Wandering Between Worlds: The Huxleyan Undercurrents in Human Psychology

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Wandering Between Worlds:
The Huxleyan Undercurrents in Human Psychology

By

Adam Harrison Smith

Accepted in Partial Completion
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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Master’s Thesis

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Adam Harrison Smith

May 26, 2019
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A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of
Western Washington University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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Adam Harrison Smith
May, 2019
Abstract

This thesis explores the early history of psychology, from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s, and the life and ideas of public intellectual Aldous Huxley (1894-1963). I argue that, in his role as an interdisciplinary outside observer, Huxley framed a new humanistic approach for psychology decades before the Humanistic movement emerged as a legitimate disciplinary approach in the 1950s and 1960s. By focusing on Huxley’s considerable body of non-fiction relating to psychology, including his many books of essays, critiques, articles, letters, and lecture transcripts, as well as the formative contributions of major psychological theorists, this thesis demonstrates how ideas from diverse fields influenced the evolution of a discipline and how Huxley was an integral part of that mixing process. In doing so, this thesis challenges the accepted historical origins of the Humanistic psychology movement while introducing an original take on Aldous Huxley’s historical significance. Finally, this thesis illustrates the value of viable relationships between science and the humanities; shows the power and utility of ideas once disentangled from dogmatic systems; indicates how dynamic social trends determine which ideas, or sets of ideas, will take root and flourish; and lastly, how ideological momentum eventually dissipates, opening doors for new paradigms to emerge.
Acknowledgements

The idea for this thesis originated from a section of a historiography on spiritual trends of the 1960s counterculture that I wrote for professor Hunter Price’s “Topics in American Religious History” class during my first year as a graduate student. My premise and arguments went through several iterations before arriving at this final product.

But the final product would not have been possible without the feedback, suggestions, and vast knowledge of my committee members. First and foremost, I owe a big thanks to my thesis chair, Jennifer Seltz, for agreeing to lead this committee and for continuing to ask the question: Why should historians care about my thesis? Professor Seltz never once allowed me to slip out of that important responsibility and I am confident that my abilities as both a writer and researcher improved because of it. For this, I am extremely grateful. Ample thanks is also due to psychology professor Mike Mana for agreeing to be a part of this project. As the only committee member from outside the history department, professor Mana’s expertise was especially crucial in the early stages as his suggestions pointed my research efforts in the right directions. Hunter Price also deserves a great deal of gratitude. Besides the fact that it was his course that inspired this project, his ongoing support, approachability, and openness truly allowed it to take shape.

Lastly, but most of all, I’d like to thank my family and friends for their ongoing support of my academic ventures.
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Introduction

The sun’s afterglow gracefully faded to twilight along the California coast—it was the spring of 1960. A man driving southbound along the Cabrillo Highway caught a glimpse of those dying golden rays that, for a flickering moment, reflected a coral luster upon the ocean’s dark horizon. The peaceful gloaming seemed to counterbalance a dawning enthusiasm radiating within his mind. He rolled down the window and drew a lungful of cool, salty air. Wiping his glasses on his shirt he thought to himself: so this is inspiration. Indeed, his imagination was flowing with possibilities, his sense of enterprise awakened: earlier that day he had attended Aldous Huxley’s “Latent Human Potentialities” lecture at U.C. San Francisco; now he was itching to return to Big Sur and tell his friend all about it.¹

The driver’s name was Dick Price, his friend was Michael Murphy, and within two years the Stanford grads cofounded the Esalen Institute, an educational retreat and new-wave psychology center with a mission statement based on the two-part message of Huxley’s lecture: First, that vast human potentialities—such as creativity, insight, and inspiration—lay dormant within the oceanic expanse of the human unconscious. And secondly, by practicing mind-body techniques designed to expand awareness and strengthen perceptions, individuals can condition themselves to tap these potentialities.² In short, inspired by Huxley, the founders of Esalen built a center for the realization of human potential.

“Latent Human Potentialities” was the most popular of nearly twenty lectures Huxley had

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² Ibid., 86.
prepared in the late-1950s. Appearing at schools and institutions such as Harvard, U.C. Berkeley, the Menninger Foundation, and even the Los Alamos nuclear facility, Huxley’s speeches were so popular that he was often joined on stage by hundreds of spectators who had arrived too late to secure a seat.\(^3\) When M.I.T. contracted his services for a semester by offering a generous cash advance and the prestigious title of “Carnegie Visiting Professor,” his weekly talks “jammed traffic all across the Charles River into Boston and extra police were called out to cope on Wednesday nights.”\(^4\) Huxley spoke about a variety of humanistic themes, but one subject, human psychology, vastly outweighed the rest, accounting for roughly 40% of his total material.\(^5\)

His thoughts about the human mind resonated with the crowds in the early 1960s, not because he had developed any sexy new material, but because his old bag of insights had finally aligned with an impending cultural zeitgeist. Truth be told, Huxley’s ideas on psychology were not always so popular—over the last three decades they were often dismissed and labeled eccentric—but he was aware of the premature arrival of his thought; in a 1931 interview he admitted, “I believe that mankind is working towards some definitive and comprehensive outlook on the world, and I regard my work as contributing towards that.”\(^6\) But what exactly was this evolving outlook? In 1935, a prophetic Harvard professor suggested, “the salient difference” between Huxley’s mode of thinking and his contemporaries “is found in Mr.

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\(^4\) Ibid.


Huxley’s modernity, at the center of which is his reconciliation of the psychological and humanistic points of view. He can best be described as a ‘psychological humanist.’”\(^7\) Granted that the branch of psychology known as ‘Humanistic’ was not formally recognized until more than twenty-five years after this review, it seems fitting that Huxley, a writer most known for his dystopian image of society in *Brave New World* (which was also written in part as a critique of Freudian and Behaviorist ideals), was also a visionary when it came to his thoughts on the nature of the human mind.

Nevertheless, the fact that his ideas failed to gain traction in the first half of the twentieth century would not have surprised the early American psychologist, William James. James believed that “ideas are produced not by individuals, but by groups of individuals—that ideas are social.”\(^8\) In other words, like a virus, ideas require both their human carriers and a favorable environment in order to take hold and proliferate. This is logical, but what about the period just before an idea becomes contagious? If an individual envisions a new approach years before the arrival of a conducive environment, should those notions be abandoned, or should they be incubated and nourished until the right social conditions emerge? Conversely, how many ideas have been constructed and maintained for a time that never arrives? In this sense, ideas are like investments: some pan-out, but others die slow, exhausting the time and energy of their conceivers.

In 1962, just a year before his death, Huxley paid his first and only visit to Esalen. Surely he was flattered to see his ideas materializing upon the dramatic cliffs of Big Sur.

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Likewise, he probably smiled, or at least uttered his favorite expression, ‘extraordinary’, as he read the words: “the human potentiality” printed across its initial brochures. Attracting a generation of innovative psychologists such as Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and R.D. Laing, in its formative years Esalen was very much an international epicenter for the emerging fields of ‘Humanistic’ and ‘Transpersonal’ psychologies—movements that revolved around the essential ideas Huxley had been promoting for decades.

Had he lived through the 1960s it would have been interesting to see what his involvement with the scene at Esalen looked like. Even more intriguing would have been his take on the emerging counterculture of the 1960s. Sadly, we will never know those sentiments. On November 22nd, 1963—the same day of JFK’s assassination—Aldous Huxley lost his life to cancer, but even in death, his views about the human mind still circulate in the constructs of post-Freudian psychologies. The following narrative illustrates how a critical outsider—unfettered by academic strictures and dogmatic conventions—helped frame a new approach to psychology by traversing disciplinary boundaries and testing established ideologies with ideas obtained from life experience, personal relationships, self-experimentations, and several diverse fields of knowledge.

Scholars’ opinions about Aldous Huxley varied wildly during his life, and this trend continues into modern times. According to Donald Watts, the compiler of his critical reviews, “He was hailed as an emancipator of the modern mind and condemned as an irresponsible free-thinker; celebrated as a leading intelligence of his age and denounced as an erudite show-off;

9 Kripal, Esalen, 86
admired as the wittiest man of his generation and dismissed as a clever misanthrope.” Despite being known mostly for his novels, over the course of his career a writer, Huxley published roughly twice as many collections of essays as works of fiction. Accordingly, he often described himself as a ‘man of letters’, and occasionally, as a ‘theorist of human nature.’ He became known to the literary world in 1921 after releasing his first novel, *Crome Yellow*, but by the mid-1920s he began publishing critiques on contemporary trends in psychology. From these assessments he developed a unique and deeply integrative view of human psychology which, at the time, seemed radical to most accredited theorists. Nevertheless, his position as an outside observer had a distinct double-edged effect: on one hand, it afforded him intellectual latitude, allowing him to follow his intuitions and peculiar influences without risking his professional reputation. On the other hand, it placed him at the ‘kid’s table’, far removed from the banquet halls of officially recognized discourse.

For decades his views swirled like an undercurrent submerged beneath an ocean of Behaviorist and Freudian-based psychologies, however, in the 1950s, a new wave of psychology appeared on the horizon. As the swell approached in the early-1960s, and crested towards the end of that decade, the force of its undertow absorbed many of the ideas Huxley had assembled over the previous three dozen years. Dubbed by its founders the “Third Force” (insinuating that Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism had been the first two forces), and later “Humanistic Psychology,” the proponents of this new approach advocated a holistic understanding of mind

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and body that emphasizes the furthest reaches of human potential.\textsuperscript{12} At this point William James might have declared that Huxley’s ideas had gone viral.

Granted the idea of human potentialities was fundamental to this new movement, but what is the history of this expression? Was it Huxley who introduced the idea? If so, how and when did he conceive it? Most importantly, what exactly are human potentialities? Jeffrey Kripal, author of the enormous tome on Esalen, admits that Huxley’s lecture provided the intellectual spark that inspired the institute, but claims, “Huxley did not invent the expression ‘human potentialities’”—that honor he bestowed to the Menninger Foundation psychologist, Gardner Murphy.\textsuperscript{13} While it is true that Murphy’s first use of the phrase can be traced back to 1953, Huxley began employing the expression in his writings on human psychology in 1926.\textsuperscript{14} In the ensuing decades he used the phrase repeatedly, coloring it each time with increasing significance.

A convergence of four major intellectual influences, Romanticism, psychology, humanism, and mysticism, helped Huxley establish the basis for his idea of “human potentialities.” His romantic leanings, demonstrated by his fondness for the writings of Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and others, can be traced to the 1910’s.\textsuperscript{15} The Romanticist’s yearning to encounter the elusive elements of inner-experience, which they saw as a creative impetus, was a


\textsuperscript{13} Kripal, Esalen, 480.


common theme in their literature. Historian Ross Woodman explains, “The experience of letting oneself drop into the seething life below the threshold of consciousness is enacted over and over again in the work of the major Romantics.”\textsuperscript{16} This impulse has been interpreted by historians as a backlash against the cold, scientific materialism that prevailed in the 19th century. “The great renunciation of mechanism in post-enlightenment European culture,” writes Louis Menand, “is the essence of the Romantic reaction.”\textsuperscript{17} The conviction and reverence these Romantic artists expressed about unconscious realms of inspiration captivated Huxley at an early age and sparked the idea that latent sources of human potential might actually exist. Maintaining this belief, later in life he became determined to understand the psychological mechanisms of human potentiality.

The ideas of William James were highly influential to Huxley’s views and many historians have drawn connections between the two figures.\textsuperscript{18} Huxley clearly used a pragmatic approach to knowledge in general, and in forming his views on psychology in particular. James’s concept of ‘Radical Empiricism’ led him to explore ideas and methodologies that his contemporaries deemed outside the realm of science, and Huxley followed suit in his personal investigations of spiritual practices and psychedelic drugs. James’s philosophy of ‘Pluralism’ led Aldous to adopt Sir Thomas Browne’s musing that “man is the great and true amphibium,” as the trope is found repeatedly throughout Huxley’s writings to “convey the multiplicity of human

\textsuperscript{17} Menand, \textit{Metaphysical Club}, 247.
\textsuperscript{18} The list of authors who have made comparisons between Huxley and James includes: Huston Smith, Dana Sawyer, R.S. Deese, Holly Nelson-Becker, Allene Symons, Douglas Kellogg Wood, Larry Culliford, Michael Pollan, Marilyn Ferguson, Hal Bridges, Michael Horowitz, and more.
experience and potential.” But James’s ideas about unusual states of consciousness, and especially his four-point definition of the ‘mystical experience’ from The Varieties of Religious Experience, were arguably most poignant to Huxley’s ultimate views on human psychology.

