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# Second-order characteristics of multi-level elections in Spain

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**SECOND-ORDER CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTI-LEVEL ELECTIONS IN SPAIN**

By

Megan J. de la Cruz

Accepted in Partial Completion  
Of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

Moheb A. Ghali, Dean of the Graduate School

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## MASTER'S THESIS

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Megan J. de la Cruz  
29 April 2010

**SECOND-ORDER CHARACTERISTICS  
OF MULTI-LEVEL ELECTIONS IN SPAIN**

A Thesis  
Presented to  
The Faculty of  
Western Washington University

In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

By  
Megan J. de la Cruz  
April 2010

## **Abstract**

This thesis project applies the second-order framework to compare levels of elections in Spain. I pay special interest to the link between the country's electoral timing, territorial cleavages, and central-regional dynamic. The project implements two tests, one to measure vote choice in relation to general election expectations and cycles, and another to measure voter volatility between first- and second-order levels. Both tests are broken down by regional electorates and applied to elections to the European Parliament and regional assemblies. In light of the varying levels of decentralization found among Spanish regions, I expect test results to vary between regions that are more and less devolved from the center. I also hypothesize that European-level data will more strongly adhere to second-order expectations due to the differential of power between the two types of legislative bodies. My principal finding is that, from a second-order lens, most of Spain's voting behavior in European Parliament elections can be explained. In contrast, irregular voting patterns indicate a detachment of voter logic between general and regional elections.

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## **Introduction**

Spain is a young democracy on solid footing. It is widely deemed as a successful, if not exemplar, political case for its non-violent and relatively swift passage of the 1978 Constitution. Besides the attempted coup in February 1981, internal political strife has been minimal, with the major exception of terrorist violence from the Basque Country (*País Vasco*). While it is singular in its sometimes violent nature, the Basque Country's relationship with the central government in Madrid represents the clash of regional and central issues that characterize Spanish politics. But not even well-represented diverse interests within its borders delayed its early democratic course. Political development in Spain has been both peaceful and punctuated by center-periphery issues.

What makes Spain's regional political structure exceptional has roots in its democratic formation. The quick approval of the Constitution demonstrated both consensus and purposeful omission. The constitutional drafters left for their progeny to decide what they could not agree upon: arrangement of sub-state institutions. The result has been unequal devolution within a single state: the *Estado de las Autonomías* or State of Autonomies. It is an arrangement of seventeen regions or Autonomous Communities (ACs), each distinctive in regards to its formation and relationship with the central tier (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 134).

No two regions coordinate with the center, raise and allocate taxes, and otherwise arrange political institutions in the exact same manner or degree. This stems, in part, from social differences among the regions themselves. They have unique cultures, histories, and economic concerns. Some regions have their own language and national identities; others are barely distinguishable from the homogenous, unitary state lionized by Franco. In place of established institutions, each region deals with the central government separately, on a bilateral basis (Rodden 2004, 491).

Spain's deep territorial divides are well known, and their effect on voting behavior and party performance is manifest in election results. But this is often attributed to social, not institutional, divisions. Only rarely has its peculiar multi-level arrangement been examined as a determining factor of voting behavior across those levels. Uneven decentralization in Spain provides a unique opportunity to compare inter-level elections: since it is a single state, most electoral and countrywide variables are held constant while degrees of decentralization vary across regions. *Interstate* make-up of sub-state institutions, on the other hand, is increasingly becoming more distinct from each other (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 7). The difficulty of navigating different states' decentralized institutions such as tax structures also make it prudent to focus on single-country studies (Rodden 2004, 495).

Two sets of authors have assessed Spanish voting behavior in light of its decentralized character: Jeffery and Hough in 2003 and Pallarés and Keating in 2006. They analyze voting behavior based on hypotheses rooted in the second-order framework. The second-order election (SOE) model anchors its analysis on the countrywide, first-order election: second-order voting behavior references the first-order arena. The studies that examine Spain conclude that elections in some regions exhibit more "second-orderness" than others. This thesis updates the strategies utilized by Jeffery and Hough to gauge Spain's fit to the second-order framework. I expect that degrees of decentralization, like regional identity, are a source of Spain's dissimilar inter-level election results. In other words, strong territorial divisions interact with political institutions to produce weak second-order effects in Spain's multi-level system.

## ***Outline***

This thesis first reviews second-order literature and expectations, and follows with a discussion on the strategies to test for second-order effects. The analyses of these tests focus on the differences between election levels as well as between regions. Regions are grouped according to their rate and extent of autonomy from the center. Thus, before any tests are applied, I re-establish the institutional asymmetry present in Spain's regional arrangement. Its unequal devolution is manifest at the formation of the State of the Autonomies and in its system of regional finance, and, as we will see, this division between regions is mildly reflected in the updated test results.

The test results draw a more stark contrast between elections on different levels—the European Parliament (EP) and the regional assemblies. This supports second-order research: the power discrepancy between the EP and most other offices make it particularly dependent on first-order circumstance. An enumeration of the powers and actors of Spain's multi-level institutions reaffirm these findings: the central parliament has first-order supremacy, followed by the regional parliaments whose powers outnumber those of the EP. So while regional elections exhibit second-order characteristics, they do so to a slighter degree and in a less consistent manner than the EP elections. In other words, the EP elections show greater dependence on the first-order arena, while regional elections reflect a more detached voting logic.

## ***Research Questions and Hypotheses***

Do regional or European elections in Spain reflect second-order expectations? Do election results and second-order effects vary with devolution, by level of election, or both? The approach of this thesis is to re-examine Spain using expected vote share and the index of

dissimilarity. I expect some regions in Spain to better fit the second-order model than others, depending on electoral timing and what Jeffery and Hough call territorial heterogeneity (2003, 210). Regional election voting behavior, taken as a whole, will reflect greater voter autonomy from first-order elections than elections to the European Parliament.

## **Literature Review**

### ***The Second-Order Framework***

Political theories abound regarding all facets of elections. The formation of the European Union (EU) has produced a relatively new vein of inquiry into elections: those that occur in multi-level systems. What defines the dynamic between elections on different levels? Do elections on one level simply replicate those on another level, or do they differ fundamentally? In 1980, Reif and Schmitt found that differences vary across systems, but an electorate does not behave equally across levels. One level holds prominence over others: the countrywide contest.

They coined the term “second-order” election to describe the EU's first election to the European Parliament (EP). Second-order elections also include regional and municipal elections, or any others conducted “below” the countrywide level; however, the same status is given to EU elections because they are considered less crucial in the eyes of the electorate and political parties. The elections themselves are conducted on a countrywide basis but the *offices they determine* are secondary to the offices of first-order elections. Second-order elections appoint representatives for lesser offices, outside the countrywide “main arena” which controls countrywide policymaking (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

The significance of placing elections into “orders” is the first-order’s influence on the second-order. More generally, “multi-level electoral systems are characterized by the fact that different elections are not independent but are related to one another” (van der Eijk and Schmitt 2008, 5). Both voters and parties base their political logic from a countrywide standpoint: first-order calculations are needed to rate second-order options (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 9). All second-order events follow, and are defined by, their first-order counterparts. Disentangling the second from the first order becomes difficult because they share a political system. In a broader sense, Reif and Schmitt emphasize the inability of voters to separate first- from second-order decisions because both reflect “the political situation of the first-order arena” (Reif 1984, 8). This includes the nearness (in time) of a first-order election, the partisan make-up of the government, and its current concentration of political power.

### **Lower Turnout and Government Parties Lose**

Given that outcomes vary across cases, second-order elections all share particular characteristics that distinguish them from first-order elections. First, overall turnout is low. Compared to first-order elections, fewer voters turn out to vote in the first place since the offices to be determined at a second-order election are less important to them. Second, minor parties fare better than governing ones. Of the voters who participate in second-order elections, more tend to disfavor parties in government at the first-order level. Opposition parties, small and regional parties experience an increase of their vote share, while the party (or coalition) in government gathers fewer votes *vis-à-vis* the countrywide election.<sup>1</sup> Voters can express

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<sup>1</sup> In a follow-up to the original article, Reif updates their definition of “small parties” to include radical, protest, and populist parties. Their common characteristic is the relative lack of resources that large, established parties engage during election campaigns (1997, 118).



displeasure with the incumbent government party, preference for a weaker party, or at once punish one and reward the other. All paths result in a lower vote share for the countrywide governing party (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Again, this follows from the logic that voters place less value on a second-order vote: they are more willing to take risks and vote “against” the central governing party and “for” alternative parties.

Reif and Schmitt tested for lower turnout and government punishment effects after the first European Parliament election. They examined voter participation and partisan vote share simply by comparing data from the EP election with that of the closest countrywide election in member countries. They found without exception that turnout was lower in the EP election. In seven out of eight cases, governing parties lost while minor parties gained support (1980, 16, 19). Their explanation of the apparent change in voter preference underscores the “less-at-stake dimension,” or the lower salience of second-order elections in the minds of voters. Voters are less likely to participate in the first place and, when they do, the governing party suffers (1980, 9).

### **Degrees of Second Order**

The ensuing research on second-order elections reveal that second-order characteristics vary by intensity. Any change in “the stakes” or circumstance of a second-order election affects its outcome. Timing matters. Studies in American congressional elections have long underscored cyclical effects. Midterm elections have a distinct flavor from elections held on the same day as the presidential elections. Voters “punish” governing parties most midterm (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 10). This highlights the simple fact that “the likelihood of disappointing voters is much higher for parties in charge of government than for those in opposition” (Schmitt 2005, 652), but researchers have proposed several other causes of the midterm lull in government support.

Protest, expressive, instrumental, and strategic voting are all terms coined to explain this phenomenon. During midterms, voters feel free to express their displeasure with the party in power without risking its stability. They are more prone to experiment with parties more closely aligned with their true preferences than cast a strategic vote for a larger, better established party. The few explanations of why a voter would vote for a smaller party repeat the same theme with a different vocabulary: a voter chooses a party closest to his or her preferences, the small party is relatively closest to a voter's preferences in an ideological or issue space, or the voter is voting expressively (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 58; Marsh 1998, 594; Norris 1997, 12).

Whatever the reason, evidence strongly demonstrates that voters disfavor the governing party(ies) most frequently when the temporal distance between first- and second-order elections is greatest. The government penalty effect is well established in both European and American politics. The distinction of the former is the presence of minor parties that may penalize the opposition as well as the governing parties (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 79). For many studies applying the second-order framework to European cases, minor parties' gains in relative vote share surpass those of the opposition party (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Hough and Jeffery 2006).

Like timing, election type varies. All non-countrywide elections are not equal: some are more "secondary" than others. Voters consider the main arena to be on the countrywide level because of the relative responsibilities assigned there. Simultaneously, voter attention lessens for elections and offices that exhibit weaker political influence. Reif and Schmitt focus on two very different levels of elections in this regard: while countrywide elections determine who will form government, the functional design of the EU relegates EP elections to a particularly secondary status. Though the EP is directly elected, the Commission and Council of Ministers are appointed by countrywide parliaments, ensuring that "national institutions continue to retain the

primary responsibility” of governing the European Union (Norris 1997, 114). In second-order language, the first-order political arena remains countrywide (not Union- or region-wide) simply because it wields the most political power. And powerful offices draw more people to the poll booth and monopolize their voting logic.

Some offices at a secondary level, however, approach the political prowess of the countrywide level. Assuming this changes the salience of that secondary office, it engenders change in voting behavior. Indeed, the more responsibility assigned to an office, the less secondary its elections appear. Heath, et al. contrast partisan choice in EP and local elections in Great Britain and conclude that European elections exhibit more second-order characteristics than local elections (1999). This follows the logic of Reif and Schmitt’s original article: as stakes increase, secondary results decrease. Voters base their local and EP vote choice on countrywide-level issues and government performance, but this effect is less pronounced in local elections.

Heath, et al. gather data from the British Election Panel Survey (BEPS) as preliminary evidence of the hierarchy voters assign to different levels of elections. The most voters turn out for countrywide elections, fewer for local elections, and the fewest for EP elections; this ranking is maintained throughout the study. Eighty-two percent of respondents claimed they cared a great deal about which party won in the countrywide election, but that number drops to 62% for local and 45% for EP elections. Similarly, 86% felt it made a difference who won the countrywide election, while 71% and 56% thought it made a difference at the local and EP elections, respectively (1999, 393).

