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Self-regulation among highly prejudiced people: a tool for the amelioration of racial bias

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Self-regulation among highly prejudiced people:

A tool for the amelioration of racial bias

By

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Accepted in Partial Completion

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

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Kristina L. Silverbears

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Presented to
The faculty of
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In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements of the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Kristina L. Silverbears
July 2011
Abstract

The source of motivation to respond without prejudice varies among individuals and is connected to their evaluations of biased materials. People who are highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice tend to be lower in prejudice than are people who are highly externally motivated. High internal motivation is typically associated with less biased responding, but when bias does occur feelings of self-directed negative emotions often result. For low prejudice people these self negative feelings can lead to a system of responses culminating in future self regulation. The same self-negative feelings do not function identically for people who are higher in prejudice. It was hypothesized that other directed negative affect might function in a similar regulatory capacity for participants higher in prejudice. This study investigated the relationship between other directed negative affect and biased responding, utilizing jokes as the bias measure. Participants were presented with biased jokes and asked to provide humor ratings. Affect was assessed following a confrontation manipulation after participants were given an opportunity for biased responding. Subsequently two other opportunities, one public and one private, were offered. It was expected that confronted participants would decrease their bias responding in public and potentially increase bias in private reports, when compared to the control condition. This backlash was not found. Confronted participants responded to the manipulation with a decrease in biased responding publicly, when compared to the control group which was not confronted. Self and other directed negative affect did not differ significantly between the two groups, although some gender interactions were significant.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................iv
Introduction ....................................................................................................1
Method ...........................................................................................................13
Results ..........................................................................................................17
Discussion .....................................................................................................24
References ....................................................................................................31
Tables ...........................................................................................................34
Figures .........................................................................................................38
Appendix .......................................................................................................42
Self-regulation among highly prejudiced people

Contemporary social norms reflect low-prejudiced attitudes (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996). However, these attitudes have not led to an entirely equal playing field for Black and White people in employment (Deitch, Barsky, Butz, Chan, Brief, & Bradley, 2003) and civil justice (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). Unemployment rates are consistently higher among Black people, when compared to White people (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). These differences might be caused in part by implicit prejudice amongst people who do not outwardly express prejudiced attitudes (Devine, 1989). They may also caused by the continued influence of highly prejudiced persons and institutions (Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003).

Social psychology has come to focus on the latent prejudice in most otherwise non-prejudiced persons (Bargh, 1999; Dasgupta, 2004). Such people do occasionally behave in ways which do not meet their non-prejudiced standards, that is, they occasionally act more prejudiced than they would like to act (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliott, 1991). Often when this happens people who have internalized non-prejudiced standards feel guilt and self-directed anger, components of self-regulation, which lead them to correct and prevent similar future behaviors (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et. al, 2002). This regulation occurs because non-prejudiced behavior is important to their strongly held self beliefs. High-prejudice people are not internally driven to behave non-prejudicially, but research suggests that they are capable of modifying their behaviors in public to appear less prejudiced when situational factors warrant (Plant and Devine, 2001). Failing to control expression of prejudice can lead to negative repercussions including sanction from others who might draw attention to the break with social expectations (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, and Bylsma, 2003), leading to feelings of embarrassment and other-directed anger (Czopp, Montieth, and Mark, 2006). The negative other-
directed affect experienced by the confronted highly prejudiced person might influence their ability to control public expression of prejudice in a way similar to how low-prejudice persons control themselves through guilt and self-directed anger. The premise that a form of self-regulation can occur in public among highly prejudiced people has not yet been tested and is the focus of this research.

**Prejudiced Behavior**

Behaviors are generally believed to reflect attitudes. However, people occasionally behave in ways that are more prejudiced than they would like; behaving in a highly prejudiced way while concurrently holding non-prejudiced beliefs is one example of a prejudice-related discrepancy. Discrepancies are caused by simultaneously possessing stereotypic knowledge and the desire to behave in non-prejudiced ways (Devine, 1989). For example, someone who knows that Black people are stereotyped as violent may cross the street to avoid them, even though they feel it was the wrong thing to do. Discrepancies are theorized to exist because stereotypic knowledge is automatically activated, and a person must actively attempt to replace that knowledge with non-prejudiced beliefs through controlled processing (Devine, 1989). Unlike automatic processing which occurs with little thought and without sustained mental oversight, controlled processing requires focus and deliberation making it slower and costlier to use.

Even under wholly controlled processing discrepancies can also exist between what people think they should do and what they would do in a situation. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) studied the issue of different standards and the affective consequences of acting outside of those expectations. Participants were asked to respond to a series of situations based on what they believed they *should* or should not do. For example, they were asked if they should be upset at having a Black interviewer. Following that, participants responded to very similar
items with what they would do in those situations. For example, they were asked if they would be upset having a new Black neighbor. A discrepancy index was created after these measures by subtracting every should rating from every would rating and adding the differences. This was followed by an affect measure.

Devine et al. (1991) found that prejudice level, should and would scores were related in that people higher in prejudice (as determined by the Modern Racism Scale) reported both that they should and would be more prejudiced than did low prejudice persons. Importantly, they found that more than 70% of all participants reported that they would behave in ways which were more prejudiced than they felt they should. This means that most people admitted to engaging in discrepancies. Larger discrepancies were associated with more negative self-directed affect. Examples of this negative self-directed affect, or negself, are feeling self-critical, angry at myself, and regretful. Devine et al.’s (1991) first study was unable to explicitly examine these effects on high prejudice persons owing to the relative dearth of high prejudice persons naturally in their sample.

In order to consider high prejudice persons Devine et al. (1991) looked at prejudice related to homosexuals in a second study. It was less difficult to find participants who were prejudiced against homosexuals than those who were prejudiced against Black people. Their method did not change, except that the questionnaire material now focused on heterosexism instead of racism. Seventy-nine percent of participants reported that they would behave in ways that were more prejudiced than they felt they should behave. Low and moderately prejudiced persons with large discrepancies reported high levels of negself. However, high prejudice persons, even those with large discrepancies between how they should and would behave toward homosexuals, did not report very high levels of negself. This suggests that high prejudice persons
did not experience feelings of compunction. However, high prejudice persons reported experiencing more anger and irritation directed to others, (negother), and discomfort, than did other participants.

The reason these affective differences exist was examined in their final study. Under the hypothesis that the location of the standards is different between high and low prejudice persons they had participants in a third study report their own personal standards and also what they viewed society’s standards to be. High prejudice persons reported more internalization of society’s standards than did low prejudice persons. Low prejudice persons reported greater egalitarian personal standards than did high prejudice persons, suggesting that society’s standards are more moderate and that low prejudice persons have very internalized standards. Low prejudice persons experience guilt following a discrepancy because they have threatened their self-concept, but high prejudice persons experience other-directed feelings of discomfort, anger, and irritation.

