestic turmoil over the new security treaty threatened to force him to cancel his historic visit to Tokyo. As a result, MacArthur again stated that the visit to Okinawa would be unwise and even offensive to the Japanese if the visit to the mainland failed to materialize. But Washington prevailed. “If Communist minority demonstrations in Tokyo achieve their purpose in dealing us one really devastating blow,” Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon told him, “there is no reason why we should give the impression that they can impose their will upon us with respect to an area in which we retain legitimate rights.”\(^\text{22}\) It was thus agreed that the President should make a stopover—for two hours—in Okinawa on his way from the Philippines and Taiwan to South Korea.

Okinawans had been waiting for him. Twenty-seven individuals and organizations had presented USCAR twenty-nine petitions listing some sixty requests. They ranged from an invitation to visit Koza, a “GI town” adjacent to Kadena Air base, to a series of questions in an open letter from the People’s Party demanding answers on Okinawa’s political status, the people’s civil and democratic rights, and the high commissioner’s


\(^{21}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{22}\) Dillon to the Embassy in Tokyo, 12 June 1960. Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/6-1260. \textit{FRUS, ibid.}, 354.
appointment of the chief executive and judges.

The Okinawa Trade Association asked that the United States treat its imports from the Ryukyus as domestic trade, or at least reduce its duties on Ryukyuan goods. The Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce requested that Post Exchange (PX) activities of the U.S. forces be limited in view of the fact that they "[had] expanded a little too much covering not only daily necessary items but also such items usually left for private stores in the United States," and that this adversely affected local economic development and job creation.

The Federation Of Military Land Owners’ Associations pointed to the unsettled claims for compensation for damaged property (204,526 persons involved, $42,000,000 claimed) and people killed or injured (552 persons, $750,000) by U.S. forces between the end of the war and the day before the peace treaty went into effect and for the restoration of the land formerly used for military purposes but now released ($2,400,000). A similar petition was filed by the Association of the Chairmen of Municipal Assemblies and the Association of Municipal Mayors. The Okinawa Social Welfare Council urged the United States to establish social assistance programs; it pointed out that Japan’s national treasury covered 80 percent of the public assistance expenditures of prefectural governments while the programs in the Ryukyus were entirely supported by taxes collected from the people.

The All-Okinawa Military Employees Labor Federation demanded the repeal of US-CAR Ordinance No. 116, an end to arbitrary dismissal of local employees and investigations of their views and ideology, and requested a two-fold increase in wages to bridge the wide difference in earnings between themselves and non-Ryukyuan military workers and the introduction of retirement allowances.

The Okinawa Teachers’ Association filed a six-page petition, asking for the earliest possible administrative reversion to Japan, permission to fly the Japanese flag on school buildings, removal of travel restrictions to Japan, increased financial aid for the promotion of education, abolition of the approval system for publications, and popular election of the chief executive. The Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, a united front which the Teachers’ Association and sixteen other bodies had organized on April 28, the eighth anniversary of the Japanese peace treaty, “to campaign actively for reversion until the day when our long-cherished desire will be realized,” filed a similar petition of its own.

Chief Executive Ota welcomed the President and petitioned for a solution to the pre-peace treaty claims, “extension of foreign trade and immigration to overseas areas,” “increased economic assistance,” and expanded political autonomy. He also noted that “in order to maintain peace and security in the Far East, it is our firm determination to . . . seek the early return of the Ryukyuan people to their natural status.” The GRI Legislature requested “speedy recovery of the natural status” of Okinawa and expressed “strong opposition to strengthening military bases” on Okinawa.

Eisenhower arrived at Kadena Air Base, made a brief speech emphasizing the “vital role” that the Ryukyu Islands played “for the free world in the circumstances of this era” and the “friendship” existing between the Okinawans and the Americans stationed there. He then headed for Naha in an open sedan. As a USCAR report described it: “[A] uniformly friendly crowd estimated around 200,000, waving thousands of U.S. [flags] and hundreds of Japanese flags, greeted [the] President along the entire route to Naha. Most signs (several strung over Highway One) [and] placards carried ‘Welcome President Ike’ or equivalent messages while some stated [a] desire for reversion.”

But the scene changed as the motorcade approached the executive building of the

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Government of the Ryukyus which the United States had "dedicated" to the Okinawan people in 1953. The motorcade was besieged by hundreds of demonstrators (estimated at anywhere between 2,000 and 10,000) carrying small Japanese flags or red labor union flags and placards reading "We Want to Return to Our Fatherland" or "Take All H&A Bombs out of Okinawa" in both Japanese and English and occasionally shouting "Yankee, Go Home." In spite of government efforts "to fill critical areas with moderate or cooperative groups," angry crowds of people had gathered since 9:45 a.m. for a "meeting to demand reversion to the fatherland" and adopted a declaration calling on the President to return Okinawa to Japan expeditiously and on "the democracy and peace loving people of the world" to support "our ardent desire." University students and young teachers, zigzagging from one side of the street to the other, clashed with 700 policemen and almost overwhelmed them. Only the reinforcement of some 1,500 helmet-wearing U.S. marines, armed with carbines and fixed bayonets could hold the crowd back and permit the motorcade to pass through the hecklers to the government building.

Eisenhower finally reached the building, greeted twenty-four legislators (five others had boycotted the meeting) waiting outside, made a two-minute speech and conferred with the Chief Executive inside for about twenty minutes. Behind the building, with tear gas at the ready, was one reinforced marine rifle company held in reserve. With the angry demonstrators still around, the President departed from the building via a pre-planned alternative route to Naha Air Base where he and his party were air-lifted by helicopter to Kadena to depart for Korea.

The New York Times commented that "most of the people [in Okinawa] were friendly [to Eisenhower], though a small group of juvenile delinquents were not." But the estimated figures, both 200,000 in the welcoming crowds and 2,000-3,000 in the opposing forces, were misleading; they hardly represented the underlying sentiments that most Okinawan people harbored against the U.S. occupation. U.S. officials never scrutinized claims relating to the numbers of well-wishers or how they had been organized and supplied with U.S. flags.

For all its symbolism, the presidential visit had little substantive impact on the subsequent course of events relating to Okinawa. During their brief meeting, Chief Executive Ota did not even press for a solution to the fukki question or related issues raised in a number of petitions, nor did the President volunteer any new policy initiative.

Ota read his petition and requested the President's cooperation in restoring the $1,500,000 cut from the annual appropriation for economic support to the Ryukyus, and asked him to help get the Price bill and the Judd immigration bill passed. The first referred to a decision by the subcommittee of the House Committee On Appropriations. The second concerned a bill introduced early in 1959 by Congressman Melvin Price proposing annual appropriations of up to $6,000,000 to the high commissioner for economic development, reimbursement for government services and disaster relief in Okinawa, from federal income taxes withheld at the source from Americans stationed or employed in the Ryukyu Islands. The Judd bill provided for the immigration of up to 100 Ryukyuan to the United States annually. The President told his aide to phone General B. Persons, his assistant at the White House, "and ask him to mobilize such support as he could for restoration of the cut" and bring Ota's request concerning the Price bill to Persons' attention. The immigration bill was unlikely to be passed in the current session;

24Ibid.
Eisenhower mentioned a need for preparations for the next session.

