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Planning for the 2010 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Vancouver, Whistler, British Columbia: a case study on cross-border collaboration

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Planning for the 2010 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Vancouver, Whistler, British Columbia:

A Case Study on Cross-Border Collaboration

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Accepted in Partial Completion of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

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Jasper MacSlarrow
Washington, D.C.

May 13, 2010
Planning for the 2010 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Vancouver, Whistler, British Columbia:

A Case Study on Cross-Border Collaboration

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of
Western Washington University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

By
Jasper MacSlarrow
May, 2010
Abstract

On July 2, 2003 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced it had chosen Vancouver/Whistler, British Columbia, Canada as the host city for the 2010 Winter and Paralympic Games. The 2010 Games were Canada’s first since the City of Calgary hosted the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and were the first time Vancouver had ever hosted the Olympics.

The Games were an opportunity for Vancouver, Whistler, and British Columbia to showcase their cities and their region. With an expected 3 billion people from around the world tuning in to watch the Games, planners and organizers were extremely cognizant of the opportunities and challenges they faced.

Of the many challenges faced by planners is the proximity of the Games to the U.S. – Canada border. Richmond, one of the venues in Vancouver where some of the 86 winter sporting events were held, is only 31 miles from U.S. territory. This obviously presented logistical challenges in terms of transportation, subcontracting, construction, etc. However, it also presented a security challenge as well. With over 250,000 visitors expected, not to mention the previously mentioned 3 billion people watching on T.V., the Olympics are largely considered a possible target for terrorists. In fact, during at least two Olympics, terrorists have attacked. At the 1972 Munich Games, 11 athletes were killed when terrorists took a group of Israeli athletes hostage, and in 1996 at the Atlanta Games, a bomb was detonated by Eric Robert Rudolph in Centennial Olympic Park killing two and injuring 111. In fact, between 1972 and 2004, there have been 168 terrorist attacks related to sporting events (Zekulin, 2009, 1).
Additionally, plans needed to be put in place to ensure the public’s safety should a national disaster take place. With a number of cities, towns, counties, a U.S. state, a Canadian province, and two sovereign national governments involved, security planning would be difficult.

To complicate matters, there has not been much—if any—precedence for robust cross-border, regionally-focused security planning. While there is academic literature describing cross-border transportation and environmental planning, for example, security cooperation has continued to remain almost exclusively a function of the federal government and thus absent from the literature of cross border regionalism. This is particularly true of the US-Canada security relationship.

The coordination in planning for the 2010 Games internationally as well as nationally was an interesting challenge for the Pacific Northwest region—also known as the Cascadia Region. The region before, during and after the Games faced security threats, job creation opportunities and transportation challenges and planning and preparation in a coordinated fashion between government agencies would be critical. This thesis describes cross border security cooperation during the 2010 Olympics and through an analysis of the literature on cross border regionalism develops an explanation for why, in this particular instance, there was notable cross-border coordination within the Cascadia region leading up to the 2010 Games. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, security cooperation between the U.S. and Canada has been challenging. To have such robust coordination that is led by regional leaders is notable.

The following paper provides some background on the 2010 Games, outlines what could be explanations for the cross-border security coordination seen leading up to
the Games, and briefly discusses literature on cross-border regionalism that could help answer the question of why, in this particular instance, there has been cross-border cooperation that was led by regional leaders and implemented by federal, state, and local government officials.

The particular optics for the following review will be from a U.S. perspective and not a Canadian one. While this paper discusses some of the efforts made by Canadians to plan the Games, the focus of this paper is on the U.S. efforts to support the Canadian 2010 Olympic planners and how U.S. security officials coordinated with their Canadian counterparts -- and with each other.

Specifically, this thesis intends to investigate why cross-border coordination occurred in this region at this time for this particular event. So much has been written about challenges faced by both the US and Canada on cross border issues including immigration, security planning post 9/11, drug smuggling, gun issues, and others. However, cross-border collaboration and cooperation on security planning for the Games was notable and could provide new insight to cross-border relationships.

A contention underlying this study is that because political authorities at the federal, state, and local levels have different interests regarding cross-border regional planning, there are fundamental challenges to cross-border coordination. However, when interests match, as many did in the preparation for the 2010 Games, there is more of a likelihood of cross-border coordination such as we’ve seen in the planning of the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver.

Specifically, because the Cascadia region has historically seen a lot of cross-border collaboration, that security planners in the region were more willing to collaborate
internationally with each other. And, without a strong federal government presence
dictating the terms, subnational groups took the lead in ensuring the Games would be safe
and secure.
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Introduction and Methodology

In 1998, the Canadian Olympic Committee selected Vancouver to present Canada’s bid for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. The application was for Canada to host her first Games since Calgary hosted the Winter Games in 1988. In the Vancouver 2010 “Bid Book” it stated:

“Canada’s climate has nurtured a deep respect for the challenges of winter and an equally deep passion for the abundant sport opportunities that snow and ice present. This passion drives every aspect of our Olympic bid. This northern land has bred a nation of ingenuity, a people of great competence, trust and integrity. The 2010 Olympic Winter Games will be in safe and secure hands in Vancouver. Our bid enjoys the support of more than 80% of Canadians. All levels of government are unequivocally committed to hosting the 2010 Games. The resources are in place. Vancouver is Canada’s Pacific gateway. Like the Olympic Movement itself, Vancouver looks outward to the world beyond. Its location halfway between Asia and Europe and its embrace of multiculturalism uniquely position Vancouver to host the world. Canada brings together the cultures of the world, as well as an ancient and rich First Nations culture, in one harmonious society: a living embodiment of the Olympic ideal. Its balance of spectacular natural setting and urban innovation has garnered Vancouver international acclaim as one of the world’s most livable cities. Vancouver has proved its unique talents for successfully hosting major international events with great style, enthusiasm and competence. Vancouver’s oceanfront setting is complemented by Whistler, the foremost alpine ski resort in North America, with world-class facilities and an intimate, pedestrian-friendly village” (2010 Bid Book, 2002, Introduction)

On July 2, 2003 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) at its 115th Session in Prague announced it had chosen Vancouver/Whistler, British Columbia, Canada as the host city for the 2010 Winter and Paralympic Games over two other finalists PyeongChang, South Korea and Salzburg, Austria. The Olympic Games would take place from February 12 – 28, 2010 and the Paralympics would follow on March 12 to 21, 2010. The XXI Winter and Paralympic Games were the third Olympic Games held in Canada. Previously, Montreal hosted the 1976 Olympics and Calgary the 1988 Winter Games.
The process for Vancouver/Whistler, B.C. to win the bid as host city was difficult. The City was subjected to intense scrutiny and Vancouver residents were even asked in a referendum in February 2003 if they would accept the responsibilities of being the host city should Vancouver/Whistler win the bid. Residents said yes with a resounding 64%. Additionally, the show of support for Vancouver/Whistler’s bid from other cities around British Columbia and Canada was remarkable.

Following the announcement, preparations for the 2010 Games began in earnest. On September 30, 2003 the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (VANOC) was established with the mandate to support and promote the development of sport in Canada by planning, organizing, financing and staging the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. According to its own website, “VANOC is guided by a 20-member board of directors nominated by the Government of Canada, the Province of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee and local First Nations” (Vancouver Organizing Committee).

Expectations for the Games were high from the beginning. In 2006, John Furlong, CEO of VANOC, stated that the Games were estimated to cost around $1.7 billion – up from the earlier estimate of $1.4 billion. While the cost is impressive, the anticipated numbers associated with the Games were equally impressive (all statistics from DHS Report to Congress, 1997, 15):

- 6700 Athletes and Officials expected to attend
- 86 participating countries
- 1.8 million tickets sold
- 250,000 visitors
- 10,000 media
- 25,000 volunteers for the Games, 10,000 volunteers for the ceremonies
- 3 billion people will watch the Games on television

What was particularly unique to these Games, however, was the impact they were expected to have across the border and in the United States. The Richmond venue, for example, where the Richmond Olympic Oval is located and where all speed skating events were held, is only 31 miles from Blaine, Washington in the United States. This presented the U.S. with opportunities – and challenges.

One of the first steps taken by U.S. officials was to identify what the impacts across the border would be. In March, 2004 a Peer Exchange was held through the Transportation Planning Capacity Building (TPCB) Program, a program jointly sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA). The Whatcom Council of Governments (WCOG), a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) in Northwest Washington, organized the Peer Exchange to provide an opportunity for representatives from the NW Washington region to learn about the Olympic planning process and impacts that the Olympic Games may have on their region during the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. The Peer Exchange consisted of two separate trips: one to Salt Lake City, Utah (March 2-4) and a second to Bellingham, WA (March 15-18). Fifteen delegates from Whatcom County in Washington State traveled to Salt Lake City to meet with their Salt Lake City counterparts who were active in planning for the Salt Lake City Olympics. The topics discussed focused on planning responsibility, security, travel patterns, local and regional transportation, and funding.
In response to the anticipated impact, Washington Governor Gary Locke in 2004 established the Governor’s 2010 Olympics Task Force for the express purpose of organizing the State’s preparations for the Games. The Task Force included agency heads from the Military Department (home of the Washington National Guard), the Transportation Department, the Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development (recently renamed the Department of Commerce), staff from the Governor’s office, and was chaired by a sitting and former Member of Congress.

Additionally, on January 8, 2007 U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff named Mark Beaty of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the Federal Coordinator for both the 2009 World Police and Fire Games and the 2010 Winter and Paralympic Games – both events being hosted in Vancouver.

As the relevant government agencies moved forward with putting the pieces in place to prepare for the 2010 Games, non-governmental organizations were also getting involved. The International Mobility and Trade Corridor (IMTC) project at the Whatcom Council of Governments established a 2010 subcommittee, the Border Policy Research Institute at Western Washington University (WWU) in Bellingham began to host events and publish research on the Olympics, and the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER) began coordinating efforts between Pacific Northwest states/provinces, and relevant organizations to develop and execute a regional business plan for the 2010 Olympics and other relevant tourism initiatives. Many of these organizations, including the governmental agencies, had been involved in cross-border events and coordination for many years. In fact, as will be discussed later, the Cascadia Region is known throughout
the world for its cross-border cooperation. However, what is unique in this case is the level of cooperation surrounding security planning.

As academics have noted, many border regions have been successful in cooperating on economic issues, transportation issues, environmental issues, and others. (Brunet-Jailly, 2008, 114: Smith, 2008, 70: Alper, 2008, 28: Clarke, 2002, 15). However, cross-border security cooperation has always been a challenge. As the 2010 Games approached and Federal, state, and local governments as well as non-governmental organizations began to plan, it became readily apparent to those involved that cross-border cooperation on security would be necessary to ensure a safe and secure 2010 Winter Games. The question at the time for planners was how to organize such cooperation given the complicated issues involved and the numerous levels of government with a stake in security matters. A principal goal of this study is to examine how this process played out at the regional level.

The conclusion of this review is that there was a substantial degree of cross border cooperation in the Cascadia border region during the planning and preparation for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and Whistler, British Columbia. My explanation for this cross border cooperation is that in the absence of a strong federal presence controlling and guiding the planning process, cross-border subnational groups worked to identify matching interests and then collaborated to solve problems, apply pressure to relevant Federal agencies, and respond to these interests.

This study will provide an overview of the 2010 Winter Olympics Games, to be followed by a description of the processes followed by both the US and Canada to prepare for the security needed at the Games, and an analysis of the challenges faced by
security planners and what collaborative cross-border solutions were implemented. It will then review academic literature that could provide clues for why cross-border collaboration occurs, and lastly provide an assessment of how and why such cooperation took place during the Games.