These findings are critical because they suggest that high prejudice persons may be able to self-regulate through their feelings of negother. Weiner (2000) found that negative emotions, like guilt and anger are motivating. Higgins (1987) posited that guilt flows from transgressing personally held moral standards. When standards are internalized people have a responsibility to conform to those standards, motivating them to meet personal standards. While high prejudice persons may not be motivated to meet the same standards as low prejudice persons, negative affective consequences do occur when they are made aware of their discrepant response. Anger for a high prejudice person may be as motivating as guilt is for a low prejudice person because the person experiencing anger may be expecting punishment from others (Higgins, 1987) leading
them to avoid similar circumstances in the future. In this way, high prejudice persons may be able to regulate their socially discrepant behaviors.

**Self-Regulation of Prejudice**

Monteith (1993) hypothesized that among low prejudice people, aspects of the discrepancy situation form cues which assist in future discrepancy avoidance. Monteith’s model begins with the automatic activation of social stereotypes. When processing at an automatic level people can engage in a discrepant response. Awareness of that discrepancy then leads to behavioral inhibition which involves slower, controlled processing, allowing for the inhibition of future discrepant responses. Monteith hypothesized that future discrepant responses would be decreased because the person had developed associations or cues between the discrepant situation and negative self-directed affect. The presence of such cues in the future could lead to nonbiased responses becoming more accessible, leading potentially to eventual nonbiased automatic responding.

In order to test the model Monteith (1993) put participants in a situation in which they believed that they had engaged in a discrepancy. For half of the participants the discrepancy was against a meaningful group, homosexual men, for the other participants the discrepancy was inconsistent with a vague personality trait, being “Type-D”. Only a discrepancy relating to something truly meaningful, in this case anti-homosexual prejudice, should lead to the expected self-regulatory responses. This means that participants should not go through a self-regulatory response for failing to act in a way that is unfavorable to “Type-D”. To elicit the belief in a discrepancy for both groups she gave first a direct measure of the issue (i.e., a measure of attitudes toward homosexuals, or a measure of “Type-D”) followed by a subtle measure of the same issues. During the subtle measure the computer gave participants feedback about their
responses, specifically how in line their responses on the subtle measure were compared to the direct measure. After completing the measures all participants were told by the computer that they had a strong discrepancy between the two measures. Participants were then asked to complete a second, supposedly unrelated, study on humor which required them to evaluate biased jokes.

Monteith (1993) was expecting that participants who believed they were discrepant against homosexuals would act to try to change their future behaviors but that participants would not try to change their discrepancies against being “Type-D”. The prejudiced feedback condition was expected to lead to self-regulation because the nature of homosexual prejudice should be meaningful and negative to low prejudice participants.

Low prejudice persons in the discrepancy to homosexuals group spent more time answering the items on the subtle questionnaire, Monteith’s (1993) measure of behavioral inhibition, than did low-prejudice persons in the “Type-D” group. This behavioral inhibition reflected a higher degree of controlled processing to the jokes in the discrepancy to homosexuals condition. Basically, low prejudice people slowed down and tried to control themselves when they thought they might do something anti-homosexual, but low prejudice people did not do this when they thought they might do something that would be against being “Type-D”. Behaving in this inconsistent manner against homosexuals lead to actions associated with self-regulation, while the possibility of being inconsistent against “Type-D”-ness did not alter their behavior. High prejudice persons took longer to respond to the “Type-D” feedback than the anti-homosexual feedback. This means that high prejudice persons did not slow their processing for anti-homosexual bias. High prejudice participants did not attempt to regulate their responses.
Thus, it appears that highly prejudiced persons were not using controlled processing in the discrepancy to homosexuals condition.

In addition to behavioral inhibition via pausing, low-prejudice persons were found to inhibit later prejudicial responding when they had experienced a previous prejudice-based discrepancy. They tended to find the homosexual jokes less humorous than did high prejudice persons and other low-prejudice persons in the “Type-D” feedback condition. This happened even though the content of the response (evaluation of the joke as humorous) was quite different than the previous task (accepting a student into law school). High prejudice persons did not rate the homosexual jokes differently based on their condition. All together this suggests that the cues for self-regulation can be developed, at least for low-prejudice persons, from a specific discrepancy and be applied to a related context.

Montieth’s (1993) studies provided evidence of behavioral inhibition, controlled processing, and decreased prejudiced responding following a discrepancy suggesting the creation of cues for control. The model has been further tested to examine the affective consequences of the discrepancy and post-discrepancy thoughts, what the authors call retrospective reflection (Monteith et al., 2002). The behavioral inhibition found in Monteith (1993) was predicted to allow for retrospective reflection of what caused the discrepancy, creating a connection between the negself experienced by engaging in the discrepancy and related stimuli. These stimuli then could become cues for control, reminders of the previous discrepancy which could help to avoid later discrepancies. If these cues existed in another situation they were theorized to allow for similar behavioral inhibition, slower processing, which enabled prospective reflection, or future thinking to occur. Prospective reflection allows a person to behave in ways consistent with their beliefs, rather than with automatic biases.
Monteith et al. (2002) tied together every component of the self-regulation process. The goal was to actually create a cue for control using the racial IAT. It was hypothesized that taking the IAT would serve in the creation of cues for control because participants would become aware of their personal difficulty in categorizing typical Black names with good and typical White names with bad, leading participants through the cues creation process. This was followed by a second IAT requiring the categorization of some of the same names by living: nonliving, and then by like: dislike. Giving a response of disliking a typical Black name would mean the person was responding discrepantly a second time. A person would not be discrepant for responding that a typical Black name was nonliving.

IAT bias was positively correlated with negself. Greater negself was also associated with greater liking of the Black names. The most important finding is that only in the like: dislike categorization task was there behavioral inhibition. Participants only paused when categorizing the names when a response could reflect bias, as it would for categorizing Black as disliked. The names did not function to inhibit all response types, because pausing was not observed in the living: nonliving task. This means that participants recognized one situation as one in which a discriminatory behavior could be generated, showing that a cue for control exists within the like: dislike task. They were also able to replace that discriminatory behavior with a consistent behavior, generating like responses to Black names.

Thus, in Monteith’s (1993) model, a low prejudice person first behaves in a discrepant way. Once aware of that discrepancy, negself leads to personal focus on oneself, and to stimuli which may have led to the discrepancy, building connections between those stimuli and the negself. It has been theorized that those connections become cues for control, with the power to, in future situations, aid the person in choosing to avoid discrepant responding (Monteith, et al.,
A similar model using negother instead of negself may be functionally equivalent for highly prejudiced persons. Negother occurs when a highly prejudiced person becomes aware that they have acted in a way that is more prejudiced than they believe is socially acceptable in a social situation. Negother occurs instead of negself because highly prejudiced persons have more externalized standards than do low prejudice persons. Higgins (1987) argues that feelings of negother occur when external standards are used because a person expects negative responses from others when those standards are violated. Feelings of negother may still lead to greater situational awareness of the discrepancy, allowing for the creation of cues for control, and later self-regulation. This premise will be tested in this research by putting highly prejudiced people in a discrepancy-plausible situation.