The other petitions to the President were subsequently answered by George R. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army. He told Chobyo Yara, president of the Reversion Council, that the United States had "no territorial ambitions" over the Ryukyus, that it recognized "the honest desire" of the Okinawan people to return to Japanese administration, but that the present status "must be continued, so long as threats and tensions exist in the Fast East." He explained: "The world is faced today with a threat—a threat that has been stated by communist nations, time and again, as being the submission of all [the] free world's peoples to communist domination." Roderick was not receptive to Yara's plea for travel liberalization. "Your request appears to be predicated upon the concept that the Ryukyus and Japan have the same administrative status," he wrote. "This premise ignores the fact that, under duly constituted international agreements, the administration of the Ryukyus is vested in the United States."

The Price Bill was signed into law on July 12, 1960, as Public Law 86-629. The U.S. economic assistance under official appropriations—"Government and Relief in Occupied Areas and Administration" (GARIOA), "Administration, Ryukyu Islands" (ARI) and later "Ryukyu Islands, Army" (RIA)—had been declining since 1950, when it had peaked at $50,400,000, falling to $1,000,000 in 1957, $1,100,000 in 1958 and $1,300,000 in 1959. Only when appropriations for the construction of power and water utilities, resettlement and disaster (typhoon) relief were included, did the amount reach $6,900,000 in 1957, $4,000,000 in 1958, and $2,400,000 in 1959. A rise in appropriated funds toward $6,000,000, minus non-appropriated funds, was expected to boost the people's standard of living, which lagged far behind the fast-rising standard in Japan.

As a result, the Congress authorized $3,300,000 in fiscal 1960 for the Ryukyus in direct grants and for technical training and education. That figure did not include some $18,000,000 the United States was providing for a water system and $2,700,000 for an electric power system, with an aggregate total of $24,000,000.

To Senator John Sparkman, however, even a $6,000,000 appropriation was not enough to maintain what he called "the most strategic and most useful of America's Far Eastern bases." A member of the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Sparkman, who visited Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines between July 29 and August 13, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in November: "[The present system]... is far from satisfactory to most Ryukyuans. Even among conservative [i.e., pro-American] Ryukyuans there is a sentiment that the United States has assumed the responsibility for governing their people but not adequate care of them. Ryukyuans inevitably compare their economic situation with Japan's booming economy. The comparison, of course, is unfavorable... In all sectors, Okinawa's economy is far below Japan's." He noted that the people's strong desire for reversion to Japanese administration was motivated in part by economic concerns. "It is argued that, if Okinawa were a

26 Roderick to Yara, 28 December 1960. NARA, RG 260, Box 91 of HCRI-LN ("President Eisenhower's Visit, 19 June 1960").
28 Federal income taxes withheld from the U.S. citizens (both military and civilian) in the Ryukyus totaled about $9,000,000 annually. Ibid., 3994.
Japanese prefecture, it would receive more assistance," he said, continuing: "And that is quite true. Okinawa receives less assistance from the United States than Japan budgets for its seven poorest prefectures."

The Senator urged that the United States "should provide economic aid" to the Ryukyus "that is at least consonant with modest growth requirements," particularly in the face of the call for reversion—an "economic and emotional issue"—which was "supported by all seven political parties, including the ruling conservative party."

At the same, he noted that Japan was accepting Okinawan teachers and students into its universities and that American and Japanese officials were "discussing the possibility of sending Japanese doctors to Okinawa and establishing a model Japanese-style farm." He said the United States should "encourage" Japan to be involved in more such "non-political activity" in Okinawa and that the United States "should seek and welcome greater Japanese participation" in the promotion of the Okinawan people's welfare.

In Japan, Prime Minister Kishi was forced to resign in July 1960 after massive public demonstrations protesting both against the revised mutual security treaty and the way he bulldozed it through the Diet. The demonstrations, in which a university student was killed, forced President Eisenhower to cancel his scheduled visit to Tokyo. Kishi's successor, Hayato Ikeda, found himself free from the burning security treaty (Ampo) issue and thus able to chart a new political course.

The new Japanese administration demonstrated a keen interest in Okinawan affairs. Various departments were receptive to GRI pleas for budget increases. The special Okinawa committee of the ruling Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party pledged to work for Okinawa's "substantial integration" with Japan as a step toward the earliest possible administrative reversion. The government established a liaison office in Naha, and Sensuke Fujieda, director general of the Prime Minister's Office, became the highest Japanese official to visit Okinawa since the war. While in Okinawa, he announced that the government's policy would be directed towards increasing economic assistance and looking for ways to solve various problems.

On December 2, 1960, the Defense Department announced the appointment of Major General Paul W. Caraway (soon to be promoted to lieutenant general) as the new high commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands as successor to General Booth. The new high commissioner stressed the strategic importance of Okinawa in his inaugural address, given on Feb. 16, 1961. "It is well known that the reason for the presence of U.S. military forces here is to maintain an essential link in the chain of free-world defenses against potential aggression," he stated. "Our presence here helps to protect free peoples of the western Pacific islands and of Asia from being overrun by forces hostile to the security and welfare of the people of the area, including you, the people of Okinawa and your brothers on the other islands." He then promised to pursue the basic missions prescribed in the Executive Order such as "continued development of an effective and responsible government," "expansion and balancing the economy," "steady advancement of individual welfare," and preservation of "basic liberties." Never once did he mention the Okinawan people's paramount aspiration for reversion or problems resulting from long-term military occupation.

The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo reported on December 16, however, that although the Okinawan people's desire for reversion was now "within manageable proportions," "we

30 Ibid., 12.
31 Office of the High Commissioner, Ryukyu Islands, Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, IX: I (for 1 October 1960 to 31 March 1961), 8-10.
must recognize that until administration is eventually returned to Japan, [the] problem of reversion will be a constant irritant in Japanese-American relations.” It cautioned: “We must frankly recognize that we waited dangerously long to modify certain of our policies in Okinawa regarding land acquisition, Japanese participation in certain Ryukyuans matters, and almost had an incipient ‘Cyprus’-type situation on our hands three years ago.”

The Embassy suggested that U.S. authorities on the islands “keep Okinawans reasonably satisfied [and] have [a] flexible outlook as political or economic problems arise” and that the United States continue “to bring Japan into [the] picture to [the] maximum extent possible.”

“I recognize the Ryukyus to be part of Japan”

After fifteen years of American occupation, the stage seemed set for lifting the Okinawan people out of the quagmire. They could now expect the beginning of an end to their long plight, a light at the end of the tunnel of military occupation.

On January 1, 1961, Ikeda sent an unusual New Year’s message to the “900,000 fellow countrymen of Okinawa,” expressing “sympathy and a grave responsibility” for the people who had not only suffered “the torments of the war’s disaster” but had been “separated from the fatherland for sixteen long years.” He said that “not only our Okinawan fellow countrymen, but also the Japanese people eagerly await the day Okinawa will be returned to Japan,” adding:

The Japanese government thus far has taken every opportunity to negotiate the matter with the American government. The Ikeda cabinet is of the policy to continue making utmost efforts for the return of Okinawa to the fatherland through Japan-U.S. diplomatic channels, and will not grudge giving a variety of assistance to Okinawa until the day Okinawa is reverted to Japan. The basic attitude of the Japanese government as well as that of the Japan Liberal Democratic Party . . . is that “Okinawa is Japanese territory and must eventually be returned to Japan.”

