



Western Washington University
Western CEDAR

WWU Honors College Senior Projects

WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship

Winter 2022

Buenvivir - The Politics of Living Well

Jeremy Caldeira

Western Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwu_honors



Part of the [International Economics Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Caldeira, Jeremy, "Buenvivir - The Politics of Living Well" (2022). *WWU Honors College Senior Projects*. 548.

https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwu_honors/548

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in WWU Honors College Senior Projects by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Western Washington University

Buenvivir: The Politics of Living Well

The success and failures of a South American Indigenous development ideology and how it might be utilized and flourish in the contemporary developing world

Jeremy Caldeira

Honors Capstone Project

Advised by Ashley Hollenbeck

March 2022

Introduction

On January 20, 1949, many Americans tuned into a monumental moment in TV history. US President Harry Truman was giving his inaugural speech following his stunning upset victory over Thomas Dewey, the first ever televised (Truman Library). Truman's speech was far from unusual, calling for unity and continued efforts to rebuild and recover from WWII. He summed these ideas in four different points; however, the last point turned out to be arguably the most significant and introduced a new idea to the world. Truman proclaimed, "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial processes available for the improvement of growth of underdeveloped areas." (CBS News) This statement may seem run-of-the-mill political oratory, but this was the first time that the word "underdeveloped" was publicly used to describe nations and peoples. Put in other terms, 2 billion people became underdeveloped that day (Esteva 7).

From this moment, academics and politicians worldwide had a new phenomenon to study, create metrics for, and attempt to resolve. Around 60 years after Truman's speech, one unique attempt to explain "underdevelopment" arose from the Andes mountains of South America. *Buenvivir* (from Spanish, roughly translates to good living) is a development policy that originated from the Quechua people's ideology of *sumak kawsay* (in Ecuador, or *suma qamaña* in Bolivia). *Sumak Kawsay*, an idea that evolved over thousands of years, focuses on "living in harmony within communities, ourselves, and most importantly, nature." (Pachamama Alliance)

Buenvivir, thus, is radically different from classical theories of development and growth, notwithstanding that the knowledge comes from a traditionally marginalized source. But it has found a home in two South American countries, those being Ecuador and Bolivia. *Buenvivir* was implemented under two left-wing politicians, President Rafael Correa in Ecuador from 2007 to 2017 and President Evo Morales in Bolivia from 2006 to 2019. Issues such as the rights of nature and autonomous Indigenous communities were first mentioned in important political documents, in each case these nations' new 21st century constitutions. These countries were modern trailblazers, forming crazy schemes such as the

Yasuní-ITT Initiative, hoping to develop their economies and improve the lives of their people without compromising the environment.

However, both presidents are no longer in power, and this partially stems from failures related to implementing *buenvivir*. The best interests of these leaders, while sounding great on paper, rarely resulted in any tangible victories. So, what went wrong? The answer is, unsurprisingly, complex. The history of the use of *buenvivir* reveals many frustrating failures, but also presents hope for the future. With the right policies and people implementing and safeguarding the ideals of *buenvivir*, a radically new form of living could be realized.

Author's Note: Throughout this paper I will refer to buenvivir, but buenvivir means something different in different contexts. In sections dedicated to one vein of buenvivir, I will refer to that vein simply as "buenvivir." In other sections not dedicated to a specific vein, I will refer to the different veins with a specific adjective that will make it clear which vein I am referencing, unless I am referring to the phenomenon of buenvivir as a whole.

International Development Before Buenvivir

Before *buenvivir*, there were 60 years of attempts to define development, an evolution of ideas that eventually created the circumstances from which *buenvivir* surfaced. The first major attempt to explain development, and conversely underdevelopment, was modernization theory. This theory stated that it was necessary to look at which aspects of a country are inhibiting development while also focusing on the classical economic belief of developing strong sectors to become economic powerhouses (Rostow). The Marshall Plan, the US post-WWII recovery plan for Eastern Europe, is a key example of this.

Modernization theory quickly proved inadequate, as a new acknowledgement emerged that the structure of a country, political or otherwise, may also contribute to underdevelopment. This belief was dubbed structuralism. Structuralism states that the power is in the governments of so-called "third world" countries to amend whatever issues were inhibiting efforts to develop, and to provide solutions. The main

suggestion of structuralists is import substitution industrialization (ISI), where governments buy directly from domestic industries to decrease dependency on the global economy and strengthen at-home industries (Hunt). Some structuralists took this a step further, stating that “third world” countries should trade heavily amongst themselves, to avoid the understated economic hegemony of “first world” nations (Colman).

This idea manifested itself further in dependency theory of the 1960s, especially as modernization and structuralism did not provide working solutions. Dependency theory strayed more into neo-Marxist territory, asserting that underdeveloped countries will struggle to develop due to extractive systems in place. In a world built on dependency, resources flow from the underdeveloped to the developed, creating massive accumulation of wealth in the latter (Ghosh). Because of this, developed countries try to maintain the cycle, as the removal of this source of cheap resources and labor would cause their economies to collapse (Schmidt). This theory was often applied to Latin America as an attempt to explain the continued meddling of the US in Latin American political affairs.

The less controversial approach following the inadequacy of modernization and structuralism was Basic Needs theory, a theory implemented by the International Labor Organization in 1976. It attempts to define the absolute minimum number of resources necessary for physical well-being (Jolly). In this sense, Basic Needs theory was the first to consider poverty as something beyond monetary policy (Stewart). Poverty became multi-dimensional, and living good also meant access to education, health care, and a clean and safe environment.

From here, a school of thought that can be described as nihilist emerged in the 1990s, this being post-development. Post-development scholars were opposed to the idea of development itself and criticizes it as “escaping underdevelopment.” (Esteva 7) Furthermore, post-development argues that when Truman uttered his fourth point, a world was created with new norms, one where those who do not have the pre-determined standards of living are lacking.

The main piece of literature from this movement was the Development Dictionary edited by Wolfgang Sachs, which is the counterculture journal of development. This book provides numerous thoughts on where development goes wrong. C. Douglas Lummis, in musing on equality, posits that equality is a homogenization process based on other countries “catching up.” (38) Lummis continues by expressing that it is not feasible for every country to be on the same level, and that “the problem of inequality lies in excess, not poverty.” (50) Marianne Gronemeyer, in writing on helping, says that “help” does not help, and is nothing more than self-interested states doing what they see is best (62). Finally, Ivan Illich, on needs, attacks Basic Needs theory, expounding that it is foolish to define people by what they “lack.” (91)

While post-development provides many critiques of other schools of thought, it does not provide concrete alternatives to traditional development methods. That is where *buenvivir* comes in. *Buenvivir* is very closely related to the thoughts of post-development and is an amalgamation of the Indigenous ideas of *sumak kawsay* and post-development theory.

The Three Veins of *Buenvivir* and their Tenets

What exactly is *buenvivir*? The concept itself is not black and white. What is certain is that it was brought to the public conscious for the first time by the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE) in the 1990s (Espinosa). However, *buenvivir* is not a blanket term. Different individuals presenting the idea can have vastly different definitions of what *buenvivir* is. *Buenvivir* finds itself with three different “veins.” While each vein has some overlap in tenets, each serves its proponents a different purpose.

Indigenous Vein

The Indigenous vein of *buenvivir* aligns itself most closely with *sumak kawsay*. This is the vein that CONAIE has been a champion of since the 1990s. Its core tenets thus naturally flow from *sumak*

kawsay, those tenets being leading a balanced and harmonious life, as well as a belief in autonomous communities centered on a communitarian approach to life.

This vein finds balance and harmony in various areas. First, it aspires to mix traditional spiritual Andean values with the realities of modern living (Villalba). However, it does not exalt modern living as the superior way of life. Rather, it acknowledges that a globalized world with rapid intercultural communication will bring new discourse to the Indigenous peoples of Ecuador, and South America in general, and that this will unwittingly impact *sumak kawsay* (Altmann). Furthermore, this vein is anti-materialist. *Buenvivir* is about gathering nothing more than what is necessary, and living a life that is “complete,” not one of “excess.” (Benalcazar & de la Rosa) Finally, *buenvivir* is balanced in that it seeks harmony in its interpersonal relationships, but also in its relationship with *pachamama* (roughly Mother Earth). Life is not harmonious unless one is in touch with everything they interact with, and to the Indigenous peoples who inspired this vein, nature is the most important aspect of life (Altmann; Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano; Lalander).

Buenvivir strongly supports autonomy and communitarian-based living. First, it believes that members of any given community should be able to live their lives with self-determination dictating their actions (Benalcazar & de la Rosa; Merino). In this sense, *buenvivir* looks inwards, opposing outside influence on community-based decisions. For example, *buenvivir* would say that the national government of Ecuador having control over the land that Indigenous communities live on is inherently harmful, and that any decisions made about land should only be made by the communities daily utilizing it. Finally, *buenvivir* supports looking towards the future. It believes that every community should have access to the resources it needs to imagine and build the future that it desires (Merino). In this sense, *buenvivir* views the central government as the agent of this role, providing the necessary resources with no strings attached.

Ecologist/Post-development Vein

The second vein of *buenvivir* has been proposed by ecologists and post-development aficionados alike. In this sense, it strays from *sumak kawsay* in some areas, as Western scholars insert Western ideas into the way of thinking. This vein is hyper-critical of development in the tradition of post-development thinkers but lends itself to a more theoretical rebuke rather than providing action-based solutions to the accused weaknesses of modern development theories.

This vein of *buenvivir* directs its attention to the inadequacies of traditional development methods, but also attacks more recent ideologies such as sustainable development (Martin and Scholz). The main critique is that these theories paint development as a linear process, that is, as one problem is addressed in an “underdeveloped” nation, the next level can be reached, like unlocking levels in video games. Rather, *buenvivir* sets forth that development is a distinctly non-linear process, and thus the most utilized development policies are doomed to fail as a result (Altmann; Gudynas, “Value, Growth, Development”). Additionally, *buenvivir* derides ideas of “growth” or “degrowth.” (Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano) Both suggest that the world’s economies need to undergo some process to change their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to improve the living conditions for their constituents. *Buenvivir*, rather, suggests that economies should not use GDP as a measure of growth, and by extension, welfare. In this sense, *buenvivir* is a process of “agrowth,” neither growth nor degrowth (Altmann).