Highly externally motivated people are quite capable of altering their public behavior to match their perceptions of public norms (Plant and Devine, 1998). This suggests that primarily externally motivated people do engage in some form of self-monitoring when in public. Plant and Devine (1998) dissociated internal and external motivations to appear non-prejudiced. Internal motivation to be non-prejudiced is a perpetual personal goal, from personal values, while external motivation is more varied and derived from social factors. Internally motivated people want to be non-prejudiced; they tend to be low-prejudiced and have higher standards than their social situation would require of them. Externally motivated people may behave non-prejudicially to avoid negative reactions from others. Externally motivated people only want to appear non-prejudiced; they do not have goals or internal motivation to behave in a non-prejudiced way except when there may be a negative reaction for failing to meet the standard. There is a consistent correlation between being primarily externally motivated and high
prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998) contended that internal and external motivations exist in every person. They suggest that the combination of the two motivations, not simply the existence of one, affects prejudicial responding. To that end Plant and Devine developed a scale to measure those motivations. The scale contains five items relating to internal motivation, (IMS) and five items for external motivation, (EMS). Each set of items is distinct, measuring different aspects of motivation to respond without prejudice. IMS is associated with the desire to be less prejudiced while EMS is associated with the desire to express less prejudiced attitudes.

Plant and Devine’s original scale was developed to measure motivations toward Black people. The scale has been adapted to consider the expression of bias toward homosexuals. In this study adaptations will be made to use the scale in a more general fashion. Instead of participants rating their motivation to avoid being prejudiced toward Black people we will remove the directed language in order to obtain a more general measure of participant’s motivations.

Plant and Devine (1998) demonstrated that failing to meet personal standards as suggested by a person’s internal motivation leads to negative affect. Specifically they found that when a person high in IMS engaged in a discrepancy, the person felt guilty. This guilt occurs because internally motivated people are comparing their behavior to their own beliefs, so that the guilt is coming from within. A high EMS person who also engaged in a discrepancy would feel threatened because they would be anticipating something negative from outside them, from external sources.

Although not formally tested, research is consistent with the idea that high prejudice/EMS people respond to public discrepancies with negative affect and subsequently change their behavior. Czopp, Monteith, & Mark (2006) examined the effectiveness of one method of
discrepancy awareness, that of direct confrontation. Czopp et al. (2006) found that confrontation is an effective method for decreasing subsequent prejudiced behavior. They examined the effects of confrontation on the expression of racist and sexist remarks, particularly how these confrontations affected participants’ affect, evaluation of their partner, subsequent biased responding, and their immediate reaction to the confrontation.

Czopp et al. (2006) found that confrontation did lead to a decrease in subsequent public prejudicial responding, both for high and low prejudice participants. They found that greater feelings of negself were associated with greater decreases in post confrontation prejudicial responding. Confrontation was also associated with greater feelings of negother. These negative feelings may exist because of the external nature of confrontation as a method of discrepancy awareness. Confrontation is external because awareness of a discrepancy is made publicly; another person is involved.

Plant and Devine (1998) hypothesized that the source of a person’s motivation affected that person’s reaction to pro-Black pressure. They expected that a low prejudice person, someone who is high IMS, would be little affected by pro-Black hiring pressure because that person would already agree with the policy. A highly prejudiced person, someone who is high EMS, might feel angered by pressure to act in a way inconsistent with their beliefs, and may lash out, acting even more anti-Black when that pressure is removed. They expected this backlash when participants gave private evaluations.

Plant and Devine found that high EMS participants initially complied with the pro-Black pressure (publicly) but later responded with greater angry and threatened affect than did low EMS participants when pressure to behave non-prejudicially was removed. High EMS/low IMS participants responded with behavioral backlash (privately); they were the least likely to hire the
African American applicant once the pressure had been released. Another study examined the issue by looking at the effects of writing a counter-attitudinal essay on participants’ affect. Participants were told that the college was considering changing the recruiting policy to accept more African American students through giving them additional scholarships. Plant and Devine found that low IMS/ high EMS participants reported the highest levels of angry threatened affect. Low IMS/ high EMS participants were also the most likely to respond with backlash, as once the pro-Black pressure was released those participants were more against the recruiting policy than were other control group Low IMS/ high EMS participants.

Together these studies examined the effects of pro-African American pressure on low IMS / high EMS participants and found that they were willing to comply with outside pressure in public situations. The effects of that pressure, however, led to subsequent backlash- they were less willing to hire an African American in study two, and consistently responded with angry and threatened affect. These studies suggest that pressure to behave in a non-prejudiced manner may not always lead to attitudinal change and can lead to negative consequences. Backlash appears to occur when participants previously exercised self control publicly but are later able to counter to that control by overreacting privately.

**The present research**

Discrepancies exist because of the simultaneous possession of stereotypic knowledge and the desire to behave in non-prejudiced ways. There are negative affective consequences for engaging in a discrepancy. Among low prejudiced persons, those who are highly internally motivated, the consequence is increased negself. For highly prejudiced persons the consequence is negother. Only negself has been associated with the self-regulation of prejudiced responding. Self-regulation occurs through the building of connections, or cues, between the negself, stimuli
related to the discrepancy, and the discrepancy itself. These cues, if present in a later situation in which a discrepancy is possible, can inhibit further prejudiced responding.

In the present research relatively highly prejudiced participants will be induced into engaging in a behavioral discrepancy, specifically they will be given the opportunity to rate biased jokes as humorous. Participants will then be publicly made aware of this discrepancy. This awareness, as it is delivered externally, should lead to feelings of negother among persons who are primarily externally motivated. We hypothesize that these feelings will lead to the development of cues for control in a way similar to how low prejudice persons self-regulate. Participants will be given the opportunity to engage in a second discrepancy publicly and then a third discrepancy privately. These options will test participants’ ability to self-regulate following their awareness of the initial discrepancy.

Participants are expected to have increased negother after being made aware of their first biased response (Czopp et al. 2006). Previous research has found that increased negself is correlated with decreased biased responding among low prejudiced persons (Monteith, 1993). It is anticipated that increased negother will lead to greater decreases in biased responding publicly. Overall, participants are expected to respond with less bias in public than in private (Plant & Devine, 1998). Men are also expected to express greater bias than women as they have in previous research (e.g., Monteith, 1993).

Method

Participants and Materials

Eighty-three participants (80% White, 72.3% women) were recruited from Western Washington’s undergraduate Psychology population. In a preliminary online session students completed a revised version of Plant and Devine’s (2001) IMS and EMS (see appendix). The
scale was revised to allow for a less directed measure of motivations. These less directed scales allowed us to use multiple biases in our materials and a non-specific manipulation, possibly decreasing the appearance of the confederate as a person with something to gain by changing the participant’s behavior, as might have occurred with a specific target group.

