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## Some Notes on the First Ch'ing Administration of Eastern Turkestan

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SOME NOEPS ON THE FIRST CH'ING ADMINISTRATION  
OF EASTERN TURKESTAN

by

Henry G. Schwarz

(Incomplete Draft)

The first fifty years of Ch'ing rule in Eastern Turkestan were, with the major exception of the revolt at Uch-Turkhan,<sup>1</sup> a peaceful and prosperous period. Saguchi Tōru has offered us much information about the social and economic conditions of the period.<sup>2</sup> His work deserves to be made better known to Westerners<sup>3</sup> but that task is best left for another time. The objective of this paper is much more modest: it is merely to elaborate on a few points that have so far received little or no attention by scholars, to wit, the structure and functions of the military and civilian administrations. My main sources are contemporary or near-contemporary accounts by Ch'ing officials, some of whom had personal experience in Eastern Turkestan.<sup>4</sup>

The Military Administration

The Ch'ing dynasty came to Eastern Turkestan rather late. Not until 116 years after the conventional beginning of the dynasty did the armies of Manchu China penetrate Central Asia and subjugate the peoples on both sides of the T'ien Shan. Moreover, it was

be fairly speculated that had the Court not allowed itself to be-  
 come entangled in some internal squabbles among the Dzungars,<sup>5</sup>  
 Ch'ing would have stayed away from that part of the world for much  
 longer. Of course, it can and has been argued that Ch'ing was  
 eager to expand its control (see, e.g., its repeated intervention  
 in Tibet), but I reject this view for reasons spelled out else-  
 where.<sup>6</sup>

In any event, Ch'ing armies crushed the Dzungars by 1757  
 and two years later found themselves in control over Eastern  
 Turkestan as well. Continuing their military operations on both  
 sides of the T'ien Shan, the troops secured the border by re-  
 peated invasions of neighboring territories. In 1756, 1757, and  
 again in 1760, they enforced the submission of the nomadic peoples.  
 Both the Middle Horde and the Little Horde of the Kazakhs as well  
 as the Kirghiz began to send tribute missions to Ch'ing. Like-  
 wise, the state of Kokand began to send tribute.<sup>7</sup>

The armies had swept down across the T'ien Shan because two  
 Muslim leaders who had earlier been liberated from a Dzungar  
 detention camp by Ch'ing armies had dared to call for an uprising  
 in the South. This minor provocation was sufficient to shift the  
 momentum of the victorious troops southward. But if Ch'ing had a  
 preconceived plan of annihilating the Dzungars and of securing the

North, it had no definite plans for Eastern Turkestan with whose population it had no serious disagreements.

Help came in the form of a memorial to the Ch'ien-lung emperor, sent by Chao Hui 兆惠, the commanding general of all forces in Eastern Turkestan, on September 13, 1759, shortly before his return to Peking. Chao Hui recommended a four-point policy: (1) non-interference in the religious and secular practices of the native population; (2) the widest possible use of natives in most administrative functions, including those of taxation and justice; (3) the freezing of the tax level to that of the previous Dzungar overlords; and (4) the exclusive use of all taxes within Eastern Turkestan, specifically for the maintenance of the garrison forces and the operation of the military and civilian administrations.<sup>8</sup>

The Court adopted Chao Hui's plan for indirect rule because it seemed best suited to extricate Ch'ing from a potentially troublesome and expensive situation. Direct rule through annexation, the other major alternative, would have obliged Ch'ing not only to staff the entire civilian administration with Chinese and Manchu officials but also to maintain large garrison forces to give adequate protection to those officials. Two major problems with this option became immediately apparent. The added drain on the central treasury would have been far larger than the Court was

evidently willing to tolerate. Moreover, the natives were likely to resent direct administration by alien officials, backed up by an army of occupation, as a loathsome burden. This option would probably provoke them into early and widespread uprisings which, in turn, would then obligate the dynasty to protect its heavy investment by committing still more troops and treasure to Eastern Turkestan.

For the next fifty years or so, Chao Hui's policy seemed to work as, except for the revolt at Uch-Turfan, Eastern Turkestan remained peaceful on the surface. But soon thereafter, provocateurs from Kokand fanned accumulated grievances against both the native rulers and their Ch'ing overlords into a series of revolts that culminated in the Great Muslim Rebellion of the late nineteenth century.

One major reason for increasing discontent in Eastern Turkestan may have been the wholly military character of the Ch'ing regional administration. In 1760, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Kashgar was made the seat of the councillor (參贊大臣 ts'antsan tach'en) who, despite his civilian-sounding title, was in command of all forces in the region.<sup>9</sup> Eleven major cities were controlled by imperial agents (辦事大臣 panshih tach'en). They were Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hissar, Khotan, Uch-Turfan, Akser

Kucha, Yijian, Hami, Tufan, and Karashar.<sup>10</sup> Each major city had between five and twenty smaller towns under its jurisdiction, headed by a commander (領隊大臣 lingtui tach'en).