Buenvivir also removes the focal point from “progress.” Actions “in the name of progress” are no new phenomenon, but *buenvivir* believes that such actions are unnecessary at best, and detrimental at worst (Vanhulst & Beling). *Buenvivir* philosophies that life is not a matter of “haves” and “have nots,” and that these labels only divide and destroy (Benalcazar & de la Rosa). Additionally, *buenvivir* is opposed to an incessant focus on the future, stating that life should be lived in the present (Vanhulst and Beling). From this point, *buenvivir* views skills and products not as marketable goods and services, but as means of a peaceful and fulfilling lifestyle. So, rather than focusing on building up industries and a nation’s economies by using its citizens’ skills, *buenvivir* would support movements that would allow workers freedom to do as they please for their own livelihoods rather than for their nation (Villalba).

Buenvivir is also ecocentric. Life should be focused on a harmonious relationship between humans and nature, both plants and animals. *Buenvivir* borrows heavily from *sumak kawsay* but provides ecocentric policy suggestions (Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano). A key example of this is that *buenvivir* is a proponent of nature having its own set of rights that can be fought for by humans on its behalf (Lalander; Merino; Villalba). Additionally, *buenvivir* is adamant that anthropocentric ideals have no place in the modern world, and such ideas are toxic and destructive.

Socialist/eco-Marxist

The final vein aligns itself heavily with socialism. However, there is also a focus on the environment, but in a differing manner from the ecological vein. This vein is also the most frequently used in actual policies that have been implemented, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia (Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano). Naturally, this vein thus strays furthest from the original ideas of good living found in *sumak kawsay*.

Buenvivir focuses heavily on social values, in the spirit of socialist ideas. *Buenvivir* proposes “plurinationality” as a concept. Plurinationality is about each distinct culture in a nation being recognized as unique and given some autonomy as a result (Merino). But *buenvivir* is not segregationist, as it also supports intercultural ties between each culture. It imagines a world with smaller working parts working together to meet larger goals when necessary. *Buenvivir* also supports collective rights, equity, and social justice, and exalts them above other needs (Espinosa; Lalander). Also, *buenvivir* pushes participatory democracy as the purest form of government (Benalcazar & de la Rosa). It implores that all stakeholders need to be included in every step of governmental policies, especially the Indigenous population. *Buenvivir* also focuses on human development. It encourages the general wellbeing of the people, with wellbeing defined as whatever everyone feels they need to live a content life (Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano). In policy terms, *buenvivir* suggest policy focused on “food, financial, energy, and bodily sovereignty.” (Benalcazar & de la Rosa) It also is a strong defender of investment in public works. *Buenvivir* desires to “strengthen society, work, and life.” (Vanhulst & Beling)

But socialist *buenvivir* is biocentric, unlike the ecocentrism of post-development *buenvivir* (Caria & Dominguez; Lalander). *Buenvivir* still sees nature as deserving of rights; however, it suggests that the rights and needs of human beings supplant those of nature (Villalba). Additionally, the central government, with the widespread support of the people, has control over the rights of nature, and make decisions using the participatory democratic process (Correa; Gudynas, “Value, Growth, Development”). In this sense, *buenvivir* may sometimes pursue extractive activities that may be harmful to nature. It also pursues activities related to sustainable development, seeking to grow through extractive methods while placing measures that will protect the environment. It suggests “pragmatic extractivism.” (Villalba & Etxano)

Structural Issues with Tenets

Due to the complicated nature of *buenvivir*, and the diverse meanings and uses of the word, there are characteristic structural issues. This starts in the multifarious differences in the core tenets of each vein. In fact, many of these differences directly contradict each other. For example, the Indigenous vein’s views protecting nature above all else as key, while eco-Marxist vein believes that nature can be extracted in certain cases. Moreover, the eco-Marxist vein was biased in its creation, as the development of its tenets past the Indigenous vein was meant to accommodate the leftist beliefs of politicians such as Correa and Morales. (Gudynas, “Value, Growth, Development”). The question is thus posed: if *buenvivir* is divided, can it stand?

An equally prominent issue is the “Westernization” of *buenvivir*. The post-development and eco-Marxist veins add Western ideas to the Indigenous vein and *sumak kawsay*. While there is certainly cultural homogenization in morals and values, the fact is that some of the Indigenous peoples whose way of life formed *sumak kawsay*, especially those in the Ecuadorian Amazon, were isolated from the tide of the Renaissance, Industrial Revolution, and other influential Western cultural changes. Thus, adding Western values to *buenvivir* is like watering it down, and rendering it less effective, or quite simply,

tainted. Some have gone as far to call it the colonization of Indigenous ideas to fit Western sensibilities (Altmann; Benalcazar & de la Rosa).

Others question whether *buenvivir* can amount to anything if separated from the Indigenous peoples who formed it (Merino; Villalba & Etxano). To start, *buenvivir* is not an accurate translation of *sumak kawsay*. Rather than “the good life,” it translates more closely to “the plentiful life.” (“Bioregional Plan 2030”) The word plentiful certainly contains a lot more nuance than good, and words matter, especially when forming entire development ideologies from them. Additionally, the eco-Marxist vein supports policy that would tear ancestral lands apart for resource extraction. But *buenvivir* also says “there is no *sumak kawsay* without *sumak allpa*.” (Altmann) Translated, this means that there cannot be harmony of life if there is not “prodigious land without evil.” To the Indigenous, such evil would be defined by extractive activities, resulting in yet another inconsistency. Finally, the scaling up of *buenvivir* may create problems, as *buenvivir* in its purest, original form is highly place-based, and grounded to the people who created it (Giovannini). Can it amount to anything outside of the villages of the Indigenous peoples of the Andes and the Amazon?

Buenvivir in Ecuador

The first country to implement the tenets of *buenvivir* into policy decisions was Ecuador, under President Rafael Correa. Correa took office in 2007 as part of the South American pink wave, along with Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Correa represented the *Movimiento Alianza Patria Activa i Soberana* (Proud and Sovereign Homeland Movement Alliance, PAIS). A big base of this party was the Indigenous activists of CONAIE and proponents of *buenvivir*. Correa was inspired by *buenvivir*, and desired to place it on the upmost pedestal in Ecuadorian policy. He attempted to do so in two ways: through the 2008 Constitution, and the implementation of the Yasuní-ITT initiative.

The 2008 Constitution

One of the first tasks on Correa's agenda as president was to re-write the Ecuadorian constitution to address current issues. Ecuador had experienced an extended period of economic hardship, with the late 1990s bring rising inflation that resulted in dollarization, with the US Dollar becoming legal tender in 2000. Dollarization resulted in massive debt, as its limitations, specifically the ability to have autonomous monetary policy, only allowed Ecuador to finance via debt (Morales). Thus, Correa imagined an Ecuador that was free from the influence of Western states and self-sufficient. This new Ecuador would also focus on spending on people, celebrating culture, and protecting nature.

The new constitution especially focuses on Indigenous rights through its bylaws and thus finds itself in the Indigenous vein of *buenvivir*. One of the key rights provided was self-determination of ancestral lands (Lalander; Merino). This law means that many areas of Ecuador would be protected from extractive activities solely for the livelihoods of Indigenous people. Furthermore, the government is required to consult with the residents of said lands before any sort of activity is pursued and include Indigenous peoples in every step of the process (Benalcazar & de la Rosa). In the extreme case, the constitution allows Indigenous people to self-isolate from the rest of Ecuador on their protected lands. Indigenous people are imparted the ability to follow traditional ways of life, including bilingual education, customary Indigenous justice systems, and use of Indigenous technology and medicine (Benalcazar & de la Rosa; Keating & Lind). Finally, the constitution proclaims that Indigenous people have the right to be free from racist attacks, and any form of discrimination (Lalander).

The constitution focuses on further country-wide social issues, a feature of eco-Marxist *buenvivir*. First, it advocates for a great increase in social spending, calling for expenditure on a widespread variety of issues such as nutrition, water, education, housing & infrastructure, health care, and science & technology (Correa; Merino). The constitution also calls for equitable ownership of land and resources, in opposition to the previous corporate-dominated ownership (Caria & Dominguez). Finally, the constitution declares that all citizens of Ecuador will be included in each step of the policy process. The government

would follow a participative democratic policy, desiring to ensure constituent input on every step of government decision-making (Benalcazar & de la Rosa; Caria & Dominguez).

The constitution is also littered with references to culture, specifically the dualistic nature of Indigenous versus non-Indigenous. Ecuador calls itself plurinational, accounting for the autonomy desired by the Indigenous vein of *buenvivir* (Espinosa), but also an intercultural nation, in the spirit of eco-Marxist *buenvivir* (Keating & Lind). The constitution acknowledges the dissonance between these two ideas and creates a middle ground where both are valid and implementable. It allows for Indigenous peoples to have their own set of autonomous processes, as mentioned previously, but these processes are to be in harmony with all other process within the country. In this way, cultural differences are protected for while still allowing for “cross-pollination” of cultures, building intercultural understanding and awareness (Benalcazar & de la Rosa).

The final *buenvivir* talking point that the constitution touches on is harmony with nature. Ecuador’s constitution was novel in what it set out to do regarding nature. In fact, Ecuador’s constitution was the first to provide nature sweeping rights, in the same tenor as human rights. The constitution stated that nature is an entity that is due respect, and due to its non-sentience, can have humans fight on its behalf (Kingsbury et al; Lalander). By extension, the citizens of Ecuador were to be included in every decision that could have an impact on nature. Moreover, extractive activities were prohibited and acknowledged as dangerous to the livelihood of nature (Gudynas, “The Political Ecology”).