**Methodology**

Generally speaking, this paper leans heavily on inductive reasoning as opposed to deductive reasoning. As Ackleson explains:

“In deductive scholarship, scholars begin with general ideas, often termed theories, and develop hypotheses based on these ideas. The hypotheses are then tested, typically by the gathering and analyzing of data (observations). Conversely, in inductive research scholars first make observations and then subsequently develop ideas, general statements, and hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested on the basis of further observations” (Ackleson, 2009, 3).

In the interest of full disclosure, as an aide to U.S. Congressman Rick Larsen beginning in 2002, the author had a front row seat to watch the planning and preparation for the 2010 Olympics in Washington State. He was in the room for many of the Security Subcommittee meetings, and attended a majority of the briefings throughout the process. Because of this, the initial approach of this research topic included preconceived thought patterns on what had occurred, and utilized the gathering of research and follow-up interviews to test these preconceived notions. Based on what was learned and experienced, factors were induced that ultimately encourage or discourage cross-border cooperation – much like Ackleson in *Factors That Influence Cross-Border Cooperation: A Preliminary Inductive Analysis* (2009).

Specifically, during the planning and preparation process leading up to the Games, the author noted that there appeared to be robust cross border collaboration
between U.S. and Canadian planners and suspected that it may be unique, particularly the security coordination.

With these initial observations in hand, the author engaged the literature on cross border regionalism and conducted interviews with relevant officials and with this new information formulated tentative hypotheses that could then be further explored. After an in-depth process of research and review, the author was finally able to develop conclusions regarding the planning and preparation for the 2010 Olympics. This process was initially inductive- that is, moving towards theory (Roberts and Wilson, 2002, Introduction), but once propositions had been developed, the rest of the research process was focused on testing them.

After a number of initial interviews and research, the author concluded that the cross border coordination had been robust, and that the collaboration on security planning between the U.S. and Canada was unusual. Specifically, it appeared that the security planning, particularly on the U.S. side, had been initiated and led by the local and regional security planners, and not the Federal government – an unusual circumstance. The following paper attempts to flesh out these observations, expand upon them, and then answer the question of why this unique planning and collaboration took place.
The 2010 Games

On February 28, 2010 the Closing Ceremony for the 2010 Winter Games came to a close at B.C. Place in Vancouver, B.C. and Canada said goodbye to the 2600 athletes who had competed and the billions of spectators around the world that had tuned in to watch. The ceremony marked the end of 17 days of spectacular competition, memorable moments, and tragedy. Canada, despite the challenges of hosting, was clearly very proud of what had been accomplished. John Furlong, VANOC CEO, in his closing statement remarked:

"Athletes of the world, at your hands and through your determination and tenacity we have felt every imaginable emotion. We have lived the agony and the ecstasy with you as if we ourselves were competing. Boys and girls you will never meet now know that it is possible to achieve greatness through the power of a dream. I believe we Canadians tonight are stronger, more united, more in love with our country, and more connected with each other than ever before. These Olympic Games have lifted us up. That quiet, humble national pride we were sometimes reluctant to acknowledge seemed to take to the streets as the most beautiful kind of patriotism broke out all across our country. And finally to those who have watched us all over the globe we hope you enjoyed these Games and the telling of our humble Canadian story. The young men and women you sent here are coming home — you can be very proud of them” (Furlong, Closing Speech, Feb 28, 2010).

The Games did not get off to a successful start, however. On February 12, 2010, 21-year old Georgian luger Nodar Kumaritashvili was killed when he lost control of his sled and was thrown through the air and struck a trackside steel pole coming out of the final curve at nearly 145 km/h. Then, during the Opening Ceremony later that same evening, after several somber pauses during the show to pay respects to the deceased luger, a piece of the set failed to rise from the stadium floor, and left one of the four final torchbearers, speedskater Catriona LeMay Doan, unable to use her torch. The tragedy and glitch, in addition to the other challenges such as low snowfall forcing planners to helicopter and truck in snow, bad weather that delayed events, and low turnout at certain events led Dan
Wetzel from Yahoo news to write: “Woe Canada: Games off to bad start” (Wetzel, February, 2010).

However, these challenges did not last the entire 17 days. Canada’s response to the Kumaritashvili tragedy was well-received, and the weather and logistical operations improved. In the end, the final numbers associated with the Games were massive. According to VANOC:

By the numbers: The Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games

*February 12 to 28, 2010*

- 15 sport disciplines
- 9 competition venues
- 3 Olympic training facilities
- 86 medal competitions
- 86 Victory Ceremonies (16 in-venue medal presentations, 25 at BC Place and 45 at Whistler Medals Plaza)
  - 615 medals awarded
  - 1,055 athlete bouquets presented
- 82 participating National Olympic Committees (NOCs)
  - 6,500 athletes and team officials in total
  - 2,632 registered athletes
- 50,000 workforce members for the Games, including paid, contractor and volunteers
  - 25,000 workforce uniforms distributed
  - 96,409 people accredited for the Games
- 10,800 media representatives: 7,000 rights holding broadcasters, 2,800 press reporters and photographers and non-rights holding broadcasters, as well as 1,000 host Olympic Broadcast Service (OBSV) personnel
• 3.5 billion worldwide television viewers are estimated to have tuned into the Games

• Olympic rights holding broadcasters have offered Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games coverage on more than 300 TV stations and on more than 100 websites worldwide

• 47 per cent more global television coverage of the Games than for the Torino 2006 Olympic Winter Games
  • This represents approximately 24,000 hours of coverage

• 50,000 hours of total broadcast hours of the Games across all media platforms around the world
  • 6,000 hours of coverage worldwide on mobile platforms

• As of Day 15, 33.1 million Canadians (99 per cent) have watched coverage

• 27.7 million cumulative audience or CUME (meaning 82.7 per cent of Canadians) experienced the Games on February 27 through the platforms of Canada’s Olympic Broadcast Media Consortium.
  • 1.6 million tickets available for the 2010 Winter Games

• $500-million target for gross retail sales of Vancouver 2010 branded merchandise met by end of Games

• More than 4,000 artists at 600 events, over 60 days in 60 venues are taking part in the More than 12,500 volunteer hours clocked for Olympic Closing Ceremony. The thousands of volunteer performers range in age from 10 to 68

• 275 million visitors in total to www.vancouver2010.com, shattering the previous record of 105 million set during the Beijing 2008 Games
  • 14,000 followers on Twitter.com/2010Tweets
The numbers related to the Olympics are truly staggering and makes one appreciate the immense challenge faced by the planners. In addition to the numbers, however, was the challenge of the geography of the Games as well. All told, there were 15 major competitive and non-competitive venues spread out among four distinct areas within the region. In the city of Vancouver was Canada Hockey Place, the Vancouver Olympic Centre, Pacific Coliseum, and the UBC Thunderbird Arena (also known as the Doug Mitchell Thunderbird Sports Centre). In Whistler, there was the Whistler Sliding Centre, Whistler Creekside, and Whistler Olympic Park. In Richmond there was the Richmond Olympic Oval and in West Vancouver was Cypress Mountain which alone had a capacity of over 30,000 spectators.

There were also six non-competition venues -- areas used by VANOC and its partners to ensure the smooth functioning of the Games. In Vancouver was BC Place, the Main Media Centre, and the Olympic Village Vancouver and in Whistler there was Olympic Village Whistler, the Whistler Media Centre and the Whistler Medals Plaza.

The large footprint of the Games meant a very complicated transportation scheme and led VANOC to strongly encourage spectators to utilize any mode of transport other than their car including -- mass transit, rapid transit including the Expo, Millennium and Canada Lines which ran every few minutes, the SeaBus which provided passenger ferry service from Waterfront station in downtown Vancouver to Lonsdale Quay in North Vancouver, the City of Vancouver streetcars, the West Coast Express - a passenger railway linking downtown Vancouver (at Waterfront station) with suburbs to the east, and an extensive network of bus services operating throughout the region. In line with this strategy, Canadian planners set the goal of achieving at least a 30 percent reduction
in vehicle use during the Olympic Games in order to ensure athletes, officials and others could get to their events on time and local residents could move efficiently. And, on March 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2010, VANOC announced they had reached their goal:

\textit{“Throughout the Games, Metro Vancouver and the Sea to Sky corridor saw record numbers of people walking, cycling and taking transit, and an overall reduction in vehicle use. In particular, vehicle use was reduced by an average of more than 35 per cent each day. In addition, TransLink, the public transit operator in Metro Vancouver, moved an average of 1.5 million people per day during the Games, an increase from 730,000 trips per day, while BC Transit, the public transportation provider in the Sea to Sky corridor, saw five times the ridership on the public transit system over normal winter levels” (VANOC, March 3, 2010).}

The numbers, the geography, and the transportation planning of the Games were just some of the challenges faced by the planners when they first submitted the bid and were awarded the Games. The following section provides a description of the planning process leading up to the Games.

**The Canadian Planners: VANOC**

The Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) was established on September 3, 2003 with the mandate, as listed on their website “to support and promote the development of sport in Canada by planning, organizing, financing and staging the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games” (VANOC website).

The Committee was comprised of a 20-member board of directors nominated by the Government of Canada, the Province of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee and local First Nations. By February 2010, VANOC had nearly 1400 employees working on a wide-variety of things related to the Games and divided
into seven sections and broken down into 52 functions. As the Vancouver Sun editorialized on March 6, 2010:

“It is hard to overstate the enormity of the challenge the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games took on when it assumed responsibility for realizing the commitments of the official 460-page Bid Book, the ambitious to-do list that led to Vancouver being awarded the right to host the Games…..If Vanoc was a permanent, rather than a temporary single-purpose entity, it would rank among Canada's largest corporations, with 52 departments, an operating budget of $1.8 billion, a capital budget of $590 million, 1,400 full-time employees, 3,500 part-time employees and 25,000 volunteers. It was charged with attending to the needs of 6,500 athletes and team officials, 10,800 accredited media and, to a lesser extent, the tens of thousands who filled the streets daily during the last two weeks, and longer if you include the Cultural Olympiad, in which Vanoc played a leading role” (Vancouver Sun Editorial, March 6, 2010).

One of the key accomplishments of VANOC was the completion of all Olympics venues on time and within budget. On February 19, 2009, VANOC announced that construction on new sport competition venues for the 2010 Winter Games including the Richmond Olympic Oval, The Whistler Sliding Centre, University of British Columbia Thunderbird Arena, Whistler Olympic/Paralympic Park, Cypress Mountain, and the Vancouver Olympic/Paralympic Centre was completed. Additionally, according to VANOC, substantial upgrades were also made to existing facilities such as the Pacific Coliseum and Whistler Creekside.

Canadian Security Planning

One of the key areas facing 2010 planners that did not fall under the jurisdiction of VANOC was security planning. As indicated earlier, security planning was critically important leading up to the Games, particularly because major sporting events like the Olympics are considered to be targets for a large number of threats including “a vehicle
to embarrass host governments, draw attention to injustices, apply political blackmail, and raise serious ethical concerns” (Zekulin, 2009, 1). As Michael Zekulin notes,

“the Olympic Games in the post 9/11 era of terrorism represent opportunity... represented by a highly symbolic event, attended by hundreds of thousands of tourists, athletes, and support staff as well as international leaders and international media. This is exacerbated by the reality that it is a live event televised around the globe to billions of people. All of these factors make the Olympic Games a highly desirable target” (Zekulin, 2009, 2).

The 2010 Olympics were considered a high-value target for terrorists and security planning was quickly taken seriously and given a high-priority for the Games.

