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Common images and representations of combatants and criminals are usually presented as men. Gang members, vigilantes, revolutionaries, and soldiers have a male identity in most mainstream depictions. Through this, violence itself has come to be associated with masculine traits and masculine actors. Academic scholarship, education, and advertising follow suit. These media and cultural influences portray *men* as the primary agents in exercising violence to seek their goals and establish power over societies. Simultaneously, when imagining victims of such violence, we often create images of women: weak, debilitated, and powerless to change. But this is not always the truth.

However common it may be for women to be victims of collective violence, the prevalence of literature depicting this victimization outweighs the depiction of women as agents in collected movements that utilize physical force. Still, women's agency-- both in forming and participating in collective violence-- does exist with a myriad of methods and motivations, and women's agency in movements for change is continually represented as non-violent, as women are continually depicted as victimized pawns of war in masculine games of political power (Viterna, 2013; Cohen, 2016). Though not common in literature, women have frequently taken it upon themselves to form collective movements to address their grievances with society and their discontent within it. To demand change, and when the motivations of the group are strong enough, the methods through which women may achieve political representation will not stop short of violence.

Collective alternatives, such as collective action and violence, shed light on human interaction. However, a focus on the gendering of such interactions lacks substantial consideration of the motivational factors and various forms through which women carry out collective violence movements. Although there are common and popular theories of collective violence, the presentations of these theories have-- in historical and contemporary instances-- focused on the

role of men as the sole agents in the formation of and participation in collective violence movements. While there are countless instances in which men play the primary role within these movements, the lack of consideration of the influence and membership of or instigation by women continues to limit general definitions and understandings of the many forms in which collective violence can manifest itself.

Within current classifications of collective violence movements, there are varying degrees of political association and diverging methods of violence. As will be shown, women do engage as agents in collective violence, but it seems as though the likelihood of women's formation of versus participation in a movement varies in accordance with women's perceptions and prioritization of status discontent. Still, despite men being commonly depicted as the protagonists of these movements, theories of revolutions, vigilantism, and authoritarianism help provide a foundation for a broader understanding of how and why *women* engage in violence as a collective. From such offerings, four clear classifications of women's collective violence can be established along a spectrum that encompasses the growing tendency to exercise violence within two main dimensions of (1) ideology, and (2) degree of institutionalization. Such classifications emerge from the following case studies: women in support of the 1964 military dictatorship in Brazil; the O'odua People's Congress among the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria; the Gulabi Gang in Uttar Pradesh, India; and the role of women in the Nicaraguan Revolution.

By analyzing the 'input' political and societal conditions that characterize these case studies, this essay will construct a clear system of classification for how and why certain 'input' conditions of status discontent result in 'outputs' of (1) feminist revolutionary movements, (2) pre-political progressive vigilantism, (3) pre-political traditional vigilantism, and (4) authoritarian support. Such 'outputs' will indicate the degree of institutional reform, changes in the societal

status quo, and varying levels of violence committed by women as simultaneously derived from scholarship theorizing social movements, revolutions, vigilantism, and authoritarian support.

However complex this theoretical foundation may be to lay, it is both appropriate and necessary to consider the societal and political influence of women through acts of collective violence. As contemporary scholarship neglects a profound examination of women's roles in these movements, one must wonder why this is the case, what its implications are, and, perhaps most importantly, what does women's collective violence mean for changes in not only traditional gender and societal roles, but how might it contribute toward a more equal and equitable future?

The Power of Status Discontent

While much academic literature outlines women's tendencies as agents within social movements or other forms of protest, there continues to be a gap in a profound recognition of women's agency in movements of a violent nature. Although traditional and broadly accepted definitions and characterizations of vigilantism, revolutions, and authoritarian support commonly fail to recognize women, their offerings will ultimately facilitate the construction of a framework for understanding the role of women in collective violence that mirror these three classifications of such. Additionally, recognizing the motivational factors of women participating in and forming non-violent social movements is conducive to considering women's motivations for engaging in collective violence.

To examine the conditions and characteristics of women's collective violence, considering theories of women's collective action is crucial. Commonly, this collective action has been illustrated in the form of women's social movements. Jennifer Somerville (1997) argues that these female-driven movements often develop from an overwhelming sense of status discontent within society due to the inequalities between men and women and the societal role of the woman as the

nucleus of the family, and therefore her restriction to non-professional life. While various attempts to ameliorate this status discontent have been pervasive, Somerville (1997) argues that, in the context of the United States and the United Kingdom, women who participated in *any* social movement for female advancement tended to look favorably upon "feminist objectives, such as equal opportunities in education, employment, pay, [and] public office" (p. 684). However, due to dissenting opinions on other female concerns, Somerville (1997) argues that the lack of clarity of the interests of women concerning status discontent has also hindered the development of one central women's social movement that agrees on both motivation and method. Still, there has been opportunity for the development of political organization through governmental representation within political parties. These interests and methods of representation of concerns also help to determine how social movements are shaped by the cultural and historical contexts of the community from which they derive (Somerville, 1997).