However, as per eco-Marxist *buenvivir*, there are numerous loopholes that afford the Ecuadorian legislature the ability to circumnavigate barriers to extractivism. While the constitution states that preservation and restoration of nature are of public interest, the state can provide exceptions. They can get permission for extractive activities through referendums (Lalander). The constitution also places the government as the dominant force over land, a biocentric approach, and states that all environmental services are subject to the state (Keating & Lind; Neto & Lima). The constitution even allows the

government to ignore the opinions of Indigenous people regarding activities on their own ancestral lands in “exceptional cases.” (Gudynas, “The Political Ecology”)

The 2008 Ecuadorian constitution, by giving rights to nature, considering Indigenous autonomy, and considering their nation plurinational, was an unprecedented and radical document. In this regard, the constitution followed some tenets of the Indigenous vein. However, the numerous safeguards and loopholes puts the constitution safely in the eco-Marxist vein. Ecuador’s focus on eco-Marxist *buenvivir* manifested itself in many of the immediate policy decisions after the ratification of the constitution, the most important of these decisions being the Yasuní-ITT Initiative.

Yasuní-ITT Initiative

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, a piece of legislature that had its roots in 2007 during the constitutional process, was the *pièce de résistance* of Correa’s efforts to build a post-capitalist economy that still had development potential. This potential was derived through a highly unconventional method, contradictory to most previous attempts at development, and unique in its framework. Instead of extracting oil and selling that oil for profit to oil-hungry nations such as China and the US, Ecuador would leave the oil in the ground, but still request those same nations to pay for part of its value. The fitting slogan was “Leave the Oil Underground.” (O’Connell)

The setting of this initiative was Yasuní National Park, in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Yasuní is considered by some scientists the most biologically diverse location in the world, making it a special focal point for Correa’s constitutional mandates to respect the environment (Lalander). It was known that the Yasuní region contained 20% of Ecuador’s vast oil reserves (Kingsbury, et al), with much of this being centered in three adjacent oil fields: the Ishpingo, Tambococho, and Tiputini oilfields, which together stand for the ITT in the initiative's name (Martin & Scholz). Overall, the initiative would keep underground 850 million barrels of crude oil worth \$7.2 billion and prevent the emission of 410 tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (O’Connell; Rival).

Ecuador’s justification for ignoring this potential source of wealth was that the world would still pay for it. The Ecuadorian government invited governments and private organizations alike to buy Yasuní Guarantee Certificates, fungible commodities that could be traded, that would raise funds to cover up to half of the value the ITT oil (Sovacool & Scarpaci). The collection of the funding would be done in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who would run a trust fund with the accumulated funds (Lalander; Martin & Scholz; O’Connell). Once the funding was collected, it would be utilized to support the five key goals, as seen in the table below. Despite the novel approach, the initiative immediately garnered support from a widespread array of luminaries and governments, including numerous Nobel laureates, the UN, the EU, and some of its member-states' governments, and even OPEC (Sovacool & Scarpaci).

Yasuní Objectives (adapted from Vallejo, et al)
1. Effective conservation and the avoidance of deforestation
2. Reforestation, afforestation, natural regeneration, and appropriate management
3. Increases in renewable energy use and national energy efficiency through energy savings
4. Social development in the areas of influence for the Yasuní-ITT Initiative
5. Research and development in science, technology and innovation based on bio-knowledge

However, the Yasuní Initiative encountered a smattering of significant impediments that derailed the project. The first issue was the presence of the so-called “Plan B.” Correa had contingencies in place to still be able to fund the Yasuní objectives, with Plan B being to disregard the initial initiative, and go all in on extracting the plentitude of oil in the ITT fields (Martin & Scholz). This immediately weakened international buy-in. The German government, one of the earliest outside supporters of the initiative, was concerned that despite the promises in the initiative, Plan B’s presence would mean that Correa would still extract oil regardless and make Germany’s investment worthless from an environmental standpoint (Kingsbury). This may explain the most important failure: the initiative only earned \$336 million in pledges, of which \$13 million, or 0.37% of the amount desired, was ever collected (Sovacool & Scarpaci).

Beyond funding and transparency issues, outside forces had a big say in the gradual disintegration of the initiative’s promise. Ecuador, in the year’s following dollarization, had financed debt through loans

from China's developmental banks, and thus owed China \$7 billion dollars (Martin & Scholz). China was also very eager to sign a contract to mine oil in blocks nearby Yasuní. Correa was unable to back away from the desires of his country's main creditors and was constantly in talks to negotiate a drilling deal with China (O'Connell). But, most significantly, the Western world had one main political concern about this initiative, that being that it would become commonplace. With Yasuní's success, the developing world might implement similar policies, with one German official stating, "A direct payment into a fund of this type would set a precedent that could ultimately prove very costly." (Sovacool & Scarpaci). This international dissidence may have dissuaded organizations and governments from donating; the Yasuní Initiative's ambitious goals may have been its own undoing.

With funding goals woefully overdue, the initiative was cancelled in 2013, only 5 years after its triumphant placement as the future of development politics. Correa tearfully blamed the people of the world for "failing Ecuador." (Sovacool & Scarpaci) Furthermore, Correa did not seek an alternative plan to extraction, opening the ITT blocks up for business. Correa stated, "We cannot be beggars sitting on a sack of gold," (Guardiola & García-Quero) opening Ecuador to further activities that opposed the ethos of the 2008 constitution and Indigenous *buenvivir*. Correa did promise that only 0.1% of Yasuní would be impacted, and that innovative technology would be used to minimize environmental damage (Lalander).

But the response in Ecuador was deafening. Correa's actions were vehemently opposed, and many blamed Correa solely due to his under-the-table negotiations and Plan B contingency. The Indigenous people, on whose land such activities encroached, were especially furious. However, Correa did not take kindly to this animosity, and responded by censoring social organizations that opposed him, and implemented a decree that considered most acts of protest as terrorism (O'Connell). In the process, over 200 activists and social leaders were jailed on trumped up charges, ceasing any anti-extractive, and anti-Correa, momentum. Extractive activities continued, and exports of raw materials, deforestation, and pollution all increased in the aftermath (Caria & Dominguez).

So, while the Yasuní-ITT initiative started in a good place and had a novel approach to mitigating environmental damage without hindering development prospects, too many outside factors got in the way. Organizations and countries that had pledged support became apprehensive about the precedent that could be set, seeing a world where the Western world would have to prop up the developing world through funding, but without control over these countries' politics. Thus, when Correa's Plan B became public knowledge, these previous supporters jumped on the opportunity to remove support for the initiative, resulting in bureaucratic tactics by President Correa to salvage some sort of positive outcome.

Buenvivir in Bolivia

Bolivia was the second nation to implement ideas of *buenvivir* into its politics. It started with Evo Morales, formerly a lowly *Aymara* coca farmer, who was elected as Bolivia's president in 2006. Morales' leftist politics and progressive ideals made him analogous to Correa in Ecuador, and his policy decisions make that clearer. Morales found support from the many Indigenous groups in Bolivia, including his native *Aymara* tribe, with this support coalescing into the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement for Socialism, or MAS). From MAS arose the implementation of *buenvivir* into Bolivian politics. *Buenvivir* was realized in the brand new 2009 constitution, the 2010 Framework Laws of Autonomy and Decentralization, and in the struggle regarding the *Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure* (TIPNIS).

2009 Constitution

Just as in Ecuador, one of the first tasks for Morales and MAS was to re-write the constitution to fit the current needs of the Bolivian people. Bolivia's presidential history is complex, full of *coup d'états*, resignations, and party change, and Morales aimed to create a constitution that would not only transcend political turmoil and upheaval but also put frameworks in place to reduce it using *buenvivir*. Morales addressed key tenets of the veins of *buenvivir* throughout the constitution, creating a novel document not dissimilar from Ecuador's own constitution enacted a year prior.

The new constitution addresses many concepts related to human wellbeing. In fact, the constitution states that the basis of the state is “the search for living well.” (Laing; Ranta, “Decolonial Alternative”) It desires to build a nation based on participatory democracy that helps build communitarian policy (Alderman; Schilling-Vacaflor; Tockman, “Hegemony”), and an economy distanced from capitalism and the “Washington Consensus” neoliberal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank (Bracarense; Ranta, “Vivir Bien Governance;” Villavicencio & Kotze). It also includes explicit bylaws related to women’s rights, and further expands on social rights, such as the spending that funds education, aid for women, children, and the elderly, and literacy programs (Schilling-Vacaflor). Furthermore, the constitution gives special attention to Indigenous rights. The constitution specifically gives Indigenous groups the right to self-determination and autonomy through the construction of communities entitled *Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino* (Peasant Native Indigenous Territory, TIOC) (Laing; *The Economist*; Tockman, “Decentralisation;” Tola). In TIOCs, Indigenous people were granted the right to govern based on traditional Indigenous law (Artaraz & Calestani), and thus also needed to be consulted before decisions were made within the limits of each TIOC (McNeish).

The new constitution also focuses on culture, especially the concept of plurinationality. In the utmost celebration of the spirit of *buenvivir*, Bolivia changed its official name to “The Plurinational State of Bolivia.” (Marston; Tockman & Cameron; Verdugo) The constitution stated, “Bolivia is a Unitary Social State of Plurinational Communitarian Law that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies.” (Alderman) Plurinationality was further acknowledged with the re-branding of Bolivia’s legislative branch as the Plurinational Assembly, with seats specifically for minority groups and Indigenous representatives (Tockman, “Hegemony”). The constitution also names 36 national languages in addition to Spanish, celebrating the cultural wealth present in the diverse area that Bolivia’s land encompasses (Alderman; Laing; Mayta). Finally, certain projects and policies ensure that local knowledge is imparted into the processes of every project, creating multicultural projects with a wider span of knowledge. One such project is *Biocultura*, which works on improving water quality and

access in Bolivia (Weyer), an area in which Bolivia's Indigenous people have been blatantly ignored previously, as during the Cochabamba Water War.