Only high EMS students were directly contacted and encouraged to participate, although other students were also able to sign up. Low IMS/ high EMS students were specifically chosen because they are not internally motivated to be non-prejudiced and express prejudice that is situationally driven. After 200 participants had completed the Plant and Devine (2001) measure scores were compiled and their distribution was analyzed. From that it was determined that the top third of participants scored a 6 or higher on the EMS component of the measure. The range of the measure is from one to nine. Following previous research the top third of the EMS distribution were contacted for participation. This means that only students who scored a six or higher were directly contacted. IMS scores were not used in the selection process. Participants were e-mailed and asked to participate in the study. Participants were not informed of the process behind their selection. Confederates were also blind to participants’ motivations.

**Design and Procedure**

The design was a 2x2 mixed model with discrepancy awareness as a between subjects factor; public versus private reports was a within subjects factor. The dependent variable was biased behavior, specifically finding biased jokes funny.

A confederate was used in this study because a confrontation from an equal-status person was desired. A total of three confederates were trained to exhibit similar behaviors throughout the study. All of the confederates were undergraduate Caucasian women.
At the beginning of the study participants were taken to an individual room where they were asked to complete the consent form. The confederate was ostensibly completing the same form in another small private room adjacent to the participant’s. The participant and confederate then were publicly given the cover story and instructions for the first component of the study together in an area between the two private rooms.

Participants were informed that the study examines the effect of jokes and humorous statements on affect. This cover story was used to explain both our request for them to read jokes and the repeated affect measures. Additionally, participants were informed that recent research has suggested that humor may have disparate effects if delivered in public or private settings, so we asked everyone to hear and read jokes publicly and privately. The experimenter also issued a general warning at the start of the experiment that some of the material they would be reading and hearing may be offensive.

Following this explanation, participants and confederates were each given a sheet with five distinct celebrity statements (see Appendix). Confederates were asked to rate statements which were distasteful but not specifically biased. Confederate responses were scripted. The participant read aloud statement one, which the confederate rated. Then the confederate read aloud statement two, which the participant rated. This turn-taking continued until there was no more material on their pages. Participants rated three distasteful statements followed by two biased statements. See the appendix for exact formatting and content of these biased materials. Participants were asked to rate each statement on a scale of 1 (not at all funny) to 9 (very humorous). The experimenter asked the participant and confederate to take turns reading their celebrity statements aloud, beginning with the participant reading the first statement. Statements were numbered to encourage the correct order to be followed. Statements read by the confederate
were to be rated by the participant and those read by the participant were to be rated by the confederate. Participants were asked to give their rating of the celebrity statement aloud, which the confederate recorded on their sheet. After the participant gave the final rating on the last celebrity statement the confederate issued a mild verbal confrontation to half of the participants. This confrontation statement “Whoa, those last couple jokes crossed the line”. Immediately after the confrontation, the experimenter, who was listening at the door, came in to pick up the paperwork and then distributed the first affect measure.

While it was possible that the participants may have rated the biased celebrity statements as not at all funny, recent pilot study research suggested that this would have been unlikely. We collected pilot data from 55 undergraduate students, on a 1 to 5 scale, asking them which of four target groups they would feel the most self-bad about committing biased behaviors toward. They reported the least bad feeling to laughter at Homosexual jokes (M= 2.45) and most bad feeling for laughter at Obese jokes (M= 3.3). Jokes may be one area where social pressure to be non-prejudiced has less influence. Confederates were told that if a participant failed to give a rating of at least 1 then that participant was not to be confronted and their data may not have been used. This scenario never occurred in the lab; everyone rated at least one of the two biased jokes funnier than a 1.

While completing the affect measure participants rated the extent to which they feel 32 items (e.g. Sad, threatened, angry at others) on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much); this is the same scale used by Plant and Devine (2001). Following the affect measure the experimenter then informed them that the next stage of the experiment required that they read each other jokes and record each other’s humor ratings. Jokes were utilized in the final two response formats because of their similarity to the statements and the ease of gathering
biased jokes was greater than that of the celebrity statements. To the extent that the self-regulation situation needs to match the situation wherein bias was recognized, switching the type of response material can only make it harder to find effects, not easier, making this test more conservative.

Participants were told that the system of turn taking would continue just as it was before, and the scale was kept the same. Confederates continued to give the scripted responses with no further confrontation. In order to make the story more believable confederates were made to respond to a biased joke. This was done because participants were required to respond to too many of them and participants may have begun to speculate if a difference in joke content were very apparent. Confederates rated the biased joke a one, regardless of the condition.

The participant and confederate were then separated and asked to return to their individual rooms for the final set of jokes and affect measure. Two of the final set of eight jokes was biased in nature, as can be seen in the appendix. After the jokes there was another affect measure which included demographic questions. During this time participants were still under the belief that the confederate was a naïve participant. Once the final measures were completed participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. No one suggested knowledge of the confederate until after being debriefed, when they were informed of the truth. No one was excluded from the study.

Results

Summary of Analytical Approach

Unless otherwise noted, all dependent variables were predicted using multiple regression with condition (0 = control, 1 = confronted) and participants’ standardized Internal Motivation and External Motivation scores entered at the first step. Interactions between condition and both
Internal and External Motivation were entered as predictor variables at the second step, along with the interaction between Internal and External Motivation.

Participants’ ratings of the celebrity statements were averaged to create expressed bias figures for each stage of the study. Bias expressed pre-manipulation was not expected to differ between the two groups. An independent groups t-test was run to determine if the control and confrontation groups differed in their pre-manipulation bias ratings and was found to be nonsignificant $t(81) = .69, p = .64$. As expected the two groups were equally biased before the manipulation.

Analyses were also run considering race as a factor. Participants who self-identified as any race other than White were grouped together and compared to self-identified White participants. Expressed bias did not differ by condition or context based on race. The absence of this effect was unexpected, although possibly caused by social presentation concerns on the part of outgroup members. All subsequent results are reported irrespective of race.

**Affect**

The first affect measure was given to participants following the manipulation. Participants were either confronted or not confronted about their previous ratings of biased statements. Confrontation condition was randomly assigned.

Participants’ responses to the 35 item affect measure were submitted to a principal-axis factor analysis with Varimax rotation. Results were expected to be similar to those in Devine et al. (1991). The initial affect measure yielded a six factor solution which accounted for 71.6 % of the variance. Each item loaded onto one factor with a loading criterion of .45 or higher and only factors with an eigenvalue of 1 were included. Devine et al. (1991) also found a six factor
solution which accounted for 60.4% of the variance. A comparison with their factors can be found in Table 1.

