The Americal’s Japanese Americans: An American Tale from the South Pacific

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Author’s Note: I dedicate this to the memory of my father, Lloyd R. Thompson (1926-2021), who died while I was writing this fourth article in my Americal Journal series. I mourn the death of this patriotic World War II enlistee. As I wrote these articles, my father and I returned to the stories he had been telling me for over sixty years about his Army Air Corps experiences (1944-45) and his small part in the vast effort of America’s “Greatest Generation.” Let us hope that the men and women of this generation, some of whom we have met in these articles--Walter Walt, Dale Friend, Peggy Hammer, and now Shigeru Yamashita--never become strangers to future generations of Americans.

Introducing Shigeru Yamashita

The Americans Shigeru Yamashita, Masanori Minamoto, and Iwao Kawashiri were elementary-school students in Japan when Hirohito became emperor in 1926. A decade later, soon after Yamashita graduated from the only high school on the island of Shodoshima, the American Yoshio Noritake started the 1936-37 school year in the nearby city of Okayama, just a short boat ride across the waters of the Inland Sea. During Noritake’s summer vacation of 1937, Japan started its undeclared war with China. Its troops in China, many of whom had embarked from nearby Hiroshima, would eventually number a million. Yamashita’s and Noritake’s high-school friends would be subject to Japanese military conscription after graduation. Not so for the Japanese Americans, yet. But that would change in 1940.

All four of these Americans, along with sixteen million other men, citizens and aliens alike, registered with the Selective Service on 16 October 1940. Roy (Iwao) Kawashiri and Yoshio Noritake had recently turned 21 by that day in 1940, just old enough to be required to register; Yamashita was 22, Minamoto 24. All four, soon “selected” to serve in the U.S. Army, began basic training in 1941. Eighty years ago this fall (2021), Yamashita, Minamoto, Kawashiri, and Noritake were brought together on 1 November 1941 in an empty airplane hangar at Crissy Field to study Japanese. During study breaks they could stretch their legs outside and take in the spectacular view of the recently-completed Golden Gate Bridge. Neither Pearl Harbor nor anti-Japanese war hysteria on the West Coast would disturb their studies.

Five months after the 7 December 1941 Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, these four Americans who had lived in Japan (Kibei) were joined by three other second-generation Japanese Americans with little or no experience in Japan (Nisei),
and sent to join the code-named task forces that had steamed to the South Pacific in the desperate days of January 1942: BOBCAT (Bora Bora) and POPPY (New Caledonia). The need was so urgent that Mas Minamoto went alone to Bora Bora before his classmates had even finished their studies in late April. After hurried visits home for some students, Yamashita, Kawashiri, Noritake, and three Nisei—the “New Caledonia Six”—received their orders at roll call on the morning of 7 May 1942.

On one busy day, the six graduates immediately packed up their belongings at the hangar, headed to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, boarded the new Liberty ship SS Timothy Pickering, and departed for the South Pacific via Long Beach, the former headquarters of America's Pacific Fleet. These soldiers, barrels of high-octane aviation fuel, and steamrollers needed for New Caledonia’s critical new airfields, reached Noumea Harbor on 6 June 1942. They would soon learn that the mysterious “C.O. POPPY” on the envelope they were each handed at Crissy Field on 7 May 1942 was Task Force 6814's General Alexander Patch. The general was now the commanding officer of the week-old Americal Division.

As the Battle of Midway far to the north near Hawaii was ending, the attention of both the Japanese and the Americans would shift once again to the South Pacific, and the line of communication between Hawaii and Australia. The New Caledonia Six were ready. This is their secret tale, known by few on New Caledonia as the Americal Division prepared for the Battle of Guadalcanal.

**A Secret Language School in the Shadow of the Golden Gate**

On the night of 16 October 1940, President Roosevelt addressed the nation, and especially the sixteen million young men, citizens and aliens alike, who just that day had registered for possible training and service in the United States military. He said their acts affirmed their loyalty and were part of America's mobilization for total defense against total war. This act was, the president said, “the keystone in the arch of our national defense.” A month earlier, on the day he signed into law the Selective Training and Service Act, he tied it to a “broadened” concept of citizenship, with equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and now, “equal service.” Roosevelt ended this statement with a vision of military service, that, through the luck of the draw and the power of numbers, would show the rich and poor, those from rural and urban settings—men from all “walks of life”—how to “depend upon” and to “appreciate” each other’s “dignity as American citizens.”

This remarkable effort on 16 October 1940 reached down to over 6,500 localities in America.