In October 2007, Ward Elcock, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Deputy Minister of National Defense, was named Canadian Coordinator for the 2010 Olympic Games and G8 Security. In this role, Mr. Elcock “reported directly to the National Security Advisor Marie-Lucie Morin in the Privy Council Office (PCO) and was responsible for keeping Heritage Canada, the lead federal government agency for the Games, and the Department of Public Safety, the lead agency for domestic security issues, informed as to how security preparations were progressing” (Brister, 2010, 19).

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reported directly to Mr. Elcock and served as the lead security agency for the Games – and within the RCMP, the Vancouver Integrated Security Unit (ISU) established the working plan for security for the Games.

The Games were viewed by Canadian security officials as a serious threat. Elcock emphasized this concern in a statement in November 2009, a few months before the Games opened:
"The reality is that Canada is one of the nations that al-Qaida some years ago identified as a potential target. We haven’t actually had an attack by al-Qaida but the threat to Canada is outstanding out there,” says Ward Elcock, head of security for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (Green, 2009).

Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and Australia were all on a list that al-Qaida published in 2002. They have all been attacked, except Canada. For this reason alone, security planners were concerned.

A critical part of the job facing Mr. Elcock, the RCMP, and the ISU was coordination with American security planners – and this was recognized early on. Mr. Elcock, according to Canadian Embassy staff, visited Washington DC on three different occasions to brief U.S. policymakers and security officials. As Mr Elcock himself said:

"We share a border and Vancouver is very close to the U.S. border. If you take a ferry to Victoria on Vancouver Island, the reality is you back into U.S. waters to take that ferry to a part of Canada. Your airspace is very close to Vancouver. If you want to manage the airspace in terms of security for the Olympics, very quickly you find yourself in U.S. airspace” (Green, 2009).

The resources needed for the Games to ensure a secure and successful event was immense for the RCMP. As an RCMP Staff Sergeant, with primary responsibility for security operations for the Games stated:

“"It’s the largest security operation, ever, in Canadian history," said Staff Sergeant Mike Côté of the RCMP unit in charge of security for the Games. The co-ordination of a $900-million security plan is a gigantic nationwide human-resources effort, pulling personnel from coast to coast to keep things safe. About 5,200 RCMP officers will be joined by 1,800 municipal, regional and provincial police officers from across the country. Thousands of military personnel and private security guards will also be involved. Some of them will need specific skills” (Krashinsky, 2009)

The numbers paint a fuller picture:

• 5,200 RCMP officers.
• 4,500 Canadian Forces personnel.
• 1,800 Police officers from municipal, regional and provincial units across Canada.
• 5,000 Private security personnel.
• 60 Days the Integrated Security Unit operated, including setup time at the beginning of January, the 17 days of the Games, and the Paralympic Games.

The U.S. Planners

When the IOC announced that Vancouver/Whistler, BC had won the bid to host the 2010 Games, reaction from south of the 49th Parallel was swift and positive. On the day of the IOC announcement, Washington State Governor Gary Locke, in a press release congratulating Vancouver/Whistler on being named host city for the 2010 Games, stated:

“I congratulate Vancouver, B.C. for winning the bid to host the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. I know a lot of hard work went into the city’s winning proposal. This is a great economic opportunity for Vancouver, and it will certainly have positive impacts on tourism in Washington State, whether through increased passenger traffic at SeaTac Airport, or side trips to Birch Bay, Bellingham, Everett, Seattle or other great spots in our state. Washington State officially expressed support for the Vancouver bid to the International Olympic Commission. Rep. Jeff Morris, D-Anacortes, sponsored a joint resolution that was passed in the Legislature, which I also supported……This is definitely a win-win for Vancouver, B.C., and for Washington State” (Office of the Governor, 2003)

However, very quickly it became apparent that because of the close proximity of the border to Olympic venues, and the sizeable federal border assets at the five ports of entry in Whatcom County, Washington the impacts felt by the United States would be sizeable and perhaps dangerous. Early on, however, the question was how sizeable and how dangerous?

In a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Report to Congress – requested by Members of the Washington State Congressional Delegation – the following anticipated impacts were reported:
• 55 percent of all attendees (287,782 approximately) will come from the United States, 36 percent of these attendees (just over 100,000) will come from the West Coast with approximately 30,000 driving through the five Ports of Entry in Whatcom County, WA.

• The impact on border flow is expected to be “significant”

• Seattle-Tacoma airport will be used as an alternative to the Vancouver International Airport – approximately 16,000 attendees will fly into SeaTac.

• Washington State will provide “key transportation access and overflow accommodations” for the Games (DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 6).

Based on this report and others, planners in the U.S. realized that the impacts felt south of the border would be sizeable and a large amount of planning was necessary.

Federal response

An initial key challenge faced by U.S. federal government officials was deciding what federal agency would take the lead role in Olympics planning. According to Federal officials, because the 2010 Olympics were not being hosted by the United States, and were thus Outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS), the Games fell below the threshold of a National Special Security Event (NSSE). As explained by the Department of Homeland Security, “When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a National Special Security Event (NSSE) the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. Examples of NSSEs include State of the Union addresses, State funerals,
and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions” (*DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 7*)

Instead of being an NSSE, the 2010 Winter Olympics were instead classified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a Special Event and on May 30, 2006, the National Preparedness Task Force (NPTF) within the DHS Preparedness Directorate became responsible for the coordination of all agencies related to the 2010 Games. The NPTF also chairs the Special Events Working Group (SEWG), an inter-agency committee that became responsible for coordinating Federal activities in the U.S. in support of the 2010 Games.

**Washington State Response**

Recognizing the possible impacts the Games could have on Washington State, Governor Locke in 2004 created the Governor’s 2010 Olympics Task Force and charged it with being a coordinated initiative to maximize the opportunities presented by the 2010 Olympics and build long-term benefit for Washington State (following her election in November 2004, Washington State Governor Gregoire reappointed the Task Force to continue its work). The Task Force was also tasked with being the lead voice for Washington State with VANOC and the BC Provincial Government (*Department of Commerce presentation, 2008*). Perhaps most importantly, however, it established the 2010 Olympic Games as a priority issue for the Washington State government and the relevant state agencies that would need to be involved.

The Governor’s Task Force was co-chaired by U.S. Congressman Rick Larsen and former U.S. Congressman Sid Morrison and had four subcommittees:

- Business Development Subcommittee chaired by Herman Uscategui,
• Transportation Subcommittee chaired by Washington State Secretary of Transportation Doug MacDonald and his replacement Paula Hammond,
• Tourism Subcommittee chaired by Steve Pomranz, and
• Security Subcommittee chaired by Washington State Adjutant General Tim Lowenberg and later co-chaired by FBI Special-Agent-in-Charge Laura Laughlin.

For the Business Development Subcommittee initial questions existed such as: Who is spending money and how can Washington State companies compete for these contracts? For the Tourism Subcommittee, it was recognized that there would be opportunities but also challenges and the Subcommittee was charged with seeking those opportunities and linking Washington State businesses to those opportunities. For the Transportation and Security Subcommittees, much work was needed to be done to ensure safe and secure travel for the spectators crossing the border.

Accomplishments

The three key agencies most involved in Olympics planning in Washington State were the Military Department, the Department of Transportation (WSDOT), and the Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development (CTED) – now named the Department of Commerce. All three claim successes from their efforts leading up to the Olympics.

*Department of Transportation:* Taking its lead from the Governor’s Task Force, WSDOT’s goals leading up to the Games were to increase traveler information and finish
major construction projects near the border, and according to WSDOT staff, this was accomplished. According to WSDOT officials “WSDOT has added new cameras and border wait times to its traveler information to help drivers make informed decisions about traffic and border conditions and know when and where to cross the border” (WSDOT, Feb 9, 2010).

Additionally, WSDOT made major construction projects near the border region a priority including:

- I-5, HOV lane additions in Everett at a cost of $262.6 million
- SR 543, I-5 to Canadian Border at a cost of $49 million
- SR 539, Bellingham to Lynden at a cost of $169 million
- SR 9, Nooksack Road to Cherry Street at a cost of $18 million

While these projects were likely not absolutely critical to the success of the 2010 Olympic Games, they certainly added to the legacy of the Games for Washington State and facilitated a much smoother transportation process for spectators heading to Vancouver through Washington State – particularly the SR 543 project at the Blaine truck border crossing which was completed six months ahead of schedule.

Perhaps the transportation highlight, and an example of successful cross-border coordination, was the announcement on October 9, 2009 of the start of the long awaited second Amtrak Cascades train service to Vancouver, B.C. As Secretary Hammond said, “We are continuing to invest in growing our passenger rail program. This expanded service provides a viable travel option to the 2010 Olympics and also addresses the increased demand for those traveling to British Columbia aboard this already highly successful Amtrak rout.” (WSDOT, October 9, 2009).
The Canadian government approved the second train service on July 3 as a pilot project to run between August 1 through the end of the 2010 Olympic and Paralympics Winter Games. WSDOT worked with Amtrak, BNSF Railway, U.S. Customs, and other stakeholders to get the additional Amtrak Cascades service operational on August 19, 2009. Due to the success of the second train through the Olympic Games, however, the Washington State and British Columbia governments announced that they would extend the train until September 30, 2010.

Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development (CTED) – now named Department of Commerce: CTED, from the outset, was very aggressive in preparing for the 2010 Games. The agency hired Mary Rose to coordinate tourism planning, and focused on a number of priorities:

- Focus media attention on winter sports and competitions being held in Washington before the Olympics (Snowboard competition, March 25)
- Potential training sites catalogued on PNWER site with links from Washington sites
- Travel packages for ticket purchasers
- Alternative modes of travel and alternative lodging opportunities (Bellingham, San Juan Islands?)
- Rebound visitor opportunities – Canadians coming to U.S. to escape congestion in Vancouver and Whistler
- Eco-tourism and ethnic affinities with regions
It will be awhile before the long-term payoffs of tourism for Washington state will be assessed. However, in an effort to maximize opportunity CTED hosted a number of events leading up to the 2010 Games, provided information to local tourism agencies interested in opportunities, and produced an Impact Study that provided more data for those interested in the Games. CTED also allocated funds for these efforts including $150,000 in 2005-06 that was utilized in the following key program areas:

- Seminars and Events. Including, statewide information seminars and speaking engagements and a special event with Governor Gregoire and Premier Campbell.
- Business Development and Tourism Services
- Communication and materials: Web site, e-newsletter, media outreach, etc.; Task Force meeting and communications support; other promotional materials as needed

*Washington State Military Department:* The department charged with perhaps the most important and most challenging planning was the Military Department headed by Adjutant General Tim Lowenberg who also served as co-chair of the Security Subcommittee of the Governor’s Task Force. In an effort to ensure that all relevant federal, state, and local security agencies were involved in the security planning leading up to the Olympics, General Lowenberg formed the Washington State 2010 Olympics Task Force Security Subcommittee on April 2005. This was over a year before the U.S. federal government had categorized the Olympics as a Special Event and turned planning responsibilities over to the NPTF. This is an important point since it provided regional planners a substantial amount of time to organize and establish a process for planning and
preparing for the Games, making it much harder for federal officials – who came in later – to change the momentum of the security planning.

The Subcommittee had over 300 active members from approximately 40 agencies and associations involved in 6 work groups including Operations, Planning, Intelligence, Finance, Logistics, and Communications Operations.

By June of 2008, the Subcommittee had accomplished a number of things. With the help of the Washington State Congressional delegation, the Department of Homeland Security had issued a Report to Congress and was responsible for an Olympics funding strategy. Additionally, DHS – due in no small part to urging by the Security Subcommittee -- had compiled a Special Events Awareness Report (SEAR) that analyzed multiple data points including venue features, dignitary attendance, estimated total attendance, and combined capabilities. Following the SEAR, the Secretary of Homeland Security identified the need for a Federal Coordinator to coordinate Federal incident management and security assistance activities for the Olympic Games.