The cabinet followed the statement with a decision to increase its economic aid to Okinawa eight-fold in the new fiscal year starting in April 1961, from ¥59,600,000 to ¥485,000,000 (roughly $1,350,000). Even so, the amount fell far below the $6,230,000 appropriated for the Ryukyus by the U.S. Congress for fiscal 1961, including $4,570,000 in economic assistance (i.e., for GRI services and projects; construction of electric power and water facilities; technical assistance, education and technical training) and $1,630,000 in the general fund (for the administration of the U.S. civil government). Washington also spent additional millions of dollars for the construction of military facilities in Okinawa.

Japanese aid, limited to technical assistance and scholarships until fiscal 1960, was now extended to a variety of programs. A majority of the funds were allotted in 1961 to WW II civil service and military survivor pensions, solatia to the families bereaved in that war, and compensatory payments to wartime repatriates and government employees. Approximately half of the support went to economic assistance for, among other things, the construction of a microwave system linking the Ryukyus to Japan and a high altitude weather station, scholarships to educate Okinawan students and teachers at Japanese uni-

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33 Okinawa Times, 1 January 1961.
versities, and programs to train government specialists in a number of fields and to pro-
vide doctors and university professors.

In the United States, the administration changed in January 1961 from the Republican
Eisenhower to the Democrat John F. Kennedy. The new president, who had campaigned
for “a new frontier,” called upon Americans in his inaugural address “to bear the burden
of a long twilight struggle . . . against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty,
disease, and war itself,” and surrounded himself with liberal Harvard advisors.

Kennedy appointed the eminent Japanologist Edwin O. Reischauer as ambassador to
Japan at the suggestion of Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles. Born in Tokyo to
missionary parents, fluent in Japanese, married to the granddaughter of a two-time prime
minister of Japan, the new ambassador was highly respected in Japan for his intimate
knowledge of its history, culture and customs, and for his liberal views. Reischauer was
also known to have strong views on Okinawa. He had called Okinawa an American col-
ony, the Okinawans a “colonial people,” and the Okinawa issue a “stumbling block” in
U.S. relations with Japan.

When Ikeda and Kennedy met in Washington in June 1961, they apparently agreed to
put off the discussion of political issues in favor of the promotion of people’s welfare. In
fact, Ikeda told Kennedy that he had “no intention” of seeking Okinawa’s administrative
return to Japan or “interfering in any way with U.S. administration.”34 His main interest
was to ensure that the Okinawan people would receive “[economic] treatment at least
equivalent to that accorded Japanese nationals in the poorer prefectures of Japan.” The
President “affirmed” further U.S. efforts “to enhance the welfare and well-being” of the
Okinawans and “welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts.” The Prime Minister
“affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end.” The
joint communiqué was silent on how the anomalous status of Okinawa and the Okinawan
people would or could be resolved, focusing instead on the improvement of their eco-
nomic condition. It fell disappointingly short of the Okinawans’ expectation that the two
leaders might place on their agenda reversion of the islands to Japan.

The new U.S. administration appeared little different at first from the previous one. In
response to a letter to the Secretary of Defense from Lawrence Speiser of the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army flatly rejected the conten-
tion of the ACLU that the “Ryukyus should be prepared for their eventual return to Ja-
pan.”35 “In view of Okinawa’s great strategic importance and the lack of any other base
over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction in the Western Pacific,” he stated,
“it would appear that the U.S. security interests will require retention of the Ryukyus for a
period of indefinitely long duration.” As such, he said, it would be both “premature” and
“potentially harmful to U.S. security interests” to launch a program for reversion, for it
would further increase demands for reversion and limit the United States in the exercise
of its authority over the islands. Based on this premise, the under secretary disagreed that
the Ryukyuan legislature should appoint the chief executive pending future popular elec-
tion, that the Ryukyu people should be represented in the Japanese diet, or that they
should be recognized as Japanese citizens.

As it turned out, however, the Kennedy/Ikeda communiqué initiated a series of highly
significant changes in the U.S. administration and moved the reversion issue forward after

35Howard E. Haugerud to Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liber-
ties Union, 31 July 1961, with an enclosed memorandum on “Civil and Political Rights in the Ryu-
all. Shortly after it was issued, High Commissioner Caraway made public an agreement between the two leaders to permit Okinawans to fly the Japanese flag on Japanese buildings, including government facilities and schools, “during all Japanese holidays . . ., plus the first three days of the Japanese New Year, plus Ryukyuan holidays.” The Japanese flag in Okinawa, the display of which had been thus far permitted only on private houses, would soon become a political symbol of the fukki movement.

To implement its commitment expressed in the communiqué, Washington sent Ambassador Reischauer to Okinawa in August 1961. In October, Carl Kaysen, a Harvard University economist who was then on the White House National Security Council staff, led an interdepartmental survey team to Okinawa to “review the major economic and social welfare problems” there for the development of new U.S. “policies and programs which would more effectively improve the islands’ living conditions.” The decision to send the mission to Okinawa resulted from a suggestion by George Ball, Special Assistant To The President For National Security Affairs, who had visited Okinawa briefly three months earlier. “Until then,” Ball wrote, “I had thought of Okinawa as a major World War battleground. Now, observing our vast stores of supplies and the proprietary manner in which our military administered the island, I thought it “preposterous that fifteen years after the war we should still be treating [Okinawa] as our colony.” He depicted the situation as “tailor-made to generate trouble between Tokyo and Washington,” and sent the President “a telegram describing the dangers implicit in our position.” The Kaysen mission’s mandate, nevertheless, did not extend to an investigation of political issues or of the ways to solve them.

The so-called “Kaysen report” made a number of significant recommendations, however, such as an economic cooperation agreement between Washington and Tokyo as a basis for a future U.S.-Japan relationship in Okinawa, a possible announcement of eventual reversion of the islands to Japan, and greater autonomy for the Government of the Ryukyus. Revealingly, an undated copy of the recommendations noted that the Japanese government had “no desire to push us [the Americans] out of Okinawa.” On the contrary, the government welcomed the American bases on the island, as they contributed to Japan’s own security “without creating the political problems which would follow if the base were situated in [mainland] Japan.” It would “continue to speak publicly” in favor of restoring its administration over the islands while recognizing that the United States would not return them in the “foreseeable future.”

Based on the recommendations in the report and perhaps on those made by George Ball and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who discussed Okinawa with a variety of

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36White House press release, 30 September 1961. In April 1958, U.S. Ambassador to Japan MacArthur had suggested several “minimum measures” to “stabilize[e] the situation in Okinawa.” These included “assurance to Ryukyuans of substantially greater economic and financial assistance,” “a decision to send a competent civilian economic mission” to Okinawa, “giving [the] Ryukyuan people a substantially greater voice in their own administration,” withdrawing USCAR’s responsibility in local government matters to the maximum extent, and providing the Department of State with “full and equal voice” as the Department of Defense. (Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 1 April 1958. Department of State, Central Files, 794C.00/4-158.)