The strongest factor, which accounted for 38.4% of the variance, included the twelve items: self-angry, guilty, embarrassed, bothered, self-annoyed, regretful, self-disappointed, self-disgusted, low, helpless, shame, and self-critical ($\alpha = .93$). Following previous research, e.g. Devine et al. (1991), this factor is called negself because the items contain self-directed negative emotions. A second factor, negother, contains four other directed negative emotions including: fearful, angry at others, irritated at others, and disgusted at others ($\alpha = .81$). See table 2 for means.

Four other factors were created although they are less theoretically important. The first of these factors is positive, consisting of pleasant emotions: friendly, happy, energetic, optimistic, content and good ($\alpha = .92$). Another factor, termed lost, consists of negative emotions which suggest an absence of something: depressed, frustrated, threatened, and sad ($\alpha = .78$). One factor ($\alpha = .82$) containing: uneasy, anxious, tense, and uncomfortable, we labeled discomfort following Devine et al. (1991). The final two affect items converged to form the final factor. These two items were not part of either Devine et al.’s (1991) factor defined affect index.

**Negself at time one**

It was expected that feelings of negself would not differ between the two groups at time one. Negself did not differ as a function of condition (control $M = 1.69$, confront $M = 1.78$), $F(1,79) = 0.06$, $p = .81$, $\beta = .03$. The affect measure allows a range of scores from 1 to 9, suggesting low average negself scores for both groups. The relationship between negself and Internal Motivation was not significant, $F(1, 79) = 0.002$, $p = .97$, $\beta = .004$; nor was the
relationship between negself and External Motivation significant, $F(1, 79) = -1.14, p = .29, \beta = -.12$. No interactions were significant.

**Negother at time one**

Against expectations negother did not differ as a function of condition (control $M = 1.67$, confront $M = 1.82$), $F(1, 79) = 0.13, p = .72, \beta = .04$. It was expected that negother would be higher among the confronted condition than the control condition. Also it was expected that higher Internal Motivation would be inversely related to negother and that higher External Motivation would be directly related to negother. The relationship between negother and Internal Motivation was not significant, $F(1, 79) = 2.44, p = .12, \beta = .17$; nor was the relationship between negother and External Motivation significant, $F(1, 79) = -1.54, p = .22, \beta = -.14$.

The relationship between condition and Internal motivation was nonsignificant $F(1, 75) = 0.22, p = .64, \beta = .09$. Likewise the relationship between condition and External Motivation was nonsignificant $F(1, 75) = 0.55, p = .46, \beta = .12$. There was a significant effect of Internal and External Motivation on Negother $F(1, 75) = 5.73, p = .02, \beta = .42$. Also, as seen in Figure 1, the three-way interaction between Internal Motivation, External Motivation and condition was significant, $F(1, 75) = -6.85, p = .01, \beta = -.462$. This effect is driven by the low IMS group within the control condition. It appears that for those who are low in Internal Motivation as their External Motivation increases their feelings of negother decrease. No differences exist in the confrontation condition.

**Public Bias**

The four biased jokes presented publicly after the manipulation were averaged to create the measure of public bias ($\alpha = .60$). It was expected that control participants would continue to provide biased responses while confronted participants would show decreased bias. There was a
marginally significant effect of condition on public bias such that control participants had higher scores on public bias ($M = 3.11$) than did confronted participants ($M = 2.71$), $t(79) = -1.87, p = .065, \beta = -.20$. The range of bias scores at each time point is 1 to 9, and the means reflect the average of each biased joke told at that time point. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of bias scores. As expected there was a significant main effect of Internal Motivation on public bias $t(79) = -2.58, p = .01, \beta = -.27$. Specifically participants with higher Internal Motivation expressed significantly less public bias than did participants with lower Internal Motivation. No other effects were significant.

**Private Bias**

The two privately rated biased jokes are significantly correlated at $r(83) = .67, p < .001$. It was initially expected that confronted participants would experience a backlash and would therefore provide more biased responses in private than would control participants. This effect was not found as there was no effect of condition on private bias $t(79) = -1.22, p = .23, \beta = -.13$, also in Figure 2. This expected effect was hypothesized to be greater for those with higher External Motivation, however, there was no effect of External Motivation on private bias $t(79) = -0.17, p = .86, \beta = -.02$. In keeping with the theory there was a significant effect of Internal Motivation on private bias $t(79) = -3.83, p < .001, \beta = -.39$. This effect was such that higher Internal Motivation was associated with less bias in private reports.

**Negself at time two**

After the private reports participants were given a second affect measure, the items of which were combined into the same factors as previously reported. There was no significant effect of condition at time two, $t(79) = -1.02, p = .31, \beta = -.12$. Also there were no significant
effects of Internal Motivation, \( t(79) = -0.96, p = .34, \beta = -.11 \), or External Motivation \( t(79) = -0.10, p = .92, \beta = -.01 \). None of the interactions were significant, either.

**Negother at time two**

There was no significant effect of condition on negother at time two \( t(79) = -1.39, p = .17, \beta = -.16 \). The effects of Internal Motivation, \( t(79) = -0.37, p = .71, \beta = -.04 \), and External Motivation, \( t(79) = -1.66, p = .10, \beta = -.19 \) were also not significant.

**Within Subject Analyses**

It was expected that a difference of condition would emerge such that confronted participants would have lower bias scores in public than would control participants, but higher bias scores in private than control participants. A mixed model ANOVA was run comparing the two groups by their public and private bias scores. The mixed model ANOVA found no significant differences between the two groups on public and private bias, \( F(1, 81) = .16, p = .69 \). The control group \((M = 3.11)\) and confronted group \((M = 2.71)\) showed similar levels of bias in public. Again the bias scores could range from 1 to 9. There was a marginally significant effect of jokes and context such that both groups found the private biased jokes to be more humorous than the public jokes, \( F(1, 83) = 3.86, p = .05 \), public \((M = 2.91)\) and private \((M = 3.30)\). This means that in private both groups expressed more bias than in public. There was no significant interaction between context and group, \( F(1,81) = 2.15, p = .15 \).

A mixed model analysis was used to determine if there were significant changes in negself from the time it was first measured to the second time. There was a significant main effect of negself, \( F(1, 81) = 5.91, p = .03 \), such that negself decreased from time one to time two. This effect is overshadowed by the interaction of condition and negself change, \( F(1, 81) = 4.60 \),
$p = .04$, which shows that the change in negself primarily existed in the confronted condition, see figure 3. The control group showed little altered negself ($M_1 = 1.69, M_2 = 1.68$). The change shows decreased feelings of negself over time for confronted participants ($M_1 = 1.78, M_2 = 1.52$), which a paired samples t-test found to be significant, $t(40) = 2.72, p = .01$. Control participants did not change in how self-negative they felt throughout the study, but confronted participants had greater self-negative feelings after the confrontation than the control group and less self-negative feelings than the control at the end of the study.