Additionally, Bolivia's constitution focuses on nature. However, the constitution does not go to the same level as Ecuador's constitution in providing constitutional rights to nature. But it does acknowledge that Mother Earth is a "person with rights" that need to be considered, just not necessarily treated with the utmost respect (Tola), with the people of Bolivia having the constitutional right to fight on behalf of nature, just as in Ecuador (Villavicencio & Kotze). Even so, Bolivia does have final say in what can and cannot be done regarding nature. The constitution states that the state dominates all natural resources (Merino), and further says that Indigenous peoples have no rights to their own land beyond the right to be consulted about its use before any action (McNeish; Tockman, "Hegemony"). This is contradictory to the theory behind TIOCs and shows Bolivia's constitution to align itself more with the socialist/eco-Marxist vein of *buenvivir*, like Ecuador's constitution.

Overall, Bolivia's constitution is very radical, and showed that President Morales and MAS were committed to implementing the ideas of *buenvivir*. However, the constitution lacked in some areas which were addressed either in later laws passed by the Plurinational Assembly, or in violent conflict.

2010 Framework Laws

One of these later laws was the 2010 Framework Laws of Autonomy and Decentralization (often shortened to the Framework Laws). While the constitution ratified the previous year had created a process for developing autonomous Indigenous territories in the form of TIOCs, other laws related to dominant government control over nature and land undermined autonomy. The Framework Laws intended to address this contradiction, and truly make TIOCs autonomous, while still being connected to Bolivian government at large (Alderman; Tockman, "Decentralisation"). The Framework Laws would let Indigenous peoples set up separate judicial, political, social, and economic organizations and institutions that would have the power of self-determination without government interference over a certain area

allocated by the national government (Tockman & Cameron). For example, in the small town of Charagua, the local TIOC created an organ of collective decision making called the *Ñemboati Guasu*, with a separate legislative organ overseeing the decisions made by this group (Postero & Tockman).

Furthermore, the Framework Laws specifically granted permission for TIOCs to undertake certain programs that would normally be undertaken by the national government. Through the below initiatives, autonomy was granted to Indigenous peoples, while also reducing some of the responsibilities of the national government, a process of decentralization to communitarian government much supported by *buenvivir*. All these initiatives would be financed through a variety of means, including hydrocarbon taxes, royalties from extractive activities elsewhere in Bolivia, and directly from the National Treasury (McNeish; Postero & Tockman).

Framework Laws Goals (adapted from Tockman, “Decentralization”)

1. Safeguard Indigenous knowledge and traditions
 2. Construct houses according to tradition
 3. Sustainable forest resource management
 4. Environmental protection and pollution reduction
 5. Agricultural and irrigation management
-

However, the Framework Laws were rife with an assortment of issues that made implementation extremely difficult. To start, the bureaucratic requirements to get a TIOC officially recognized by the Bolivian government were tedious, and near impossible to undertake. To complicate matters, the government officials that staffed the office dedicated to TIOCs were typically tremendously inexperienced, which resulted in a high rate of job turnover, slowing down any paperwork that had to be completed (Tockman & Cameron). Furthermore, despite the push for autonomy provided by the laws, there was still much conflict between the political and policy desires of MAS and the Indigenous leaders of TIOCs (Augsburger & Haber). While the Bolivian government was supposed to step back, it did not do so. At the TIOC level, there was even conflict between the created “organs.” In Charagua, the *Ñemboati Guasu* and the legislative organ often clashed over confusion on who was supposed to do what (Postero & Tockman), bureaucratic problems that TIOCs operating under *buenvivir* were supposed to leave behind.

Finally, while the implementation and creation of TIOCs did respect rural Indigenous autonomy, the rapidly growing number of Indigenous peoples living in cities like La Paz and Cochabamba were not granted the same level of autonomy (Artaraz & Calestani). Those people found themselves in a barren middle ground, watching their fellow peoples being given more rights than ever before, a huge victory, but at the same time, not getting to enjoy those rights due to their home address.

TIPNIS

TIPNIS is an example of where inconsistencies between the constitution and other implemented laws led to conflict, and change. Subsequent legislative discourse on nature was at odds with the eco-Marxist *buenvivir* of the constitution and lent itself more to the other two veins. The first was the proposed Law 071 of the Rights of Mother Earth, brought to the table in 2010. Law 071 enumerated specific rights to which nature is allowed (Villavicencio & Kotze). For one, Law 071 dictated that the government also has the duty to uphold the rights of nature, beyond the scope of the constitution, which gave this duty to the people. Expanding on this, the law stated that a harmonious relationship between policy decisions and Mother Earth was of the utmost importance, and those actions should thus be in favor of Mother Earth. However, Law 071 faltered due to opposition, and was tabled. However, in 2012, the ideals of Law 071 were resurrected in the wordy Framework Law 300 of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well of 2012. Law 300 aimed to operationalize the rights of Mother Earth in relation to *buenvivir*, providing rights to life, the diversity of life, water, clean air, equilibrium, restoration, and pollution-free living (Villavicencio & Kotze).

However, before Law 300 could be ratified, the inconsistencies between discourse and law manifested themselves in the *Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure*, or TIPNIS, in 2011. TIPNIS is both an Indigenous Territory, and a protected National Park in the heartlands of Bolivia (Laing; McNeish). It is also highly isolated from cities surrounding it, due to the westward Andes and swamps eastward. So, the Bolivian government proposed to build a road through the heart of TIPNIS. This would connect the Indigenous peoples residing in the Bolivia backcountry more directly with large cities and

commercial zones such as Cochabamba, and by extension make it easier for oil companies to connect between the western metros and eastern oilfields of Bolivia (Sanchez-Lopez). The perceived economic mobility that this road would generate gained many supporters amongst all levels of Bolivians, and of outside corporations (Fabricant & Postero; Reyes-García, et al).

But the dissent against the TIPNIS access road rapidly rose to the forefront. Indigenous peoples in TIPNIS feared ecological destruction and deforestation at the hands of coca farmers, who need flat land to grow their cash crop (Achtenberg; Fabricant & Postero). There was also a prevalent fear that gangs and criminals would come with the road, destroying any semblance of peace in TIPNIS (Reyes-García, et al). So, over 2500 protestors started a march on pre-existing roads from TIPNIS to the executive capital of La Paz (Ranta, “Decolonial Alternative”). President Morales responded decisively, and brutally to this march. Local police cracked down viciously on supporters, with one particularly dreadful day being in Yamuro, where 45 protestors were wounded (Achtenberg; Sanchez-Lopez). When brutally did not dissuade the marchers, Morales went as far as to request pro-MAS youth to “seduce” the Indigenous women involved in the protest, and thus distract them. This approach, simply, did not work, and the protestors marched on (Achtenberg).

Eventually, the protestors reached La Paz, where they were greeted by thousands of supporters (Sanchez-Lopez). This swell of support forced the Bolivian government to action, with two government officials involved quickly resigning, and Morales setting up a meeting with the protestors (Achtenberg). The result was Law 180, which declared TIPNIS as an intangible zone to be free from a road, or other development schemes (Laing; McNeish). This full process showed the belief in the *buenvivir* tenet of participatory democracy, and the new law was a victory for Indigenous *buenvivir* especially. However, the demands for a road were not any lesser after this law, and Morales could not resist them. Six years later in 2017, Law 180 was repealed, and the road through TIPNIS started (*Página Siete*). *Buenvivir* struggled to overcome bureaucracy and outside demand, even though Law 300 did provide some rights to nature. Additionally, TIPNIS illustrated the power of *buenvivir* in action through the medium of protest.

Frameworks for Evaluating Policy in Developing Countries

While *buenvivir* had mixed results in use, its support base has not disappeared. Indigenous groups in both Ecuador and Bolivia still have the same ideals governing their lifestyles, and still imagine their countries being able to implement these ideas. Additionally, the constitutions of each country, laced with references to *buenvivir*, are still currently in use. It is reasonable to believe that *buenvivir* still has the ability of being pursued anew in each of these countries and beyond. For that reason, it is of interest to explore what went wrong in each country, and how these mistakes could be amended for future pursuits of *buenvivir*.

Consequently, looking at both the internal and external processes that dictated *buenvivir* may reveal these mistakes. Such internal processes would be centered around the so-called policy cycle. The policy cycle is a streamlined explanation of a complex, non-cyclical process, but is still in widespread use. The process sets to define concrete and ordered steps that an organization or government looking to solve a problem through policy should follow. The cycle can be seen as the following four steps (adapted from May & Wildavsky):


1. Agenda Setting: In this stage, problems that are desired to be solved come to the forefront. Once these problems have been realized, policymakers prioritize which issues should be addressed.
2. Policy Formulation: In this stage, groups of policymakers each craft and contribute a potential policy that can be implemented to address the defined problem on the agenda.
3. Policy Adoption and Implementation: A “best” policy is chosen after the formulation stage. Then policymakers work on building up an instrument to implement and enforce the chosen policy.
4. Evaluation and Updates: After a set period, policymakers investigate the cumulative impact of the policy. Then, policymakers may let the policy continue, adjust it slightly, or cancel it entirely.

Within these four steps, various external processes come into play. For example, political actors can influence which issues come to the forefront in the agenda stage, and implementation may be constrained by a lack of realized funding, a lack of resources, or even a natural disaster.

However, while this framework can be used to evaluate policy in any country, given that Ecuador and Bolivia are both defined as “developing” countries, other factors unique to developing countries come into play that impact internal policy processes. Other frameworks are readily available to fill these gaps. The first of these is provided by Brinkerhoff and Crosby in their book *Managing Policy Reform*. The authors underline regular parts of the policy process that are especially key to developing countries, while also introducing barriers to implementation specific to them, as seen in the table below. These points serve to give more insight into the policy process and provide supplementary information in evaluating the efficacy of Ecuador’s policy circle.