Similar to Somerville (1997), Helen Icka Safa (1990) writes about women's social movements in the Latin American context. Safa (1990) characterizes the Latin American women's movements as prioritizing redefinition and transformation of "their domestic role from one of private nurturance to one of collective, public protest, and in this way challenging the seclusion of women into the private sphere of the family" (p. 355). While this characterization parallels with movements in the United States and the United Kingdom, women's movements in Latin America have tended to shy away from traditional political avenues of representation, as many of the movements formed during periods of authoritarian rule that thwarted opportunities for legitimate mobilization in political institutions (Safa, 1990). Additionally, and further contrasting from Somerville (1997), Safa (1990) emphasizes that women's identities as mothers and wives fuel their collective consolidation and demand for change, as their appeals to the state focus on basic

necessities for improved standards of living that most directly affect domestic life and the family, and therefore the woman (Safa, 1990).

In their theories of women's social movements, Somerville (1997) and Safa (1990) present the movements' motivational factors as deriving from a shared status discontent with the identity of being a woman. While often taking intersectional concerns of women (class, race, ethnicity, religion, etc.) into the interest of the movement, the collective is formed with a shared sense of discontent as women rather than as their other identities. This is not to restrict women from representing the interests of-- or even prioritizing-- their other identities. However, for a *progressive* collective movement of women to form, I argue that women believe their status discontent to derive primarily from their dissatisfaction with the societal expectations of women, which is perceived to influence dissatisfaction with their other identities.

However, as will be shown in this paper, women's movements do not always represent a progressive association in line with feminism.[1] Extrapolating from the argument of status discontent, it appears that conservative women's movements do *not* believe their identity *solely* as women to outweigh or serve as the primary cause of their status discontent, but they may be more likely to believe that their discontent-- or potential discontent-- derives from identities that they possess because they are women-- such as their being mothers, their role as community members, etc.[2] Instead, conservative women find a place in pre-existing organizations or institutions that are

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[1] Feminism is "the theory of the political, economic, and social equality of the sexes" (Feminism).

[2] It is important to note that this paper does not intend to separate the identities of "woman" from that of "mother," "community member," "religious affiliation," "heteronormativity," etc. The interrelationship between women and the social, political, regional, and historical determinants of their co-constitution or mutual constitution with these generally inherent identities of the woman varies within the societal context of each case study presented, and within those not discussed in this paper. Within this argument, the inherent identities of women are distinguished from the identity of 'woman' not in any attempt to separate these identities, but to reflect a different prioritization of collectivization due to discontent *as* women with an intention of perceived progress *for* the identity of the woman within society, *or* collectivization due to a shared discontent or potential discontent *with* other women and *as* women, but with a prioritization of perceived progress *for* the identity or identities that women inherently possess (their being mothers, community members, etc.)

most generally comprised of a majority of men. In these, women tend to become participants in movements that combat different, shared discontent and does not explicitly seek to reform the societal role of women for the sake of womanhood.

Additionally, Somerville (1997) and Safa (1990) primarily focus on women as agents within *non-violent* movements, and many theories of collective violence lack a considerable focus on the role of women. However, instances in which the role of women *is* included are characterized by a lack of their agency, and women are commonly depicted as supportive participants, spectators, or victims of violence rather than instigators of violence or aggression. This depiction is not always inaccurate, but it neglects to recognize instances in which women are primary participants in pre-existing groups or are agents in the formation of collective violence movements.

Collective Violence as a Foundation

As social movements present instances of non-violent demonstrations for change, their violent counterparts are oftentimes manifested in the form of a revolution. James DeFronzo (2015) defines revolution as "a social movement in which participants strive to drastically alter or totally replace existing social, economic, or political institutions" (p. 10). Although sometimes non-violent, DeFronzo (2015) also highlights that most revolutions, when successful, have utilized violence to some degree, and separates the tendencies of left-wing and right-wing movements. A left-wing revolution intends to reform the standing political, social, or economic structure of the larger society, while a right-wing revolution will aim to restore traditional institutions within society, and will prioritize traditional authority over social equality (DeFronzo, 2015). However universal a definition of revolutions like DeFronzo's (2015) may be, there seems to be a lack of gendered consideration of revolutionary movements which focuses on theoretical assertions regarding the agency of men versus women. Still, these definitions do facilitate the possibility of

connecting revolutions to the theoretical arguments of women's social movements and status discontent, offered by Somerville (1997) and Safa (1990), to construct a rationale for women's revolutionary movements, as will be presented later.