On January 8, 2007 Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff named Mark Beaty of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to be the U.S. Federal Coordinator for the 2010 Winter Olympics. Beaty’s role would be Secretary Chertoff’s primary federal point of contact for coordinating federal and regional planning and support for the Games. The press release announcing the appointment affirmed the subnational primacy of these endeavors:

“As these events are primarily under the jurisdiction of provincial, State, and local governments, the Federal Coordinator is responsible for coordination with
This announcement was a huge victory for the Security Subcommittee, which had continually advocated for stronger federal involvement in the planning and preparation of the 2010 Games. Notably, it was the first time the DHS named a federal coordinator for an event outside of the USA. However, it is telling that even in the announcement of a Federal coordinator being appointed, DHS pointed that “these events are primarily under the jurisdiction of provincial, State, and local governments” -- not the Federal government.

There were other successes by 2008. The Subcommittee had been successful in helping Whatcom County receive $3 million in state funding for communications improvement and $10 million in state/local Public Safety Interoperability Grant funding for the region (Briefing for Senator Murray and Congressman Larsen, July 2, 2008). Additional state funding had been identified to support one full time equivalent (FTE) employee to support the committee, and a secure Security Subcommittee information sharing portal had been established.

The accomplishments that were reached by these three state agencies and coordinated by the Governor’s 2010 Olympics Task Force are important to note for a number of reasons. First, they indicate the high priority the Games had within the bureaucracy of the Washington State government. Clearly the initial reports that were done showing the possible impacts of the Games on the state got people’s attention which led to action across a wide spectrum of agencies.
Second, they show that a majority of the planning and preparation done in the lead up to the Olympics was done at a sub-national level. In fact, particularly in the security realm where the Federal government should have had a much larger and earlier role in the planning, A review of the planning shows that the State agencies took the lead and had to push the federal government at various times to engage in the process. This is an important piece of the explanation of why such close cross-border collaboration in the security planning for the Olympics took place. It appears that the lack of a strong federal presence in the planning actually helped the cross-border collaborative process, and allowed sub-national groups to reach across the border and partner with their Canadian counterparts. This is not to say there was no federal presence, nor federal cross-border planning, but I do conclude that the state’s leadership role in preparing for the Games was a critical element in the occurrence of cross-border cooperation.

To conclude this section of the paper, it is worth noting that the planning done on both sides of the border was impressive. Much was accomplished and those involved left a legacy that will never be forgotten. The goal of this section of the paper was to paint a picture of what occurred on both sides of the border and how massive the planning for the Games was for planners in both countries. The next section will focus on the cross-border collaboration between these two planning teams.

Cross Border Collaboration and Cooperation – Particularly focused on Security planning

The Cascadia region, as described by Susan Clarke, “runs from Eugene, Oregon along the Cascade range up to Vancouver, BC,…[and] is promoted as the tenth largest
economic center in the world with an economic base including high tech firms such as Microsoft, McCaw Cellular and Boeing” (Clarke, 2002, 2). The region has a long and successful history of cross border collaboration, so when planning for the 2010 Games began and more and more examples of cross border cooperation and successes were being seen, it should not have been a surprise to people. As previously discussed, within the transportation realm, a second Amtrak train from Seattle to Vancouver was announced. Additionally, VANOC CEO John Furlong made a number of trips to Seattle to meet with business and government officials to update them on steps being taken in Vancouver to prepare for the Games. Another prominent example of cross-border collaboration was the launch of the Joint Border Action Plan. This bilateral initiative, led by B.C. Premier Gordon Campbell and Washington State Governor Christine Gregoire, sought to streamline cross-border trade and travel in an effort to avert long delays at the border in advance of the Olympics. The agreement signed on June 20, 2008 “calls for both jurisdictions to work together and engage the two federal governments to improve staffing levels at border crossings and increase hours of operation; improve border waits and processing; increase use of NEXUS and FAST; expand and extend Enhanced Drivers Licences; take action to reduce emissions at the border through anti-idling measures; and improve compatibility of cross-border public safety radio communications systems for emergency situations” (Office of the Premier, Office of the Governor, June 20, 2008).

Cross-border cooperation and collaboration, as these few examples indicate, are not new in Cascadia. Scholars such as Brunet-Jailly (2008), Clarke (2002), Alper (2008), and Scott (1999), to name only a few, have noted robust cross border collaboration in this region for decades. However, in terms of security cooperation, there has never been such cooperation and collaboration seen in the Cascadia region before then during the lead up to the 2010 Olympic Games. The reasons for this are numerous.
The following section will describe the security challenges facing planners as the Olympics grew closer, and explain what kinds of cross border security cooperation was seen before and during the Games to respond to these challenges.

Security Challenges Facing the Games

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the United States has a history of providing security assistance for overseas Olympic Games:

- For the Athens Olympics, nearly 20 different U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security assistance and support.
- For the Turin Olympics, nearly 20 different agencies provided more than $16 million in security support (DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 17).

However as the DHS Report to Congress points out “The operational challenges facing regional, local, tribal, state, and federal authorities in preparing for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games are particularly complex due to the close proximity of the Olympic venues in Whistler BC and Vancouver, BC to the U.S.” (DHS Report, 2007, 52).

The initial substantial challenge facing planners was the basic geography of the region. The geographic challenge played itself out in several very real and important ways. Perhaps the most obvious was airspace issues. As can be seen from Figure 2, the concentric circles indicating the 2010 Olympics Airspace Plan spans both the U.S. and
Figure 1: Geography

Figure 2: Airspace
Canada. This meant that when Canada shut down the airspace during the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, planes would have difficulty flying into Bellingham International Airport in Bellingham, WA – the largest airport north of Seattle.

A second challenge was the international border separating the two nations. The Peace Arch border crossing is the third busiest passenger vehicle crossing along the U.S.-Canada border and the Blaine truck crossing is the fourth busiest commercial crossing. Every day, over 21,000 cars and nearly 3,000 trucks cross the Cascade Gateway carrying over $59 million (USD) in trade (IMTC Manual, 2010, 5). The Cascade Gateway is a prominent, international trade and travel connection. Having this major passenger and commercial border crossing less than 40 miles from one of the major sporting venues made it a terrorist target. And, as the DHS Report to Congress indicated, the impacts on the transportation and border infrastructure of spectators traversing through the border and up to Vancouver would be sizeable.

A third challenge faced by both nations was the challenge of competing government bureaucracies. On the U.S. side, planners had to deal with a large number of federal agencies, with the Department of Defense, DHS, the Department of State, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency taking the lead roles. And while the Department of Homeland Security had the most involvement in security planning because of the border resources at the U.S. border as well as its departmental mission, the Department of State was actually in charge of ensuring the safety and security of U.S. interests abroad and was Lead Agency for all bilateral activities with the Canadian government.
For Canadian security planners, bureaucratic challenges were even more troublesome, as experienced by previous host nations and cities. As Zekulin describes, jurisdictional issues many times will lead to disputes between involved agencies. In one such example during the 1996 Atlanta Games, U.S. Vice President Al Gore asked an FBI presenter “Who is in charge?” and after waiting for an answer and even posing the question again, he was told that it all depends on the situation – clearly an unacceptable security strategy (Zekulin, 2009, 6).

According to Brister, however, in planning for the Games, Canadian officials established the security architecture independent of the existing security infrastructure which “may well have been a reaction to the emergence of “stove piping” characteristics within the Canadian system” (Brister, 2010, 26). This is an important indication of how seriously the Canadian were taking the security planning. By removing the security planning from the normal security architecture, they could ensure better efficiency and hope to avoid bureaucratic turf wars.

Another key security challenge was communications operability, particularly across the border and amongst U.S. and Canadian security personnel. In July, 2005 Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 conducted a DHS-sponsored Cross-Border Tabletop Exercise (TTX) in conjunction with the Canadian Province of British Columbia. The exercise focused on key local emergency responder communications, coordination, critical decisions, and the integration of external assets necessary to save lives and protect the public during a cross-border terrorist threat. The After Action Report (AAR) identified that
“cross border communications capabilities should be analyzed and improved.” Federal, State, local, and tribal U.S. personnel do not have direct radio contact capability with Canadian law enforcement” (DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 40).

The challenge of U.S. – Canada interoperability is one that plagued the two nations for decades, and needed to be rectified as the Olympics approached. One of the legacies, one could argue, of the 2010 Games was the successful ability of security planners in the Cascadia region to argue for increased resources for cross border communications. The $3 million in state funding for communications improvement and $10 million in state/local Public Safety Interoperability Grant funding for the region are prime examples of this.

Another challenge faced by security planners, and one that will continue to impact U.S.-Canada security officials for years to come, is the differing approaches to security taken by both nations. U.S. officials have frequently commented that the Canadian officials can be slow to react to security matters, particularly due to stove-piping issues that are built into the Canadian system. Because of this, tension can be created within the relationship.

With respect to the American sense of immediacy, Canadian officials have commented on the frequent exertion of pressure to act on issues deemed of critical and immediate importance to the security of the Games by their American counterparts” (Brister, 2010, 28).

This challenge is another example of differing priorities. The U.S. in the post 9/11 world has made security the top priority, and because of this, is much quicker to react when faced with security matters. Additionally, U.S. officials will not be shy about sharing their perspectives with other countries in this regard. This issue will be covered more in depth later in this study.
One very good example of the different approaches can be seen in their separate and differing rules of engagement. According to Zekulin leading up to the Olympics rumors abounded that the U.S. was offering to assist in airspace security and surveillance by loaning the Canadian government Predator drones and other assets. Additionally, NORAD was being considered as responsible for monitoring traffic. This was troublesome, Zekulin wrote, because each country had separate rules of engagement, and pointed to a CTV News story to make his case (Zekulin, 2009, 17):

“Watch out if you ignore the rules. The response varies, depending on whether you are in Canadian or U.S. airspace. "The U.S. government may use deadly force against the airborne aircraft, if it is determined that the aircraft poses an imminent security threat," says a U.S. Federal Aviation Administration flight advisory. FAA spokesman Mike Fergus says he was not aware of "deadly force" ever being used against aircraft that violated temporary flight restrictions. "But we need that well known out there, so the really, truly bad guys will know they are going to get their southern hemispheres fried if they don't heave ho, so-to-speak." Canadian authorities are more measured in their response. "Any unauthorized aerial activity within the restricted airspace will be subject to intercept by military aircraft," a Transport Canada bulletin says” (CTV News, Sept 25, 2009).

A continuing strategic and diplomatic challenge, particularly for the U.S. during the planning of the Games, was the concern that U.S. efforts would overshadow what were clearly and importantly “Canada’s Games.” In an interview with Mark Beaty, DHS Federal Coordinator, it became clear that a real concern by U.S. security planners was not to take over the Canadian efforts, but to provide support to whatever the Canadians were planning. This obviously came with challenges related to the previously discussed issue, but it was very real for U.S. security personnel. Brister also recognized this when he said “…it indicates the presence of yet another of the common policy threads, a continuing concern and need to balance the relationship between domestic public perceptions of...
Americans ‘taking over’ the security for the Games” (Brister, 2010, 29). Others have taken this further, stating that “Canadians remain concerned about the degree to which the U.S. exerts control over Canadian life and fear cultural, economic, and political “take over” (Nicol, 2006, 48). This was clearly an issue for the Canadians during event planning and security collaboration based on my own personnel experience, and Beaty was equally clear when he underlined the fact that American planners were sensitive to this issue.