38“Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on the Ryukyus” was submitted to a special committee in the White House on 14 December 1961 and to the President on 11 January 1962.

people during his visit to Japan around the same time, President Kennedy signed on March 19, 1962, Executive Order 11010, an amendment to Executive Order 10713 of 1957. In his statement, the President said:

I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty.

The statement had no legal significance nor did it contain anything spectacularly new, for the Ryukyus had always been recognized as a part of Japan to which the United States would eventually return the islands when “threats and tension” ceased to exist in the Far East. But it made a symbolic departure from previous U.S. policies toward Okinawa; it was the first time Washington declared the islands to be officially Japan’s and expressed a hope for the eventual restoration of full Japanese sovereignty over them.

Admittedly, the new policy represented a compromise between two conflicting priorities. Kennedy himself emphasized the importance of the U.S. military bases in the Ryukyus as a “deterrent power in the face of threats to the peace in the Far East” and pointed to a need for “reconciling the military imperative for continued United States administration with the desires of the Ryukyuan people to assert their Japanese identity, and to have a greater voice in the management of their own affairs.” Many Okinawans, including Chief Executive Ota, were disappointed that the President pegged their return to Japanese administration to “the security interests of the free world” and did not make clear the approximate date for the reversion, although they nevertheless regarded the statement as a major step forward.

Under the new executive order, the chief executive would now be nominated by the Ryukyuan legislature—he needed the support of a majority of the popularly elected legislative representatives—before being appointed by the high commissioner. The high commissioner was required to “give all proper weight to the rights” of the people and respect democratic principles. The civil administrator would now be a civilian. Inevitably, however, the changes were all qualified. The chief executive would still have to be “acceptable” to the high commissioner, and the high commissioner could appoint a chief executive without a nomination in the event that the legislature failed to make an acceptable nomination. The high commissioner retained his power to veto “any bill.” The civil administrator would be appointed by the Secretary of Defense “after consultation with the Secretary of State and with the approval of the President” and “have such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the high commissioner.”

Curiously, there was no reference to an amendment to Section Six of Executive Order 10713 in which the Secretary of the Army had anticipated the problem of division of

40 The President had authorized rescission of NSC 6008/1 (“U.S. Policy Toward Japan”) on 9 January, 1962.
41 The American Civil Liberties Union “commended” the measures taken by President Kennedy to extend civil rights and local autonomy to the Okinawans, but commented that the new executive order failed to “contribute to solving the conflict of security with freedom.” ACLU news release, 23 April 1962. Baldwin Papers, Box 10, F17.
42 When the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 February 1963 emphasized to Kennedy the continued strategic essentiality of Okinawa to the United States, the President also indicated “that he had no intention to giving up the island.” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, 773.
powers. In a letter to the GRI Legislature dated October 30, 1959, he had noted that, with the amendment, the U.S. Civil Administration would “consult with the Government of the Ryukyus with a view to establishing a mutually agreeable balance, following the practice of democratic nations, between those aspects of the electoral process which should remain as provisions of the Executive Order and those which may be appropriately left to the discretion of your legislature.”

The President also ordered a number of actions “to give expression” to the “spirit of forbearance and mutual understanding” by the United States, “to discharge more effectively our responsibilities toward the Ryukyus, and to minimize the stresses that will accompany the anticipated eventual restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese administration.” Among these measures were:

1. Asking the Congress to amend the Price Act to remove the $6,000,000 ceiling on U.S. economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands;
2. Preparing plans for the support of new programs in the Ryukyus to raise the wages of Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. forces and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, and the levels of public health, educational and welfare services to those comparable areas in Japan over a period;
3. Preparing proposals for the Congress to increase loan funds for the development of the Ryukyuan economy;
4. Initiating discussions with the Government of Japan to develop arrangements for a cooperative relationship between the two countries for the promotion of the Ryukyuan people’s welfare and well-being and the development of their economy; and
5. Continuing to review governmental functions in the Ryukyus to determine when and under what circumstances the United States could delegate additional functions to the Government of the Ryukyus.

The new Japanese and U.S. policies set off a series of dramatic developments. Okinawans were now allowed to fly the Japanese flag, thus far generally restricted to private houses, on public buildings such as government office buildings, city halls and schools, on all Japanese national holidays. The White House replaced General John G. Ondrick with Shannon B. McCune, former provost and vice president of the University of Massachusetts, as Civil Administrator, the first civilian to occupy the post. A bill to amend the so-called Price Act (the Act Providing for Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands) was submitted to Congress, proposing that the $6,000,000-ceiling on U.S. assistance to the Ryukyus be raised to $25,000,000, with another proposing an increase to $12,000,000 in fiscal year 1963.

Two members of the Japanese Diet, including the chairman of the Okinawa Measures Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party formed the first of a series of Japanese government survey teams and visited Okinawa in July 1961. And in June 1962, the Japanese government sent its own version of the Kaysen mission to Okinawa based on an agreement between its foreign minister and Ambassador Reischauer. Headed by Hisao Kodaira, director general of the Prime Minister’s Office, the nine-member team was to collect comprehensive data as a basis for developing the Okinawan economy and promot-

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43High Commissioner Booth’s message to the 18th Session of the GRI Legislature, 1 February 1961.
44Kennedy signed Public Law 87-746, which raised the annual authorization ceiling on U.S. aid to the Ryukyus, on 4 October 1962.
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ing the welfare of the Okinawan people in cooperation with the United States. In September, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, the Ryukyu Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation and the Government of Japan signed an agreement on operation of the microwave system.

Stumbling Blocks

Kennedy's new policy, however, faced two stumbling blocks: Congress and the Pentagon. The bill to amend the Price Act met such opposition in the Senate that the Congress slashed the presidential request to a $12,000,000 ceiling in September 1962 in spite of statements by senior officials of the Departments of Defense and State and High Commissioner Caraway emphasizing the strategic importance of Okinawan bases and the concomitant necessity of appeasing the Okinawans economically. The Congress authorized only $7,000,000 for fiscal 1963 against a $12,000,000 request by the President. The ceiling was raised to $17,500,000 in November 1967, but never to the $25,000,000 originally requested by Kennedy.

The military was not about to jeopardize its unrestricted hold on the Ryukyus for the sake of a “cooperative” relationship with Japan. In December 1961, for example, the Army assured High Commissioner Caraway that it continued to be U.S. policy “to remain in the Ryukyus as long as threats and tension exist in the Far East,” to be “responsible for the administration of the Ryukyus,” and “to keep Japanese economic assistance in reasonable balance with U.S. economic assistance.”

Caraway, known as a self-righteous rigorist, was well suited to implement such a mission. Over the next few years, his “arbitrary” exercise of powers would bring him into conflict with the Ryukyuan government, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo under Ambassador Reischauer, and the Japanese government, and draw charges that he turned whatever dream the Okinawan people may have conjured from President Kennedy’s policy into a nightmare. The various complaints of the U.S. Embassy in 1963 illustrated what many people criticized as Caraway’s “direct rule,” “paternalism” and “[Japan-Ryukyus] separatist policy.”

45 Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 13 December 1961. 811.0094C/11.3061 XR894.0094C. RG 59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963 Box 2176 F3


47 Caraway, of course, was not the first American administrator to be known for his paternalism. David Ogden, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus in the early 1950s, compared the United States to the demigods that an Okinawan legend says created the islands and produced the first inhabitants. The Americans were even better than the legendary demigods as they introduced a “new democratic form of government,” taught the Okinawans “new skills and new ways of life,” built highways and water treatment facilities, and were training “thousands of unskilled Okinawan laborers.” (“Keystone of the Pacific,” 42-43.)