In the 1920s the dynamics of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical technique fueled Huxley’s belief that a methodic connection to an unconscious realm was possible. Freud explains that, in its most utilitarian form, Psychoanalysis is a technique that permits temporary access into the subject’s unconscious. Although he briefly mentioned an obscure kind of emotional intelligence operating from within the unconscious, Freud’s clinical practice aimed to cure neuroses which, to him, meant focusing on the darker elements of the subject’s unconscious: base desires, primordial instincts, and traumatic memories. Freud reasoned that if an analyst successfully located and exposed the root of the subject’s emotional traumas during Psychoanalysis, then the repressive tensions (which he believed caused the neurotic symptoms) could be mitigated when made aware to the subject. Huxley, on the other hand, influenced by his Romantic leanings, thought it was equally important to apprehend the constructive elements latent within the unconscious. He hypothesized that within the depths of the human mind there exists both neuroses (e.g. depression, anxiety, delusion, etc.) and their positive counterparts (e.g. inspiration, serenity, insight, etc.). He named these latent unconscious equivalents human potentialities.

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21 Ibid., “The Ego and the Id,” 637.
23 Huxley, The Human Situation, 154-158.
The existence of latent human potentialities, and the possibility of uncovering them, formed the central premise of Huxley’s humanism. He believed that a psychological movement, which made subjects aware of their potentialities instead of their neuroses, would facilitate a more meaningful human experience for individuals on both the personal and collective levels. Some individuals, he reasoned, would discover a potential for helping others; others might develop extraordinary abilities that would inspire those around them. But most importantly, he thought, once individuals began to realize their latent potentials, it would manifest in feelings of identity, value, and belonging within their communities. In other words, a psychological movement based on potential, instead of neuroses, would not only be infectious, it would also divert the flow of collective emotional energy from angst and inhibition, and channel it towards self-esteem and creative expression.

In the late-1920s Huxley’s interest in mysticism led him to speculate about the dynamics of spiritual practices. Spiritual devotees claimed that their methods helped them experience a divine reality, but Huxley, thinking in psychological terms, hypothesized that their techniques actually conditioned inroads to the positive realms of the unconscious. He reasoned that if a technique like psychoanalysis worked to access the unconscious, then quite possibly these spiritual techniques worked in a similar fashion. It was this conviction, along with the work of a psychologist named Geraldine Coster, that inspired his investigations of psychophysical techniques in the 1930s. Similarly, his aspirations to explore the realms of the unconscious emboldened him to volunteer as a test subject in the nascent stages of clinical drug research in

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the 1950s.

The concept of latent human potential formed the central premise for Huxley’s views on psychology and, upon this foundation, the other core principles fell into place: First and foremost, his idea of latent human potential is predicated on the notion that the unconscious contains both destructive and constructive dimensions. Second, his idea that psychophysical methods could be used to connect to the unconscious warrants a holistic approach to the human organism. The premise that the whole organism serves as a single ground for consciousness and perception is what Huxley called the psychological mind-body. In the words of Isaiah Berlin, “[Huxley] was the herald of what will surely be one of the great advances in this and following centuries—the creation of a new psychophysical science, of discoveries in the realm of what at present, for want of a better term, we call the relations between body and mind.”

Lastly, Huxley’s vision for a humanistic approach to psychology was not limited to helping only the emotionally disturbed, but intended for anyone who desired to actualize their latent potential. His unflinching confidence in the innate goodness of the individual, and his desire to help others discover the psychodynamics of this connection, was the reason Julian Huxley thought Aldous would “go down in history as the greatest humanist of our perplexed era.”

However, in this thesis I do not argue that Aldous Huxley should be considered the greatest humanist of the twentieth century; nor do I contend that he should be recognized as the founder of humanistic psychology. In this thesis I argue that Huxley’s role as a interdisciplinarian—a communicator of ideas between fields—only helped outline and popularize

27 Ibid., 25.
a more humanistic approach to psychology, but also demonstrates the power and utility of ideas once they become disentangled from dogmatic systems, transmitted across disciplinary boundaries, and applied to the problems of humanity. William James often argued that ideas should never be permanently bound together and imposed ‘wholesale’ as ideologies, for once they become indivisible from the ideologies of which they are attached, they lose their most pragmatic quality: adaptability in an ever-changing world. Since new paradigms arise from combining existing ideas with new evidence, insights, and experiences, Huxley’s ability to assimilate ideas, view them through a humanistic lens, combine them with personal insights, translate them into a common language, and exchange them across fields, was undeniably of historical significance. In this way he bridged information gaps, unveiled new relationships, challenged dogmas, and posed novel questions—a process that pushed the boundaries of discourse and enriched the intellectual landscapes through which he wandered.

Like a mechanic scavenging for parts, Huxley deconstructed systems like Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis, and reassessed the earlier notions of psychologists like James, Bergson, and Vittoz, looking to extract and utilize serviceable ideas. Many of his thoughts derived from lesser known psychologists like James Leuba and Geraldine Coster; others he borrowed from historical figures in philosophy, literature, mysticism, and science. He integrated these insights with knowledge acquired through personal experiences, friendships, and systematic self-experiments.

This intake of knowledge led to a constant dissemination and exchange of ideas. An avid correspondent, Huxley regularly exchanged letters with some of the most gifted minds of his generation including scientists like Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, C.P. Snow, and Albert Hofmann;

writers like H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Thomas Mann, and T.S. Eliot; religious thinkers including Thomas Merton, Alan Watts, and Swami Prabhavananda; and psychologists such as Carl Jung, Barry Stevens, and J.B. Rhine. Beyond these notables, he was also in communication with professional sociologists, philosophers, anthropologists, psychiatrists, conservationists, musicians, educational reformers, philanthropists, physicians, and even foreign dignitaries. On a more personal level, his eclectic inner circle consisted of characters as diverse as composer Igor Stravinsky, polymath Gerald Heard, psychiatrist Humphry Osmond, spiritual philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti, novelist D.H. Lawrence, astronomer Edwin Hubble, and perhaps most influential, his brother, the renowned biologist Julian Huxley. It should also be noted that Huxley’s network of friends and much of his intellectual labor was made possible by his wife Maria Nys Huxley who—due to her husband’s damaged eyesight and inability to maintain a schedule—read, typed, drove, and also managed his professional and social affairs.

Beyond viewing Huxley as an inter-disciplinarian that helped forge a new, humanistic course for psychology, this thesis also points to several other key developments in psychology aided by disciplinary interactions. Similar to other subjects, psychology was born out of philosophy and married into science, but its path forward has proven to be anything but a straight line. William James borrowed from both Darwin and Emerson; Freud combined neurology with aspects of Greek and Romantic literature; Jung invoked religious and cultural symbolism, but also collaborated with the physicist Wolfgang Pauli; and the Gestaltists borrowed elements from both Aristotle and field theory. Behaviorists worked the experimental angles, while psychiatry was transformed twice in the twentieth century: once by Psychoanalysis, then again by

pharmacology. Huxley, though he acted from the peripheries, was an integral force in this mixing process. Although he acknowledged the importance of specialization for digging deeper into the mines of knowledge, he also realized that academic specialization, untempered by disciplinary integration, often produced knowledge for its own sake, or what he called, “a celibacy of the intellect.” To continue with the mining analogy, he believed that specialization produced the deepest tunnels in the pursuit of truth, but occasionally, integration uncovers entirely new veins of knowledge. For this reason, in his final years, Huxley explained, “To discover methods of bringing these separate worlds together, to show the relationship between them, is, I feel, the most important task of modern education.”

Works concerning the life of Aldous Huxley constitute a formidable historiography. Sybille Bedford, a family friend of the Huxleys, contributed the largest and most comprehensive biographical account titled, *Aldous Huxley*. This narrative covers aspects of his fiction, essays, letters, philosophical and psychological positions, travel, dealings in the film industry, and ventures in mysticism and psychiatry. Bedford’s narrative is without a doubt the most essential of all the Huxley biographies, especially since it combines meticulous research and personal experience with the subject. However, any one attempt to cover so much ground is bound to generalize some important aspects—Huxley’s relationship to psychology being one.

As the author of *Brave New World*, *Point Counter Point*, and *Crome Yellow*, Huxley is most commonly remembered for his satire and contributions to the genre of ‘philosophical

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31 Ibid., 7.
fiction’. Occasionally he is also recognized for his historical narratives, screenplays, and every now and then, for his poetry. Scholars have long considered his life in these capacities. Nicholas Murray’s, *Aldous Huxley: A Biography*, Peter Firchow’s, *Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist*, and James Hull’s *Aldous Huxley, Representative Man* are all narratives that focus primarily on Huxley’s fiction and analyze the philosophical deliberations of his characters.

One original work is Milton Birnbaum’s *Aldous Huxley’s Quest for Values*, which examines Huxley’s moral and ethical philosophical positions and influences from his essays, letters, and works of fiction. Although Birnbaum’s book focuses on Huxley’s philosophy, it leaves out much of his mystical philosophy and other esoteric influences.

Huxley’s mystical strand has been a fascinating subject of interest for other contributors due to the profundity of his more metaphysical works like *Ends and Means, The Perennial Philosophy*, and *Doors of Perception*. Contributions to this field include Sissela Ann Bok’s article “Meeting the Mystics,” David Robb’s “Brahmins from Abroad,” Hal Bridges’ “Aldous Huxley: Exponent of Mysticism in America,” and Dana Sawyer’s *Aldous Huxley, A Biography*.

June Deery’s recent work, *Aldous Huxley and The Mysticism of Science*, is an exceptionally novel addition. Her efforts to combine Huxley’s moral and ethical positions on technology with his views on mysticism is certainly an original take. Likewise, historian R.S. Deese’s 2015 contribution, *We Are Amphibians*, compares and assesses the work and philosophies of both Aldous and Julian Huxley—specifically, how their thoughts on spirituality, humanism, ecology, and science have become increasingly relevant to the current and future states of humanity.

David King Dunaway’s *Huxley in Hollywood* is another novel contribution and
illuminates Huxley’s life in the late-1930s after he moved to Los Angeles and took up part-time work in the film industry. This account does a fine job of analyzing his fiction and mystical philosophy of this period while also detailing the makings of his filmography. It also includes several amusing anecdotes concerning his friendships with legendary film-stars like Charlie Chaplin, Greta Garbo, and Paulette Goddard, and other industry writers like Anita Loos and Christopher Isherwood.

Huxley’s interest in psychedelic drugs, a topic inseparable from both his mystical leanings and his relationship with psychiatry, is another subgenera that has generated some compelling accounts, including Steven Novak’s “LSD Before Leary,” and Don Lattin’s Distilled Spirits. Jake Poller’s article “Beyond the Subliminal Mind,” is another inventive take which details Huxley’s interest in paranormal psychology and affairs with the Society for Psychical Research, a role played briefly over the last eight years of his life.

Allene Symons’s, Aldous Huxley’s Hands, is truly an innovative addition. In this 2016 piece Symons uses her investigative skills as a journalist to track-down and uncover a cache of lost documents which, before her book, had never been used in any published account of Huxley’s life. These new records counter some critical assumptions held by all previous biographers, including Bedford. Symons’s story is also a heartfelt remembrance of her father’s unusual scientific research and why it fascinated Huxley, while also incorporating old and new clinical research on psychedelic drugs.

Indeed, there is no shortage of material on Huxley’s life, except surprisingly, in one important category: his relationship with the history of psychology—a subject that defined so many of his deepest convictions about human nature. Despite a substantial body of evidence
pointing to his original ideas and refined positions on psychology, Huxley biographers have left this field virtually untouched. One of the goals of this thesis is to fill that historical gap.

Unlike most narratives, this thesis will primarily concentrate on Huxley’s essays, letters, and lectures instead of his works of fiction. Using this methodology I will separate the ideas on human psychology Huxley supported from the ones he rallied against without having to speculate about the context of his fiction. Key primary sources include: Grover Smith’s voluminous *Letters of Aldous Huxley*; Robert S. Baker and James Sexton’s six-volume collection of Huxley’s essays titled, *Aldous Huxley’s Complete Essays*; philosophical works like *Proper Studies* (1927), *Ends and Means* (1937), *The Art of Seeing* (1942), and *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945); and the transcripts of his popular lectures contained in his post-humous, *The Human Situation*. Other primary sources include interviews, prefaces and forwards Huxley contributed to other writer’s non-fiction, and transcriptions from his speeches at psychiatric symposiums. To add outside perspective, historical context, and character accounts, I have incorporated reviews of Huxley’s ideas from several literary and scientific journals, letters, personal accounts, various memoirs, a collection of oral histories, and critiques about Huxley’s historical significance from more recent sources. To account for historical ideological context, I have referenced several psychological and psychiatric articles, history of psychology textbooks, and several books of psychological theory from the first half of the twentieth century. By comparing and contrasting the ideas and positions from these sources I will gauge the extent to which Huxley influenced and/or framed emerging psychological trends of the 1950s and 1960s.

