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Is there power in perception?: perceived economic condition and perceived immigrant population their impact on negative attitudes towards immigrants

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Is There Power in Perception?:
Perceived Economic Condition and Perceived Immigrant Population
Their Impact on Negative Attitudes towards Immigrants

By

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Accepted in Partial Completion
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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Master's Thesis

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Joshua Martin

November 22, 2011

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A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of
Western Washington University

by
Joshua Martin
November 2011

Abstract

This study examines some of the potential underlying conditions that trigger prejudice against immigrants in Western Europe. The specific factors of economic concerns and perceptions of immigration population are used to generate three hypotheses 1) that economic concerns and perceptions of large immigrant populations drive negative attitude formation toward immigrants, and these factors are especially acute when they interact, 2) the two factors contribute to negative attitude formation regardless of societal context, and 3) that the two factors of study are not spurious and are able to withstand the factoring in of exclusionary variables. The study uses the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey for testing and finds that the hypotheses are partially confirmed. Economic concern is a factor when an individual is thinking about their country at large and when personal concerns interact with perceptions of high immigration, however the degree to which these factors influence negative attitude formation may be tempered by societal context. The larger finding of this study is that negative attitude formation toward immigrants is largely affected by an individual's personal level of happiness, life satisfaction, and general feelings of fairness and trust. This study is left to conclude that animosity or negative feelings toward immigrants is an external demonstration of internal dissatisfaction, in other words a symptom of an underlying problem rather than a substantial problem unto itself.

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Introduction

Prejudice can apply to almost any sub-set of the human experience. Prejudice towards foods, places, experiences, but the most influential and the most damaging is prejudice towards other people. Prejudice towards others is a prevalent topic in social science because it is so vast and so important. One could not hope to address all the lines of research possible in the area of prejudice, so one must choose what avenue to take. The current study will focus on prejudice towards immigrants.

The many societies of people across the Earth are becoming more and more interconnected through technological means; that make communication and travel faster and easier to access than ever before. As such, people who live in less than satisfactory or indeed, harsh situations will seek better living conditions and a better life in increasing numbers. Depending on the environment of a receiving country the mixing of native and incoming population can almost be seamless or it can cause social turbulence, which has major political and social ramifications.

This study follows a steadily developing literature on prejudice and immigration in Europe. The close proximity of multiple countries with varying political systems and political histories makes prejudice and immigration a key topic for both policy debate and academic study. The issue has become an increasingly controversial and hotly debated topic as the former communist bloc countries, with their highly restrictive immigration policies, sought to transform and morph into more liberal countries at the outset of the early 1990's and beyond; as large segments of the Balkan population are still displaced as refugees from various severe conflicts throughout the 1990's; as the European Union continues to develop

an ever-expanding Schengen agreement, which eases the movement between Schengen countries (Kunovich, 2004 p.22). As these events continue to evolve so too will immigration and its implications. The academic study of majority attitudes toward immigrants has yielded interesting results but there is still room for contributions as the literature is far from reaching a unanimous consensus (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010).

Even though there are many definitions of prejudice, the current study will use but one as its guide. The definition given by Ashmore (1970) is simple and effective, “Prejudice is a negative attitude toward a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be a member of that group” (p. 253). This study uses this definition to guide it in an attempt to find answers about attitude formation toward immigrants in Western Europe. Indeed, it is the quandary of immigration in Western Europe that drives this research, this study attempts to answer what the underlying factors for negative attitudes towards immigrants are. This study presents three hypotheses: (1) both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant group size will have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity towards immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when both independent variables are combined to form an interaction term. (2) This relationship will be confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in the study. (3) This relationship will remain significant after controlling for both individual level variables and state-level aggregate variables. This study finds partial evidence to support the first two hypotheses, while finding evidence that requires the rejection of the third.

Immigration Motivation

Perhaps not surprisingly the motivation for immigrants to move into new home countries is the desire to improve their economic standing; for most this means staying in their adopted home country, yet for some, the arrangement is only meant to be temporary with a future return to their previous homes intended (Quillian, p.590-91). Even less surprising, these movements of people generally flock towards countries with more affluent economies and wherever they settle, new migrants are directly competitive with low-wage and manual workers because most immigrants find employment in manual labor jobs (Quillian, p.591); indeed, there is a geographic mobility among immigrants from lower developed countries to industrially developed ones (Safran 1997) The manual labor the immigrants are able to find are often unpleasant and sometimes dangerous to the point where there is resistance from the native population to perform it (Sides and Citrin, p.478).

This process really started in the 1950s and 1960s when many Western European nations started to enjoy immense economic growth; with such rapid growth these countries faced labor shortages (McLaren, p.909). To address the potential labor shortage problem these countries started importing people from countries where the supply of laborers was in abundance (McLaren, p.909). Standard labor-market dynamics provide all the motivation immigrants needed to pursue work on foreign soil. When the gains of labor in a foreign country offset the costs of migrating the rational actor, in this case the immigrant will migrate to try to earn higher wages (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.100).

The situation has since ballooned to enormous proportions. As the 21st century drew nearer approximately 200 million people around the year 2005 lived as migrants outside their

area of birth (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.99). The figure of 200 million is an increase from 154 million in 1990; it is also worth noting that 1 in 10 of the residents in advanced industrialized societies is an immigrant (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.99).

Real World Consequences of Prejudice Towards

Immigrants

Public opposition to the presence of ethnic minorities and immigrants has swelled in many Western European countries since the Second World War (Karapin, p. 312). The tension has only increased as over the last several decades immigration has become a more and more visible and problematic issue (Rustenbach, p.53). For most developed nations there has been a rise of anti-immigrant attitudes, which are often associated with economic conditions and a rising number of immigrants (Rustenbach, p.53). As the number of global migrants continues to grow, there is also a growing need to understand the foundational root-causes of hostility and resentment toward immigrants (Rustenbach, p.54). Developing an understanding of these root causes can have implications for policy makers; it can perhaps aid nations to become more effective and efficient in integrating immigrants in a manner that can be seen as culturally and economically beneficial while decreasing conflict and turmoil (Rustenbach, p.54).

A visible example of public turmoil fueled by angst surrounding the immigration issues are riots¹ that have occurred at various points in time in some European countries. In Britain for example, there have been at least six major riots in the 20th century (Karapin, p. 318). Episodes occurring in Liverpool (1948), the Deptford neighborhood of London (1949), the Notting Hill neighborhood of London (1958), Nottingham (1958), Middlesbrough (1961), and Dudley (1962) (Karapin, p. 318) are illustrative of the extremely violent affect the

¹ Here defined by Karapin (2000) as “intense physical violence, with an ethnic or racial motive, by a large number of people belonging to a dominant ethnic group against members of a minority group or their property” (p. 212).

immigration can have. As it pertains to the current study it is informative to try and explore the reasons behind the eruption of these riots.

The riots in Liverpool and Deptford had up to 2,000 and 1,000 whites participate in attacking Black residents of hostels (Karapin, p. 321). Other examples of riots appear in Germany. In the case of Liverpool the sudden arrival and settlement of black, West Indians caused an already festering conflict between black and white sailors over ship jobs to sour further (Karapin, p. 322). In both cases, concentration of the black population into hostels seemed to intensify cultural differences between the new residents and the white population in the neighboring areas (Karapin, p. 322). Discrimination in the housing system forced the new residents into the hostels; after the black population rose to a high enough number the increased visibility made them a target for attackers (Karapin, p.322). After 1950 it became less common to have new settlers forced into hostels as policies on housing introduced quotas to keep concentration down and newer settlers increasingly settled with previously established residents (Karapin, p. 322-23).

At the end of August of 1958 in Nottingham violence began to brew and would only grow as a anti-immigrant campaign began; shortly thereafter, the violence would spill to the Notting Hill neighborhood of London (Karapin, p. 325). As local political leadership (much of which was far-right) and sensationalistic media immersed themselves in the situation the rioting became prolonged and intensified (Karapin, p. 325-26). While the turmoil which began in Nottingham would eventually capture national attention it initially started away from the spotlight (Karapin, p. 325). The factors that ignited the rioting were said to be cultural conflicts, which were made worse by competition for material gains in conjunction

with aggression pursued by young local working-class whites as well a general passivity of local police; these factors were even more intense in the Notting Hill situation (Karapin, p. 325-26). Ironically, as far as the fear of economic competition is concerned, although rumors of increased competition would help fan the proverbial flames of the riots it seems that these fears were generally unfounded as the comparisons of the unemployment rate indicates (about 14 percent for the black population and about 1 percent for the white population) (Karapin, p.326).

In August 1961 in Middlesborough shops that belonged to Pakistanis and “Arabs” were victimized (Karapin, p. 328). The Middlesborough incident was sparked by the arrest of an “Arab” in connection to a murder of a local youth (Karapin, p.328). Shortly thereafter in Dudley in late July and early August of 1962 crowds gathered with the specific purpose of targeting black members of the population (Karapin, p.328). As far as Middlesborough is concerned it is likely that the fact that the ballooning population of immigrants from South Asia during 1960-1961 (which itself was in response to the fear that immigration controls would soon tighten) and a marginal increase in unemployment as a result of newly passed austerity measures in July of 1961 fueled hostilities that led to rioting (Karapin, p. 329). However, perhaps more important than the above mentioned factors in relation to the riots is the fact the burgeoning cultural conflicts were blossoming; especially after the release of the Arab who had been arrested on suspicion of a fatal stabbing of a local white youth (Karapin, p.329). The Dudley riots on the other hand can almost entirely be traced back to the passage of the immigration act of 1962, with the possible goal that more violence would lead to

further political action against the black population that was already present not just any new members that may want to enter the country (Karapin, p.329).

From 1986 to 1997 six notable riots occurred in Germany via the catalyst of immigration, especially during the August-September period of 1992 (Karapin, p.319). Briefly these riots occurred in: Hoyerswerda (May 1, 1990), Hoyerswerda (Sept. 18-22, 1991), Rostock (Aug. 22-26, 1992), Cottbus (Aug. 28-30, 1992), Eisenhüttenstadt (Sept. 5-6, 1992) and Quedlinburg (Sept. 7-11, 1992). The first incident in Hoyerswerda on May 1, 1990 was a brief but volatile event which saw between 150 to 200 German youths violently engage fifty foreign nationals from Mozambique; who were in the country for labor purposes (Karapin, p. 331). The initial incident in Hoyerswerda can be attributed to long-standing cultural conflicts between the German population and the increasingly arriving African workforce (Karapin, p. 331). The repressive structure of the former communist East Germany separated the native and foreign populations, thus fanning the flames of mistrust; as the old system fell there was no system in place as yet to keep conflict from forming (Karapin, p. 331).

The second event in Hoyerswerda occurred as several German youths attacked Vietnamese laborers (Karapin, p. 332). Much like the first riot, cultural conflicts were responsible for much of the violence that occurred, especially as foreign workers were concentrated to certain neighborhoods (Karapin, p.332-33). The riots in Hoyerswerda were significant but it is the events that occurred in Rostock that retain the most notoriety. Occurring in August 1992 hundreds of German youths would storm a foreign worker hostel in Lichtenhagen eventually setting it on fire (Karapin, p. 334). The national political

environment, dominated by the anti-asylum campaign contributed heavily to the aggression displayed in Rostock (Karapin, p. 334). The political environment inspired action by extreme-right groups who were already hostile towards foreigners for reasons similar to the Hoyerswerda events; the events of Rostock suggest coordination on the part of extreme-right groups on the attack of the hostel (Karapin, p.334-35). In the weeks following Rostock, three other riots occurred that were minor in comparison, all of which followed the pattern of German youths attacking hostels housing foreign workers (Karapin, p. 337).

Riots are not the only phenomenon that has political ramifications for immigrants. If a perception exists that there is sufficient public support there might also be national legislative campaigns² targeting immigrants. In Britain, for example the first such campaign was small in scope occurring between 1954 and 1955; when some conservative members of parliament began to openly question the Churchill administration on the issue of immigration, leading to a formal debate on the matter in November 1944 (Karapin, p. 316). The second notable campaign to occur in Britain took place in 1958 as Cyril Osborne, with assistance from conservative members of parliament and some members of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's administration; led the call to curb immigration from the Caribbean, India, and Pakistan (Karapin, p.316 & 318). The third and fourth campaigns of note occurred from 1960-62 as conservatives campaigned vigorously for controls on immigration (Karapin, p.318). The last campaign ended with the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in April 1962; which effectively cut immigration from about 90,000 per year to 40,000 (Karapin, p.318). Interestingly, even as the Labour party took power in 1964, immigrations

² Here defined by Karapin (2000) as "a series of efforts by individual politicians, political parties, national interest groups, and/or local residents groups to change national laws or regulations in order to reduce foreign immigration rates" (p. 212).

controls were maintained at status quo and in 1965 tightened through increased regulations (Karapin, p.318). It is useful to probe deeper into these campaigns in attempt to ascertain how immigration played a role in their occurrence.

In 1954 reports of increasing conflicts between whites and blacks involving issues such as: discrimination in employment, housing, and dance halls coincided with an increasing population of new black residents, thus fueling a campaign aimed at curtailing immigration (Karapin, p. 323). As the new black settlers attempted to gain entry in the normal environment that whites enjoyed (such as jobs and social establishments), efforts were made by white residents to exclude them (Karapin, p. 325). The racial conflict presented itself in many different cities thus, gaining legislative attention at the national level; mainly, the attention revolved around anti-immigrant positions (Karapin, p.325).

The violence that would occur in Nottingham served as a launching pad for two members of parliament from the city to begin a campaign for immigration-control (Karapin, p. 325). As violence worsened in Nottingham and Notting Hill national politicians used the opportunity to both denounce the violence and call for the first-major post war immigration-control initiative (Karapin, p.325).

The next significant period of anti-immigrant campaigning in Britain came in 1960 and lasted through 1962. Starting in 1960 members of parliament pushed the notion of controls on immigration; the campaign for immigration control would intensify in November of 1961 and this period of intensity would last until April of 1962 (Karapin, p. 325). This period would ultimately conclude with the passage of the immigration act of 1962, but the passage of the act would not signal the end of vigorous debate. Two more anti-immigrant

campaigns would occur from September 1964 and December 1965 (Karapin, p.330). These campaigns were used by some conservative parliament members as active campaign issues; the strategy would have some success and even as the Labour party which generally disliked the new anti-immigrant policies came into power the successful use of the immigrant issue would force Labour to bend closer to the conservative position as it increased in popularity among the public (Karapin, p.330). Britain is not the only West European country to have campaigns against immigration as Germany has also seen its share of anti-immigrant campaigns.

Campaigns to put limitations on the rights of asylum seekers were present in West Germany in 1978; these were followed by periods of debate in 1980, 1982, and 1986 (Karapin, p. 319). While these periods could be informative, there have been campaigns that occurred soon before and well after re-unification that are more informative. Between 1989 and 1994 there have been six periods of notable campaigns against immigration, especially from asylum seekers (Karapin, p.318). For Germany, the basic conflict arose between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in conjunction with the Christian Social Union (CSU) against the Social Democratic Party (SPD) over the amending over the national constitution (Karapin, p. 319).

In February 1989 there was a unexpected vote share of 7.5 percent for the far-right Republikaner Party in the elections of West Berlin, this event served as a partial catalyst for debate (Karapin, p. 319). Another event the further pushed the debate about restrictions was the national elections campaign of August-October 1990 which saw SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine support restrictions (Karapin, p. 319). Another notable period of contention came

in September-November 1991 when the CSU and CDU lead the charge for the amendment change (Karapin, p. 319). Contentions arose once more in January-June 1992 (reaching a zenith in April) as the amendment issue was used to success by far-right parties for the state elections held in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein (Karapin, p. 319). Another period of debate occurred between August 1992 and January 1993 when the amendment campaign of the CSU and CDU earned the support of the SPD leadership (Karapin, p. 319). Finally, there was a brief spike in debate in May of 1993 when internal arguments about the amendment issue occurred within the SPD shortly before the amendment would be passed (Karapin, p. 319). Ultimately, the amendment would reduce the applications for asylum down to 100,000 a year, from a high of about 300,000 a year that occurred from 1990-1993(Karapin, p. 319).

Whether one is discussing riots or legislative campaigns this much is certain, these forms of political action are potent in gaining space in the national political conversation; and thusly, help increase chances of increasingly restrictive immigration policies, especially when the two actions are combined to strengthen one another (Karapin, p. 212).

Modern riots in France in October and November of 2005 and the violence provoked by the anti-Muslim cartoons that appeared in print in Denmark in 2005 (Rustenbach, p.54) are some of the latest examples of antagonistic action that has the potential of upsetting the political orders of those nations. However, these examples are somewhat isolated incidents; political parties have infinitely more potential in influencing the political order of any given society. Prejudice is the most damaging when it is allowed to seep into a nation's institutions and institutionalized discrimination becomes manifest (Quillian, p.588). Institutionalized,

prejudice can be self-perpetuating. Institutions can generate and fuel political conflict by opening opportunities and creating incentives for elites to gather and steer the population towards one potential threat or another (Weldon, p.331) (in this case permanently towards immigration); also institutions help form the characteristics and environment of political discourse (Weldon, p.331).

Carried out to its logical conclusion, if prejudice is institutionalized then, the political environment toward minority groups would become permanently hostile and venomous. Increased support for anti-immigrant political parties like the *Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs* in Austria or *Front National* in France (Rustenbach, p.54) and parties in the Flanders portion of Belgium (van der Brug, Fennema, Tillie, p. 537) demonstrates the weight the immigration issue carries among the polities of Europe and how potential exists for prejudice to seep into the various political institutions. For instance, as extreme right parties gain continued and increased success, other parties in response shift closer to the positions of the extreme right, thus, legitimizing the extreme right in the mainstream political discussion (Jackman and Volpert, p.503). For example in France in 1991 as a result of relentless pressure by extreme right parties to repeal benefits that immigrants (particularly illegal) received; Socialist Prime Minister Edith Cresson uncharacteristically, became voluntarily aggressive against illegal immigrants (Jackman and Volpert, p.503-504).

To illustrate the importance of the immigration issue for some European electorates, it is effective to turn toward some previous research. Given the history of the Europe in the 20th century it comes as little surprise that the factors that determine the success (to the extent that there is any) of extreme right parties. Golder (2003) differentiates extreme right parties

into two categories: neo-fascist and populist parties. Among a sample of both parties immigration played a positive statistically significant role in gaining vote share for extreme-right parties (Golder, p.451). When tested separately, immigration did not play a statistically significant role among neo-fascist parties but it does play a positive significant role among populist extreme-right parties in gaining vote share, only losing significance when the interaction term of unemployment and immigration is factored in, which was also a positive significant factor in extreme right populist parties gaining vote share (Golder, p.451).

Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers (2002) also studied extreme-right voting in Western Europe. Their findings indicate that an immigration-restrictive climate increases extreme-right wing voting (Lubbers et al., p. 363); however they found this result to be spurious upon factoring in the strength of extreme-right wing parties (Lubbers et al., p.365). The findings seem to indicate that the stronger the organization of extreme-right parties in a given country the less explanatory power an restrictive immigration environment has (Lubbers et al., p.365). Most importantly as it relates to this study is that Lubbers et al. (2002) found that individuals possessing anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for extreme-right parties (Lubbers et al., p.363 & 365); this finding thus begs the question of, what are the factors that would influence an individual to form anti-immigrant attitudes? It is precisely this question the current study works to address.

The link between immigration issues and right-wing populist parties is further established by Ivarsflaten (2008). Ivarsflaten (2008) posits that right-wing populist parties did not find success without using the immigration mobilization grievance (Ivarsflaten, p. 14). Evidence further suggests that as restrictive immigration policies become increasingly

popular the probability electorally successful populist right-wing parties rises, for seven countries across Western Europe (Ivarsflaten, p. 16-17). Once again, the question is what makes the idea of more restrictive policy preferences more appealing? The research undertaken in the current study aims to shed some light on the matter. By attempting to find the factors behind the formation of negative attitudes toward immigrants there can be further understanding as to why a restrictive immigration may or may not be appealing.

As can be seen from research issues relating to immigration are becoming an important part of the European political agenda, contributing to the importance of the immigration issue is the ever evolving phenomenon of the continued integration of more and more societies into an overarching whole (the modern day European Union for example), while citizens of these societies remain loyal to their national identities (Sides and Citrin, p.477).

As recently as the year 2000, according to one poll, 39 percent of Europeans think that friction between different ethnic groups will diminish if immigration is also diminished (Hjerm, p.1254). Perhaps this number can be attributed to the visibility of contentious debate. Arguments about immigration and the part anti-immigrant parties play in the political environment have generated some of the most intense and emotionally-laden debates, in addition to political and social turmoil in many societies (van der Brug et al., p.538). While, the percentage of the aggregate vote tally for parties on the extreme right in Europe since the 1980's has usually been small, extreme right parties have done much better than expected in raising electoral support (Jackman and Volpert, p.502). The small but growing success of extreme right parties are a subject of focus because the synthesis of

xenophobia and populist anti-system attitudes is in direct opposition to the ideals and norms of tolerance in liberal-democratic polities (Jackman and Volpert, p.502).

Another cause for concern about institutionalized prejudice is the effect on citizenship policy. Citizenship policy could become exclusionary, preventing wide swaths of ethnic minorities membership and thus access to the country in question (Weldon, p.334). In less extreme circumstances an allowance of ethnic minorities could continue, but a requirement could be instituted that allows conditional citizenship based on the strict adherence to the duties, rights, and cultural norms of the majority ethnic group (Weldon, p.334).

The process of this potential outcome starts with policy makers factoring in mass opinion into their decisions (Citrin and Sides, p.49). However, even if policy makers do not take the full weight of mass opinion into consideration, there are still potential political effects to be felt. If there is mass dissatisfaction with immigration in a given nation then opportunistic candidates can use the environment to their advantage and make repeated appeals to the populist fervor; if the appeal to populism works then there could be a period of repeated and prolonged election of increasingly right-wing (at least on the immigration issue) officials. This danger has become a very real concern as, in recent decades; there have been gains of extreme right-wing electoral parties (McLaren, p.910, Weldon, p.331). The continued and prolonged success of extreme right parties are far from a certainty, but if they should continue to find success then their influence will grow and the aforementioned institutionalized discrimination becomes ever the more likely. Thus, because public opinion has the potential to carry serious political effects it is important to study the foundation upon which public opinion rests (Sides and Citrin, p.477).

As minority groups grow in number their power of political mobilization increases and this can be seen as threatening to the majority and/or the powerful (Quillian, p.589). Not only is the election of extreme right-wing officials a possibility but also the occurrence of violence towards ethnic and racial minorities which has been occurring with increased frequency (Weldon, p.331).