Similar to right-wing revolutionary movements, assertions on right-wing political ideologies provide insight from which to extrapolate further understanding for women's support for right-wing authoritarian regimes. Paola Bacchetta and Margaret Power (2002) provide analysis on women's support for right-wing political ideology, and pose that a majority of male and mixed-gender movements tend to believe that the dominant figure and agent within society should be male. While this belief is predominant in many right-wing ideologies, there exists a divergence in the perceptions of women's involvement in that women tend to see their role as more integral than do men (Bacchetta & Power, 2002). Additionally, Bacchetta and Power (2002) offer that these movements-- and especially the women supporting them-- believe in complementarity of the sexes within three possible classifications: (1) women and men are different but equal; (2) woman should subordinate to the man; and (3) women subordinating to men *is* equality. The prioritization of identities for these women highlights the importance of their roles as mothers, the conceptualization of the heteronormative family as the ideal model for not only the progress of society through reproduction, but also for facilitating the societal positions of both women and men, and the construction and denouncement of the 'Other' (Bacchetta & Power, 2002).

Both men and women in right-wing movements construct the presence of the Other as a classification designated to those identities that pose a threat or are contradictory to the values of the right-wing ideology. While these Others are designated to myriad identities, the general characteristics of the Other woman simultaneously and dichotomously characterize right-wing women. Bacchetta and Power (2002) describe the othered women as those "who threaten the

integrity of right-wing women's heteronormative family, 'race,' society, religious community, or nation" (p. 9). This description offers an intersectional consideration in that it implies that right-wing women rely to some extent on their racial, societal, religious, or national identity concurrently with their identity as a woman. However, extrapolating from the theoretical offering that right-wing movements often have ideologies that emphasize the subordination of women and dominance of men, it seems as though right-wing women prioritize the status discontent of their heterosexual, racial, societal, religious, or national identities rather than of their identity as a woman.

While revolutions and authoritarian regimes tend to be characterized by either progressive reformation of societal, political, or economic status quo and institutions or the authoritative preservation of the conservative traditions of such, vigilantism offers another, less reformative form of collective violence. Offering substantial insight on vigilantism, H. Jon Rosenbuam and Peter C. Sederberg (1976) define vigilantism as a movement that "consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion" (p. 4). While Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976) recognize the goal of the vigilante group to maintain the social status quo through means of aggression and protection, they also offer three types of vigilantism and their motivations: (1) crime control, (2) social-group control, and (3) regime control (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1976).

The first type of vigilantism, crime control, is claimed to be common when government capacity is low and criminal activity is unable to be prosecuted. The second type of vigilantism, social-group control, "...may be roughly distinguished according to whether the identity of the target group ... [shares] a primordial characteristic such as race, religion, caste, tribe, and the like..." (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1976, p. 12). The classification of social-group control is often

characterized by the goal of relative upward mobility of a low-ranked social group. Regime control, however, is intended to upset a regime's intentions to redefine a society's status quo and political and social order (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1976). While the authors present a general framework for the classification of vigilante activity, their offerings will provide considerable insight and framing for the consideration of women's acts of collective violence.

Although Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976) highlight the many forms that vigilante activity can take through providing these three types of vigilantism, the authors give little recognition to the agency-- or even presence-- of women in their framework. Crime control, social-group control, and regime control vigilantism will provide lenses through which a women's framework can be constructed. However, the structure that will be presented will extrapolate from the three-group layout of Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976), and, along with the assertions above on revolutionary movements and right-wing authoritarianism, will comprise a theoretical model that defines each of these movements of collective violence through examining the agency of women within them.

Categorizing Collective Violence

The above frameworks of violence all present arguments rooted in the shared sentiment of status discontent among groups of women. The differences that will be proposed, however, are the prioritization of identities that women possess as an indication of progressive or conservative association, the influence of an internal versus external societal threat, and the level of institutional reform or change that the collective seeks to achieve. While these different variables will be considered 'input' conditions that will be evaluated within each case study, and the 'outputs' of each case study will be a reflection of each form of women's collective violence. These outputs will be further situated within a spectrum of classification based on the following characteristics

of the respective movements: (1) the degree of progressive versus conservative political association, (2) the likelihood of formation of versus participation in a movement of collective violence, and (3) the degree of women's agency in the exercise of collective violence.