While the Manchu troops were garrisoned in the cities and helped man some of the kalun 卡倫 (see below), Chinese troops shared these duties but also were engaged, here and there, in fields and mines. Manchu and Chinese garrisons 營<sup>11</sup> were strictly segregated, each having its own complete chain of command. The Manchus were responsible to the Ili general and the Chinese to the provincial commander-in-chief (提督 t'itu) whose office was originally located at Barkul and moved in 1764 to Urumchi.<sup>12</sup> As Table 1 shows, Chinese troops were garrisoned in every major city of Eastern Turkestan, but Manchu banners were stationed only in those cities close to the border, like Kashgar, Yangi Shar, Yarkand and Aksu. After the suppression of the revolt at Uch-Turfan, both Manchu and Chinese garrisons were also established in that city.

The total number of Ch'ing forces in the eight cities of Eastern Turkestan was a surprisingly low 5,000. It proved to be adequate for supervising a variety of civilian functions during peacetime, but had to be beefed up in times of unrest and revolt. Fortunately for the dynasty, it was not forced to rush troops from

the interior until late in the nineteenth century because until then, revolts seldom occurred in more than one place at a time. Thus, when the people of Uch-Turfan rose against their begs and Ch'ing overlords in 1764, troops sent from neighboring Aksu as well as from Ili north of the T'ien Shan managed to put down the revolt.<sup>13</sup> The Ch'ing troops were aided by Muslim troops, but we know very little about them. Ho-ning mentions that Kashgar had 500 Muslim troops.<sup>14</sup> Elsewhere, he merely says that Muslim soldiers were used for kalun duty in this place or that no Muslim soldiers were stationed in that place.<sup>15</sup> It is clear from these isolated remarks that this was not a part-time militia but a full-time auxiliary branch of the Ch'ing command. A non-Chinese source, reporting on the region at a much later date, probably in the late 1870's, spoke of 10,000 to 15,000 Muslim troops in addition to the 17,000 to 25,000 Ch'ing forces.<sup>16</sup> If it can be assumed that this ratio was about the same a century earlier, it would seem that a relatively small force of about 3,000 Muslim troops assisted the Ch'ing garrisons in the period from 1760 to 1800. This, however, is an extremely uncertain hypothesis.

We have a set of regulations for the garrison at Kashgar around 1800 that shed considerable light on some administrative details.<sup>17</sup> Thirty-four of the fifty-three regulations listed by Ho-ning dealt with military matters, thereby underscoring my earlier

remark about the nature of the first Ch'ing administration of Eastern Turkestan.<sup>18</sup> The thousand troops stationed at Kashgar were responsible not only for the city itself but a large territory running 370 li from east to west, with the longest distance being 510 li from northwest to southeast.<sup>19</sup> They had at least one major military review every year.<sup>20</sup> During the rest of the year, the troops underwent some drill with firearms, but the tight budget restrictions imposed by the Court's policy probably prevented the troops from being combat-ready. Only 200 chin of lead annually were allotted to the 1,300 troops of Kashgar and Yangi Shar.<sup>21</sup> In the city, troops manned the gates and towers and kept the crowds under constant surveillance. They also helped to augment their rations sent from Shensi and Kansu by growing vegetables in the city's moats.<sup>22</sup> This, however, was the only agricultural activity the Kashgar garrison had to perform as, unlike other garrisons, it did not maintain t'unt'ien 屯田.<sup>23</sup> The garrison also had to handle litigation involving Chinese merchants, issue travel warrants to Chinese merchants plying their trade within Eastern Turkestan, and manage Chinese merchants in the suburbs by issuing licenses and collecting rent.<sup>24</sup> The garrison was also in charge of transporting money and goods destined for Kashgar and garrisons beyond, like Yangi Shar, Yarkand, and Khotan, and of collecting tax on silk goods, horses, oxen and sheep passing through chün t'ai 車台, or military post stations.

A particularly onerous task was the handling of prisoners. We have no figures for any period of time but do know that the Kashgar garrison dealt with two kinds of prisoners. One group consisted of criminals banished from the interior as slaves (奴人 nur). They were distributed by the Manchu (or Chinese?) seal office (印房 yin fang) to the various cities and towns and placed in the care of begs.<sup>25</sup> The other group was convicted military officers and men of the Tsungaria command. They were handed over to Ch'ing forces throughout the Kashgar district where they performed manual duties. It is not known whether other garrisons in Eastern Turkestan received either type of prisoner, but it is likely that they did.