Aside from prejudice affecting the political institutions in a direct and formal way, prejudice can also potentially have an influence on subtler, more personal policies in a society. Take for instance the issue of different religions like Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. The differences between these religions and traditional Western religious institutions are usually quite noticeable and stark particularly through standards and practices in attire (McLaren, p.917). The clash of religious cultures between the traditionally Christian (yet, ever more secular) Western Europe and the non-Western religions may generate suspicion and distrust and thus, prejudice (McLaren, p.917). Whether motivated by a sense of secular multiculturalism or fear of foreign cultural takeover, government (particularly if right-wing parties are elected) might opt to impose sanctions against certain practices and manners of dress.

Prejudice Theory

For a topic such as prejudice it is unsurprising to discover that there are many theories to try to explain such a weighty and potentially problematic phenomenon. Some theorize that prejudice exists, specifically in the case of immigrants, simply because of the inability of the host population to relate to the new population. As proposed in the past by Blumer (1958), it can be said that prejudice is a reaction to challenges to the privileges of a group; this is not to say that these privileges are always connected to the individual interests of members of the group (Quillian, p.586). It can also be said, as set forth by Pettigrew (1980), that prejudice is hostility coupled by erroneous generalization; in this way, prejudice is indicative of irrationality and emotional investment (animosity) (Quillian, p.587).

The study of prejudice, especially racial prejudice, historically, has three main avenues of research: a tradition following a social-psychological approach, a path that follows individual- level correlates of prejudice, and investigations based upon theories of self-interest (Quillian, p.587). These three avenues have yielded a large volume of theories and corresponding research. It is informative to briefly discuss the general areas of theory.

A general area of focus stems from a social-psychological perspective prejudice is seen as a result of individual emotional and/or cognitive capacity and functioning that lay underneath the total control of a person's consciousness (Quillian, p.587). Similarly, this line of research has investigated sources of prejudice as the psychological projection of fear and/or anxiety onto other people, a variation of psycho-pathology generated by certain personality characteristics developed as a child or as a demonstration of a reliance on

stereotypes due to limited cognitive functionality and mistaken or misplaced attribution (Quillian, p.587).

Another general approach to the study of prejudice is the use of attitudinal surveys to gauge the effect of background variables. Survey analysis uses statistical procedures and techniques to link a respondent's answers to questions on attitudes about race with individual-level variables like income, marriage status, or education level; past research has demonstrated that there is a fair amount of consistency in the results of this line of study; the working class, older respondents, and the less educated demonstrate more prejudice (Quillian, p.587).

A different line of research on prejudice explores the notion that people form negative feelings and inflexible perceptions toward others with whom they compete with (Quillian, p.587). This field of research posits that individuals form prejudices to serve their interests, and this concern of self interest follows closely with theories of rational-choice; a classic example of this line is the split labor-market theory proposed by Edna Bonacich (Quillian, p.587). A split-labor market occurs when the price for labor varies across ethnic or racial lines; the usual manifestation of these phenomena occurs when members of the majority group actively try to exclude the members of minority groups who are willing to perform comparable labor for lower wages (Kunovich, p.22-23).

One of the most vexing things about the development and practice of prejudicial attitudes is that members of the dominant social group in a society may express a desire for restrictions on immigration or proclaim the aforementioned prejudicial attitudes, even though they may benefit from the low costs associated with employing immigrants who work for

low wages (Quillian, p.588). The three general areas of research have generated multiple theories, it is prudent to discuss eight of them here.

There have been several versions of the first general theory but it can be synthesized under the banner of *cultural marginality theory*, in that, different cultures, different historical struggles, etc. prevent host and immigrant populations from relating to one another (Rustebach, p. 55). The key to this line of thinking lies in the lack of trust between individuals based upon a lack of common factors (Rustebach, p.56). Alternatively, when there is a certain amount of common ground affinity can develop between those in the host population and the immigrant population (Rustebach, p.56). Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders (2002) proposed an alternative viewpoint in that an extreme form of hostility (ethnic exclusionism) can be explained using a hybrid of realistic conflict theory and social identity theory which they dubbed ethnic competition theory (Scheepers, et al. p.18). Simply stated Scheepers et al. (2002) proposed that competition both on an individual and societal scale, may buttress the factors of social (contra-) identification, as a result, eventually ethnic exclusionism will occur.

Some theorists postulate that tolerance and prejudicial attitudes are dependent on the second general theory, human capital. The two main arguments that support human capital theory are: 1) education provides individuals with skills so that they do not have to compete with immigrants for occupational positions and a greater ratio of unskilled immigrants in the population gives the implication of higher wages for skilled workers (Rustebach, p.57). 2) Higher levels of education provide an individual with an expanded worldview which breeds tolerance of different races and cultures (Rustebach, p.57).

The third theory parsimoniously attributes prejudice to *political affiliation* and is concerned with two factors. This theory would suggest that an individual's political leaning (left vs. right) and political involvement dictates either tolerance or prejudice, in relation to immigration (Rustenbach, p.57). Simply put, leftists tend to be more tolerant whereas those on the right tend to be more restrictive and prejudicial; each side is intensified with the more involved and engaged an individual is with the political climate and apparatus in the country (Rustenbach, p.57).

The fourth theory provides a straightforward explanation in *social attachment*. Theories concerned about variations in the individual's level of trust. Those with higher levels of trust (interpersonal, to the government, etc.) will probably be less likely to blame immigrants for societal problems (Rustenbach, p.57). Conversely, those with little trust are probably expressing prejudicial sentiments from either an isolated incident with a member of that particular social group or is just expressing general life dissatisfaction through the prism of prejudice (Rutenbach, p.57). There is however, an alternative definition of social attachment. Social attachment can also mean how concerned an individual is with the continuation of society itself. For instance, if a someone married with three children would be considerably more invested in the general health of society and be wary of anything that could conceivably disrupt that health (like immigration) (Rustenbach, p.58). Therefore one has more familial attachments may be more likely to express prejudice (especially toward immigrants) as a result of a concern that the different social group will be disruptive or damaging to the overall welfare of society (Rusenbach, p.58).

In a related vein to the second meaning of social attachment and the fifth theory is the concern for *neighborhood safety*. An influx of immigrants may create a feeling of uncertainty into the host population and especially if there is a sense of a rising immigrant population, altercations and incidents of violence and crime may be attributed to the immigrant population (Rustenbach, p.58). Therefore, concern about neighborhood safety may make native population more wary of “outsiders” and thus be more suspicious of and prejudicial toward perceived outsiders including immigrants (Rustenbach, p.58).

The sixth line of inquiry is the exploration of the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis, first introduced by Robin M. Williams in 1947 and later emphasized and expounded upon by Gordon Allport in 1954 (McLaren, p. 911), is actually an hypothesis on how to alleviate prejudicial attitudes among individuals. The hypothesis is that contact with members of external or unfavorable (subordinate) groups will diminish prejudicial tendencies against these groups (McLaren, p.911). The key factor in the connection between friendships with minority group members and prejudice relates to the idea that prejudice is the product of a perception of difference in belief systems, cultures, and norms between a person and other people from different groups (McLaren, p.913). If members of different groups interact and realize that they actually share more similarities than differences then prejudicial attitudes should wane (McLaren, p.913). Necessarily, for contact to truly be effective it must be of an intimate nature, as exemplified in friendships (McLaren, p.913). If the assumption is that the contact hypothesis is true than it would follow that its converse, the lack of contact, would then be a factor in increased prejudicial tendencies. Whether, one is studying prejudice under a framework of interest or identity based theories, the common thread that is a necessary

prior condition to prejudice toward immigration (and thus toward immigrants) is a sense of threat (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Where there is a difference and what scholars still debate is the nature of threat and whether the threat is based on an objective sense of economic and social conditions or if the threat is influenced by cultural and psychological orientations (Sides and Citrin, p.478).

In a somewhat less explored line of inquiry the seventh theory offers a focus on *foreign direct investment*. The argument is that the more that a comparatively wealthy country decides to invest in poorer nations information on those nations becomes more available and publicized and thus the more the citizenry learns and understands about the plight of the people in the poorer nation they will be less likely to act harshly towards people from that nation (Rustenbach, p.59).

The above theories are interesting propositions and in the interest of due diligence this study attempts to test variables that related to the theories; however the above theories are not the specific focus of this study. Instead this study focuses on the eighth general theory area, the effects of economic competition and population ratio which is a specific take on the group threat theory that will be discussed below. Of all the potential reasons why a feeling of threat may or may not present itself it is the opinion in this study that economic considerations and population numbers are the most tangible aspects of a threat an individual will experience with immigrants. If an individual in the native population is having difficulty finding work or work that they feel they deserve, or having financial concerns and they hear or see of immigrants coming and finding work then the person can very easily start to feel threatened by the incoming immigrants. Likewise, if an individual hears or simply believes

that the immigration population is on the rise then they may feel the threat of material competition but they might also feel the threat of cultural (language, religion, societal norms etc.) competition. Either one of these factors might be potent on their own but they are likely to be especially acute when they interact with one another. It is this possibility that makes the two factors intriguing for research; indeed, it is the potential explanatory power of the two factors that inspired this study.

The overarching three lines of prejudice research tend to focus on the individual. However, there is also a line of research that focuses on groups writ large; indeed many previous theories have slight differences when the unit of analysis is an individual or the group (McLaren, p.915). These theories tend to consolidate around the concept of group threat, prejudice that stems from perceived challenges to the *groups* position and not necessarily the individual (Quillian, p.588).

Perhaps the most notable scholar of group level prejudicial research was also among its original proponents, Herbert Blumer (Quillian, p. 588). Blumer proposed that prejudice by the dominant group in society was the result of a general sense of threat to the group; prejudice is generated because groups jockey for social positioning against each other (Quillian, p.588). This jockeying for social position can then create fear and anxiety towards other groups or “outgroups”; therefore individuals who identify with their “ingroup” may be fearful of all those that do not belong and it is this fear that is an important predictor of intolerance (Weldon, p.333).

According to Blumer four essential “feelings” are needed for the development of prejudice among members of the dominant group. The first feeling is that the dominant group

needs to feel superior than other groups; the second feeling is a stark and rigid sense of difference between the dominant group and other groups, moreover this sense of difference is an inherent one; third the dominant group feels they are entitled to exclusive claims on certain privileges; lastly, a feeling among the dominant group that subordinate groups want to encroach on the entitled privileges of the dominant group (Quillian, p.588). The underlying point is that the dominant group feels certain benefits that are their exclusive domain, stated otherwise as a sense of group position (Quillian, p.588). Among these potential benefits are higher income, governmental resources and access (McLaren, p.915)

The dominant group and the subordinate groups are according to Blumer, by historically unequal, inter-group power relations (Quillian, p.588). Prejudice is a defensive response to this power struggle, in the sense that there is either an explicit or (most often) implicit challenge to the dominant group's sense of exclusive entitlement (Quillian, p.588). Members of the dominant group are not automatically inclined to respond to challenges with prejudice; however, members of the dominant group are linked by an awareness of group position in comparison to subordinate groups (Quillian, p.588). This theory and line of research has been called "group-threat theory" because, the focus is entirely on threats felt and responded to at a group level (Quillian, p.588). This approach is buttressed by research that demonstrates individuals are not necessarily driven by a strict sense of rational decision-making and are very often focused more on the collective society than themselves (McLaren, p.915).

Over time, "group-threat theory" has been modified and adapted. One of the more notable modification's of Blumer's work is that of Lawrence Bobo. Bobo has proposed that

subordinate groups present a real and tangible threat to the resources available and the preferred practices of the dominant group; Bobo has called this “realistic conflict theory” (Quillian, p.588). What sets Bobo’s work apart from Blumer’s is that Bobo sees a tight coupling of subjective perceptions of group interest and objective, measurable group interests; therefore, to the extent that prejudice exists, it is a result of concerns over real interests and not just the perception of interests that may or may not be tethered to an actual interest of the group (Quillian, p.588-89). Kunovich (2004) also offers a slight variation; disadvantaged groups may actually feel less prejudice than advantage groups if the sense of group threat is lower, which is to say that members of the majority group who are disadvantaged may be less prejudiced than members of the majority group who have more advantage (re: high income) if those with more advantage actually feel a greater sense of threat (Kunovich, p.25). The emphasis of Kunovich’s alteration is that the *feeling* of being threatened supersedes any individual or even group level variable in predicting prejudice toward immigration.

Considerable weight is given to the multiple variations of group threat theory because it has been shown to be meritorious, at least on a surface level; indeed, research has provided evidence that the concept of intergroup threat is a predictor of antipathetic attitudes toward outgroups (Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006). This finding continues to drive group-threat research. Continued research is needed because if intergroup threat is a predictor of negative attitudes it is imperative to learn which threats contribute the most towards negativity, so that perhaps solutions can be proposed to alleviate these threats. This task is made ever the more difficult, and therefore more important, when the evidence suggests that there are multiple

threat factors that are a significant indicator of negative attitudes toward outgroups (Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006).

Another aspect of research on prejudice and on potential indicator of negative attitudes concerns the size of subordinate groups. Perhaps the most famous scholar to explore this area of investigation is Hubert Blalock. Blalock primarily emphasized the importance of the effects of the size of minority group on discrimination and prejudice (Quillian, p.589). According to Blalock two factors link intergroup threat and prejudice; the first factor is that contestation for finite resources is increased with the size of a minority group relative to the dominant group; the second factor, is the potential for political mobilization through the force of numbers; if the numbers of a minority group grow then the strength of their political mobilized population grows as well to the determinant of the political mobilization efforts of the dominant group (Quillian, p.589). When using Blalock's work for research one must be careful because a positive correlation between minority group size and racial inequality does not necessarily mean that there is a causal relationship between minority group size discrimination by the majority group (Quillian, p.589).

In a related line of inquiry in the study of prejudice is centered on economic condition. There has been much speculation in the literature on this connection, although surprisingly, as late as 1995 little research had been performed in this area (Quillian, p.590). The main argument in this line of research is that the connection between economic condition and prejudice produces either blame to the subordinate group(s) for economic difficulty, or from the competitive struggle between groups for finite resources (Quillian, p.590). Either one or both of the above processes can occur among individuals but the collective threat

perspective would suggest that a decrease of economic standing among a few dominant group members would increase prejudice among all group members, not just those in direct competition with minority group members. (Quillian, p.590) If members of the dominant group are fearful or concerned about their economic position, they become fretful that they will lose their relatively higher position over the members of the subordinate group; if there is an improvement of economic circumstances there should be a concurrent reduction of perceived competition and thus there should also be a decrease in feelings of threat and hostility (Quillian, p.590). Indeed, scholars argue that higher amounts of income act as an insulator from competition toward others be they a minority group member or otherwise; therefore the common expectation is that wealth reduces prejudice those with greater resources feel more secure in their social position (Kunovich, p.23).

The main important theoretical idea behind this line of inquiry is that economic conditions are key in varying levels of prejudice because economic conditions have a direct influence on the amount and severity of competition between a society's dominant group and subordinate groups (Quillian, p.591). At least some variation on this idea is what is meant when scholars discuss "interest-based" theories (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Often the political dialogue in any given nation-state reflects this focus on interest (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Contentious debates about jobs, wages, crime, schools, and welfare programs are some of the topics where immigrants are regularly introduced into the discussion (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Also, another part of the discussion on interest based theories revolves around the previously mentioned distinction between personal (threat to "me") and collective (to "us");

consensus is difficult to reach because evidence as to which (personal vs. collective) is more accurate in predicting prejudice, has been mixed (Sides and Citrin, p.479).

However, economic conditions pitting members of the majority group against those in minority groups is not the only possible outcome. To the extent that economic frustration is felt, it could be directed towards political elites and the feelings may intensify as conditions worsen, as a result, members of minority groups could be ignored altogether (Kunovich, p. 21). In fact as far as disadvantaged groups are concerned members' prejudice may actually decrease as a sense of threat increases (Kunovich, p.25). This is plausible because members in a disadvantaged group may feel despair as the overriding emotion with worsening economic conditions, relegating other emotions (like hostility toward immigrants) to secondary status; or, if economic conditions are exceptionally burdensome toward immigrants, even those in disadvantaged situations may be less inclined to feel animosity towards individuals who are faring *even worse* than they; or it could simply be the case that disadvantaged groups reserve their animosity in worsening conditions for political elites who could be perceived as being "responsible" for the worsening conditions (Kunovich, p.25). If animosity is directed elsewhere, worsening economic conditions could be a catalyst for solidarity between groups and create a unified class of people (Kunovich, p.26). Conversely, advantaged groups may actually be more prejudiced because they may perceive that there is economic competition between groups, even if they are not directly involved or impacted in such competition; or advantaged groups can simply be fearful that worsening economic conditions will dissolve the factors that make them advantaged and therefore they will soon have to compete (Kunovich, p.26). Therefore any study aiming to address the question of

opinion towards immigrants would do well to include measurements for economic conditions.

However although economic conditions affect (or not) attitudes toward immigrants certain factors within the economic framework should have an impact on attitudes. For example, the simple variable of income, (which has a forceful influence on an individual's social standing) or, a person's education or labor market position should have an effect on an individual's attitude toward immigrants because they all contribute to social standing (and therefore, arguably, quality of life) (Kunovich, p.22).

From the discussion of these lines of investigation it would seem logical that both economic conditions and minority population size would have an impact on perceived threats to the dominant group (Quillian, p.591). While the combination of economic conditions and minority group size is expected to have its impact on perceptions on a group level; this does not mean that there are not individual level indicators that may predispose some towards prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.591). It can even be argued that that there is a coupling (albeit possibly a loose one) between individual level indicators of prejudice and a feeling of being threatened (Quillian, p.591). Indeed, depending on the indicator, individual-level indicators may be informative in revealing who may be more predisposed to forming prejudicial attitudes when threatened; this is so because, depending on the person's social position or psychological processes they may feel threatened in a more direct and personal way and thus likelier to express prejudicial sentiments (Quillian, p.591).

Previous Findings

Research on attitudes toward immigrants has been performed on a case by case (or in this case country by country) basis as well as the European continent at large. One example of a specific test case is found in the work of Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) and their work in the Netherlands. Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) found that outgroup size (in this case again, immigrants being the outgroup) both on an aggregate municipal level (re: official measurements) and as perceived by the majority both relate positively to feelings of group threat. To go further, perceived group threat has a positive association with discriminatory intentions toward immigrants and immigrant disapproval (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). However, the evidence also finds that group threat is tempered by contact with immigrants. Not only has research of this kind been conducted in the Netherlands but, in Germany as well. Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, and Wolf (2006) found that in Germany evidence exists that suggests that intergroup contact has a powerful and positive effect on the attitudes of group members; thus, providing support for the propagation of contact theory. Perhaps more interesting than the apparent support for contact theory is *how* contact theory works in Germany. Findings suggest that it is the proportion of people in minority groups in the population of a country that leads to a decrease of prejudice in people of the majority group (Wagner et al. 2006). Although these findings can only be attributed to Germany it is nonetheless interesting that they are opposite of what Blumer and Blalock would expect.

A European at large perspective is found in the work of Quillian (1995). Quillian (1995) finds that education and age have the strongest and most significant effects (p. 597). Prejudice diminishes with higher education and increases among older responders (Quillian,

p.597). Quillian (1995) found that most individual-level effects are small in nature (p. 599). Quillian (1995) concludes that differences in individual-level characteristics do not explain variation among countries on the national level (p. 599). Indeed, Quillian (1995) finds that the specific parameters of group-threat theory are the drivers of prejudice across countries in that dominant group economic condition (re: country-level unit of analysis) and the relative population of a subordinate group compared to the dominant group spur prejudicial attitudes across countries; so, the metrics to gauge perceived group threat are good predictors of prejudice (p. 601-02). Quillian (1995) concludes that to the extent certain individual-level traits of dominant group members have an effect on prejudicial attitudes their impact is dependent on the presence or absence of group level perceived threat (p. 605).

Further research has demonstrated that an extreme form of prejudicial attitude (supportive of ethnic exclusion) is fueled by those with a low level of education, manual workers, as well as the unemployed (Scheepers et al. p.25-27). As far as income is concerned, there is a minor yet statistically significant relation, in that, the lower an individual's income the more likely they are to support ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al. p.27). Several social classes were found to support ethnic exclusion including routine non-manual workers, the petty bourgeoisie, housekeepers, and the retired; the service class was less inclined to support ethnic exclusion (Scheepers et al. p.27). Men supported exclusion more than women, and Christians more than those who claimed to be non-religious (Scheepers et al. p.27). Ethnic exclusion also found more support among those identifying with a conservative political orientation (Scheepers et al. p.27). The size of the proportion of non-EU citizens in the population was also positively related to more support for ethnic

exclusion (Scheepers et al. p.27). In fact, it seems the more non-EU citizens there are in a country, the more those working in manual labor were likely to be supportive of ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al. p.28). Also the level of unemployment or changes in unemployment has no impact on support for ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al. p.27).

McLaren (2003) goes beyond simple prejudicial attitudes and gauges respondents' willingness to remove members of a subordinate group from their country (p.911). McLaren (2003) controls for population of minorities, much like other studies, yet a distinction is made. McLaren (2003) separately controls for dominant group members who do not have contact with immigrants and live in areas heavily populated by immigrants and those who do have contact (p. 916). McLaren (2003) finds that widely across Europe those with friends who are in subordinate social groups are significantly less likely to be hostile towards immigrants (p. 922).

Kunovich (2004) finds that there are differences in levels of prejudice depending on an individuals' labor market position (p.33). Generally, education decreases prejudice, and income has a faint, negative effect on prejudice (Kunovich, p.33). Those who are self-employed, "blue collar", unemployed, or those generally not in the labor force show more prejudice than those in "white collar" positions (Kunovich, p.33). Of those not in the labor force there is one group that shows a negative association with prejudicial feelings toward immigrants. Students are substantially less prejudiced than even "white collar" workers.

If one were to build a hierarchical structure based on these findings, at the bottom, where the most prejudice lies, would be the self-employed, "blue collar", unemployed or non-workforce (i.e. retired) individuals. In the middle would be individuals with "white

collar” jobs. At the top, where there is the least amount of prejudice, would be students. Men demonstrate more prejudice than women, age tends to increase prejudice, those who are married show more prejudice, respondents’ whose parents are both citizens show more prejudice, individuals who have ever lived abroad demonstrate less prejudice, and the length of time spent in current residence also increases prejudice (Kunovich, p.33). Although both education and income showed a general tendency to lower prejudice the size of the effect differs depending on the country in question (Kunovich, p.34). The size of the immigrant population is shown to have an intensifier effect.