The categories into which these outputs will be sorted are classified as (1) right-wing authoritarian support, (2) pre-political traditional vigilantism, (3) pre-political progressive vigilantism, and (4) a left-wing revolutionary movement with some feminist values. Within the category of right-wing authoritarian support, the outputs will generally be strong conservative political association, women participating in a pre-existing movement that is not explicitly for women or by women, and very little women's agency in the exercise of collective violence. Situated close to the 'static center'-- characterized by degrees of status discontent that would not result in movements of collective violence-- is pre-political traditional vigilantism in which the outputs are characterized by a conservative-leaning political association that is less extreme than that of right-wing authoritarian support, women participating in a pre-existing movement, and little agency in exercising violence.

With more progressive tendencies, pre-political vigilantism encompasses movements formed by women in which there is little political association, but the movement itself poses progressive tendencies relative to the larger society, and agency in exercising violence, though non-violent methods of addressing status discontent are very common or even preferred. Most progressive among the categories is left-wing revolutionary movement, which would be represented by strong progressive political association, the formation of the movement itself by women and for women's interests, and a very high degree of agency in the exercise of violence. Even though a left-wing feminist revolutionary movement with these characteristics is not

represented in literature, the case study examined will serve as a window into the likely attributes

and probability of such a movement.

Visually represented, Figure 1 presents the framework of the categories upon which the

case studies will build.

Figure 1: *Categorical spectrum of women's collective violence.*

Figure 2 provides an alternative visual representation of the classification of case studies as derived

from their degree of institutionalization, ideological association, and agency in violence.

Degree of Agency in Violence

High   Low

Feminist Revolutionary Movement	Authoritarian Support
Pre-Political Progressive Vigilantism	Pre-Political Traditional Vigilantism

High

Degree of Institutionalization

Low

Left   Right

Figure 2: *Condensed table reflecting categories of collective violence.*

Women's Participation: Authoritarian Support for Right-Wing Political Movements

A strong example of women's support for collective violence is the Brazilian military dictatorship, which transformed the political conditions within the country. In 1964, a military-led coup d'état toppled the left-leaning government of João Goulart, and a 21-year succession of military regimes governed Brazil. As the coup was influenced by Goulart's inability to develop a strong economy and the mobilization of lower classes for a radical socio-economic shift in line with left-wing values, the military regime consolidated power into the executive and began reforming political rights, ultimately leading to the abolition of all political parties except for a pro-government party and a weak opposition party (Skidmore, Smith, & Green, 2014).

One central aspect of the military regime was the high rate of state repression against political opponents and of state killings and kidnappings. While Brazil's government has experienced adversity in collecting data on the number of people killed and kidnapped by the military regime, the National Truth Commission (CNV) was able to confirm 434 victims of the

state during the regime and found "377 public agents responsible for crimes such as kidnapping, torture, murder, and hiding corpses" (Canofre, 2016, p. 99). These political opponents targeted were often communist-leaning Brazilians, and the military regime and its supporters heavily resisted and denounced communist sentiments (Céspedes, 2015).

Throughout the rule of the military regime, there was considerable support from women for preserving the traditional values and denouncing the opposition parties. According to María Stella Toro Céspedes (2015), women who supported the regime prioritized their inherent identities as mothers and the protection of their families from the perceived risk posed by leftist values. With these interests, many women looked to the preservation of these identities within the conservative military dictatorship that sought to return the country to its traditional values (Céspedes, 2015).

Concurrently with the gravitation of many women toward the traditional values of the regime due to their prioritized identities as mothers within the heteronormative family was the development of programs under the military regime that provided support to women in their domestic roles. Similarly, anti-communist civil societies were established, and women soon made up many members and leaders within these societies, therefore expressing their support for the regime overall and their stronger denunciation of the left (Céspedes, 2015). At the same time, women often felt excluded from the left due to its focus on consolidating workers-- who were primarily men-- and representing workers' interests that did not coincide with the interests of right-wing women.

Before the 1964 coup, Brazilian women had established the Campanha de Mulher pela Democracia (CAMDE) in 1962, which cited its concerns of communist influence within Brazil and the risk it posed to their families, their religion, and their nation. Although CAMDE's ideological association was in line with that of the military government, it formed its path in a

slightly different direction-- that of representing women's interests within the larger conservative political landscape. CAMDE women participated in protests and petitions to the Goulart government, and, while the leaders were generally from wealthier classes, their influence did reach women in other classes that shared the same prioritization of identity interests (Céspedes, 2015).