They conclude that countrywide-level issues remain the most influential, but do not dominate local elections as much as European ones. The stakes are high enough in local elections for at least one subset of voters to create a second-order voting calculus distinct from

the first order. In turn, they are more likely to deviate from their vote decision at the countrywide level (1999, 406). According to the BEPS survey, 47.6% of those that switched votes named local issues as the reason for the change (1999, 408): almost half of split-ticket voters consciously identify their behavior as context-specific. Again, not all second-order elections exist on a single level: local British elections appear to be “one-and-three-quarter order” relative to elections to the European Parliament (1999, 409). The stakes are higher in local elections, whether that causes or is caused by a level-specific voting calculus.

Type and timing of second-order elections affect ballot-splitting and turnout because they affect the stakes of an election. Second-order effects do not feature as prominently at local British as European elections, but this follows Reif and Schmitt’s main assumption that the level of stakes designates the “order” of any given election. Not only do stakes differ according to district (such as local versus EU-wide), stakes can change from year to year in the same kind of election. For example, over the course of the first several EP elections, lower turnout paralleled a regular decline in government support. Second-order effects can change over time even within the same type of election (Marsh 1998, 597-599).

Further complicating matters, the degree of first-order influence also varies among countries and their respective political makeup and actors (Reif 1997, 117). Parties can raise the stakes of elections by campaigning and raising awareness in the media, although it can have the adverse effect of underscoring that less really is at stake, such as highlighting the limited powers of the EP (Norris 1997, 114; Reif 1997, 118). And other factors complicate the task of isolating second-order effects from others during any given election cycle. “The rise of new parties, the disappearance of old ones and various temporary and permanent amalgamations” make comparisons of election outcomes tricky even within a single country (Marsh 1998, 595).

### ***Second-Order Tests***

Jeffery and Hough combined two strategies to test for second-order effects in their adaptation of the second-order framework in their article titled *Regional Elections in Multi-Level Systems* (2003), and again in a chapter of **Devolution and Electoral Politics** (119-156, 2006). They explore cyclical effects using a popularity-curve or “Dinkel’s” test, which they also apply to Germany. They employ the index of dissimilarity to examine territorial effects. Both techniques had been used previously for cross-level, but not necessarily second-order, analyses. The tests are described as “top down” and “bottom up,” respectively. Both are “vertical” analyses that compare regional and national levels (2003).

They purposively incorporate these rather simple analytical tools to “locate starting points for the comparative analysis of electoral dynamics in multi-level systems” (2003, 200). Their aim is to introduce these tests as initial rubrics for understanding partisan vote share. Their main research question is basic: it asks whether or not the second-order model applies to Spain and Germany. This encompasses numerous questions on the subordination of regional to countrywide elections, but the core of Jeffery and Hough’s investigation was the respective relationships between elections on different levels concerning government, opposition, and regional parties (2003).

### **Cyclical Effects: Dinkel’s Curve**

Jeffery and Hough’s top-down analysis begins with a discussion of regional elections as second-order elections, and emphasizes the less-at-stake dimension. Like Reif and Schmitt before them, they turn to Dinkel’s work in electoral cycles literature (Dinkel 1977). In 1977, Dinkel’s simple litmus test illustrated second-order patterns in multi-level elections before

“second-order” language existed. He proposed, and demonstrated, that parties controlling the federal government fared poorly in midterm Länder elections in Germany.

The test is straightforward: party performance in regional elections is calculated by “expected vote share,” or the average vote share of the two federal elections before and after a given Land election. For example, if a party received 48% of a region’s vote share for a federal election in 2000, and 52% in 2004, then its expected vote share for any Land election between 2000 and 2004 would be 50%. The only explanatory variable is timing, and the average somewhat controls for actual change in voter preference between countrywide elections (an option unavailable to Reif and Schmitt, who were restricted to one EP election) (Jeffery and Hough 2001, 80).

Dinkel compared the expected vote share to actual Länder results and confirmed that the federal party in power invariably received fewer votes than expected. Whether or not the party formed a Land’s government or opposition did not matter. But timing of a regional election in the federal electoral cycle corresponded to a predictable pattern of punishment effects (Reif 1997, 115; Jeffery and Hough 2001, 80). Dinkel concluded that “federal government parties did not just underperform in Länder elections, they underperformed most at midterm” (Jeffery and Hough 2001, 80). This resonates both with Reif and Schmitt’s second-order framework and congressional studies in American politics.

Jeffery and Hough revisit German election results through 1990 and plot the relative vote, or the actual vote as a percentage of the expected vote, along a timeline between countrywide elections. For government parties, this created a “parabola” of support, its nadir precisely halfway between federal elections, with rates of support increasing as Länder elections approached federal election dates (2001, 82). And while opposition parties performed relatively

better midterm, they did not quite gain as much as the government party lost. Small parties benefited the most, surpassing their expected vote share by 50% at midterms. The authors conclude that opposition parties suffer from small parties “[mopping] up dissatisfied supporters of both federal government and federal opposition in the Länder, before being squeezed again at the next federal election” (2001, 83-84).

In unified Germany, small parties continued to perform well, and government parties continued to lose, during midterms. Opposition support, however, was more erratic after 1990, only vaguely following a trend. Although opposition vote share performed better than expected, it experienced a loss of support from the federal election (Jeffery and Hough 2001, 89; 2003, 202; 2006, 135). So why are cyclical effects dampened for opposition parties? Jeffery and Hough posit that small parties have been gaining support because of greater regional focus.

Small parties may appeal to specific Länder issues, conduct large-scale anti-establishment advertising campaigns, or have a charismatic regional leader (2001, 91-92; 2006, 135). Their gains are now made at the expense of both the government and opposition. These strategies are successful due to changes in Germany’s multi-level arrangements. Post-unification, the party system has become more regionally diverse and the federal system more “competitive,” displaying “more distinctive policy portfolios” (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 132). Germany diversified its regions by physically gaining more territory and thus raising the salience of Länder-specific issues.

### **Territorial Divisions: The Index of Dissimilarity**

Territorial cleavages lie at the heart of multi-level change; they exist “when a self-conscious minority is concentrated” within a state’s territory (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 2).

Multi-tiered governance rarely exists without some internal territorial divisions—its existence is to coordinate discordant interests of the regions and center (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 11). Jeffery and Hough suggest that territorial cleavages diversify voting behavior, which disrupts second-order patterns of cyclical support (2003, 206-211).

How does voting behavior change with increases in territorial cleavages? Jeffery and Hough expect that volatility of partisan support between regional and countrywide levels will increase. To demonstrate voting disparity between electoral levels, they turn to the index of dissimilarity, which measures change in vote share. Jeffery and Hough chart indices of Länder votes for pre- and post-unification in Germany. Consistent with their argument, election results are more “homogenous” before unification and more diverse afterward (2003, 202). Not only has voting behavior changed along the electoral cycle but also between electoral levels.

Like Dinkel’s expected vote share, the index of dissimilarity is a simple calculation: “it expresses the proportion of the electorate who would have to change their vote in order for the provincial election result to be converted into the national one” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 209). It calculates net dissimilarity for regions within a state, with the federal election usually serving as the basis of comparison. Unlike expected vote—which uses an average of two countrywide elections—the index contrasts results of one regional election against the countrywide federal election. Sequence of the elections does not matter: the nearness of the elections is most important to better control exogenous effects (Johnston 1980, 155).

Adopted by Johnston to compare provincial and federal voting in Canada, the index serves as a resource to track trends across both time and regions. After charting indices for all federal elections and provinces, he found that each Canadian province had a unique inter-level voting history. Vote shares changed at different times and rates, and the convergence between



provincial and federal levels expanded for some regions and not for others. Results from Quebec's and British Columbia's elections "differed radically between levels" and from those of other provinces (1980, 159). There was little resemblance between electoral levels within a province; few similar patterns emerged between provinces as a whole.

Like Jeffery and Hough's conclusion regarding modern Germany, Johnston proposes that Canada's disaggregated party system and dual federal system encourage high rates of dissimilarity (1980). Canada's extreme countrywide-substate divergence stands out even among other strong federal states (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 11). Canada serves as an exemplar of decentralized systems: inter-level coordination between parties on different levels is nominal, and laws passed in Ottawa are largely ineffective without provincial approval (Wolinetz and Carty 2006, 54). Overlapping jurisdictions often require intergovernmental negotiations that cumulate in formal contracts between levels (Rodden 2004, 491). It is no wonder that the index of dissimilarity was first adapted to the Canadian case, in a country whose provincial-federal dichotomy is so sharply defined.

How does this trend hold across different countries? Are dissimilarity indices correspondingly lower in countries that have less fragmented party and federal systems? Research so far confirms this correlation. German divergence has increased post-unification, but its federal system does not reach Canadian proportions. Accordingly, Canadian dissimilarity values far surpass their German counterparts. Modern index scores in Germany, in turn, surpass those of Austria (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 129). While Austria has experienced a trend towards divergence in recent decades, its federal system remains relatively centralized. Compared to Germany, federal legislative powers are more concentrated and regional interests are represented by a weak upper house (Abedi and Siaroff 2006, 158-159).

Of course, of particular interest is Spain, which does not have a formal federal system but is undoubtedly decentralized. Two sets of authors calculate its indices of dissimilarity, which fall somewhere between those of pre-unification Germany and Canada (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 129). Pallarés and Keating take an extra step in calculating dissimilarity in Spain by also measuring the volatility between elections of the same type (2006, 113). Like Jeffery and Hough, they find Spain's historic nationalities to exhibit the largest degrees of dissimilarity between levels (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 111; Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210). Neither article finds that to be idiosyncratic but consistent with Spain's lopsided regional set-up. Jeffery and Hough describe it as territorial heterogeneity (2003, 210); Pallarés and Keating emphasize both the party system's "territorialisation" and the central government's failure to minimize power disparity among its regions (2006, 98-100).

### **Decentralization, Devolution, and Federalism**

Regionally homogenous states experience low rates of split-ticket voting between levels. The influence of territorial cleavages on Dinkel's test and the dissimilarity index is indirect: territorial divisions *per se* do not affect voting behavior. Their influence is mainly expressed through social traditions and political institutions. On the institutional side, research has focused on a state's adoption of territorial cleavages in its constitution and party system.

How a constitution interprets territorial issues first depends on whether those issues are addressed at all. A unitary state necessarily does not institutionalize regional interests; multi-level governance by definition addresses them to a certain degree. Strength of regional institutions has a wide range among multi-level governments. Degrees of decentralization, devolution, and federalism all vary. Although these three terms appear to be used interchangeably, they have

distinct definitions. Decentralization refers to distribution of power: it is simply “a shift of authority towards local governments and away from central governments” (Rodden 2004, 482). Rodden is careful to point out that central governments do not necessarily give up authority. Instead, powers newly extended to regional governments often overlap with those of the center. This intersection of power creates challenges when isolating regional from central political arenas (2004, 482-489).

Inversely, Chhibber and Kollman use the term “provincialization” in place of decentralization because the latter emphasizes action of the center, when in reality authority shifts tend to be unintended consequences of other political changes (2004, 102). Devolution, on the other hand, is a result of the central government granting decision-making and administrative powers to sub-state units. But the difference between decentralization and devolution is nuanced: devolution is decentralizing institutional reform. This is often codified in constitutional amendments and new institutional arrangements, such as the recent creation of new regional assemblies in the United Kingdom. It may or may not create a new level of governance (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 2).

Federalism by definition creates distinct levels of governance. It engages sub-state units in policymaking on the central level. Intentionally, no single level can “unilaterally modify the federal structure of the state” and each level also has some final decision-making authorities (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 9). A federal designation in a constitution protects the regions from exploitation by the center. It serves as a contract between central and sub-state levels that structures future interactions and power sharing between them. While decentralization describes an allocation of authority, federalism is a formal political institution (Rodden 2004, 489-491).

What all federal systems have in common is the inter-level agreement on their structural relationship. Many federal states feature judicial review to adjudicate disputes between levels and a bicameral legislature. Often represented in the upper house, sub-state interests are thus guaranteed representation at the federal level. But for all the characteristics they have in common, federal systems spring from many molds. They range in size and number of constituent units. They vary in electoral rules, veto authorities, and the substantive policy areas assigned to each level (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 9-10).

And while it is often considered federal—and included in multi-country studies of federations—Spain is not. Unambiguously, Article 145.1 of the Constitution declares that “Under no circumstances shall the federation of Autonomous Communities be allowed.” While the powers and administration of the AC governments resemble healthy federal sub-units, Spain’s lack of a system of shared rule between the sub-units and the center belie any classic federal arrangement (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 136).

Chhibber and Kollman’s examination of federalism reflects Jeffery and Hough’s bottom-up approach in that their explanatory variable is the degree of strength of regional government. Unlike Jeffery and Hough, the book extends its focus beyond voting patterns to the nature of party aggregation (2004). Both sets of authors acknowledge the sociological cleavages that distinguish regions from the center and from each other, but partly dismiss them as the main driving force behind regional party vote success.