In countries with large immigrant populations the previously mentioned hierarchy is still intact but those at the bottom would feel prejudice more intensely (Kunovich, p.38). Those with “white-collar” positions would feel more or less the same amount of prejudice but the interesting observation is that students seem to feel substantially more threatened in countries with large immigrant populations, so they would likely remain at the top but, the strength of their anti-prejudice attitude would be considerably diminished (Kunovich, p.38). Countries that have poor economic conditions have a chilling effect on prejudice toward immigrants. Students and “white collar” workers remain negatively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes but the strength of the variable diminishes; interestingly, in a similar fashion “blue collar”, self-employed etc. individuals maintain a negative attitude towards immigrants but the magnitude of the variable is decreased (Kunovich, p.38).

Weldon finds low levels of tolerance across Europe (p. 337). The results in Weldon’s (2006) study showed that political tolerance for ethnic minorities is significantly higher than social tolerance for ethnic minorities; however there is still a bloc of the citizenry

in all countries that were surveyed who are willing to deny minorities even the most basic of rights (p.337). Using the basic typologies set forth by Liah Greenfeld, Weldon tests to see if citizenship-regime forms the amount of tolerance for ethnic minorities; collectivistic-ethnic nations demonstrate the lowest amount of tolerance (Weldon, p. 337). This typology clusters societies into citizen-regime types, which reflect the general expectations of what it means to be a proper citizen in that society. What follows is an explanation of the citizenship-regime types.

The collectivistic-ethnic type is essentially identical to the more traditional *ethnic* categorization (Weldon, p.334). The focus with this type is that there are somewhat natural lines of division that create objective differences between people; this difference which national identities and distinctions are built from is ethnicity (Weldon, p.334). Under the collectivistic-ethnic point of view the nation is seen as an all encompassing whole with its own unique spirit that is greater than any individual member; members are expected to have a sense of connectivity among one another in recognition of their common ancestry and thus form solidarity with each other and remain at least somewhat distant from outsiders (Weldon, p.334). Unsurprisingly, with this perspective citizenship becomes exclusive, it become entwined with one's sense of self and not merely a sign of membership in a polity (Weldon, p.334). The *jus sanguinis* perspective on citizenship heavily informs this citizenship-regime type, under *jus sanguinis* citizenship is largely decided on "bloodline" (Weldon, p.334). The importance of bloodline is that it serves as the proverbial anchor that ties a person's ethnicity to their nation (Weldon, p.334). With such an ethnic-oriented dynamic, one cannot simply choose to be or not to be a citizen; it is a characteristic of their condition (not unlike hair or

eye color). Germany is a popular example of this sort of citizenship perspective, but Switzerland, and Belgium are examples as well (Weldon, p.334); as such these three countries are included in the current study and are classified under the collectivistic-ethnic citizenship-regime type.

Secondly, there is the collectivistic-civic regime type. This approach to citizenship reflects an assimilationist or republican disposition in that, predominately the viewpoint is that the nation-state is a collective but unlike the collectivistic-ethnic perspective there is a rejection of the idea that the collective has to be centered on ethnic concerns (Weldon, p.334). The nation-state is defined through a secular and political prism, and citizenship simply means loyalty to the larger political community (Weldon, p.334). The focus on the political community through a secular and political lens is meant to supersede any concerns about ethnicity (Weldon, p.334). Foreigners under this citizenship-regime are able to obtain citizenship; however there is an expectation that any new citizens discard the unique cultural norms of their past and accept the norms of the native population (Weldon, p.334). In furtherance of this ideal, the state is to facilitate effort to blend the cultural characteristics of the native population and incoming foreigners; if new members of the population wish to retain their former cultural background they must do so in private. France's ban on Muslim headwear in public schools is an example; other than France, Portugal and Denmark are examples (Weldon, p.334 & 338). Although the collectivistic-civic regime type seeks to remove ethnicity as a matter of competition, success in this effort is of varying degrees (Weldon, p.334-35). The problem with blending cultures is that often it is only minority groups who have to sacrifice any part of their cultural heritage and the majority group, while

the dominant ethnic group can claim legitimacy and domain over the political community and thus the acceptable norms (Weldon, p.334-35).

Lastly, there is the individualistic-civic regime type. The individualistic-civic regime type of citizenship regime functions under the ideal of “pluralism” (Weldon, p.335). Under this view the nation-state is not an all encompassing factor that is a foundational cornerstone in a person’s makeup or a collective to which allegiance must be sworn to; instead, the emphasis is placed on the individual (Weldon, p.335). Individuals are free to choose which ethnic and cultural heritage they most identify with and are allowed to proceed accordingly; the state is there to protect the rights of different ethnic backgrounds and the expressions thereof and sometimes actively pursues methods of supporting ethnic minority cultures (Weldon, p.335). The main point with this citizen-regime type is that no sacrifice is, or should be, called for on the part of minorities to give up their former way of life should they choose not to. Presumably so long as the laws for the general welfare are being followed, each person is left to decide how to express their ethnicity and culture. Examples of this regime-type include Great Britain, Spain, and The Netherlands (Weldon, p. 338).

Research shows that Collectivistic-civic regime types have more tolerance than collectivistic-ethnic and individualistic-civic has the highest level tolerance of all (Weldon, p. 337). Individual-level factors demonstrate that working class status and age are not a factor and education is only marginally beneficial for improving political tolerance (Weldon, p.342-43). Factors such as a perception of threat or a strong sense of in-group identification were strong predictors of political intolerance (Weldon, p.342-43). Those who would prefer a

more authoritarian style of government, are politically conservative, or are dissatisfied with the democratic process are also more likely to be politically intolerant (Weldon, p.343).

In terms of social intolerance the individual-level factors are stronger predictors but demographic variables still yield less influence than psychological variables (Weldon, p.345). When it relates to social tolerance age is a statistically significant factor but the overall strength of the variable is marginal (Weldon, p.345). Already a strong indicator as it relates to political tolerance, a perception of threat becomes an even more telling indicator when social tolerance is the dependent variable (Weldon, p.345). Ultimately Weldon (2006) concludes that the citizenship-regime type acts as a facilitator for individual-level variables as it relates to either political or social tolerance against ethnic minorities (Weldon, p.345). Individual-level factors that are thought to contribute to intolerance are exacerbated or mitigated depending on the citizenship-regime type (Weldon, p.345).

In one study when asked what the biggest concern regarding immigrants is, 68 % of respondents replied that they believed immigrants make crime worse (Sides and Citrin, p.484). In this particular study, in no county surveyed was there any indication of support for a more accepting immigration policy, regardless of the origin of the immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.485). In the same study evidence was found that suggests that economic concerns both on a personal and societal level have significant effects on opposition to immigration; in short, those who are more economically satisfied are less opposed to immigration and societal economic concerns trump personal financial concerns when factoring opposition to immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.489-91).

Interestingly in the study mentioned above, objective measures of economic standing, either personal or societal (GDP for example) have smaller effects when compared to subjective evaluations. This finding is also present with absolute numbers of immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.491). This is reflected in the finding that in nations that have a demonstrably higher (comparatively speaking) percentage of unemployment and a larger immigrant population there are lower levels of opposition to immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.496). Also, anxiety about cultural pluralism has strong associations with negative evaluations on immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.491).

As it relates to the number of immigrants and its effects on opinions about immigrants and immigration, Sides and Citrin (2007) find a negative association between perceptions of the immigrant population and negative attitudes toward immigrants (p. 491). However, the perception variable has a comparative element. If respondents believe their country receives fewer immigrants than other nations then there is no statistically significant impact on opinions towards immigrants or immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.492).

In terms of education and social trust or having immigrant friends (a measure of the “contact” hypothesis), high levels of these variables diminish negative feelings and can generate positive feelings toward immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.493). In general it is the cultural factors that carry the most weight (as opposed to economic) in determining attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, although both are important (Sides and Citrin, p.494).

Evidence exists that demonstrate that a feeling of cultural threat combined with preferences of linguistic unity and a general cohesion of society significantly correlates with hostility toward immigrants (Citrin and Sides, p.37). Some evidence also suggests that

country-level factors are of minimal use in explaining hostility toward immigrants (Citrin and Sides, p.37). As it relates to issues regarding religion, certain evidence suggests that “Western” countries are more or less distributed evenly across the spectrum of opposition and support for religious homogeneity (Citrin and Sides, p.37). There seems to be more agreement on cultural homogeneity however, as the majority of nations support it (Citrin and Sides, p.37).

Other results indicate that the ability to speak the language of the host country is the most important factor in being accepted while racial considerations (i.e. being “white”) was of least importance (Citrin and Sides, p.39). However, it is noted that results reflecting the minimal importance of racial characteristics could be a result of respondents giving a socially desirable answer (Citrin and Sides, p.39). Opinions on the value of cultural homogeneity, social trust and education are particularly influential (Citrin and Sides, p.46). Financial concerns have comparatively less impact on findings which suggests that attitudes toward immigrants are based largely on cultural symbolism than concerns about material standing (Citrin and Sides, p.46). The factors that are perhaps the most influential were social trust and cultural and religious homogeneity; these factors remain significant across countries and have a larger magnitude than other factors (Citrin and Sides, p.48).

As it relates to financial concerns, some results suggests that there is more concern about immigrants among nations that can be considered “wealthier” or are making gains to becoming wealthier, however again, according to these results the overall strength of the financial factor is minimal (Citrin and Sides, p.49). As for specific financially-related factors like unemployment; there is a mild negative association between immigrants and the

unemployment rate but a relationship between changes in unemployment and immigrants is practically non-existent (Citrin and Sides, p.49-50). Perhaps most surprisingly, according to some evidence there is no relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and the size and/or configuration of the immigration population (Citrin and Sides, p.50).

Hjerm (2007) similarly finds those with a higher education and healthy private financial situations are less xenophobic; also, those with immigrant friends or co-workers tend to be less xenophobic than those who do not have similar relations (p.1267). Those who perceive higher proportions of immigration tend to express more xenophobia (within a specific country) (Hjerm, p.1267). However, actual measurements of the foreign-born population have no affect on xenophobia (Hjerm, p.1267). When both actual and perceived measurements were examined comparatively across countries on a group level neither factor related to xenophobia, this remained so even after the two were formed into an interaction variable (Hjerm, p.1269). This also remains so after political context and GDP were taken into account (Hjerm, p.1269). GDP remained an ineffective indicator (in either a negative or positive direction) of xenophobia when tested alone but variables relating to immigration politics and political articulation were viable indicators of xenophobia (Hjerm, p.1269).

Some research has come across findings that run counter to what theorists would believe to be true. Such an example is found in Green's (2009) work. Some theorists would predict that the higher the immigration or, of arguably greater concern, refugee population is the more hostile attitudes should proliferate. However Green (2009) found that the lower a country's refugee rate the higher the chance of endorsement of ascribed immigration criteria, ascribed immigration criteria being an aspect of xenophobia. Findings like this are intriguing

and help to propel continued study forward because if findings like this are consistent then a re-evaluation of the population theory needs to be undertaken.

Research performed by Herreros and Criado (2009) have provided interesting results. Specifically, as it relates to the current study, those who are satisfied with the economy have positive attitudes toward immigrants, this effect is statistically significant across both models tested (Herreros and Criado, p.348). Also, it seems that the more immigrants there are in a country the poorer the attitude toward immigrants; yet, positive growth trends in immigration demonstrates a statistically significant relationship with positive attitudes toward immigrants (Herreros and Criado, p.348). The finding about the immigration trends is especially intriguing because it runs counter to what the authors' hypothesized; perhaps this finding illustrates a disjuncture between those in the population and current population trends. In other words, just because a country is experiencing growth in the immigration population does not necessarily mean that members of the native population realize growth is occurring, lending all the more importance to theoretical power of perception.

Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet (2009) performed research that centered on attitude change toward immigration in Europe. Meuleman et al. found that in the five year period between 2002 and 2007 there were significant attitude changes found in a majority of the countries being tested (p. 359). The authors found some evidence that short-term changes in the size of the immigrant population contribute in attitude change (Meuleman et al., p. 361). Moreover, the evidence suggest that those countries with high immigrant populations, attitudes tend to be more restrictive (Meuleman et al., p. 361). The economic indicator found to be most predictive in attitude change is changes to unemployment. Evidence suggests that

decreasing unemployment is indicative of increasingly positive attitudes toward immigration (Meuleman et al., p. 363). Overall the findings of Meuleman et al. (2009) indicate that, at least from the 2002-2007 period, high immigration population and labor force position are the key ingredients in the presence and prevalence of group threat.

Rustenbach (2010) found, similar to most scholars, that higher education was related to more favorable attitudes toward immigrants (p. 63). Likewise, having a left-leaning political orientation or being a member in a left-leaning nation and being interested in politics leads to positive attitudes towards immigrants (Rustenbach, p.63). Additionally, evidence suggests that members of a country that give foreign direct investment are less prejudicial (Rustenbach, p.63). Those demonstrating more interpersonal trust demonstrated less prejudicial attitudes. Results pertaining to those who developed familial connections were non-significant (Rustenbach, p.64). Those who are concerned about neighborhood safety show a positive association with prejudicial feelings toward immigrants (Rustenbach, p.63). National unemployment also had an effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Rustenbach, p.66). Those with a right-leaning political orientation are shown to demonstrate prejudicial attitudes as well (Rustenbach, p.66). This result is also present in those that have little interest in politics (Rustenbach, p.68).

With economic measurements the effect seems to vary depending on which variable is being measured. For instance, lower income per capita and regional GDP was shown to have a positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes but, individual unemployment and national GDP were not significantly related to anti-immigrant opinions (Rustenbach, p.64). Interestingly, regional and national-level unemployment levels demonstrated a relationship

opposite of what one would expect in that, as rates increased animosity decreased (Rustenbach, p.65). Perhaps even more interestingly, no significant evidence was found to support cultural marginality theory; those who had been discriminated against (and were therefore theoretically likely to discriminate against others) did not hold anti-immigrant attitudes (Rustenbach, p.65). Similarly, the number of immigrants at the regional and national level had no relation to anti-immigrant attitudes, which according to Rustenbach's study (2010) calls into question the validity of contact theory (p.65).

Data & Methods

The current study uses the parsimonious definition of prejudice set forth by Ashmore (1970).

Quillian (1995) combined certain theoretical elements from multiple theorists; following Blumer's work Quillian (1995) perceived racial prejudice as the result of the dominant group feeling that their exclusive privileges are being challenged by subordinate; as such prejudicial attitudes are a reaction to this challenge (p. 591). Following Blalock, Quillian (1995) incorporates relative group size into a prejudicial heuristic; hypothesizing that the relative size of the subordinate group to the dominant one should impact perceived threat, and thus prejudicial attitudes (p. 591). As subordinate groups grow larger relative to the dominant group the feeling of threat, and as a consequence, prejudice should grow; conversely the smaller the minority group relative to the dominant group the feeling of threat, and thus, prejudice should decrease (Quillian, p.591). Continuing with the work of Blalock (as well as other researchers) subordinate groups will most likely appear more threatening and offering a greater challenge when the economic conditions within the receiving nation are either on the precipice of negative movement or already trending negatively; therefore, the worse economic conditions are in a receiving nation, the more threatened the dominant group will be and the higher the likelihood that members of that group will express prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.591). The underlying fear that connects a country's general economic well-being and dominant group members' concern about immigrants is one of positioning (Quillian, p.592). Members of the dominant group are concerned that their superior economic position will erode through competition with subordinate groups; this fear

is compounded in an unstable or negatively trending economic climate, and resources become even scarcer (Quillian, p.592). In Europe, wealth tends to diminish competition between immigrants and members of the dominant group and thus tends to neutralize a sense of threat among dominant group members (Quillian, p.592). This study will follow in the footsteps of Quillian (1995) in regards to the synthesis of theories.

Also like Quillian (1995) the current study will focus on certain individual-level traits that pose a potential risk for the generation of prejudicial attitudes, especially as group privileges are challenged. Focusing on the individual level is a justified exercise as studies have found that the majority of the variance (of xenophobia, hostility, etc.) can be explained on the individual level; for example, Hjerm (2007) found that 10% of the variance of xenophobia can be attributed by country level factors whereas individual level factors explain about 90% (p. 1266). In another study (Rustenbach 2010) it has been further demonstrated that the majority of the variance in anti-immigrant attitude takes place at the individual level; which would suggest that appeals for a change in beliefs would be most effective at that level (p.69). It is prudent therefore, to focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, where it seems prejudice has the strongest influence. Certain individual characteristics will be predictive of prejudicial leanings and this will be felt more intensely among individuals who are concerned, either on a personal level or on a group level, about economic well-being. Unlike Quillian (1995) this study follows McLaren (2003) and focuses more on the individual level of analysis than on the assumption of uniformity of behavior of the dominant group population. Whatever the factors that may contribute to its generation prejudice is created and felt as a personal, individual experience, and therefore this study argues that they

are the most appropriate unit of analysis. This is not to say that the importance of the differentiation that dominant group members engage in to separate themselves between themselves (“us”) and subordinate groups (“them”), what Quillian (1995, p. 592) labels as “group threat theory”, should be ignored but rather, group threat theory is most likely an element and not the overarching cause of prejudicial tendencies. With this in mind, Quillian’s (1995) version of “group threat theory” is incorporated into the current study. While the individual’s perception of themselves is the focus, there is also an attempt in this study to gauge the individual’s perception of the group; this is done in an attempt to further understand what, if any, level breeds more prejudice. Despite the noted distinction between the two testable threat categories (personal and collective) both are capable of being tested concurrently because the logic behind both distinctions is identical (Sides and Citrin, p.479).

A large theoretical focus of this study is concerns about individual perception. Studies have demonstrated that there is solid reason to think that individuals’ perceptions about the number of immigrants will lead to overestimation; indeed, citizens (of any nation) have a tendency to overestimate the size of minority populations (Citrin and Sides, p.39). Moreover interestingly, it would seem that overestimation is more severe in countries with few immigrants (Citrin and Sides, p.42). Therefore testing strictly aggregate immigration population numbers against individuals will probably lead to misleading results. Also, if individuals tend to be inaccurate in their estimation about immigration it stands to reason they will be inaccurate with other national level phenomena. Therefore, the concern will be of individuals’ perceptions of certain variables.

Whether or not an individual's perception are in line with the facts, the perception will fuel how a person feels about a certain variable and therefore become a major factor in the actions and behavior of the individual. Indeed, a person's perception may be significantly divorced from reality, in that rumors or specific incidents can ignite a general consensus that immigrants are the source of economic difficulties (Rustenbach, p.60). Alternatively, it is possible that in times of economic trouble members of the native population are simply searching for a scapegoat and their perceptions are adjusted to that end (Rustenbach, p.60). However, for the sake of thoroughness national-level aggregate variables will also be tested. Also, in this line of study testing for country-level variables has been shown to contribute to a more complete account of the total variance (Weldon, 2006). The current study also tests for the role of perceptions of immigrant population size in prejudice formation. Perceptions of a growing immigrant population would be a likely catalyst for feelings of hostility and anxiety towards immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.480).

In many studies there is a noted concern over political environment and/or institution as a variable. There is a widely held argument that attitudes are context dependent, and that dynamic shifts in attitudes are not due to individual factors alone, but also contextual factors (Ceobanu, Escandell 2008, p. 1154). However, there is considerable variation as to how to best measure this variable. Many studies use aggregate variables in an attempt to control for contextual factors, but this study follows Weldon (2006) in using the citizenship-regime typologies largely created by Liah Greenfeld. Of course, no society serves as a perfect template for their particular category, but it is best to remember that typologies such as this are heuristics used to aid in the study of what can be difficult phenomena to study.

Following Weldon's (2006) lead, the nine countries in this study (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Portugal, Denmark, Great Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands) are thus parceled to the corresponding citizenship-regime type that it most closely resembles.

The argument that contextual plays an important role in attitude formation is popular (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Weldon 2006, etc.) and indeed, contextual factors may play an important role. Societal/political contexts may be important because they institutionalize the common notions of rights and responsibilities of individuals in order to become legitimate members of society (Weldon, p.335). These notions are distributed through the school system and the workplace and they are internalized, and eventually they are reinforced through familial experiences (Weldon, p.335). Moreover they inform the policies and acceptable political rhetoric of the nation-state's leaders and potential candidates (Weldon, p.335).

Due to the importance attributed to factors like economic indicators (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Kehrberg 2007, Schneider 2008, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, and Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008), immigrant population factors (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Kehrberg 2007, Schneider 2008, Semyonov et al. 2006, and Semyonov et al. 2008) and generally perception (Green 2007, Schneider 2008, and Semyonov et al. 2008) the second hypothesis in this study maintains that the key independent variables will have more explanatory power and therefore have similar effects regardless of political environment. It is difficult to find an effective way to measure the effect of political environment hence, the usual use of aggregate variables. Citizenship-regime types provide a conceptually sound way to differentiate as well as gauge political environments and pool

countries that have similar environments. Therefore this study uses the citizenship-regime types in an attempt to control for any potential effect that political environment might have on the main independent variables.

Given the factors previously mentioned this study therefore sets out to test the following hypotheses:

- H1: Both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant group size will have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity toward immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when both independent variables are combined to form an interaction term.
- H2: This relationship will be confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in the study.
- H3: This relationship will remain significant after controlling for both individual level variables and state-level aggregate variables.

Many studies in this line of research make use of the Eurobarometer (Quillian, 1995, McLaren 2003, Weldon 2006, Scheepers et al. 2002) some even make use of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (Kunovich 2004). However, over recent years many others have started to use the European Social Survey (Citrin and Sides, 2008, Sides and Citrin 2007, Hjerm 2007, Rustenbach 2010,). This study follows the line of use of the European Social Survey.

Following a litany of other studies (Quillian, 1995) this study tests for certain individual-level variables that have become somewhat standard in the field.

Education: Since Samuel Stouffer (1955) it has since been widely recognized that respondents with higher level education backgrounds are less likely to express prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), Weldon (2006), Sides and Citrin (2007), Kunovich (2004), Hjern (2007) the current study will control for educational attainment.

Age: The simple logic here is that older individuals will express more prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), Sides and Citrin (2007), and Hjern (2007) this study will also control for age.

Class Status: People who are more directly competitive with immigrants, so-called “blue collar” workers, should be more likely to be prejudiced towards immigrants (Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), and Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will take class status into account as a possible intervening variable.

Change in Economic Status: The implications of psychological frustration-aggression hypotheses would predict that those experiencing a recent decline in economic standing would increase frustration and thus increase prejudicial inclinations towards members of subordinate groups (Quillian, p.595).

Income: The logic here is straightforward, those with less means, lower income, will experience competition in a more intense way, moreover, they will be competitive against a

greater multitude, like members of various subordinate groups (Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), Kunovich (2004), Hjern (2007), and Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will use personal income as a control factor.