In the formation of CAMDE, the founding women recognized that the contemporary political climate in Brazil just prior to the coup was conducive to the participation of women because men were more willing to consider their demands and ideas within the political arena. After the coup, CAMDE continued to operate in support of women's conservative interests, and women continued to find social and political organizations in which to participate that supported the political leaning of the military regime. CAMDE was able to spread across the country, membership increased considerably, and, in March of 1964, a march of between 500,000 and 800,000 women-- both religious and non-religious, and both members of CAMDE and not-- expressed a cohesive statement to the Goulart government that the women were ready for political change and heavily valued the protection from communism of their families and their Catholicism, and, above all, their country (Céspedes, 2015).

Drawing from the experiences of CAMDE and other women understanding that their values aligned with those of the conservative movement and eventually the military coup, it becomes evident that the right-wing women in Brazil believed that their status discontent in relation to their motherhood and religiosity *as women* outweighed their status discontent solely as women. These women saw the conservative values of the military regime as conducive to accomplishing the concerns they had with their prioritized identities, and they used the institutional sway that they had in the form of a social movement to situate themselves in line with the values of the right-wing movement. As political repression was incredibly common under the

authoritarian military regime, women furthered that repression within both the social realm through their accumulating a mass of women advocating to ameliorate their status discontent with their non-woman identities, and the political realm through their participation in the anti-communist efforts of the regime.

Ultimately, women's support of the 1964 military regime in Brazil seemingly derives from women's collective status discontent due to their non-woman identities. This, coupled with the perceived threat of communism as an external entity that would alter the social, economic, and political values in Brazil, characterized the conservative association of these women. Still, this is not to say that the identities that women prioritized were not related to their being women, but rather their discontent with their other identities aligned with the potential they saw in participating in the right-wing authoritarian political sphere and supporting the conservative agenda despite its repression and use of violence. In the case of Brazil, women had little agency in committing acts of collective violence, but their support for the regime that had that agency classifies them as participants in a conservative movement of collective violence.

Women's Participation: Pre-Political Traditional Vigilantism

While the Brazilian case study occupies a more extreme position of conservative political association, the example of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) in southwest Nigeria, presents a less politically extreme movement of participatory collective violence in the form of vigilantism. In 1966, military rule took over the Nigeria's First Republic, and, although Yoruba communities had valued the shared leadership of men and women prior to the military regimes, women's political rights were quickly oppressed, leaving them with no institutional means of addressing their needs (Nolte, 2008). In 1993, the annulment of the newly elected president led to a rise in the

belief that the government was opposed to any political and social resistance, and, therefore, was opposed to the Yoruba people itself (Nolte, 2008).

In resistance to this perceived government threat, the OPC was established "as a socio-cultural organization by a group of Yoruba public intellectuals" (Nolte, 2008). The OPC developed and, under the belief that the government was exercising "extra-judicial political and economic tactics" (Nolte, 2008, p. 88), as a means of targeting Yoruba leaders, the OPC found itself resorting to vigilante activity in order to protect itself from the state's repression, and often carried out attacks on police stations or engaged in armed conflict with law enforcement (Nolte, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2003). In addition to this armed conflict, the OPC has advocated to establish itself as a sovereign nation, and to form a "sovereign national conference" with other ethnic groups to better represent the marginalized interests of regional entities under the federal structure of the government (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Since its establishment and its practicing of vigilante activity, the membership of the OPC has been reflective of the pre-military rule, and, in 2005, 10 to 20 percent of its members were women, with a division in the nature of participation. The development of a Women's League within the OPC has emphasized women's participation as necessary for supporting further women's membership (Nolte, 2008).

Although the women's role affords women less agency in the exercise of violence, they are integral to the success of the OPC, especially as derived from Yoruba spiritual association of women as spiritual beings due to their raising of children within the society, and therefore their communicative relationships with the spiritual world. The perceptions of women within the OPC hold true to the belief of their necessity for the group's success, as one OPC leader claimed, "Without women, nothing can succeed. If you have family or a town or even a state, it cannot exist

without the women's support… But if the women give you their blessing it is a very powerful thing" (Nolte, 2008, p. 94).

The division of duties among men and women in the OPC is characterized by women's tendencies to participate in non-violent aspects of the group, often playing a supportive or organizational role. In correlation with the importance of women in the movement, it is believed that women's presence encourages and pressures men to perform better when carrying out physical acts of violence for the movement. With women not engaging directly in carrying out violence, the cultural context of the spiritual power of women gives them great influence within the movement's strength because they are believed to hold the power of determining an individual's connection to the spiritual world (Nolte, 2008).