Huxley’s life odyssey led him through several distinct phases. Most biographers have divided these periods into four parts: the tragedies and trials of his youth (1894-1920), his
ascending career as a skeptic and satirist (1921-1933), his involvement in pacifism and mysticism (1934-1952), and his final stage as a voluntary test subject, psychiatric commentator, and lecturer (1953-1963). The timeframes of these phases also correspond to Huxley’s evolving perspectives on psychology and establish the body sections of this thesis which I have labeled: Impressions, Theories, Methods, and Manifestations.

Impressions explores Huxley’s family background and demonstrates how the tragedies, lessons, and redemptions of his adolescence established a foundation for his philosophy on human nature. It also provides historical context for the emerging and diverging psychological fields of this early period. Theories deals with Huxley’s initial critiques of the prevailing psychological theories of the 1920s to early-1930s. It also demonstrates how their shortcomings led him to adopt the ideas of less popular theorists and develop his own unique perspectives. Lastly, this chapter chronicles how his progressive psychological theories deviated from more accepted positions while also building upon their foundations. Methods demonstrates how Huxley began testing his theories via self-experimentation with a series of mind-body techniques like meditation, the Alexander Technique, and the Bates Method. In so doing, he distinguishes his own holistic therapeutic approach from those of conventional psychologists whose methods hinged on analysis or other kinds of talk therapy. Manifestations shows how pharmacological innovations in psychiatry during the early 1950s led to Huxley’s medically supervised experiments with psychedelic drugs, which, in turn, advanced his understanding of consciousness, influenced the course of psychiatric research, and initiated his active participation in psychiatry. It also shows how invitations to deliver speeches at psychiatric symposiums launched his career as a professional lecturer, which he used as an opportunity to consolidate his
progressive views on psychology and disseminate them amongst the top colleges and institutions
around the United States. Finally, this chapter details how Humanistic psychology, Transpersonal psychology, and other emerging cultural movements found inspiration in Huxley’s ideas.
Chapter I - Impressions

Aldous was certainly not the first Huxley to possess a relentless curiosity and desire to challenge the status quo. Most prominent was his grandfather, the esteemed biologist T.H. Huxley, who was among the first advocates of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. T.H. was also known for his fierce opposition of religious fundamentalism and for coining the word “agnostic.”

Aldous’s father, Leonard Huxley, was a schoolmaster, editor, and biographer whose wife, Julia Arnold, niece of the poet and social critic Matthew Arnold, founded the still existing ‘Prior’s Field School for Girls.’ Following in the scientific tradition of T.H. was Aldous’s brother, Sir Julian Huxley, who became one of the most influential biologists of the twentieth century. Julian’s long list of accomplishments includes advancing the “modern synthesis” in evolutionary biology, and founding associations such as UNESCO, the World Wildlife Fund, and the British Humanist Association. Aldous’s younger half-brother, Sir Andrew Huxley, was a physiologist whose discovery of the electrical signaling properties of neurons earned him a Nobel prize in 1963.

Given this family constellation, it might be easy to assume that Aldous’s background set him on a clear path for success. While these favorable conditions certainly helped, a devastating


34 Margaret Elliot, Prior’s Field School: A Century Remembered, 1902-2002, (Published by Prior’s Field School Trust, Ltd., 2002), ii.


series of early tragedies also played a large role in forging his character. In total, a combination of family influences, tragic misfortunes, education, and adolescent social relations played essential roles establishing the foundations for Huxley’s integrative views on human psychology.

At the age of fourteen, Aldous left home to board at the prestigious Eton School where he endured some initial homesickness, but otherwise got along fine. He looked forward to St. Andrew’s day when he expected the first visit from his family—the holiday came and went, but his family never arrived. Soon after, he was informed that his mother had died of cancer that Sunday. To Aldous the news felt crude and surreal. Considered too young to be made aware of his mother’s diagnosis, her sudden death caught him completely off-guard. As the family gathered for the funeral on a grassy hillside, Aldous’s father tearfully recited a poem he wrote to honor his wife’s memory. Ghostly pale and still in shock, Aldous stood there shaking.  

Two years later, back at Eton, Huxley woke up one morning and noticed that something felt wrong with his eyes. Appearing red and swollen, the matron of the dormitory falsely diagnosed his condition as ‘pink-eye’. The symptoms continued to worsen and two weeks later Huxley had gone completely blind. Finally, the proctor took him to a physician who diagnosed the condition as ‘keratitis punctata,’ an ophthalmological disease that caused rapid corneal inflammation and, in extreme cases, irreparable ocular damage. In Aldous’s case, the physical trauma blinded him almost entirely for the next eighteen months. Forced to drop out of Eton, he found himself now wandering in a world of darkness, separated from his studies, activities, classmates, and most regrettably, his precious books.

37 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 24-25.
38 Ibid., 32-33.
During this period, a lectureship at Oxford occupied most of Julian’s time, but their middle brother Trevenen played an attentive role in bolstering Aldous’s spirits. Trevenen encouraged his little brother to keep his mind busy by developing special abilities such as reading braille, touch typing, and playing the piano. Wasting no time in learning and applying these new skills, Aldous managed to touch-type his first manuscript—an 80,000 word drama about a bitter young man who had fallen in love with two different types of women.³⁹ One family member commented that the slow and tedious process of reading braille influenced Huxley’s prose by making him keenly aware of word economy and sentence clarity.⁴⁰

Recollecting this difficult period Julian remarked:

I shall never forget the way in which [Aldous] dealt with the eye trouble which overtook him at Eton at sixteen, and rendered him virtually blind for over a year. He never complained. Not only that, but he set himself to learn to play the piano and to read Braille. He even extolled the advantage of Braille as enabling him to retreat under the bedclothes to read on cold winter nights.⁴¹

Though tragic at the time, Huxley’s temporary blindness yielded a key insight: it was possible to cultivate and actualize latent human potential by sharpening the senses and embracing the possibilities of imagination. Later in life he reflected on this lesson, explaining, “I am to a considerable extent a function of defective eyesight. Keratitis punctata shaped and shapes me; and I, in my turn made, and make, use of it.”⁴²

Although he recovered substantially, the physical damage to Huxley’s vision was medically irreversible and left him with the inability to see anything more than light from his

³⁹ Ibid., 34-35.
⁴¹ Julian Huxley, ed., Memorial Volume, 22.
⁴² Huxley, Letters, 373.
right eye. The injury also caused a permanent strabismus (an uncontrollable ocular misalignment commonly known as a ‘wandering eye’) and left his right eye semi-translucent and ‘milky’ in appearance.\textsuperscript{43} In an era when using a microscope was essential for medical school students, Huxley’s visual impairment disqualified him from becoming a scientist like Julian or his famous grandfather. In the first three years of recovery his left eye faired somewhat better—it healed just enough to enable him to read, but not without the help of a magnifying glass and regular doses of atropine eyedrops.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1912, at the age of seventeen, just as Aldous started to recover partial vision, his father remarried and became increasingly distant as he resettled with his new family.\textsuperscript{45} However, the final tragedy of Aldous’s youth occurred in 1914 when Trevenen, the only sibling who comforted him in his period of darkness, was unable to cope with his own. After falling into a depression over academic pressures and an ill-fated love affair, the family committed Trevenen to a local psychiatric hospital. A couple weeks later the center relayed a positive report, however on August 15th, against the explicit direction of the chief orderly, Trevenen had convinced one of the staff to let him out for a walk. He never returned. The family instructed the police to begin a search—it was initially presumed that Trevenen ran-off to enlist in the war. An entire week passed before Trevenen’s body was discovered hanging from a tree in a nearby forest.\textsuperscript{46}

It may seem trivial to recount these early tragedies, but each of them played a pivotal role in the development of Huxley’s psychological perspective. His mother’s unexpected death

\textsuperscript{43} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 373.
\textsuperscript{44} Aldous Huxley, \textit{The Art of Seeing}, (London: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 1.
\textsuperscript{45} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 37.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 47.
contributed to his notion of impermanence—a lesson regarding the pitfalls of attachment and the ephemeral nature of existence. The eighteen month period between the onset of keratitis and his partial recovery instilled two valuable lessons: he learned the functional necessity of a positive mindset; and secondly, he discovered that by practicing mind-body techniques (i.e. braille, touch-typing, piano, etc.) he could preserve meaning and even add value to his life, inspiriting a sense of wellness. The sad and untimely death of his brother crystalized his sense of impermanence, but also revealed the reality of mental illness and the inadequacies of the mental health system. All three of these hardships left indelible marks on Huxley’s developing mind—impressions that influenced his psychological views for the remainder of his life. Concurrently, it was during Huxley’s formative years that psychology as a fledgling new discipline underwent its own series of turbulent, conceptual formations.

Anyone with a basic understanding of the history of philosophy should know that a discourse on the nature of the human mind dates back several thousand years. Historian Henri Ellenberger adds that “Certain medical or philosophical teachings of the past, as well as certain older healing methods, offer a surprisingly high degree of insight into what are usually considered the most recent discoveries in the realm of the human mind.”\(^47\) That being said, the actual date that psychology branched out from philosophy is a matter of historical debate. Some scholars believe an acceptable point of divergence occurred in 1868 when an American named Noah Porter published *The Human Intellect: With an Introduction Upon Psychology and the Soul.*\(^48\) In this work Porter defined psychology as “the science of the human soul” and attempted


to take objective viewpoints on subjects including consciousness, cognition, sense perception, memory, logic, and the association of ideas. However, most scholars attribute the actual beginnings of psychology to the efforts of Wilhelm Wundt in the mid-to-late 1870s. Regardless of whose work marked the true genesis of psychology as an individual discipline, it is clear that a distinct emergence occurred sometime in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century. Typical to emerging disciplines, the early history of psychology included rapid, amorphous, and at times, circuitous growth which involved dozens of competing theories on the nature of mind and behavior.

At the time of Huxley’s birth a few psychological approaches dominated the field. In Europe, a German physiologist named Wilhelm Wundt and his British protege, Edward Titchener, had established Voluntarism and Structuralism, respectively. Meanwhile, in the United States, a competing approach, built upon the ideas of William James, became known as Functional psychology. Meanwhile, back in Europe, Sigmund Freud and a trio of German-educated theorists were busy advancing their own unique theories and methods which eventually led to Psychoanalytical and Gestalt psychologies.

Structuralism maintains that, at any given moment, the sum total of an individual’s prior experience determines his or her conscious state, or, in other words, one’s perspective is governed by memory. Influenced by his doctoral advisor Wilhelm Wundt, who argued that consciousness is a synthesis of sensory perception and accrued knowledge, Titchener’s goal was to catalogue each individual element of conscious experience through a process called

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50 Hergenhahn and Henley, *History of Psychology*, 258.
‘introspection’, also known as ‘Voluntarism.’ Using this method, Titchener believed he could predict human behavior by systematizing the ways knowledge combined with sensory input. Claiming that unobservable aspects of consciousness had no place in science, Titchener rejected assumptions of an unconscious mind and focused solely on observable conscious events. This concept was the most fundamental difference between Titchener and William James, who maintained that “there is no such thing as a science of psychology.”

The major flaw of Structuralism was its dependence on introspection as a tool for identifying and examining mental occurrences. As one might expect, the results of introspection varied subject by subject, depending on individual past experience and exactly what each subject was seeking. Additionally, by definition, introspection could not be employed in the examination of sensory events since individuals can only reflect on thoughts as past events. In other words, the method should have been called ‘retrospection’ since it actually examines the memory of a perception, not raw experience. Perhaps the most damaging criticism of Structuralism was its lack of a practical application. Titchener argued that his methods enabled the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, that its application for humanity was not his concern. Nevertheless, partially because of the criticisms mentioned here, but also because of new, more promising approaches, the influence of Structuralism peaked and faded away within the first twenty years of its inception.