Key Process for Developing Countries	Important Constraints for Developing Countries
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Includes key stakeholders • Compromising • Contingency planning <p><i>(Adapted from Brinkerhoff & Crosby)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional and resource constraints • Demands from new constituents • Pressure to achieve results in a short time <p><i>(Adapted from Brinkerhoff & Crosby)</i></p>

A second useful supplementary framework is the Multi Streams Framework (MSF), as expounded on by Herweg, et al in *Theories of the Policy Process*. The MSF attempts to explain the numerous working parts during the policy process, from formation to implementation. In this, there are six assumptions stated to be true about policy, as seen in the table below. But the focus is on the streams of the process, the structural backbone of the MSF. These streams all run separately during the agenda and formulation stages but meet near the end of the formulation and adoption/implementation stages at something called a policy window, a particularly opportune time for a specific policy.

6 Assumptions of Policy (MSF)	Streams in the MSF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is Ambiguous • Involves Time Constraints • Includes Problematic Policy Preferences • Has Unclear Technology • Needs Fluid participation • Needs Stream independence <p><i>(Adapted from Herweg, et al)</i></p>	 <pre> graph LR PS[Problem Stream] --> PW[Policy Window] PStream[Policy Stream] --> PW PolStream[Politics Stream] --> PW PE[Policy Entrepreneur] --> PW PW --> GA[Government Agenda] </pre>

Analyzing *Buenvivir* in Ecuador and Bolivia

Agenda Setting

Agenda setting is about which problems get to the table and for what reasons. At this stage, it is important that policymakers give every voice an opinion; those with more influence, whether monetary or political, should not have their problems dominate the agenda. In other words, policymakers follow due process by running a stakeholder analysis when setting the agenda. A stakeholder analysis defines all individuals who are impacted by what is on the agenda using two qualifications, level of power and level of interest, and places them at the proper intersection of the two.

From PAIS/MAS Perspective	High Power	Low Power
High Interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rafael Correa • Evo Morales • National legislators • Big local businesses, like Petroecuador 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONAIE and Indigenous groups • Indigenous Leaders • Other citizens of Ecuador/Bolivia • United Nations/IMF/World Bank
Low Interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic powers (like the US and China) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nearby countries, like Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Chile • Other countries (EU)

The above table defines key stakeholders in Ecuador and Bolivia as the agenda for the upcoming *buenvivir* constitutions were being set. Each group of stakeholders is treated to a different political strategy. For example, it is important for President Correa to be managed closely in the process, due to his

high power and interest. More importantly, those stakeholders with low power but high interest, often called vulnerable stakeholders, are to be kept duly informed throughout the whole policy cycle, with this transparency ensuring a lack of surprises when a policy is implemented (Smith). Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that a stakeholder is constantly changing. Certain groups may gain or lose power, or not even be relevant to a stakeholder analysis at all. This is related to the MSF's assumption of policy related to fluid participation (Herwig, et al 20). Stakeholders come and go in the process, but as stakeholders change, the agenda should not change too drastically.

So, how effective were Ecuador and Bolivia in managing their stakeholders? In some cases, both countries were highly effective. With both constitutional processes, CONAIE and Indigenous groups, representative of the vulnerable stakeholders, were included liberally. If these stakeholders had been excluded, it is highly likely that *buenvivir* would not have been quite so prevalent and foundational. Additionally, initiatives such as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative show high concern for the impact on vulnerable stakeholders. In almost any other country of the world, extracting oil would be an easy decision. But Ecuador focused on a solution that catered to the most vulnerable stakeholders instead. TIOCs are another complementary example, with the provision of autonomy being another issue of importance for vulnerable stakeholders that made its way onto the agenda.

On the other hand, as time passed after the initial *buenvivir* push, stakeholders were mismanaged consistently in each country. Specifically, all stakeholders with high power became the focus of agenda-setting. Low interest high power stakeholders, such as China, became more relevant, especially as China eventually shifted to having a higher interest in Ecuador due to loans provided to finance spending. With this increase in interest, Correa felt compelled to manage China closely, and this influenced his decision to end Yasuní, and start extractive activities. In Bolivia, Morales focused on oil companies, spurring his decision to try to build a road through TIPNIS, and fueling his continued focus on that issue even as protests happened and disdain for such a road grew amongst the vulnerable stakeholders.

Another crucial point to consider is the reasons for a certain agenda being formed, which connects to the MSF idea of the problem stream. The problem stream is where a situation is defined as undesirable, and thus a problem, with a more desirable situation needing to be pursued (Herweg, et al 22). For both Ecuador and Bolivia, the concept of “developing” is an example of a result of the problem stream. The Western world has defined a certain level of income as “undesirable,” and both Correa and Morales saw their countries’ situation as such. Thus, a new solution was sought to “fix” this undesirable situation, and all resulting “problems” manifest themselves from this initial thought.

In Ecuador, this manifested itself into improving the economy and increasing social spending without funding that “growth” through extractive means. In fact, Correa’s main concern was social spending, and his view of that problem as essential meant that he was willing to solve the “problem” in any way he could, even if other “problems” had to be ignored. In Bolivia, Morales viewed Indigenous autonomy as a key problem as someone of Indigenous heritage himself. In fact, as the first Indigenous president of Bolivia, he had the weight of every Indigenous demand since Bolivia was incorporated on his shoulders, as well as the recent memory of the Cochabamba Water War as a motivator to prevent any similar issues (Villavicencio & Kotze). Additionally, as so much of Bolivian political and economic structure was construed as a problem, whether due to internal demands for improvement or an outside world that painted a picture that Bolivia was “underdeveloped,” the problem stream was especially inundated in Bolivia.

The timing of the policy is also important. This connects to another key MSF idea, that being policy windows. Policy windows are an opportunity for a specific policy to earn support due to internal or external events (Herweg, et al 26). For Ecuador and Bolivia, a policy window for *buenvivir* appeared to open after the Copenhagen Accords and the Rio+20 Conference. Both conferences gave support to movements that protected the environment without compromising economic growth, as sustainability was the buzzword of the moment. For Ecuador, this meant that providing rights to nature and the Yasuní-ITT Initiative should have seen great support, and for Bolivia, Law 300 should have also drawn support.

But this was not the case. Ecuador did not receive much financial support for its Yasuní-ITT Initiative. Morales hosted his own counter-conference to the Copenhagen Accords to protest the lack of focus on capitalism as the main reason for climate change (Laing). Even now as the UN pledges to focus on green growth, countries are reluctant to implement policies that protect the environment. This makes the policy window much less clear, to the extent that it might have been merely a façade.


Policy Formulation

Once a policymaking group sets the agenda, the next step becomes creating policy that addresses the problem through the creation of a framework of decisions to meet set goals. Policy agents work together in their policy communities to produce a formal policy proposal. Several different proposals are then put forward and the costs and benefits of each are weighed. All these steps are components of the policy stream in the MSF. In this stream, policies are judged based on their technical feasibility, value acceptability, public acquiescence, and financial viability (Herweg, et al 24).

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative would receive mostly positive grades for these four criteria. Yasuní was a technically feasible policy. It was crafted to be as simple as possible, with funding going directly from donors to social spending projects defined by the policy. However, there were some small issues with unclear technology, as dictated by assumptions of the MSF (Herweg, et al 19). There was some uncertainty for donors about what exactly their funding was going to go to, and thus worry about corruption. And while Correa did face corruption charges later in his political career (León Cabrera), the uncertainty about whether Correa would still extract seemed unfounded. Furthermore, there is nothing unsavory about the values of Yasuní. It supports the environment and spends money on public services and infrastructure. Public acquiescence was also not an issue, as CONAIE and the government built up much support from luminaries around the world (Sovacool & Scarpaci). The rest of the world, however, may not have supported Yasuní fully, as the values of *buenvivir*, being somewhat socialist in nature, would not have gelled with some political ideologies. Some would also say that Yasuní was not financially viable. From a neoclassical economist's standpoint, this would be true. However, there is

certainly much wealth in the world that could be redistributed to the campaign and not be wasted. So, from the perspective of agrowth (Altmann), Yasuní is certainly financially viable.

Bolivia, on the other hand, while facing similar issues to Ecuador, had additional problems in relation to the policy stream. The technical feasibility of a policy such as the autonomy granted in the Framework Laws is far from simple to define, as autonomy is a complex issue with lots to unpack in terms of who has the right to receive it or grant it. But, in this case, many nuances of granting autonomy to a group of people were ignored, such as the many Indigenous people living in cities rather than the countryside where TIOCs would be implemented (Artaraz & Calestani). This makes it hard to define the Framework Laws as technically feasible, as the plan was too simplistic to account for the complexities present. For the same reasons as in Ecuador, value acceptability, while certainly present amongst the Indigenous peoples of Bolivia, was not equal across all Bolivians. The strong affluent right-wing community in Santa Cruz were huge detractors of most *buenvivir* policy and Morales himself, and their influence ensured that there would always be “important” people voicing disdain for certain policies (Sivak 210). As in Ecuador, the presence of this disdain applies to public acquiescence, and minimizes overall support. Finally, TIOCs were also financially viable. Although Bolivia is considered as stuck in the resource trap due to its reliance on oil for economic growth (Tockman & Cameron), it is possible for Bolivia to disentangle itself. Additionally, TIOCs were built to be self-sustaining, making Bolivia’s resource reliance a moot point overall.



During policy formulation, policy choices are developed from the knowledge of policymakers, and dedicated research. Additionally, major policy actors, called policy entrepreneurs as per the MSF, have an impact on policy choices. A policy entrepreneur is any individual who has a keen interest in solving an identified problem and

provides resources to solve them (Herweg, et al 28). Ecuador and Bolivia had no shortage of policy

entrepreneurs, whether that be Correa and Morales, or the Indigenous groups. Their activity and interactions in the policy formulation process is based on their power, a concept related to the Iron Triangle. As seen above, the Iron Triangle defines a tripartite relationship between members of the legislative body, bureaucrats, and special interest groups, all key policy entrepreneurs. The triangle defines a relationship where the work of formulating ideas of policy is shared; consequently, those benefits become muddled when two parts of the triangle overlap (Rourke). In both Ecuador and Bolivia, this was apparent, especially in the drafting of each constitution. Both Correa and Morales headed the legislative body working on the constitution while also being the most important bureaucrats in their political system. Additionally, for Morales, being Indigenous himself, he also was a part of the main *buenvivir* interest group. The power that resulted allowed both to wield undue influence on policy formulation, as seen by later decisions, such as canceling the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and implementing plan B in Ecuador and continuing to build a road through TIPNIS in Bolivia.