It meant, then, that the selection rolls mirrored the diversity of America. For the Japanese American citizens on the West Coast, rigorous statistical equity meant that selection letters went out to them too. As long as they were twenty-one to thirty-five years old, even young men of Japanese ancestry born in Japan—aliens—could receive selection letters.

This meant, in the summer of 1941, as the training of America’s growing peace-time army included great nation-wide maneuvers, officers could consult new personnel rosters and identify about 1,300 Japanese Americans from the continental United States now serving in the U.S. Army. From this pool, they hoped, they could find soldiers who could read and speak Japanese and send these select few to a planned Japanese-language school at the Presidio in San Francisco.

The officers were disappointed to discover how poor the language skills of the second-generation American citizens—Nisei—were. Only ten percent seemed viable as students, and many who made the first cut were struck off the list because of security or other concerns. In the end, after a four-month search from July to October in 1941, the Army selected fifty-eight Nisei soldiers for the language school. Of this select group, only a special sub-category of Nisei, the Kibei who were born in America but educated in Japan, were qualified to be in the A-1 class of 15 at the Presidio. But the Army had its first classes of differing abilities for its new language school. (Of the ten Caucasian officers, only two older Reserve officers who had lived in Japan as children—John Burden and David Swift—would graduate with the forty Nisei students who passed the course of study.)

This was a significant achievement of the U.S. Army. The power of numbers, and statistical control, had made it possible to quickly compile selection lists. Because about 110,000 people of Japanese
ancestry lived on the West Coast, inevitably, when the numbers were crunched, there would be a small but representative pool of young Japanese American male citizens and aliens called to service. And given that there was scant interest and opportunity for white Americans to study Japanese in the 1920s and 1930s, it was fortuitous that some immigrant families had sent their young Japanese American children to relatives in Japan to live and study. America was very lucky.

Shigeru Yamashita, who is at the center of the photograph on the cover of this issue of the Americal Journal, was one of these Japanese Americans. In 1921, his immigrant grandparents took the toddler Shigeru and his older sister back to the family’s farm on the poor island of Shodoshima, across the Inland Sea from Okayama. His grandparents soon died, but Shigeru’s struggling immigrant parents farming in Nevada could not afford to send for their children, stranded and now essentially orphaned in Japan. But Yamashita persevered, and graduated from Shodoshima’s only high school in 1936. Earning passage home to America after a year’s work in Kobe, Yamashita was reunited with his parents in Nevada in 1937. He learned enough English to graduate a second time in 1939, this time from Moapa Valley High School in Overton, Nevada. He was working in Los Angeles in 1940, improving his English-language skills, when President Roosevelt addressed his generation of young Americans on the evening of 16 October.

Like many American men, Shigeru Yamashita took his chances. But he was one of the five percent of the sixteen million men the president had said would be selected. His letter, like Walter Walt’s, came from a local board in Los Angeles in 1941. The Army soon discovered Yamashita’s Japanese-language abilities, and he was one of the fifteen students selected for the A-1 class at the Presidio on 1 November 1941.

This was a novel undertaking by U. S Army—the Navy, by contrast, focused its attention on Caucasians only, who were taught by contract teachers hired at universities with established Asian studies programs—and in November 1941, the curious commanding officer of the 4th Army, General John DeWitt, left his office at the Presidio and came by the abandoned aircraft hangar at Crissy Field that served as both classrooms and living quarters. General DeWitt quietly slipped into the A-1 class and sat for a few minutes in an empty chair among the students. Before leaving, he spoke a few words of encouragement to Roy Kawashiri, the Japanese American soldier sitting in front of him.

By the time Shigeru Yamashita and his classmates graduated on 1 May 1942, with America at war with Japan, war hysteria had led to the evacuation and eventual internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast, and given rise to “Fifth Column” suspicions even within the ranks of the U.S. Army. Yamashita and his fellow classmates would have had good reason to comment cynically on President Roosevelt’s lofty 1940 words of equality and loyalty.

But in a yearbook-style set of entries made by Yamashita and his classmates in April 1942, as classes were wrapping up, almost all students—Kibei, Nisei, and Caucasians alike—signed. There was no apparent cynicism in the few substantive entries. One student wrote to “Mas” (Masami) Maeda: “We have the chance to show our duty to the United States. As Nisei let’s beat our enemy wherever they might be. Our task is none too great. Carry on. Fellow American, Hiro Oyama.” Another student, Masaru Ariyasu, who would go to New Caledonia with Shigeru Yamashita, becoming a life-long friend and a fellow recipient of the Legion of Merit in 1997, wrote: “Let’s beat Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler.” Kaye Sakamoto wrote on 24 April 1942: “Let’s give ‘em hell.” (Caucasian students in the Crissy Field Japanese-language classes also signed the “yearbook.” Faubion Bowers—who wrote “With best wishes” to Mas Maeda—was destined to restore, at General Douglas MacArthur’s September 1945 order, the United States Embassy in a devastated Tokyo to its pre-war splendor.) Duty still called; the Japanese American soldiers at Crissy Field were still answering.