While women's involvement in the OPC is not characterized by direct agency in violence, the OPC presents a dynamic of women's involvement in a movement of collective violence that differs from the aforementioned Brazilian case. The identities that women in the OPC prioritize seem to be that of their community and that of their religion. With this prioritization, women seem to believe that their status discontent within Nigeria as members of the Yoruba ethnicity outweighed their status discontent as women both locally and nationally. As this status discontent was shared with Yoruba men, their association is categorized as slightly conservative in that their involvement does not seek to upset the status quo of gender norms and roles necessarily, and is participatory rather than reformative and grass-roots, representing issues which prioritize the identity of women. Additionally, while women may not have had institutional opportunity for participation within the larger society, they saw institutional opportunity in a nationally less-legitimate movement that, despite not seeking to reform the larger society necessarily, aims to

preserve and protect the values of Yoruba identity as a whole from the perceived external threat of the state that oppresses the Yoruba people.

Women's Formation: Pre-Political Progressive Vigilantism

While the vigilante activity of women in the OPC serves as one example of women's participation in collective violence, a more progressive instance of women's vigilantism is manifested in Uttar Pradesh, India, among a group of women known as the Gulabi Gang. The group aims to resist a corrupt, discriminatory government, strict gender roles that restrain women's opportunities and independence, and acts of violence against women (White & Rastogi, 2009). The Gulabi Gang formed after a group of women responded with physical force to an electric company that charged residents for electricity that was never provided. When their demands for resolution and fair treatment were not met, the women resorted to "roughing up" staff with sticks and smaller weapons and locking the workers in the building until the electricity bills were dismissed (White & Rastogi, 2009; Richards, 2016). After the formation of the vigilante group, the Gulabi Gang established social services for poor women in local communities, trained members in self-defense, and received some support from men and other non-members who shared similar group concerns (White & Rastogi, 2009).

Ultimately, the group's founder, Sampat Pal Devi, cites the movement's power of collective action against repressive and unjust actions toward women. When discussing the responsiveness and purpose of the Gulabi Gang, Sampat claims, "a woman on her own would be ineffective. Men would just laugh at her. But when we're in a group, men get nervous" (Dhillon, 2007: para 4). The formation of the group derives from a need to represent women's interests and protection when oppressive activity at the hand of men and law enforcement is pervasive.

Additionally, as women make up only 11.8 percent and 11.4 percent of the Lower House and Upper House of India's parliament, respectively, the viability of women's participation in politics or public office through the state's formal channels is limited, as those women who do hold positions in public office are generally from more affluent backgrounds (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018; Khanna, 2009). While women's right to vote is defined within India's Constitution, their de facto participation in the political processes of the state is inconsistent with their de jure civil privilege. With this, the social beliefs of gender roles are representative of women's submissiveness to men and the association of women with household and child-nurturing activities and of men with the political sphere, therefore creating a political arena that advocates for the interests of men (Khanna, 2009).

As an example of crime-control vigilantism, the Gulabi Gang has both formed and established itself as an extralegal force that uses physical coercion to address the crime and injustice women experience. Though it is difficult to account for a statistical analysis of the Gulabi Gang's success in Uttar Pradesh, the social impact of the group proves beneficial to examine the movement's implications for women's collective violence.

With motivations in prioritizing their status discontent as women within a repressive social and political context, the Gulabi Gang's use of violence as a means of preserving their ideal of status quo for women's progress-- that, to the external society, may be perceived as counter to the status quo-- is indicative of their progressive tendencies. Additionally, the conditions of their society made it obvious to the Gulabi Gang women that no alternative movements were advocating-- and fighting-- for their interests. Not only were there no movements, but there was very little opportunity for pursuing political or institutional channels for addressing concerns. While the Gulabi Gang was unable to resort to institutional options, the movement itself does not

seemingly seek to reform institutions completely, but rather to protect women's interests and safety, and, perhaps over time, change the social fabric within Uttar Pradesh to be more responsive to women's treatment.

Women's Formation: Left-Wing Feminist Revolutionary Movement

Although the Gulabi Gang falls along the progressive and formative side of the spectrum of women's collective violence, the most progressive theoretical example would be a left-wing feminist revolution by women and in pursuit of addressing status discontent due to women's identity. However, a real example of this category has seemingly never existed. Still, to frame a broader structure that considers women's engagement in collective violence, a feminist revolutionary movement will be likened to a left-wing revolutionary movement, in accordance with its definition above. The most prominent example of women's involvement in a left-wing revolution is that of the Nicaraguan Revolution in which many women became prominent military leaders and active participants in combat with the Nicaraguan government in pursuit of institutional reformation in accordance with socialist values (Murray, 2019).