"As we have begun to implement the policy announced by the President," the Embassy charged, "we have faced disagreements with the High Commissioner's Office in Okinawa on various problems. . . . The U.S. military authorities in Naha appear to feel that every effort must be made to limit Japanese activities in the Ryukyus; that Japanese interests are contrary to ours; that, in fact, the Japanese constitute a subversive element which should be treated as such."^49

Specifically, the Embassy complained about the High Commissioner's attitudes toward the proposed U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus consultative committee, free textbooks for Okinawa, Japanese aid programs in Okinawa, and entry of Japanese government officials and opposition party members into Okinawa.^50 The Embassy envisaged "a forum for friendly and useful discussion of technical problems," composed of the head of the Japanese government liaison office in Naha, a senior official of the Government of the Ryukyus, and the deputy civil administrator from the Office of the High Commissioner (HICOMRY). The high commissioner's office, however, objected to the liaison office having any role in connection with the Japanese aid program or its chief joining the committee. It suggested that the Japanese government send a group of technicians annually to consult representatives of the high commissioner concerning the U.S. proposal for Japanese aid, an affront to Tokyo in the Embassy's view.

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and Ambassador Reischauer agreed in November 1962 to establish a U.S.-Japan consultative committee in Tokyo and a U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus technical committee in Naha in order to seek the means by which to improve Japanese economic and social assistance to the Ryukyus. But such measures were not inaugurated until April 1964. The microwave system linking Japan and Okinawa, completed in November 1963, would be opened only the following September. Members of the Japan Socialist Party were not allowed to visit Okinawa until the high commissioner left.

The free issue of textbooks for Okinawan public school children in grades one through six was started in 1963 at the suggestion of the Japanese government which provided $100,500 (the Government of the Ryukyus covered the remaining two-thirds of the cost). Tokyo had originally offered $30,000 for provision of free textbooks to first-grade children only, but the High Commissioner made a counter-proposal that the program be expanded to include all elementary school children. In the Embassy's opinion, the outcome turned out to be a "happy" one, but the way it was handled ran contrary to the "Kaysen report" which had warned against evoking competition between Japan and the United States to win the "affections" of the people. "A genuinely cooperative approach to the textbook question would have been substantially different from that which the United States actually took," the Embassy pointed out. "This type of competition on our side is likely to spur a similarly competitive approach on the Japanese side and is a game . . . in which the Japanese enjoy many advantages."

With regard to Japanese aid programs for Okinawa, the Embassy criticized the High Commissioner's policy, stating that, seemingly, it was trying to limit Japanese aid to the minimum and channel it into "the most inconspicuous areas." This, the Embassy stated, "can prejudice our whole policy" if carried too far. In 1963, the Embassy continued, the United States "refused to accept any increase in the Japanese technical assistance program


^50 Members of the Japan Socialist Party were not allowed to visit Okinawa until after Caraway left Okinawa.
for training Okinawans in Japan or for sending Japanese technicians to Okinawa; . . . refused to authorize the construction by Japan of additional hospital facilities in Okinawa; . . . insisted that Japanese doctors must be assigned to Okinawa for a minimum of two years, though it is apparent that the GOJ will have much difficulty in recruiting doctors for this period.” In order to take a more cooperative approach, the Embassy declared it “took a strong position on the need to accept the $5,100,000 [sic] aid program proposed for the next fiscal year by the Japanese government.”

The fourth complaint concerned entry of Japanese officials into Okinawa. On this issue, the Embassy noted: “We tend to quibble over the entry of minor Japanese representatives and to delay issuance of permits even in the case of senior Japanese officials such as Mr. Tokuyasu [director general, Prime Minister’s Office]. To limit severely entry permit authorization or to delay the issuance of permits conveys a most negative impression of U.S. intentions.”

In response, the Office of the High Commissioner asserted that Caraway’s approach toward the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus was, basically, that he and his staff “must look beyond policy,” that is, the U.S. policy declared by President Kennedy in March 1962, to the “U.S. objectives” that this policy sought to achieve. These objectives were defined by “the military situation in the Far East [which] alone dictates that the United States must have complete administrative control in the Ryukyu Islands and freedom of action as to deployment, entry and exit of military units, weapons and individual personnel. Further, the internal security of Okinawa as a base demands certain restrictions with respect to travel of individuals. Moreover, the military situation demands that the Ryukyuan populace remain generally content with U.S. administration and the U.S. not divert troop strength on Okinawa to internal policing or other duties alien to their primary mission.”

In another document, H. N. Simmons, the director of USCAR’s Public Safety Department, rebuked a U.S. embassy official for his “implications that we should ‘knuckle under’ to Japanese public opinion in regards to denial of travel of individuals other than those posing strictly a security risk.” Simmons justified entry denials from Japan and elsewhere for “security or other reasons” under “SOP [standard operating procedure] established at the direction of the High Commissioner [Caraway].” USCAR travel requirements, he noted, “are geared to protect not only U.S. security but also . . . the Ryukyuan labor market and economic enterprises.” If the activities of a Japanese person while in Okinawa “are detrimental to U.S. interests either for security, economical or political reasons,” USCAR would “expeditiously” deport them in order to prevent “business ‘grabs’ and adverse political influences.” Simmons believed that, in any case, it was “a good policy to have an indirect reminder to Japan through control of travel, that Okinawa is in fact administered by the U.S. and separated from Japan under current treaties.”

In other words, the High Commissioner “is not receptive to any program sponsored by the Government of Japan unless it is carefully thought out, adequate, and meets a real need which does not undercut U.S. administration in the Ryukyu Islands.” In order for the United States to achieve its overall objective in Okinawa, the High Commissioner pointed out that it should “provide more aid than the government of Japan,” hopefully, “in

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52Harriman J. N. Simmons, “SOP re Notification of Entry Denials,” 18 October 1962.
53Ibid.
the order of magnitude of 2 to 1.\textsuperscript{54}

And, in order to ensure the security of the base, the High Commissioner "must exercise care in screening requests for entry into the Ryukyu Islands of all Government of Japan officials . . . . It would be inconceivable, for example, for the high commissioner to authorize entry of Diet members from the governing and opposition parties at the time of a weapons demonstration or the annual Nike service practice. Such an action would provide a built-in platform for the opposition party." The High Commissioner would not compromise the U.S. occupation of the islands.

The High Commissioner stated he objected to the head of the Japanese Liaison Office in Naha participating in the tripartite consultations "in his capacity as the Liaison Office Chief"; he would not object if the official were to participate "as an individual" or to wear another official title. He noted that competition in the free textbook case had been started by the Japanese government and that "in any other area in which the Government of Japan offers competition, the high commissioner can counter with as much success as was met in this case." The high commissioner "can see no need to authorize construction of additional hospital facilities without the medical personnel to maintain those facilities" and he "sees no sense in dispatching doctors to isolated areas for [a] period less than two years."