Jeffery and Hough underscore that structural elements, like institutional or electoral rules, are deliberately set aside in their analysis but include a brief discussion on the decentralized Spanish state and its effect on party systems and voter behavior (2003, 210). Chhibber and Kollman, for the most part, hold electoral rules constant (as the countries examined all feature

single-member, simple plurality systems) but emphasize the role of federalism. This is not a complete departure from Jeffery and Hough's article. Since party success relies directly on the votes it receives, application of Chhibber and Kollman's party system analysis straightforwardly applies to parties' vote shares in elections. Regional parties thrive in regions that are powerful while countrywide parties benefit under highly centralized states. And while Spain is not federal, its varying levels of devolution are expected to be reflected in the relative success of regional parties among its Autonomous Communities.

### **Democratic Institutions of Spain**

Type of political office underpins the second-order framework, because the office at stake changes the stakes of an election. Three types of offices are under review in this project: party lists compete for seats in Congress at the countrywide level, in regional (AC) parliaments, and in the European Parliament (EP). To gauge the first- or second-order nature of an election, we must first understand these offices, and the political institutions to which they belong.

#### ***Congress: Congreso de los Diputados***

Reif and Schmitt single out countrywide parliamentary elections as the first-order election: all remaining types of elections—regional, municipal, by-elections, and “the like”—belong to the second order (1980, 8). In Spain's case, the *Congreso* (Congress) unambiguously fits the first-order description. Although officially a constitutional monarchy, Spain is functionally a parliamentary monarchy. The constitutional roles of the lower house also sustain its first-order designation: it elects the prime minister (albeit called “*presidente*”) and exercises full legislative control independent of the upper house (the *Senado*, whose limitations will be described in more

detail below). Once elected from Congress by an absolute majority (or a simple majority in a second vote), the prime minister forms a cabinet, oversees the various executive bodies, and has the power to call elections (Aja 2001, 233; Lancaster 2003; Share 2006).

### **Electoral Rules**

The 350 deputies (*diputados*) are elected under a modified system of proportional representation (PR). Unlike some parliamentary systems, however, two large centrist parties dominate elections to *Congreso*: the Spanish Worker's Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP). Since 1982, they have together dominated overall percentage of votes in general elections (Michavila 2005, 4).

It is a Duvergerian outcome without Duvergerian conditions; that is, two parties receive a majority of vote share and seats even in absence of a Single-Member Plurality (SMP) system. The Duvergerian thesis places emphasis on electoral rules when explaining party systems and that, specifically, an SMP electoral system is expected to create a two-party dominant party system, and, inversely, a PR system encourages a multi-party system. If only a single winner can emerge from one district, only two parties emerge as viable competitors in that district (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 35-38).

So why is Spain's party system two-party dominant despite having a PR system? First and foremost, it is an adulterated PR system. Second, a small number of seats are usually won by other parties. In short "the Spanish electoral system facilitates a multiparty system yet does so in a rather distorted way" (Lancaster 2003, 357-358; Rush 2007). Its "corrected" fixed-list proportional system guarantees at least two deputies per district, and then assigns more using the D'Hondt method. Spain's fifty districts correspond to its provinces, creating small

constituencies: the median district magnitude is five. Due to the two-seat minimum, provinces with rural or small populations are overrepresented. In a larger province, a seat is “worth” 150,000 votes but as little as 31,000 in others (Rush 2007, 716). Indeed, the modifications of the PR system by the founders of the new democracy had the intent to promote both a stable two-party system and an overrepresentation of rural provinces (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 135; Montero 2005, 16).

The vote-to-seat ratio in *Congreso* is skewed in favor of large political parties with countrywide agendas since it is easier for them to accumulate seats from several small provinces. And once established, the dominance of the PSOE and PP leave third parties at a comparative disadvantage: in the 2008 election, the two parties garnered 84% of the vote and 92% of the seats. Rush calculates that if one party simply won all the “cheap seats” in the smallest districts, it would hold 50.57% of congressional seats but only represent 40.55% of Spain’s population. In the 2000 general election, the PP won a majority of seats without a majority vote (Rush 2007, 716). This translates into disproportional congressional voting power, allowing a majority government to avoid coalitions even without a majority of the votes. But the more common occurrence in the case of minority governments is that non-countrywide parties (NCWPs) hold a key number of seats, despite the PR system’s “strongly majoritarian tendencies” (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006, 24).

### **Political Parties**

Since 1982, the balance of power in Congress has favored either the center-left PSOE or center-right PP. The PSOE is the social democratic party revived from Spain’s short-lived Second Republic (1931-1936) and served as the opposition party in the initial years of the new

democracy. After winning the 1982 election, it enjoyed fourteen successive years as the majority party between 1982 and 1996. The uninterrupted stint in power, however, coincided with PSOE party members' patronization of state-owned industries and corruption. By 1993 it failed to win enough seats to rule on its own. After years of media-reported government scandal, it was no surprise when the center-right PP won in 1996 with a plurality of votes. Although the extent of the PP victory over the PSOE was not as extreme as predicted (often referred to as a "bitter victory, sweet defeat"), the PP went on to win the 2000 with an absolute majority (Balfour 1996, 331). The PSOE rebounded in the 2004 and 2008 elections, winning 164 and 169 congressional seats (out of 350), respectively.

Until its 1996 win, the progress of the PP was hampered by the lack of a conservative tradition in Spain and suspicions it had not completely severed its Francoist ties (Gilmour 2006, 26; Pallarés and Keating 2006, 99). In the early stages of democracy, it was known as the *Alianza Popular*, or Popular Alliance, which in 1979 ran with the Christian Democrats (*Partido Demócrata Popular*) under the banner of the *Coalición Popular*. The coalition only ran under that name that year and was completely disbanded by 1986. In 1989, the Popular Alliance was reconstituted as the Popular Party. Under new leadership, it became more moderate and unified, and (coupled with the misdeeds of the PSOE) its makeover steered the party to its 1996 victory (del Castillo 1996, 266; Gilmour 2006, 22-23).

Particularly in the minority governments of the 1990s, smaller parties have also participated in congressional politics. While the top two parties regularly take up over three-fourths of the vote share, sufficient electoral room is left over for a handful of seats for third parties. In Spain most of those parties have been those that are regionally concentrated—



another phenomenon facilitated by its small constituencies and two-seat minimum (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 103).

Of the smaller countrywide parties, *Izquierda Unida* or the United Left (IU) is the only one to have consistently won seats in parliament. It contains the remnants of the *Partido Comunista Español* or Spanish Communist Party, which was one of the four main parties of the democratic transition. Today its presence is slight, however, winning only two seats in 2008. That still fares better than the *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD). As winners of the 1977 and 1979 elections, it was the fourth and titular party of the democratic transition, but after those initial years it has been largely obsolete (Gilmour 2006, 22). After its break up in 1982, it was succeeded by the *Centro Democrático y Social* (CDS) (Aja 2001, 241), but since 1993 the CDS has not sent a deputy to Congress.

Collectively, third parties that cater to particular regions, or non-countrywide parties (NCWPs), have experienced much greater success than the IU or CDS. In particular, parties from Basque Country (*País Vasco*) and Catalonia (*Cataluña*) enjoy regular representation at the central level. The Convergence and Union Party of Catalonia (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco* or PNV) secured ten and six seats in the 2008 election, respectively. The Catalan Republican Left (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* or ERC) currently has three seats, and the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG) from Galicia and *Coalición Canaria* (CC) from the Canary Islands each have two. Of these parties, the CiU and PNV consistently hold the most seats on the first-order level since the first election in 1977. In practice, however, NCWPs do not participate in full coalition governments in the main arena. Instead, they back or oppose the main governing or opposition parties on a case-by-case basis. Regional parties mostly “limit themselves to giving parliamentary support to single-party minority governments and to agreeing

on parliamentary accords” (Colomer 1998, 49). Within their respective assemblies, the previously mentioned regional parties play an even greater role in the formation of government or opposition.

### ***Regional Parliaments: Asambleas Regionales***

All regions replicate the institutional arrangement at the central level—a high court, parliament, president, and cabinet form of government—although for most regions it was not necessary to do so (Agranoff 1996, 387; Newton and Donaghy 1997, 131). The unicameral regional assembly and its executive have authority to propose laws, albeit this is limited to areas of law that have been ceded to them by the central government. Within the wide range of appropriate areas, however, regional assemblies have authority to approve and carry out legislation independent of the central authorities. They may also may introduce laws to Congress and file appeals with the Constitutional Tribunal in Madrid (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 132).

Activity of the regional parliaments has increasingly flourished over the years, particularly in the 1980s, the formative decade of the Autonomous Communities. The number of laws passed by regional parliaments increased dramatically, collectively passing 85% of all laws in Spain in 1990, in contrast to the 14% of the central government (whose share was 68% in 1981) (Agranoff 1996, 389-390). Regional administration has also grown rapidly: regional governments have developed an intricate bureaucracy that “reproduces the [central] pattern, with undersecretaries, director generals, and so on” that burgeoned with the onset of regional authority (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 134).

## **Electoral Rules**

Furthermore, all regional and local level governments adopted an electoral system nearly identical to the one at the countrywide level. Proportionality is often better at these levels, however, because there are more seats per province or municipality (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 103). The least populated AC, La Rioja, sends four deputies to Congress but has a regional chamber with 33 representatives.<sup>2</sup> Nor are regions equal or synchronized in regards to electoral timing. Four regional governments have the authority to call their own respective elections, but the remaining thirteen regions must collectively hold their AC and local elections simultaneously. These regional governments do not have the option to call early elections.

## **Political Parties**

Across the regional assemblies, the PSOE and PP remain primary actors, but small parties that fail to gain seats in central parliament are not so unlucky at the regional level. And, again, the regional parties that have sent deputies to Congress have an even greater presence in their regional assemblies, with Catalanian and Basque parties leading the way. The CiU regularly receives a plurality of votes in Catalonia, winning 32% in the 2006 election and averaging 39% since 1980. The Catalan Republican Left (ERC) garners an average 9%. Notably, in Catalonia the PSOE merged with the regional socialists to form the Party of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC) (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006, 21-24), which is usually second to the CiU in terms of regional votes.

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<sup>2</sup> Even at the local and most proportional level, however, the vote-to-seat ratio can echo the disproportional outcomes of the countrywide level: in the 2007 local elections, the PSOE won the most seats, although they won fewer votes than the PP (34.9% to 35.6%, respectively) (Barreiro and Urquizo-Sancho 2007, 538).

Like the CiU, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has formed the regional government since its first elections and has an average vote share of 34%. The Basque Solidarity party, *Eusko Alkartasuna* (EA) follows with 5%. The PNV and EA have smaller successes in the bordering region of Navarra. In both Catalonia and Basque Country, the PP suffers more than the PSOE in relative vote loss from the central level. The PP vote share averages only 8% in Catalonia and 12% in Basque Country, while the PSOE averages 29% and 21%, respectively.

The vote is more evenly split among the PSOE, PP, and CC in the Canary Islands (with vote shares of 35%, 24%, and 24% in the 2007 AC election, respectively). In Galicia, the PP has won with an average of 50% of vote share over the last five regional elections, a comfortable margin over the PSOE (26%) and BNG (20%). Across the regions, other prominent political parties with regional representation are numerous; however, many parties or coalitions have been short-lived. Others have been more successful, and have established a regional presence for at least the past fifteen years: *Partido Andalucista* (PA), *Partido Aragones* (PAR), *Chunta Aragonesista* (CHA), *Partido Regionalista de Cantabria* (PRC), *Extremadura Unida* (EU), *Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra* (CDN), *Partido Riojano* (PR), *Unión Valenciana* (UV), *Partido Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa* (PSM-EN), and *Unión Mallorquina* (UM). These last two parties are named for the largest of the Balearic Islands, while the remaining parties' regions are reflected in their respective names.

### ***European Parliament***

The functions of the EP are numbered, and bear little resemblance to the countrywide and regional level institutions. The EP does not form a government, cannot introduce or enact laws, has only shared power over the budget, and is unable to raise funds. Certainly, its powers have steadily increased over the lifespan of the EU, and it works in collaboration with the

Commission and Council of Ministers in various capacities. It also holds several negative powers and institutional checks over other EU institutions (McCormick 1999, 101-107; Schmitt 2005, 652-654). Despite the steady evolution of its powers, however, its role still diverges from that of any European countrywide government.