Sex: It is hypothesized in much of the literature (Quillian, 1995) that men will have more prejudicial attitudes than women. Following Quillian (1995), Kunovich (2004), and Hjern (2007) this study will also control for sex.

Life Satisfaction: Recalling psychological frustration-aggression hypotheses and following Quillian (1995) people who are generally frustrated with their station in life will develop prejudicial attitudes. Following Quillian (1995), and others (Sides and Citrin 2007) this study will factor in life satisfaction.

Contact: Following much of the previous literature, (Quillian, 1995, McLaren, 2003) people who have or have had steady contact with members of subordinate social groups should have a better understanding of those groups and be less compelled by stereotypes and rumor and thus, be more rational and less prejudicial. Over time, the contact hypothesis has been amended, almost to the point of being rendered unhelpful but most researchers in this line of research maintain that under the right conditions contact is able to alleviate prejudice (McLaren, p.911). The ESS module that the current study uses measured contact mainly through one variable, working abroad; this style of measurement is not entirely without precedent as Kunovich (2004) used a similar variable “living abroad” to gauge the contact

hypothesis. The two variables are similar in that unless an individual's native country and destination are close enough to commute to, then working abroad essentially means living abroad as well. This study will use the ESS measure of working abroad to gauge contact.

Political Ideology: At least on a conceptual level it could very well be that prejudice (or the lack thereof) is a manifestation of political ideology. Therefore this study follows many scholars (Sides and Citrin 2007, Weldon 2006, Scheepers et al. 2002) in controlling for this variable.

Democratic Process: It is possible that individuals who are dissatisfied with the democratic processes are merely expressing this dissatisfaction through a negative focus and opinion of minorities, particularly immigrants (Weldon, p.339). Following Weldon (2006) this study will control for an individual's satisfaction with the democratic process in their country.

Political Awareness: Individuals who are more politically aware may have a more nuanced and sophisticated appreciation for the political issues of the day, including immigration; therefore, those that are politically aware may be less inclined to feel animosity towards immigrants. On the other hand, it could be that raised political awareness only stokes the emotions the individual previously held, thus acting as an intensifier. In either case, it is prudent to test for this variable and the current study follows others who have also done so (Sides and Citrin 2007).

Social Trust: Hostility towards immigrants could be a symptom of a general misanthropy or suspicion on the part of an individual towards others. Any animosity felt would not be simply because other people are immigrants but because other people are simply people and they are not to be trusted. Conversely, if someone feels positively towards other people then they may be less likely to feel hostility towards anyone, be they an immigrant or otherwise. It is prudent to test for this variable and following Sides and Citrin (2007) the current study will do so.

Location: It may be possible that attitudes are at least partially dependent on area of residence. Those who live in larger metropolitan cities may have more exposure and familiarity with multiple cultures, and points of view and therefore may be less bothered by diversity in the population. Comparatively, those who live in small suburban or rural areas may be culturally isolated and therefore be more suspicious and less trusting of members of a different group, and thus, be more likely to express prejudicial attitudes. Following Scheepers et al. (2002), this study will factor in an individual's place of residence (e.g. metropolitan area or countryside) as a control variable.

Religion: The exact affect of religion on prejudicial attitudes is uncertain. It could be that because many of the world's largest religions teach lessons of peace and hospitality that the more religious an individual is the less likely they will be to express prejudicial attitudes. On the other hand those who are highly religious and spend a great deal of time in a specific cultural setting may become culturally isolated and become less trusting and more suspicious

of other groups, especially those that do not share the individual's particular religious beliefs. Therefore following Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will control for both a person's self-described "religiosity" and the frequency with which that person attend religious services.

Values: It would not be a great stretch to imagine that an individual's personal thought process would be informed on their personal values. Research has been undertaken to try and measure different categories of values and how they might affect attitudes. Using the first wave of the European Social Survey (2002-03) Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet and Schmidt (2008) constructed two dimensions of value-orientations; "Self-transcendence" is comprised of values of "universalism" and "benevolence" as gauged by questions in the survey (Davidov et al., p.587). The other value-orientation identified is "Conservation" comprised by the values of "tradition", "conformity", and "security" also gauged by question held within the survey (Davidov et al., p.587). Following this line of research value-orientation is used as a control variable in the present study.

Following Weldon (2006) and others I excluded respondents who self-identified as a member of an ethnic minority group or who felt discriminated against because of ethnic background.

Many studies of this nature rely on the tool of multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Hjerm, 2007, Weldon 2006, Kunovich 2004, Scheepers et al. 2002). HLM is used as a technique to reduce the likelihood of underestimated standard errors and identify where most of the variance lies within nested units of analysis (ex: individuals within countries) (Hjerm, p.1258, Scheepers et al. p.23). However, the present study will not use

HLM primarily because the number of countries (N) falls outside of conventional use, which states that there should be an N of at least 10 (Hjerm, p.1259). The present study is using 9 countries for use as the citizen-regime types. Another reason that HLM is not being utilized in the present study is because the unit of analysis is the individual, no attempt is being made to expressly differentiate what level has more explanatory power (the individual or country level) but macro-level data are included for control purposes, so as to limit any spuriousness that may result.

Some would argue for the need to try and control for the *type* of people being discriminated against. Members of the majority group in France may react differently to immigrants originating from Middle-Eastern countries than from North African countries whereas the dynamic may be reversed in another European country. Indeed, there is a strong logical argument for this position as submitted by Bail (2008). Bail (2008) presents the notion that citizens living in various cultures are going to have varied views on different minority types and their “proper” social position. The symbolic boundaries prevalent in some nations are of little interest in others (Bail 2008). The argument is extended further by stating that the differentiation of set definitions is so wide that even the official overarching immigration philosophies of nations can differ with the general public’s understanding of the various symbolic boundaries (Bail 2008). Bail’s arguments are compelling and because of that it makes it tempting to try and conceive of variables to measure what symbolic boundaries the public draws in different countries; this study maintains that such an endeavor would be productive but for present purposes would be irrelevant.

This study argues that while members of the majority group in different country might have different groups in mind when they think of the word *immigrant* but the underlying social processes are essentially the same when they think of the term; in other words, the term *immigrant* is a strong enough trigger word that when it is brought to the attention of survey takers there will be a specific group in mind. To elaborate further, currently in the United States when a person of the majority group is surveyed they will probably think of a person from a Latin American country despite the fact there are immigrants coming from other parts of the world; similarly, as mentioned before if one is to survey a member of the majority group in France there is a good chance that the person will think of a person of Middle-Eastern decent despite the fact that people from all over the globe immigrate to France. Due to the probability of international populaces attaching specific associations with the word *immigrant* there are likely universal processes that contribute to how populaces form attitudes about the people they think of as immigrants. When, in a survey setting a respondent is asked about feelings toward immigrants they are not so much reacting to the nationality of a people but reacting to a social phenomenon. For example, in the United States during the mid-1800's when the railroads were being constructed if a majority group member was asked about immigrants there is a good chance that what would come to mind is a Chinese national as immigration from that country was widespread during that time period. There is little reason to think that a person in the majority group in the United States during the mid-1800's would feel any different about a Chinese national than an individual in the present day would feel about a Mexican national for example, simply because the countries of origin are different. Therefore, this study treats

the underlying phenomenon of immigration as universal and attitudes about immigrants, whoever comes to mind at the mention of the word, are shaped by external, environmental factors.

Results

The results from this study are based on the comparison of individualistic-civic and collectivistic-civic regime types with collectivistic-ethnic used as the reference category. There are two dimensions of animosity that could potentially be measured. One tests the variables against the dependent variable of animosity toward the perceived *effect* immigrants have on society. The other dimension tests animosity that exists against the perceived *allowance* of more immigrants into the country. These two dimensions are similar but distinct, as efforts to combine the two dimensions into a measurable index resulted in uncorrelated results. For the purposes of this study the dependent variable of the perceived *effect* of immigrants is chosen. It seems very likely that how an individual perceives an immigrant's impact, either positively or negatively, will serve as the basis for attitude formation. It would follow that if an individual perceived immigrants positively they would be more accepting of the allowance of more and vice versa; therefore, since an individual's attitude about the allowance of immigrants is probably at least partially predicated on that person's attitude about immigrants, it is prudent to test for the factors that contribute to the formation of attitudes about the effect of immigrants. The sample consists of 7,144 respondents.

As can be seen in table 1³ in model I the R-Square value is .056 which means only about 5% of the variance is explained. Perhaps somewhat interestingly the overarching citizenship-regime types demonstrate a positive statistically significant relationship with animosity toward immigrants ($P < .001$). Showing some support for the hypothesis regarding

³ For Tables displaying full results see appendix

concerns about personal finances, an index built to measure personal economic condition perception shows that when an individual has a negative outlook about personal finances

Results Table1-Model I

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime	Positive	P<.001
Individualistic-Civic Regime	Positive	P<.001
Personal Level Negative Economic Perception	Positive	P<.05
Borrow Money to Meet, Difficult or Easy	Positive	P<.001
Low Income	Positive	P<.05
High Income	Negative	P<.001
Low Immigration Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
High Immigrant Population Perception	Positive	P<.001

they are likely to develop animosity toward the effect of immigrants; this finding is significant at the ($P < .05$) level. Another significant variable ($P < .001$) is that those who find it difficult to borrow money (a measure of economic difficulty) are also likely to show animosity against the perceived effect of immigrants. Those who are among the low income earners demonstrate a statistically significant ($P < .05$) relationship with the dependent variable; whereas, those among the high income level demonstrate a significantly negative relationship with the dependent variable ($P < .001$). Perhaps most telling are the two measures corresponding to the two perceived levels of immigration. Those who think that there is low immigration show a negative relationship towards animosity of the effect of immigrants ($P < .001$), while conversely, those who believe there is a high number of immigrants demonstrate a positive relationship with animosity toward the effect of immigrants ($P < .001$).

As seen on table 2 Model II remains the same except for the addition of an interaction term measuring the interaction between negative personal economic circumstances and the perception of high immigration; as such, there is little change in the R-Square measurement, meaning that approximately the same amount of variance is accounted as before. The interaction term is significant at the ($P < .05$) level, and it shows a positive relation between itself and animosity toward the effect of immigrants, although the magnitude is smaller than one might expect (.154). Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the interaction term renders the variable of perception of high immigration and personal perception of negative economic circumstances non-significant. All other factors remain unchanged as to their effect on the dependent variable.

Results Table 2-Model II

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime	Positive	P<.001
Individualistic-Civic Regime	Positive	P<.001
Borrow Money to Make Ends Meet, Difficult or Easy	Positive	P<.001
Low Income	Positive	P<.05
High Income	Negative	P<.001
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
The Interaction of Negative Personal Economic Perception and the Perception of a High Amount of Immigration	Positive	P<.05

Model III switches out the personal level of economic circumstance for an individual's perceptions about group-level financial situations. The R-Square is increased and now about 11% of the variance is explained. When this is performed living in a collectivistic-civic society no longer is statistically significant, which leads one to suspect that the political effect of these types of regime-societies is heavily concerned about financial well-being. Alternately, individualistic-civic societies remain both statistically significant (P<.01) and positively related with animosity toward the perceived effect immigrants have.

Those who are dissatisfied with the economic condition of their country demonstrate a positive relationship with animosity toward the effect of immigrants

Results Table 3- Model III

Variable	Direction	Significance
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	P<.01
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	P<.001
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Positive	P<.001
High Income	Negative	P<.001
Low Income	Negative	P<.001
Immigrant Population Perception High	Positive	P<.01
Immigrant Population Perception Low		

(significant at the P<.001 level). An index constructed to gauge dissatisfaction with economic conditions on a group level (peer groups, citizenry, family etc.) demonstrates that group level negative economic perceptions relate positively with animosity toward the perceived effect of immigrants, although the magnitude is somewhat smaller than might be expected (.092), the variable is significant at the (P<.001) level. Results regarding income are interesting; using the group level criteria yields results that demonstrate that belonging to the low income strata is a statistically insignificant factor yet, belonging to the high income strata remains significant (P<.001) and negatively related to the dependent variable. The variables relating to perceptions about high and low immigration population yield similar

results as model I; the variables show similar significance (although high immigration perception drop to the $P < .01$ level) and direction; although, interestingly, the magnitude of perceptions of high immigration is lower than the previous model.

On table 4 Model IV can be seen and it is the same as model III however an interaction term is added. The interaction term measures the effect of group level negative economic perceptions and perceptions of high numbers of immigrants. The R-Square does

Results Table 4- Model IV

Variable	Direction	Significance
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	$P < .01$
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	$P < .001$
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Positive	$P < .001$
High Income	Negative	$P < .001$
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	$P < .001$

not change to any noticeable degree, meaning that 11% of the variance is explained. Surprisingly, the interaction term is not statistically significant, and when added the interaction term renders the variable for perception of high number of immigrants non-significant as well. The variables concerning group level negative economic perception and dissatisfaction with economic condition of country are still significant.

Model V reverts back to a focus concerning an individual's view of their personal situation and adds a litany of control variables in order to be more certain of variable effects

and in an effort to weed out potentially spurious factors. Model V yields an R-square value of .497 percent of the variance meaning that about 49% of the variance is explained. With the control variables added the collectivistic-civic regime maintains a positive and significant ($P < .01$) relationship, however the individualistic-civic regime is rendered non-significant. The index created to gauge a negative perception of personal economic circumstances has become non-significant. An individual who perceives a low immigrant population is disinclined to harbor negative perceptions about the effect of immigrants and this factor is significant at the $P < .001$ level; curiously, having a perception of a high amount of

Results Table 5- Model V

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	$P < .01$
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	$P < .001$
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	$P < .05$
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	$P < .001$
Political Interest	Negative	$P < .001$
National Trust	Negative	$P < .001$
Supra-National Trust	Negative	$P < .05$
Worked for Organization	Negative	$P < .01$
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	$P < .001$
Boycott Products	Negative	$P < .01$
Political Left	Negative	$P < .01$
Political Right	Positive	$P < .01$
Life Satisfaction	Negative	$P < .001$
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	$P < .001$
Immigrants Receive More or	Positive	$P < .001$

Less Than They Contribute		
Many Manage to Obtain	Positive	P<.001
Benefits/Services Not Entitled To		
When Should Immigrants	Positive	P<.001
Obtain rights to Social		
Benefits/Services Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #1 Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #2 Social	Negative	P<.05
Benefits/Services Lead to a More Equal Society		
European Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.01
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.01
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

immigrants is not significant. Showing the potential influence of the media, those who watch television frequently are demonstrate a positive relationship with the dependent variable and it is significant (though just barely) at the $P < .05$ level.

Those who demonstrate interpersonal trust do not seem to be inclined to have a negative perception of the effect immigrants have and this is significant at the $P < .001$ level; likewise, for those individuals whom show an interest in political matters (also $P < .001$). Interestingly, the magnitude of effect is greater for those showing political interest (-.421) than it is for the index for the index of interpersonal trust (-.075), though this could be a measurement artifact as an index is comprised of multiple items, all having an influence in one direction or another, in comparison with a single-item indicator. Another index that shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable and is significant ($P < .001$) is national trust; this is not surprising given that if an individual is trustful of the institutions of their government they are probably going to assume that the immigrant situation is healthy. This is also true for those who show trust for the supra-national institutions (ex. The European Union), in fact the magnitude is slightly larger than those who show trust in the national institutions (-.038 vs. -.036), though the significance is lower ($P < .05$ as opposed to $P < .01$).

A surprisingly significant variable is the negative relationship between those who have worked for an organization (of a political variety) and the dependent variable, this variable is highly significant at the $P < .01$ level. Perhaps, it is reflective of the idea that those involved in political organizations have exposure to the immigration population and their plight and therefore are less likely to form negative attitudes; or perhaps, it is a result that

those who are willing to work for political organizations are already possess a predisposition to be more accepting and tolerant. Participating in political demonstrations is also negatively related to the dependent variable and is significant at the ($P < .001$) value, this is similar to participating in boycotts of products ($P < .01$); suggesting, that there is a relationship between participating in political actions and possessing at more worldly point of view. The effect of political orientation is practically a mirror image in that, those who identify as being politically left-leaning have a negative relationship with the dependent variable whereas, those who identify as being politically right-leaning have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Both political orientation variables are significant at the $P < .01$ level and both have similar magnitudes albeit in the opposite directions ($-.374$ for left vs. $.367$ for right).

The variable representing a life satisfaction index is negatively associated with the dependent variable and is significant at the $P < .001$ level. Those who identify with values of tradition and conformity show a positive relationship with the dependent variable and it is significant at the $P < .001$ level. Similarly, those who feel that immigrants receive more benefits than they contribute show a positive relationship that is also significant at the $P < .001$ level; suggesting that perhaps a lot of animosity towards immigrants comes from a perception of unfairness. This is buttressed by the findings that those who believe that many members of society manage to obtain benefits that they are not entitled to; and, those who claim that immigrants should either wait a long period or never receive full citizenship benefits; both show a positive relationship with the dependent variable and are significantly significant at the $P < .001$ level. Alternatively, those who demonstrate either index

measurement of universalism demonstrate a statistically significant ($P < .001$) negative relationship with the dependent variable. Along similar lines, those that believe that social services and or benefits lead to a more equal society are negatively associated with the dependent variable, this finding is significant at the $P < .05$ level but it is barely so (.044).

There is also some evidence that general attitudes with European unification is an indicator of animosity (or the lack thereof) towards immigrants. The variable measuring whether European unification has gone too far or not far enough indicates that there is a negative statistically significant ($P < .001$) relationship with the dependent variable. What the unification measurement likely indicates is that those who feel strongly about unification are those that are for it and those that are for it are more accepting of the ideal of a unified European people or even a unified world population and therefore are less likely to think harshly of immigrants. A curious finding comes via social participation. Both those who participate frequently and infrequently in social life have a negative relationship with the dependent variable; but, it is only those who have low social participation that demonstrates statistical significance ($P < .01$). This study offers no theories as to why social participation would have such an odd affect, but perhaps this is can be an area for future research.

Variables concerning crime have a visible relationship with the perception that immigrants have a negative societal impact. An index constructed to gauge respondents' fear of crime demonstrates a positive, statistically significant (at the $P < .01$). Additionally, a variable the measures a feeling of safety at night is positively related to the dependent variable and this too is significant at the ($P < .001$) level. An interesting result illustrates that there is a positive relationship between fear of a terrorist attack and the dependent variable,

however it would only be statistically significant at the somewhat generous ($P < .10$) level; possibly indicating that fears of more immediate and personal crimes are more pertinent to immigrant hostility. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, neither of the variables relating to religion have a significant effect.

Interestingly, origin seems to have some relevance to the dependent variable. Both variables relating to whether a respondents' parents were born in country had a positive and fairly strong (.629 for father and .555 for mother) statistically significant ($P < .01$ and $P < .05$ respectively) relationship with the dependent variable. Surprisingly none of the variables for the different age groups had a statistically significant relationship; perhaps revealing that perhaps it is not age that has bearing on a respondents attitudes toward immigrants but the company that an individual keeps that has a bearing on attitude formation. Most of the household demographic variables reveal no significant relationship to the dependent variable except for having ever lived in a house with children. Those who have lived in a house with children show a positive, significant ($P < .01$) relationship with the dependent variable; indicating, that perhaps concerns for the future of children are an ingredient for formulating negative perceptions about immigrants. Another interesting background variable shows that among respondents whose father had a "blue collar" job, there is a statistically significant ($P < .01$) positive relationship with the dependent variable.

Model VI (on table 6) follows the same procedure as Model V only with the addition of the interaction effect of a high perception of immigrants and a perception of negative personal economic circumstances. The R-square value does not change to any noticeable extent at a value of .497. The interaction variable is statistically significant at the $P < .05$ level

and demonstrates a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Given the results from model V it is likely that although, the interaction effect measures the interaction of these two variables that the perception of high immigration part of the term is of more explanative power. After the introduction of the interaction term the stand-alone variable for perceptions of high immigration has reversed direction and become non-significant, due to the presence of the interaction term. None of the control variables seem to be effected by the interaction term.

Results Table 6- Model VI

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	P<.01
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
The Interaction of Negative Personal Economic Perception and The Perception of a High Amount of Immigration	Positive	P<.05
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	P<.05
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	P<.001
Political Interest	Negative	P<.001
National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.01
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.001
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01

Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services Not Entitled To	Positive	P<.001
When Should Immigrants Obtain rights to Social Benefits/Services	Negative	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #1	Negative	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #2	Negative	P<.05
Social Benefits/Services Lead to a More Equal Society	Negative	P<.001
European Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.01
Low Social Participation	Positive	P<.01
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.001
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.01
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Ever Had Children Living		

in Household R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01
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Model VII can be found on table 7 and it follows the same procedure as model V except the focus turns toward a “group level” of perception. The R-square value is slightly higher than that of the individual perspective at .498, although this is hardly a substantial change. The Collectivistic-Civic remains the only significant regime and it is positively related to the dependent variable. Dissatisfaction with the economic climate of the country is statistically significant at P<.01 and is positively related the dependent variable. Oddly, the index to measure group level (i.e. family, friends etc.) is both statistically significant (P<.05) and negatively related to the dependent variable. The finding about the group level negative economic perception is surprising and a bit perplexing. This study does not have an explanation for this finding but seeing as how the magnitude is small (-.026) and the variable is very close to being non-significant (.040) perhaps, it is the case that the presence of the control variables as well as the overall country perception variable is influencing the effect this variable has. As it stands the face value of the results suggest that those with a negative group level perception of economic circumstances focus any hostility and animosity toward parties other than immigrants; perhaps this is true as well, it could be the case that

Results Table 7- Model VII

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	P<.01
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	P<.01
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Negative	P<.05
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	P<.05
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	P<.001
Political Interest	Negative	P<.001
National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.01
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.001
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01
Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Not Entitled To When Should Immigrants Obtain rights to Social	Positive	P<.001

Benefits/Services		
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #1		
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #2		
European Unification Go	Negative	P<.001
Further or Gone		
Too Far		
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.05
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.01
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

government or industrial leaders may be the receivers of resentment and hostility among those whom this variable applies. As for the control variables two variables are affected, the measurement gauging the idea of social benefits making society fairer is no longer significant. Also, the measurement for low social participation drops in significance from P<.01 to P<.05.

Model VIII repeats model VII only adding an interaction term of group level negative economic perception and high immigration perception. There is no discernable change in R-square value. The only discernable effect is the effect of the stand-alone variable gauging group level negative economic perceptions. The result remains in a perplexingly negative

direction but has increased in significance (.014) and slightly strengthened in magnitude (-.036). The interaction term demonstrates a positive relationship but it is not significant.