These challenges, while not an exhaustive list, were serious for security planners. However, by reviewing these challenges, it becomes clear why U.S.-Canada cross-border coordination on security is difficult, and raises the questions of how did U.S. and Canadian security planners coordinate for this specific event when there had been no real precedent for it before? The following section will describe what steps were taken to establish a cross-border collaboration to ensure a safe and secure 2010 Winter Olympics.

Security Solutions

Faced with all of these challenges, what steps were taken to facilitate cross-border cooperation and collaboration on these security matters? As previously discussed, the U.S. federal government for the most part had taken a non-leadership role in planning for the Olympics – indicated by the delay in appointing a federal coordinator and the numerous references in the DHS Report to Congress that the federal government would support state and local planning efforts – and instead followed the lead of sub-national planning groups like General Lowenberg’s Security Subcommittee. However, this does
not mean that cross-border collaboration at the national level did not take place. Before
discussing the cross-border efforts made by the Security Subcommittee, it’s appropriate
to review a few of the national cross-border initiatives that were occurring subsequently
to Olympics planning.

**Shiprider**

In various interviews with U.S. officials charged with security planning during the
Olympics, the Shiprider program was singled out as a prime example of cross-border
security cooperation. While this program was created independently from Olympics
planning, it was utilized during the Olympic Games.

According to the Heritage Foundation, “*The Shiprider program was created in
2005 by the U.S. and Canadian governments to mitigate and eliminate the exploitation of
these security seams*” (Lenuik and McNeil, 2010, 1). The initial Shiprider operated in the
Great Lakes region between the U.S. and Canada and was not heavily used in the Puget
Sound until much later.

The strength of Shiprider is that it allows U.S. Coast Guard officers to jointly
patrol shared waters with RCMP officers, thus allowing the patrols to cross the border
when pursuing interdiction targets. According to the Heritage Foundation report, during a
two-month span in the summer of 2007, Shiprider watercrafts boarded 187 suspect
vessels. The Shipriders seized over 200 pounds of marijuana, more than 1 million
contraband cigarettes, $38,000 (CAD) in illicit cash, and six vessels used in illegal
smuggling operations. These operations also resulted in the arrests of 12 people.
On February 3, 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard and the RCMP announced that it would launch the Shiprider program in the shared U.S.-Canada waterways to enhance security operations during the Olympics.

“The United States and Canada are committed to securing our shared waterways against threats on both sides of the border,” said Secretary Napolitano. “This pilot project will enhance coordination and information-sharing between our two countries and strengthen our joint efforts to protect our citizens and visitors from around the world during the 2010 Winter Games” (USCG press release, 2010).

While this was not the first use of Shiprider in the Puget Sound, the use of it during the 2010 Games indicates the level of support it has from both the U.S. and Canada.

During an interview, Katie Tolan, a Canadian official at the Embassy in Washington D.C. indicated that the Shiprider program was extremely successful, was well-thought of on both sides of the border and at the tenth meeting of the Cross-border Crime Forum the program was reauthorized and extended.

Airspace Security- Operation Gateway

In July 2008, the Calgary Herald reported that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) would be given operational responsibility of providing protection from the air and monitoring the airspace over the Olympics (Calgary Herald, 2008).

While it was clear from the beginning that the plan was to have much of the airspace security and surveillance done by the Canadian NORAD regional command under Lt. General Charlie Bouchard, deputy commander of NORAD, it was equally clear that American resources would be available. In fact, in interviews with security planners who attended the final cross-border, multi-agency airspace meetings, it was stated that the
Canadian NORAD team was very straightforward on the fact that it did not anticipate needing or wanting additional assets for air defense and air surveillance. This turned out to be inaccurate. Aiding the Canadian Air Defense Sector, U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) crews were dispatched out of Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma to Vancouver just before the start of the Olympics and remained through the duration of the Games. The AWACS personnel reportedly flew sorties to provide additional radar coverage specifically looking for aircraft flying in restricted flight zones (Tinker Air Force Base press release, February 26, 2010). The assignment came about when, despite previous assertions to the contrary, NORAD requested the aid from the U.S. for the AWACs crews. Although it came at the last minute, clearly the early collaboration and communications between U.S. and Canadian planners paid off and U.S. airborne platforms were able to fill in any perceived gaps in the security umbrella.

Additionally, according to Mark Beaty, the Canadian Government, through a Diplomatic Note, requested the assistance of the U.S. Government in establishing gateway airports where General Aviation Airplanes (GAA) could be security screened prior to departure for Vancouver International Airport. This effort was dubbed “Operation Gateway.”

In response CBP, in conjunction with TSA and the GAA community, agreed to establish 16 U.S. gateway departure airports throughout the country. Gateway Teams consisting of assets from CBP and TSA were formed to conduct security inspections/outbound examinations between February 1-28, 2010. These operational protocols in the area of operations ensured that:
CBP was notified timely of all imminent Operation Gateway departures to YVR;

All GAA, crew, and passengers were vetted against CBP law enforcement databases;

Coordinated CBP/TSA outbound examination and security screening of all GAA, crew, passengers and baggage;

Outbound departure approvals and/or denials were communicated in a timely manner between CBP, the RCMP and FAA; and,

All GAA, crew and passengers were screened for radiological material.

Establishing gateway airports in the U.S. assisted the Canadian Government in securing the TFR airspace by eliminating the need for U.S. registered GAA to land at one of the four Canadian portal airports, and by reducing anticipated ground delays at the four Canadian portal airports. This collaboration was a success for both the U.S. and Canada and solved a huge concern leading up to the Games.

The collaboration between the U.S. and Canada through the Shiprider program and the airspace security program indicates a very high-level of cooperation. Both NORAD, the RCMP, the U.S. FAA, the Coast Guards from both countries, and the DOD were all members of General Lowenberg’s Security Subcommittee and having them all at the same table as early as 2005 was an important step in a process that concluded with a near seamless air and water security umbrella. While it is quite possible that these programs, and others like them, would have occurred regardless of what the Security Subcommittee did, the early creation of the Subcommittee and the thorough and well-
attended quarterly meetings led to easier collaboration for Federal government security officials. As Amanda Bibler from Customs and Border Protection noted in an interview, while CBP “came to play,” there was never any concerns about the work already done by the Security Subcommittee – particularly because of the networks created amongst the agency representatives (Bibler, April 28, 2010).

Joint Training Exercises

Jeff Parks from the Whatcom County Sheriff’s Office and also lead planner for the Security Subcommittee’s Operations Work Group, referred to the joint training exercises a number of times as examples of the robust cross-border coordination occurring during the planning for the Games. Katie Tolan from the Canadian embassy also cited them as one of the best examples of cross-border cooperation. In order to solve the interoperability and communications issues it was necessary for both sides to train together and find the capability gaps.

Initially, both nations planned for exercises independently although both sides were aware of the other’s planned training sessions. According to the DHS:

“The Training and Exercise Work Group anticipates using one annual event as a venue to bring together federal, state, local, tribal and international partners leading up to the 2010 Games.

- In FY07 – seminars and workshops leading to a TTX or functional exercise – utilizing Regional response 07 (RR07) framework if possible.
- In FY08 – seminars and workshops leading to functional exercise or full-scale exercise during Regional Response 08 – focusing on information sharing, communications, and resource sharing.

- In FY09 – full scale exercise early Jan. – March 09 – focusing on resource sharing, information flow, and communications. (*DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 14*).

As members of the Security Subcommittee, Canadian security planners from the RCMP and other agencies were involved in these exercises. However, the Canadian planners had their own exercises planned as well. The Canadian Security planning joint training exercises - referred to as the Olympic Integrated Exercise Program - were named Gold, Silver, and Bronze and according to Katie Tolan at the Canadian Embassy were “extraordinary” in establishing cross border security collaboration. In fact, she said, following the Silver exercise, Canadian officials flew to DC to directly brief the Special Events Working Group (SEWG) which led to American security units engaging directly with the next joint exercise, Gold (*Tolan, 2010*). The Ottawa Citizen, reporting on a briefing by the Canadian Defence Department to Members of Parliament, recorded:

*NDP MP Peter Julian (New Democratic Party) had a number of questions about the 2010 Olympics at a recent Commons defence committee meeting that DND officials couldn’t immediately answer.*

*The Defence Department has responded with the answers below:*

**Question 1:** Exercise Gold, will it involve American forces?

**Response:** Yes. *NORAD is a bi-national command that includes both Canadian and American personnel and equipment. NORAD will be participating in exercise Gold. Various U.S. military headquarters and operations centres will be exercising with Canada Command during exercise Gold, through exercise Determined Dragon (a Canadian Forces exercise) and exercise Vigilant Shield (a U.S. military exercise).*
addition, a small number of U.S. military liaison officers will be participating with Joint Task Force Games. (Pugliese, 2009)

Based on interviews with those involved with the process, the joint training exercises were a key piece in mitigating the many issues and challenges that may have come up during the Olympic Games. Whatcom County Sheriff’s deputy Jeff Parks emphasized that doing the exercises with your Canadian counterparts was important simply because officials were able to meet and talk with the person they were supposed to call if something bad happened like a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

The U.S. Olympics Coordination Center (OCC)

The establishment of an Olympics Coordination Center at the Bellingham International Airport by U.S. Olympic security planners is perhaps the “crown jewel” of the U.S. security efforts. The first official description was included in the DHS Report to Congress which stated:

“CBP and the 2010 Task Force Security Subcommittee have established a goal of a ‘brick and mortar’ Multiagency Coordination Center close to the border to include Federal, State, local, and tribal representation. This facility could be augmented by a virtual presence of additional partners as needed” (DHS Report to Congress, 2007, 25).

Michael Zekulin writing in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies noted the importance of the OCC:

“Setting aside domestic inter-agency issues, other countries, most notably the United States due to its proximity to the Games, are expected to play a large role in security operations. While it is being pegged as ‘an opportunity to deepen cross border cooperation on large scale emergencies, border security and counterterrorism’ American officials have created the U.S. Olympic Security Committee (USSC) and an integrated Multi-Agency Coordination Centre
(MACC). These two agencies are essentially ‘shadow agencies’ located just across the Canada-U.S. border” (Zekulin, 2009, 17).

These two citations indicate the interest and importance of what became known as the Olympics Coordination Center, a critical piece to the cross-border security web for the Olympic Games.

Leaving aside the apparent suspicion Zekulin has about U.S. security efforts to assist Canadian security planning, the OCC is nothing like a “shadow agency” – or an agency at all, for that matter. Similar in nature to IBETs – Integrated Border Enforcement Teams – that are comprised of both Canadian and American law enforcement agencies and enable the five core law enforcement partners to work together daily for more efficient sharing of information and intelligence, the OCC is a central facility where all relevant security and non-security agencies could be housed and their efforts coordinated. During a tour in October 2009, Federal Coordinator Beaty commented: "This was a warehouse (in) January of this year. This thing got turned around quicker than any project I've ever seen in federal government.” The center served as a home for the relevant federal agencies, including DHS, the FBI, WSDOT, the FBI, and others to work face-to-face during the Olympics. According to the Bellingham Herald in October 2009,

“The center's role is to provide a communications link for federal, state and local agencies, plus representatives from Canadian agencies. Their focus will be safety during the Olympics, plus smooth operations at the border during the international games” (Fraley, 2009).

The Center housed teams from 70 federal, state, and local agencies, had 54 work stations, 13 50-inch computer monitors and eight wide-screen projection systems that could feed information from traffic cameras, maps, and overlays provided by the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The screens also showed airspace management zones for the Olympics and feeds from cameras mounted in the nose of aircrafts piloted by pilots from Customs and Border Protection. Staff occupied the center 24 hours/day. However, a benefit of the new facility, as stated by in an AP story written by Bob Brewin, is the close proximity of experts. As Mark Beaty stated “If I need an expert, all I need to do is walk over and talk to one” (Brewin, January 25, 2010).