Nicaraguan Generals Somoza García and Somoza Debayle ruled Nicaragua with support from the United States starting in 1936. After Somoza García's come to power, political repression within Nicaragua against the opposition characterized the country. At the same time, Nicaragua was plagued by very high levels of poverty, and there was an unequal distribution of wealth between the wealthy elite of the Somoza regimes and the general public. There were also fewer opportunities for employment, and although many men were able to access basic and higher education, the women's role was to care for children and the home. As state repression, poverty, and fewer opportunities for employment continued, status discontent began to develop among many women, who turned to the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)-- a socialist-

leaning movement for liberation and freedom in Nicaragua-- and women began to participate in demonstrations and protests (Murray, 2019).

However, during manifestations, there were instances of state violence against the protestors, leading to many deaths, and a devastating earthquake in 1972 shed light on the repression of the state as it attempted to maintain control over the citizenry, and many Nicaraguans-- including many women-- decided that there were no political alternatives but to directly confront the Somoza regime with armed opposition. Many women joined the fight with the FSLN against the government and occupied positions of command at a higher rate than any other revolution. Soon, FSLN women believed the group's intentions to include women more prominently and with higher status in society (Murray, 2019).

As some women engaged in direct combat-- often using guns, grenades, and other forms of ammunition-- to fight for the FSLN cause, some figures, like Dora María Téllez, became a *comandante* in the movement, and commanded soldiers beneath them. This leadership propelled Téllez into the 1978 take-over of the Nicaraguan National Palace in Managua, in which she served as the third-in-command among a group of 25 FSLN soldiers and headed the negotiations and communications with the Somoza government. After the fall of the Somoza regime, the FSLN took control of Nicaragua (Murray, 2019).

Eight years after the beginning of FSLN's government reformation, the party released a statement in 1987 noting the increase in political presence of women, who made up 31.4 percent of leadership positions in the new Nicaraguan government, as well as 26.8 percent of the membership of the FSLN (Chinchilla, 1990). However, it was soon claimed that these increases in political representation were not enough, even if they were relatively better than before the Revolution. The reactions to the statement "implicitly accepted the argument that, at each stage of

the revolutionary process, some form of gender-specific or feminist struggle can and should be waged" (Chinchilla, 1990, p. 372). On a similar note, when Téllez was asked if there was a need for a women's revolution following the Nicaraguan Revolution as a means to prevent the return to traditional women's roles, she responded, "There's a difference-- revolutionary processes have necessarily to liberate women-- any sort of process that doesn't liberate women-- gradually, perhaps-- is no revolution" (Murray, 2019).

From the reaction to the statement released by the FSLN and the quote by Téllez regarding women's perceptions of the necessity for a women's revolution, it seems as though the FSLN-- perhaps due to its very progressive left-wing ideology-- provided the outlet for women to represent their concerns and interests adequately within the pre-existing movement and in relation to their degree of status discontent as women. As women's agency in collective violence was quite common among those women in the movement, it falls close to the category of a left-wing feminist revolutionary movement, but may just miss the mark. In accordance with the framework presented in Figure 1, the FSLN seems to have not been a movement of formation by women, but rather of participation. However, pulling from the claim by Téllez and the statement of the FSLN, it may be that the women in the movement were simultaneously fighting a revolution of women's liberation under the guise of the Sandinista Revolution, while believing the intentions of ameliorating status discontent to be equally as important to their women's identities.

With the recognition of these identities, the case study of the Nicaraguan Revolution presents an example in which women prioritized their identities of class and community *as much as* their shared identity as women through their participation in the FSLN and the progressive representation of women's interests. Still, this does not mean that women did not experience adversity in these advancements, as the FSLN rule came to a close in 1990. Though this case study

may not be entirely representative of the characteristics of the category of a left-wing feminist revolution, the experiences of women in the Nicaraguan Revolution may be the closest instance of women's collective violence to that highly progressive and reformative category.

How Does Women's Collective Violence Shape the Role of Women in Society?

While the framework presented may seem to indicate a strong correlation between the input conditions of status discontent and the output classifications separated by differences of political association, institutionalization, and exercise of violence, many questions about women's collective violence remain unanswered. The four case studies examined above may pose strong evidence of women acting as agents in collective violence, either through forming or participating in movements that utilize violence to achieve their institutional goals. However, incorporating more case studies to further explore the classifications established above would be beneficial in adding to the many influential input conditions that propel women toward different degrees of agency in collective violence.