Finally, a major task of every garrison was the manning of kalun 卡倫, or border stations. The kalun of Kucha and Karashar, farthest removed from the western frontier, were staffed by Chinese and Muslims or only by Muslims.<sup>26</sup> Khotan, closer to the frontier, staffed its kalun only with Chinese. Yarkand, still closer, had Chinese troops commanded by imperial guardsmen (侍衛 shih-wei). The kalun of Kashgar, Yangi Yul, Uch-Turfan, and Aksu, closest to the frontier had Manchu instead of Chinese troops, supplemented by Muslims and commanded by imperial guardsmen.<sup>27</sup>

The kalun of Kashgar were easily the most important because they handled by far most of the traffic across the frontier (see

below). 150 Manchu troops were distributed to seven major and ten minor kalun.<sup>28</sup> Each major kalun was commanded by an imperial guardsmen who was assisted by ten to twenty Manchus and nine to nineteen Muslims. Each major kalun also had one interpreter (通事 t'ungshih) who was not only to make life easier between Manchus and Muslims but to interpret between the imperial guardsmen and the foreigners passing through his kalun.<sup>29</sup> The small size clearly demonstrates that kalun were not expected to defend against invasions from Kokand with whom China had peaceful relations or from the Kirghiz who were in no position to launch a major military attack. Accordingly, each kalun had very little in the way of arms, to wit, ten to twenty fowling pieces, 300 to 400 arrows (no bows listed), fifty to 100 chin of gunpowder, 300 to 500 bullets, and ten to twenty wicks (? 火 索 huosheng). The number of fowling pieces listed would indicate that either the Muslims were not armed or that each man, Manchu and Muslim alike, had a weapon issued to him and that the fowling pieces listed were permanently stored in each kalun as reserve weapons.

The garrison at Kashgar was heavily engaged in foreign relations because of the city's historical role as a major commercial crossroads and its geographical proximity to Kokand which in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a considerable economic and military power. The Ch'ing world view demanded con-

tinued adherence to the notion of tribute in official records, but in one corner of the empire at Kashgar, it was trade pure and simple, with the Kokandian gradually gaining the upper hand. Between 1789 and 1809, Kokandian trade delegations visited Kashgar no fewer than twenty-four times.<sup>30</sup>

Because Ch'ing persisted in pretending that this increasing commercial activity, initiated and dominated by Kokand, was tribute, the garrison at Kashgar was obliged to spend an inordinate amount of the red treasure on Kokandian trade missions. According to the Kashgar regulations,

"when the envoys of Akin of Kokand arrive. . . each member is given, according to regulations, a banquet using one sheep, eight sen chin of white wheat flour, white rice, oil, tea, firewood, and fifty-two cash for pocket money. Envoys and servants also receive one sheep and one-half chin of white rice daily. [When they] proceed from here to Yarkand, [they receive] five days' rations of two sheep, tea, and rice at reduced prices [折錢 che ch'ien]. When they return, they are supplied as before. Complete and submit to court."<sup>31</sup>

In a general sense, the regime did derive considerable benefits

from Ch'ing's notion of superiority. Whenever Kirghiz arrived in the Kashgar region, they were presented with horses and wine, a half roll of silk goods, and one sheep.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, on the first and fifteenth of each lunar month (? 朔望 shuo wang), the garrison made provisions available for feasting the Kirghiz.<sup>33</sup>

Every garrison and each of its subordinate units were tightly supervised by the Court through an elaborate system of inspections and reports. Annual and semi-annual inspections of the city fortifications, kalun, chün t'ai, t'unt'ien, and garrisons were conducted by the principal officers, i.e. the councillor, imperial agents, and commanders. The task of supervising all activities mentioned earlier rested primarily with the seal office, indisputably the nerve center of each garrison. It also received a constant stream of routine reports from all subordinate units, like kalun, chün t'ai, t'unt'ien, copper mines, granaries, stables, and armaments. No detail seemed too insignificant for reporting. For example, reports included such things as the exact amount of alfalfa grown and consumed by each garrison's horses and livestock. At the end of an unreckoned year, the Kashgar garrison had not expended all of its allotted 200 shih of lead. It dutifully reported that the surplus came to fourteen chün, twelve liang, and nine ch'ien.<sup>34</sup>

The Manchu and Chinese seal office - compiled and condensed

these reports and had a special office, the memorial office (摺房 che fang), write them up in the proper form and send them to the governor-general (總督 taunpu) of Shensi and Kansu who, in turn, forwarded them to the throne. The huge stream of communications between Peking and Eastern Turkestan was carried by a system of chin t'ai in Turkestan and i-chen 驛站, the civilian postal system within and without the Wall.<sup>35</sup>

#### The Civilian Administration

While Ch'ing garrisons were supposed to keep a watchful eye on the natives, they did not actually govern them. This task was left to the bago. The word bago had been commonplace in Central Asia long before the Ch'ing conquest. It was a generic term that encompassed a large variety of different kinds of officials. Table 2 lists seventeen titles mentioned by Ho-ning, but probably several more existed around 1600 which he, unfortunately, neglected to specify. At any rate, we do know that at a later time, at least eighteen other kinds of bago held office in Eastern Turkestan.<sup>36</sup>

The civil administration had nine grades, exactly like the regular Ch'ing administration in the interior, but the records do not indicate a further division of each rank into principal (正 cheng and subordinate (從 ts'ung) levels. Moreover, in practice, no native official belonged to the top two ranks nor to the

ninth or lowest rank. The hakim beg was the highest placed native official who was in charge of an entire city and the surrounding region. At the lower end of the scale (and not listed in Table 2) were four kinds of sub-officials. They were (1) interpreters used in kalun (see above); (2) those who helped protect kalun and took care of sheep flocks belonging to kalun (防守卡倫牧羊 fangshou k'ulun su yang); (3) messengers (應差 ying ch'ai or 當差 tang ch'ai) employed by chün t'ai; <sup>37</sup> and "gold button Muslims" (金頂回子 chin ting Huitzu), i.e. civil servants belonging to the seventh and eighth ranks and who appeared to be factotums. <sup>38</sup>