Results Table 8- Model VIII

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	P<.01
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	P<.01
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Negative	P<.05
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	P<.05
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	P<.001
Political Interest	Negative	P<.001
National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.01
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.001
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01
Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services Not Entitled To	Positive	P<.001

When Should Immigrants Obtain rights to Social Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #1	Negative	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #2	Negative	P<.001
European Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.05
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.01
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

Model IX (located on table 9) blends both individual and group levels of perception. Despite the blending of perspective the R-Square value remains at .498. The regime-type is not affected by this as Collectivistic-Civic remains the significant regime and is positively related (P<.01). Under the blended perception model only concerns about country's economic status and group level negative economic perceptions are statistically significant (P<.01 and P<.05 respectively); however the group level perception variable remains in the opposite direction as hypothesized. On the surface of the situation the results suggest that an

individual is more concerned about the country at large than themselves as it relates to attitude formation towards immigrants. Moreover, when an individual is dissatisfied about the economic situation of the country animosity towards immigrants is present however, when one is concerned about the economic situation of their group then animosity is sent elsewhere (future research is needed to address the question of where). There doesn't seem to be any further effect when blending the perceptions.

Results Table 9- Model IX

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	P<.01
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	P<.01
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Negative	P<.05
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	P<.05
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	P<.001
Political Interest	Negative	P<.001
National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.01
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.001
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01
Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity,	Positive	P<.001

Security Focused Immigrants	Positive	P<.001
Receive More or Less Than They Contribute		
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Not Entitled To When Should Immigrants Obtain rights to Social Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #1		
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #2		
European Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.05
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.01
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

Model X is found on table 10 and is identical to IX except it adds the interaction effects of both individual and group level perceptions. This dynamic yields an R-square value of .499, which indicates that about 49% of the variance is explained. Again, both

dissatisfaction of the country's economic climate and group level negative economic perception are the leading perceptual indicators; both retain their previous significance and direction. What is interesting is that even in a blended perceptual model the interaction effect of personal negative economic perception and a perception of high immigration is statistically significant ($P < .05$) and positively related to the dependent variable. The finding about the personal interaction effect is interesting because neither variable on their own has significant explanatory power, suggesting that the combined effects of the two variables is more telling and informative than either one on their own. The interaction effect of group level economic perception and a high perception of immigration is not significant.

Results Table 10- Model X

Variable	Direction	Significance
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	Positive	$P < .01$
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	$P < .01$
Group Level Negative Economic Perception	Negative	$P < .05$
Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	$P < .001$
The Interaction of Negative Personal Economic Perception and the Perception of a High Amount of Immigration	Positive	$P < .05$
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	$P < .05$
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	$P < .001$
Political Interest	Negative	$P < .001$

National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.01
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.001
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01
Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services Not Entitled To When Should Immigrants Obtain rights to Social Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #1	Negative	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #2	Negative	P<.001
European Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.05
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01

Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.01
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

Model XI retains the same procedure as model IX except for the addition of aggregate country-level variables (GDP, official immigration population etc.). As can be seen on table 4 this model yields a R-square value of .502, which means that about 50% of the variance is explained. With the aggregate variables included the citizenship-regime types become non-significant factors. Those who are dissatisfied with the national economic situation maintain a significantly (P<.001) positive relationship with the dependent variable. A perception of low immigration is also a factor that maintains a significant (P>.001) relationship with the dependent variable, in a negative direction. Interestingly, there is a positive, significant (P<.05) relationship between the amount of money (USD) in foreign direct investment (incoming) and the dependent variable; perhaps, this is because countries receiving significant quantities of foreign capital are countries that are struggling and the perception may very well be that an influx of immigrants will only make the situation worse. Of the aggregate variables potentially the most surprising finding is that the official population of immigrants (according to EUROSTAT figures) has a negative, significant (P<.05) relationship with the dependent variable. It would seem then, that when one has a firm

Results Table 11- Model XI

Variable	Direction	Significance
Country Economy Dissatisfaction	Positive	P<.001

Low Immigrant Population Perception	Negative	P<.001
Foreign Direct Investment (Incoming) in US Millions	Positive	P<.05
Number of Foreigners- (EUROSTAT)	Negative	P<.05
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	P<.05
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	P<.001
Political Interest	Negative	P<.001
National Trust	Negative	P<.001
Supra-National Trust	Negative	P<.05
Worked for Organization	Negative	P<.05
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	P<.01
Boycott Products	Negative	P<.01
Political Left	Negative	P<.01
Political Right	Positive	P<.01
Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Not Entitled to When Should Immigrants Obtain Rights to Social Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #1		
Universalism, Benevolence	Negative	P<.001
Focus Index #2		

Social Benefits/Services Lead to a More Equal Society	Negative	P<.05
Europe Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.01
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Perception on the Likelihood of Terrorism	Positive	P<.01
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Number of People Living Regularly as Member of Household	Positive	P<.05
Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.05
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

understanding of what the *actual* immigrant population is estimated at they are less likely to develop hostile attitudes. To go further, when one understands the actual population (or what official agencies estimate it to be) of immigrants they understand that the immigrant population is most likely a small part of the population and therefore any threats they pose are also likely to be small.

Among the control variables an interesting finding that in this model the belief that social benefits/programs lead to a more equal society is a significant ($P < .05$) negative factor in relation to the dependent variable. Another interesting finding is that, for the first time the index constructed to gauge individuals' perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist attacks becomes significant ($P < .01$) and is positively associated with the dependent variable. This study offers no explanation as to what could be behind the effect the aggregate variables have on this factor. Another interesting finding is that the number of people living regularly in the household is a significant ($P < .05$) variable and it is positively related to the dependent variable; suggesting that at least, when you also consider the aggregate variables, the more people who live in a household raises the concern about the future of the country and this in turn raises concerns (or makes them more tangible) about the effect immigrants might have on the future of the country. Or, an alternative explanation of the finding could be that the more people who live in a household raises and/or intensifies the concern for safety of the individuals of the home, and it could be that immigrants are viewed as a threat to that safety. Other than the mentioned factors no changes are noted among the control variables.

Model XII is the last model and it factors in all the previous factors into one Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. The final R-square value is .503, which is not much of a change from the previous model. Interestingly, the Individualistic-civic regime type gains significance ($P < .05$), however it is negatively related to the dependent variable, which suggests that when all the variables are factored citizens in this type of regime are less likely to form negative attitudes about the perceived negative effect immigrants have. Another factor that is interesting concerns the interaction effect of a negative perception of personal

economic circumstances and a perception of a large amount of immigration; this variable, is positively associated with the dependent variable and is significant at the ($P < .05$) level. All other variables retain their significance and direction as found in model XI.

Results Table 12- Model XII

Variable	Direction	Significance
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	Negative	$P < .05$
Country Economy	Positive	$P < .001$
Dissatisfaction		
Low Immigrant Population	Negative	$P < .001$
Perception		
Foreign Direct Investment (Incoming) in US Millions	Positive	$P < .05$
Number of Foreigners- (EUROSTAT)	Negative	$P < .05$
The Interaction of Negative Personal Economic Perception and the Perception of a High Amount of Immigration	Positive	$P < .05$
Large Amount of TV Viewing	Positive	$P < .05$
Interpersonal Trust	Negative	$P < .001$
Political Interest	Negative	$P < .001$
National Trust	Negative	$P < .001$
Supra-National Trust	Negative	$P < .05$
Worked for Organization	Negative	$P < .05$
Participated in Demonstration	Negative	$P < .01$
Boycott Products	Negative	$P < .01$
Political Left	Negative	$P < .01$
Political Right	Positive	$P < .01$

Life Satisfaction	Negative	P<.001
Tradition, Conformity, Security Focused	Positive	P<.001
Immigrants Receive More or Less Than They Contribute	Positive	P<.001
Many Manage to Obtain Benefits/Services Not Entitled to When Should Immigrants Obtain Rights to Social Benefits/Services	Positive	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #1	Negative	P<.001
Universalism, Benevolence Focus Index #2	Negative	P<.001
Social Benefits/Services Lead to a More Equal Society	Negative	P<.05
Europe Unification Go Further or Gone Too Far	Negative	P<.001
Low Social Participation	Negative	P<.01
Concern About Crime	Positive	P<.01
Feeling of Safety of Walking Alone in Local Area After Dark	Positive	P<.001
Perception on the Likelihood of Terrorism	Positive	P<.01
Father Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Mother Born in Country	Positive	P<.01
Number of People Living	Positive	P<.05

Regularly as Member of Household Ever Had Children Living in Household	Positive	P<.05
R's Father Had Blue Collar Job	Positive	P<.01

Discussion

Recall that the hypotheses that have driven the study are the following:

H1: Both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant group size will have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity toward immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when both independent variables are combined to form an interaction term.

H2: This relationship will be confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in the study.

H3: This relationship will remain significant after controlling for both individual level variables and state-level aggregate variables.

The results of this study have demonstrated that to the extent that these hypotheses can be accepted, they can only be partially so. For example, the results have shown that H1 is greatly dependent on the perspective of the individual and in what context individuals find themselves in. As can be seen from model XII those that are concerned about the economic standing of their country at large (a measurement of group-level concern) are more likely to develop negative attitudes about immigrants. Additionally those concerned about their personal economic well-being are also likely to develop animosity toward immigrants, but only when this concern is paired with a perception of a high level of immigration on the part of the individual.

As far as H2 is concerned, there is partial evidence to both support and refute this hypothesis. The variables mentioned above remain significant after controlling for the citizenship-regime type, yet, there is still some question as to what effect the regime-types have on individual level perceptual factors. For example, in the last model, it is shown that

those living in individualistic-civic regime types are at least more likely to develop animosity towards immigrants where those living in a collectivistic-civic regime type are not, because according to the results, the concerns of the people living in those types of countries can be explained by other factors. While offering up any explanation as to why the different regime types might affect individual perceptual level factors is beyond the scope of this study, it is within in the realm of possibility that the particular way that norm socialization occurs in these countries yields suspicion of outsiders; this and similar questions are fertile ground for further research.

Using the various control variables in the study has essentially refuted H3. Clearly, there are other factors at work that affect attitude formation towards immigrants, that can minimize financial and population concerns. Although H3 is essentially rejected, the testing of the hypothesis has yielded some interesting insight. If one is to take full stock of the results from model XII one would have to acknowledge the fact that animosity towards immigrants is often the by-product of some other phenomena. For example, the fact that the index for interpersonal trust withstood the factoring of all the other variables is telling. If those with high amounts of interpersonal trust have little animosity towards immigrants than it is most likely the case that those with little interpersonal trust have some animosity, this is because of the general sense of suspicion that plays a daily role in these individuals' lives; it stands to reason, that this suspicion would only grow in the presence of "strange" outsiders like immigrants. This is far from the only example.

Variables like national and supra-national trust, life satisfaction, tradition focus, the measurements regarding fairness (some are able to receive what they did not earn/immigrants

receive more than they contribute), the universalism measurements, feeling of safety, crime, terrorism etc. are all indicative of a sense of relationship to the world. The results demonstrate that those who have a more insecure and/or distrusting relationship with the world around them are more likely to think that immigrants (the consummate “outsider”) have a negative impact on society; whereas, those who seem to have a more open and trusting disposition are less likely to think that immigrants have a negative impact. The results reveal, at least in part, that attitudes are concerned less with fiscal health or material competition and are more related with a personal sense of comfort and security; stated simply, it would seem that those who feel less comfortable and secure feel more suspicious and distrusting, and part of the way that this discomfort and distrust manifests itself is through negative attitudes towards immigrants.

So far the discussion has surrounded the factors that have been shown to be of significance but it is worthwhile to have a discussion about factors that would seem like they would be important but as far as this study is concerned, turned out not to be. The measurements concerning religion did not seem to have any sort of impact, which is somewhat interesting because it would seem logical that those who identify as being religious or participate in religious activity would receive their normative cues from their religious source of choice. As far as attitudes towards immigrants are concerned religion seems to be either concerned with other matters or the cues that are being given about immigrants are being ignored. Another interesting non-factor is age. None of the age groups displayed statistical significance, so the mere fact that one is a certain age has little bearing in comparison to the other daily factors that play into attitude formation, at least as it concerns

immigrants. To put it another way, the way an individual feels about immigrants is determined by the current outlook on life that a person holds and has less to do with how old that person is.

Gender is another interesting non-factor. One might be tempted to think that biosocial imperatives and gendered social norms may influence the thought process of the two genders. As far as a negative attitude about immigrants is concerned, this is not the case. The apparent importance of personal outlook supersedes any influence biology and social norms seem to have on this subject. Similarly, it is surprising to discover that education and personal improvement were non-significant factors. The findings in this study seem to speak against those who would claim that accruing more social capital (such as education and skills) will make one feel less threatened and therefore view immigrants more positively. Human capital notwithstanding if personal disposition does not improve it seems unlikely that immigrants will be looked upon favorably.

Finally, some other factors that are of particular surprise are population area, blue collar occupation and contact. None of the above listed factors are found to be significant which seems to fly in the face of what could be considered “common sense”. It would be easy to think that those living in somewhat isolated rural areas would view immigrants more harshly than those in the city who see a diverse population daily. It makes sense to think that those with “blue collar” positions would feel more competitive with incoming populations in the labor market and therefore take a harsh stance towards new competitors. It would also make sense to think that contact with foreign populations would open the worldview of an individual. Yet, as can be seen these factors are reduced in significance by other factors at

work, which means if one wishes to attempt to address a problem of negative attitude formation one would do well to look beyond what would seem to be “obvious” common factors.

However, it has to be noted that the results the above listed factors have yielded could be due to the way they are measured. The 2008 version of the ESS has a simple response set for a respondent’s place of residence. Perhaps, a more nuanced choice selection for this variable would have produced different results. Choice selection also plays a role in the classification of “blue collar” worker, if a researcher were to use the same data source but construct the variable with different criteria then perhaps there would be a different result for the variable. Perhaps the biggest caveat is reserved for the measure for the contact factor. As of the writing of this study only one variable of the 2008 wave of the ESS provided a measure to factor in contact theory. Perhaps if a different measure was formulated by the ESS or a series of measures were developed for use in a potential index, one could better ascertain the potential impact that contact with a foreign or “outsider” population has, but as these results stand, contact has little to do with the formulation of negative attitudes towards the perceived impact of immigrants.

Policy Implications

The findings in this study can be useful to any government that wishes to make their nation a more welcoming place for immigrants. The first finding reflects a need that governments seek to fulfill in the course of their regular duties, and that is to provide a good economic climate. However, to help curb any desire among the native population to blame or otherwise scapegoat immigrants, there is a need for the native population to know that the economy is good when it is and see tangible steps for improvement when there are downturns and recessions. Since people tend not to form negative attitudes about immigrants when they believe the immigrant population is low, it would be of great benefit to interested parties to distribute accurate information when there are times when political entrepreneurs might try to paint the immigrant issue in a negative light for their own interests. Since one of the factors of negative attitude formation is the interaction of the perception of a large immigrant population and personal economic concerns, addressing either one in a systematic way, would dampen the formation of said attitudes.

One prime example of the need for properly functioning political institutions is a functioning and (at least mostly) uncorrupt police force. Fears of crime, nighttime safety, and terrorism make people suspicious of one another; especially it seems, against noticeably different members of the “outsider” immigrant population. This study shows that these fears play significant roles in the formation of negative attitudes toward immigrants. To address the concerns about crime with a capable police force also addresses a potential source of hostility toward immigrants.

Another one of the findings suggests that an investment in ensuring the proper functioning of the political institutions would be worthwhile. If there is a general trust in political institutions, there will be less of a need for the native population to look for someone to blame because the system is not operating as planned. The same can be said for supra-national trust, especially in the European context. If a European (particularly Western) country can get the general population to buy in to a sense of “Europeaness” then, perhaps there would be less resentment on the part of the native population. Admittedly, the Europeanization process would have to start very early on in education. Activities, like frequent field trips to other countries (possible due to the close proximity of many European countries) and extensive language and culture studies as part of the curriculum. If individuals internally normalize other ways of life then they will probably be more accepting of people from foreign lands. Along similar lines, if through social normalization a general interest in political issues can be formed individuals may seek to understand the issues better and try to understand either side, and not rely on rumor and hearsay for information and confuse speculation and conjecture for fact.

It would be a very difficult thing to do for any government to try and establish inter-personal trust among members of the population. However, the education process once again provides a potential opportunity to attempt this very feat. Implementing trust and team building exercises into the routine part of normal school life from small children up through late teenagers may be a pathway to create a sense of trust among members of the population. If these exercises are designed and carried out in an effective manner than perhaps enough trust among members of the native population will build to at least give new members a

chance to get acclimated and settled, without being the object of resentment and scorn. Indeed, if there is any action to be taken on the part of governments to try to make their country a more welcoming place for immigrants, it is through the long term normalization process. If serious efforts are undertaken to try and encourage the native population to be more trustful of one another, issues like suspicions that people receive what they do not earn or immigrants receiving more than they contribute should dissipate as well, thus diminishing the chances that negative attitudes towards immigrants will form.

Another example of this process is value formation. As is seen those with so-called “traditional” values (values concerned with tradition, discipline, etc.) are more likely to form negative attitudes about immigrants. Those who are more universal in their outlook tend to be less critical of the supposed negative impact immigrants have. Given the fluctuation in leadership in a democratic system and the different priorities therein, long-term value formation would be very difficult to achieve. Adding to the difficulty is performing it in such a way as to not be accused of indoctrination. However, if it is decided that “open-mindedness” is among the core virtues for which that nation stands then there is a possibility that there can be widespread acceptance of that ideal. Ultimately, the underlying factor that a government needs to address if they want to make their land more welcoming to immigrants is fear. If people are fearful for one reason or another then it is quite possible and in some cases (as evidenced by Karapin) quite likely that episodes of aggression and hostility will occur. If serious efforts are put forth to address the concerns of the population, or in a more long term scenario make the population less fearful as a people then that more than anything else will greatly mitigate any hostility that may form.

Conclusion

This study set out to demonstrate the predictive effect economic concerns and a perception of a high immigration population had on the formation of negative attitudes towards immigrants. The importance of immigration becomes quite clear when one examines the issue at any length. Upon the brief examination of factors that motivate immigrants and what some real world consequences can be if enough prejudice is formed against immigrants in a given society; that have been performed here it is apparent that as the world continues into further integration and globalization that immigration is going to become an ever more important issue. As economies fluctuate millions of people may find it more beneficial to locate elsewhere. As migration flows continue to occur it is important that contingencies be planned for what might occur. Based on what was presented here, populist anti-immigrant far right parties may rise in political power, or perhaps riots can occur. These events make the study of attitudes towards immigrants a worthy endeavor.

As part of studying attitude formation towards immigrants one must look to see what ideas have been presented in the past. This study highlighted eight general theory areas that demonstrated the possible importance of such factors as contact, human capital, political orientation, and cultural marginality to name a few. For the purposes of this study a variation on the idea of group threat was selected as its guiding theory. Group threat is the idea that members of the majority group will feel threatened if there is material competition (often seen in the form of jobs) and cultural/political competition (which can manifest through a rising population of immigrants). Some academic debate exists as to whether this feeling of threat needs to be thought of as real or if it is enough if there is simply *perceived* threat.

More debate takes place as to what level the threat needs to be felt at whether or not an individual feels threatened or if it is only groups that can feel threatened is another issue. This study chose to adopt the framework for threats felt on a group level and uses that framework for individuals.

Before illustrating results of this study, previous results from other studies were highlighted. Studies revealed consistent results around the effects variables like education, contact and blue collar work classification. Less consistent results surrounded economic circumstances and immigrant population. Studies showed that depending on which economic measurements are used different effects occur. The inconsistency behind population results are perhaps due to different measures being used on different data samples during different times. With a firmer understanding of what previous research has found the study turned attention toward data and methods.

This thesis made use of the 2008 European Social Survey. A typology for citizenship-regime types was introduced to control for societal context. Using Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis a number of factors were considered. The main hypothesis considering the perceptions of negative economic conditions (both on a personal and group level) and a perception of high immigrant population was supplemented by the introduction of various control variables to help ensure that results were not due to spurious relationships.

The results obtained from the regression analysis were interesting. Individuals who believe the economic situation in their country is bad are likely to form negative attitudes towards immigrants. The same is true for those who hold a negative outlook on their personal economic situation but only if those concerns are combined with a perception that

the immigrant population is high. These results indicate a partial acceptance of the hypothesis given, however it cannot be said that the results are consistent through all citizenship-regime types. As the models progressed it was seen that the importance citizenship-regime has fluctuates with the factors being considered, to put it another way, some concerns override others in developing negative attitudes toward immigrants, depending on which regime is in question. The variables pertaining to the main hypotheses are informative but perhaps even more telling are some of the control variables.

Variables regarding outlook on trust, personal satisfaction, and outlooks on fairness were more statistically significant than any of the primary independent variables. This result means that there is more certainty of the effect these kinds of variables have than there is with standard variables of concern (like contact, economic, population etc.). Given the results, one can not help but to conclude that to the extent an individual forms negative attitudes toward immigrants, it is very likely that those attitudes are shaped by factors that are not immediately tangible. It would seem that even if an individual was in good economic standing and thought that immigration population is low, that person may still develop hostile attitudes if they are unhappy or distrustful. Therefore, it seems likely that if a person is exhibiting signs of aggression towards immigrants it could be the case that there is a very specific catalyst that caused the situation or according to the results here, that person is lashing out due to some other negative influence. Understanding these results informs what can possibly be done about negative attitude formation.

Based on the results here it would seem that overt attempts to assuage anger (to the extent there is any) toward immigrants may only be marginally successful. If the national

leadership of a country desires a welcoming environment for immigrants, long term normalization is needed. Particular focus would be needed about trust, values, and personal worldview. If an individual is trustful, maintains a universalistic perspective and feels that their country dispenses benefits in a more or less even way then they are less likely to foster negative attitudes in general least of all towards immigrants. However, the opposite is true if more and more of the population begins to feel unhappy and jaded and their worldview narrows it is very likely that animosity will be felt toward a host of segments of the population, immigrants included.

While this research is far from the final word on attitudes toward immigrants, with 50% of the variance explained it does go a long way in finding an increased amount of certainty among factors. Commonly held notions of contact, blue collar work, and rural living area found less support here (albeit there is an argument to be made about measurement). This is important because it means that perhaps future research can spend more time investigating the links of personal happiness and seemingly antagonistic attitudes. It seems that fear is a prime motivator but, this study cast the idea of fear of immigrants in question. Perhaps fear in other parts of life is what really inspires individuals to take extreme positions against other individuals.