It was Caraway's basic belief that "for U.S. administration to be effective, it must be substantive and not the mere holding of a right of administration." If Japan was allowed to enhance its role in Okinawa, that right would become "increasingly meaningless" and the United States would eventually find itself holding "a hollow shell of administrative rights . . . . while the substance of administrative control is exercised by Japan."

In his messages to the Legislature, Caraway rarely referred to "Japan," "Japanese assistance" to Okinawa, U.S-Japanese cooperation for Okinawa, or the possibility of ultimate reversion to Japanese administration. In fact, he was known for his rinichi or "separatist" policy of alienating Okinawa from Japan contrary to the increasing efforts of the Ryukyuan and Japanese governments to "integrate" their institutions in various fields. When the GRI enacted a law, authorized by Booth, to provide its Liaison Office in Tokyo with the power to promote integration, for example, the high commissioner amended it to place the office under his supervision. During his administration, the United States established a museum of Ryukyuan historical documents and artifacts in the ancient capital of Shuri and sponsored other programs to promote the Okinawan people's awareness of their history and culture and their "Ryukyuan" identity.

Travel between Okinawa and Japan was more severely restricted than ever before. Applications for travel to the mainland withheld or disproved in 1963 numbered forty but were 110 for the first four months of 1964, compared with a total of 201 over the preceding ten years.\textsuperscript{55} Those refused exit permits included students, doctors, patients and housewives. Reasons for refusal were not disclosed.

Caraway also angered many Okinawans and stunned officials in Washington and To-

\textsuperscript{54}Tokuji Tokonami, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives and vice-chairman of the Special Okinawa Problems Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party confirmed in December 1963 that the ratio of Japanese and U.S. assistance to Okinawa was "established at 1 to 3," noting that this limited Japanese aid to ¥2,000,000,000 in fiscal 1963 when "a distribution tax and many other grant-in-aid funds in the amount of ¥20,000,000,000 to ¥30,000,000,000 would naturally be delivered to Okinawa" if it were a prefecture of Japan. "Review of the Okinawa Problem," December 1963. Department of State RG 59 Central Department Files 1964-1966, Box 2625, F4.

\textsuperscript{55}Okinawa-ken Fukki Toso-shi, 176.
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kyo with a speech he gave on March 5, 1963. His statements so “appalled” Adlai E. Stevenson, in fact, that the then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations sent a telegram to Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, and personally called the attention of Robert A. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, to Caraway’s remarks. “Viewed from our perspective,” he told Rusk, “it [Caraway’s speech] has [a] general tone of paternalism and indefinite extension of external control easily susceptible to anti-U.S. exploitation in UN, where prevailing statement is strongly and emotionally in [the] direction of [an] ‘inalienable’ right [of] all people to self-determination. . . . Even if special problems confront our administration in Ryukyus, [this] speech contradicts repeatedly proclaimed US policies toward dependent people in refusing even ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government’ and in interpreting them also to mean only independence.”

In a letter to McNamara, with a copy to President Johnson, Stevenson added: “I cannot believe . . . that the policy of the United States in that area, as represented in the speech, can be so inconsistent with our general policy in regard to politically dependent peoples. If it is, a general review is in order. I hope, therefore, that you can look into this yourself so that any future pronouncements regarding the political status of the Ryukyuans will be in harmony with our general principles and with our broader interests and obligations.” He called Caraway’s speech “patronizing and even dictatorial.”

What upset Stevenson—and many others in Okinawa, Japan and the United States—were Caraway’s attacks on the Government of the Ryukyus as irresponsible and ineffective. The theme of his speech, to members of the Golden Gate Club, an elite group of Okinawans who had studied at American universities under GARIOA or U.S. Army scholarships, was “autonomy.” He described the autonomy pursued by Okinawans as “self-government without any outside control” or “sovereignty,” and declared: “If we are to face reality, we must conclude that autonomy for the Ryukyus, or any area that is a political subdivision, is impossible. It is no more possible with a state, or a province, or a prefectural government than it is under the United States Civil Administration as provided by Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Autonomy at the present time is a myth; it does not exist. And it won’t exist unless you Ryukyuans determine of your own free wills that you wish once again to become an independent nation-state.”

The High Commissioner was apparently frustrated by what he called the “failures” of the three branches of the Government of the Ryuku Islands to carry out their duties responsibly or effectively. Although the United States was continuously reviewing what additional functions it could transfer to the Ryukyu government, he said, the transfer was contingent upon the “degree of ‘responsibility’ and of ‘capability’ (as measured by achievement) rather than the hue and cry after ‘autonomy’” by the Ryukan government. He accused the executive branch of having failed to benefit the general public instead of special interest groups or privileged segments of society; the legislative branch failed to enact “all the legislation” needed for the welfare of the people, and the judiciary branch failed to carry out speedy justice.

He pointed to such examples of bad government as:

1. The executive branch of the GRI only held the unemployment insurance fund in

56 Stevenson to Rusk. NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1963, Box 4029, F2. Stevenson to McNamara, 20 March 1963. Ibid.
trust for the workers. Yet, the GRI had tried a number of times to divert it to purposes other than for the benefit of the workers.

2. The GRI had tended to regard all actions during a labor dispute, be they criminal acts or not, as part of the dispute. From a legal point of view, this was a fraud committed upon the entire community by the authorities and an irresponsible act.

3. The government had licensed two sugar mills across the street from one another, when that could not be justified economically.

4. Directors of a bank were permitted to make unsecured loans to commercial corporations they headed, which would have constituted a felony elsewhere. GRI refused to act and sought to evade its responsibilities and shift the blame to the United States Administration.

5. The Legislature drafted a medical services bill which failed to provide the annual inspections necessary for the protection of the public and a workmen’s accident compensation bill which made the taxpayers, instead of the employer, liable for on-the-job injuries suffered by workers.

Under such circumstances, Caraway asserted, the cry for “autonomy” was a “rabble-rousing, excusing [excusing] alibi for failures” and the cry for “complete freedom from all restraints, for power to rule without responsibility or demonstrated competence is a false ‘aspiration of the people’. It is, unwittingly or wantonly, a screen to hide incompetence; irresponsibility; disloyalty to the community which vested authority in it; or it is a shield for special interest and special privilege battening on the remainder of the community.”

Caraway’s allegations were not all unfounded. Indeed, he had done all he could to put the house in order. He personally reviewed the bills that had been worked out between GRI and USCAR officials, sometimes forcing the executive branch to delay or even cancel its submission to the Legislature. When the ruling party passed a bill in a committee of the Legislature to reduce income tax, the High Commissioner pressured it to withdraw the bill out of concern for its possible adverse effect on Senate deliberations on U.S. appropriations for Okinawa. After GRI warnings against inappropriate practices at certain banks failed to be effective, the High Commissioner issued an ordinance empowering the Chief Executive to supervise and regulate operations of the GRI-licensed banks more tightly; this led to the establishment of a GRI board of bank inspectors. The High Commissioner later revised the ordinance, promoting the board to make it an independent organ and permitting the high commissioner to interfere directly in its work if necessary. Subsequently, directors of five banks and two insurance companies resigned from their posts or were charged with corruption. At the Bank of the Ryukyus, owned 51 percent by the United States, the president and directors resigned after the high commissioner criticized its inefficiency.