### **Electoral Rules**

Since becoming a member of the European Union in 1986, Spanish constituents have voted in six European Parliament elections which have been held as countrywide elections. Spain continues to use a closed-list proportional representation system. This system allows parties the greatest control over candidates: candidate selection in Spain is also centralized (Hix 2004, 196-202). Like all elections, Spain verifies results through the *Junta Electoral Central* and allocates seats according to the d'Hondt rule. For the most part, Spanish EP election procedures reflect those most commonly exercised by EU member states (del Castillo 1996, 260).

### **Political Parties**

Spain's political parties have a history of pro-European attitudes (del Castillo 1996, 252). In the EP, the PSOE is included in the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the PP in the European People's Party (EPP). Delegates from both Spanish parties have had success in the ranks of the larger parties: the PES chair is a former PSOE leader, and two PP members have been secretary generals in the EPP (Hanley 2006, 160). Since the country acts as a single constituency, this poses a number of problems for regional parties, who have difficulty obtaining enough votes to send a single member to the EP. Most resort to forming "rather artificial alliances" (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 104). In addition, small parties are often squeezed out of the larger European parties, as was the case with the PNV being displaced by the PP in the

European People's Party (Hanley 2006, 161). (The norm of only allowing one political party per country into an EP party, however, eases the difficulty of comparing party performance on multiple levels.) The PSOE and PP took all but six of the 50 Spanish EP seats in 2009 (five out of 54 in 2004 and thirteen out of 64 in 1999). Although these numbers “punch somewhere around their true weight” on the countrywide level, they are achieved with joint lists formed from broad alliances (Hanley 2006, 162).

### ***The “Orders” of Multi-level Elections***

Elections to the Congress, regional assemblies, and European Parliament share important similarities: all use a similar PR system and the same political parties participate on all three levels, albeit with varied coalitions and degrees of success. These commonalities alleviate the institutional-procedural complications in studying elections across multiple countries (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 12). The disparity of power between the parliaments, however, is distinct. The functions of Congress are far more substantial than those of the EP, and, to a lesser extent, the regional parliaments. Consistent with the second-order framework, the elections to the central parliament are of the “first order”: most plainly, it controls the countrywide budget, determines government, and creates policies with “binding consequences” (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 8; Norris 1997, 115).

Although the powers of the EP and regional parliaments are both weaker than those of Congress, they are by no means equal to each other. Most activity emanating from the EP is controlled through other EU bodies and its lawmaking ability is limited to making co-decisions or recommendations. In contrast, regional assemblies have a robust set of laws they have approved and carried out (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 124). In second-order language, the

stakes are higher in a regional versus EP election. In sum, EP elections are expected to exhibit the most second-order characteristics because their stakes are lowest. European Parliament electoral outcomes hinge on the timing and previous results of the first-order arena. The relatively higher stakes in a regional election dilute any corresponding second-order effects.

### **The Emergence of Autonomous Communities**

While all regional assemblies have a second-order level somewhere between that of Congress and the EP, it would be disingenuous to treat them all the same. Again, one of the most defining characteristics of Spanish political institutions is the relationship between Madrid and the regions. Regarding the central-regional power structure, the Constitution created what many refer to as “asymmetric federalism” that “is a confusing and often contradictory arrangement” (Share 2006, 263). And even though it is often classified as a federal system and it has many federal features, Spain is not so officially. Under Franco, the centralized state controlled the various municipalities, which executed decrees directly from Madrid. During the democratic transition after his death, drafters of the Constitution avoided establishing concrete regional divisions. Instead, they included constitutional articles which allowed a region to come forward and form its own AC, with central parliament’s approval of its Statute of Autonomy into organic law (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 134).

The seventeen official Autonomous Communities in Spain today all completed the “autonomic” process by 1983. Spain’s devolution is notable in two ways: overtime, it has only increased the powers of regional governments, and the rate of devolution is markedly different among the regions. The Constitution defines which legal areas are exclusively under the control of the powers in Madrid, otherwise leaving open what other powers may be transferred to the

AC governments. In practice, and regardless of their starting point, all ACs have increased autonomy over time but have not always maximized the authorized powers within their grasp (Colomer 1998, 47).

### ***Fast-Track and Slow-Track Regions***

Scholars generally lump ACs into two groups: those that took the fast- or slow-track methods. Only Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia were awarded rapid routes to autonomy. Cultural differences aside, they are the only three regions in the pre-civil war period in which autonomous referendums had passed. This uniquely qualified them to ascend to autonomy with relatively few requirements, and they are referred to under a special provision in the Constitution. Their two-step process required that their Statutes of Autonomy be approved by Congress and by a regional referendum. Basque Country and Catalonia held their first AC elections in March of 1980, followed by Galicia in October 1981.

A second “fast-track” or “rapid route” procedure, however, was enacted for Andalusia after much public protest in the region. The slogan that arose from these demonstrations, *café para todos*, or “coffee for everyone,” emphasized that regional autonomy should be available for all those who seek it. Indeed, the heightened devolution and label of “historic nationalities” are often considered unfair to those regions that do not share special status, further complicating center-periphery tensions. Some parties actively campaign to harmonize the system: slow-track Autonomous Communities continue to push for powers equal to the original historic nationalities (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 148; Pallarés and Keating 2006, 102; van Biezen and Hopkin 2006, 22).



In the end, Congress approved the formation of the Autonomous Community of Andalusia in 1981. While Andalusia is generally grouped with the fast-track regions because of its early ascent to autonomy, its procedure was not as easy or fast. Andalusia's autonomous initiative depended on the approval of three-quarters of the municipal councils, an overall majority of voters in each province, and a second referendum approving the actual language of its autonomous statute. So while it ascended to autonomous status more quickly than most regions, its lack of a pre-civil war referendum meant it had to clear additional hurdles. Regardless, once its Statute of Autonomy was approved under Article 151 of the Constitution, it has enjoyed the same "fast-track" status of the three special provision regions.

Andalusia's particular route to autonomy was initially open to all regions; however, the failed military coup of 1981 prompted Congress to effectively stop any other region from following suit (Agranoff 1996, 390; Newton and Donaghy 1997, 121-124). Specifically, deputies approved the Law of Harmonization of the Autonomous Process, *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico* (LOAPA). The law attempted to equalize the autonomy-seeking procedure. While significant sections of the law were overturned by the Constitutional Tribunal, it successfully set uniform standards for regional parliaments, executives, and financing. It is this law that requires all ACs formed after 1981 to hold their regional elections on the same date and accede to autonomy via Article 143 of the Constitution. LOAPA did not deter the remaining territories of Spain to form *Comunidades Autónomas*. These thirteen "slow-track" or "Article 143" regions became Autonomous Communities by May 8, 1983, effectively leaving no territory without autonomous status (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 123).

### *Legal Asymmetry: Traspasos de Competencias*

Between the passage of the Constitution and 1986, all of the newly created ACs assumed many powers transferred from the central government. In addition to the set of *traspasos de competencias* or transfers of powers constitutionally guaranteed to the ACs at their foundation, certain additional services were turned over from the center to the regions. These first few years of transfers were both rapid and relatively uncontested. Between 1978 and 1986, a grand total of nearly 1,000 transfers were approved by Congress, which make up over half the total they enjoyed in 2008, two decades later (Table 1).

**Table 1** Running total of ceded powers by general election year

	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008
Andalusia	2	20	85	87	98	109	115	127	151
Aragon	3	16	55	56	63	85	96	98	104
Asturias	1	16	55	59	59	79	94	95	104
Balears	2	15	51	52	60	84	96	101	109
Canaries	1	8	67	69	78	103	112	116	119
Cantabria	0	16	53	53	53	78	87	89	103
Catalonia	7	53	82	93	103	121	145	162	180
C-L	0	16	55	62	65	88	100	107	108
C-M	1	15	55	60	62	81	86	90	92
Extremadura	1	14	51	55	56	78	86	92	94
Galicia	2	24	75	89	92	119	138	142	154
La Rioja	0	0	34	38	38	57	70	73	75
Madrid	0	0	39	45	46	70	82	93	93
Murcia	0	14	55	59	62	88	97	105	111
Navarra	0	0	32	36	40	40	59	60	60
P. Vasco	3	43	66	73	73	88	91	91	93
Valencia	3	21	80	91	93	107	125	127	130
Total	26	291	990	1077	1141	1475	1679	1768	1880

*Source: Ministry of Public Administration. Author's calculations.*

After 1986, however, the rate of transfers slowed precipitously, in part due to the additional restrictions imposed by Spain's entry into the European Union (at the time, the European Economic Community) and, more markedly, burgeoning multi-level conflicts. The

recognition of the central government as the sole representative body in the EU frustrated regional parties, and created new issues regarding AC jurisdiction and representation in an international context.

As ACs gain more powers, more disagreements led to challenges in the Constitutional Tribunal. They disputed jurisdiction of each other's laws and transfers regarding shared powers. Of course, constitutional challenges occur only in the event of the breakdown of bilateral negotiations between the center and AC (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 140-141).

Notably, the number of transfers varies both by year and by region (Table 1). No federal institution synchronizes or monitors the evolution of these transfers or relationships in general. Outside of bilateral negotiations and a judicial referee, no institutional recourse is available to settle central-regional conflict. Transfers of *competencias* likewise lack a uniform dispersal. Therein reside the roots and development of asymmetry within the Spanish state; each AC has "individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid" (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 124).

### ***Weak Inter-level Institutions***

Most of Spain's modern political institutions are designed to accommodate its regions; however, it still lacks a regional institution at the level of the central government. While it has a Senate (*Senado*) described as a territorial chamber in the Constitution, it does not effectively represent regions and its powers are weak. Its formation as an upper house of parliament is instead a result of several proposals to smooth the transition from the authoritarian regime during the early democracy. Its powers fall far short of those of the Congress, and Article 90.2

ensures that Congress can virtually override any action from the upper house (Colomer 1998, 49).

In regards to lawmaking, both houses can draft or propose legislation, but a bill enters the Senate for its “considered opinion” only when it has been passed by Congress. The Senate has two months to attempt to amend or veto the bill. Any amendments introduced by the Senate can then be accepted by a simple majority in the lower house. Alternatively, an absolute majority of senators may veto the bill, but several constraints prevent any veto from being long-standing.

A senatorial veto can be reversed with an absolute majority of deputies; if the bill is more than two months old, a simple majority can suffice. Moreover, if a bill is deemed “urgent” by Congress or government, the Senate only has twenty days to review the text (Art. 90). In short, the *Senado* does not provide a “coordinated and institutionalized means for making all those decisions affecting both realms of power in such a way that both nationwide and regionally bounded interests are represented and protected” (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 136).

Institutions that do organize inter-level negotiations are primarily administrative in nature. Regional and central government relations are coordinated by sector conferences and cooperation agreements that are limited in scope. Established in the early years of democracy and for specific policy areas, their powers are limited to ironing out administrative differences between levels. Of these inter-level arrangements, the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF) and the ministers of education are notable for their consistent meetings (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 136-137). The policy proposals of such councils can be adopted into law via parliament. While they have successfully provided cooperative guidance to public projects in their respective fields, they do not provide regions with substantive policy-making or veto power. Neither sector conferences nor cooperative agreements can renegotiate autonomous authority,

and their own rules limit regional influence by granting central government equal votes in proposal approval (Montero 2005, 74).

Without formal institutions to foster central-regional shared rule, practically all policy and reform is a result of bilateral agreements (Agranoff 1996, 390; Colomer 1998, 49; Montero 2005, 74). Many political elites suggest this is a problem, and that the solution is reform of the *Senado* and transitioning to a full federal system. While some experts agree that the parliament should become truly bicameral, others propose that the Senate should simply initiate review of regional concerns, draft policy proposals, or both (Agranoff 1996, 398). This debate, however, has been latent since the mid-1990s. To date, the Constitutional Tribunal remains the final authority on disagreements between the central and regional governments (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 137). Of course, universal regional reform can and does pass. It just has to be ratified on a bilateral basis by each region, such as in the case of regional financing.

### ***Fiscal Asymmetry: Regional Financing***

Regional financing embodies the devolved and asymmetric character of Spain. It is a devolving process because financial powers are centralized and the dispersal is asymmetric because they are unequal. Montero divides regions into four fiscal groups. Two groups are from the slow-track Article 143 regions, divided by ACs made up of one or many provinces. The third fiscal group includes the fast-track regions Andalusia, Catalonia, and Galicia plus the Canary Islands and Valencia. The first three groups make up the “common” financial regime. Finally, Basque Country and Navarra have a “special” regime status, constitutionally protected by their historic *fueros* or charters. They are the most distinct from a financial lens in that they manage

their own taxes and return an annual *cuota* or quota of revenue to the central government (2005, 76-77).