This study focused solely on Western Europe, it did so, in part, to assess the idea of an overarching “Western Culture”. Aside from the specific purpose of the study it is hoped that this study will prove useful in identifying the extent of which Western principles have an influence on social phenomena. If Western principles have an influence then results should be similar across Western countries. While a thorough comparison of the results of this study

and a similar study from the United States is beyond the scope of this study, perhaps the results found here can aid future researchers in this endeavor. Immigration is an important topic and will likely remain so for years to come and it is worthwhile to examine if Western principles affect issues regarding immigration.

As it related to this study, if upon comparison the results are similar to that of similar research from the United States then there exists an evident link that can be highlighted as demonstrating the traditionally thought of “Western” culture. If on the other hand, the evidence presented here finds no similarities when compared to similar work performed in the United States, then it would be a demonstration of the unique influence of specific political environments. The idea of a “Western” culture that binds the United States and Western Europe together would lose support. This study attempted to answer and address the hypotheses presented but it is also attempted to contribute a small piece to the ongoing literature that compares similar phenomenon across continents that claim to have similar ideals.

While the United States is a part of “Western” society; its history with immigration markedly differs from other “Western” countries. The United States bases its origins on immigration, therefore its sense of “Americanness” has revolved around ideals of a commitment to democracy, equality, and other foundational values as outlined by the Constitution (Safran 1997). Without a deep history of feudalism there is a contractual-like nature to American society as opposed to a sociobiological and/or a tradition steeped society that one might find in Europe (Safran 1997). In Europe, immigration does not play such a foundational role in the histories of nations. To the nations that comprise Western Europe

and the others that make up the constantly expanding European Union; immigration is removed from the creation of social identity; instead identities are more bound to ethnic concerns (Citrin and Sides, p.34).

The ongoing comparison is especially important when you consider the results found in the present study. Unlike similar research in both Europe and the United States this study found substantial evidence that negative attitude formation towards immigrants is largely due to social-psychological factors. It would be enlightening for future research to revisit the social-psychological paradigm in the social contexts of Europe and the United States, in part to continually attempt to answer the question of whether an overriding Western culture exists. Ultimately, future research will have to decide if each country is bound and shaped by its own unique historical immigration story, or if countries with similar cultural environments handle social phenomena, like immigration, similarly? Hopefully, this study will be helpful for future scholars to answer this question.

It is of the utmost importance to realize that the immigration issue is only going to intensify. As the immigration issues continue to develop it is important that the correct factors regarding immigration issues be identified. The results found in this study will hopefully lead to consideration of alternatives in the fact of potential waste of time, energy and resources in well-intentioned but perhaps ineffective remedies against prejudice, particularly against immigrants. Given the geopolitical ramifications prejudice can have if left unchecked it is always of the utmost importance to continue studying this issue from new angles and perspectives. If individuals and societies can better understand the fear of the other than perhaps they can know better than fall prey to it.

Appendix

Tables

Table A-1. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b	b	b
<i>Inclusive variables</i>			
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	0.910*** (0.178)	0.906*** (0.178)	0.231 (0.176)
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	0.886*** (0.155)	0.879*** (0.154)	0.493** (0.150)
<i>Focal Independent Variables</i>			
Per. level negative economic Percep.	0.075* (0.029)	0.046 (0.032)	
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more	-0.033 (0.245)	-0.053 (0.245)	
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.	-0.294 (0.243)	-0.295 (0.243)	
Borrow money to make ends meet	0.260*** (0.060)	0.259*** (0.060)	
Low Income	0.467* (0.195)	0.471* (0.195)	0.272 (0.188)
High Income	-0.778*** (0.180)	-0.780*** (0.180)	-0.694*** (0.174)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.	-1.423*** (0.176)	-1.432*** (0.176)	-1.063*** (0.176)

High Imm. Pop. Percep.	1.193*** (0.227)	0.102 (0.540)	0.693** (0.225)
Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop		0.154* (0.069)	
Eco. Dis. Country			0.584*** (0.031)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.			0.092*** (0.016)
Intercept	12.805*** (0.324)	13.011*** (0.337)	10.073*** (0.285)
R ²	.056	.057	.113
Model change in R ²		.001	.056

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Number of cases = 7,144

Table A-2. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	b	b	b
<i>Inclusive variables</i>			
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	0.226 (0.176)	0.544** (0.158)	0.547** (0.158)
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	0.481** (0.151)	0.089 (0.129)	0.082 (0.129)
<i>Focal Independent Variables</i>			
Per. level negative economic Percep.		0.025 (0.027)	0.002 (0.028)
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more		-0.232 (0.185)	-0.248 (0.185)
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.		0.293 (0.191)	0.298 (0.191)
Borrow money to make ends meet		-0.013 (0.046)	-0.013 (0.046)
Low Income	0.271 (0.188)	-0.030 (0.149)	-0.025 (0.149)
High Income	-0.695*** (0.174)	-0.100 (0.140)	-0.101 (0.140)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.	-1.084*** (0.177)	-0.550*** (0.132)	-0.557*** (0.132)
High Imm. Pop. Percep.	0.273 (0.502)	0.206 (0.169)	-0.661 (0.401)

Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop		0.122*
		(0.051)

Eco. Dis. Country	0.585***
	(0.031)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.	0.084***
	(0.018)
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop	0.033
	(0.035)

Exclusionary Variables

Lit. Amt. TV View	0.105	0.109
	(0.137)	(0.137)
Lar. Amt. TV View	0.243*	0.249*
	(0.121)	(0.121)
Lit. Tim. List. Radio	0.219	0.225
	(0.150)	(0.150)
Lar. Tim. List. Radio	0.124	0.131
	(0.161)	(0.161)
Lit. Tim. Read. News	0.125	0.132
	(0.170)	(0.170)
Lar. Tim. Read. News	-0.242	-0.226
	(0.347)	(0.347)
Lit. Net. Use	0.235	0.245
	(0.209)	(0.209)
Lar. Net. Use	0.010	0.013
	(0.191)	(0.191)
Intpersonal Trust	-0.075***	-0.075***
	(0.012)	(0.012)

Political Interest	-0.421*** (0.073)	-0.422*** (0.073)
Pol. Easy to Und.	0.049 (0.055)	0.045 (0.055)
Eas of Pol. Dec.	-0.017 (0.060)	-0.014 (0.060)
National Trust	-0.036*** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.006)
Supra-National Trust	-0.038* (0.017)	-0.038* (0.028)
Voter	-0.127 (0.143)	-0.116 (0.143)
Cont. Pol.	-0.065 (0.145)	-0.067 (0.145)
Wrk. Pol. Party	0.135 (0.236)	0.133 (0.262)
Wrk. Org.	-0.468** (0.144)	-0.474** (0.144)
Disp. Bad/Sticker	0.107 (0.209)	0.102 (0.209)
Sign. Pet.	-0.125 (0.117)	-0.121 (0.117)
Par. Dem	-0.725*** (0.190)	-0.729*** (0.190)
Boycott Prod.	-0.373** (0.130)	-0.369** (0.130)
Pol. Left	-0.374** (0.130)	-0.373** (0.130)
Pol. Right	0.367** (0.132)	0.367** (0.132)

Life Sat.	-0.117*** (0.018)	-0.116*** (0.018)
Trad Val.	0.112*** (0.011)	0.112*** (0.011)
Imm. Rec. More than Con.	0.689*** (0.028)	0.689*** (0.028)
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.	0.339*** (0.060)	0.339*** (0.060)
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.	0.810*** (0.057)	0.811*** (0.056)
Uni. Val. #1	-0.084*** (0.013)	-0.083*** (0.013)
Uni. Val. #2	-0.197*** (0.019)	-0.196*** (0.019)
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small	0.036 (0.054)	0.038 (0.054)
Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.	-0.048 (0.062)	-0.050 (0.062)
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.	-0.122* (0.061)	-0.124* (0.061)
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far	-0.438*** (0.022)	-0.438*** (0.022)
Low Soc. Cont.	0.043 (0.170)	0.046 (0.170)
High Soc. Cont.	0.128 (0.113)	0.132 (0.113)
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters	0.062 (0.208)	0.055 (0.208)
Low Soc. Par.	-0.321** (0.122)	-0.324** (0.122)

High Soc. Par.	-0.094 (0.136)	-0.096 (0.136)
Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.	-0.011 (0.132)	-0.009 (0.132)
Conc. Abt. Crime	0.065** (0.021)	0.065** (0.021)
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark	0.298*** (0.078)	0.302*** (0.078)
Per. Lik. Of Terr.	0.075 (0.039)	0.075 (0.039)
How Relig.	0.000 (0.024)	0.000 (0.024)
Relig. Pract.	-0.039 (0.022)	-0.039 (0.022)
R born in country	0.386 (0.269)	0.391 (0.269)
Father born in country	0.629** (0.231)	0.618** (0.231)
Mother born in country	0.555* (0.236)	0.572* (0.236)
Age 15-24	0.552 (0.514)	0.550 (0.514)
Age 25-34	-0.248 (0.460)	-0.242 (0.460)
Age 35-44	-0.324 (0.449)	-0.317 (0.449)
Age 45-54	0.019 (0.439)	0.027 (0.439)
Age 55-64	-0.018 (0.407)	-0.009 (0.407)

Age 65-74	-0.131 (0.380)	-0.129 (0.380)
Age 75-80	0.618 (0.429)	0.610 (0.428)
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.002 (0.165)	0.001 (0.165)
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.020 (0.140)	-0.020 (0.140)
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.143 (0.259)	-0.134 (0.259)
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.195 (0.273)	-0.185 (0.273)
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.385 (0.222)	-0.374 (0.222)
Num. Reg. Mem. Household	0.083 (0.062)	0.084 (0.062)
Male	-0.169 (0.119)	-0.166 (0.119)
Liv. Small Pop. Area	0.028 (0.115)	0.033 (0.115)
Highest Lvl. Education	-0.031 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.042)
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.	-0.117 (0.123)	-0.112 (0.123)
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days	-0.399 (0.572)	-0.363 (0.572)
Ed. Lst. 7 Days	-0.717 (0.636)	-0.698 (0.636)
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days	0.163 (0.622)	0.168 (0.622)

Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days	0.071 (0.632)	0.114 (0.632)
Retired Lst. 7 Days	0.018 (0.584)	0.049 (0.584)
Comm Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days	-0.376 (2.504)	-0.359 (2.504)
House Duty Lst. 7 Days	0.222 (0.585)	0.252 (0.585)
Blue Collar	0.119 (0.121)	0.120 (0.121)
Wrk. for Pub. Org.	-0.153 (0.385)	-0.164 (0.384)
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.	-0.042 (0.377)	-0.050 (0.376)
Wrk. Outside Count. more 6 mon. within last 10 Yrs.	-0.178 (0.228)	-0.171 (0.228)
Currently Mem. Trd. Union	0.112 (0.169)	0.109 (0.169)
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union	-0.134 (0.143)	-0.131 (0.143)
Leg. Attached to Par.	0.426 (0.225)	0.431 (0.225)
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.	-0.020 (0.213)	-0.026 (0.213)
Lives with Partner	-0.098 (0.183)	-0.110 (0.183)
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg. Attachment	0.011 (0.119)	0.013 (0.119)
Part. Highest Ed.	0.032 (0.029)	0.030 (0.029)

Has Not Been Divorced	-0.232 (0.176)	-0.234 (0.176)
Children Liv. at Home	0.125 (0.177)	0.117 (0.177)
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home	0.426** (0.151)	0.419** (0.151)
Father Highest Ed.	-0.033 (0.049)	-0.033 (0.049)
Father Wrk. when R was 14	-0.192 (0.221)	-0.196 (0.221)
Father had Blue Collar Job	0.393** (0.131)	0.394** (0.131)
Mother Highest Ed.	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.054)
Mother Wrk. when R was 14	0.072 (0.145)	0.080 (0.145)
Mother had Blue Collar Job	0.140 (0.157)	0.135 (0.157)

Intercept	10.153*** (0.297)	15.123*** (1.288)	15.149*** (1.287)
R ²	.113	.497	.497
Model change in R ²	.000	.384	.000

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Number of cases = 7,144

Table A-3. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
	b	b	b
<i>Inclusive variables</i>			
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	0.503** (0.160)	0.500** (0.160)	0.503** (0.158)
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	0.047 (0.129)	0.034 (0.129)	0.041 (0.129)
<i>Focal Independent Variables</i>			
Per. level negative economic Percep.			0.028 (0.027)
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more			-0.224 (0.185)
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.			0.314 (0.191)
Borrow money to make ends meet			-0.011 (0.046)
Low Income	-0.007 (0.148)	-0.008 (0.148)	-0.032 (0.149)
High Income	-0.123 (0.139)	-0.124 (0.139)	-0.114 (0.140)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.	-0.619*** (0.135)	-0.643*** (0.136)	-0.618*** (0.135)
High Imm. Pop. Percep.	0.264 (0.172)	-0.209 (0.384)	0.271 (0.172)
Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop			

Eco. Dis. Country	0.099** (0.031)	0.099** (0.029)	0.099** (0.029)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.	-0.026* (0.018)	-0.036* (0.014)	-0.028* (0.013)
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop	0.033 (0.035)	0.037 (0.027)	
<i>Exclusionary Variables</i>			
Lit. Amt. TV View	0.095 (0.137)	0.094 (0.137)	0.096 (0.137)
Lar. Amt. TV View	0.247* (0.121)	0.247* (0.121)	0.248* (0.121)
Lit. Tim. List. Radio	0.221 (0.150)	0.221 (0.150)	0.227 (0.150)
Lar. Tim. List. Radio	0.121 (0.161)	0.121 (0.161)	0.128 (0.161)
Lit. Tim. Read. News	0.119 (0.170)	0.120 (0.170)	0.112 (0.170)
Lar. Tim. Read. News	-0.245 (0.347)	-0.238 (0.347)	-0.254 (0.347)
Lit. Net. Use	0.256 (0.209)	0.257 (0.209)	0.263 (0.209)
Lar. Net. Use	0.024 (0.191)	0.023 (0.191)	0.023 (0.191)
Intpersonal Trust	-0.075*** (0.012)	-0.075*** (0.012)	-0.075*** (0.012)
Political Interest	-0.436*** (0.073)	-0.435*** (0.073)	-0.436*** (0.073)

Pol. Easy to Und.	0.052 (0.055)	0.052 (0.055)	0.050 (0.055)
Eas of Pol. Dec.	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.060)
National Trust	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.029*** (0.007)
Supra-National Trust	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.041* (0.018)
Voter	-0.126 (0.142)	-0.123 (0.142)	-0.119 (0.142)
Cont. Pol.	-0.075 (0.145)	-0.079 (0.145)	-0.075 (0.145)
Wrk. Pol. Party	0.129 (0.262)	0.122 (0.262)	0.132 (0.262)
Wrk. Org.	-0.472 (0.144)	-0.471** (0.144)	-0.467** (0.144)
Disp. Bad/Sticker	0.119 (0.209)	0.118 (0.209)	0.117 (0.209)
Sign. Pet.	-0.146 (0.117)	-0.145 (0.117)	-0.145 (0.117)
Par. Dem	-0.716*** (0.190)	-0.713*** (0.190)	-0.721*** (0.190)
Boycott Prod.	-0.388** (0.130)	-0.388** (0.130)	-0.393** (0.130)
Pol. Left	-0.393** (0.129)	-0.391** (0.129)	-0.391** (0.129)
Pol. Right	0.360** (0.132)	0.362** (0.132)	0.359** (0.132)
Life Sat.	-0.112*** (0.018)	-0.112*** (0.018)	-0.108*** (0.018)

Trad Val.	0.112*** (0.011)	0.112*** (0.011)	0.112*** (0.011)
Imm. Rec. More than Con.	0.686*** (0.028)	0.687*** (0.028)	0.686*** (0.028)
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.	0.337*** (0.060)	0.341*** (0.060)	0.337*** (0.060)
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.	0.809*** (0.056)	0.809*** (0.056)	0.809*** (0.056)
Uni. Val. #1	-0.083*** (0.013)	-0.083*** (0.013)	-0.084*** (0.013)
Uni. Val. #2	-0.199*** (0.019)	-0.198*** (0.019)	-0.198*** (0.019)
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small	0.042 (0.054)	0.043 (0.054)	0.037 (0.054)
Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.	-0.055 (0.062)	-0.057 (0.062)	-0.055 (0.062)
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.	-0.114 (0.061)	-0.115 (0.061)	-0.116* (0.061)
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far	-0.432*** (0.022)	-0.432*** (0.022)	-0.432*** (0.022)
Low Soc. Cont.	0.041 (0.170)	0.049 (0.170)	0.040 (0.170)
High Soc. Cont.	0.128 (0.113)	0.131 (0.113)	0.129 (0.113)
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters	0.062 (0.208)	0.059 (0.208)	0.071 (0.208)
Low Soc. Par.	-0.303* (0.122)	-0.303** (0.122)	-0.308** (0.122)
High Soc. Par.	-0.083 (0.136)	-0.082 (0.136)	-0.085 (0.136)

Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.	-0.007 (0.132)	-0.009 (0.132)	-0.010 (0.132)
Conc. Abt. Crime	0.066** (0.021)	0.066** (0.021)	0.064** (0.021)
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark	0.304*** (0.078)	0.305*** (0.078)	0.301*** (0.078)
Per. Lik. Of Terr.	0.067 (0.039)	0.067 (0.039)	0.066 (0.039)
How Relig.	0.004 (0.024)	0.004 (0.024)	0.002 (0.024)
Relig. Pract.	-0.041 (0.022)	-0.042 (0.022)	-0.041 (0.022)
R born in country	0.379 (0.269)	0.376 (0.269)	0.381 (0.269)
Father born in country	0.620** (0.230)	0.617** (0.230)	0.631** (0.230)
Mother born in country	0.535* (0.236)	0.539* (0.236)	0.543* (0.236)
Age 15-24	0.625 (0.513)	0.620 (0.513)	0.572 (0.514)
Age 25-34	-0.171 (0.458)	-0.174 (0.457)	-0.242 (0.460)
Age 35-44	-0.281 (0.447)	-0.287 (0.447)	-0.327 (0.449)
Age 45-54	0.039 (0.437)	0.035 (0.437)	0.021 (0.439)
Age 55-64	-0.002 (0.406)	-0.004 (0.406)	-0.010 (0.406)

Age 65-74	-0.132 (0.379)	-0.142 (0.380)	-0.122 (0.380)
Age 75-80	0.606 (0.428)	0.602 (0.428)	0.604 (0.428)
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.011 (0.165)	-0.013 (0.165)	-0.015 (0.165)
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.013 (0.140)	-0.014 (0.140)	-0.011 (0.140)
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.157 (0.259)	-0.166 (0.259)	-0.156 (0.259)
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.205 (0.273)	-0.210 (0.273)	-0.212 (0.273)
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.388 (0.222)	-0.392 (0.222)	-0.382 (0.222)
Num. Reg. Mem. Household	0.090 (0.062)	0.090 (0.062)	0.089 (0.062)
Male	-0.171 (0.119)	-0.171 (0.119)	-0.175 (0.119)
Liv. Small Pop. Area	0.033 (0.115)	0.036 (0.115)	0.030 (0.115)
Highest Lvl. Education	-0.033 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.033 (0.042)
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.	-0.117 (0.123)	-0.116 (0.123)	-0.116 (0.123)
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days	-0.370 (0.571)	-0.362 (0.571)	-0.408 (0.572)
Ed. Lst. 7 Days	-0.700 (0.636)	-0.692 (0.636)	-0.738 (0.636)
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days	0.330 (0.610)	0.331 (0.610)	0.156 (0.622)

Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days	0.085 (0.631)	0.073 (0.631)	0.079 (0.631)
Retired Lst. 7 Days	-0.029 (0.583)	-0.029 (0.583)	-0.021 (0.583)
Com. Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days	-0.509 (2.502)	-0.515 (2.502)	-0.522 (2.502)
House Duty Lst. 7 Days	0.231 (0.584)	0.237 (0.584)	0.206 (0.584)
Blue Collar	0.126 (0.121)	0.130 (0.121)	0.127 (0.121)
Wrk. for Pub. Org.	-0.167 (0.384)	-0.167 (0.384)	-0.164 (0.384)
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.	-0.047 (0.376)	-0.052 (0.376)	-0.059 (0.376)
Wrk. Out Count. more 6 mon. within last 10 Yrs.	-0.143 (0.227)	-0.134 (0.228)	-0.159 (0.228)
Currently Mem. Trd. Union	0.132 (0.169)	0.128 (0.169)	0.131 (0.169)
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union	-0.133 (0.143)	-0.130 (0.143)	-0.132 (0.143)
Leg. Attached to Par.	0.430 (0.225)	0.434 (0.225)	0.427 (0.225)
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.	-0.001 (0.213)	-0.001 (0.213)	-0.005 (0.214)
Lives with Partner	-0.103 (0.183)	-0.106 (0.183)	-0.098 (0.183)
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg. Attachment	0.011 (0.119)	0.014 (0.119)	0.014 (0.119)
Part. Highest Ed.	0.029 (0.029)	0.029 (0.029)	0.029 (0.029)

Has Not Been Divorced	-0.222 (0.176)	-0.225 (0.176)	-0.231 (0.176)
Children Liv. at Home	0.153 (0.177)	0.152 (0.177)	0.139 (0.177)
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home	0.451** (0.152)	0.449** (0.152)	0.450** (0.152)
Father Highest Ed.	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.032 (0.049)
Father Wrk. when R was 14	-0.211 (0.221)	-0.211 (0.221)	-0.205 (0.221)
Father had Blue Collar Job	0.405** (0.131)	0.404** (0.131)	0.402** (0.131)
Mother Highest Ed.	-0.068 (0.054)	-0.068 (0.054)	-0.068 (0.054)
Mother Wrk. when R was 14	0.081 (0.145)	0.079 (0.145)	0.078 (0.145)
Mother had Blue Collar Job	0.132 (0.157)	0.132 (0.157)	0.138 (0.157)

Intercept	14.737*** (1.280)	14.791*** (1.280)	14.599*** (1.309)
R ²	.498	.498	.498
Model change in R ²	.001	.000	.000

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Number of cases = 7,144

Table A-4. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	b	b	b
<i>Inclusive variables</i>			
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type	0.503** (0.160)	-0.390 (0.624)	-0.392 (0.624)
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type	0.026 (0.130)	-0.278 (0.145)	-0.290* (0.145)
<i>Focal Independent Variables</i>			
Per. level negative economic Percep.	0.005 (0.029)	0.020 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.029)
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more	-0.237 (0.185)	-0.212 (0.185)	-0.223 (0.185)
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.	0.0319 (0.191)	0.366 (0.191)	0.370 (0.191)
Borrow money to make ends meet	-0.011 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.046)
Low Income	-0.028 (0.149)	0.028 (0.149)	0.033 (0.149)
High Income	-0.115 (0.140)	-0.204 (0.142)	-0.205 (0.142)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.	-0.641*** (0.136)	-0.516*** (0.136)	-0.538*** (0.137)
High Imm. Pop. Percep.	-0.858 (0.485)	0.232 (0.172)	-0.788 (0.484)
Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop	0.115* (0.052)		0.106* (0.052)