The High Commissioner undoubtedly took these and other actions with the best of motivations and intentions to carry out his duties as defined by the Executive Order. Here was the man who had originally suggested the dispatch of a high-powered survey mission to Okinawa and who appealed to congressional committees for increased U.S. aid to Okinawa. Caraway raised the minimum wages of Okinawan employees of the U.S. and government contractors from twelve cents to fourteen cents an hour, repealed Civil Administration Ordinance 145 which required a labor union to be non-threatening to the

58 Ota, Okinawa no Teio, 207-08.
security of the U.S. forces in Okinawa in order to be recognized as a bona-fide organization, and extended three-year multiple trip travel documents to Okinawan students studying in Japan. Many Okinawans applauded his anti-corruption measures, although they were annoyed by other ordinances such as the one which regulated not only cultivation, distribution and use of narcotics and sedatives but the distribution and use of regular tranquilizers, painkillers and cold cures as well.

His tight rein on local self-government and his autonomy-as-a-myth speech, however, betrayed not only the spirit of the possible amendment to Section 6 of Executive Order 10713, but his own words to a congressional subcommittee:

Under the U.S. administration, the Ryukyans possess the right to elect their own legislature, to maintain their own court system, to levy taxes and budget their revenues. The basic liberties enjoyed by people in democratic countries are preserved to them. In all major respects the rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States under its constitution apply with equal effect to Ryukyans. 59

His style also contrasted with the conciliatory approach of his predecessor, General Booth. In his last message to the Legislature, Booth had suggested that the “development of an effective and responsible government... with the highest degree of autonomy consistent with the legal status and with the minimum degree of reliance on outside assistance” should be one of the objectives of the Ryukyuan government and people while under U.S. administration. Booth emphasized that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands should make close cooperation with the United States its basic policy and that both the USCAR and the GRI should welcome the cooperation of the Japanese government in the development of the economy and welfare.

Caraway instead offended and alienated even the ruling Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party which had just won a majority. The party, led by Chief Executive Ota, had incurred Caraway’s wrath in March 1963 when it published a document criticizing the High Commissioner’s “direct rule” for negating the principle of President Kennedy’s new policy toward Okinawa. Specifically, the pro-American party pointed to the U.S. failure to implement fully President Kennedy’s statement and called for an end to the practice of “prior adjustment” of legislative draft bills, for a greater delegation of authority to Okinawans, for their right to elect their own chief executive, and rescission of high commission ordinances governing the economy and financial institutions. USCAR ridiculed the document as an attempt “to demonstrate that [the party] had more backbone when standing against the United States than the party had received credit for.” 60 Akio Nagamine, speaker of the Legislature and a former LDP member, made an unusual public statement calling both on the Chief Executive to deal with bills at his own volition and on the high commissioner to refrain from interfering with autonomy. The High Commissioner was alleged to have undertaken too personal a control of the details of civil administration, sometimes directly approaching individual legislators over the heads of the USCAR and the Chief Executive.

Shannon B. McCune, the first civilian civil administrator, had apparently been so frustrated working under Caraway—who reportedly considered the former scholar as a mere

60 High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1963-64, Vol. XII, 29.
“errand boy” without any authority—that he left the post in February 1964, barely two years after his appointment, to return to academic life. He would be replaced by Gerald Warner, political adviser to the High Commissioner.

Never before had a High Commissioner himself become such a political issue. Amid the confusion, President Lyndon Johnson announced Caraway’s retirement from service, effective August 1, and appointed Lieutenant General Albert Watson as his successor. Caraway was undeterred by Johnson’s announcement, and maintained his “iron rule” until his departure.

“From Chief Executive on down,” Rafael Steinberg of the Washington Post reported from Naha, the people believed that “democracy in the Ryukyus was a sham”; for, in their view, “only one man’s opinion really counts. And that is Caraway[s].”

“When an administrator holds the power to rule by decree, can veto laws or administer them, and controls the economy and the courts, then public opinion may not seem very important,” Steinberg observed in another article. “But in the view of many responsible and influential Okinawan leaders, including some of those most friendly to the U.S., many of the problems faced by the American rulers on Okinawa, and much of the grumbling and dissatisfaction, might fade away if the high commissioner paid as much attention to local desires as he does to pure efficiency.”

Seisaku Ota, who had often been criticized as being too subservient to Caraway even by members of his own Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), retorted that the Chief Executive’s political responsibility was necessarily limited in Okinawa where, he said, sovereignty lay with the United States, not with the people. Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga, who had also been appointed by the High Commissioner, publicly acknowledged that autonomy had been “shelved,” or at least had lost too much ground.

On June 10, 1964, the OLDP joined the other parties in adopting a resolution in the Legislature requesting public election of the Chief Executive and expansion of political autonomy. A few days later, Ota was denounced by the secretary general of his party for his “responsibility in connection with the past direct administration of the High Commissioner, and the recent random issuance of ordinances.” When he pledged to abide by a party decision seeking his resignation as the Chief Executive, but failed to provide the exact date he would step down from the post, eleven legislators and Mayor Junji Nishime of Naha left the party in protest. In its public statement, the dissident group enumerated a series of “unacceptable political phenomena” under the High Commissioner’s direct rule: among them, “the myth of autonomy and the High Commissioner’s manipulation of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands; the pre- and post-adjustment of bills; direct investigation by the High Commissioner into the execution of the budget and into Noren (Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations) and financial institutions; direct inspection of the construction of schools and vessels; and delay in the establishment of the Joint Tax Council.”

Ota tendered his resignation to Caraway a few days later, to be joined by the Deputy Chief Executive and all departmental directors. The High Commissioner, however, would neither accept nor reject Ota’s resignation immediately. Caraway was bound by Executive

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63Ota later wrote that Caraway was “self-righteous like Hitler,” believing that “the end justifies the means.” Seisaku Ota, Omoide-o Zuihitsu-ni Nosete (private publication, 1970), 310. Also see Ota, Rekishi no Shogen (Tokyo: Rikitomi Shobo, 1980), 311-20.
Order 10713 requiring him to nominate a chief executive on the basis of an acceptable nomination made by the Legislature, but the legislature was not in a position to nominate Ota's successor and all parties were advocating public election of the chief executive.

In Japan, the director general of the Prime Minister's Office called on the U.S. Embassy and said that "the successive promulgation of ordinances... runs counter" to the spirit of President Kennedy's statement and lamented the so-called "direct rule" of the High Commissioner. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato himself later told Ambassador Reischauer that the presidential statement was not being implemented in Okinawa. He said that Caraway had not shown proper understanding of the situation, which had "retrogressed rather than progressed." It was interesting that the Prime Minister was not concerned about the Okinawan people's autonomy alone. Sato was also worried that the unrest might adversely affect Japan's own security.

Caraway left Okinawa on August 1, 1965, and Watson finally accepted Ota's resignation in October when the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party and its dissident group reached a compromise and agreed to support Seiho Matsuoka's nomination as the next chief executive.