William James, who some historians name as the “founder of American psychology,” was

51 Ibid., 250-251.
54 Hergenhahn and Henley, History of Psychology, 263.
probably the single most influential scholar for Huxley’s own views on psychology. Moreover, an adaptation and revitalization of James’s views, by Huxley and others, can be detected in the humanistic psychologies that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{55} Labeled as both a psychologist and philosopher by his contemporaries, James’s ideas, such as Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Radical Empiricism, combined with his evolutionary and transcendental influences, were foundational to the branch of psychology known as Functionalism.

Most essential to James’s philosophy was the concept of Pragmatism. More of an approach to knowledge than a theory that defines it, Pragmatism assesses ideas and mental constructs based on their practical applications. Pragmatism works sort of like a threshing machine, but instead of separating grains from husks, it processes systems of thought and separates the functional components from the ones that fail to contribute to the intended effect of the system. James believed that once ideas shed their irrelevant elements (like superstition, ritual, and historical precedence), they become serviceable, allowing them to interface with other ideas and, in turn, help to spur new intellectual evolutions. In \textit{Pragmatism} he explains, “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.”\textsuperscript{56} The production of new truths, he continues, “are resultants of new experiences and of old truths combined and mutually modifying one another.”\textsuperscript{57} Put simply, truth is not static; it is an ongoing, evolutionary process that depends on combining of new evidence with


\textsuperscript{56} William James, \textit{Pragmatism} (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), 168.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 168-169.
established principles.

Pragmatism, however, was not without its share of critics. Arguably the fiercest of whom was one of Huxley’s mentors, Bertrand Russell. Russell declared that without any knowable certainty of truth, morality would always be subject to brute physical force. “In the absence of any standard of truth other than success,” he argues, “Ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of truth.” Russell concedes that James did not seem to extol the idea of force, as did Nietzsche, but nevertheless, “the pragmatic theory of truth,” he writes “is inherently connected to the appeal of force.”

Along with his concept of Pragmatism, two nineteenth century icons heavily influenced James’s ideas on psychology: Ralph Waldo Emerson and Charles Darwin. Frederic I. Carpenter makes the case that James borrowed Emerson's ideas, systematized them, and applied them in a format that adhered to the standards and language of academic psychology. “Emerson,” he writes, “was content to put forward an idea in general, literary terms. James often took the same idea, defined it more exactly, verified it by scientific methods…and gave it new currency.” The fact that Emerson was a close family friend of the Jameses (and William’s godfather) surely played a role in his influence. Historian Louis Menand adds that Emersonian Transcendentalism, which celebrates the unique spirit of the individual, is thoroughly reflected in James’s distaste for intellectual convention. “Pragmatism,” he writes, “belongs to a disestablishmentarian impulse in


American culture—an impulse that drew strength from the writings of Emerson who attacked institutions and conformity.”60 This anti-conformist impulse also informed James’s idea that “no single point of view or attitude commands everything at once in a synthetic scheme”—a philosophical position he defined as Pluralism.61 By asserting that reality consists of a multitude of independent, self-driving forces, James separated himself from most thinkers of his era who strove to envelop all perspectives under one unifying system. The assumption that one’s subjective experience qualifies as an exclusive truth is what James called “the psychologist’s fallacy.”62

One prominent theory that many thinkers in the late-nineteenth century had come to accept as a unifying system was Darwinism. Although James’s views on psychology were undoubtedly influenced by Darwin’s ideas, he refused to consider Darwinism as an absolute truth. Like Pragmatism, James believed Darwin’s ideas were most effective as tools for generating data, not fundamental truths that explained the nature of reality. Menand explains that although James “was Darwinian, be he was not a Darwinist. This made him truer to Darwin than most nineteenth century evolutionists.”63 James’s refusal to accept Darwinism as a natural law has led some scholars to qualify his contributions to psychology as “decidedly post-Darwinian.”64

James began to formally compile his ideas on psychology in 1878 after Harvard awarded him a grant to write a comprehensive textbook on the subject. No sooner than twelve years later,

60 Menand, Metaphysical Club, 89.
61 Ibid., 378.
62 James, Principles, 196.
63 Menand, Metaphysical Club, 141.
he finally completed *The Principles of Psychology*—a two-volume tome containing twenty-eight chapters and over 1,400 pages. Though James was highly critical of his own efforts, almost a century after its publication the British philosopher, A.J. Ayer, still referred to *Principles* as “probably the best general review of the subject that has yet been written.”

Perhaps the most salient contribution from *Principles* is James’s conception of human consciousness. In the abridged edition James argues that consciousness is defined by four distinct qualities:

1. Every ‘state’ tends to be part of a personal consciousness.
2. Within each personal consciousness states are always changing.
3. Each personal consciousness is sensibly continuous.
4. [Consciousness] is interested in some parts of its object to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the while.

Fascinated by the wide range of potential conscious states, James continued to investigate their qualities well into the twentieth century. Using an evolutionary lens, he hypothesized that each form of consciousness serves some pragmatic, or adaptive function. In a determined effort to understand these mental frameworks, he investigated mind-altering drugs, mysticism, and the methods of hypnotists, mind-cure practitioners, spiritualists, magnetic healers, Christian Scientists, and osteopaths. “[A]ll these new facts that are gradually coming to light about our organization,” he explained, “are bringing me to turn for light in the direction of all sorts of despised spiritualistic and unscientific ideas.”

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70 James, *Letters of William James*, 310.
experiential knowledge, James argued pragmatically that if an idea, technique, or phenomena produced observable results, it should be considered valid no matter how unusual they might appear. This open-minded experimental approach for discovering relationships between subjective experience and physical reality formed the basis for what James dubbed *Radical Empiricism*.

Through this approach James learned about one variety of consciousness that intrigued him more than the others because descriptions of its experience seemed to undermine his pluralist perspective. “*Mystical experiences,*” he declared at the 1902 Gifford Lectures, “[are] reconciling, unifying states.” He explains that these states point to two philosophical tendencies: “One of these directions is optimism, and the other is monism.” In researching the mystical experience James noted that they all have four unique characteristics: first, they are *ineffable*; “no adequate report of its contents can be given in words.” In other words, they must be experienced directly, implying states of feeling or emotion rather than intellect. The second characteristic, *noetic quality,* appears to be a contradiction of the first, but as James explains:

> They are states of insight into the depths of truth un plumbed by the discursive intellect. Illuminations full of significance and importance; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time.

The third quality is *transiency*—the state is ephemeral and cannot be sustained. He called the last characteristic *passivity,* indicating that once the state sets in, a sensation of being “grasped and held by a superior power” ensues, creating an effect that modifies the subject and “may

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71 James, *Varieties,* 416.

72 Ibid., 380.

73 Ibid.
render the soul more energetic in the lines in which their inspiration favors.”\textsuperscript{74} This description, perhaps more than any of the others, sounds remarkably similar to the Romanticist’s idea of 
\textit{unconscious cerebration}, the idea that a higher level of cognition occurs somewhere beneath the conscious level.\textsuperscript{75} Employing one Eastern scholar’s description, James explains that in the midst of the experience there is “no feeling of \textit{I}—the truth shines in and we come to know ourselves, the potential of what we truly are.”\textsuperscript{76} The idea that a psychological experience has the power to tune one’s mind towards inspiration and result in a deeper knowledge of self was at the heart of Huxley’s idea of human potential, and in \textit{Varieties} James qualified the experience beyond the Romanticist’s poetic affirmations.

Though James admitted to having never experienced a “well pronounced and emphatic” mystical experience, he claims to have had glimpses while experimenting with nitrous oxide. “Looking back on my own experiences,” he explains,

\begin{quote}
they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity…I feel as if it must mean something, something like what the Hegelian [monistic] philosophy means.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

His own, though admittedly modest, monastic insights, and the accounts of others’ more fully formed mystical experiences, puzzled James, especially as they relate to Pluralism. Traversing the barriers between the individual and the absolute was what he called “the great mystic achievement.”\textsuperscript{78} Stranger still, James notes that mystics of all religions—monistic, dualistic, and

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\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 381, 415. \\
\textsuperscript{76} James, \textit{Varieties}, 415. \\
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 388. \\
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 419.
\end{flushright}
pantheistic—all reported the same monistic experiences, and therefore, “It would be odd,” he admits, “if such a unanimous type of experience should prove to altogether wrong.”

Can a pluralistic reality also, in some way, include a genuine universal experience? James allowed it as a hypothesis, but it is evident that towards the end of his life he seems to have been more open to the possibility. In 1907 he writes, “The world is indubitably one if you look at it one way, but indubitably it is many, if you look at it in another. It is both one and many—let us adopt a sort of pluralistic monism.” Historian Charles Tolman observes that James, on one hand, was “so averse to any kind of monism that when he found himself forced to take a stand he always described it as simply ‘pluralist.’” However, he continues, James’s suggestion of a pluralistic monism “was in fact entirely consistent with his Pragmatism,” and concludes that it “is not only more characteristically ‘Jamesian,’ but provides a workable resolution to the long-standing debate over the one versus the many.” In 1909, just one year before his death, James appears to have arrived at a rather poetic understanding of the one versus many enigma:

We with our lives are like islands in the sea...There is a continuum of cosmic consciousness against which our individuality builds but accidental fences, and into which our several minds plunge as into a mother sea or reservoir. Our “normal” consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our external earthly environment, but the fence is weak at spots, and fitful influences from beyond leak in, showing the otherwise unverifiable common connection.

In this passage James suggests that our individuality, our ordinary human experience, is, in fact, pluralistic in the sense that such an outlook allows us to interact with our physical environment.

Ibid., 424.


But simultaneously, the “continuum of cosmic consciousness,” as he calls it, resembles a monist perspective. The “accidental fence” between the two modes exists, less as a static boundary which implies dualism, and more as a traversable construct that permits both a pluralistic individual existence and a universal spiritual connection.

James’s intuition of a “pluralistic monism” was an idea that Huxley espoused in his thoughts on human psychology. Repeatedly, throughout his writings, Huxley employs the phrase, “Human beings are multiple amphibians, living at once in half a dozen radically dissimilar universes.” Historian R.S. Deese explains that Huxley employs this phrase to express “the clearest way to convey the multiplicity of human experience and potential.” Indeed this implies a pluralistic view, however Huxley also agreed with the physicist Max Planck’s position that “the two worlds, the abstract and the immediate, are simply aspects of the same reality, that the basic reality is a neutral monism.” Huxley, in a direct reference to James’s final concession of the one verses many dichotomy writes, “there may be a kind of reservoir of this mental life into which we plunge; and above this, enveloping it and interpenetrating it, we may also have to postulate something with which William James spoke of as ‘cosmic consciousness.’” Indeed, James’s notion that unitive mental states “render the soul more energetic in the lines in which their inspiration favors,” aligns with the Romantic idea that creative forces spring from an unconscious reservoir. The confluence of this Jamesian-Romantic portrayal of inspiration and creativity establishes the conceptual basis for Huxley’s notion of ‘latent human potentialities’.

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84 Huxley, Human Situation, 10.
85 Ibid., 167.
Though James offered several plausible explanations about the nature of abnormal psychology, one of the critiques of his work was that it offered no clear dynamic system geared towards rehabilitating patients suffering from mental illnesses and irrational patterns of behavior. In other words, he failed to contribute a dynamic system explaining how and why unconscious activities influenced one’s behavior. Jamesian psychology, adds Menand, “explains everything about ideas except why a person would be willing to die for one.”

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, a Viennese physician-turned-psychologist named Sigmund Freud made these irrational forces beneath human behavior his primary concern, and over the next half-century his shocking theories about the mechanisms of the human mind polarized the world of psychology. Eugene Taylor notes that in 1894 James was the first to recognize Freud’s work in the American psychological literature and continued to hold his work in high esteem. So much so that, in 1909, after witnessing Freud and his Psychoanalytical Society deliver lectures at Clark University, James allegedly said: “The future of psychology belongs to your work.”

However, at the same time that James predicted the ascendancy of Freudian psychology, privately he feared Freud’s ideas might become dogmatized like Darwin’s had become in the previous century.