While this paper has focused on women in movements of collective violence, it is important to reiterate that not all movements in which women prioritize their identity as a woman versus their other identities will result in movements of violence. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to assume that all women who participate in left-wing societies or revolutions will necessarily carry out acts of violence. The societal conditions that drive women toward violence (or not) act in tandem with status discontent, and examining more instances of women's collective violence movements would prove beneficial in more profoundly understanding the societal conditions that lead to discontent strong enough to push women toward violence.

With these societal conditions comes the concern of lasting change and the question of the longevity of these movements: did Las Sandinistas revolutionize gender relations? How does

Brazil's 1964 military coup continue to affect the country today? What are the legacies of these movements, and what do they indicate about the possibility for further progress toward equity and equality in society?

In the case of women in Nicaragua, women seeking positions of political power or leadership felt a strong sense of resistance from men following the Revolution. Although women played prominent roles of leadership during the Revolution, the eventual establishment of the new societal order pushed women away from the revolutionary hopes for equal political power among both women and men. While there was enough support from men to allow women to occupy some spaces in the new FSLN government, there was no opportunity for women to hold the highest political positions, and the eventual leadership of Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua has been followed by intimidation of women who served as prominent figures in the Revolution and the erasure of their agency in the fight for change (Murray, 2019). In the Nicaragua case, the presence of women as agents in collective violence seemingly had the largest impact during the Revolution, with a return to patriarchal order and the resistance of women in places of power following the war. Although this case demonstrates women's agency in a left-wing revolutionary movement that supported feminist values to some extent, the result of such a movement does not necessarily indicate success in achieving the progressive hopes for women's equality that were represented by women during the war, and further examination of movements like the FSLN in Nicaragua would prove helpful in determining the legacy and success of this classification of women's collective violence.

On the other end of the spectrum, the legacy of the 1964 Brazilian military dictatorship continues to characterize Brazilian society, especially following the recent election of right-wing politician Jair Bolsonaro as Brazilian president. Bolsonaro, a prominent supporter of the 1964

military dictatorship and its conservative and aggressive tendencies, and a politician with a record of extremely sexist behavior, has experienced strong support from many right-wing Brazilians, including many women. Contemporary conditions in Brazil are characterized by high levels of crime and violence, leading many concerned Brazilians to support Bolsonaro's militaristic policies to repress crime and violence. Still, many women living in areas concentrated with crime are opposed to Bolsonaro's response, as they fear their children will be hurt or killed by law enforcement (New York Times, 2018). Opposed to Bolsonaro, there is a strong, non-violent women's movement, known as #EleNão. Leading up to the election, #EleNão organized protests with the goal of consolidating women in a collective against Bolsonaro. While the official results of the election do not collect information from voters to determine the voting differences between men and women, the voting polls recorded during the protests indicated a growing number of women in support of Bolsonaro. During a poll period between September 16-18, 2018, 15 percent of women were projected as in favor of Bolsonaro, but during a poll period between October 25-26, 2018, that projection had increased to 37 percent (Mussi & Bianchi, 2018).

Considering that the Brazilian election occurred so recently, drawing conclusions on why the number of women in support of Bolsonaro grew is difficult. Still, the return of Brazil-- and especially of so many Brazilian women-- to the 1964 coup's conservative values presents even more questions about the conditions that may influence women's tendencies to support right-wing movements that, on the surface, may appear in opposition to women's interests.

While it is possible to consider the implications of the cases of Nicaragua and Brazil due to the time that has passed since the movements, contemplating the implications of women's pre-political vigilantism in the case studies above is much more difficult considering their more contemporary practice. Again, further research should be dedicated to dissecting the characteristics

and implications of each classification of women's collective violence in efforts to shift the orientation of scholarship defining the social, political, and economic phenomena that shape the way humans interact and coexist.

Although many questions remain, the above classifications of the four case studies shed light on one central question: why is collective violence so commonly depicted as masculine while women as agents are neglected in this research? As indicated earlier, the more general and widely accepted definitions of revolutions, vigilantism, and authoritarian support neglect to consider the roles of men *and* women within collective violence. This ultimately raises concern with the prevalence of ignoring differences between men and women within academic scholarship and education. When the agents in political, economic, and societal phenomena are depicted as men, and when women continue to be portrayed as victims, it reinforces society's beliefs of the roles of women and men, and the power of men over women. While men may be the most common agents in these movements, failing to recognize that women also play a substantial role in them is fueling the patriarchal bias of participants in the movement, bystanders, and academics and students who are far removed from the movement's reality. Still, it is important to note that there are countless marginalized identities that are also neglected within much literature, and, while the focus of this paper does not profoundly examine the reality for other marginalized groups, the role of women in collective violence serves as a window into the necessary areas of academia that have yet to be examined.

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