The total number of officials grew steadily after the Ch'ing conquest, from about 245 in 1760 to 259 about 1772 and 277 about 1800 (see Table 3). By the time of the Great Muslim Rebellion seventy years later, the ranks of begs would grow still larger. None of the Chinese sources available to me carry a full account of all sub-officials, but Ho-ning does seem to list at least all "gold buttons" and messengers for all areas, except, strangely enough, Kashgar itself. According to his figures, there were about the year 1800 some 122 "gold buttons" and 495 families working as messengers at chün t'ai. A conservative extrapolation would place the figures for Kashgar at fifty "gold buttons" and 200 messenger families bringing the total for all officials and most sub-officials

in Eastern Turkestan around 1800 to about 449 individuals and 695 families.<sup>39</sup>

Bags of grades 3 through 6 were handsomely remunerated for their services to their Ch'ing overlords, as the following table for Kashgar shows.<sup>40</sup>

Table 4:

Statutory Compensation of Bags in Kashgar, ca. 1800

Grade	Salary (cash)	Land (bataen)	Services (peasants)
3	30,000	150	80
4	12,500-15,000	80-100	30-50
5	7,500	40	15
6	5,000	30	4

The total cost in salaries was 192,500 cash, or approximately the equivalent of 875 liang. Moreover, bags received travel allowances for their periodic reassignments. Like Chinese officials throughout the realm, Muslim bags were moved from place to place at periodic intervals of unknown length. Judging by the detailed information given in Table 5, we must assume that this rule affected all grades except, quite probably, the "gold buttons" and other sub-officials who stayed in their native places and that it was implemented

frequently and routinely.<sup>41</sup>

Table 5

Travel Allowances for Begg, ca. 1800 (in liang)

Between Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Shar, Khotan, Bugur, and Kuria  
And Ili

Grade 3	200
4	150
5 and below	100

Between Aksu, Uch-Turfan, Sairen, Bai, Kucha, and Shayar  
And Ili

Grade 3	150
4	100
5 and below	50

Between Erzhgar, Yarkand, Yangi Shar, and Khotan  
And Kucha, Shayar, Bugur, and Kuria

Grade 3	150
4	100
5 and below	50

Between Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Shar, and Khotan  
And Aksu, Uch-Turfan, Sairen, and Bai

Grade 3	100
4	50
5 and below	30

### The Revolt at Uch-Turfan

The only serious disturbance during the first fifty years of Ch'ing administration in Eastern Turkestan broke out in 1764 in Uch-Turfan. Because the official Ch'ing record gives us a rare insight into the actual conduct of civilian administrative practices as well as into official responses during and after the revolt, I shall quote it at some length.<sup>42</sup>

"After the Dzungars were defeated, the hakim beg of Uch-Turfan, Khwaja Si Beg, captured Davatsi 達瓦齊 and delivered him to the [Ch'ing] forces. He was rewarded with the title wang. Earlier, however, when the two Khwaja brothers had risen in the south, Khwaja Si Beg's loyalty had wavered. [The court], therefore, mistrusted him and ordered him to Peking. He was replaced by the beg of Tami, 'Abd al'lah 阿布都拉 who brought with him many servants and retainers. His rule became unbearable. People were exploited when selling food and cloth to the beg's henchmen. The latter would steal well-fed horses and sheep and sell them on the market. The Manchu imperial agent, Su-ch'ang 蘇成, was foolish and paid no attention to the situation. On the contrary, while drunk, he would commit unseemly acts in the presence of others. He even detained the begs' women in his yamen, had his underlings undress them and amused himself with them ad sorietim.<sup>43</sup>

"In March of 1764, some 240 Muslims were rounded up and sentenced severely. They assembled and planned a revolt. One Muslim escaped and reported to 'Abd al'Lah who, however, scolded him and sent him away. The Muslims did not wish to join the revolt and went jointly to the seal office. But they, too, were scolded and sent away. On that same evening,<sup>44</sup> the revolt started, and 'Abd al'Lah, Su-ch'eng, and their subordinates were all killed. The imperial agent of Aksu, Pien-t'a-ha 邊他哈, learned of the revolt and rushed 500 Muslim troops to Uch-Turfan. The populace there opened the gates to receive them. But Pien-t'a-ha ordered artillery pieces trained on them whereupon the city closed its gates. Two days later, the city was bombarded by artillery. At that time, the rebels numbered only about 400. The rest of the people locked their doors and did not wish to have anything to do with them. Now, however, [that the city was being bombarded, the rebels] forced the population to join the revolt. The rebel leader Alintullish 阿拉木圖喇<sup>45</sup> sent a total of 2,000 infantry and cavalry troops out of the city to do battle. Pien-t'a-ha was defeated and fled. The troops of the imperial agent of Kucha, Ompao 鄯寶, were likewise defeated. Now the councillor of Kash-garia, Na-zhuh-t'ung 納世通, general Ming-jui 明瑞 and the councillor of Ili, Yung-kuei 永貴, all sent their troops and jointly laid siege to Uch-Turfan.<sup>46</sup> [The court] inves-

tigated the circumstances and sentenced Pien-t'a-ha to death. Also Na-shih-t'ung was punished for his responsibility for the revolt. [The government] troops stormed the city day and night. The rebels sent emissaries to all Muslim cities to fan the flames of revolt. At the same time, they asked Kokand and the Kirghiz for help.<sup>47</sup>