Freud’s passion for psychology began in the early-1880s while attending medical school in Vienna. There he met an older physician named Josef Breuer who had discovered a unique application for hypnosis that appeared to relieve his patient’s neurotic symptoms. Breuer found

88 Ibid., 469.
89 Menand, *Metaphysical Club*, 141.
that under hypnosis his subjects could access subconscious information about their neuroses they could not retrieve in an ordinary waking state. If, by subtle suggestion, he succeeded in leading the minds of his hypnotized patients to the original memory of their trauma, he found that they were often, if only temporarily, relieved of their symptoms.\textsuperscript{90} Fascinated by Breuer’s findings, Freud sought to learn more about the dynamics of hypnosis and, in 1885, traveled to Paris to work as a translator for Jean-Martin Charcot, a leading French neurologist and hypnosis researcher.\textsuperscript{91} Analogous to Breuer’s findings, Charcot believed that neurotic symptoms were not related to anatomical abnormalities, but stemmed from poorly processed memories of traumatic events. Although Freud told Charcot about Breuer’s technique, Charcot remained focused on using hypnosis as a tool to erase damaging memories—an approach that clashed with Breuer’s cathartic method of exposing them to his patients.\textsuperscript{92}

Equipped with knowledge from both Breuer and Charcot, Freud returned to Vienna in 1886 and decided to discontinue his role as a clinical researcher and launch a new career as a psychopathologist. In his early efforts he used both Breuer’s hypnotic technique and electrotherapy to treat his patients. The third option was to prescribe hydrotherapy treatments at a spa clinic, but he soon abandoned this alternative because outsourcing patients proved, in his words, “an inadequate source of income.”\textsuperscript{93} Soon thereafter, Freud began to doubt the efficacy of electrotherapy as a viable treatment, but he also came to realize that he was a poor hypnotist—

\textsuperscript{91} Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 435.
too often he failed to induce trance, and when he succeeded, the effects of his treatments lasted only a short while before his patients relapsed back into neurotic patterns of behavior.\(^\text{94}\) Hoping to improve his practice, Freud returned to Breuer for advice.

In the following years the two pieced together some of Charcot’s findings with the dynamics of Breuer’s technique and co-published their synthesis in a book titled, *Studies in Hysteria*. By drawing a demarcation between conscious and unconscious effects, they argued that neurotic tendencies were largely determined by a dynamic process occurring within the unconscious.\(^\text{95}\) They hypothesized that when a subject consistently applies mental energy repressing traumatic memories, the energy begins to “dam-up” in the unconscious and is eventually discharged somatically in the form of a neurosis—a process they dubbed *conversion*.\(^\text{96}\) On the other hand, if they applied Breuer’s technique, the subjects tended to release their welled-up energy in a cathartic reaction, which they termed *abreaction*.\(^\text{97}\)

Freud thought that Breuer’s cathartic method held a lot of value, especially as a tool to mitigate war-related neuroses, but his major criticism of their collaboration was that it neglected the subject of human sexuality. Freud indicates that Breuer shied away from sexual themes because he believed carnal impulses held no more significance than other emotional excitations.\(^\text{98}\) Consequently, after Breuer retired and Freud “became the sole administrator of his legacy,” he introduced his ideas about the primacy of human sexuality to neuroses. Having

\(^{94}\) Ibid., 10


\(^{97}\) Ibid., 14.

\(^{98}\) Ibid.
noticed that “abuses of the sexual function” were present in nearly all of his patients, Freud concluded that the blocked mental energies causing neuroses were intrinsically sexual. His reframing of the conversion process necessitated the terms libido, to define the quotas of psychic energy, and repression, to indicate the subject’s subconscious struggle to subdue libido. It is the repression of libido, he argues, that forms “the cornerstone of our understanding of neuroses.”

Much has been made of Freud’s tendency to view human psychology predominantly through the lens of human sexuality, including the fact that he admitted “making frequent use of cocaine”—a drug which he declared was not only a vital stimulant, but also a strong aphrodisiac—during the years in which he reframed his and Breuer’s findings from Studies in Hysteria.

In her book, Freud and Cocaine, medical historian Elizabeth M. Thornton argues that Freud’s regular use of, and probable addiction to, cocaine between 1883 and 1895 accounts for not only his overbearing fixation of sexual themes, but also for his erratic writing style, misuse of data, and manic-depressant behavior during this period. Ellenberger adds that Freud’s enthusiasm for cocaine was so bullish that his contemporaries accused him of unleashing a “third scourge” upon mankind (the other two being alcoholism and morphinism). Coincidentally during this time, Freud’s best friend was an ear, nose and throat specialist named Wilhelm Fliess who treated Freud’s “nose condition” and, in 1894, Freud also began to suffer painful symptoms from a

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 18.
103 Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, 442.
sudden heart condition.\textsuperscript{104}

Regardless of the aphrodisiacal factors which may have influenced Freud’s overtly sexual approach to human psychology, it is important to realize that the end of the nineteenth century also marked the end of the Victorian Era in Europe. It seems fitting that at the twilight of a period so colored by its inhibited, polite, prudish, and hypocritical cultural approbations, there would arise a sexy new set of ideas to dispel those outmoded cultural identities.\textsuperscript{105} It is also important to mention that the idea of \textit{struggle}, which emerged in the wake of Darwin, Nietzsche, and Marx, was a dominant paradigm in the late-nineteenth century.

Pursuant to these historical themes, Freud began to view both Breuer and Charcot’s hypnotic methods as too passive to exact permanent change in a patient’s psyche and, accordingly, began to consider a new dynamic approach that encouraged subjects to actively engage their inner struggles. “My patients,” he declared, “must in fact ‘know’ all the things which had only been made accessible to them in hypnosis.”\textsuperscript{106} As a result, in 1896 Freud began to devise his psychoanalytical technique, a method that aimed to consciously “uncover repressions and replace them with \textit{acts of judgement}.”\textsuperscript{107} Menand adds that, “[Freud’s] clinical experience taught him that, by the method of free association, patients could uncover what they had repressed and achieve some relief. And so psychoanalysis was born.”\textsuperscript{108}

The state of consciousness experienced by the subject during Psychoanalysis is an

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 445.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 18.
approximate middle ground between the hypnotic state and ordinary consciousness—it permits enough awareness for the subject to recollect analytic breakthroughs, while also allowing the passivity required for the patient to lower their psychological defenses. In fact, according to Dr. Udi Bonshtein, a modern medical hypnotist, a comparison between Psychoanalysis and hypnosis reveals more similarities than differences. “Like hypnosis,” he explains, “Psychoanalysis is saturated with suggestive processes, including free association, the therapeutic setting (lying on the couch, the therapist’s tone of voice, the fixed time), and the theory itself.” Moreover, he adds, the emergence of *transference*, defined as the unconscious redirection of the patient’s feelings about a third person towards the analyst, is a defining characteristic of both hypnosis and Psychoanalysis. Bonshtein concludes that “Freud never actually abandoned hypnosis, only its authoritative style, replacing it with a more permissive form of hypnosis, which he called Psychoanalysis.”

Menand agrees that Psychoanalysis owes its existence to hypnosis, but considers Freud’s innovation to be “the bridge from hypnosis to the kind of talk therapy we have today.” Historian Michael S. Roth goes even further, agreeing that, indeed, Psychoanalysis emerged out of hypnosis, but argues that their *dissimilarities* defined Psychoanalysis’s serviceability. Unlike Charcot’s hypnotic techniques, which, he claims, were attempts “to either erase the past or alter it so that it no longer haunted the present,” Freud developed Psychoanalysis “as a mode of


111 Bonshtein, “Relational Hypnosis,” 399.

interpretation that would create a past with which one could live.” In other words, instead of trying to eradicate traumatic memories, Freud aimed to defuse their power by exposing them to his subjects’ conscious awareness, which, he believed, allowed them to resume personal growth.

The physical mechanisms of the Psychoanalytic technique fascinated Huxley much more than the complex Freudian theories which came later. To him, Freud had discovered a viable method to tap the unconscious, albeit the darker elements of it. When Freud developed Psychoanalysis, he believed that the unconscious consisted of repressed memories, wishes, and desires—his idea that it might also contain elements of a higher nature did not arrive until 1923. Remarkably, even after this acknowledgement, Freud never attempted to use Psychoanalysis to uncover those constructive unconscious elements, but remained fixated on neuroses. Huxley explained that Freud’s neglect of the positive unconscious aspects was a result of his medical training which kept him focused on sickness rather than health. Freud’s oversight was precisely the gap that Huxley attempted to elucidate through his investigations of mind-body techniques in the 1930s.

His sexual framing of the mind and the development of Psychoanalysis formed the foundation of Freud’s dynamic psychology, but his 1900 landmark title, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, marked the meteoric ascension of his ideas. Part “concealed autobiography” and part

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113 Michael S. Roth, “Psychoanalysis and History,” 19.
117 Ellenberger, *Discovery of the Unconscious*, 454.
“analysis of the considerable literature on dreaming,” in *Dreams* Freud outlines the sexual nature of the nocturnal psyche, which he called “the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious.”¹¹⁸ Ellenberger writes that in the years leading to *Dreams*, Freud struggled with extreme feelings of rejection, depression, and hostility towards others and “liked to paint himself as an isolated outsider who was mocked by the Viennese medical society for his ideas.” However, he also notes that, “there is little evidence that shows much animosity towards Freud from his colleagues; none of his articles were ever refused by a journal, nor were any of his books rejected by a publisher.”¹¹⁹ One can argue that a taste of Freud’s (real or imagined) bitterness is palpable in the opening line of *Dreams*: “If heaven I cannot bend, then hell I will arouse,” though it is also likely that this quote from Virgil’s *Aeneid* alludes to the neurotic consequences of repression.

Regardless of Freud’s level of anguish, Ellenberger asserts that *Dreams* marked the end of his “neurotic period” and opened the door to a new understanding of the unconscious. Peter Gay adds that, in addition to dream analysis, the book was also monumental for introducing “seduction theory”—renamed “Oedipus Complex” in 1908. Although the initial reviews of *Dreams* pointed to a lack of scientific credibility, the book soon proved itself as a brilliant and sensational psychological masterstroke. Additionally, Freud’s first wave of acolytes: Adler, Blüher, Stekel, and Ferenzi, all cited *Dreams* as the reason they decided to follow Freud.¹²⁰

From two radically different perspectives, both James and Freud theorized about the evolutionary nature of consciousness and its emotional functions, but their conjectures were, and


¹¹⁹ Ellenberger, *Discovery of the Unconscious*, 455

¹²⁰ Ibid., 452.
still are, almost entirely rejected by the standards of experimental psychologists who depend on quantification. Most modern experimentalists agree with Dr. Gregory Kimble who, after reviewing James’s *Principles* on the hundredth anniversary of its publication, proclaimed he “could not find a single principle in it.”¹²¹ Eugene Taylor writes that few modern psychologists admit to spending much time with the theories of either James or Freud, but if they do, the common judgement is usually that they should be read as works of literature rather than psychology.¹²² A similar point of view was shared by most scientific materialists at the turn of the twentieth century, including two Russian physiologists whose work influenced the branch of psychology known as Behaviorism.

An account of the origins of Behaviorism would be incomplete without mentioning Ivan Pavlov. Likewise, a study of Pavlov is lacking without acknowledging an earlier Russian scientist by the name of Ivan Sechenov. Unlike Pavlov, who won the Nobel Prize in 1904 for his discovery of the ‘conditioned reflex’, Sechenov’s work was largely unappreciated until it was discovered by the next generation of Russian scientists.¹²³ For starters, Sechenov did not espouse any glamorous theories of the mind; he founded his entire approach on the rejection of metaphysical features like instincts, drives, and consciousness, claiming instead that all behavior results from purely physiological reactions to stimuli. In other words, the only credible way to understand psychology is through a physical analysis of the brain and nervous system, not philosophical speculations about some immaterial realm called mind. Sechenov was well aware of the mundane nature of his approach, but argued that although theories rooted outside physical

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¹²² Ibid., 465-466
¹²³ Hergenhahn and Henley, *History of Psychology*, 373.
science appear progressive, more often than not they actually sidetrack the advancement of credible knowledge.\textsuperscript{124}

Ivan Pavlov adopted Sechenov’s positivist approach and considered theorists like James and Freud as mere philosophers and clinicians—“neither associated with the laboratory or problems of quantification.”\textsuperscript{125} In the nineteenth century this positivist approach carried a lot of weight for experimentalists because they strove to place psychology on equal footing with natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology. As a consequence, they had little patience for phenomenological views and, to a certain extent, William James agreed. According to Taylor, James felt that a natural science in its infancy should be rooted in positivism, but “sooner or later, in order to mature, all young positivistic sciences must be renovated by philosophy.” In other words, the findings of experimental psychology should eventually extend beyond quantitative data points and be assimilated into a cohesive, yet adaptable understanding of mind and behavior.\textsuperscript{126}

However, around the turn of the century, new scientific discoveries were beginning to call many traditional ideas from both science and culture into question. Arthur I. Miller argues that the intellectual climate at the beginning of the twentieth century was a transformative “era of genius unmatched since the Renaissance,” at the core of which included a lively debate about forces of nature imperceptible to the naked eye—forces which had always been present, but never fully acknowledged or understood.\textsuperscript{127} Figures such as Einstein, Curie, Tesla, Edison, the

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Taylor, “William James and Sigmund Freud,” 468.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 467
Wright brothers, Planck, Janet, Poincare, and even Picasso had begun to demonstrate possibilities that undermined long-held assumptions about the nature of reality and the limitations of perception. Innovations in technology like the automobile, radio, cinematography, and the airplane challenged ideas about mobility and communication, while advances in science, such as the discovery of radioactivity, magnetic fields, new geometries, and special relativity, forced the brightest minds of that generation to consider the limits of empirical observation and ask the question: \textit{what else might exist beyond the limited senses?} Moreover, artists began to reflect these ideas as they departed from traditional standards of perspective and figuration in order to express more emotional, nonrepresentational portrayals of reality.\textsuperscript{128} All these radical new possibilities had begun to erode the certitude of Newtonian mechanics and permitted a environment ripe for abstraction and intellectual flexibility.