A similar analysis was done with negother, to determine if there were changes in negother from the two times negother was measured. There was no significant main effect of negother change, $F(1, 81) = .001, p = .97$. However, the negother and condition interaction was significant, $F(1, 81) = 4.48, p = .04$. This interaction seems to be driven by an increase in feelings of negother among the control condition ($M_1 = 1.67, M_2 = 1.87$) and a decrease in negother among the confronted condition ($M_1 = 1.82, M_2 = 1.62$) see figure 4. This means that control condition participants experienced greater other-directed anger and irritation as the study progressed, while confronted participants experienced a decrease in these other-directed negative feelings. Paired samples t-tests found these differences to be nonsignificant, $t(41) = -1.72, p = .09$ and $t(40) = 1.33, p = .19$, respectively.

**Participant Gender**

With respect to gender feelings of negself and negother were considered. There were no significant main effects of condition or gender, although there was a significant multivariate interaction of gender and condition, $F(2, 78) = 3.63, p = .03$. Gender had no effect on negself was nonsignificant, $F(1, 79) = 1.91, p = .17$, nor did gender effect negother, $F(1, 79) = .78, p = .38$. 
Gender differences within context were also considered. There is a main effect of gender such that regardless of condition, men had higher bias scores (control $M = 3.5$, confront $M = 3.1$) than women (control $M = 2.94$, confront $M = 2.58$) in public. This main effect continued in the private ratings with men having higher bias scores (control $M = 4.3$, confront $M = 4.45$) than women (control $M = 3.24$, confront $M = 2.55$). Bias scores could have been as high as 9 or as low as 1. Public and privately rated bias scores were significantly different for men and women, $F(1, 79) = 4.88, p = .03$. No interactions between gender and condition were significant.

**Discussion**

This research is meant to build upon a self-regulation model designed by Monteith (1993). In her model negself is the catalyst for several regulatory responses among low prejudiced persons. Feelings of negself occur when a low prejudice person is made aware of their own biased behaviors. This allows them to form connections between the situation and their negative feelings. In similar situations low prejudice people are reminded of their bias and make attempts to respond in ways which more closely represent their ideal responses. It was considered here that negother might provide a similar mechanism for high prejudiced persons. Negother, being a disagreeable state, might also allow for the forming of connections between the confrontation situation and future chances for expressed bias. However, neither of these effects was significantly different for control and confronted participants when considered as a main effect.

It was considered that negother would be particularly strong among participants who were higher in prejudice, people who were more strongly externally motivated. This was expected because previous research has found that negother increases among those who are low
IMS high EMS (Montieth et al., 1993). However, there were no direct differences between negother based on Internal or External Motivation. When considered together Internal and External Motivation did have a significant effect on negother. The effect is wholly unexpected, as it is entirely driven by the control condition. It appears that for persons who are low in Internal Motivation as they become more Externally Motivated their feelings of negother decrease. An attempt to explain this could be made by noting that for a person who has little self-guided principle for prejudice reduction as their other-guided principles become more important it might be more difficult to dislike someone else for determining the situation. This ambient niceness then disappears when that person confronts them about their lack of personal standards.

However, this extrapolation is purely hypothetical and exists mostly as an attempt to explain the inconsistent findings rather than to suggest absolute truth. We also found that high External Motivation was related to positive feelings such that as External Motivation increased so did positive feelings. These positive feelings might explain why control condition low Internally Motivated, high Externally motivated participants felt less negother; they are happier people in general, except when confronted.

Affect was measured twice for each participant, once following the confrontation manipulation and once after the private joke ratings. Negself significantly decreased over the course of the study, although this decrease is led almost completely by an interaction with condition. The diminishment of negself feelings is primarily driven by the confronted condition. This decrease can be understood by the passing of time since the confrontation as the sting of the confrontation may have seemed less important once participants were able to reflect upon it. Also, the opportunity to respond to more biased material in accordance with the social norms
might have encouraged positive feelings for confronted participants, as they had the opportunity to validate themselves as not being biased.

Feelings of negother also changed during the course of the study and these changes were different depending upon condition. In confronted participants negother diminished as the study progressed, probably for the same reasons that negself decreased in the same group. In the control condition another pattern emerges. Control participants felt greater feelings of negother as the study progressed. While this might not initially appear reasonable once a flaw in the affect measure is considered the increase in negother is understandable. The affect measure used to get a sense of participants’ affect is non-directive. While we assume that the initially greater negself in the control condition is probably related to their feelings about the confederate’s confrontation, which is reasonable as those feelings diminish over time, there is another more likely possibility for control participants. Freed from any outside criticism of their own enjoyment of the biased jokes these participants are well able to consider two groups of people when viewing the jokes- those who created the jokes and those who are targeted by the jokes. It cannot be determined who control participants are feeling more negative toward as the study progresses, indeed the combination of motivations might vary which group the negative feelings are toward, something which should be considered in further study.

Our manipulation of the confrontation situation was marginally effective at eliciting behavioral inhibition among confronted participants. Confronted participants rated the biased jokes as less humorous than did control participants in public. This was expected because confrontations establish a norm of egalitarianism in which finding biased jokes such as these to be humorous would be inappropriate. The established norm encourages participants to provide lower humor ratings of these jokes. However, the difference between the two groups in their
privately rated biased jokes was not significant. The lack of difference between the two groups for private ratings of the humorous material existed because the new norm of egalitarianism was not maintained in private. It should be mentioned that when the jokes were rated is completely confounded with the jokes. Jokes which were rated publicly were always rated publicly and the same for privately rated jokes. It is possible, then, that the increase in bias scores shown by both groups in the private condition is in response to the actually greater humor of those particular jokes.

It was not expected that confronted participants would show decreased bias privately, because we did utilize people who were more externally motivated and in the absence of external pressure they would not control their responses to be in line with outside pressure once that pressure is removed. Initially we hypothesized that the confronting condition would backlash after social pressure was removed and would, consequently, rate the biased jokes in private much more favorably than would the control condition. The confronted group did not rate the private jokes much more favorably than the control condition, but they did respond to the removal of social pressure by exerting less control over their own responses. Confronted participants may not have backlashed for a few reasons: possibly our selection of high prejudiced students was ineffective, the confrontation was not strong enough to elicit the necessary other-directed negative emotion required in order to propel the humor of the private jokes, or the large deviations of the privately rated jokes are concealing the effect.

In response to these explanations of a lack of backlash we can begin with the first argument that the selection of high prejudice people was ineffective. When first validating the IMS and EMS scales Plant and Devine (1998) reported a set of descriptive statistics about their sample. For the EMS component of the measure Plant and Devine (1998) reported a mean of
4.61, and a standard deviation of 1.96. In our sample the mean was 5.81 with a standard deviation of 1.53, suggesting that our sample is comparable, also noting the disparate locations and populations our samples are from.