"It so happened that the wife of the hakim beg of Yarkand, Odui 鄂對, by the name of Jaimu 熱依木<sup>48</sup> (Yaim? Ijaim?) was visiting Kucha with her son Osman 鄂斯滿 when she heard of these events. At once she rode for five days straight back to Yarkand where she invited all akhuns and aimans<sup>49</sup> to a banquet. She accused them of placing themselves in great danger. Then she encouraged them with the aid of dancing girls to drink until they were all drunk. She had them disarmed and their horses untied and driven several hundred li into the mountains and swamps. Her son Osman led Muslim troops from Kucha to Uch-Turfan.

"Also in Kucha quite a few played with the idea of revolt. The ishikan beg Alayar 阿拉雅爾 assembled all begs daily in front of the imperial agent's yamen. The hakim beg of Aksu, Sadi-bardi 色提巴爾第, was on his way to Peking when he heard of these events and rode for seven days back to Aksu.<sup>51</sup> [The rebels there] did not dare move. Moreover, Pa-tun-pu who had been

sent by the rebels to Kokand was captured by the Kirghiz and handed over [to Ch'ing authorities].

"[These developments] prevented the rebels in Uch-Turfan from receiving aid. [The Ch'ing troops] also cut them off from their kindling wood supplies and herding places. Still, the rebel leaders forcibly kept the people from submitting themselves. The siege continued without success from June<sup>52</sup> until August. Then the army tied up the chief rebels and submitted. [The Ch'ing troops] drove into the city and cut down the rebels and their followers. The entire population of over 10,000 was sent to Ili as colonists.<sup>53</sup> The restoration of order was reported to the throne, and the following regulations were issued: the authority of the hakim beg was to be split up; the followers of Ko-na-t'an 格納坦 were to be eliminated<sup>54</sup>; service obligations were to be equalized for all Muslims; the competition for the post of dugwan beg was to be public; servants of begs were to be kept in check; levies for tax and services were to be publicized; residences of Chinese and Muslims were to be separated; and regulations were to be established for travel by begs and [Ch'ing] officials. Besides, the seat of the councillor was to be moved to Uch-Turfan, and Muslim families were to be shipped from other cities to replace [those who had been sent to Ili]."<sup>55</sup>

### Some Concluding Remarks

The revolt at Uch-Turfan was touched off by a specific provocation, the punishment of some local inhabitants, but it was merely the proverbial straw. The people of Uch-Turfan had suffered various kinds of abuses explicitly stated in the official account. It is noteworthy that not only local begs indulged in criminal acts but also Ch'ing officials. The account also implied that prior to the revolt there was a great deal of inequity in the service obligations of the native population, that the single but highly lucrative post of dugwan beg, the official catering to foreign missions, was farmed out in a non-public manner, and that the people had no access to lists of tax and service levies.

The Court's reaction appears at first sight to be exemplary in its swift punishment of Pien-t'a-ha and Na-shih-t'ung. But what were these two officials punished for? A close reading of the official record tells us that the latter had allowed the delicate peace in Eastern Turkistan to be disturbed while the former was executed not because of his initial stupidity of rejecting the population's peace overture but because he lost the subsequent battle. Thus the Court's two chief concerns become clear, namely, an orderly peace and an image of invincibility on which peace depended as much as on anything else.

Ch'ing had good reasons to be concerned because Muslim leaders in Yarkand and Kucha (and, possibly in other cities) also were ready to revolt. Given the extraordinary long time it took 10,000 troops to subdue 400 rebels and their followers in one city, Ch'ing may well have been unable to cope with simultaneous rebellions elsewhere in Eastern Turkestan.

But the narrow concern with an orderly peace and a show of invincibility ultimately defeated both objectives. One can find the seeds of the final disaster in Ch'ing's attempted solution of the Uch-turfan affair. While, according to formula, the common people were absolved of any responsibility for the revolt, the entire population was uprooted and shipped into exile, and hundreds of other equally innocent families were put in its place. One can well imagine the feelings of these hapless victims of Ch'ing colonial rule.

Most importantly, the Court did nothing about the major underlying causes of the revolt. This paper has provided a few glimpses at the heavy economic burden of supporting both the civilian and military administrations. The local people, perhaps numbering 250,000 to 300,000 around 1800, had to support about 5,200 Ch'ing officials and troops as well as their horses and other animals, 500 native officials, and about 3,000 Muslim troops. Native

officials and Muslim troops were legally exempt from taxation, and many others managed to escape some or all of their tax and service obligations.