But, in both Ecuador and Bolivia, one of the main influencers of policy formulation was Western ideas of development. While protecting the environment and ensuring autonomy are separate from discussions of “growth,” initiatives such as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative illustrate a pressure to increase GDP. Even as economists today have disparaged GDP as an accurate measure of welfare, proposing metrics such as the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), thousands of policy entrepreneurs were trained with this mindset of GDP growth above all else. When Correa decided to cancel the Yasuní-ITT Initiative due to money not flowing quickly enough to Ecuador’s economy, Western economic ideals were at play. When Morales chose to build a road through TIPNIS to facilitate transportation from oilfields to big commercial hubs, Western economic ideals were at play. While *buenvivir* is opposed to Western ideas of growth and definitions of wellbeing, the formulation of *buenvivir* policy still relied on these ideals, in the process, corrupting the initial tenets of *buenvivir*. It is difficult to escape the ideology of a prevalent and powerful hegemon, and Ecuador and Bolivia were not an exception.

Policy Adoption & Implementation

Once the policy stream has proposed various policies to be implemented to solve a problem as dictated from the problem stream, the next step of the policy cycle comes into play. Adopting the chosen policy sets in motion the steps to create what is necessary to implement said policy. However, before implementation, there is a period of compromise that decides which policy is chosen (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 6). A compromise is necessary to ensure that everyone who has power is mostly content with the final decision that is made. This further connects with the MSF idea of the political stream, which states that individuals and groups with a powerful desire for a certain outcome have a lot of power in the policy decision, and thus compromise is needed to balance these powerful interests (Herweg, et al 24).

In Ecuador, compromise was a main component of *buenvivir*. The tenets of *buenvivir* did not align with any previously used method by Ecuadorian politicians, and even implementing it into the constitution was a process that required much compromise. But CONAIE and other Indigenous group's desire to get *buenvivir* into the constitution helped them wield a lot of power, power that ensured *buenvivir* was included. However, after this, compromise was not as evident. While Yasuní was a huge victory for CONAIE and the constitutional rights of nature, it was not so for the petrol companies of Ecuador, firms that possessed considerable influence due to their intertwining with the Ecuadorian economy through employment. If the rights of nature were fully implemented, these companies would be forced to absolve, as their industry would be outlawed. However, this is not what happened, so at some point, petrol companies were able to reach an agreement to still maintain some extractive activities, even if not in the oil rich Yasuní National Park (Sovacool & Scarpaci).

In Bolivia, compromise was also crucial, but oftentimes ignored. As in Ecuador, compromise was necessary to include *buenvivir* and plurinationality into the constitution and conceive of the idea of TIOCs. Additionally, the development of the laws regarding the protection of nature, which started as the more progressive Law 071, but morphed to the still progressive Law 300, illustrated a healthy process of compromise. However, under Morales, compromise sometimes only happened when extreme measures were taken by Indigenous peoples. For example, with TIPNIS, Morales did appear to compromise and

look for other alternatives for the road, but only after the march and protest in La Paz took place. Even Morales' decision was not one of compromise, as he viewed the choice as bipolar: either there would be a road, or there would not be. Furthermore, Morales' eventual recanting of his previous change of heart, and decision to build the road once again showed that this compromise was a mere façade.

A last step that must take place with policy adoption is choosing a contingency plan (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 6). Contingency plans do not necessarily require a separate process from the previous policy formulation stage. Rather, since multiple policy options are generated in this process, a second-best plan can be chosen as a back-up, or a slightly adjusted version of the original policy can be used. Contingency planning was clear in Ecuador, with the presence of Plan B for Yasuní (Martin & Scholz). However, like in the case of TIPNIS, Plan B was just the opposite of the original plan, that being to open up Yasuní completely to extraction. There was, however, also a Plan C, one that would have generated income through increasing tax rates slightly (Kingsbury, et al). This plan would have kept tax rates competitive, while raising money and still ensuring extraction in Yasuní would not happen. But this proposal was ignored, and its promise was never capitalized on. This is still a step better than Bolivia, which did not appear to have any concrete contingency planning, explaining the constant back-and-forth decisions related to the road through TIPNIS. In sum, contingency planning in both countries was flawed.

Once policy is adopted through this process of compromise and accommodation of influential political actors, implementation can finally begin. Implementation relies on creating an instrument with available resources to fulfill each goal of a policy. For Ecuador, that meant working with the United Nations to construct an instrument to receive donations for Yasuní. For Bolivia, this meant creating the office that worked on the TIOC creation and application process. However, both implementation instruments were deeply flawed. Shaky implementation of the Yasuní framework was the stated reason that some countries did not want to donate (Kingsbury, et al). The TIOC office was terribly inefficient, making it difficult for autonomy to ever be granted (Tockman & Cameron). In general, both countries,

while focusing on the plan to address a problem, did not spend as much time as they should have on what would ensure the plan would be a success.

Evaluation & Updates

After some time has elapsed from policy adoption, policymakers should evaluate how successful implementation of a policy has been. Whatever criteria were established to evaluate meeting certain goals should be used to evaluate efficacy. Once this evaluation has been done, policymakers can decide what to do next. They can leave the policy as-is if successful, tweak small parts of it to make it more effective, or end implementation of the policy entirely, and put a contingency plan in its place (May & Wildavsky). Furthermore, this evaluation should provide feedback for the future on how to implement other similar policies. Overall, this step is extremely important, as if ignored, a policy may, in the worst-case scenario, worsen the problem that is trying to be solved.

Evaluation can be done using qualitative and/or quantitative methods. A straightforward way to evaluate efficacy is through a survey of key stakeholders impacted by the decision of the policy. Just as during the agenda process, seeing how stakeholders are doing ensures that the ultimate decision made by policymakers is based on who is truly being affected. In Ecuador, with Yasuní, this certainly did not happen. The decision to pivot to Plan B did the exact opposite, choosing a decision that would harm the vulnerable stakeholders, those being the isolated Indigenous peoples and nature contained in Yasuní National Park. In this way, this decision ignored the initial goals of the Yasuní Initiative, and thus was not an effective update to the policy. A similar process happened in Bolivia with TIPNIS. When Morales chose to halt building the road, this could be viewed as a “stalling tactic” to give him more time to produce an alternative that encouraged development without bringing harm. However, Morales did not do so, choosing to use the same harmful policy. So, both countries did poor work in evaluating policies based on stakeholders and making updates based on their wellbeing.

The issue both countries did focus on was an important problem to consider when evaluating policy, this issue being resource constraints (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 18). Both Ecuador and Bolivia struggled with this issue. Both countries had a seeming lack of viable economic options beyond extraction. However, Ecuador does have other potential areas of growth. According to the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization, Ecuador is a top-10 producer in bananas, cacao, and palm oil ("Ecuador"). Ecuador also grows roses that are considered highly desirable, although the COVID pandemic has hampered the rose industry greatly (Solano). All these industries are other means of economic viability that could be bolstered and subsidized. But Ecuador chose to focus on oil. Bolivia did too and it is considered the most dependent Latin American country on natural resources (Tockman & Cameron). While both countries implemented policies and constitutions that protected nature and limited extractive activities, such activities are a temptingly uncomplicated way to generate capital. This temptation was apparent in Ecuador's decision to end the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and extract, and Bolivia's decision to build the road through TIPNIS no matter what. So, while both countries did try alternatives to extraction, the constraints on resources ensured that these policies would need to be updated.

The second important problem to consider when evaluating policy is time constraints, whether defined by the policy or self-imposed. Both supplementary frameworks allude to time, indicating its importance (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 18; Herwig, et al 19). Time constraints might be due to pressure to achieve results as quickly as possible, a common occurrence for newly elected politicians. For both Correa and Morales, this manifested itself into the rapid drafting of new constitutions, to ensure that both had a crowning achievement early on that would help in re-election.

But, in policy evaluation, time constraints influence how a policy is updated. In Ecuador, Yasuní faced mostly self-imposed constraints. Correa only chose to cancel the initiative after 5 years, a relatively brief period for such an ambitious project to fully succeed. However, Correa would have seen the slow rate of returns, and felt he had no choice but to assume that it would not generate the desired capital fast enough and feel a need to seek an alternative. This shows the unfortunate folly in relying on a world full

of bureaucracy to provide funding in an abbreviated period. Additionally, both Correa and Morales would have felt the pressure to achieve results due to the history of the presidency in both countries. With so much presidential turnover preceding each of their terms, both would have felt that a coup was not far off, and thus pushed to ensure that powerful people were happy. If *buenvivir* did not ensure this, then policies would be updated to lessen its impact, which is what happened with both Yasuní and TIPNIS.

A Contemporary Example: The Sacred Headwaters Project

So, the success of *buenvivir* policy has been mixed, to the point that it is not really practiced as strongly today in Ecuador and Bolivia. However, there is still valuable work being done to craft *buenvivir* policy that has the chance to both succeed and achieve radical results. One example of this is the Sacred Headwaters Project, organized by the Ecuadorian NGO *Fundación Pachamama*, and facilitated by the San Francisco-based Pachamama Alliance. The overall mission of these organizations is “to empower Indigenous people of the Amazon rainforest to preserve their lands and culture and, using insights gained from that work, to educate and inspire individuals everywhere to bring forth a thriving, just and sustainable world.” (Pachamama Alliance) These organizations have also worked on projects related to Indigenous resilience, prenatal and neonatal health, and supporting the rights of nature, all areas of interest in the tenets of *buenvivir*.

The Sacred Headwaters Project is a bioregional plan that specifically focuses on protecting the Amazon headwaters in Ecuador and Peru, as well as supported over 30 Indigenous groups who inhabit that region, many with minimal contact with the rest of the world. The Alliance aspires to implement this project no later than 2030, and has a clear set of objectives, areas of focus, and related policy strategies to achieve this. In fact, the executive summary of the plan provides 54 strategies, with 134 related actions for implementation.