It was in this era of scientific and cultural revision that Aldous Huxley came of age. However, the lofty spirit of the times descended towards more terrestrial matters in 1914 as Europe approached a military conflict on a larger scale than anyone had ever experienced. Ironically, of all the tragedies that Aldous encountered in his youth, keratitis punctata may have been his saving grace—though he enlisted for service, the British Army rejected his application due to his visual impairment.\textsuperscript{129} So, instead of heading to the Western front, Aldous remained in England and, by the time the central powers collapsed in 1918, many of his closest childhood friends had become war casualties, including over a third of his Eton graduating class.\textsuperscript{130} Julian also believed that his brother’s affliction was a net-positive because it steered him away from a

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{129} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 53.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 27.
career as a scientist:

I believe his blindness was a blessing in disguise. For one thing, it put paid to his idea of taking up medicine as a career. Aldous was certainly not cut out for the day-to-day practice of medicine. Nor, though he was intensely interested of medical (and biological) research, do I think that he would have achieved the fullest realization of his genius in the research field.\textsuperscript{131}

Indeed, Aldous had been dead-set on following his brother and grandfather’s footsteps, but, after the onset of keratitis, he began to identify with the more artistic Matthew Arnold side of the family. However, according to David Cecil, Aldous’s passion for science never actually ceased, but shone through his verse:

\begin{quote}
We hear much these days about the two cultures, scientific and literary, now competing for the attention of man’s spirit. Is it possible to be at home at both? The answer is that Aldous Huxley managed to be so. He was equally at ease with Dante and with Darwin.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

Perhaps Huxley, because of his acumen and scientific awareness, could have made a great scientist, but nevertheless, through his writings, he still managed to impress upon a generation’s views of human psychology.

After graduating from Oxford in 1916 (taking firsts in English and History), Aldous accepted an invitation to work as a “farm laborer” at Geoffrey Chaucer’s old family estate known as Garsington Manor.\textsuperscript{133} Garsington, however, was no ordinary farm; in the first decades of the twentieth century it had become a hotbed for many of England’s most promising young intellectuals. There, under the patronage of its owner Lady Ottoline Morrell, Huxley established lifelong friendships with several brilliant minds such as Virginia Woolf, T.S. Elliot, Alfred North Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell—innovators who doubtlessly exposed Huxley to some of the

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{A Memorial Volume}, ed. Julian Huxley, 22.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 13-14.
\textsuperscript{133} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 63-64.
newest ideas in literature, philosophy, and science. There too, inspired by Morrell’s esoteric inclinations, Huxley plunged into the mystical writings of Jakob Böhme and William Blake.\textsuperscript{134} William James’s \textit{Varieties of Religious Experience} was also one of Morrell’s personal favorites, and she often held open discussions to contest its merits with Bertrand Russell, the skeptical atheist and Jamesian critic.\textsuperscript{135} Whether or not Garsington was the place where Huxley first became acquainted with Jamesian psychology is unclear, but throughout his life he regularly referenced James’s ideas, especially those from \textit{Varieties}. As an indication of the gravity that Huxley assigned to \textit{Varieties}, the autocratic rulers in \textit{Brave New World} name the book as one of the most dangerous pieces of contraband to their dystopian society.\textsuperscript{136}

Huxley considered his Garsington years to be among his “most educational and eye-opening periods,” but equally significant to the camaraderie and mental stimulation was the sense of liberty that permeated the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{137} Falling along those lines, Garsington became the place where Aldous experienced his first true love: a beautiful dark-haired Belgian refugee named Maria Nys.\textsuperscript{138} After a two-and-a-half year courtship, the couple wed and remained together until Nys’s death in 1955.

Following his residence at Garsington, in 1918 Huxley accepted a teaching position at Eton College. There he developed a lifelong friendship with his favorite pupil Eric Blair, known

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\textsuperscript{136} Aldous Huxley, \textit{Brave New World} (London: Chatto & Windus, 1932), 231.
\textsuperscript{138} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 75.
\end{flushright}
later by his pen-name, ‘George Orwell.’ However, with his poor eyesight, Huxley found it
difficult to manage a classroom full of haughty British teens. Reflecting on his meager teaching
abilities, one former student explained, “Poor Aldous! He must have been one of the most
incompetent schoolmasters who ever faced a class…The majority [of students] simply conversed
in loud voices. A very few, of whom I was one, did genuinely want to listen to Aldous; but it was
useless in that pandemonium.”

Apparently, Huxley was either oblivious or in denial of the
unruly behavior in his classroom. In one letter he explained, “They are, most of them, nice
fellows and treat me, all being considered, wonderfully well, though I wish I could see them
more penetratingly.” However, perhaps reflecting in a less congenial mood, he exclaimed, “I
have to go and stand up in face of these sinister young men and try to keep them amused.”
The main lesson Huxley learned from his return to Eton was that teaching was not his calling—a
single year had convinced him to pursue other options.

139 Ibid., 92.
140 Ibid., 89.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., 90.
By the time Huxley decided to move on from teaching, three schools of psychology had come to dominate the field: Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology. In Vienna, Freud’s notoriety had become so immense that it attracted an assemblage of followers who became known as the “Psycho-Analytical Society.” However, by 1913, two of his star pupils, Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, had defected in order to initiate their own analytical schools. Peter Gay explains that, “The departure of Adler and Jung, the two most spectacular defectors from the Freudian camp, were not excommunications: both men saw the disputes that in the end led to an irreparable rift with Freud as something of a liberation—an opportunity to found psychologies of their own.” Gay's synopsis, however, differs from Jung’s sentiments. Jung indicated that Freud’s primary attitude at the time was “bitterness, every word being loaded with it.”

As the Freudian camp divided, across the Atlantic, a troubled yet energetic South Carolinian named John Broadus Watson launched Behaviorism—a scientific approach, influenced in part by Sechenov and Pavlov, that addressed the problems of psychology through a systematic analysis of behavior and conditioning. In many ways Behaviorism emerged as a reaction to Freud’s quasi-scientific analytical approach. “The Behaviorist,” wrote Watson, “cannot find consciousness in the test-tube of his science.” As if the denial of consciousness

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143 Ellenberger, *Discovery of the Unconscious*, 454.
144 *The Freud Reader*, Peter Gay, ed. comments, xxvii.
was not enough to repudiate Freud, Watson also rejected the idea of instincts stating, “There are then for us no instincts—we no longer need the term in psychology. Everything we have been in the habit of calling an ‘instinct’ today is a result largely of training—belonging to man’s learned behavior.”

Freud, of course, fired back, calling Behaviorism “a theory which is naïve enough to boast that it has put the whole problem of psychology completely to rest.”

As Watson and Freud challenged each others’ credibility, a third approach, Gestalt psychology, began to take form in Germany. Influenced by the novel concept of ‘field theory’ in physics, the Gestaltists aimed to correlate psychology with post-Newtonian science and, accordingly, rejected any understanding of consciousness that reduced experience into elemental or mechanistic parts.

Meanwhile, in the early-1920s, Huxley achieved a precipitous start to his writing career as his first novel, *Crome Yellow*, drew high praise from critics and authors alike. By the middle of the decade, in addition to writing fiction, he also started publishing critiques on contemporary psychology. In these early essays he took all three of the major schools of psychology into account and, though he never accepted any of their systems ‘wholesale’, he began to pragmatically assimilate concepts from each, along with ideas from outside the discipline, into his own anomalous outlook.

Like many of Freud’s original followers, Alfred Adler was initially attracted to Psychoanalysis following the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and, from 1902 until his defection in 1911, belonged to Freud’s innermost circle. According to Freud, Adler’s

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decision to depart from the Psycho-Analytical society was because “he entirely repudiated the
importance of sexuality, [and] traced back the formation both of character and of the neuroses
solely to men’s desire for power and to their need to compensate for their constitutional
inferiorities.”

Ellenberger adds that Adler never accepted the importance of the Oedipus complex because, in his own childhood, he experienced the opposite dynamic as Freud: he was rejected by his mother and protected by his father. Also contrary to Freud’s rationale, he explains that Adler was never a “psychoanalytical deviant”—he had established his own systematic philosophy of human nature before ever meeting Freud.

A student of Nietzsche, Adler saw the ‘will to power’ as the primary driving force behind human behavior and believed that social adaptation was the individual’s highest goal. He believed that ‘inferiority complexes’ accounted for the majority of human suffering and, in order to overcome one’s real or imagined weaknesses, individuals consciously or unconsciously devised schemes of action, which he termed, “styles of life.” For Adler, the goal of analysis was to make his patients aware of their style of life, a tactic that allowed subjects to either revise their existing style or create a new one in order to expedite their adaption to society. Adler named his own approach Individual Psychology and claimed that its optimal outcome was social adjustment.

Similar to Adler, the breaking points between Freud and Jung also concerned the Oedipus

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149 Ibid.
150 Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, 579-580.
151 Ibid., 571, 598.
152 Ibid., 603.
153 Hergenhahn and Henley, History of Psychology, 523.
complex and the purely sexualized notion of libido energy. Jung maintained a more diffuse understanding of libido, arguing that it should be understood as a general psychic force composed of several forms of energy.\footnote{Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 696-697.} In addition, Jung contested the Freudian unconscious, an idea he considered incomplete and indomitably negative. In his own model he proposes two overlapping unconscious realms: the first, called the ‘personal’ or ‘psychoid’ unconscious, covers involuntary mental and physical functions. The second, and much larger, ‘collective unconscious’ is a psychic domain shared by all members of a species, consisting of culturally recognizable archetypal symbols.\footnote{Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 705.} According to Ellenberger, Jung devised his theory of the collective unconscious after noticing that images produced by the hallucinations of schizophrenics often corresponded to common archetypes from mythology and religious literature, an observation that led to his analytical approach of combining free association with symbology.\footnote{Freud, “An Autobiographical Study,” \textit{The Freud Reader}, 33.}

By 1913, Jung’s methods had become so dissimilar to Freud’s, he felt compelled to defect and initiate his own approach named “Analytical Psychology.” In explaining his departure, Freud recalled that “Jung attempted to give to the facts of analysis a fresh interpretation of an abstract, impersonal and non-historical character, and thus hoped to escape the need for recognizing the importance of infantile sexuality and of the Oedipus complex.”\footnote{Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 705.} Ellenberger, on the other hand, argues that, like Adler, Jung should not be considered a “deviant from Freud’s...
Psychoanalysis, and that his analytic psychology should not be measured with the yardstick of Freudian psychoanalysis…Both should be understood in terms of their own philosophy.” Historian Ann Addison agrees with Ellenberger, but goes a step further, arguing that “even at the time of their meeting, Jung had already formulated an epistemological approach that was significantly different from that of Freud.”

By the time of Jung’s departure the fundamental tenets of Psychoanalysis (i.e repression, wish fulfillment in dreams, the pleasure principle, the dualistic libido and ego drives, Oedipus complex, and the psychophysical mechanisms of Psychoanalysis) had been well established. However, perhaps moved by Adler and Jung’s defections, between 1914 and 1920, Freud began to revise and further systematize his own approach. Gay argues that the onset of WWI influenced Freud’s revisions explaining, “It should surprise no one that the prolonged and increasingly senseless slaughter had an impact on Freud’s thought.” The war not only stunted the growth of Psychoanalysis as “most of Freud’s associates [were] drafted into the army as physicians,” it also caused a great deal of anxiety for Freud because two of his three sons served near the perilous Russian front. Ellenberger agrees, contending that, as a distressed and emotionally invested observer, Freud began to “ascribe more and more importance to the role of aggressive and destructive instincts,” many of which he published in a 1915 collection of essays titled, Instincts and their Vicissitudes.