Moreover, tremendous inequities existed in the tax structure which perpetuated a practice since the days before the Ch'ing conquest of taxing households according to the number of family heads and not on the basis of the amount of land they held.<sup>56</sup> The main categories of taxation were cash, grain, and animals. In Kachgar alone, the annual tax levy was about three million cash, 2,000 batman of grain, and 2,000 to 4,000 animals.<sup>57</sup> We do not know the total annual grain production in Eastern Turkistan at that time, but it is almost certain that regular levies exceeded the traditional kharsaj, or tithe. Additional illegal extortions by local begs was one more abuse about which Ch'ing did nothing.

Table 1

Military Strength

City	1759/60	1782	ca. 1800	Notes
Kashgar				
Manchu garrison	549	334	400	
Chinese garrison	910	625	611	
Yangi Sher				
Manchu garrison	162	80	80	
Chinese garrison	392	200	217	
Yarkand				
Manchu garrison	300	211	200	
Chinese garrison	?	680	673	
Khotan				
Chinese garrison	?	232	233	
Aksu				
Manchu garrison	200	—	60	Abolished in 1765 but re-established sometime before 1800. Figure for 1759/60 includes Solon garrison. Command was set up in 1766, with these figures for each group: ? 650 50 1000
Chinese garrison	1000	100	170	
Ch. <u>chünt'ai</u> troops			120	
Ch. copper mine troops			298	
Uch-Turfan				
Manchu garrison	—	200	146	
Chinese garrison	—	750	670	
Ch. copper mine troops	—	250	—	
Ch. <u>t'unt'ien</u> troops	—	400	250	
Karashar				
Chinese garrison	ca.467	ca.395	221	
Ch. <u>t'unt'ien</u> troops	ca.350	ca.350	302	
Kucha				
Chinese garrison	300	202	?	
Sairam and Bai				
Chinese garrison	142	50	51	
TOTAL	4772	5659	4702	

## Sources:

For 1759/60 and 1782: Ch'in-ting Huang-yü Hsi-yü t'uchih, chüan 31, 10b-14b  
 For ca. 1800 : Ho-ning, chüan 7, 5a-chüan 10, 10b, passim.

Table 2:

Titles and Ranks of Begs, ca. 1800 (incomplete)

Title	Ranks	Number	Duties
Hakin 阿奇木	III(9)IV(8)V(3)VI(4)	24	Chief of all Muslims in a city and region
Ishihan 伊什罕	IV(8)V(1)	9	Deputy chief of all Muslims in a city and region
Gazanachi 噶桑納齊	IV(9)V(4)	5	Handling of money and grain taxes
Shang 商	IV(1)V(5)	6	Handling of money and grain taxes
Has 哈孜	V(1)VI(11)VII(1)	13	Mediation and litigation
Mirab 密喇卜	V(1)VI(8)VII(5)	14	Water conservation and irrigation
Nakob 納克卜	V(1)VII(1)	2	Forced laborers
Motlapu 莫提色普	V(1)	1	Culture and religious education
Mitwal 密圖瓦里	V(1)	1	Commercial affairs
Ming 明	VI(1)VII(62)	63	Chief of 1,000 Muslims
Bachiger 巴齊格爾	VI(1)VII(1)	2	Tax matters
Dugwan 都觀	VI(1)	1	Supplier for foreign missions
Bakmatat 巴克瑪塔爾	VI(1)	1	Managing of melon and fruit fields
Axbab 阿爾巴普	VI(1)	1	Transporting of money and grain
Patishab 帕提沙普	VI(1)	1	Patrolling cities and seizing escaped prisoners
Yüz 玉孜	VII(6)	6	Chief of 100 Muslims
We t'ung 挖銅	VII(2)	2	Supervising copper excavation
Unspecified	IV(4)V(20)VI(41)VII(60)	125	

Table 3:  
Geographical Distribution of Bogs

Place	ca. 1772	ca. 1800	Notes
Kashgar	57*	56	* Includes Yangi Shar
Yarkand	49	54	
Khotan	49	49	
Aksu	42	46	
Kucha	17	19	
Shayar	10	11	
Bugur	8	10	
Kurle	8	10	
Uch-Turfan	7	8	
Bai	6	6	
Sairen	6	5	
Yangi Shar	-	3	
	259	277	

Sources:

For ca. 1772: Huichiang chih (Taipei 1968 reprint), 138-169.  
 For ca. 1800: Ho-ning, chüan 7, 18b to chüan 10, 12b, passim.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>The transliteration of most proper names of Eastern Turkistan is far from uniform. Not only are there differences among the various Western languages but also among works written in English. This confusion could be solved by universal agreement to use IPA, but few scholars besides linguists have so far adopted this excellent but cumbersome system. In this paper, I have attempted to provide transliterations that an English speaker can readily understand and pronounce rather accurately. For example, I use Khwaja instead of the customary Khoja and Uch-Turfan instead of Ü-Turfan, Ush-Turfan, or, still worse, Osh. I have rejected Chinese names as inappropriate for the time under consideration, and I have used Chinese transliterations only when I was not sure of the original word.