Sacred Headwaters Project Objectives	8 Areas of Focus
1. Strengthen the Amazonian well-being	• Transitional pathways
2. Ensure Indigenous self-determination and territorial governance	• Indigenous governance and self-determination
3. Stop the advance of extractive industries	• Forest economies and regenerative values
4. Promote river and forest conservation and restoration	• Intercultural health
5. Eliminate forest loss and ecosystem degradation	• Ecological awareness and intercultural education
	• Transportation and connectivity
	• Smart cities and bio-social housing
	• Forest and watershed conservation and restoration

Structurally, the plan proposes to utilize a variety of actors to both fund and operate the project, creating a project delicately interwoven between the fabrics of both international interest, national politics, local governments, and individual leaders. The project would cost \$18 billion over 10 years to implement, with much of that funding coming from the national governments of Ecuador and Peru. Many of the implementable points are already the responsibility of each respective national government, but the Alliance would take over management duties while still receiving the same amount of funding. The remainder of the funding is proposed to be solicited from international funds, multilateral organizations like the World Bank, international governments, and NGOs, as well as private sector donations and crowdfunding. Once funding is solicited, responsibility for implementation would be divided amongst Indigenous organizations, civil society, local governments, and community associations.

This is an example of an extremely ambitious project that tackles an issue of interest using *buenvivir*-influenced policy strategies. It is novel in that it proposes local leaders take on projects of typically national importance, decentralizing some level of power and autonomy while keeping typical funding methods. For this project to succeed, the previously small-project focused groups involved in implementation will need to show they have the political chops and power to get a larger project done. Admittedly, while there are 134 actions, many actions are related to speaking up on behalf of relevant issues, and not all actions will require careful planning and negotiating. However, this project will still

have to contend with national bureaucracy. However, Ecuador has not rejected *buenvivir* as workable, even if its attempts at utilizing it have failed. So, it should not be out of the realm of possibility to gain support for this project from people with national political power and influence.

Eliciting the approximately \$672 million in funds outside the national government funds may be the larger issue. As shown by the similarly ambitious Yasuní-ITT Initiative, well-meaning policies that rely on the international community to facilitate success can spectacularly fail. However, given that some of the key issues of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative were lack of transparency and a confusing framework, Sacred Headwaters can learn from these mistakes. As the executive plan is highly delineated based on each objective and area of focus, any potential donor should get a clear idea of what to expect from the project. Additionally, as the people implementing the policies are the ones who will benefit directly from implementation, there should be less concern about corruption and misuse of funding. Overall, this project is exciting, in that it provides many workable solutions to the issues brought to the table by *buenvivir* and is worth a closer look as it enters its initial phases over the next few years.

Conclusions and Recommendations

So, *buenvivir*, when utilized, has provided an interesting case study for post-development ideologies in use. Its use in Ecuador's and Bolivia's constitutions is a huge stride towards wide-spread acceptance of its ideas. But there were too many political hurdles to overcome for *buenvivir* to be able to further entrench itself in South American politics, and potentially beyond. Overall, *buenvivir* has tried to be *sumak kawsay*, but has mostly been eco-Marxist. This cognitive dissonance has been a facilitator of failure for *buenvivir*. The first step to better use of *buenvivir* is a better definition of what it means and stands for, rather than the current trinity of opposing *buenvivirs*.

Other failures, beyond the foundational structure of *buenvivir* itself, stem from the actors who were heavily involved. When *buenvivir* became constitutional, powerful leaders like Correa and Morales were able to override or ignore constitutional tenets. These leaders blurred the lines between *buenvivir*

and traditional Western political methods, a fusion the spirit of *buenvivir* could not survive. Even when constitutional mandates were not ignored, the ambiguous wording and presence of a plethora of loopholes became the saboteur of policy initiatives designed to support the rights of nature, Indigenous autonomy, and community-based social spending. Additionally, while there seemed to be a policy window for *buenvivir* to triumphantly gain entry, that window ended up being little more than a façade. The international community was not ready for, and actively discouraged ambitious ideas like the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, and even today's world ethos might not accept *buenvivir*.

However, despite these failures, *buenvivir* is still worth pursuing. The peoples of Ecuador and Bolivia were immeasurably behind it, and even today groups like CONAIE and the Pachamama Alliance still believe in its workability. There is also a growing amount of literature dedicated to analyzing *buenvivir*, a key step in increasing worldwide cognizance. However, this literature is woefully inadequate. Policy experts, economists, and other erudite scholars take a critical lens in their analyses, pointing out the flaws in previous attempts at implementing it, but fail to use their expertise to provide solutions. Future scholars should avoid this sort of discourse and focus their energy on providing tangible frameworks for implementation. Furthermore, there are questions about whether *buenvivir* can work at a level beyond the community-based level from which the idea was wrought. There is no current reputable literature on whether *buenvivir* failed when implemented due to scalability issues, so this too is a question whose answer is worth pursuing.

Overall, there are recipes for success for *buenvivir*. Starting with a smaller issue, like in the Sacred Headwaters Project, can help reveal successes, failures, and further solutions that can then be scaled up to slightly larger issues. Then, this knowledge can be brought up to respectively larger issues, to create a more organic bottom-up process, as opposed the top-down approach in Ecuador and Bolivia. Additionally, including more local stakeholders in the implementation process may bring more success. Having people who care about the ideology and the issue at hand makes a significant difference, and considering the support *buenvivir* garnered, there should be no problem finding such individuals amongst

the general populaces of Ecuador and Bolivia. This exciting “development” ideology, one that has already generated a thought-provoking amount of political action, is not one to ignore in the coming years. With updates, it could very well find itself in the fabrics of South American political society again.

Bibliography

- Achtenberg, Emily. "Road Rage and Resistance: Bolivia's TIPNIS Conflict." *NACLA Report on the Americas (1993)*, vol. 44, no. 6, Routledge, 2011, pp. 3–4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2011.11722129>.
- Alderman, Jonathan. "Indigenous Autonomy and the Legacy of Neoliberal Decentralization in Plurinational Bolivia." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1, Routledge, 2018, pp. 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17442222.2018.1417692>.
- Altmann, Philipp. "The Commons as Colonisation – The Well-Intentioned Appropriation of Buen Vivir." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 39, no. 1, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2020, pp. 83–97, <https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12941>.
- "A Passport to Utopia; Bolivia's New Constitution." *The Economist (London)*, vol. 390, no. 8615, Economist Intelligence Unit N.A. Incorporated, 2009, p. 50.
- Artaraz, Kepa, and Melania Calestani. "'Suma Qamaña' in Bolivia: Indigenous Understandings of Well-Being and Their Contribution to a Post-Neoliberal Paradigm." *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 42, no. 5, SAGE Publications, 2015, pp. 216–33, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X14547501>.
- Augsburger, Aaron, and Paul Haber. "Constructing Indigenous Autonomy in Plurinational Bolivia: Possibilities and Ambiguities." *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 45, no. 6, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 53–67, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18791970>.
- Benalcazar, Patricio Carpio, and Francisco Javier Ullan de La Rosa. "The Institutionalized Buen Vivir: a New Hegemonic Political Paradigm for Ecuador." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 64, no. 1, Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2021, p. 1, <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202100101>.
- "Bioregional Plan 2030." Edited by Juan Manuel Crespo et al. Translated by María Del Mar Iturralde et al., *Amazon Sacred Headwaters Project*, Fundación Pachamama, Sept. 2021.

Bracarense, Natalia, and Karol Gil-Vasquez. "Bolivia's Institutional Transformation: Contact Zones, Social Movements, and the Emergence of an Ethnic Class Consciousness." *Journal of Economic Issues*, vol. 52, no. 3, Routledge, 2018, pp. 615–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2018.1495986>.

Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Benjamin Crosby. *Managing Policy Reform: Concepts and Tools for Decision-Makers in Developing and Transitioning Countries*. Kumarian Press, 2002.

Caria, Sara, and Rafael Domínguez. "Ecuador's 'Buen Vivir': A New Ideology for Development." *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 43, no. 1, SAGE Publications, 2016, pp. 18–33, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X15611126>.

Colman, David. *Economics of Change in Less Developed Countries*. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994.

Correa, Rafael. "Ecuador's 'Buen Vivir' Revolution." *New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2, Institute for National Strategy, 2011, pp. 70–72.

"Ecuador." *Food and Agricultural Organization Statistics*, United Nations, <https://www.fao.org/faostat/es/#country/58>.

Espinosa, Cristina. "Interpretive Affinities: The Constitutionalization of Rights of Nature, Pacha Mama, in Ecuador." *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, vol. 21, no. 5, Routledge, 2019, pp. 608–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1116379>.

Esteva, Gustavo. "Development." *The Development Dictionary*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, pp. 6-25.

Fabricant, Nicole, and Nancy Postero. "Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia: The Struggle Over the TIPNIS." *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 91, no. 3, George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research, 2018, pp. 905–36, <https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2018.0044>.

Ghosh, B. N. *Dependency Theory Revisited*. Ashgate, 2001.

- Giovannini, Michela. "Indigenous Community Enterprises in Chiapas." *Community Development Journal*, vol. 50, no. 1, Oxford Journals, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 71–87, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsu019>.
- Gronemeyer, Marianne. "Helping." *The Development Dictionary*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, pp. 53-69.
- Guardiola, Jorge, and Fernando García-Quero. "Buen Vivir (living Well) in Ecuador: Community and Environmental Satisfaction Without Household Material Prosperity?" *Ecological Economics*, vol. 107, Elsevier B.V, 2014, pp. 177–84, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.07.032>.
- Gudynas, Eduardo. "The Political Ecology of the Biocentric Turn in Ecuador's New Constitution." *Revista de estudios sociales (Bogotá, Colombia)*, no. 32, Univ Los Andes, Fac Ciencias Soc, 2009, pp. 34–46, <https://doi.org/10.7440/res32.2009.02>.
- Gudynas, Eduardo. "Value, Growth, Development: South American Lessons for a New Ecopolitics." *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism*, vol. 30, no. 2, Routledge, 2019, pp. 234–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1372502>.
- "Harry Truman Inaugural Address: Jan. 20, 1949." *YouTube*, CBS News, 19 Jan. 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fWwcZLNrtAY>. Accessed 14 Feb. 2022.
- Herweg, Nicole, et al. "The Multiple Streams Framework: Foundations, Refinements, and Empirical Applications." *Theories of the Policy Process*, edited by Paul A. Sabatier, Routledge, New York, NY, 2019, pp. 17–54.
- Hunt, Michael H. *The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present: A Documentary Reader*. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Illich, Ivan. "Needs." *The Development Dictionary*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, pp. 88-101.