In these essays Freud establishes a topographical designation of the human mind that falls

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161 Ibid.
162 Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, 513.
into three distinct psychological realms: the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious.\textsuperscript{163}

In this system he expands the role of the unconscious beyond that of a vesicle for repressed psychic material, and illustrates how each realm operates in accordance with the others.\textsuperscript{164} In this more somber representation the unconscious contains not only repressions from one’s past experiences, but also primal instincts which operate on the basis of the “pleasure principle,” or the drive to seek immediate gratification of all needs and desires. Moreover, in this revision the unconscious operates on the basis of three irrational features: it has no direct relationship with reality, it does not acknowledge the principles of contradiction or time, and lastly, it contains an unrestricted flow of energy.\textsuperscript{165} Accordingly, Freud argues that the content of the unconscious derives from two primary sources: primal instincts and repressions—the later of which links to the instincts via association. In order for the individual to become aware of unconscious content, an articulation of the preconscious must occur before it can be accessible to the subject.\textsuperscript{166} If the morbid and senseless accounts of the war had, in fact, influenced Freud’s outlook, \textit{Instincts and their Vicissitudes} can be interpreted as their psychological justifications. Peter Gay argues that “it, more than the others, would have had to be rewritten if Freud had conceived it in the 1920s.” Indeed, it took a full five years after the Armistice before Freud revised this ominous portrayal of the unconscious—a task which eventually led to his 1923 landmark, \textit{The Ego and the Id}.

A case can be made that the despondency that colored Freud’s theories may have been attributable to his locality during the war, his regular health issues (in addition to his lingering

\textsuperscript{164} Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 512.
\textsuperscript{165} Freud, “The Unconscious,” \textit{Freud Reader}, 582.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 582-583.
heart and intestinal conditions he also suffered thirty-three separate surgeries on his jaw and palate), waves of anti-Semitism in central Europe, and/or his persistent self-identification as an underdog. However, many of his ideas can also be viewed as a systematic revival of psychological themes borrowed from the stories of the Greek tragedians and Romantic literature.\textsuperscript{167} Ellenberger comments that “Freud repeatedly referred to the fact that the great poets and writers had proceeded psychologists in their explorations of the human mind.” Additionally, it is easy to equate Freud’s persona to the lonely, yet heroic, Byronic protagonist who struggles against a host of enemies on a noble quest to defend some righteous ideal.\textsuperscript{168} Indeed, much of the passion that fueled Freud’s work seems to swing dramatically between his need for recognition and his need to identify as an dark-horse.

In terms of interdisciplinary influence, a similar case can be made for Jung, but instead of conjuring the Romantics and Greek tragedians like Goethe and Sophocles, he invoked mythical and religious symbology, themes from cultural folklore, and the esoteric musings of Medieval mystics and alchemists. Adler, on the other hand, was more concerned with social dynamics and more practical humanistic themes—instead of focusing on the Romantics, tragedians, or religious mystics, he looked to the writings of Nietzsche and Marx to inform his theories. However, although the assimilation and systemization of literature, theology, and philosophy inspired and advanced the theories of the analytical psychologists in Europe, their approach left a gaping hole for the authority of hard science. By the mid-1910s the state of psychology was

\textsuperscript{168} Ellenberger, \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, 465-467.
primed for a fresh materialistic and experimental approach that could address this deepening chasm.

The filling of this void became the life’s work of a roguish, but highly intelligent American psychologist named J.B. Watson, the recognized founder of Behaviorism. A product of a chaotic and broken home, in his youth Watson showed great promise, but also exhibited an unruly streak demonstrated by a tendency to get himself arrested: once for fighting, and again for discharging a firearm on a crowded street. Discovering that through education he could escape his problematic surroundings, at the age of fifteen Watson enrolled at Furman College where he bloomed intellectually, earning a master’s degree at twenty-one and, just four years later, a PhD from the University of Chicago.

In Chicago Watson fell under the wings of two prominent professors: James Angell, a Jamesian Functionalist, and Jacques Loeb, a physiologist whose work on ‘tropism’, the study of an organism’s response to external stimuli, made a lasting impression on young Watson’s development. Loeb had deduced that the mental events of simple organisms played no active role when exposed to controlled stimuli—their responses were automatic and utterly predictable. Intrigued by Loeb’s findings, Watson thought he might achieve similar results in more complex organisms such as rats. Subsequently, in 1903 he submitted his doctoral thesis, “Animal Education: The Psychical Development of the White Rat, Correlated with the Growth of its Nervous System,” in which he articulated the relationship between the rats’ nervous


170 Ibid.

systems and their cognitive functions. Following his dissertation, Watson speculated that human motivations might be examined and explained using a similar methodology, but when he approached his superiors with the idea, it was firmly rejected.

Watson remained in Chicago until 1907; however, when James Mark Baldwin, editor of the *Psychological Review* and chairman of the well-funded Johns Hopkins psychology department, offered to triple his salary in Baltimore, Watson jumped at the opportunity. Soon after his arrival, he encountered another golden opportunity: Baldwin had been spotted in a local brothel (which he described in court as a “house of a ‘colored’ social sort”), and when news of the scandal reached the university, the administration forced his resignation. Ever the opportunist, Watson quickly filled Baldwin’s editorial position and, perhaps emboldened by his rapid ascension, pitched his theory of human motivation for a second time, but, yet again, his superiors rebuffed the idea. Then, in 1913, Watson decided to take a calculated risk: when asked to deliver a series of lectures at Columbia University he seized the opportunity to go off-script. With his captive audience at hand, Watson delivered his now famous Behaviorist manifesto, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it”:

> Psychology as the Behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The Behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of

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174 Ibid.

175 Robert H. Wozniak and Jorge A. Santiago-Blay, “Trouble at Tyson’s Alley: James Mark Baldwin’s Arrest in a Baltimore Bordello,” *History of Psychology*, vol.16(4), (Nov. 2013), 228.

animal response, recognizes no difference between man and brute.  

Watson’s gamble paid off. Following the initial waves of criticism, his theory captured the attention of a formidable ally in Edward Titchener—though Structuralism had fallen out of favor, the Titchener name still resonated in academic circles. He publicly commended Watson’s bold address and announced that his new approach armed psychology with “a theory and methodology that satisfied the contemporary requirements for achieving status as a science.”  

Indeed, Watson was acutely aware that the merit of his approach pertained to its divorce from philosophical subjectivity—in a letter to Bertrand Russell, Watson declared he was “trying to get psychology just as far away from philosophy as are chemistry and physics.”  

As his notoriety increased, Watson became increasingly absorbed with correlating stimuli to response, but curiously absent from his citations were any mentions of Pavlov or his idea of the conditioned reflex. Finally, in his 1915 address to the A.P.A., he conceded that Pavlov’s work could be used to predict human behavior. Remaining within the parameters of his original thesis, Watson further advanced and systematized Behaviorism in the following years using mostly infants and toddlers as subjects for his experiments. In so doing, he developed Behaviorist theories to explain everything from language, cognition, and instinct, to child education.  

Ironically, Watson failed to learn much from his predecessor’s behavior—in 1920 he

177 J.B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it,” Psychological Review, 20, (1913), 158.  
179 Ibid., 210.; (Buckley’s source: Russell Papers, “Letter from Watson to Russell,” dated Oct. 11, 1921)  
180 Hergenhahn and Henley, History of Psychology, 388.  
suffered his own embarrassing public scandal and, he too, was forced to surrender his academic posts. But the crafty Watson landed on his feet—after explaining the advantages of using Behaviorism as a tool to predict and control consumer behavior, he landed a job with the Thompson Advertising Agency. Historian Kerry Buckley explains that “The notion of a psychology, whose assumptions and techniques were as applicable in the marketplace as in the laboratory, was part of the very fabric of Behaviorism itself.”¹⁸² Within a decade, Watson proved his worth to the extent of $70,000 per annum, the modern equivalent of earning about $900,000/year.¹⁸³

Although Huxley was highly critical of Behaviorism—calling it excessively “overweening,” “sweeping,” and “lacking in the love which alone can make knowledge precious and valuable”—it undeniably influenced his ideas about psychophysical conditioning. He actively demonstrated this in the 1930s and 1940s by promoting the habituation of mind-body techniques as a means of self-exploration and psychological modification.¹⁸⁴ That being said, Huxley railed against Watson’s claim that human behavior is entirely determined by environmental conditioning—that people, like robots, could be programmed for any purpose regardless of genetic variability.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, he rejected Behaviorism on the grounds that it undermined the notion of free will. “If we were all the same,” he explains, “as Watson in his early days believed, then there would be no point in liberty; what would be good for one would

¹⁸² Buckley, “The Selling of a Psychologist,” 207.
¹⁸⁴ Huxley, The Human Situation, 9-10.
be good for all.” Reflecting William James’s distaste for humanistic conformity, Huxley pointed to Behaviorism (along with all rigid ideologies) in what he called the *Will to Order*, or the “urge for tidiness, which revolts against the wild and maddening diversity of men and likes to concentrate instead on the uniformities of culture.” In addition to this critique, Huxley also despised the notion of employing psychological tactics to drive consumer habits.

Ironically, around the same time that Watson rebelled against psychological subjectivity, a trio of theorists, led by the Austro-Hungarian, Max Wertheimer, united in Germany to revolt against the elemental perspective. In other words, if Behaviorism pushed psychology towards a more reductionist approach, Wertheimer and his ‘Gestaltists’ pushed it in the opposite direction. Gestalt theory rejects any psychological outlook based in elementism, or the tendency to assume the function and existence of things which can only be separated verbally (such as mind and body or space and time) as isolated elements. There is no English equivalent for the German word *Gestalt*; it can translate to *form* or *shape*, but is also used to describe a *state*, *process*, or *divisible whole*. Huxley points out that “In science and philosophy there are probably two main methods of explaining reality. One is the method of concentrating attention on the atomic elements of reality”—a mode he insists is the basis for Newtonian physics, chemistry, and in Behaviorism in psychology—“the other method,” he continues, “is the formal one of concentrating attention on the *gestalten* of nature, on the *forms* which are presented on a large scale.” This second approach, he explains, is represented in Platonic philosophy, morphology,


taxonomy, and in psychology by the Gestalt school. At the core of Gestaltism is the principle that the ‘whole’ is not necessarily greater, but always different than the sum of its parts.

Similar to the Jamesian idea that consciousness is more like a “flowing stream” than a series of mental events, Gestaltist’s argue that perception cannot be reduced to individual events without distorting the true nature of experience. In other words, since reality consists of meaningful, whole configurations, then psychology should also focus on essential, intact experiences.

This ‘molar’ (as opposed to molecular) approach to psychology has several philosophical antecedents. Aristotle argued that “many things have a plurality of parts which are not merely a complete aggregate but instead some kind of a whole beyond its parts.” Another example comes from the German idealist, Immanuel Kant, who argued that the whole of conscious experience differs from the independent sensations drawn from it. According to Kant, the discrepancy between sensation and perception is due to an automatic organizing function of the mind that processes raw experience into meaningful symbolic representations.

Shifting paradigms in physics also influenced Gestaltism. Following the discovery of electromagnetic fields, physicists like Max Planck realized they were practically impossible to gauge using Newtonian schematics, so he devised a new model called ‘field theory’ in which all events in a known field are interrelated. One of Gestalt psychology’s founders, Wolfgang Köhler, had studied with Planck and was well-versed in its shifting paradigms. To Köhler, Gestaltism represented an attempt to model psychology after a holistic system like field theory

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instead of elemental and/or mechanistic systems like Structuralism or Behaviorism. Most influential to Wertheimer, however, was his university professor, the philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels whose 1890 paper, “On Gestalt Qualities,” addressed many of the precepts used to assemble Gestalt psychology.”