<sup>2</sup>Saguchi Tōru, Jūhachi jūkyū seiki Yō-Torukisutan shakai-shi kenkyū, esp. chapters 3 and 4.

<sup>3</sup>The only translation known to me is "The Eastern trade of the Khoqand Khanate," Memories of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, XXIV (1965), 47-114.

<sup>4</sup>See bibliography in back.

<sup>5</sup>I am referring to the succession struggle after Galdan Tseren's death in 1745 and the ultimate expulsion of 噶爾丹策凌

Amursana 阿睦爾撒納 by his accomplice Davachi upon the latter's assumption of supreme leadership over the Dzungars in 1753.

<sup>6</sup>This paper is part of a chapter in a projected history of Sinkiang. The preceding chapter, covering the period from Galden to Galden Tseren, deals, inter alia, with the question of Ch'ing policy toward Central Asia.

<sup>7</sup>Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, 134; Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, 50. It may be argued, of course, that Ch'ing allowed rather than enforced tribute. Kokandian merchants itched to get their heads on the trade in Eastern Turkestan. In the case of the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, tribute was symbolic rather than substantial, consisting of an annual contribution of one horse and one ox in a hundred and one sheep in a thousand and collected by Ch'ing army detachments who were usually accompanied by Chinese merchants. Thus, in contrast to the pious picture painted by Peking of political subordination to the Central Kingdom, reality looked more like mutually beneficial trade.

<sup>8</sup>Kuropatkin, 117, 122-23.

<sup>9</sup>Ho-ning, Huichiang t'ungchih, Introduction, 2. This office was moved to Uch-Turfan in 1765 and back to Kashgar in 1787 (Ho-ning, chilan 7, 4a.) My translation of titles is guided by the example set by Brunner and Hagelstrom in their Present-Day Organization of China, esp. pp. 439-441 "Eastern Turkestan." The

term tach'en is the Chinese equivalent of the Manchu amban, often used by Western writers when referring to central government representatives in non-Chinese territories.

<sup>10</sup>The first imperial agent was installed at Karashar in 1759. See Hsinchiang t'uchih (HCTC) chihkuan, chüan 3, 8a. Hami and Turfan are excluded from consideration in this paper.

<sup>11</sup>ying 營 has no single English equivalent. During Ch'ing, it was also used to designate infantry battalions and cavalry and artillery divisions. It also denoted the entire Chinese army, the lü ying 綠營, usually translated as the Army of the Green Standard. For a discussion of ying and its various applications, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, 288-289.

<sup>12</sup>HCTC, chihkuan, chüan 8, 10b-14b.

<sup>13</sup>At the time of the uprising, Uch-Turfan did not have regular garrison forces. See Table 1.

<sup>14</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, 24a.

<sup>15</sup>See, e.g., Ho-ning, chüan 10, 5a and chüan 8, 7b-8a.

<sup>16</sup>Kurapatkin, 127.

<sup>17</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, 14a-18a "panshih changch'ang."

<sup>18</sup>Of the remaining regulations, eight were on civilian matters (five on prisoners alone), six on taxation, and five on foreign relations. The total is more than fifty-three because some regulations were listed under more than one category.

<sup>19</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, lb. One li 里 equals 1/2 kilometer or 1/3 mile.

<sup>20</sup>It was held during the ninth and tenth months of each lunar year when the councillor inspected the troops and awarded twenty-four sheep.

<sup>21</sup>One chin 斤 equals 16 liang 兩 or 604.53 grams ( 1 1/2 lbs.).

<sup>22</sup>In case of trouble, the mounts could be quickly flooded.

<sup>23</sup>The only t'unt'i'm in Eastern Turkestan at that time were located at Uch-Turfan and Karashar.

<sup>24</sup>Chinese merchants used to live within the Muslim section of the city until 1794 when, upon the recommendation of councillor Yung-pao 永保, the Court ordered the merchants removed into newly constructed houses in the suburbs.

<sup>25</sup>Ho-ning does not say whether it was Manchu or Chinese. Distribution was determined by balancing the number of convicts available in any given batch with the number requested by each beg. While they were being processed by the garrison, these prisoners received a daily ration of one shang 升 of rice and the equivalent of one chin of white wheat.

<sup>26</sup>In the latter case, seventh-grade begs were in charge.

<sup>27</sup>Two kaiun at Uch-Turfan and Aksu were the partial exceptions. They were commanded by a k'aiun to 卡倫達 (?) and a waipi t'ishshih 委筆帖式 (?), respectively.

<sup>28</sup>Information given here is based upon Ho-ning, chüan 7, 11a-12a. I am puzzled by the totally different list given in the 1782 revised edition of Ch'in-ting Huang-yü t'uchih (HYHT), chüan 31, 38a-b.