Regional spending practices reflect divisions between groups. Basque Country and Navarra spend the most per inhabitant, with the other fast-track group spending about two-thirds of that amount. Uni- and multi-provincial Article 143 regions spend the least, at one-third and half the rate of fast-track regions, respectively (Montero 2005, 76). For the common regime regions (all ACs less Basque Country and Navarra), the *Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas*, or LOFCA, established the negotiations of regional fiscal responsibility at five-year intervals: 1980-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-2007. The most recent reform was approved in July 2009. The centerpiece of these negotiations is the transfer of money to regions from the center, calculated on the regions' ability to collect taxes (for the central government). This increases asymmetry from a fiscal perspective, since tax revenues vary widely from one region to the next (Montero 2005, 75-76; Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 83).

LOFCA created the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF) whose members include the minister of finance, his or her regional counterparts, and the minister of public administration. Any reforms proposed by CPFF must be ratified by bilateral committees, *Comisiones Mixtas de Transferencias*. Again, this requires that each region agree to the reform with the central government individually. Chief among their policy-making powers is the reform of LOFCA at the end of each five-year interval.

The Spanish tax system has been highly centralized and requires all tax powers to be ceded by the central government to regions (Agranoff 1996, 391-394). Indeed, there has been a steady and substantial increase in ceded taxes and a corresponding decrease in central government transfers to ACs. And whenever powers are delegated to the ACs, their newly

acquired responsibilities must have approval through organic law and designate how they will be funded (Art. 150.2). Over time, total regional spending has increased to one third of public spending, or 42% of public spending outside of social security (OECD 2007, 96).

Central provision of social services, however, ensures that the levels of government remain intertwined even in areas that are strictly under AC jurisdiction. For example, while tourism initially fell exclusively under regional control, the Constitutional Tribunal later ruled it was a shared responsibility under economic development. The EU requires central regulation by setting standards in agriculture, fishing, and labor (Agranoff 1996, 396). The EU Commission has overruled AC control over modifying certain tax rates and applications (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 77). VAT and sales tax in particular encounter “the specific problem of the rigid rules surrounding tax harmonization that, as is known, have made more progress in this field than in any other” in the EU (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 86). Regional sources of revenue are thus limited by both central and EU controls. On the other hand, certain EU funds can be routed directly to the ACs (and bypass central agencies) since 1994 (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 129).

In 2001, the central and regional governments accepted a “strong revision” of LOFCA which dramatically changed AC financing (Bosch and Durán 2008, 8). Most notably, 33% of personal income tax, 35% of value-added and excise taxes, and 100% of electricity taxes were devolved to the regions. The variety of new tax sources, however, are still generated through central tax revenues, and “no difference whatsoever exists between receiving a part of the state’s whole tax revenues and receiving many small portions” (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 83). Roughly one-third of regional income still comes directly from central funds (Ruiz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 147).

The 2001 LOFCA reform also demonstrates regional-central overlap in administration of the welfare state. Decentralization of health, education, and other social services must rely on central funding via the Sufficiency Fund, *Fondo de Suficiencia*.<sup>3</sup> The CPFF wanted to ensure that all regions could provide a similar level of services for the “same level of fiscal effort”; this guarantee requires redistribution from fiscally robust regions to those with weaker fiscal capacity (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 150). The amount of funds is determined by each region’s need, less its regional tax collection. If a region’s tax collection exceeded its expenditure needs (as it often does in Basque Country and the Balearic Islands), funds are transferred from the region (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 153; OECD 2007).

Tax revenue and expenditure needs, however, are not based on the actual dollar amount collected or spent. Instead, the calculation of a region’s need is based on per capita income, population size, and (rural or insular) location. Likewise, tax revenue is based on a formula which takes the rate of ceded taxes at the year they were devolved to the region and adds the growth rates of *central* government taxes up to the current year (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 152-153). In addition, it has a status quo or stop-gap mechanism which guarantees that regions with incoming revenue from the fund get at least the amount received the period prior. While equalization grants reduce the differences in services provided, their application varies widely across regions, and the formula to determine funds is convoluted. Equalization grants exacerbate fiscal asymmetry while maintaining central control. This is not necessarily viewed negatively by regional governments: central tax administration provides a political incentive for the ACs, which can blame the center for tax increases (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 77).

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<sup>3</sup>As outlined in Article 158 of the Constitution, *Asignaciones de Nivelación*, Equalization Grants, are to be transferred to a region when an increase in its population necessitates outside funding to maintain a minimum level of services. In practice, however, this specific fund has never been distributed (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 150).



Despite whether or not the arrangement is preferred, many of the funds raised by ACs are processed through the central administration (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 127). Such funds cannot be considered own-source revenue and must be considered separately (Rodden 2004, 483). Spain's regions are increasingly retaining a larger percentage of revenue; their public expenditure rivals those of federal countries (Bosch and Durán 2008, 5). Common regime "regions enjoy only a limited capacity for the self-generation of funds and the greater part of funds spent at regional levels derive from central coffers" (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 142). The impact of greater budgets is the ability to take responsibility for ceded *competencias*. Both power transfers and financing must be delegated from the center to the sub-units. Basque Country and Navarre, from a perspective of fiscal decentralization, are the only two ACs with a wholly autonomous fiscal system. In response, common regime regions petition for more comparable fiscal authority through LOFCA (OECD 2007, 95).

### **Regional Finance Reform: The Catalanian Charge**

Regions, however, are not passive recipients of funds or any other type of transfer. It is often at the urging of regional elites that powers are devolved to them. Historic regions usually provide the impetus for change in autonomous authority: territorial reform is a centrifugal force. Catalonia's demand to control a greater portion of the income tax eventually led to reform across all regions in the early 1990s. Catalonia continued to champion devolution of the income tax, along with property tax, inheritance, and gaming taxes. By 2002, through separate negotiating processes, all common regime ACs controlled 33% of the income tax (OECD 2007, 95-96).

And reform does not always begin at the level of the autonomous government. Barreiro and Urquizo-Sancho suggest that territorial reform stems equally from Madrid as it does from the ACs themselves (2007, 543). Catalonia's 2005 reform to its Statute of Autonomy became a countrywide issue in the 2007 local and regional elections. The reform colored debate in other regions because ratification of the reform by *Congreso* proved contentious. It was most controversial in regions controlled by the opposition (the PP) who portrayed acceptance of the reform as privileging Catalonia over others. This campaign gained traction in Madrid, where centralization is esteemed, and in Valencia, where the high level of Catalanian devolution is deemed unfair. Barreiro and Urquizo-Sancho argue that this success is manifest in the 2007 election results: only in those two regions did the PP gain votes from the local to the regional elections. In the other regions, vote share remained consistent (2007, 544).

The PP's countrywide effort to feed inter-regional resentment also represents the center-periphery issue from an ideological standpoint. While sometimes a dormant issue, parties are often willing to bring it to the forefront during an election. Partisan and territorial interests coincide, and not only in the so-called "historic nationalities." A proposal for greater autonomy in one region ignites the same desire in others (Bosch and Durán 2008, 21). This affects region-to-region, center-to-region, and party-to-party relationships.

In Congress, both the PSOE and PP have allied with regional parties to form alliances in Congress. Regional parties have strong incentives to represent themselves at the level of the purse. And as an ally of the ruling party, their bargaining position is strong. Not surprisingly, Catalanian regional parties have often enjoyed this position, and they spearhead reform favorable to gains in regional responsibilities. LOFCA and the Catalanian trailblazer serve as the only harmonizing forces of fiscal equalization in the absence of a formal institution.

### *The “Orders” of Autonomy*

In sum, the null powers of the Senate and the system of regional finance exacerbate the asymmetry of regional autonomy. The Constitution did not create an institution to coordinate central-regional concerns, and LOFCA reform remains dependent on bilateral approval. But there exists some cohesion in the latter process, since the reforms of one region (usually Catalonia) soon translates to similar adoptions in all others. “Autonomy” itself is a sticky concept which, along with devolution, can be broken down and measured along distinct lines. In Spain, broad divisions are clear in regional legal and fiscal capacities. Two groups emerged at the establishments of ACs: fast- and slow-track regions. Likewise, regional fiscal arrangements fall under one of two categories, the special regime with historical *fueros* or the common (“non-special”) regime. Fast-track ACs are not the same as the special regimes. That is, only *País Vasco* has membership in both groups.

The division between fast- and slow-track, or between “historic” and “non-historic,” remains the most marked: three of the four fast-track ACs also have the greatest number of devolved responsibilities (Table 1). The fourth, Basque Country, maintains a special regime financing system and police force. The fast-track regional institutions have greater normative and procedural autonomy. In contrast, the remaining regions began at a lower devolved status and remain “behind” despite several gains in transfers, as reflected in their levels of expenditure and transferred powers.

For this project, and consistent with prevailing literature on Spanish politics, the fast-track ACs (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia) are assessed separately from the slow-track regions. Due to their distinct electoral timeline and large number of devolved responsibilities, fast-track regional politics are expected to take on a dynamic more independent

of the first-order arena. In particular, I expect that the outcomes of the fast-track regional elections will stray more frequently from expected vote share in the Dinkel test, since their regional assemblies can independently time their elections.

Since dissimilarity scores are provided for each region, a more nuanced division between regions may take place. The financial authority of a region can be taken into account. While fast-track regions are still expected to lead the rest in measures of volatility, Navarra's special regime status is also expected to encourage region-specific voting behavior. All fast-track financial regions are expected to have greater dissimilarity scores than those of Article 143 regions. From a legal perspective, the number of ceded powers, financial or otherwise, a region possesses should correlate negatively with second-order effects.

### **Methodology**

Methods of analysis center on the tests put forth by Jeffery and Hough to assess fit of the second-order framework to elections on different levels and in different regions. First, turnout is assessed as it flows with second-order logic in the same manner of straightforward comparison used by Reif and Schmitt in 1980. Second, Dinkel's expected partisan vote share of regional and EP elections is plotted along a general election timeline. Third, the index of dissimilarity for these regions is tabulated for all countrywide election years. Together, these test results address two questions of each election type in question: first, do election results respond to the electoral cycle of the first-order political arena? And, second, does vote distribution reflect the election results of the first-order? An answer to the affirmative of either question implies that the election displays a "secondary" status.

Results from the European and regional levels are then compared to each other. And regions are compared to each other according to their level of departure from the central government's control. The focal points across all levels remain performance of government, opposition, and small parties. This research project differs from Jeffery and Hough's in three fundamental ways: instead of focusing on four regions, it examines all seventeen; instead of comparing just regional and countrywide elections, tests are calculated for elections to the EP; alongside territorial cleavages, degrees of decentralization are introduced as explanatory variables for second-order effects. Specifically, I expect fast-track and special regime regions to have a poorer fit to the SOE model.

Although confined to one country, the study uses the comparative method, as defined by Lijphart (1971). Furthermore, this study's focus on electoral regions within Spain aims to minimize the "many variables, small N problem of the comparative method" (1971, 686-687). That is, studying variance across regions within a single country enhances comparability "by focusing on intranation instead of international comparison [which] can take advantage of the many similar national characteristics serving as controls" (1971, 689). The primary advantage to this approach is that several variables are controlled for, as the study takes place in one setting (with the major caveat that a country does, clearly, change over time in many respects). The main disadvantage is that a single national setting is limited in making generalizations across countries.

With this in mind, the thesis narrows its focus to three levels of elections in Spain, using Jeffery and Hough's 2003 article as a technical blueprint. According to Jeffery and Hough, the Spanish case was incompatible with the second-order model because of its heterogeneity: territorial cleavages and strong regional traditions bolstered regional elections closer to "first-order" status in the minds of voters (2003). Hence voters do not believe there is less at stake in

regional elections, which violates the major premise of the second-order framework as outlined by Reif and Schmitt. If election results “fail” to conform to a second-order Dinkel curve, we expect high scores of dissimilarity from them as well. That is, a non-response to the electoral cycles of the general election should parallel evidence of “territorialization.”

Findings in previous studies so far indicate that second-order effects do not extend to all of Spain’s regions, but they do in most (Hough and Jeffery 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2006). We expect second-order phenomenon to vary from location to location, and from time to time—it is interesting that they would vary so widely among regions belonging to the same state and during the same electoral moment. Reif and Schmitt first analyzed one second-order election (the 1979 EP election) to the first-order elections in many countries (1980). This study looks at two types of second-order elections (to the EP and regional assemblies) in one country across multiple cycles.