Five years later, Caraway spoke his mind about Okinawa and Japan in a Japanese magazine. He called the Japanese government's repeated inquiries since the Korean War about the American right to station its forces on Okinawa "dreary reiteration of the same question." Washington's answer, he stated, should have been that its forces were there because Japan invited them by its attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Okinawans, he said, were "free to leave [their island] at any time they desire[d]," but, in spite of their "complaints and cries of spurious distress," they remained on the island "rather than to go back to their home islands where there are no military installations, or to seek employment in Japan, a country that has no military forces and is now facing a perennial labor shortage." His only conclusion—or, rather, "the only conclusion that, we, the people of the United States"—could draw from these and other factors, was either that "Japan is seeking to gratuitously embarrass the United States" or that Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party was trying to divert the attention of the Japanese people away from its failure to solve domestic problems.

Watson took a decisively different approach to the administration of the Ryukyus. Six months after he assumed his position, He told the Legislature that he was not recommending any specific acts of legislation—a total departure from his predecessors—"because... I recognize it to be the responsibility of the Legislature to enact such laws on matters of domestic application as will contribute to the welfare and well-being of the people." The U.S. Civil Administration, he said, had "moved significantly and rapidly toward its goal of providing advisory services to the GRI rather than engaging in direct administration."

USCAR transferred so many functions to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands that, by February 1966, only 96 ordinances remained in effect, down from 145 in August 1964

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64 U.S. Embassy to the Department of State, 9 July 1964. RG 59 Central Dept Files 1964-1966, Box 2625 F4.
65 Reischauer to Rusk, "Japanese Prime Minister Questioning about U.S. Conflict of Interest on Okinawa," 7 July 1964. Dept of State Record No. 76691.
66 Ibid.
when he took office. Watson said the government performed “effectively and efficiently.” Unlike his predecessors, he would not “make a detailed report on the economic and political situation, or . . . request specific legislation, or even . . . describe in detail the situations requiring legislation.” Henceforth, the Chief Executive would assume full responsibility for recommending the annual legislative agenda to the Legislature.

Watson’s conciliatory approach pleased Okinawan and Japanese leaders. He had a good working relationship with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese government, and U.S.-Japan relations on Okinawa improved during his administration. His arrival on the island was followed by the visit to Okinawa of Director General Soichi Usui of the Prime Minister’s Office, the visit of a survey mission of the Japan Socialist Party, Watson’s meeting with Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo, and the arrival of a Japanese government economic survey mission. The functions of the Japan-U.S. consultative committee were expanded under diplomatic notes exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo. “Instead of insisting that Ryukyuan laws conform to American standards in every detail, as did his predecessor,” the Washington Post’s Rafael Steinberg wrote, “Watson lets the elected Ryukyuan legislature write and pass its own laws. He and the staff of the U.S. Civil Administration give advice, but even if unsatisfied with a bill they do not step in to block it.” Indeed, the GRI Legislature adopted, and the chief executive signed, a bill designating the Japanese Constitution Day (May 3) a legal holiday—without any obstruction from the High Commissioner. Watson was also given credit for simplifying travel procedures and relaxing travel restrictions, abolishing restrictive labor regulations and the requirement of prior approval for publications, as well as generally respecting Okinawan opinions and improving their conditions.

Then, in the summer of 1966, the High Commissioner stumbled over what turned out to be a trip line: he directed that the GRI Appellate Court transfer two pending cases—one involving taxation on mackerel and the other election results—to the USCAR Civil Court in accordance with Executive Order 10713. The 1957 order had empowered the High Commissioner to transfer “any case or controversy of particular importance affecting the interests of the United States” to a USCAR court. In the first case, the GRI Central Circuit Court had challenged the validity of the High Commissioner’s retroactive amendment to his Ordinance No. 17 (Commodity Tax Law) against Executive Order 10713; the Ryukyuan government appealed to the Appellate Court where it was pending. In the second case, the Central Circuit Court questioned the validity of Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68 (Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands). The Central Election Administration Commission filed an appeal in this case, too, which was awaiting a decision from the Appellate Court.

Since the United States had “the right to exercise [any or] all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction” over the Okinawan people under Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, USCAR noted, “the propriety and legality of any official act” of the U.S. administration in the Ryukyus was “properly subject to examination by U.S. authority only.” In other words, only USCAR courts had the authority to rule—or the power of

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71 There were three levels of GRI courts: sessions courts, superior courts, and an appellate court, each made up of one or more American judges, employed by the United States Government and appointed by the high commissioner.
judicial review—on the “constitutionality” of the U.S. ordinances; the Ryukyuan courts had invaded the U.S. jurisdiction. The transfer order—and the High Commissioner’s rationale—immediately backfired and turned many Okinawans against him and the United States: it posed a serious threat to what they considered their last sanctuary for justice under foreign rule: the integrity of the court.

Independent legislator Choko Chinen tendered his resignation in protest against the High Commissioner’s action, which he said disregarded the judicial power of the Ryukyuan government. This prompted the Prefectural Council of Labor Unions and the Okinawa Teachers’ Association to call for the resignation of all legislators. The Legislature adopted a unanimous resolution to request a repeal of the transfer order; other organizations, such as the Naha City Assembly, the Council of Municipal Speakers, the Teachers’ Association, the Okinawa Reversion Council, the Ryukyu Bar Association, and the Civil Liberties Union followed suit in a movement reminiscent of the island-wide protests against the U.S. land policy in the 1950s. The Chief Justice of the Appellate Court, who had been appointed by the high commissioner, made a similar request and expressed his intention to resign. The Legislature adopted two additional resolutions, one addressed to the American President and Congress and the other to the Japanese government, and sent two members to Tokyo to request the Japanese government’s help for the withdrawal of the order. The human rights committee of the Second Tokyo Bar Association made a statement criticizing the High Commissioner’s order as “an unjust interference into the judicial jurisdiction” of the Government of the Ryukyus and a violation of President Kennedy’s Executive Order which guaranteed the Okinawan people’s fundamental rights and freedoms.

Watson, nonetheless, proceeded to appoint Stephen H. Simes from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Headquarters in Japan, and two other American judges to the USCAR Civil Court on September 28. On the same day, President Johnson announced Watson’s retirement. He left the island on October 2.

Hearings continued through mid-October. Not once did the accused or his counsel in the election case appear in court during the proceedings. The USCAR Civil Court finally announced its findings on December 2. Significantly, the court not only upheld the validity of U.S. ordinances in both cases, but also ruled, in Judge Simes’ words, that the Ryukyuan courts were “clothed with jurisdiction to examine a legislative act of the High Commissioner in the light of the Executive Order.” Simes further declared that these courts could determine validity or invalidity of ordinances, but that this did not give “finality” to their decisions, which could still be reviewed by USCAR courts. This was considered a monumental ruling. Executive Order 10713 had seemingly given the highest USCAR appellate court the sole power to “interpret” the Executive Orders and proclamations, ordinances and orders of the High Commissioner.

In spite of the controversial court transfer issue, Watson earned high credit for his policy of delegating to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands functions that were not essential to the security interests of the United States. In 1965, for example, Watson not only rescinded three ordinances and two directives which were considered obsolete or covered adequately by GRI laws, but amended a number of Civil Administration (CA) ordinances and proclamations and high commission ordinances and directives, delegating more functions and responsibilities to the GRI. In September 1966, he rescinded or amended eleven acts altogether in what he called a “house cleaning” exercise. They included U.S. Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 1 of 1945, CA Ordinance No. 95 of 1953 (“Elec-

73 Secretariat, GRI Appellate Court, Saibanshoho (Court Journal), 10 February 1967.