<sup>29</sup>The minor kalun had neither imperial guardsmen nor interpreters, obliging the Manchus and Muslims there to find some way, probably through Chinese to converse with each other. Actually contact between Manchus and Muslims was likely to be as minimal as it was between the separate garrisons in the cities.

<sup>30</sup>They visited in 1749, 1761, 1765 (twice), 1766, 1767, 1769 (three times), 1770, 1771, 1772, 1773, 1776, 1782, 1783, 1788, 1791, 1792, 1795, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1809. From Na-yen-ch'eng tsou-i, chüan 19, 4a-5a, and Chia-ch'ing 14.8.1 report, as quoted in Saguchi, "Eastern trade," 51. Saguchi erroneously counts only twenty-three missions.

<sup>31</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, 14b-15a. Translation in Saguchi, "Eastern trade," 52 is incomplete.

<sup>32</sup>The regulations do not tell us whether these amounts were for an entire mission or for each member. They do say that the annual average expenditure in silk goods was "more than forty rolls."

<sup>33</sup>Also incense and candles were supplied for sacrificial purposes.

<sup>34</sup>A ch'ien 錢 was one-tenth of a liang, or about 3.78 gram.

<sup>35</sup>The standard source in English is Fairbank and Teng, "On the transmission of Ch'ing documents."

<sup>36</sup>See Ch'ing Shih, II, 1412-3, and Saguchi, Juhachi, 109-110.

<sup>37</sup>Families rather than individuals were assigned to this type of duty.

<sup>38</sup>The Aksu area also employed "gold button Kirghiz."

<sup>39</sup>The great majority of begs was posted in the four areas of Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and Aksu. See Table 3.

<sup>40</sup>Ho-ning, ch'ian 7, 22a-b. A batman is said to equal five tan and three ten 三, or about 660 lbs. This is a very tentative guess because Chinese weights and measures, being far from uniform, varied widely from place to place and product to product. We are on somewhat firmer ground with regard to money. Cash (錢文 ch'ien wen) was converted into silver liang at approximately uniform rates at any given time. It became, however, quickly devalued during the first fifty years of Ch'ing administration, as these figures show.

Equivalent of one silver <u>liang</u> in cash:	1759	50
	1760	70
	1761	100
	1787	160
	1801	220

Fifty pieces of cash equalled one teng, the local currency unit

that continued to circulate since long before the Ch'ing conquest.

Ho-ning, chüan 7, 8b-9c.

<sup>41</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, 23a-b.

<sup>42</sup>Actually, I used two major extant records, one by Ch'i-shih-i, written in 1777 and included in his Hai-yü taung-chih (HYTC), chüan 2, 15b-20a, and the other by Wei Yüan, written in 1842 and contained in his Sheng-wu-chi (SWC), chüan 4, 41b-42b. Wei Yüan's work is better known and more concise. I have translated it here, omitting only a few short portions of little value and adding information from Ch'i-shih-i's work where it adds to or conflicts with that given by Wei Yüan. A complete translation into German is in W. Eichhorn, "Kolonialkämpfe der Chinesen in Turkestan während der Periode Ch'ien-lung," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Vol. 96 (1942), 318-322.

<sup>43</sup>SWC, chüan 2, 41b. Ch'i-shih-i was more explicit when he said that the relatively few good-looking women of Uch-Turfan were all rounded up, stripped, and ganglaid 輪姦. See HYTC, chüan 2, 16a.

<sup>44</sup>Neither Wei Yüan nor Ch'i-shih-i mention the day.

<sup>45</sup>HYTC, chüan 2, 17a. Wei Yüan transcribes his name the same as that of 'Abd al'Leh. Eichhorn 320, thinks it should read Abd. stullah.

<sup>46</sup>The total strength was said to be over 10,000 Manchu and

Chinese troops. See HYTC, chüan 2, 17a.

<sup>47</sup>According to Kuropatkin, rumor had reached Uch-Turfan that a Muslim army was approaching Sinkiang from the west. Actually, Bokhara and Afghanistan were fighting Badakshan whose king, Sultan Shah, they killed and burned his capital. In 1763, when the army reached Khodjend in Kokand, the Afghan troops went home and the alliance was dissolved. See Kuropatkin, 135.

<sup>48</sup>HYTC, chüan 2, 17b.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid reads begs and alhums.

<sup>50</sup>HYTC, chüan 2, 19a.

<sup>51</sup>HYTC, chüan 2, 18b says that he was in Suchou, 6,000 li away from Akou.

<sup>52</sup>HYTC, chüan 2, 19a says May.

<sup>53</sup>Hence the term Taramchi (Turk: cultivator), given to Uighurs in the Ili region for the next two centuries.

<sup>54</sup>I have no idea what Ko-na-t'en might mean. Richhorn, 322 is also puzzled.

<sup>55</sup>The repopulation was begun in 1766, and eventually 708 households were moved from Aksu, Yarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, and other cities. See Ho-ning, chüan 9, 8a.

<sup>56</sup>Ho, L'Oeuvre colonisatrice de la Chine dans le Turkestan chinois, 66-67.

<sup>57</sup>Ho-ning, chüan 7, 7b-8a.

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