However, despite the overwhelming support for the concept of an OCC by the members of the Security Subcommittee and by the Department of Homeland Security who described it as a needed asset in its Report to Congress, funding for the Center was difficult to come by. There were numerous attempts made to have DHS fund the Center from within its own budget, but to no avail. In the end funding came through an earmark request by Senator Patty Murray and supported by Congressman Larsen that was included in the FY2009 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Both Senator Murray and Rep; Larsen expressed strong support for the funds acknowledging that ensuring safety during the Olympics was a top priority and that the Center was critical in this regard. General Lowenberg and FBI Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC) Laura Laughlin shared these views in a statement:

“Lessons learned from numerous high-profile events show that to successfully combine the efforts of large numbers of agencies that operations should be conducted from a single command center with a unified command. The 2010 Olympics Security Coordination Center will coordinate the security efforts for over 40 federal, state and local agencies on the U.S. side of the U.S. – Canadian border. This facility will provide a strategic response platform to facilitate critical response efforts during the Olympic Games and beyond.” (Murray Press release, 2008)

The coordination and collaboration by both countries within the OCC did not evoke any apparent controversy. Both Mark Beaty and Jeff Parks, as well as staff for General Lowenberg
indicated to the author that having all relevant agencies in one room was critical to maintaining communication. As Jeff Parks said, while you can email and do teleconferencing, it’s not the same as having the person sitting right next to you. Adding to this perspective, the New York Times reported:

“In addition to conventional methods of coordination like conference calls, both countries have included law enforcement agents from the other inside their respective Olympic security centers. Perhaps not surprisingly, Jeff Parks, the undersheriff for Whatcom County, Wash., said that most of the agencies had found the coordinated approach to be a better way for dealing with cross-border issues. It’s turned into a model of efficiency,” he said from the center in Bellingham, adding that he hopes financing will be available after the Games to continue the program” (Austen, 2010).

Border crossing coordination

Perhaps the biggest concern for spectators was what the border wait times would be when the Olympics began and thousands of spectators crossed the border. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been numerous reports of long lines at the border. With an expected surge of more than 200,000 at the five border crossings in Whatcom County, there were concerns about border wait times. The DHS Report to Congress stated

“CBP recognizes that an event of this magnitude has the potential to attract large numbers of tourists to the U.S. and that many of these tourists may elect to lodge on the U.S. side of the border….it is anticipated that this special event will result in an increase in border crossing that is approximately 124 percent of daily summer-peak travel volumes at the Peace Arch crossing and 94.9 percent of daily summer peak travel at the Pacific Highway crossing” (DHS Report, 2007, 17-18).

To mitigate border wait times, U.S. Customs and Border Protection committed to opening ten lanes during the Olympics and “maximum wait times should not exceed the current average peak wait times” (DHS Report, 2007, 20). This meant adding four temporary
booths to the usual six permanent booths. As it turned out, expectations initially described by the local organizations like the IMTC and the Border Policy Research Center did in fact materialize – the volumes were about the same a summer peak day and wait times were not excessive.

One unusual challenge at the time of the Olympics was the ongoing construction of a $71 million Peace Arch crossing facility by the General Services Administration (GSA). When GSA and CBP announced the construction of the new facility at the border, there were initial concerns about the possible impacts on the Olympics. Part of the construction plan called for completely shutting down the main artery into Canada – Interstate 5 – so the GSA contractors could construct a bridge. CBP was committed to doing all it could to ensure the smooth travel for passengers going to and coming from the Olympics, but the construction project was GSA’s responsibility. After several months of negotiation, GSA finally agreed to have all work on I-5 and on the bridge completed by January 2010. They also committed to having the main facility project and secondary lanes completed, and agreed to work with CBP to ensure there were ten lanes open during the Games. As it turned out, the bridge portion of the project was completed months ahead of time, and there were no complaints about the project during the Olympics.

Ken Oplinger, president of the Bellingham/Whatcom Chamber of Commerce and Industry, whose work involved monitoring the border and construction-related issues stated that he was satisfied that federal agencies were doing what is needed to keep Olympics traffic flowing across the border. As reported in the Bellingham Herald,
"They've definitely taken this seriously," Oplinger said. "If anything, they're going to be overstaffed. ... I would much rather the feds spend the money to be prepared" (Stark, Jan 31, 2010).

All of the planning appeared to have made a difference. According to the Washington State Department of Transportation, “Between the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, nearly 200,000 vehicles crossed from Washington State into Canada; yet for the vast majority of the Olympics, border delays averaged less than ten minutes.” (WSDOT final summary, 2010).

The challenges faced by security planners on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border were daunting. These challenges were made easier by significant cross-border collaboration which appears to have alleviated many of the anticipated security concerns related to the Olympics. Specifically, because local security planners were willing to emerge from their historically stove-piped agencies to work with their cross-border counterparts, issues that could have arisen.

While it’s apparent that a notable amount of cross-border collaboration during the planning and execution of the 2010 Olympics occurred, how can we explain why it occurred and the form that it took? The following section of the study attempts to consult recent cross border literature to help answer this question.

Analyzing the Literature – How and Why does Cross Border Cooperation Happen?

The academic fields of political science and international relations have examined the importance of borders and cross-border cooperation for decades. As the European continent made leaps toward integration, and regional trade agreements like the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) removed barriers and brought down walls, academics have sought explanatory power to provide context for these changes.

This section focuses on the Olympics as a case study of cross-border regional collaboration on security. First, the paper will review the three main lines of analysis within the field that are relevant to this case study. Second, a description of the approach being used for this case study will be developed. Third, there will be a discussion of the importance of the Cascadia region in cross-border cooperation and as a region where unique cooperation such as that seen during the Olympics planning happens regularly.

Cooperation or Integration?

One of the key issues debated within the literature is whether cross-border cooperation leads to broad-based political integration that includes supranational frameworks. The debate is generally broken down between realists and multi-level governance arguments. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly describes the difference between the two:

“Both realist and multilevel governance perspectives suggest that state sovereignty is intact. Realists assert that central states remain in control of the supranational institutions, whereas multi-level governance proponents suggest that central states and all of their levels of governments end up working together and across not only intergovernmental lines but also international borders to develop, design, and implement policies” (Brunet-Jailly, 2008, 107).

In general, the debate comes down to control and power; is the state controlling and driving the supra-national and subnational groups, or are non-central governments wielding control?

The issue of state sovereignty is a particular salient topic in these debates when discussing security issues more generally. There has been much debate and much written about
the European Union’s continual integration across a myriad of fields, and this deliberation has given rise to new debates of territoriality and borders. As Berg and Ehin explain,

“A glance at the mode of governance in this policy sector suggests that the EU is quickly moving towards supranational regulation of its external borders. Europeanization of border legislation is evident from the incorporation of the Schengen Treaty in the acquis communautaire and the transfer of issues related to migration, asylum, and visa policies in to the first pillar with proposals to establish a Common European Border Corps no longer controlled or accountable at the national level (Berg and Ehin, 2006, 59).

According to Berg and Ehin, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 moved European nations beyond economic integration and towards security cohesion and more comprehensive political integration. For this reason, the European model of cooperation and integration is likely not suggestive or explanatory for what is happening in North America. In this regard, Brunet-Jailly makes the point as follows:

“What is not in question is that North American political integration would follow in the footsteps of the European Union (EU) where countries have delegated large portions of sovereign prerogatives to supranational institutions” (Brunet-Jailly, 2008, 105).

Unlike the EU, the NAFTA agreement was centrally a trade agreement and barely touched on other political issues such as immigration, security, energy cooperation, and law enforcement. Since NAFTA was signed there have been other agreements signed between the U.S and Canada like the Smart Border Accord, and between the U.S. and Mexico like the The U.S.-Mexico Social Security Totalization Agreement. However none are efforts to construct a continental integration project like that found in the EU. There are two important points related to the 2010 Olympics security planning here. First, that a comparison of cross-border collaboration between the EU and North America yields little insight on North American regionalism since each approach is so different from the other. The EU is seeking to integrate institutions and is forming a model that can and will lead to increased economic and political
integration. This is not the case in the NAFTA region. Second, the cross-border collaboration and cooperation seen in the planning of the Olympics should not lead IR theorists or political scientists to believe that due to a notable level of security cooperation that there has been a move toward political integration by the U.S. and Canada. It does show, however, that nations can find way to cooperate in very intensive ways and on very complicated issues such as security without resorting to supranational arrangements geared to broad-based integration.

Types of Cross border cooperation and security challenges

Since the signing of NAFTA we have seen much closer ties between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. While not leading towards an EU integration model, the level of cross-border collaboration and cooperation has greatly expanded. When NAFTA was ratified in 1994, it was the first integration scheme between two developed nations and a developing country. Ten years after its ratification, trade between the U.S. and Mexico had increased four-fold, and U.S.-Canadian trade had doubled.

The impact of NAFTA on the U.S.-Canada relationship has been large, but likely not as immense as it had on the U.S.-Mexico relationship. This is due to a number of factors, but the fundamental disparities in power among the three North American neighbors are perhaps the best explanation. As Alper and Loucky explain:

“Economic asymmetries are perhaps the clearest set of differences characterizing the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico borders. The ambiguous and contentious nature of the U.S.-Mexico border is profoundly associated with the fact that this is the most dramatic case in the world where developed and developing countries directly meet...By comparison, Canada and the United States are not now widely differentiated, nor were they before. The two countries have similar levels of economic development, wage levels, types of products produced and levels of consumption” (Alper and Loucky, 2008, 17).
Yet, while the impact of NAFTA may not have been as large on the U.S.-Canada relationship as it had on the U.S.-Mexico relationship, there has been a notable increase in regional cross-border cooperation between the U.S. and Canada. In 2009, the Government of Canada’s Policy Research Initiative (PRI) completed the Final Report for its project on *The Emergence of Cross-Border Regions Between Canada and the United States – Reaping the promise and public value of cross-border regional relationships*. The PRI study showed the growing strength of the economic, socio-cultural, and organizational dimensions of Canada-U.S. cross-border relationships. One key finding of the PRI study was that

“regional cross-border networks and organizations have proliferated since NAFTA, and provide a useful vehicle for bi-national business and community groups to work together on issues of mutual interest, often with the ultimate aim of problem solving or creating local competitive advantages in the larger North American and global economies.” (PRI Study, 2009)

The point here is twofold; since NAFTA we have seen growth in cross-border regionalism and that this cross-border cooperation covers a gamut of issues.

However, one area of cross-border cooperation that has not been the focus of attention in either the PRI or other studies is security cooperation. The most obvious explanation for this is that because security relations involve large questions of national interest, identity, and history – all of which lack “fit” with subnational politics for cross-border regionalism -- security is a very difficult issue to be managed at the regional level.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, both the U.S. and Canada showed an advanced and impressive level of cooperation became challenging when the U.S. and Canadian Federal governments diverged on how best to move forward on ensuring national security. Monica Serrano points to the impact of the Iraq War in this regard:
“The September 2001 terrorist attacks brought about unprecedented levels of security cooperation and coordination in North America. The ensuing wars on terror and on Iraq acted, in turn, as a power catalyst for the break-up of the initial consensus underpinning the emerging security partnership among Canada, the U.S. and Mexico” (Serrano, 2006, 621).