The second possible explanation of no backlash is that the confrontation did not elicit enough other-directed negative emotion. This is a very real possibility, as the between condition differences are not significant for both negother and negself. Our manipulation statement of “Whoa, those last couple of jokes crossed the line” was not designed to be direct or particularly harsh. Previous research has considered the effect of harsh confrontations and found that negself does not differ because of threat type, but negother is stronger among those who were more harshly confronted, compared to a mild confrontation (Czopp et al., 2006). However, we should note that harsh confrontations were not more effective at decreasing subsequent biased responding (Czopp et al., 2006). Future research should reconsider the issue by utilizing a stronger confrontation statement.

The large standard deviations in expressed bias privately when compared to expressed bias publicly may be caused by social expectations. Participants may have been constrained by the social situation to act in more normative ways when making public evaluations which were not present in private evaluations. These constraints led to decreased variability in publicly expressed bias. In private participants felt more able to respond according to their own beliefs, which can be expected for both confronted and control groups. Condition effects in privately expressed bias might have existed in a larger sample.

We intended to select for high prejudice participants, high EMS low IMS, in this study. Due to the need for greater participation our study was opened up to include participants outside of these criteria. We examined our data for possible differences among participants who are
actually low prejudice, those who are low EMS, high IMS. None of our participants met the
criteria of having EMS scores two standard deviations below the mean and also having IMS
scores two standard deviations above the mean.

Our decision to use an adapted version of Plant and Devine’s motivation scales did allow
us to provide multiple types of biased materials in the study. Some of the jokes targeted
homosexuals, some women, some Black people, and others the obese. This diversity of bias
could have been tested with several separate groups and a much larger sample size, which would
have been if not impossible, then impractical in a college sample. Altering the scale allowed us
to create a general level of bias which might have helped sell the cover story to participants.
Focusing on one type of bias might have been too obvious. However, the alteration to the scales
could conceal actual variability in the motivations of our participants. It is possible that someone
who is highly internally motivated to be non-prejudiced toward Black people might also be non-
motivated to be non-prejudiced toward homosexuals. Potentially our adaptation of Plant and
Devine’s scales could explain why there were no effects by IMS and EMS scores.

The confrontation manipulation led to decreased expressed prejudice in public and at
least equal expressed prejudice in private. This unexpected result is favorable because a backlash
in privately expressed prejudice did not occur, rather expressed bias returned to what it might
otherwise have been before the manipulation. It is less positive because low prejudice persons
when confronted show decreases in expressed prejudice both in public and in private (Czopp et
al., 2006). This suggests that confronting high prejudice persons might not be enough to
effectively diminish their private bias directly. However, if publicly expressed bias is inhibited
people may come to believe themselves to be less biased, as would be in line with their behavior,
thus decreasing their own bias over time and contributing to the low bias public norm.
Outside research has found that low prejudice persons have a different strategy for handling interracial interactions than do high prejudice persons (Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 2010). Plant et al. (2010) found that low prejudice, high IMS people, practiced approach-focused behaviors which led to more positive outcomes than did high EMS people who practiced avoidance behaviors. Plant et al. (2010) suggest that these behaviors reflect the avoidance used by high EMS people. The avoidance strategy utilized by high prejudiced persons often leads to their appearance of being more prejudiced than people who utilize approach behaviors. Plant et al. (2010) found that this appearance led to more negative evaluations of the participant by a Black confederate and overall lower interaction quality. After a confrontation high EMS low IMS participants seem to return to their avoidance strategies, which replicate the issue. Encouraging approach behavior in public might lead to the acceptance of a new norm for behavior which would affect a change in expressed motivation for these participants in private.
References


Table 1

*Factor Structure of Affect Components by Eigenvalue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negself</th>
<th>Discomfort</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negother</th>
<th>Lost</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Self-angry</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guilty</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Embarrassed</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bothered</td>
<td>.489</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Self-annoy</td>
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<td>Regretful</td>
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<td>Self-disgust</td>
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<td>Helpless</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncomfort</td>
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<td>Friendly</td>
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<td>Happy</td>
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<td>Energetic</td>
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<td>Good</td>
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<td>Fearful</td>
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<td>Other-angry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other-disgus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frustrated</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Threatened</td>
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<td>.531</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**BOLD** indicates a distinction between this factor analysis and Devine et al. (1991). An asterisk has been placed where an item fit into Devine et al.’s factor structure but not this one.
Table 2

Means of Bias Scores and Affect Factors by Condition and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Confront</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Bias</td>
<td>4.42 (1.17)</td>
<td>4.69 (1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Bias</td>
<td>3.50 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.94 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Bias</td>
<td>4.31 (2.39)</td>
<td>3.24 (2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negself one</td>
<td>1.65 (1.04)</td>
<td>1.70 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negother one</td>
<td>1.71 (.88)</td>
<td>1.65 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negself two</td>
<td>1.61 (.89)</td>
<td>1.71 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negother two</td>
<td>1.62 (.93)</td>
<td>1.98 (1.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M (SD). * p <.1. ** p <.05. Tests of significance are within a condition. Bias scores could range from 1 to 9, with higher scores reflecting greater bias. All of the affect factors could range from 1 to 7, with higher scores showing more of that feeling.
Table 3
Correlations of Variables within the Control Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IMS</th>
<th>EMS</th>
<th>Negself1</th>
<th>Negother1</th>
<th>Positive1</th>
<th>Bias2</th>
<th>Bias3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>-.174</td>
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<td>-.103</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.203</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
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<td>.003</td>
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<td>Negself1</td>
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<td>-.212</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.030</td>
<td>.245</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bias2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.679***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias3</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Significance .05*, .01**, .001***
Table 4

Correlations of Variables within the Confrontation Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IMS</th>
<th>EMS</th>
<th>Negself1</th>
<th>Negother1</th>
<th>Positive1</th>
<th>Bias2</th>
<th>Bias3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
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<td>.029</td>
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<td>-.479**</td>
<td>-.575***</td>
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<td>.074</td>
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<td>.011</td>
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Significance .05*, .01**, .001***
Figure 1. Interaction of Internal Motivation, External Motivation, and Condition for Negothe
Figure 2. Means of Public and Privately Rated Bias by Condition
Figure 3. Change in Negself over time and by Condition.
Figure 4. Change in Negother over time and by Condition.
Celebrity Statement RATED BY CONFEDERATE, Read aloud by participant

Baseline bias measure, before the manipulation

Please rate the following statements on a 1 (not at all funny) to a 9 (very humorous) scale.

Ratings

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9

Sample: Mark Twain “Clothes make the man. Naked people have little to no influence on society.” ___

1) Jack Nicholson: “My mother never saw the irony in calling me a son-of-a-bitch.” ___

3) Robin Williams: "Ah, yes, divorce, from the Latin word meaning to rip out a man's genitals through his wallet." ___

5) Mariah Carey: “Whenever I watch TV and see those poor starving kids all over the world, I can’t help but cry. I mean I’d love to be skinny like that, but not with all those flies and death and stuff.” ___

7) Billy Crystal: “Women need a reason to have sex. Men just need a place.” ___

9) Rod Stewart: "Instead of getting married again, I'm going to find a woman I don't like and just give her a house." ___
Celebrity Statement RATED BY PARTICIPANT, Read aloud by confederate

Baseline bias measure, before the manipulation

Please rate the following statements on a 1 (not at all funny) to a 9 (very humorous) scale.