### ***Variables and Data Collection***

#### **Sources**

The *Ministerio del Interior* provides elections results for the central Spanish and EU parliaments. The Ministry leaves it to the Autonomous Communities to track vote distribution in elections to their respective parliaments. Fortunately, the Valencian AC government aggregates official voting data from all of its counterparts and is the single source for regional election results in this study. Both sources include absenteeism rates and vote share by party for individual elections. These sources provided all of the raw data for this project; however, all calculations and illustrations for turnout, Dinkel, and index of dissimilarity analyses are my own.

The dependent variable, non-countrywide election results, will refer to elections to the regional and European parliaments. Also like Jeffery and Hough, “regions” are synonymous with Spain’s seventeen Autonomous Communities, to the exclusion of provinces and municipalities. Also excluded are Spain’s autonomous cities *Centa* and *Melilla* on the African coast, due to their unusual electoral arrangement.

The first test is the national electoral cycle. Although Spain failed to conform to Dinkel’s curve in Hough and Jeffery’s analysis, it nevertheless creates a portrait of any voting patterns that emerge between countrywide elections. Consistent with earlier studies, the ratio of the actual vote share to the expected vote share is graphed according to the number of days since the previous general election (in Spain, an average of 1,325 days fall between elections). The second test and independent variable, territorial cleavages, is measured by the index of dissimilarity. The index attempts to operationalize the voters’ change of heart between elections. The formula is borrowed from segregation studies in sociology and adapted to voting behavior. For all k parties within a given region, it takes the absolute value of the difference in vote shares between levels, sums them, and divides the total by two:

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum |P_{ik} - P_{jk}|$$

Wherein  $P_{ik}$  is the vote percentage of k won in the countrywide election, and  $P_{jk}$  represents its vote share in the nearest regional election.

Thus, the score represents the percentage of voters that would need to recast their votes in order for the regional and countrywide election results to become the same. Since in Spain both countrywide and regional levels use the same PR system, it also roughly determines how many votes would need to change in order to make the partisan balance of the AC and the

central parliaments mirror each other. Once graphed, the index provides an excellent resource to portray trends across both time and Autonomous Communities.

It is important to note that completion of both steps of Jeffery and Hough's analysis is necessary apart from results of the first step. Regardless of the results of the Dinkel analysis, explanatory powers of the second-order framework must be assessed while considering territorial cleavage. The index of dissimilarity may or may not correlate in the same manner as the Dinkel results. In order to find out whether a correlation between these effects exists in the first place, both tests' results must be evaluated.

### **Types of Parties**

Vote share by regional population is the unit of analysis as well as the basis of calculation for both expected vote share and the index of dissimilarity. Within each region, parties are divided into five groups. The four countrywide parties each comprise one group: the PSOE, PP, UCD/CDS, and IU. As discussed above, only the first three have experience as governing or opposition parties at the central level. The UCD coalition governed only during the first five years of the new democracy, 1977-1982. In the 1982 election it competed separately from the CDS. After 1982, however, the CDS became the successor to the UCD; hence, for that year their vote share is combined. Like the UCD, the CDS has largely become increasingly unsuccessful, rarely gaining over one percent of the vote in the last three general elections. The marginal vote share it does garner, however, is considered separately from that of regional parties.

While the IU has never won a plurality of seats in Madrid, it also cannot be regarded as regional due to its countrywide, federal structure. Of the countrywide parties, it depends the



most on regional parties. Its ballot title in four ACs is presented in the regional dialect (in contrast to the PP, which never does, and the PSOE, whose name changes slightly only in Catalonia). In roughly six regions, the IU has formed pre-electoral pacts with regional parties, particularly after the new millennium and for European elections. In every one of these cases, however, the IU leads the ticket and votes for these coalitions are counted toward IU totals.

Hence the fifth type of party, regional or non-countrywide parties (NCWPs), is formed by default: once the countrywide parties are accounted for, the remaining parties are grouped under this final label. Failing to distinguish between regional parties who are more or less successful presents a potential limitation. Is it valid, for example, to group the nearly one million votes in Catalonia for the CiU in the 2000 general election with, say, the 85 votes of the unknown *Partido Democrático del Pueblo*? While this distinction is great, for the purposes of this study any vote for a party without a countrywide presence counts as a regional success. The second-order tests reviewed here do not focus on any specific regional party's achievement but on the voters who do or do not rely on their first-order decision for second-order votes. Furthermore, for parties that dominate the regional vote share, they usually do so at a great extent. For example, together the CiU and ERC in Catalonia regularly make up over 70% of all votes cast for regional parties in AC elections. In neighboring Aragon, the regional parties PAR and CHA together make up over 90%.


Nevertheless, it should be noted that this grouping of regional parties does not capture vote change that occurs between regional parties (Marsh 1998, 595). For the index of dissimilarity, volatility is not captured if a voter chooses a regional party in a general election and a second regional party in a non-general election. Another caveat is that not all small parties are limited to one region. Many experience success in more than one AC, even parties that may

appear region-specific. For example, the party *Extremadura Unida*—which only averages around 3% of the vote share in the region for which it is named—has supporting votes (albeit numbering in the hundreds) scattered in regions as far away as the Canary Islands. Regional parties may have inter-regional reach; they may not even cater to specific regional interests. Even if parties do not underscore regional issues on their platform, such as alternative communist parties to the IU, they are considered regional simply because they fail to achieve countrywide reach. In contrast, since the Dinkel test only considers main, opposition, and regional party types, the vote share for the CDS and IU are not illustrated at all. Their position with a weak, but countrywide, presence excludes them from Dinkel calculations altogether.

## Tests and Analyses

### *Turnout*

A key manifestation of voters caring less about second-order contests is their failure to vote in the first place. Turnout data from Spain demonstrates that European elections suffer the most from voter apathy (Figure 1 and Table 2). For all of Spain, including general, regional, and European elections, average abstention is 32.27% (with a median of 31.66%). An additional 11% of voters stay home during EP elections, with an average abstention rate of 43.21%. Regional election abstention is roughly on par with the grand total average, at a rate of 31.95%. General elections garner the most voters, with 25.89% absenteeism. Overall, voters turn out most often for elections to *Congreso*, not as often for AC elections, and the least often for the European Parliament (Table 2).



**Figure 1** Average abstention rates, 1979-2008

*Source: Ministry of Interior. Author's calculations.*

**Table 2** Average abstention rates, 1977-2007 (%)

	General	AC	EP	Total
Andalusia	26.35	29.97	44.66	32.33
P. Vasco	29.89	34.38	45.26	35.31
Catalonia	27.33	40.73	49.51	37.03
Galicia	36.08	38.63	50.24	40.64
Aragon	24.45	32.08	43.26	31.66
Asturias	28.70	36.13	44.72	35.10
Baleares	30.02	37.94	51.41	38.01
Canaries	32.81	36.48	50.50	38.63
Cantabria	23.47	26.87	38.51	28.50
C-L	23.74	29.24	39.45	29.52
C-M	20.65	24.90	36.94	26.25
Extremadura	22.76	25.05	37.49	27.40
La Rioja	21.83	27.68	39.34	28.20
Madrid	22.06	34.14	41.96	30.78
Navarra	26.61	30.64	43.74	32.38
Murcia	22.04	29.92	39.68	29.00
Valencia	21.32	28.33	37.94	27.76

*Source: Ministry of Interior. Author's calculations.*

At the general level, fast-track regions have an abstention rate of 29.91%.<sup>4</sup> Article 143 regions, on the other hand, have an average general abstention of 24.65%. The 5% disparity between fast- and slow-track regions is maintained for elections to the autonomous (36% versus 31%) and European parliaments (47% versus 42%). Catalonia, Galicia, and the insular regions have the four highest AC abstentions; the same four have the highest EP absenteeism (Table 2).

For all levels of elections, average abstention is greatest in regions with higher numbers of devolved responsibilities: the fast-track and special regime regions make up five of the top eight abstention rates. The other three are Asturias and the two insular regions. The Balearic and Canary Islands have the two highest EP abstention rates and the second and third highest

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<sup>4</sup> Galicia has an average of 36%, which is skewed by a 50% abstention rate during the 1979 general elections; however, even dismissing that outlier, the fast-track abstention average only drops to 29.50%.

general abstention rates, with Asturian absenteeism hovering around fifth place for all three levels of elections. The number of responsibilities ceded to the Canaries (119) is second only to the number of responsibilities assigned to Valencia (131) among the slow-track regions as of 2008. The Balearics have the fourth highest (109). The reverse also holds true: Castilla la Mancha (C-M) and Extremadura have the two highest rates of participation in AC and EP elections and few transferred powers (92 and 94, respectively) (Figure 1 and Table 1).

On one hand, lower rates of abstention in highly devolved regions contradict my hypothesis that a second-order characteristic (low turnout) would be weaker in their elections. On the other hand, this is not surprising considering that fast-track ACs hold elections separately from the remaining thirteen regions, whose elections are held in tandem with local ones. Also, the type—not merely the quantity—of votes has not yet been taken into account.

Voters may be more active in slow-track regions, but across Spain, turnout behavior is consistent when comparing the levels to each other. By and large, turnout for all regions—regardless of devolved status—rank in the same order, from largest to smallest: general, regional, and European (Table 2). Concerning participation averages, the only exception to this ranking is the inaugural 1986 election to the EP. And of the three individual exceptions, they are all instances in which regional trumped general turnout in fast-track ACs. Two instances occur in Basque Country and concern the high rate of abstention in the 2000 congressional election (36%) which surpassed those of the regional elections in 1998 and 2001 (32% and 21%, respectively). The third exception was in Andalusia, where the difference was minuscule (21.9% versus 22.7%), and when its regional election coincided with the general election of 1996. More voters turned in (barely) more ballots for this regional contest even though the opportunity cost to vote in the general election was minor. Previous second-order analyses are held up in this

case: outside of compulsory voting, Schmitt found that concurrent first-order electoral timing is the largest indicator of an increase in turnout for EP elections among its member states (2005, 657). The exceptional cases in Basque Country and Andalusia partially support the expectation that the stakes surrounding a fast-track AC election may pull up turnout numbers; on the flip side, it may be more of a function of meager levels of general election participation.

In contrast to regional levels, European turnout unequivocally falls behind the pack, averaging 16% lower than the general election average and 11% lower than AC elections. Even in the 1999 elections, which fell on the same day as local and slow-track AC elections, an average of 3.52% fewer ballots were cast for European Parliament candidates. In sum, looking solely at relative turnout rates, the division is clear between levels, and rather sizeable in the case of the EP. The turnout pattern is less distinct between regions, with fast-track ACs displaying steadily high averages for abstention but whose cases of exceptionally high turnout contribute to the notion that their stakes rival those of the first-order elections.


### ***Dinkel Analysis***

The 2003 Jeffery and Hough article found the Dinkel curve in Spanish elections to directly contradict second-order assumptions: the governing party performed best midterm, while opposition and regional parties suffered. Notably, the data sample for said study was from four regions, two in the fast-track (Catalonia and Galicia) and two from the slow-track (Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha) groups. An updated analysis of expected vote share using this same sample reveals similar results. An aggregate analysis of Spanish regions, as a whole, indicates that voting behavior more often than not fulfills second-order expectations.


Similar to results in the 2003 study, the pattern set by the Dinkel curve is “mild but distinctive” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 202). As demonstrated by the figures’ scatter plots, standard error is large but clear trends emerge (Figures 2-3). Trend lines in all figures are based on quadratic equations, since partisan support is expected to be parabolic, peaking or bottoming-out at the midpoint between general elections (Schmitt 2005, 659). The resulting curves in both AC and EP elections reflect unfavorable midterm cyclical effects. Most parties perform poorly relative to their respective vote shares near countrywide contests, with the exception of regional parties in European elections. In comparing parties’ expected vote share to each other, the most definitive recurring pattern is created by regional parties, which surpass their expected vote share much more frequently, and to a greater degree, than the two main parties. Finally, of the two levels analyzed, fewer exceptions to second-order expectations occur on the European level.

### **Regional Elections**

Figures 2 and 3 include AC election data from all seventeen regions. The trends reveal that governing, opposition, and small parties are more successful as elections are held closer to general election dates. Contrary to the four-region sample in Jeffery and Hough’s study, the governing party in Madrid suffers most midterm; however, this fits the second-order assumption that voters employ punishment effects against the main governing party at this point. Like the results of Jeffery and Hough, opposition and regional parties challenge second-order predictions by losing votes in the middle of the electoral cycle. Note that the expected vote share



**Figure 2** Main party performance in regional elections, 1980-2007



**Figure 3** Regional party performance in regional elections, 1980-2007

Sources: As for Figure 1.




scale for small parties, however, is much larger than that for the main or opposition parties. Most NCWPs achieve much higher levels of expected vote share than their larger counterparts: at face value, countrywide election results undersell the potential performance of NCWPs at regional moments.