Five Generals: Principles and Pragmatism in War

In the mid-1930s, the U.S. Army’s best and brightest studying at the most selective post-graduate school in America, the Army War College, had factored in Japanese Americans in their “war games.” By 1937, the students’ daily routine included studying and
reporting on all world events: military, diplomatic, political, economic, and social. In their study of a two-front war in Europe and the Pacific, the students, when assessing the home front, were much less concerned in 1937 about the loyalty of those with ancestral roots to Germany and Italy than those with ties to Japan. They were most concerned about the Japanese in “California, Hawaii, and the Philippines.” One student, in these empirically-rich studies, noted that in Hawaii forty percent of the population were Japanese immigrants or their descendants.

Why were these bright, well-informed, and capable mid-career Army officers more concerned about the loyalty of Japanese than any other ethnic group in America? The answer thought the most likely by the foremost scholar of the Army War College: “Racism, pure and simple.” These students would go on to high-level staff positions at the War Department and wherever else the Army was active. They would be staff officers as America prepared for war in 1941, and went to war in 1942. They would remember, these one-time students in the mid-1930s, that they had decided it would be easier to mobilize Americans to fight against Japan than European powers.

And yet the U.S. Army generals who could be advised by these men responded to the crises of 1941-42 in nuanced and varied ways with respect to Japanese Americans. Five generals—Marshall, DeWitt, Emmons, Patch, and Harmon—made pragmatic, principled, and nuanced decisions.

General John L. DeWitt, who had sat in on a Japanese-language class at Crissy Field before Pearl Harbor, had the greatest responsibility as he commanded the 4th Army and its defense of America’s West Coast. It was General DeWitt, on the basis he said of “military necessity,” who decided citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry must be removed from the coastal zone to the interior. This led, eventually, to President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 of 19 February 1942 and the forced evacuation of over 110,000 West Coast Japanese to “war relocation camps.” Anti-Japanese war hysteria continued to characterize some in the civilian population for which General DeWitt was responsible.

In the American territory of Hawaii, where Army War College students had noted the forty percent population figure, General Delos C. Emmons could not follow General Dewitt’s approach. While he had more power over Hawaii’s civilian population, put under martial law on the day of the Japanese attack, General Emmons had no choice but to keep Hawaii’s economy going with Japanese labor.

Meanwhile, in the South Pacific, General Alexander M. Patch had a much smaller population of Japanese under his control in the French colony of New Caledonia. There were more than a thousand Japanese, mostly men, on New Caledonia. (Caucasians numbered about 17,000 in 1941.) Patch could read in the January 1942 “Survey of New Caledonia” written by a recent Harvard Ph.D. in French history who worked for President Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Information, William Donovan, that in 1936 about five hundred Japanese worked in mining and industry, with an equal number working in agriculture, as merchants, and as artisans. There was a potential, Patch could infer from this report, for a Japanese presence throughout New Caledonia. Thus, as Patch surveyed the scene in March 1942 when he arrived at Noumea, New Caledonia’s capital, the need for soldiers with Japanese-language capabilities for counter-intelligence work was apparent. Like BOBCAT’s commander, POPPY’s commanding officer would soon receive a few of the students at Crissy Field scheduled to graduate on 1 May 1942.

But neither the BOBCAT nor POPPY task forces could have called for this talent without the intervention of the Army’s Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. As Patch was settling in to his New Caledonia command in late March 1942, war hysteria in the United States had not subsided. Japanese Americans selected and inducted for training and service in the U.S. Army in 1941 were shipped to bases in the Midwest and elsewhere, some were put to menial tasks, and others were discharged. After the War Department insisted it would no longer accept Japanese Americans for induction, the Selective Service instructed local boards to re-classify the Japanese Americans on their lists. The category often selected—IV-C—had been in use for enemy aliens unfit for service. And no Japanese American still in uniform could be deployed overseas.

Colonel Kai Rasmussen, the Japanese-speaking Dane so pivotal in the Crissy Field language school,
and his supervisors in the War Department, sounded the alarm. While they could not stop General DeWitt from shutting down their Crissy Field School after the first classes graduated on 1 May 1942, they worked on a re-location plan, and they argued that their students must be given overseas assignments to the Pacific Theater. Within days of General Marshall’s receipt of a 3 April 1942 memo from the Military Intelligence Division, his office waived the no-overseas-assignment rule and authorized the school’s relocation. In General Marshall, Colonel Rasmussen had an advocate who knew Asia and who knew how important foreign-language skills could be for Army officers overseas. Stationed in China in the 1920s, the young George Marshall had picked up enough spoken Chinese to use it professionally. He needed no persuasion in 1942.