This would seem to indicate that cooperation on security matters can take place at the Federal level between the U.S. and Canada, but that issues like differing priorities or terrorist attacks can quickly break-up the initial consensus that had brought both nations to the table initially. While the U.S. made pursuing terrorism around the world a top national security priority and provided hundreds of billions of dollars in this regard, Canada did not share this prioritization. This is not to say that Canada did not recognize or seek to respond to global threats. Clearly, Canada’s role in Afghanistan and other global hot spots are important and appreciated by the U.S. and other countries. However, the Iraq War was a very important security issue for the Bush Administration and Canada’s reluctance to engage likely played into a narrative that security concerns are not as important to Canada as they are to the United States, leading to tension within the relationship and making it harder for the two governments to cooperate on security matters. While this is one example, the point is that the U.S. and Canada approach security differently, and issues like the Iraq War can crop up and cause tension within the relationship that can then lead to less cooperation on security matters.

Wesley Wark makes a similar case, but explains that it is the fundamental differences in how each country defines the threats that leads to difficulty in security cooperation. He first says that security remains firmly within the domain of national security for both the U.S. and Canada. A second point that Wark makes is that each of the North American states has a unique doctrine of national security and a different set of appraisals of fundamental threats. Canada looked at security as a means to facilitate trade
while the U.S. looked at security as an ends itself. As Wark concludes “Assuming a start is ever made on the threat assessment front, there will remain a steep political hurdle” (Wark, 14, 2005).

Clearly both nations face threats. However, as Brister pointed out earlier and perhaps because of the experience of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks, the U.S is much more aggressive in terms of security. Because of this, tension is created within the relationship between the two countries making security cooperation more difficult.

There is also some indication that the challenges in security planning may run deeper than just differing threat assessments, particularly on the Canadian side. As Brister suggested earlier, there was a need during Olympics planning that Canadian efforts not be seen as being taken over by American planners. As Nicol points out, this concern has been a part of the bilateral relationship historically: ”Canadians remain concerned about the degree to which the U.S. exerts control over Canadian life and fear economic, cultural, and political ‘take over’”(Nicol, 2006, 48). For this reason, it is a safe assumption that Canadian planners, particularly at the national level, would be wary of any U.S. role in ensuring security for the Games for fear it would appear the U.S. was “taking over” – as these were well-publicized as “Canada’s Games,” this would have been unacceptable. This tension at the federal level allowed less-threatening U.S. subnational groups to step forward and take the lead on security planning and likely led to greater trust and more collaboration.

In sum, there are challenges to U.S.-Canada security coordination. Unlike trade, environmental cooperation, growth management policy collaboration, and energy consumption strategies where the U.S. and Canada continually seek ways at the federal, state, and local levels to collaborate, the concerns on both sides of the border in regard to security make
collaboration in this area very difficult. While both nations recognize global threats, the U.S. has taken a much more aggressive approach to fighting terrorism than has Canada. Due in part to this divergent approach, the U.S. policymakers question Canadian commitment and ability to ensure security, and Canada is fearful of the U.S. subsuming its efforts. Since security is probably the fundamental right of the nation-state, it is not hard to understand that collaborating on security matters would be one the more challenging policy issues to collaborate on. Additionally, security relations heavily revolve around the national interest, something that cross-border regions struggle with finding ways to collaborate on. For these reasons, security cooperation between the U.S. and Canada is consistently challenging.

National or Subnational groups?

As noted before, within the context of the debate between realists and multi-level governance perspectives is the argument over the role of subnational groups. Sovereignty of states is not challenged by either camp. However, the power and importance of sub-national groups including state and local governments, private sector companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is often discussed. Realists argue that power and authority in key areas of national interest is concentrated at the central government level – and because the border is a key national interest, the Federal government is in control of the border.

There are a number of academics, however, who argue that lower levels of authority are critical for implementation of national policies. Marks and Hooghe, when discussing European processes, state
“although European central governments and the European-level bureaucracy may control treaties and other major pieces of legislation and financial decisions, it is the increasingly important and complex networks of lower-level governments and the myriad connections of those decision-makers that explain their successes” (Brunet-Jailly, 2008, 107).

Other academics, particularly those discussing the U.S.-Canada cross border relationships, indicate the power of sub-national groups as well. James Wesley Scott makes the case that cross-border strategic alliances between cities, regions, and other subnational governments as well as the initiatives of cities to promote their economic and political interests internationally are topics of interest for academia and that “theoretical perspectives in which the nation-state is the sole creator and operator of transnational governance systems is no longer tenable.” (Scott, 1999, 607).

Susan Clarke echoes the approach that Clark takes by arguing that more regional interdependence, indivisibilities, and uncertainty lead to greater efforts at subnational levels. As she says,

“When these conditions and the consequent need for coordination spill over multiple scales effective policy initiatives become contingent on establishing multi-level governance arrangements” (Clarke, 2002, 1).

While the debate among IR theorists and political scientists will continue over the role and power of the nation-state in cross-border relationships, viewing the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship through the lens of a multi-level governance model carries explanatory power. By viewing the cross-border coordination seen during the 2010 Games as a regional and subnational effort with the cooperation of the Federal government, there is a better context provided for how and why cross border collaboration and cooperation occurs.
Cross-border Collaboration in a Regional Context – Cascadia Explained

As discussed throughout the paper, the cross-border literature is global in scope. Clearly, cross-border collaboration exists around the world, although it appears most political scientists study that which is mostly seen in Europe and North America. However, cross-border literature is very diverse and the reasons why cross-border collaboration occurs is heavily debated and discussed.

James Wesley Scott makes the case that cross-border regionalism is context-sensitive, and in the case of the Olympics planning in Cascadia, his point is useful. As Scott states,

“construction of cross-border regionalism is highly context sensitive, conditioned by degrees of regional self-awareness, local identities, ideological discourses and the material cooperation incentives generated by interstate integration processes” (Scott, 60).

The idea that cross-border cooperation stems from a contextual situation is extremely appropriate for this particular case-study, and for the Cascadia region. The Cascadia region has a history of cross—border collaboration and this experience could be the single best explanation for how so much cross-border cooperation on such a challenging issue like security took place during the Olympics. The historic interaction across the border within the region as well as the long list of north-south efforts to respond to transportation, resources, fisheries, and environmental issues have established a framework for cross-border cooperation in Cascadia. As Brunet–Jailly states;

“Overall, those recent findings imply the thickness and intensity of links are greatest in the Pacific North West (Cascadia) because culture and values are most similar there, which also suggests that economic and organizational linkages are most important” (Brunet-Jailly, 114).
Evidence of the strong cross border cooperation seen in Cascadia was reported by the Government of Canada in its Policy Research Initiative released in 2009. One of the key findings of the study was that the region of Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana showed the greatest amount of “thickness and intensity” of links where cross-border networks and organizations are most advanced, economic ties are significant, and socio-cultural values are quite similar (PRI, Government of Canada).

Susan Clarke, writing about Cascadia’s robust cross-border transportation planning, explains that transportation activists were successful regionally because they widened the conversation of transportation planning to more interest groups and began to describe the region as a “corridor.” This led to receipt of more resources, and an increased federal role in support of these efforts. Because transportation planning is generally not zero-sum, nobody on either side of the border could claim to be a loser. Clark goes on to say “One possibility is that the trust and confidence built up in Cascadia transportation initiatives can be transferred to another sectoral arena – security” (Clark, 18). However, she does downplay this possibility because of the national differences on security policy.

What Susan Clarke considers in her paper appears to have come true, to some extent, during the planning for the 2010 Games. When Mark Beaty, DHS Federal Coordinator, and Bob Dermann at the Washington Military Department, were questioned why they thought so much cooperation and collaboration between the U.S. and Canada took place in planning for the Olympics, they both noted previous cross-border efforts, particularly the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement (PNEMA). The PNEMA was signed in 1996-97 by the States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska and the Canadian province of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. In 1998, PNEMA was authorized by the U.S. Congress and
was the first international civil emergency preparedness and response agreement to receive this type of Congressional approval. Key aspects of the PNEMA compact include public health and medical preparedness and response across jurisdictions and the sharing of warnings and notifications, public health information, specimens, and laboratory data.

Following the signing of the PNEMA, a General Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in 2006 by the BC Ministry of Health and the Washington State Department of Health that enabled both organizations to collaboratively respond to surge capacity demands during emergencies and assess future areas of operational responsibility that could result in efficiencies in the provision of health services (*State of WA Dept of Health and BC Ministry of Health, June 20, 2006)*.

The PNEMA agreement, according to Beaty and Derman, set the stage for what subsequently occurred during the Olympics; namely close collaboration, the sharing of information and personnel, and the establishment of a partnership to assess and fill security gaps. However, PNEMA is not the only cross-border collaboration within the Cascadia region – there are literally dozens of examples of both the national governments and subnational entities working across the 49th parallel in a cooperative fashion. These examples include but are certainly not limited to:

- International Mobility and Transportation Corridor (IMTC) -- a U.S. - Canadian coalition of government and business entities that identifies and promotes improvements to mobility and security for the five border crossings between Whatcom County, Washington State and the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. Together, these four crossings are called the Cascade Gateway.

- BC-Washington Enhanced Drivers Licenses (EDLs) – an agreement between British Columbia and Washington State, and signed off by the respective Federal governments, to enhance driver’s licenses so they can be used as a secure travel document when crossing the U.S.-Canada border.

One particularly successful program that started in the Cascadia region is the IBETS – the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. IBETS are a bi-national partnership that enables the five core law enforcement partners involved in the teams to share information and work together daily with other local, state and provincial enforcement agencies on issues relating to national security, organized crime and other criminality transiting the Canada/U.S. border between the Ports of Entry (POE). According to Lt. Col. Margaret Stock, the IBETS started in Cascadia as a pilot project but were expanded across the shared border between the U.S. and Canada in 2001 in connection with the establishment of the Smart Border Accord. According to LTC Stock, there are now 24 IBET teams across the U.S.-Canada border, all based on the concept created in Cascadia in the early 1990’s and formalized in 1997.

There are other examples as well. As Alper points out, both British Columbia and Washington State are signatories of the Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) which commits both entities to “promote and coordinate mutual efforts to ensure the protection, preservation, and enhancement of our shared environment” (Alper, 2008, 128). In his discussion of Cascadia, Brunet-Jailly discusses PNWER but also mentions the Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council (PACE), a non-profit organization made up of leading companies in the region focused on promoting free trade. He also comments on the multitude of linkages both private and public spanning policies such as Agriculture,

The acknowledgement of PACE, as well as the importance of PNWER, the IMTC, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within Cascadia should probably not be discounted. One of the most effective policy advocates in Cascadia is the Discovery Institute’s Bruce Agnew who directs the organization’s Cascadia Policy Center. Agnew was one of the key leaders who championed the second Amtrak train that was previously mentioned, and continually advocates for cross border regional solutions to growth and transportation challenges. Likewise, staff at the Whatcom Council of Governments who run the IMTC are in constant dialogue with U.S. and Canadian policymakers and how to make the Cascadia corridor infrastructure more efficient and effective. The role of NGOs in Cascadia, and in promoting cross-border collaboration, is extremely important.

Patrick Smith finds even more Cascadia “branding” – as he calls it – when he discusses the efforts made by private, public, and non-profit entities within Cascadia to market the region as one destination as opposed to two-nations, or multiple cities and towns. As he states “This [branding] finds translation in various Cascadia joint ventures – such as Seattle’s efforts to sell the first two-nation Olympic bid, the region’s idea of the ‘two-nation vacation’ or in attempts to sell a regional environmental cleanup
capacity by firms across all Cascadia as a single package within the EU and Asia” (Smith, 2008, 70)

The list of cross-border collaborative efforts in Cascadia is long, and the list of cross-border accomplishments that sprung from these efforts is also lengthy. Fundamentally, the Cascadia region for reasons of history, cultural closeness and political ingenuity foments cross-border cooperation.