In light of the second-order framework, expected vote share for the governing party fits cyclical predictions: it averages only 89.77% and only a quarter of cases met or exceeded expected vote. Both opposition and regional parties' patterns are contrary to second-order estimations. While punishment effects are supposed to favor opposition parties midterm, their expected vote share dips below that of the governing party precisely at that point (Figure 2). Throughout the cycle, however, the opposition fares slightly better than the governing party, meeting 93.02% of its expected vote on average.

Regional parties almost double their expected vote share, at an average rate of 189.69% (Figure 3). Fewer than 12% of regional cases fail to surpass expectations set by the general elections. The trend arc is more flattened-out, however, and their relative performance does not crest midterm. Interestingly, they fare slightly better leading up to, rather than following, a general election. Since all three types of parties experience midterm punishment effects, the advantage goes to the regional parties. They exceed expected vote share most often and to an intense degree.

Cyclical effects take on the same pattern regardless of the devolved status of regions (Figures 4-7). The arcs for expected party support are similar for Article 143 regions and the four fast-track regions, which mirror the patterns of all regions together. Only the government's performance matches second-order expectations. Despite having separate regional voting dates, fast-track ACs do not noticeably follow or stray from general election data.




**Figure 4** Main party performance in fast-track regional elections, 1980-2006




**Figure 5** Regional party performance in fast-track regional elections, 1980-2006

Sources: As for Figure 1.



**Figure 6** Main party performance in slow-track regional elections, 1980-2007




**Figure 7** Regional party performance in slow-track regional elections, 1980-2007

Sources: As for Figure 1.


Likewise, the reproduction of Hough and Jeffery's sample including Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha, Catalonia and Galicia have trend lines for two party types opposite of what electoral cycles literature would suggest (the exception being regional trends)(Figure 8). That is, voters treat opposition parties more favorably near the moment of a general election, and the party in government actually performs relatively better the further an election takes place from a countrywide contest. Regional party support, however, remains strong, achieving 143.88% of expected vote share and peaking midterm.

Assessing the two slow-track regions separately reveals no substantial difference: for Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura, the Dinkel curve for regional parties conforms to second-order predictions by peaking mid-cycle (Figure 9). While the regional party trend line in fast-track regions also crests midterm, the arc for the Catalonia and Galicia is less pronounced. Overall, vote share averages are slightly more consistent and favorable in the fast-track regions (meeting 148.56% of expected vote share, as compared to 138.87% in Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura).


Yet the “wrong” trends for main parties prevail even without the influence of the two fast-track regions. Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura—with relatively few transferred powers and memberships to the common financial regime—still depart from second-order electoral rhythms. Given that these two regions also have the two highest turnout rates for AC elections, second-order prospects appear bleak all around. The two fast-track ACs (Catalonia and Galicia) each have a stronger regional party presence and higher devolution measures: it follows that votes cast in their favor are not necessarily in response to cyclical effects (Figure 10). But the second-order deviations of the slow-track sample also imply that more than first-order references are involved in voter decision-making at the regional level (Figure 9).



**Figure 8** Party performance in regional elections in Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha, Catalonia, and Galicia, 1980-2007



**Figure 9** Party performance in regional elections in Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha, 1980-2007



**Figure 10** Party performance in Catalonia and Galicia in regional elections, 1980-2006


*Sources: As for Figure 1.*

### European Parliament Elections


Curves for European elections flow in the same direction across the electoral cycle regardless of level of regional autonomy. Fast- and slow-track ACs experience an increase in small party support near midterm and overtake expected vote share by an average of 35% and 54%, respectively. In contrast, voters distance themselves from the two large parties most frequently midterm (Figure 11). The party in central government suffers the most, but also makes more relative gains as the next general election approaches. Roughly a year before an upcoming election, expected vote rates for the government party surpass those of the opposition, who, up to that point, fared better than its competition in Madrid.

Actual votes for regional parties swell in comparison to expected votes at midterm. The trend lines for all regions during European elections suggest NCWP support peaks midterm:

regional gains coincide with main party losses (Figure 12). This fits Reif and Schmitt's second-order prediction that voters, since it is less risky to do so, experiment with smaller parties while punishing the government at midterm EP elections.



**Figure 11** Main party performance in EP elections, 1987-2004



**Figure 12** Regional party performance in EP elections, 1987-2004

Sources: As for Figure 1.



## A Comparison of Levels

The common denominator in the SOE scatter plots is the position regional parties enjoy. Consistently, small parties perform much better in the SOEs than in the general election. Over the term of the general-to-general election cycle, NCWPs average 149.18% of expected vote share. The opposition and governing parties pick up much lower averages, 97.44% and 92.95%, respectively. In all, findings from the Dinkel tests are modest, but clearly differentiate between European and AC cyclical effects. For regional elections, no trend line explains a significant amount of variance for any type of party ( $p < .05$ ). The trend line for European cases explains about one-third of the variance for governing ( $r^2 = .32$ ), opposition ( $r^2 = .29$ ) and regional parties ( $r^2 = .33$ ;  $p < .05$ ). While this is a fairly small amount of explained variance, it certainly improves upon that of regional vote share and predicts a fair amount using a single independent variable.

Graphing relative vote share provides a useful initial illustration of cyclical effects, or, rather, the lack of one. These results fall in line with the 2003 Jeffery and Hough study, and in large part imply that a “countervailing dynamic” takes place outside of regional-to-general subordination in Spain (2003, 204). Something outside of the general election cycle is affecting vote share in AC elections.

In contrast, vote shares in elections to the European Parliament exhibit a link to the rhythm of the countrywide arena. “Punishment effects” are more prevalent, and the two large parties lose midterm. This occurs in all types of regions; devolved status has little effect on the size or shape of these effects. Unlike regional elections, all regions must vote for the EP simultaneously and as an entire constituency, which dampen the impact of a NCWP vote.

Nevertheless, they fare very well. This follows second-order reasoning: voters are more likely to stray from the main parties when stakes are lower.

A comparison of the two levels is clear: the European level responds much more so to the timing of general elections. This supports the Heath, et al. conclusion that European elections appear to have a greater degree of “second-orderness” than regional elections (1997). Regional elections are more unpredictable and do not conform to a set pattern—second-order or otherwise. Unfortunately, the lack of any regional election trend does little to support my expectation that a clear differentiation would occur between fast- and slow-track regions. So while a measurable disparity exists between election levels, no clear distinction arises from a comparison between territories.

### *Index of Dissimilarity*

**Table 3** Index of dissimilarity averages, 1980-2009 (%)

	AC	EU	Total
Andalusia	7.49	7.82	7.65
P. Vasco	12.72	8.32	10.52
Catalonia	17.61	7.72	12.67
Galicia	15.30	6.55	10.92
Cantabria	23.79	8.67	16.23
Canaries	18.28	9.36	13.82
Navarra	12.98	10.95	11.97
Baleares	14.69	8.37	11.53
Aragon	13.77	7.80	10.78
Valencia	8.33	9.76	9.05
Asturias	7.33	6.51	6.92
C-M	8.29	5.17	6.73
Madrid	5.86	7.47	6.66
C-L	6.49	5.69	6.09
La Rioja	5.74	6.38	6.06
Extremadura	6.29	5.26	5.78
Murcia	5.66	5.65	5.66

*Source: As for Table 2.*

### **A Comparison of Levels**

Given the expected vote share results, dissimilarity scores for EP should be correspondingly low, while they should be sporadic for regional elections. Table 3 provides average indices of dissimilarity for all regions, with the four fast-track regions listed first. Like the Dinkel test results, European elections

most frequently fit second-order assumptions and exhibit the lowest volatility rates. The average indices for the *Region de Murcia* are nearly identical at the two levels, fixed at a low 5.65%. For most other regions, volatility is higher at the AC level. Navarra, the region with the highest rate of average EP volatility, 11%, still falls short of its regional index, 13%. As expected of a less-at-stake election, European votes more closely mirror those of the nearest general election.

Comparing overall averages, the European index score (7.50%) is 3.72% less than that of the regional one (11.21%). This difference is equal to half and one-third of the EP and AC election averages, respectively. The two levels also have different ranges of index scores. The difference between the high and low scores in the EU column is 5.78; among regional scores, that number more than triples to 18.13%.

### **European Parliament Elections**

While EP volatility noticeably increased for the 1994 elections, it has more or less hovered around 7%, dropping to a low of 4.20% in 2004 (Table 4). The Dinkel factor plays a role here, in that the 2004 EP and Spanish general elections took place within ninety-one days of each other. The electoral cycles pattern in EP elections analyzed above imply that first-order decisions are more likely to be replicated the closer a SOE is to a congressional contest. In other words, the main parties enjoy a pre- and post-countrywide election honeymoon, which is evident in 2004.

**Table 4** Index of dissimilarity for EP elections, 1986-2004 (%)

	1986	1989	1993	2000	2004	Mean
Andalusia	10.11	9.79	10.66	5.18	3.38	7.82
P. Vasco	10.96	4.97	7.14	14.40	4.14	8.32
Catalonia	7.16	6.62	12.79	6.60	5.45	7.72
Galicia	5.84	9.02	11.92	4.32	1.68	6.55
Cantabria	10.89	11.01	17.64	2.20	1.63	8.67
Canaries	9.23	7.80	13.42	8.06	8.32	9.36
Navarra	9.69	12.50	11.16	12.99	8.43	10.95
Baleares	5.98	10.10	9.94	8.25	7.56	8.37
Aragon	6.45	3.96	16.44	4.44	7.70	7.80
Valencia	9.69	7.48	8.41	4.35	6.80	7.35
Asturias	4.67	8.70	9.39	6.87	2.95	6.51
C-M	4.13	6.25	8.27	5.20	2.01	5.17
Madrid	2.92	14.57	11.76	4.24	3.86	7.47
C-L	3.51	10.14	9.96	2.62	2.20	5.69
La Rioja	5.91	11.24	11.01	2.27	1.48	6.38
Extremadura	6.41	5.92	7.72	4.76	1.48	5.26
Murcia	5.22	7.30	8.54	4.80	2.41	5.65

*Source: As for Table 2.*

European index scores among regions vary to a lesser degree, but certain regions consistently stand out as those with dual voters between levels. Andalusia, Basque Country (*P. Vasco*), and Navarra had volatility over ten percent for two or more election years. Andalusia is a fast-track AC, and the remaining two have unique financial *fueros*: they are expected to have high degrees of volatility from general elections. No doubt EU regulations and funding opportunities influence the special financial regimes. This may also be the case in the Canary Islands, where as a peripheral region it has access to a special EU fund (insularity is often a benefit in receiving central Spanish funds as well). Lower volatility is expressed by scores from the remaining fast-track ACs, Catalonia and Galicia. Catalonia's index represents the median score and Galicia's

slightly below. Their moderate volatility underscores consistent support for regional parties across levels: in both regions, their general and EP election vote shares differ less than 4% over their electoral lifespan. In contrast, the high score in the Cantabrian case drops precipitously after the 1993 election, which coincides with the downfall of the *Unión para el progreso de Cantabria* (UPCA) party. The organization imploded after its popular founder (and two-time president of the regional parliament) was accused of political scandals between the 1993 and 1996 general elections (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 116).

### **Regional Elections**

The index score of Cantabria remains robust from a regional perspective, once again marking the emergence and disappearance of an entire political party. The UPCA managed to collect over 30% of vote share for the 1991 regional election, but less than 9% for the following congressional election. Likewise, the now-defunct CDS was strongly favored in Cantabria in the first few general elections but overlooked for regional contests. The increase of the 2008 index score reflects the 29% vote share of the *Partido Regionalista de Cantabria* in the 2007 AC election versus the general election, in which the PSOE and PP split 94% of the vote. This voting behavior reflects second-order logic in that large parties are favored in first-order elections. In addition, Cantabria's small population—less than half a million valid votes are typically cast in a given general election—contribute to the easy rise in vote share of a select party.

Leaving aside the Cantabrian outlier, five regions have consistently scored over ten percent in the last four regional contests held within their borders: *País Vasco*, Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Navarra, and the Balearic Island (Table 5). Of these, the Canary Islands and

Catalonia lead in averages. Given the results of the EP index scores, the steady presence of the CiU and the ever-growing one of the *Coalición Canaria*, this ranking is unsurprising.