By 8 April, orders were cut for the school’s relocation and for the dispatch of new Crissy Field graduates to BOBCAT, POPPY, and to the Aleutian Islands in the American territory of Alaska. These first three contingents (eleven graduates) of Japanese American enlisted men were the pioneers. The largest group went to New Caledonia. General Patch put them to work immediately after their 6 June 1942 arrival at Noumea. By the end of July, General Millard F. Harmon, our final general in this sketch of the variety of ways in which Army generals responded to the Japanese Problem, took stock of his small contingent of six Japanese American linguists under his newly-established command: the United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area. General Harmon would know, unlike the men themselves, that their skills would soon be needed as the United States military took on the Japanese at Guadalcanal. (Almost two years later, General Harmon still remembered “the great and immediate tactical value” of POW interrogations and the “skillful translations of Japanese documents, maps, and code books” in his letter of commendation to Shigeru Yamashita for his outstanding service in the Americal Division’s Guadalcanal and Bougainville campaigns.)

America’s response to Japanese Americans in a time of war was multi-faceted.

**New Caledonia’s Japanese Americans, North Dakotans, and the Battle of Guadalcanal**

Japan’s devastating losses in early June 1942 at the Battle of Midway—four aircraft carriers—diminished the likelihood of the Japanese carrying out their planned invasion of New Caledonia. At the least, they soon postponed it to July and then, as American and Japanese attention shifted to Guadalcanal in July, they abandoned it altogether. As the Navy and Marines prepared for the invasion of Guadalcanal, General Patch, the Task Force 6814 commander now leading the new Americal Division, continued training activities for his three Regimental Combat Teams. And he tried to put the New Caledonia Six to work.

Patch posted them to the new Advanced Command Post at Paita, about eleven miles northwest of Noumea, slightly inland from the island’s west coast. The Japanese linguists soon had a tent office with a new wooden work table and an area for their dictionaries and files. Counter-intelligence tasks awaited them as the papers, documents, and ephemera of Japanese life on New Caledonia were reviewed. As this work continued into early July, General Patch, having repaired the fraught relationship with General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French representatives, put on a traditional July 4th parade in Noumea. The band of Massachusetts’ 101st Medical Regiment (Walter Walt’s unit) led some of the men from the Rifle Company, and the Heavy Weapons Company, of North Dakota’s 164th Infantry Regiment’s 3rd Battalion at the head of the parade. The local New Caledonia militia brought up the rear as the troops were reviewed by General

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Patch and High Commissioner of France in the Pacific Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu in front of the Hotel du Pacifique, now serving as the headquarters for Patch’s American forces. The people of Noumea lined the parade route. Little did the American men on parade know that some of them were destined to play pivotal roles in the desperate battles to hold on to Guadalcanal in October and November.

It is unlikely that any of the men of the New Caledonia Six saw the parade, but they too would, even sooner, make key contributions to the Guadalcanal campaign. The attempt to take the almost-completed Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal began on 7 August. There was no resistance on Guadalcanal, but across Sealark Channel the Marines faced fierce resistance at Tulagi, which had been the administrative center for the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. Soon a vast amount of captured Japanese materials—orders, diaries, and other documents—was being sent to Noumea.

Although the details are obscure, a Japanese navy codebook soon made it to New Caledonia and became the object of a crash translation effort by the New Caledonia Six. We do not know what they were working on, but the U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph taken on 30 August 1942 shows half of them at work. The men could also soon begin interrogating Japanese POWs from Guadalcanal and Tulagi; on 18 September the Navy evacuated 162 wounded Marines and eight POWs. (The POW stockade was located at Paita; a Signal Corps photographer caught a group of soldiers on break at their “guard mess hall” on 2 October 1942.)

As this work of the New Caledonia Six continued in September, it became clear that neither the Japanese nor the Americans had assessed accurately their enemy’s intentions in the southern Solomons. As both sides soon discovered, the Japanese position to the north at Rabaul in New Britain was a prime target for the Allies. Its successful defense by the Japanese against a “reduction” by the Allies would turn on who won the Battle of Guadalcanal.