Eco. Dis. Country	0.100** (0.029)	0.110** (0.029)	0.110** (0.029)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.	-0.035* (0.015)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.018* (0.015)
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop	0.024 (0.027)		0.021 (0.027)
GDP Per Capita (US)		-2.403E-5 (0.000)	-2.499E-5 (0.000)
Foreign Direct Investment (Incoming)		1.160E-5* (0.000)	1.153E-5* (0.000)
Inflation Growth Percentage (On all items)		-0.425 (0.341)	-0.425 (0.341)
Purchasing Power Parities (USD)		0.077 (0.094)	-0.075 (0.094)
Unemployment Rate (Total Civilian Labor Force)		-0.095 (0.077)	-0.093 (0.077)
Number of Foreigners (EUROSTAT)		-1.874E-7* (0.000)	-1.887E-7 (0.000)
<i>Exclusionary Variables</i>			
Lit. Amt. TV View	0.098 (0.137)	0.099 (0.137)	0.101 (0.137)
Lar. Amt. TV View	0.254* (0.121)	0.240* (0.121)	0.246* (0.121)
Lit. Tim. List. Radio	0.233 (0.150)	0.197 (0.150)	0.203 (0.150)
Lar. Tim. List. Radio	0.134 (0.161)	0.055 (0.161)	0.061 (0.161)

Lit. Tim. Read. News	0.120 (0.170)	0.170 (0.170)	0.176 (0.170)
Lar. Tim. Read. News	-0.234 (0.347)	-0.317 (0.346)	-0.298 (0.346)
Lit. Net. Use	0.273 (0.209)	0.264 (0.209)	0.272 (0.209)
Lar. Net. Use	0.026 (0.191)	-0.051 (0.190)	-0.048 (0.190)
Intpersonal Trust	-0.074*** (0.012)	-0.079*** (0.012)	-0.079*** (0.012)
Political Interest	-0.436*** (0.073)	-0.460*** (0.074)	-0.460*** (0.074)
Pol. Easy to Und.	0.047 (0.055)	0.059 (0.055)	0.056 (0.055)
Eas of Pol. Dec.	-0.013 (0.060)	0.010 (0.060)	0.013 (0.060)
National Trust	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.007)
Supra-National Trust	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.036* (0.018)	-0.037* (0.018)
Voter	-0.107 (0.142)	-0.028 (0.144)	-0.119 (0.144)
Cont. Pol.	-0.079 (0.145)	-0.058 (0.145)	-0.063 (0.145)
Wrk. Pol. Party	0.126 (0.262)	0.095 (0.262)	0.089 (0.262)
Wrk. Org.	-0.471** (0.144)	-0.347* (0.145)	-0.352* (0.145)

Disp. Bad/Sticker	0.111 (0.209)	0.049 (0.209)	0.044 (0.209)
Sign. Pet.	-0.140 (0.117)	-0.218 (0.118)	-0.213 (0.118)
Par. Dem	-0.723*** (0.190)	-0.553** (0.192)	-0.557** (0.192)
Boycott Prod.	-0.390** (0.130)	-0.365** (0.131)	-0.361** (0.131)
Pol. Left	-0.389** (0.129)	-0.343** (0.129)	-0.342** (0.129)
Pol. Right	0.360** (0.132)	0.349** (0.132)	0.350** (0.132)
Life Sat.	-0.107*** (0.018)	-0.113*** (0.018)	-0.112*** (0.018)
Trad Val.	0.112*** (0.011)	0.119*** (0.011)	0.119*** (0.011)
Imm. Rec. More than Con.	0.686*** (0.028)	0.684*** (0.028)	0.684*** (0.028)
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.	0.340*** (0.060)	0.342*** (0.060)	0.345*** (0.060)
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.	0.811*** (0.056)	0.796*** (0.056)	0.798*** (0.056)
Uni. Val. #1	-0.082*** (0.013)	-0.083*** (0.013)	-0.082*** (0.013)
Uni. Val. #2	-0.196*** (0.019)	-0.199*** (0.019)	-0.198*** (0.019)
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small	0.040 (0.054)	0.058 (0.055)	0.059 (0.055)

Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.	-0.058 (0.062)	-0.068 (0.062)	-0.070 (0.062)
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.	-0.119 (0.061)	-0.126* (0.061)	-0.128* (0.061)
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far	-0.432*** (0.022)	-0.416*** (0.022)	-0.416*** (0.022)
Low Soc. Cont.	0.048 (0.170)	0.054 (0.170)	0.062 (0.170)
High Soc. Cont.	0.134 (0.113)	0.088 (0.113)	0.093 (0.113)
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters	0.062 (0.208)	0.006 (0.208)	-0.002 (0.208)
Low Soc. Par.	-0.311* (0.122)	-0.373** (0.122)	-0.375** (0.122)
High Soc. Par.	-0.086 (0.136)	-0.142 (0.136)	-0.143 (0.136)
Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.	-0.010 (0.132)	-0.057 (0.132)	-0.056 (0.132)
Conc. Abt. Crime	0.064** (0.021)	0.063** (0.021)	0.063** (0.021)
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark	0.305*** (0.078)	0.302*** (0.078)	0.305*** (0.078)
Per. Lik. Of Terr.	0.065 (0.039)	0.123** (0.040)	0.122** (0.040)
How Relig.	0.002 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.024)
Relig. Pract.	-0.041 (0.022)	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.022)
R born in country	0.384 (0.269)	0.415 (0.268)	0.418 (0.268)

Father born in country	0.618** (0.230)	0.642** (0.230)	0.629** (0.230)
Mother born in country	0.561* (0.236)	0.620** (0.236)	0.635* (0.236)
Age 15-24	0.567 (0.514)	0.658 (0.513)	0.653 (0.513)
Age 25-34	-0.239 (0.459)	-0.186 (0.459)	-0.183 (0.459)
Age 35-44	-0.324 (0.449)	-0.247 (0.448)	-0.245 (0.448)
Age 45-54	0.026 (0.438)	0.100 (0.437)	0.104 (0.437)
Age 55-64	-0.003 (0.406)	0.076 (0.405)	0.082 (0.405)
Age 65-74	-0.126 (0.380)	-0.047 (0.379)	-0.052 (0.379)
Age 75-80	0.594 (0.428)	0.670 (0.427)	0.660 (0.427)
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.014 (0.165)	-0.011 (0.165)	-0.010 (0.165)
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.	-0.012 (0.140)	-0.022 (0.140)	-0.022 (0.140)
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.153 (0.259)	-0.164 (0.258)	-0.162 (0.258)
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.207 (0.273)	-0.262 (0.272)	-0.255 (0.272)
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.	-0.375 (0.222)	-0.373 (0.222)	-0.367 (0.222)
Num. Reg. Mem. Household	0.090 (0.062)	0.132 (0.062)	0.133 (0.062)

Male	-0.173 (0.119)	-0.155 (0.118)	-0.153 (0.118)
Liv. Small Pop. Area	0.036 (0.115)	-0.049 (0.116)	-0.044 (0.116)
Highest Lvl. Education	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.042)
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.	-0.111 (0.123)	-0.164 (0.123)	-0.159 (0.123)
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days	-0.369 (0.572)	-0.256 (0.570)	-0.220 (0.570)
Ed. Lst. 7 Days	-0.715 (0.636)	-0.636 (0.634)	-0.616 (0.634)
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days	0.159 (0.622)	0.240 (0.620)	0.243 (0.620)
Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days	0.112 (0.632)	0.021 (0.629)	0.054 (0.630)
Retired Lst. 7 Days	0.008 (0.583)	0.036 (0.582)	0.062 (0.582)
Com. Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days	-0.511 (2.502)	-0.546 (2.494)	-0.534 (2.493)
House Duty Lst. 7 Days	0.239 (0.584)	0.248 (0.582)	0.279 (0.582)
Blue Collar	0.131 (0.121)	0.149 (0.121)	0.153 (0.121)
Wrk. for Pub. Org.	-0.174 (0.384)	-0.193 (0.383)	-0.203 (0.383)
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.	-0.070 (0.376)	-0.059 (0.375)	-0.069 (0.375)
Wrk. Out Count. more 6 mon. within last 10 Yrs.	-0.147 (0.228)	-0.135 (0.227)	-0.124 (0.227)

Currently Mem. Trd. Union	0.127 (0.169)	0.055 (0.173)	0.051 (0.173)
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union	-0.128 (0.143)	-0.093 (0.145)	-0.089 (0.145)
Leg. Attached to Par.	0.434 (0.225)	0.403 (0.225)	0.410 (0.225)
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.	-0.011 (0.214)	0.016 (0.214)	0.012 (0.214)
Lives with Partner	-0.111 (0.183)	-0.004 (0.183)	-0.017 (0.183)
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg. Attachment	0.018 (0.119)	0.089 (0.120)	0.090 (0.120)
Part. Highest Ed.	0.028 (0.029)	0.018 (0.029)	0.017 (0.029)
Has Not Been Divorced	-0.226 (0.176)	-0.184 (0.175)	-0.188 (0.175)
Children Liv. at Home	0.131 (0.177)	0.084 (0.184)	0.080 (0.184)
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home	0.442** (0.152)	0.392* (0.167)	0.390** (0.167)
Father Highest Ed.	-0.033 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.049)
Father Wrk. when R was 14	-0.208 (0.221)	-0.243 (0.220)	-0.247 (0.220)
Father had Blue Collar Job	0.402** (0.131)	0.435** (0.132)	0.436** (0.132)
Mother Highest Ed.	-0.068 (0.054)	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.057 (0.054)
Mother Wrk. when R was 14	0.083 (0.145)	0.066 (0.145)	0.072 (0.145)

Mother had Blue Collar Job	0.134 (0.157)	0.140 (0.156)	0.137 (0.156)
Intercept	14.653*** (1.309)	16.675*** (2.538)	16.759*** (2.538)
R ²	.499	.502	.503
Model change in R ²	.001	.003	.001

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Number of cases = 7,144

Variable Coding

-A dummy variable was created to control for potential differences between East and West Germany. West Germany was included in the various regression analyses.

-Dummy variables were created for the different citizen-regime types. Countries were pooled into their correct ethnic regime type and assigned a score of “1” other regime types were then scored as “0”

-The ESS variable “STFECO” “How satisfied with present state of economy in country” had the following response categories:

00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “STFECO2” “Country economy dissatisfaction”. The range of responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 00 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 00 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “UEMPLWK” “Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and looking for work” had the following response categories:

01 0-4
02 5-9
03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44

10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "UEMPLWK2" "Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and looking for work". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "NMNYBSC" "Of every 100 working age how many not money for basic necessities" had the following response categories:

01 0-4
02 5-9
03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44
10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "NMNYBSC" "Of every 100 working age how many not money for basic necessities". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables "Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and looking for work" and "Of every 100 working age how many not money for basic necessities" are combined into an additive index named, "Group level negative economic perception index". Whereas a higher score indicates a more negative perception

-The ESS variable "LKUEMP" "How likely unemployed and looking for work next 12 months" had the following response categories:

1 Not at all likely
2 Not very likely
3 Likely
4 Very likely
5 Never worked OR no longer working and not looking for work
7 Refusal

8 Don't know

9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "LKUEMP2" "How likely unemployed and looking for work next 12 months". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 5 are coded as 0 and responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "LKLPCWF" "How likely less time paid work than like because care for family next 12 months" had the following response categories:

1 Not at all likely

2 Not very likely

3 Likely

4 Very likely

6 Not applicable

7 Refusal

8 Don't know

9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "LKLPCWF2" "How likely less time paid work than like because care for family next 12 months". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 6 are coded as 0 and responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "LKNEMNY" "How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months" had the following response categories:

1 Not at all likely

2 Not very likely

3 Likely

4 Very likely

7 Refusal

8 Don't know

9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "LKNEMNY2" "How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "HINCFEL" "Feeling about household's income nowadays" had the following response categories:

1 Living comfortably on present income

2 Coping on present income

3 Finding it difficult on present income

- 4 Finding it very difficult on present income
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “HINCFEL2” Feeling about household’s income nowadays”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables “How likely unemployed and looking for work in next 12 months”, “How likely less time paid work than like because care for family next 12 months”, “How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months”, and “Feeling about households income nowadays” are combined into an additive index named, “Personal level negative economic perception index”. A higher score indicates a more negative perception.

-The ESS variable “UEMP12M” “Any period of unemployment and work seeking lasted 12 months or more” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has experienced unemployment lasting 12 months or more”, “R has not experienced unemployment lasting 12 months or more” and “Not applicable”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “UEMP5YR” “Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has experienced unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years”, “R has not experienced unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years”, and “Not applicable”. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “HINCTNTA” “Household’s total net income, all sources” had the following response categories:

- 01 J
- 02 R
- 03 C
- 04 M
- 05 F
- 06 S
- 07 K
- 08 P
- 09 D
- 10 H
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable was recoded into three dummy variables, “Low income”, “Average income”, and “High income”. Responders who gave a response of 01-04 are classified as “low income”. Responders who gave a response of 05-06 are classified as “average income”. Responders who gave a response of 07-10 are classified as “high income”. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BRWMNY” “Borrow money to make ends meet, difficult or easy” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very difficult
- 2 Quite difficult
- 3 Neither easy nor difficult
- 4 Quite easy
- 5 Very easy
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable was recoded into “BRWMNY2” “Borrow money to make ends meet, difficult or easy”. The range of responses in the ESS were reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 is recoded into 5 and an original response of 5 is counted as 1 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BRNOCNT” “Of every 100 working age how many born outside of country” had the following response categories:

- 01 0-4
- 02 5-9

03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44
10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low immigrant population perception”, “Moderate immigrant population perception”, and “high immigrant population perception”. “Low immigrant population perception” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 01-04. “Moderate immigrant population perception” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 05-06. “High immigrant population perception” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 07-11. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-There is a variable measuring the interaction effect of negative personal economic perception and the perception of a high immigrant population

-There is a variable measuring the interaction effect of negative group level economic perception and the perception of a high immigrant population

-The ESS variable “IMBGECO” “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy” had the following response categories:

00 Bad for the economy
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Good for the economy
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMBGECO” “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an original response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 0 and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IMUECLT” “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants” had the following response categories:

- 00 Cultural life undermined
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Cultural life enriched
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMUECLT2” “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an original response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 0 and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IMWBCNT” “Immigrants make country worse or better place to live” had the following response categories:

- 00 Worse place to live
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Better place to live
- 77 Refusal

88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMWBCNT2” “Immigrants make country worse of better place to live”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an original response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 0 and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”, “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants” and “Immigrants make country worse or better place to live” are combined into an additive index named, “Animosity toward the effect of immigrants”. A higher score indicates higher animosity.

-The ESS variable “IMSMETN” “Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority” had the following response categories:

- 1 Allow many to come and live here
- 2 Allow some
- 3 Allow a few
- 4 Allow none
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMSMETN2” “Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IMDFETN” “Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority” had the following response categories:

- 1 Allow many to come and live here
- 2 Allow some
- 3 Allow a few
- 4 Allow none
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMDFETN2” “Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IMPCNTR” “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe” had the following response categories:

- 1 Allow many to come and live here

- 2 Allow some
- 3 Allow a few
- 4 Allow none
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “IMPCNTR2” “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables “Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority”, “Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority” and “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe” are combined into an additive index named, “Animosity for the allowance of more immigrants index”. A higher score indicates increased animosity.

-2008 GDP, 2008 GDP Per Capita, 2008 Foreign Direct Investment, 2008 Purchasing Power Parity rates, and 2008 Unemployment rates are taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, from their website:

<http://www.oecd.org>

2008 Immigration population was taken from Eurostat, a program run by the European Commission of the European Union that tracks vital statistics for EU member nations and select non-member nations, from their website:

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database>

Specific chart:

<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do>

Control Variable Coding

-The ESS variable “TVTOT” “TV watching, total time on average weekday” had the following response categories:

- 00 No time at all
- 01 Less than 0.5 hour
- 02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
- 03 More than 1 hour up to 1.5 hours
- 04 More than 1.5 hours up to 2 hours
- 05 More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours
- 06 More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours
- 07 More than 3 hours
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little amount of TV viewing”, “Moderate amount of TV viewing, and “Large amount of TV viewing”. “Little amount of TV viewing” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate amount of TV viewing is comprised of responses 03-04, and “Large amount of TV viewing” is comprised of responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “RDTOT” “Radio listening, total time on average weekday” had the following response categories:

- 00 No time at all
- 01 Less than 0.5 hour
- 02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
- 03 More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours
- 04 More than 1.5 hours up to 2 hours
- 05 More than 2 hours up to 2.5 hours
- 06 More than 2.5 hours up to 3 hours
- 07 More than 3 hours
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little time listening to radio”, “Moderate time listening to radio”, and “Large time listening to radio”. “Little TV time viewing politics” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate time listening to radio” is comprised of responses 03-04, “Large time listening to radio” is comprised of responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “NWSPTOT” “Newspaper reading, total time on average weekday” had the following response categories:

- 00 No time at all
- 01 Less than 0.5 hour
- 02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
- 03 More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours
- 04 More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours
- 05 More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours
- 06 More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours
- 07 More than 3 hours
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little time reading newspaper”, “Moderate time reading newspaper”, and “Large time reading

newspaper”. “Little time reading newspaper” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate time reading newspaper” is comprised of responses 03-04, and “Large time reading newspaper” is comprised of responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “NETUSE” “Personal use of internet/e-mail/www” had the following response categories:

- 00 No access at home or work
- 01 Never Use
- 02 Less than once a month
- 03 Once a month
- 04 Several times a month
- 05 Once a week
- 06 Several times a week
- 07 Every day
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little net use”, “Moderate net use”, and “Large net use”. “Little net use” is comprised of responses 00-03, “Moderate net use” is comprised of responses 04-05, and “Large net use” is comprised of responses 06-07. Responders who gave responses 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PPLTRST” “Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful” had the following response categories:

- 00 You can’t be too careful
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Most people can be trusted
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Personal trust”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PPLFAIR” “Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair” had the following response categories:

- 00 Most people would try to take advantage of me
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Most people would try to be fair
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “People are fair”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PPLHLP” “Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves” had the following response categories:

- 00 People mostly look out for themselves
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 People mostly try to be helpful
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “People are helpful”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The variables, “Personal trust”, “People are fair”, and “People are helpful” are combined into an additive index named “Interpersonal Trust Index”.

-The ESS variable "POLINTR" "How interested in politics" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very interested
- 2 Quite interested
- 3 Hardly interested
- 4 Not at all interested
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "Political interest". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "POLCMPL" "Politics too complicated to understand" had the following response categories:

- 1 Never
- 2 Seldom
- 3 Occasionally
- 4 Regularly
- 5 Frequently
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "Politics easy to understand". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "POLDCS" "Making mind up about political issues" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very difficult
- 2 Difficult
- 3 Neither difficult nor easy
- 4 Easy
- 5 Very easy
- 7 Refusal

- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "Ease of political decisions". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "TRSTPRL" "Trust in country's parliament" had the following response categories:

- 00 No trust at all
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Complete trust
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "TRSTPRL2" "Trust in country's parliament". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "TRSTLGL" "Trust in the legal system" had the following response categories:

- 00 No trust at all
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Complete trust
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTLGL2” “Trust in the legal system”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRSTPLC” “Trust in the police” had the following response categories:

00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPLC2” “Trust in police”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRSTPLT” “Trust in politicians” had the following response categories:

00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPLT2” “Trust in politicians”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRSTPRT” “Trust in political parties” had the following response categories:

- 00 No trust at all
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Complete trust
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPRT2” “Trust in political parties”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “STFGOV” “How satisfied with the national government” had the following response categories:

- 00 Extremely dissatisfied
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Extremely satisfied
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “STFGOV2” “How satisfied with the national government”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “STFDEM” “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country” had the following response categories:

00 Extremely dissatisfied

01 1

02 2

03 3

04 4

05 5

06 6

07 7

08 8

09 9

10 Extremely satisfied

77 Refusal 88 Don’t know

99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “STFDEM2” “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables “Trust in country’s parliament”, “Trust in the legal system”, “Trust in the police”, “Trust in politicians”, “Trust in political parties”, “How satisfied with the national government”, and “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country” are combined into an additive index named “National trust”.

-The ESS variable “TRSTEP” “Trust in the European Parliament” had the following response categories:

00 No trust at all

01 1

02 2

03 3

04 4

05 5

06 6

07 7

08 8

09 9

10 Complete trust

77 Refusal

88 Don’t know

99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTEP2” “Trust in the European Parliament”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRSTUN” “Trust in the United Nations” had the following response categories:

00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRUSTUN2” “Trust in the United Nations”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables “Trust in the European Parliament” and “Trust in the United Nations” are combined into an additive index named “Supra-National Trust Index”.

-The ESS variable “VOTE” “Voted last national election” had the following response categories:

1 Yes
2 No
3 Not eligible to vote
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “R is a voter”. Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as a voter. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “CONTPLT” “Contacted politician or government official last 12 months” had the following response categories:

1 Yes
2 No

- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable "Contacted Politician". Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having contacted a politician. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "WRKPRTY" "Worked in political party or action group last 12 months" had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable "Worked in political party". Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having worked in a political party. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "WRKORG" "Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months" had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable "Worked for organization". Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having worked for an organization. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "BADGE" "Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months" had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Displayed a badge or sticker”. Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having displayed a badge or sticker. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SGNPTIT” “Signed petition last 12 months” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Signed petition”. Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having signed a petition. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PBLDMN” “Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Participated in demonstration”. Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having participated in a public demonstration. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BCTPRD” “Boycotted certain products last 12 months” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Boycott Products”. Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having participated in boycotting products. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “LRSCALE” “Placement on left right scale” had the following response categories:

00 Left
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Right
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Political left”, “Political middle and “Political right”. “Political left” is comprised of responders who gave responses 00-04, “Political middle” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 5 and “Political Right” is comprised of responders who gave responses 06-10. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “STFLIFE” “How satisfied with life as a whole” had the following response categories:

00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Satisfaction with life”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “HAPPY” “How happy are you had the following response categories:

- 00 Extremely unhappy
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Extremely happy
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Level of happiness”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded. The variables “Satisfaction with life” and “Level of happiness” are combined into an additive index named “Life satisfaction index”

-The ESS variable “IMPSAFE” “Important to live in secure and safe surroundings” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMPSAFE2” “Important to live in secure and safe surroundings”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PRTYBAN” “Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "PRTYBAN2" "Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "HRSHSNT" "People who break the law much harsher sentences" had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "HRSHSNT2" "People who break the law much harsher sentences". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "IPFRULE" "Important to do what is told and follow rules" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPFRULE2” “Important to do what is told and follow rules”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPMODST” “Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPMODST2” “Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPSTRGV” “Important that government is strong and ensures safety” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPSTRGV2” “Important that government is strong and ensures safety”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPBHPRP” “Important to behave properly” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "IPBHPRP2" "Important to behave properly". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "IMPTRAD" "Important to follow traditions and customs" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "IMPTRAD2" "Important to follow traditions and customs". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables, "Important to live in secure and safe surroundings", "Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy", "People who break the law much harsher sentences", "Important to do what is told and follow rules", "Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention", "important that government is strong and ensures safety", "Important to behave properly", and "Important to follow traditions and customs" are combined into an additive index named "Conservative Values- Tradition, Conformity, Security focused".