Therefore, it is not too far of a stretch to imagine that security planners when preparing for the Olympics found ways to bypass the centralist tendencies inherent in security policy to create a more regionally focused security platform that both countries could operate from to ensure a safe and secure Olympics.

Whether the Olympics case-study is unique in terms of the collaboration over security is a question that requires more attention. Additionally, the 2010 Olympics case is likely not definitive in answering the question of whether federal power is shifting as it relates to local and state governments. Regardless, the process of planning for the Olympics certainly provides a window into the federal/state/local nexus as well as how the U.S. and Canadian governments mitigate interagency complications while also negotiating and cooperating with each other. Because every relevant security actor was involved in the Olympics planning, researchers have an opportunity to review how cross-border collaboration occurred during a very intense planning process. In this case study, there is evidence of fundamental and deep-seeded cooperation on issues that heretofore had not been a primary focus of collaboration – namely security.
Assessments

Cross border collaboration on security issues was notable during the planning for the 2010 Games. It is notable for a number of reasons. First, in the post-9/11 world, the U.S. has been very careful about cooperating on security matters that could lead to complications. The thickening of the U.S.-Canada border by the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks with very little communication or collaboration with their Canadian counterparts is indicative of how the U.S has approached security matters in recent years. Additionally, as previously noted, due to a number of reasons, rightly or wrongly the U.S. does not necessarily fully trust Canadian efforts in securing the Canadian border and is not necessarily convinced of Canada’s commitment to the U.S. vision of global security. The fact that Canada maintains a different immigration regime than does the U.S. and Canada’s decision to not join U.S. efforts in Iraq did not help matters in this regard.

However, it appears that during the planning for the 2010 Games when security threats were perceived to be significant and cross-border coordination was necessary, that both nations joined a bilateral effort to address the situation. In the following few pages, we provide some insight into why this occurred based on what has been discussed in this paper.

Lack of a strong federal leadership role

My first contention is that the lack of a strong federal leadership presence on the U.S. side at the outset played an important role in allowing more cross-border coordination to occur. As pointed out earlier, General Lowenberg organized his Security
Subcommittee in April 2005, and included over 300 representatives from both U.S. and Canadian security agencies. It wasn’t until May 30, 2006 that the U.S. federal government classified the event as a Special Event and initiated the process for selecting a federal coordinator. This gave General Lowenberg’s Security Subcommittee over a year to organize and plan. By the time the Federal government took steps to begin implementing a federal plan, including appointing a Federal coordinator, the wheels of planning were already turning and the Department simply followed the Committee’s lead. In fact, in the DHS Report, there are a number of statements indicating that the federal government’s role in planning for the Games was to provide support for efforts already occurring on the ground in Washington State. While state and local officials continuously argued for a more robust federal presence, particularly in regard to resources, DHS consistently responded that while components would be actively engaged in the planning and CBP would direct efforts specifically at the border, that the Governor of Washington’s 2010 Winter Olympics Task Force, primarily the Security Subcommittee, would be the lead planning group.

Additionally, the DHS refused to fund the U.S. Olympics Coordination Center, instead relying on the Washington State Congressional delegation to earmark funds in the U.S. Congress and the initial Report to Congress was eventually required by Congressional mandate. However, this is not to say that the federal government had no role in planning or preparing for the Games – it did.

In conversations with Bob Derman from General Lowenberg’s staff, he suggested that a fundamental dynamic that plays out between state and federal governments is that federal officials tend to think in shorter time-horizons, while state officials think longer
term. One consistent message from the Governor’s Olympics Task Force, across all subcommittees, was the need for a legacy. This was true with the Security planners as well – particularly during the discussions over the need for an Olympics Coordination Center that could be retained as a functional operations center after the Games were completed. The U.S. federal government did not seek a legacy from the 2010 Winter Games, and because there were Canada’s Games, actually sought to downplay any U.S. legacy related to the Olympics. For this reason, the goals of the two levels of government were different and perhaps this led to more robust planning on the local and state level, and less at the federal.

Whatever the explanation may be, the lack of an early and strong federal leadership role allowed subnational groups like Lowenberg’s Security Subcommittee to fill the void and lead the planning efforts.

The Cascadia Region’s history in cross-border cooperation

If this type of robust cross-border collaboration was going to happen anywhere, it was going to be in the Cascadia region. As both Mark Beaty and Bob Derman noted, security planners in the region simply built off of the work that already existed. Culturally, cross-border cooperation was expected and accepted so the concept for both Canadians and Americans of working together to ensure a successful Games was not a foreign one. This should not be discounted. The infrastructure, including the ties across the border from the Governor’s office to the Premier’s office, from state and local health, transportation, and environmental departments to their Canadian counterparts had already been built and security planners when preparing for the Games simply built upon
that existing infrastructure. Additionally, there was a network of non-governmental organizations in the region supporting collaboration and cooperation including hosting workshops, seminars, delegations, and trade shows with the express purpose of preparing for the Games. While these were Canada’s Games, the whole of the Cascadia region – including Americans south of the 49th parallel – felt there was a role to play to make the Games a success. This is not to say that the private businesses, county tourism departments, or even the state agencies didn’t see this type of effort benefitting them – they did. As an example, it was certainly in the best interest of Canadian planners to collaborate with American planners on their strategies because the border was going to play a key role in the public’s perception of how smoothly the Games went, and the U.S. controlled a large part of the border. One anecdote that was shared during interviews for study came from the Atlanta Games. Before the attack at Centennial Park, one of the main storylines of the Games was the terrible transportation planning. This storyline apparently came from one incident when the bus that had been sent to pick up dozens of journalists covering the Games got stuck in traffic and was late. This type of story was not one the Canadians wanted, particularly in regard to the border.

On the U.S. side, the benefits of the Games in terms of tourism, spillover effects, and increased exposure (to over 3 billion people) were potentially enormous and the U.S. planners were well aware of this going in. While watching NBC television coverage from Washington, DC, the author saw live reports from Bellingham, WA and Blaine, WA.

However, because of previous collaborative efforts, I think those involved in the planning and preparing for the Games in Cascadia had more nuanced and perhaps deeper
understanding of the benefits – even beyond the tangible economic or tourism benefits -- , and a deeper appreciation that anything that benefits their friends and neighbors across the border will eventually benefit them. In the end, a person wants to see their friends succeed – and I think because of decades of collaboration and cooperation, policymakers, advocates, and planners on both sides of the border consider each other friends.

Lastly, it was in each Nation’s interest to collaborate on security matters

Although the U.S. federal government may not have initially understood the opportunities and challenges associated with the 2010 Games in Vancouver, planners on both sides of the border in Cascadia certainly did. On the U.S. side, General Lowenberg rightly recognized that within a few miles of the border were two refineries, a pipeline, a federal border with dozens of high value targets and with 3 billion people watching on television, that there would be cause for concern that terrorists might view the Games as a perfect opportunity to attack. For this reason, he very quickly organized the Security planning infrastructure in Washington State to allow for the U.S. and Canada to coordinate and interface with each other. Simply put, from security perspective, it was in the U.S.’s best interest to cooperate and collaborate across the border.

On the Canadian side, the issue was similar. As seen with the airspace example, the Canadian security umbrella had gaps and, in that particular instance, asked for assistance from U.S. AWACs teams out of Tinker AFB to fill some of those gaps. Leading up to the Games, the Canadians knew they may have had gaps and having the
U.S. on board in a supportive posture but ready to go at a moment’s notice was certainly in their best interest.

In the end, both sides recognized it was better to work together to ensure a successful Games than not, and that collaboration and cooperation increased the chances of a safe and secure Games – something that both sides wanted.

This section concludes by underlining the fact that security collaboration and cooperation between the U.S. and Canada at the regional level is unconventional and certainly outside the normal boundaries of bilateral diplomacy. However, the robust security collaboration during the Olympics could both provide a roadmap on how to move forward with this type of collaboration, and perhaps serve as an instigator for future collaboration.

Lessons Learned

In the months following the Olympics, there has been a good deal of review and discussion about what worked and what didn’t work. Overall, there is a very positive collective feeling about what took place. By the time February 2010 arrived, preparations were completed. Somebody commented to the author that over the 17 days of the Olympics, they didn’t hear a word or see a thing that would indicate a security presence. Although somewhat exaggerated, this impression is exactly what security planners set out to create. When security issues hit the front page is when there are problems.

According to those interviewed that were engaged in the planning, there are some lessons to take away from this process. The following are a few of those suggestions-- most
taken from a presentation given by General Lowenberg following the Olympic Games \textit{(2010 Olympics and Paralympic Games Security Committee, 2010)}:

**Start early** – based on the Security Subcommittee’s experience, it’s important that planners start early. The laws and cross-border protocols and mutual aid agreements that are already in place or need to be codified present challenges and opportunities that take time to align and adjust for events of national significance. U.S. security arrangements for international athletic events outside the United States \textit{(even those within kilometers of the U.S. border)} are led by the U.S. Department of State through the International Athletic Event Security Coordinating Group (IAESCG). Due to the large number of events each year, the IAESCG typically begins planning 12 months prior to each event. By the time the State Department became fully engaged, the WA state-hosted Security Committee had been working for four (4) years and had positively shaped the operating environment for U.S. support of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

**Think Collectively** - Agencies often have a narrow “silo” approach to planning for such events. In complex events, the challenge is to think and plan collectively and to achieve unity of effort on a much larger-than-normal scale.

**Subnational Organization and Leadership is key** -- The neutral State-hosted forum facilitated engagement of federal agencies on both sides of the border. Involvement of principal Canadian officials was also important since triggering events on either side of the border would have impacted both nations.

**Build on what is already there** -- Trust relationships formed through the cross border process. The State/Provincial Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Accord (PNEMA) greatly strengthened bi-national collaboration and allowed for further cooperation.
In the final analysis, a lot of things went right for the planners of the 2010 Olympics Games. Both sides felt like they had a willing partner on the other side of the border who shared the goal of a successful 2010 Winter and Paralympic Games.

One critical element that is sometimes lost in operations as large as the 2010 Olympics is the importance of having the right people at the right positions at the right time. In this particular instance, Mark Beaty as Federal Coordinator and Tim Lowenberg as Adjutant General were critical for moving a collaborative process forward. On the Canadian side, clearly Ward Elcock, who hosted a Washington State delegation in Vancouver as well as travelled to Washington DC three times to brief U.S. officials, recognized the importance of collaboration and helped moved the process through as well.

In the end, these were certainly Canada’s Games but Cascadia shared in their glow and the thousands of men and women on both sides of the border that had a hand in it can claim a small piece of their success.

**Conclusion**

On July 2, 2003 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced it had chosen Vancouver/Whistler, British Columbia, Canada as the host city for the 2010 Winter and Paralympic Games, and nearly seven years later and 3.5 million Canadian mittens sold, the Games came to an end. The amount of planning, the endless meetings and the tired memos are part of the legacy that is left of the 2010 Olympics. However, this case study shows that the planning process for the Games, particularly in terms of security planning, was a unique
process that had no real parallel in the U.S.-Canada relationship before. The combination of a late-arriving federal government on the U.S. side, an active group of subnational leaders, agencies, and organizations and a region with a history of cross-border collaboration led to a notable and laudable cross border security planning process.

Whether this process serves as an instigator for future collaboration between the U.S. and Canada remains to be seen. At minimum, it allowed that everything had been done to ensure a safe and secure Olympic Games.
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