**Table 5** Index of dissimilarity for AC elections, 1980-2008 (%)

	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	Mean
Andalusia		12.97	12.92	6.45	13.29	3.88	2.75	4.14	3.52	7.49
P. Vasco	9.84	11.28	21.47	9.13		12.14	12.68	10.07	15.15	12.72
Catalonia	10.91	24.64		15.56	19.10	19.35	14.92	12.17	24.27	17.61
Galicia		34.10	12.69	8.87	15.57	30.08	4.34	6.70	10.03	15.30
Cantabria		14.54	21.10	37.79		31.96	15.82	19.98	25.39	23.79
Canaries		14.52	24.71	20.53		18.67	17.04	15.71	16.78	18.28
Navarra		12.61	10.65	7.06		17.99	16.81	13.07	12.70	12.98
Baleares		21.63	9.11	13.49		13.24	12.24	18.95	14.17	14.69
Aragon		15.99	18.92	14.68		19.04	8.98	8.62	10.19	13.77
Valencia		7.18	10.88	4.53		3.50	16.65	8.98	6.63	8.33
Asturias		4.94	8.65	6.59		4.57	15.48	6.68	4.46	7.33
C-M		12.90	1.89	6.92		3.79	12.93	11.43	8.17	8.29
Madrid		5.74	4.08	12.08		2.57	3.39	4.29	8.88	5.86
C-L		12.11	5.61	6.20		5.99	4.68	5.97	4.87	6.49
La Rioja		10.28	7.91	5.21		4.31	2.76	6.65	3.08	5.74
Extremadura		11.57	8.98	3.96		5.12	7.46	3.98	3.02	6.29
Murcia		6.03	9.82	8.41		6.20	4.91	1.23	3.05	5.66

*Source: As for Table 2.*

As Jeffery and Hough discovered, the indices “reveal a territorially uneven pattern” (2003, 210). Nine regions have index scores nearly half the rates of the top six, with values comfortably below ten percent. Except for Andalusia, they are slow-track regions. The Andalusian scores coincide with their European counterparts in that both drop around the 1996 general election, when the AC began holding its elections on the same day as the countrywide contests. This supports the hypothesis that voters avoid dual voting when the switch has to occur on the same ballot. Besides Andalusia, the lowest indices emanate from regions with slow-track standing and the common financial regime.

## **Summary and Conclusion**

The pattern of interdependence of multi-level elections is both disrupted and followed in Spain. The “ranking” of elections on different levels is illustrated in both expected vote share and the dissimilarity index results. These tests provide a standardized means to track whether or not SOE expectations are met. They demonstrate that Spanish elections to the EP follow predictable patterns from the general elections, but elections to regional assemblies are not so well-defined in relation to the first-order arena. The European-general versus regional-general relationship differ within the same constituency.

Again, both the Dinkel analysis and dissimilarity test have limitations and are openly crude in application. It is not within their abilities to predict election outcomes; instead, their roles “provide at least initial techniques for mapping out the dynamic of multi-level voting” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210). In Spain, this dynamic, on one level, does not undermine the second-order framework. In the case of European elections, voters defer decision-making to the environment of the first-order arena and to their own previous first-order choice (if even to purposefully deny it at midterm). Turnout is low, punishment effects are predictable along the electoral cycle and few voters choose different parties from the general level.

In contrast, regional elections stray from the second-order course. Fewer voter choices during regional elections reflect timing of countrywide elections to parliament. Likewise, volatility between the general and regional levels varies widely among regions. When it comes to selecting a parliamentary member of a regional government, only voters in some regions refer to their central-level choice.

Across levels, improved performance of regional parties relative to the general election is the most persistent pattern. While Spain is largely a two-party dominant system, its NCWPs have

a strong presence, and perform well in both European and regional elections. At these times, voters choose to make their regional priorities known. Certain NCWPs, especially those from historic regions and the Canary Islands, regularly achieve representation at the central level, which suggests that for some voters regional issues are always of the first order.

Comparing levels, the stakes appear to be much higher in regional versus European elections. Pertaining to second-order research, this thesis most parallels the work of Heath, et al.: countrywide elections hold first-order status, EP elections have second-order status, and regional elections fall somewhere between at one-and-three-quarters status (1999, 409). Alternatively, other researchers relegate EP elections to the “third order” (Norris 1997, 121). But where those authors focus on voter attitudes (issue-voting), my primary consideration is structural (intensity of devolution). Again, reviewing voting patterns across electoral cycles and levels reveals *how* they do or do not fit to the SOE, not *why* voters choose to support a party. These tests illustrate vote distribution with the assumption that voters care less about SOE outcomes. Together, the tests reaffirm Jeffery and Hough's 2003 finding that SOE cyclical deviations correlate with high scores of dissimilarity between regional and countrywide elections. Interestingly, and contrary to my own proposed hypothesis, low volatility ACs also stray from predictable SOE-model patterns during regional contests.

So why do AC elections fail to mold to the SOE framework? My hypothesis that credits devolution rates is only modestly supported. Test results are irregular in demonstrating a link between levels of devolution and (the absence of) second-order characteristics. While it appears that “territorial heterogeneity breaks up [the] pattern of subordination of regional elections” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210), the source of said heterogeneity is not clearly a result of the State of the Autonomies. Fast-track regions do not stray from expected vote share in a regular fashion.



This affirms a departure from the voting calculus of first-order elections, but the extent of that departure is not equal in kind to the degree of a region's autonomy from the center. Fast-track and special regime regions, for example, have an above-average but not the highest dissimilarity scores: the highest levels of devolution do not translate to the most extreme denial of second-order effects, and vice versa.

So while “dissimilarity indices vary considerably between regions with and without strongly defined senses of territorial identity” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210), they also vary between regions with and without many transferred powers. This does not contradict *per se* the original framework of Reif and Schmitt, since regional electoral stakes vary due to the type and amount of powers attained by the ACs. The underlying foundation of the second-order thesis is maintained: as stakes increase, second-order effects decrease (1980). For the most part, volatility increases in fast-track ACs while the inverse is true for slow-track regions. Notable exceptions do occur on both ends, however, as demonstrated by the high volatility rates in Cantabria and the low ones in Andalusia.

This thesis's discussion and analyses orbit around the devolved nature of Spain's regions, and relatively neglect other social and structural indicators, primarily regional identity and party systems in Spain (Pallarés and Keating 2006; van Biezen and Hopkin 2006). There is no denial that each play a large role in Spanish politics, and it is difficult to separate them from (asymmetrical) devolution. Integration of party system analyses is particularly unavoidable in discussing outlier cases of expected vote and dissimilarity scores.

Indeed, devolution, party systems, and regional identity reinforce each other. Regional identity is certainly encouraged under a devolved system: especially in regards to self-government, regionalism is advanced in areas of education, language, cultural affairs, and media

communication (Agranoff 1996, 395). The next step in this line of research is to filter out these effects and establish how they interact with each other. More precise indicators of devolution will no doubt help in developing a better measure of regional autonomy. The quantity of transferred powers, for instance, needs to be differentiated by type: not all transfers are equal. Another limitation to my devolution-based hypotheses, and subsequent analyses, is that they presuppose that voters are *aware* of the relative strength of each office, when in fact they are more likely not to be up-to-date on the growing functions of the EP (Norris 1997, 121; Schmitt 2005, 668) or the number of transfers or fiscal responsibilities gained in their Autonomous Community (Bosch and Durán 2008, 15). Only polling or survey data can answer whether or not this is the case.

In closing, the second-order framework enumerates certain qualities of election results to compare them across multiple levels: second-order elections have lower turnout, higher rates of punishment or experimental voting, and midterm electoral effects. All characteristics are foils of the main arena: they are not measured independently but in relation to the first-order level. In Spain, the same constituency, in the same four-year term and given the same competing political parties, distributes vote share differently on each electoral level. Spaniards certainly do not pin their votes to one party. The prevailing challenge is to find the point at which the stakes of an election change enough to unhinge voting patterns from the first order.

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**Appendix A** Election dates in Spain, 1977-2009

<b>Election</b>	<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Nearest General Election</b>	<b>Election</b>	<b>Election Date</b>	<b>Nearest General Election</b>
General	6/15/1977	1977	General	3/3/1996	1996
General	3/1/1979	1979	Galicia	10/19/1997	1996
P. Vasco	3/9/1980	1979	P. Vasco	10/25/1998	2000
Catalonia	3/20/1980	1979	EP	6/13/1999	2000
Galicia	10/20/1981	1982	Slow-Track ACs	6/13/1999	2000
Andalusia	5/23/1982	1982	Catalonia	10/17/1999	2000
General	10/28/1982	1982	Andalusia	3/12/2000	2000
Slow-Track ACs	5/8/1983	1982	General	3/12/2000	2000
P. Vasco	2/26/1984	1982	P. Vasco	5/13/2001	2000
Catalonia	4/29/1984	1982	Galicia	10/21/2001	2000
Galicia	11/24/1985	1986	Slow-Track ACs	5/25/2003	2004
Andalusia	6/22/1986	1986	Catalonia	11/16/2003	2004
General	6/22/1986	1986	Andalusia	3/14/2004	2004
P. Vasco	11/30/1986	1986	General	3/14/2004	2004
EP	6/10/1987	1986	EP	6/13/2004	2004
Slow-Track ACs	6/10/1987	1986	P. Vasco	4/17/2005	2004
Catalonia	5/29/1988	1989	Galicia	6/19/2005	2004
EP	6/15/1989	1989	Catalonia	11/1/2006	2008
General	10/29/1989	1989	Slow-Track ACs	5/27/2007	2008
Galicia	12/17/1989	1989	Andalusia	3/9/2008	2008
Andalusia	6/23/1990	1989	General	3/9/2008	2008
P. Vasco	10/28/1990	1989	Galicia	3/1/2009	2008
Slow-Track ACs	5/26/1991	1989	P. Vasco	3/1/2009	2008
Catalonia	3/15/1992	1993	EP	6/7/2009	2008
General	6/6/1993	1993			
Galicia	10/17/1993	1993			
Andalusia	6/12/1994	1993			
EP	6/12/1994	1993			
P. Vasco	10/23/1994	1996			
Slow-Track ACs	5/28/1995	1996			
Catalonia	11/19/1995	1996			
Andalusia	3/3/1996	1996			



## Appendix B Ceded powers by region and year

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Andalucía	2	8	10	28	22	10	5	2	2	7	4	4	10	1	3	3	10	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	11	8	3	5	8	1	151
Aragón	3	4	9	14	17	5	3	1	1	7	3	3	14	1	2	6	7	14	1	2	6	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	5	110	
Asturias	1	3	12	17	12	8	2	1	3	3	3	3	15	1	11	4	5	15	1	11	11	11	4	1	1	6	6	1	3	2	2	1	104	
Baleares	2	1	3	9	14	13	6	3	1	1	1	7	19	5	3	2	19	5	3	2	7	2	7	5	2	2	3	2	3	1	1	110		
Canarias	1	3	4	21	16	17	5	1	1	7	2	2	12	8	7	2	5	12	8	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1	1	120		
Cantabria		16	19	9	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	25	6	3	2	6	3	2	6	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	9	2	3	1	103		
Catalonia	5	2	13	21	12	11	7	8	3	5	6	1	6	10	2	8	6	10	2	8	4	4	4	6	2	1	8	1	6	6	5	3	2	185
C-M	1	3	11	20	11	9	2	3	2	3	2	3	14	5	2	3	2	14	5	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	92	
C-M	6	10	14	14	10	1	4	3	4	3	3	7	9	7	4	5	7	9	7	4	5	3	2	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	1	3	111	
Extremadura	1	3	10	17	14	5	1	4	1	4	1	1	16	16	3	5	6	16	16	3	5	5	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	94	
Galicia	2	1	1	20	18	17	13	3	4	2	8	1	7	9	11	6	7	9	11	6	5	8	8	1	1	1	3	2	3	7	1	154		
La Rioja		15	9	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	8	3	8	2	5	8	3	8	2	5	6	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	75	
Madrid		4	19	13	3	3	3	6	6	6	1	6	12	6	2	3	6	12	6	2	3	6	1	1	6	3	1	1	6	3	1	6	93	
Murcia	1	2	11	18	13	7	3	2	2	2	1	2	7	19	2	2	7	19	2	2	2	5	5	2	1	2	2	2	6	6	6	111		
Navarra		16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	60	
Valencia	3	1	3	14	21	15	19	4	5	6	2	2	7	7	3	4	7	7	7	3	4	6	5	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	131		
P. Vasco	2	1	15	19	6	2	21	7	7	7	9	6	6	6	2	1	9	6	6	6	2	2	1	1	6	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	93	
Total	7	19	32	79	154	253	208	181	57	38	6	43	20	6	16	22	73	169	92	44	56	79	25	34	18	11	26	21	37	21	33	7	10	1897

Source: Ministry of Public Administration