-The ESS variable "IMRCCON" "Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute" had the following response categories:

- 00 Receive much more than they contribute
- 01 1

02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Contribute much more than they receive
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "IMRCCON2" "Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute". The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 00 is coded as 10 an original response of 10 is coded as 00 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "BENNENT" "Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to" had the following response categories:

1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "BENNENT2" "Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "IMSCCLBN" "When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services" had the following response categories:

1 Immediately on arrival
2 After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked
3 Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year
4 Once they have become a [country] citizen
5 They should never get the same rights
7 Refusal
8 Don't know

9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMSCLBN2” “When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SBSTREC” “Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBSTREC2” “Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy” had the following response categories. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SBENCCM” “Social benefits/services encourage people other countries to come live here” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBENCCM2” “Social benefits/services encourage people other countries to come live here”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal

- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "SBBSNTX2" "Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "SBLAZY" "Social benefits/services make people lazy" had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree Strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "SBLAZY2" "Social benefits/services make people lazy". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "SBLWCOA" "Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another" had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree Strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "SBLWCOA2" "Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "SBLWLKA" "Social benefits/services make people less willing look after themselves/family" had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree

- 5 Disagree Strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "SBLWLKA2" "Social benefits/services make people less willing look after themselves/family". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "DFINCAC" "Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts" had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "DFINCAC2" "Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables, "Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy", "Social benefits/services encourage people other countries come live here", "Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges", "Social benefits/services make people lazy", "Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another", "Social benefits/services make people less willing look after themselves/family" and "Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts" are combined into an additive index named "Self transcendent values 1- Universalism, benevolence focus index #1". Whereas the higher the score the more benevolence is valued.

-The ESS variable "IPEQOPT" "Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPEQOPT2” “Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPUDRST” “Important to understand different people” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPUDRST2” “Important to understand different people”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPHLPPPL” “Important to help people and care for others well-being” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPHLPPPL2” “Important to help people and care for others well-being”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IPLYLFR” “Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPLYLFR2” “Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “IMPENV” “Important to care for nature and environment” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very much like me
- 2 Like me
- 3 Somewhat like me
- 4 A little like me
- 5 Not like me
- 6 Not like me at all
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMPENV2” “Important to care for nature and environment”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables “Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, “Important to understand different people”, “Important to help people and care for others well-being”, “Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close”, and “Important to care for nature and environment” are combined into an additive index named, “Self Transcendence Value 2- Universalism, benevolence focus index #2”.

-The ESS variable “SMDFSLV” “For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SMDFSLV2” “For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SBPRVPV” “Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBPRVPV2” “Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SBEQSOC” “Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society” had the following response categories:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Disagree strongly
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBEQSOC2” “Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “EUFTF” “European Union: European unification go further or gone too far” had the following response categories:

- 00 Unification has already gone too far
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Unification should go further
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “EUFTF2” “European unification go further or gone too far”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SCLMEET” “How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues” had the following response categories:

- 01 Never
- 02 Less than once a month
- 03 Once a month
- 04 Several times a month
- 05 Once a week
- 06 Several times a week
- 07 Every day
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low social contact”, “Moderate social contact”, and “High social contact”. “Low social contact” is comprised of responses

01-03, “Moderate social contact” is comprised of responses 04-05, and “high social contact” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 06-07. Responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “INMDISC” “Anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables, “R has personal discussions” and “Nobody to discuss intimate and personal matters with”. “Nobody to discuss intimate and personal matters with” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 2. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “SCLACT” “Take part in social activities compared to others of same age” had the following response categories:

- 1 Much less than most
- 2 Less than most
- 3 About the same
- 4 More than most
- 5 Much more than most
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low social participation”, “Average social participation” and “High social participation”. “Low social participation” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 1-2, “Average social participation” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 3, and “High social participation” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 4-5. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “CRMVCT” “Respondent or household member victim of burglary/assault last 5 years” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “CRMVCT2” “Respondent or household member victim of burglary/assault last 5 years”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 2 and an original response of 2 was coded to count as 1. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BRGHMWR” “How often worry about your home being burgled” had the following response categories:

- 1 All or most of the time
- 2 Some of the time
- 3 Just occasionally
- 4 Never
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “BRGHMWR2” “How often worry about your home being burgled”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 were coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BRGHMEF” “Worry about home burgled has effect on quality of life” had the following response categories:

- 1 Serious effect on quality of life
- 2 Some effect
- 3 Or, no real effect on quality of life
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “BRGHMEF2” “Worry about home burgled has effect on quality of life”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 3 and an original response of 3 was coded to count as 1. Responses of 6 were coded to count as 0. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “CRVCTWR” “How often worry about becoming a victim of violent crime” had the following response categories:

- 1 All or most of the time
- 2 Some of the time
- 3 Just occasionally

- 4 Never
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "CRVCTWR2" "How often worry about becoming a victim of violent crime". The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "CRVCTEF" "Worry about becoming victim of violent crime has effect on quality of life" had the following response categories:

- 1 Serious effect on quality of life
- 2 Some effect
- 3 Or, no real effect on quality of life
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "CRVCTEF2" "Worry about becoming victim of violent crime has effect on quality of life". The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 3 and an original response of 3 was coded to count as 1. Responses of 6 were coded to count as 0. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables, "Respondent or household member victim of burglary/assault last 5 years", "How often worry about your home being burgled", "Worry about home burgled has effect on quality of life", "How often worry about becoming a victim of violent crime", and "Worry about becoming victim of violent crime has effect on quality of life" are combined into an additive index named, "Concern about crime index". A higher score indicates more concern about crime from the respondent.

-The ESS variable "AESFDRK" "Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark" had the following response categories:

- 1 Very safe
- 2 Safe
- 3 Unsafe
- 4 Or, very unsafe
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “AESFDRK2” “Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRRENYR” “How likely terrorist attack in Europe coming next twelve months” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very likely
- 2 Likely
- 3 Not very likely
- 4 Not at all likely
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRRENYR2” “How likely terrorist attack in Europe during next twelve months”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TRRCNYR” “How likely terrorist attack in country during next twelve months” had the following response categories:

- 1 Very likely
- 2 Likely
- 3 Not very likely
- 4 Not at all likely
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRRCNYR2” “How likely terrorist attack in country during next twelve months”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

The variables “How likely terrorist attack in Europe during next twelve months” and “How likely terrorist attack in country during next twelve months” are combined into an additive index named, “Perception on the likelihood of terrorism”. Responders who score higher have a higher perception of a likely terrorist attack.

-The ESS variable “RLDGDGR” “How religious are you” had the following response categories:

00 Not at all religious
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Very religious
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "RLGDGR2" "How religious are you". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "RLGATND" "How often attend religious services apart from special occasions" had the following response categories:

01 Every day
02 More than once a week
03 Once a week
04 At least once a month
05 Only on special holy days
06 Less often
07 Never
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "RLGATND2" "How often attend religious services apart from special occasions". The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 01 was recoded to count as 07 and an original response of 07 was coded to count as 01 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "PRAY" "How often pray apart from at religious services" had the following response categories:

01 Every day
02 More than once a week
03 once a week
04 At least once a month
05 Only on special holy days

06 Less often
07 Never
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "PRAY2" "How often pray apart from at religious services". The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 01 was recoded to count as 07 and an original response of 07 was coded to count as 01 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

The variables "How often attend religious services apart from special occasions" and "How often pray apart from at religious services" are combined into an additive index named, "Religious practice index". A higher score indicates a higher frequency of religious practice.

-The ESS variable "DSCRGRP" "Member of a group discriminated against in this country" had the following response categories:

1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables "Member of a non-discriminated group" and "Member of a discriminated group". Responders who gave a response of 1 are placed in the discriminated group category and responders who gave a response of 2 are placed in the non-discriminated category. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded. Responders who are in the discriminated group category are excluded because they stand outside the criteria for unit of analysis, which is based on majority group membership.

-The ESS variable "CTZCNTR" "Citizen of country" had the following response categories:

1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables "R is a citizen of country" and "R is not a citizen of country". Responders are given a score of 1 depending on which category they fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded. Responders who are not citizens are excluded because they stand outside the criteria for unit of analysis, which is based on majority group membership; furthermore, if a respondent is not a citizen then it is

likely that they are an immigrant and thus their attitudes toward other immigrants will be biased.

-The ESS variable “BRNCNTR” “Born in country” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R was born in country” and “R was not born in country”. Responders are given a score of 1 depending on which category they fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “BLGETMG” “Belong to minority ethnic group in country” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R is not a member of an ethnic minority” and “R is a member of an ethnic minority”. Responders are given a score of 1 depending on which category they fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded. Responders who are an ethnic minority are excluded because they stand outside the criteria for unit of analysis, which is based on majority group membership.

-The ESS variable “FACNTR” “Father born in country” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Father born in country” and “Father not born in country”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “MOCNTR” “Mother born in country” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables "Mother born in country" and "Mother not born in country". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "AGEA" "Age of respondent" was calculated based on the information given by the respondent.

The ESS variable is recoded into eight dummy variables, "Age of R is 15-24", "Age of R is 25-34", "Age of R is 35-44", "Age of R is 45-54", "Age of R is 55-64", "Age of R is 65-74", "Age of R is 75-80" and "Age of R is 81 or over". Responders who did not provide an age are excluded.

-The ESS variable "AGRPBLG" "Strong or weak sense of belonging to age group" had the following response categories:

- 00 Very weak sense of belonging
- 01 1
- 02 2
- 03 3
- 04 4
- 05 5
- 06 6
- 07 7
- 08 8
- 09 9
- 10 Very strong sense of belonging
- 55 I have no sense of belonging to any/this age group
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into the variable "AGRPBLG2" "Strong or weak sense of belonging to age group". The variable was recoded so that a response of 00 counts as 01, a response of 01 counts as 02 and so on; a response of 55 is counted as 00. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

The variable "AGRPBLG2" is recoded into three dummy variables, "Weak sense of belonging to age group", "Average sense of belonging to age group" and "Strong sense of belonging to age group". Responders who gave a response of 00-05 are placed in the "Weak sense of belonging to age group" category. Responders who gave a response of 06 are placed in the "Average sense of belonging to age group" category. Responders who gave a

response of 07-11 are placed in the “Strong sense of belonging to age group” category. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PREDET” “How often past year treated with prejudice because of ethnic background” had the following response categories:

- 0 Never
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 Very often
- 7 Refusal 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R does not experience ethnic prejudice frequently” and “R experiences ethnic prejudice frequently”. Responders who gave a response of 0-2 are placed in the “does not experience ethnic prejudice frequently” category”. Responders who gave a response of 3-4 are placed in the “experiences ethnic prejudice frequently” category. Responders who were placed in the “experiences ethnic prejudice frequently category are excluded, because if a respondent is frequently experiencing prejudice then they probably are not a member of the majority and therefore stand outside of the unit of analysis of majority members. Respondents who do not experience ethnic prejudice frequently are included because it is possible that a majority member may face infrequent accidental discrimination based on a mistake or misjudgment on behalf of the prejudiced party. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PVOLWRK” “Done paid or voluntary work last month” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes- Paid work only
- 2 Yes- Voluntary work only
- 3 Yes- Paid and voluntary work
- 4 No- Neither
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into four dummy variables “R has done only paid work in last month”, “R has done only voluntary work in last month”, “R has done voluntary and paid work in last month”, and “R has not done either voluntary or paid work in last month”. Respondents are placed in the appropriate category depending on their response. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “HHMMB” “Number of people living regularly as member of household” was an integer given by the respondent. Respondents who did not provide an integer had the following response categories:

- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “HHMMB2” “Number of people living regularly as member of household”. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “GNDR” “Gender” had the following response categories:

- 1 Male
- 2 Female
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Male” and “Female”. Responders were placed into each category depending on their response. Responders who gave a response of 9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “DOMICIL” “Domicile, respondent's description” had the following response categories:

- 1 A big city
- 2 The suburbs or outskirts of a big city
- 3 A town or a small city
- 4 A country village
- 5 A farm or home in the countryside
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R lives in large population center” and “R lives in small population center”. Respondents who gave a response of 1-2 are placed in the “large population center” category. Respondents who gave a response of 3-5 are placed in the “small population center” category. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “EDULVLA” “Highest level of education” had the following response categories:

- 0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
- 1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
- 2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)

- 3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
- 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
- 5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
- 55 Other
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "EDULVLA2" "Highest level of education". Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 55 are recoded to count as 0 and responders who gave an original response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "Improve knowledge/skills: course/lecture/conference, last 12 months" had the following response categories;

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables, "Improve knowledge/skills: course/lecture/conference, last 12 months" and "Not improve knowledge/skills: course/lecture/conference, last 12 months". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "MNACTIC" "Main activity, last 7 days. All respondents. Post coded." Had the following response categories:

- 01 In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)
- 02 In education (not paid for by employer), even if on vacation
- 03 Unemployed actively looking for a job
- 04 Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job
- 05 Permanently sick or disabled
- 06 Retired
- 07 In community or military service
- 08 Doing housework, looking after children or other persons
- 09 Other
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into eight dummy variables, "R was in paid work last 7 days", "R was in education last 7 days", "R was unemployed last 7 days", "R was permanently sick

or disabled last 7 days”, “R was retired last 7 days”, “R was in community or military service last 7 days” “R was in house duty last 7 days”, and “R was engaged in other activity”. Respondents were placed in each category based on their response. Respondents who responded with 3-4 are consolidated into the “unemployed” category. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “NACER11” “Industry, NACE rev. 1.1” had the following response categories:

- 01 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
- 02 Forestry, logging and related service activities
- 05 Fishing, fish farming and related service activities
- 10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
- 11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying
- 12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores
- 13 Mining of metal ores
- 14 Other mining and quarrying
- 15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
- 16 Manufacture of tobacco products
- 17 Manufacture of textiles
- 18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
- 19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
- 20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
- 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
- 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
- 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
- 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
- 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
- 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
- 27 Manufacture of basic metals
- 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
- 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
- 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
- 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
- 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
- 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
- 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
- 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
- 36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
- 37 Recycling
- 40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply

41 Collection, purification and distribution of water
 45 Construction
 50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
 51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
 52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
 55 Hotels and restaurants
 60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
 61 Water transport
 62 Air transport
 63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
 64 Post and telecommunications
 65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
 66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
 67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
 70 Real estate activities
 71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods
 72 Computer and related activities
 73 Research and development
 74 Other business activities
 75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
 80 Education
 85 Health and social work
 90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities
 91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.
 92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
 93 Other service activities
 95 Activities of households as employers of domestic staff
 96 Undifferentiated goods producing activities of private households for own use
 97 Undifferentiated services producing activities of private households for own use
 99 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies
 666 Not applicable
 777 Refusal
 888 Don't know
 999 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "Blue collar job classifications", "White collar job classifications" and "R has no industry". Respondents who gave a response of 1-55, 71, 90, 93, 95, 96, and 97 are classified as "blue collar". Respondents who gave a response of 60-67, 70, 72-75, 80, 85, 91-92, and 99 are classified as "white collar". Respondents who gave a response of 666 are classified as having no industry. Respondents who gave a response of 777-999 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “TPORGWK” “What type of Organisation work/worked for”

- 01 Central or local government
- 02 Other public sector (such as education and health)
- 03 A state owned enterprise
- 04 A private firm
- 05 Self employed
- 06 Other
- 66 Not applicable
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into four dummy variables, “R works for public organization”, “R works for private enterprise”, “R works for other type of entity”, and “R works for no entity”. Responders who gave a response of 01-03 are placed into the “public organization” category. Responders who gave a response of 04-05 are placed into the “private entity” category. Responders who gave a response of 05 or 66 are placed into their respective categories. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “WRKAC6M” “Paid work in another country, period more than 6 months last 10 years” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables “R has worked outside of country for more than 6 months within last 10 years”, “R has not worked outside country for more than 6 months within last 10 years” and “Not applicable for R”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “MBTRU” “Member of trade union or similar organisation” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes, currently
- 2 Yes, previously
- 3 No
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables “R is currently a member of a trade union”, “R was a member of a trade union” and “R was never a member of a trade union”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “MARITALA” “Legal marital status” had the following response categories:

- 01 Married
- 02 In a civil partnership
- 03 Separated (still legally married)
- 04 Separated (still in a civil partnership)
- 05 Divorced
- 06 Widowed
- 07 Formerly in a civil partnership, now dissolved
- 08 Formerly in a civil partnership, partner died”
- 09 Never married AND never in a civil partnership
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R is legally attached to partner”, “R is legally apart from partner”, and “R has never been legally attached”. Respondents who gave a response of 01-04 are classified as “legally attached”. Respondents who gave a response of 05-08 are classified as “legally apart”. Respondents who gave a response of 09 are classified as having never been “legally attached”. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “Partner” “Lives with husband/wife/partner at F4” had the following response categories:

- 1 Lives with husband/wife/partner at F4
- 2 Does not
- 9 Not available

The ESS is recoded into three dummy variables “R lives with partner” and “R does not live with partner” and “R has no partner info”.

-The ESS variable “LVGPTNE” “Ever lived with a partner without being married” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal

- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R has lived with a partner without legal attachment", "R has not lived with a partner without legal attachment" and "R has no partner info". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "EDULVLPA" "Partner's highest level of education" had the following response categories:

- 0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
- 1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
- 2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
- 3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
- 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
- 5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
- 55 Other
- 66 Not applicable
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "EDULVLPA2" "Partner's highest level of education". Identical coding to the ESS is used except, respondents who gave a response of 55-66 are recoded to count as 0. Respondents who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "DVRDDEV" "Ever been divorced" had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R has been divorced", "R has not been divorced", and "R has no partner info". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "CHLDHM" "Children living at home or not" had the following response categories:

- 1 Respondent has children living at home (code at F4)
- 2 Does not
- 9 Not available

The ESS variable is recoded into 3 dummy variables “Children living at home”, “No children living at home” and “R has no child info”.

-The ESS variable “CHLDHHE” “Ever had children living in household” had the following response categories:

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 6 Not applicable
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don’t know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Ever had children living in household”, “Not ever had children living in household”, and “R has no child info”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “EDULVLFA” “Father’s highest level of education” had the following response categories:

- 0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
- 1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
- 2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
- 3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
- 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
- 5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
- 55 Other
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don’t know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into “EDULVLFA2” “Father’s highest level of education”. Identical coding to the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 55 are recoded to count as 0 and responders who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “EMPRF14” “Father’s employment status when respondent 14”

- 1 Employee
- 2 Self-employed
- 3 Not working
- 4 Father dead/absent when respondent was 14
- 7 Refusal

- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R's father was working when R was 14", "R's father was not working when R was 14", and "R's father was dead/absent when respondent was 14". Responders who gave a response of 1-2 are classified into the "employed father category". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "OCCF14B" "Father's occupation when respondent 14" had the following response categories:

- 01 Professional and technical occupations such as: doctor-teacher-engineer-artist-accountant
- 02 Higher administrator occupations such as: banker – executive in big business – high government official – union official
- 03 Clerical occupations such as: secretary – clerk – office manager – book keeper
- 04 Sales occupations such as: sales manager – shop owner – shop assistant – insurance agent
- 05 Service occupations such as: restaurant owner – police officer – waiter – caretaker – barber – armed forces
- 06 Skilled worker such as: foreman – motor mechanic – printer – tool and die maker – electrician
- 07 Semi-skilled worker such as: bricklayer – bus driver – cannery worker – carpenter – sheet metal worker – baker
- 08 Unskilled worker such as: labourer – porter – unskilled factory worker
- 09 Farm worker such as: farmer – farm labourer– tractor driver– fisherman
- 66 Not applicable
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R's father had blue collar job", "R's father had white collar job", and "R has no father info". Responders who gave a response of 05-09 are classified in the "blue collar" category. Responders who gave a response of 01-04 are classified in the "white collar" category. Responders who gave a response of 66 are classified in the "no info" category. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "EDULVLMA" "Mother's highest level of education" had the following response categories:

- 0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
- 1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
- 2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
- 3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
- 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
- 5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
- 55 Other

- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into "EDULVLMA2" "Mother's highest level of education". Identical coding to the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 55 are recoded to count as 0 and responders who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "EMPRM14" "Mother's employment status when respondent 14" had the following response categories:

- 1 Employee
- 2 Self-employed
- 3 Not working
- 4 Father dead/absent when respondent was 14
- 7 Refusal
- 8 Don't know
- 9 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R's mother was working when R was 14", "R's mother was not working when R was 14", and "R's mother was dead/absent when respondent was 14". Responders who gave a response of 1-2 are classified into the "employed mother category". Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

-The ESS variable "OCCM14B" "Mother's occupation when respondent 14" had the following response categories:

- 01 Professional and technical occupations such as: doctor-teacher-engineer-artist-accountant
- 02 Higher administrator occupations such as: banker – executive in big business – high government official – union official
- 03 Clerical occupations such as: secretary – clerk – office manager – book keeper
- 04 Sales occupations such as: sales manager – shop owner – shop assistant – insurance agent
- 05 Service occupations such as: restaurant owner – police officer – waiter – caretaker – barber – armed forces
- 06 Skilled worker such as: foreman – motor mechanic – printer – tool and die maker – electrician
- 07 Semi-skilled worker such as: bricklayer – bus driver – cannery worker – carpenter – sheet metal worker – baker
- 08 Unskilled worker such as: labourer – porter – unskilled factory worker
- 09 Farm worker such as: farmer – farm labourer – tractor driver – fisherman
- 66 Not applicable
- 77 Refusal
- 88 Don't know
- 99 No answer

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, "R's mother had blue collar job", "R's mother had white collar job", and "R has no mother info". Responders who gave a

response of 05-09 are classified in the “blue collar” category. Responders who gave a response of 01-04 are classified in the “white collar” category. Responders who gave a response of 66 are classified in the “no info” category. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.

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