- Jolly, Richard. "The World Employment Conference: The Enthronement of Basic Needs." *Development Policy Review*, vol. A9, no. 2, 1976, pp. 31–44., <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1976.tb00338.x>.
- Keating, Christine, and Amy Lind. "Plural Sovereignty and La Familia Diversa in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution." *Feminist Studies*, vol. 43, no. 2, Feminist Studies, Inc, 2017, pp. 291–313, <https://doi.org/10.15767/feministstudies.43.2.0291>.
- Kingdon, John W. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Pearson, 2014.
- Kingsbury, Donald V., et al. "Populism or Petrostate?: The Afterlives of Ecuador's Yasuní-ITT Initiative." *Society & Natural Resources*, vol. 32, no. 5, Routledge, 2019, pp. 530–47, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2018.1530817>.
- Laing, Anna F. "Resource Sovereignties in Bolivia: Re-Conceptualising the Relationship Between Indigenous Identities and the Environment During the TIPNIS Conflict." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 34, no. 2, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2015, pp. 149–66, <https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12211>.
- Lalander, Rickard. "The Ecuadorian Resource Dilemma: Sumak Kawsay or Development?" *Critical Sociology*, vol. 42, no. 4-5, SAGE Publications, 2016, pp. 623–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920514557959>.
- León Cabrera, José María. "Ecuador's Former President Convicted on Corruption Charges." *The New York Times Americas*, The New York Times, 7 Apr. 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/world/americas/ecuador-correa-corruption-verdict.html>.
- Lummis, C. Douglas. "Equality." *The Development Dictionary*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, pp. 38-52.

- Marston, Andrea, and Amy Kennemore. "Extraction, Revolution, Plurinationalism: Rethinking Extractivism from Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 46, no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2019, pp. 141–60, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18781347>.
- Martin, Pamela L, and Imme Scholz. "Policy Debate | Ecuador's Yasuní-ITT Initiative: What Can We Learn from Its Failure?" *Revue Internationalis de Politique de Développement*, no. 5.2, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1705>.
- May, Judith V., and Aaron B. Wildavsky. *The Policy Cycle*. Sage Publications, 1978.
- Mayta, Chambi, and Rubén Darío. "Vivir Bien, Child Labor, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, Routledge, 2017, pp. 95–112, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17442222.2017.1318542>.
- McNeish, John-Andrew. "Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity in Bolivia: The TIPNIS Effect." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, Routledge, 2013, pp. 221–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17442222.2013.808495>.
- Merino, Roger. "An Alternative to 'alternative Development'?: Buen Vivir and Human Development in Andean Countries." *Oxford Development Studies*, vol. 44, no. 3, Routledge, 2016, pp. 271–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1144733>.
- Morales, Isabel. "Dollarization: The Case of Ecuador." *Panoramas*, University of Pittsburgh, 10 June 2021, <https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/economy-and-development/dollarization-case-ecuador>.
- "Morales Promulga La Ley Que Anula La Intangibilidad Del Tipnis." *Página Siete*, 13 Aug. 2017, <https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2017/8/13/morales-promulga-anula-intangibilidad-tipnis-148183.html>.

- Neto, Joaquim Shiraishi, and Rosirene Martins Lima. "Rights Of Nature: The "Biocentric Spin" in the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador." *Veredas Do DirectOE*, vol. 13, no. 25, 2016, p. 111, <https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v13i25.673>.
- O'Connell, Chris. "Yasuni-ITT and Post-Oil Development: Lessons for Development Educators." *Policy & Practice (Centre for Global Education)*, vol. 22, Centre for Global Education, 2016, pp. 35–58.
- Postero, Nancy, and Jason Tockman. "Self-Governance in Bolivia's First Indigenous Autonomy: Charagua." *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 55, no. 1, Latin American Studies Association, 2020, pp. 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.213>.
- Ranta, Eija Maria. "Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? The Emergence and Shortcomings of Vivir Bien as State Policy in Bolivia in the Era of Globalization." *Globalizations*, vol. 13, no. 4, Routledge, 2016, pp. 425–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2016.1141596>.
- Ranta, Eija Maria. "Vivir Bien Governance in Bolivia: Chimera or Attainable Utopia?" *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 7, Routledge, 2017, pp. 1603–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1224551>.
- Reyes-García, Victoria, et al. "Variety of Indigenous Peoples' Opinions of Large Infrastructure Projects: The TIPNIS Road in the Bolivian Amazon." *World Development*, vol. 127, Elsevier Ltd, 2020, p. 104751, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104751>.
- Rival, Laura. "Ecuador's Yasuní-ITT Initiative: The Old and New Values of Petroleum." *Ecological Economics*, vol. 70, no. 2, Elsevier B.V, 2010, pp. 358–65, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.007>.
- Rostow, Walt Whitman. "The Stages of Economic Growth." *The Economic History Review*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1959, pp. 1–16., <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.1959.tb01829.x>.
- Rourke, Francis E. *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*. Little, Brown, 1984.

- Sanchez-Lopez, Daniela. "Reshaping Notions of Citizenship: The TIPNIS Indigenous Movement in Bolivia." *Development Studies Research*, vol. 2, no. 1, Routledge, 2015, pp. 20–32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21665095.2015.1010013>.
- Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut. "Bolivia's New Constitution: Towards Participatory Democracy and Political Pluralism?" *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 90, Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos (CEDLA), 2011, pp. 3–22, <https://doi.org/10.18352/erlacs.9248>.
- Schmidt, Steven. "Latin American Dependency Theory." *Global South Studies*, University of Virginia, 21 Jan. 2018, <https://globalsouthstudies.as.virginia.edu/key-thinkers/latin-american-dependency-theory>.
- Sivak Martín. *Evo Morales: The Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Smith, L. W. "Stakeholder Analysis: A Pivotal Practice of Successful Projects." *Project Management Institute Annual Seminars & Symposium, Houston, Texas, 7-16 September 2000*. Project Management Institute, <https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/stakeholder-analysis-pivotal-practice-projects-8905>.
- Solano, Gonzalo. "Ecuador's Blooming Flower Industry Feels Pandemic's Punch." *AP News*, Associated Press, 28 Aug. 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-caribbean-international-news-latin-america-7d27b2e2873bd224e6a400b221d778dc>.
- Sovacool, Benjamin K., and Joseph Scarpaci. "Energy Justice and the Contested Petroleum Politics of Stranded Assets: Policy Insights from the Yasuní-ITT Initiative in Ecuador." *Energy Policy*, vol. 95, Elsevier Ltd, 2016, pp. 158–71, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.04.045>.

- Stewart, Frances. “Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right to Development.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 3, 1989, pp. 347–374., <https://doi.org/10.2307/762098>.
- “Sumak Kawsay: Ancient Teachings of Indigenous Peoples.” *Pachamama Alliance*, <https://www.pachamama.org/sumak-kawsay>.
- “The Inauguration of Our 33rd President – Harry S. Truman.” *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, National Archives, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/movingimage-records/mp76-37>.
- Tockman, Jason. “Decentralisation, Socio-Territoriality and the Exercise of Indigenous Self-Governance in Bolivia.” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 1, Routledge, 2016, pp. 153–71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1089163>.
- Tockman, Jason. “The Hegemony of Representation: Democracy and Indigenous Self-Government in Bolivia.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, vol. 9, no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2017, pp. 121–38, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1700900205>.
- Tockman, Jason, and John Cameron. “Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia.” *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 56, no. 3, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2014, pp. 46–69, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00239.x>.
- Tola, Miriam. “Between Pachamama and Mother Earth: Gender, Political Ontology and the Rights of Nature in Contemporary Bolivia.” *Feminist Review*, vol. 118, no. 1, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 25–40, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41305-018-0100-4>.
- Vallejo, María Cristina, et al. “Leaving Oil Underground in Ecuador: The Yasuní-ITT Initiative from a Multi-Criteria Perspective.” *Ecological Economics*, vol. 109, Elsevier B.V, 2015, pp. 175–85, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.11.013>.

Vanhulst, Julien, and Adrian E. Beling. “Buen Vivir: Emergent Discourse Within or Beyond Sustainable Development?” *Ecological Economics*, vol. 101, Elsevier B.V, 2014, pp. 54–63,

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.02.017>.

Verdugo, Sergio. “The Fall of the Constitution’s Political Insurance: How the Morales Regime Eliminated the Insurance of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution.” *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2019, pp. 1098–124, <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz084>.

Villalba, Unai. “Buen Vivir Vs Development: A Paradigm Shift in the Andes?” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 8, Routledge, 2013, pp. 1427–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831594>.

Villalba-Eguiluz, C. Unai, and Iker Etxano. “Buen Vivir Vs Development (II): The Limits of (Neo-)Extractivism.” *Ecological Economics*, vol. 138, Elsevier B.V, 2017, pp. 1–11,

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.010>.

Villavicencio Calzadilla, Paola, and Louis J. Kotzé “Living in Harmony with Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia.” *Transnational Environmental Law*, vol. 7, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 397–424, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102518000201>.

Weyer, Frédérique. “Implementing ‘Vivir Bien’: Results and Lessons from the Biocultura Programme, Bolivia.” *Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement*, vol. 9, no. 9, 2017, pp. 128–37,

<https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.2361>.