It was a battle of logistics: Which side could get the men, weapons, ammunition, and supplies to the island in sufficient quantities to win? As the stalemate stretched into late September, malaria was beginning to enervate the Marines and diminish their battle effectiveness. This scourge had appeared in late August; in October it would send ten percent of the Marines on Guadalcanal to Navy tent hospitals. The big Japanese push to defeat the United States was
scheduled for October.

Signs were ominous enough in September that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the vast “Pacific Ocean Area,” and who had overall control of the Guadalcanal campaign, decided to leave Pearl Harbor and see for himself what was going on in the South Pacific. In an extraordinary series of high-level command meetings held on land at Noumea in the residence of General Patch, who had commandeered the elegant home of the Japanese consul in Noumea, and on Noumea Harbor on the USS Argonne, the flagship of Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander of the South Pacific Area and the South Pacific Force, critical decisions were made in late September and early October. Attendees at meetings included Admiral Nimitz, Admiral John McCain, General Harmon, representatives from Australia dispatched by General MacArthur, and from Washington, D.C., even General Henry Arnold, the head of the Army Air Forces who, like Nimitz, was touring the South Pacific.

The situation was bleak for the Marines on Guadalcanal, but also for the Navy ships that were part of the battle. The Japanese Navy controlled the night and could reinforce and re-supply at will. And a few weeks before these high-level conferences, the Navy had lost the aircraft carrier USS Wasp, leaving Admiral Ghormley with only one aircraft carrier to deploy in the South Pacific. Nimitz, who had welcomed Admiral William F. Halsey back to Pearl Harbor from his stateside convalescence in early September, rushed the repairs on Halsey’s flagship, the USS Enterprise, for a quick return to the South Pacific. But the aircraft carrier would not be ready to leave Pearl Harbor until 18 October.

It was clear the Marines desperately needed reinforcements. But who? As we shall see, after all the possibilities were reviewed, and the emergency timing assessed, the answer was a very, very local one.

Nimitz, who had just completed very quick inspections of U.S. forces at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, and on Guadalcanal, convened a 2 October 1942 meeting at Patch’s Noumea residence with Patch, Harmon, and Ghormley. These four men reported directly, or almost directly, to their respective service heads in Washington, D.C: General Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations. Patch, who had briefed Nimitz a few days earlier, would probably have reminded Nimitz of the Americal’s September re-organization that put General Edmund B. Sebree at the head of its new Mobile Command.

AsNimitz returned to Pearl Harbor decision-making continued in the South Pacific. In an extraordinary SECRET dissent written on 6 October 1942, General Harmon argued in the direst of terms that Admiral Gormley must focus on the Battle of Guadalcanal: Henderson Field must be developed, Army reinforcements must be sent, and the Navy must step up its actions in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal. Harmon’s alarm won the day. On 8 October 1942,
Harmon and his chief of staff General Nathan F. Twining. Ghormley's chief of staff and personal friend of President Roosevelt, Admiral Daniel Callaghan, Ghormley's planning officer General Dewitt Beck, General Patch, and the head of the Americal's Mobile Command, General Sebree, met for a final time at Patch's residence.

The next day the men and supplies of North Dakota's 164th Infantry Regiment were loaded on the USS McCawley, the flagship of Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Commander of the Amphibious Forces of the South Pacific Force. They were ready for inspection, wearing their just-issued World War II-style helmets, by Admiral Ghormley, General Harmon, and General Patch on the morning of 10 October 1942. The Army's reinforcements--2,852 men strong--were soon on their way to Guadalcanal, escorted and covered by a flotilla of fifteen ships (cruisers, destroyers, and mine-layers). The Signal Corps photograph caption written later described and captured the significance of this moment: “The first joint offensive action of Army, Navy and Marine forces was placed under Navy command to be used to reinforce Marines in the Solomon Islands.”

By 13 October the men were on the beaches at Guadalcanal, about to experience, with the Marines, the fiercest Japanese bombardment to date of the embattled forces defending Henderson Field. On land, Japanese forces were maneuvering to attack the field from the south. The battle lines on land and sea were being drawn by the night of “The Bombardment,”

*The author enlisted in the U.S. Air Force (1970-74) and served a tour of duty in northern Thailand in 1973. He teaches Chinese history and “WWII: The Pacific War” at Western Washington University. He thanks Cheryl Yamashita for sharing with him the story of her family, especially her father Shigeru's personal history and his papers. He also thanks Rosalyn Tonai, Executive Director of the National Japanese American Historical Society, for introducing him to Cheryl. The society published First Class: Nisei Linguists in World War II (2008) by Dr. David W. Swift, Jr. Dr. Swift's assiduous research documented the personal histories of the first graduating classes of Japanese-language experts, including his father, who studied at Crissy Field in 1941-42.