Ratings

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Sample: Mark Twain “Clothes make the man. Naked people have little to no influence on society.”

2) Barbara Bush: “Clinton lied. A man might forget where he parks or where he lives, but he never forgets oral sex, no matter how bad it is.”

4) Britney Spears: “I’ve never really wanted to go to Japan. Simply because I don’t like eating fish. And I know that’s very popular out there in Africa.”

6) Dustin Hoffman: "There's a new medical crisis. Doctors are reporting that many men are having allergic reactions to latex condoms. They say they cause severe swelling. So what's the problem?"

8) Arnold Schwarzenegger: "I saw a woman wearing a sweatshirt with "Guess" on it. I said, "Thyroid problem?"

10) Tiger Woods: “Hockey is a sport for white men. Basketball is a sport for black men. Golf is a sport for white men dressed like black pimps.”
Jokes

RATED BY PARTICIPANT, Read aloud by confederate

This material was used for the Public Bias measure, post confrontation

Please rate the following jokes on a 1 (not at all funny) to a 9 (very humorous) scale.

Ratings

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<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. How can you tell if a Valentine card is from a leper? The tongue is still in the envelope. ____

3. I was in the city the other day when a drunk came up to me and said “For ten dollars I’ll teach you how to talk like an Indian.” I said “How?” He said, “See you’re learning already.” ___

5. What do you call a fat Chinese man? A chunk. ___

7. How do you keep an idiot in suspense? I’ll tell you later. ___

9. What do you call a Black person in court? Guilty. ___

11. Why are frogs always so happy? They eat anything that bugs them. ____

13. How many gay guys does it take to screw in a light bulb? One, as long as there's plenty of oil and he's real careful. ___

15. A man walks into a bar and asks “do you serve women in this bar?” “No”, replies the barman, “You have to bring your own.” ____
Jokes

RATED BY CONFEDERATE, Read aloud by participant

This material was used for the Public Bias measure, post confrontation

Please rate the following jokes on a 1 (not at all funny) to a 9 (very humorous) scale.

Ratings

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

2. What is soft and warm when you go to bed, but hard and stiff when you wake up? Vomit. ___

4. Why is the old worn-out horse named flattery? Because it will get you nowhere. ___

6. In Kentucky what do tornadoes and divorces have in common? Either way, someone is going to lose a trailer. ___

8. How many housewives does it take to screw in a light bulb? None! What the hell are they doing out of the kitchen!? ___

10. Why does an elephant have four feet? Because six inches isn't long enough. ___

12. Why do Black people smell? So blind people can hate them too. ___

14. What is the definition of Trust? Two cannibals giving each other a blow job. ___

16. What do gynecologists and pizza delivery boys have in common? They can both smell it, but can't eat it. ___
Jokes

RATED BY PARTICIPANT (BELIEVED TO BE RATED BY BOTH)

This material was used for the Private Bias measure, after separating the confederate and participant

Please rate the following jokes on a 1 (not at all funny) to a 9 (very humorous) scale.

Ratings

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9

Did you hear about Microsoft's new hard drive? It has five millisecond access, fits in a PC-Card slot, and has UNLIMITED space. Unfortunately, they haven't finished formatting it yet. ___

Someone bought Scrooge a clock for Christmas. He put it straight into the bank. Why did he do that? He was trying to save time. ___

What’s the difference between a Black man and a pizza? A pizza can feed a family of four. ___

“Granddad, do you know how to croak?” “I don’t think so, Steven, why?” “Because dad says he’ll be rich when you do.” ___

What’s the difference between St. Patrick’s Day and Martin Luther King Day? On St. Patrick’s Day everyone wants to be Irish. ___

What's the worst thing about being a test-tube baby? You know your Dad is a wacker. ___

Where do you find a dog with no legs? Where you left it. ___

Why did the chicken cross the road, roll in the mud, and then cross the road again? It wanted to be a dirty double-crosser. ___
Affect Measure 1

Completed by Participant (Believed to be completed also by Confederate)

This material was completed immediately post confrontation

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Below are words that can describe different types of feelings. For each word, please indicate how much it describes how you are feeling by circling a number on the scale. “1” means “does not apply at all,” and “7” means “applies very much” to how you are feeling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does not Apply at all</th>
<th>Applies Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fearful</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Angry at myself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Friendly</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Guilty</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Consistent</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Angry at others</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Uneasy</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Depressed</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Happy</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Embarrassed</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bothered</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Anxious</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Frustrated</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Annoyed at myself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Energetic</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Regretful</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Irritated at others</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Disappointed with myself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Tense</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
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<td>20. Disgusted with myself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Threatened</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Optimistic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Disgusted with others</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Content</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Low</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Uncomfortable</td>
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<td>27. Sad</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Helpless</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>29. Shame</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Neutral</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Self-critical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Good</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. Is anything in particular affecting how you feel at this moment?
Affect Measure 2

Completed by Participant (Believed to be completed also by Confederate)

This material was completed immediately after completing private bias measure

INSTRUCTIONS: Below are words that can describe different types of feelings. For each word, please indicate how much it describes how you are feeling by circling a number on the scale. “1” means “does not apply at all,” and “7” means “applies very much” to how you are feeling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>Angry at others</td>
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<td>Disappointed with myself</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
20. Disgusted with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Optimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Disgusted with others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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26. Uncomfortable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. Helpless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. Shame 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Self-critical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

33. Is anything in particular affecting how you feel at this moment?

34. What is your age?
35. Are you male/ female?

36. What do you consider to be your race/ethnicity?

37. What do you consider to be your sexual orientation (heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual)?
This measure was completed as a preliminary to participation in the study. This scale was modified from its original, single target use, to a more general use.

**IMS-EMS**

**Instructions**: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward members of a variety of social groups (e.g., African Americans, women, etc.). Some of the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations, whereas others reflect more external-social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other. In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. We are simply trying to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly.

Please give your response according to the scale below:

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<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

____ 1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people because it is personally important to me.

____ 2. Because of today’s PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced.

____ 3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced.

____ 4. I try to hide any negative thoughts about people different from me in order to avoid negative reactions from others.

____ 5. Being nonprejudiced is important to my self-concept.

____ 6. If I acted prejudiced, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.

____ 7. According to my personal values, using stereotypes is OK.

____ 8. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced in order to avoid disapproval from others.

____ 9. I try to act nonprejudiced because of pressure from others.

____ 10. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes is wrong.