On both the conceptual and practical levels, certain aspects of Gestaltism undoubtedly influenced Huxley’s views on psychology. His position that the mind-body acted as a single ground for human experience relates directly to the Gestalt idea of perception. On a more practical level, in his popular lectures, Huxley revived the ideas of Dr. Roger Vittoz, an early-twentieth century Swiss psychotherapist who had incorporated Gestaltist principles into a series of awarenesses exercises to treat neuroses. By conditioning his patients to live in the *here and now* of everyday life, Vittoz attracted patients from “all parts of the world,” but unfortunately, he neglected to train other psychologists to use his methods and, perhaps due to the popularization of Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, they were nearly forgotten following his death in 1925.

Not only did Huxley help resurrect Vittoz’s ideas, he correlated them to aspects of Eastern philosophy: “This business of being acutely aware of everything within and without,” he explains, “is a standard procedure in the Buddhist, Tantric, and Zen psychology.” In another example he cites a Sanskrit text called the *Gandharva Tantra* in which the god Shiva describes 118 different awareness enhancing exercises. More importantly, prior to extolling the validity

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193 Ibid, 439.
194 Ibid, 438.
196 Ellenberger, *Discovery of the Unconscious*, 807.
of awareness training, Huxley spent much of the decade between 1935 and 1945 systematically experimenting with a multitude of mind-body techniques and publishing essays about their salutary psychological effects.

Huxley’s habit of unearthing and resurrecting meaningful but obscure ideas which contemporary psychology failed to recognize, along with his ability to recognize and relate concepts from both Western and Eastern perspectives, helped advance theory and practice in the emerging psychologies of the 1960s. However, before he could do any of this, first he had to find his own voice and establish a reputation as an individual with ideas worthy of distinction.

In the early 1920s Huxley began to establish this notoriety through his fiction, although many early pundits criticized his novels for not falling into a pre-established genre. “To many observers,” remarks Watt, “the failure of Huxley’s fiction either to adopt a traditional posture or to adhere to a formalist criterion meant that he was stuck in an untenable sort of writing which hovered indecisively between the novel and the essay.”198 Nevertheless, Huxley was aware of his liminal style and, despite his critics’ opinions, continued with his manner of expression. “My own aim,” he told an early interviewer, “is to arrive technically, at a perfect fusion of the novel and the essay, a novel in which one can put all one’s ideas.”199 This technique, known today as ‘philosophical fiction’, often made the criticism of Huxley’s novels indistinguishable from the criticism of his ideas.200

Huxley’s quest to assert himself as a man of letters began in the summer of 1919, shortly

199 Yoi Mariani, “A Talk with Aldous Huxley,” Bermondsey Book, London (June 1926), 78.
200 The Critical Heritage, Donald Watt, ed. commentary from the introduction, 19.; Examples of other writers whose work falls into the “philosophical fiction” category include: Albert Camus, Fyodor Dostoievsky, Thomas Mann, and C.S. Lewis.
after his brief teaching stint at Eton. In that year he and Maria Nys married and rented a small flat just outside of London. It was there that the annoying reality of their financial situation became clear: Maria’s family fortune had vanished in the war and the couple quickly spent the little money Aldous made at Eton.\textsuperscript{201} More than anything Huxley wanted time to write, but without a steady income he and Maria struggled to make ends meet. Maria was optimistic and resourceful—she even cooked homemade meals using the pilot-light in their kitchenless apartment. Nevertheless, life quickly turned from manageable to overwhelming: no sooner than Aldous landed an editorial position with \textit{Athenaeum} magazine, Maria became unexpectedly pregnant.\textsuperscript{202} With this new development, finding time to write became an increasingly distant prospect.

Nine months later the couple celebrated the birth of baby Mathew, their first and only child. Aldous, adapting to his new role as father and provider, picked up two additional jobs: theatre critic for the \textit{Westminster Gazette} and a part-time spot at a local bookstore.\textsuperscript{203} These gigs, however, were short-lived as Aldous promptly accepted a full-time position as a journalist for \textit{Vogue}, a recent acquisition of \textit{Conde Nast Publications}.\textsuperscript{204} Journalism suited Aldous’s needs far better than his previous commitments—in addition to the increased pay, \textit{Conde’s} flexible deadlines allowed just enough time for his own writing endeavors. Subsequently, over a two month span, he completed \textit{Crome Yellow}, a satire loosely based on his experience at Garsington

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{201} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 100.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 104, 106-107.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 109.
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The novel was a hit; “almost overnight,” writes Peter Firchow, “Huxley became an internationally famous figure.” Aldous was, of course, both overjoyed and relieved, especially after receiving positive reviews from a number of literary giants: F. Scott Fitzgerald complimented his wit; H.L. Mencken wrote, “I have a good deal of confidence in the future of this Mr. Huxley.” However, Aldous became most ecstatic when his hero, the French novelist Marcel Proust, submitted his glowing approval writing, “[Huxley] occupies an unassailable position in the English literary world of today.” The Literary Review even published an article likening Aldous to a young Oscar Wilde. Within a year Huxley signed his first contract with Chatto & Windus for the modern equivalent of $90,000 a year.

But even as his literary fame ascended in the early 1920s, Huxley still lamented about his missed opportunity in science. “If I could be born again,” he exclaimed in 1925, “and choose what I should be in my next existence, I should desire to be a man of science…even if I could become Shakespeare, I think that I should still choose to be Faraday.” Regardless, he managed to stay well-informed of the latest scientific achievements and often incorporated them into his storylines. According to Bedford, as stacks of unread literary reviews accumulated in his foyer, Huxley would stand by his mailbox eagerly anticipating the delivery of his scientific

205 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 112.
208 Ibid., 8.
209 Ibid., 69.
211 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 170.
Given the notoriety of his grandfather and the rising acclaim of his brother, his enthusiasms seemed justified.

Though he seldom shied away from opportunities to work psychological ideas into his novels, Huxley saved his most decisive thoughts on the subject for his critical essays which he published in collections or sold individually to journals and popular magazines. One reviewer of Huxley’s early essays likened his thought to a modern William James; another lauded his lucidity writing, “the most baffling concepts of philosophy are placed before us with the unyielding outlines of statuary, paragraphs in which Mr. Huxley triumphantly competes with such masters as James, Bergson, and Santayana.”

Indeed, at a time when some variant of the Freudian model was widely accepted among non-Behaviorists, Huxley’s outside position freed his intuitive abilities, allowing him to make unconventional claims and bold insights without the perils of staring his professional reputation.

In regards to these critical essays, the influence of his brother Julian, the esteemed biologist, cannot be overlooked. By the end of the 1920s, Julian was already touted as one of the world’s top scientific minds, possessing a resumé that included professorships at Rice, Oxford, Kings College, and the prestigious Fullerian professor of physiology at the Royal Institution of Great Britain. Additionally, he had served in the British Army Intelligence Corps during the war and had been awarded a full-time endowment from H.G. Wells.

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212 A Memorial Volume, ed. Julian Huxley, 140.
1920s not only established credible vanguards for developing fields like genetics and endocrinology, they also informed his little brother’s views on human psychology. The frequency and content of their letter exchanges reveals the intellectual bond between the siblings. Aldous corresponded with Julian more than any other friend, acquaintance, or family member, and nearly every letter contains some portion of scientific discussion. 216 The privilege to communicate so freely with such an eminent scientific authority had multiple advantages. For starters, Julian served as a logical sounding board for his brother’s unorthodox ideas and curiosities—his ability to differentiate science from pseudoscience kept Aldous away from bogus popular theories like phrenology and “scientific” racism. Additionally, Julian briefed Aldous on the latest scientific issues, trends, and discoveries. In short, by remaining close to Julian, Aldous had access to one of the greatest scientific consultants of his generation.

Julian’s expertise certainly influenced his brother’s ideas on human psychology, but Aldous’s early views also included a rather conspicuous spiritual element. As early as 1925 his letters show that various aspects of Eastern philosophy had already begun to shape his outlook, specifically on the subject of self-assessment and the difference between Western self-consciousness and Eastern self-awareness. Considering the Western attitude (whilst taking a subtle jab at Freud), he explains:

Habituated to the practice of self-analysis on a scale never before attempted—self-analysis, which always has the terrible effect of making the analyzer conscious of the evil opposites of everything good that he analyzes. Analyzing love for a fellow being, he discovers hatred; analyzing purity, he discovers impurity. That is the penalty we pay for excessive self-consciousness. 217

216 Huxley, Letters, general review of letters to J. Huxley.
217 Huxley, Letters, 244.
Then, discussing an Eastern perspective:

The fundamental problem is love and humility…the tribe has disappeared and every at all conscious man stands alone, surrounded by other solitary individuals and fragments of the old tribe, for which he feels no respect.Obviously, the only thing to be done is to realize individuality to the full, the real individuality, Lao-Tsu’s individuality, the yogi’s individuality, and with it the oneness of everything.218

By using this comparison he suggests that the nature of psychological analysis elicits a cynical sense of one’s thoughts, motivations, and behavior, an attitude which not only denigrates the self, but also arouses a suspicious view of others and, ultimately, begets societal estrangement. The practice of self-awareness, on the other hand, seems to elicit a more holistic kind of self-reflection—a sense of being and oneness beyond egoistic fixations. Indeed, Huxley had already begun to realize that Western psychology stood a lot to learn from Eastern metaphysics. He continued to explore this angle both philosophically and through various psychophysical practices decades before mainstream psychology recognized its value.

Later in 1925, Huxley published “Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus,” his first critical essay on psychological analysis. In this assessment he critiques Freudian and other analytical methods, likening them to outmoded “sciences” of the past like phrenology, physiognomy, and astrology.219 By pointing to justifications commonly found in pseudosciences, such as using analogy in lieu of logic, citing anomalies as evidence, and employing terms with fluid definitions, he claims that Psychoanalysis operates under many of the same dubious principles.220 He contends that Psychoanalysis had lasted so long because “its falsity cannot be conclusively proved by a single experiment.”221 Furthermore, he questions whether psychological ‘cures’ are

218 Ibid., 245.
220 Ibid., 967-968.
221 Ibid.
more the results of charismatic analysts and their power of suggestion than the elaborate theories attached to analytical techniques. In other words, patients expecting to feel a relief of symptoms through Psychoanalysis might have actually been remedied by what the pharmacist Émile Coué described in 1920 as “the placebo effect.”

Huxley goes on to question the complex theories behind Psychoanalysis, such as infantile sexuality and castration complex, but he could not ignore the technique’s mechanical, psychophysical sequence: establish a state of relaxation and willful subordination, summon emotional content, manipulate through suggestion, then emphatically declare a conclusive restoration. Huxley conceded that, like hypnosis, these ordered steps worked to loosen and expose unconscious material but, as shown in his letters, he worried about the method’s potential psychosocial side-effects. What social ramifications might one expect if these mind-changing methods fell into malevolent hands? As Huxley matured as an intellectual, his curiosity about the nature of awareness, and the methods used to alter, it became a personal obsession. In the following decades he used the subject as a source of critical fodder, literary inspiration, philosophical speculation, and as a basis for personal experimentation.

Just months after “Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus,” Huxley wrote a related article titled, “The Psychology of Suggestion,” which specifies how propagandists use psychological tactics, and points to how businesses had also begun to integrate them into their marketing campaigns. Per his previous article, he maintains that tactical psychology hinged, not on

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222 Ibid., 974.

elaborate theories, but a sequential process.\textsuperscript{224} Then, he indicates how propaganda uses a similar dynamic: an appeal to patriotism establishes a state of public subordination; sociopolitical tensions, such as the threat of war or economic turmoil, elicits an emotional response. With these conditions in place, the propagandist manipulates the masses by exposing them to carefully selected symbols, preparing their mind’s for an authoritative call to action.\textsuperscript{225}

The employment of this strategy in propaganda during times of war was not especially alarming to Huxley, but its emergence in commercial advertising appalled him. He argues that, in the past, advertisers had appealed to the consumer’s sense of mystery, romance, and/or reason, but in recent times, they had succumbed to more “subversive” techniques. “In these advertisements,” he explains, “the merchant does not try to prove that you will be a gainer by purchasing his wares; what he suggests is that, if you don’t buy them, you will be ridiculous, or eccentric, or old-fashioned, or even disgusting.”\textsuperscript{226} In other words, like the tactics of Psychoanalysis and propaganda, these new ads worked by inciting and exploiting the subjects’ fears and anxieties.

Ironically, one of the biggest proponents of these new advertising techniques was Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s “double nephew.”\textsuperscript{227} After emigrating to the U.S. from Vienna, Bernays landed a job as a propagandist for the Committee on Public Information and became an expert in appropriating his uncle’s techniques to manipulate groups of people instead of

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., 392.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 394.
\textsuperscript{227} On “double nephew”: Edward Bernays’s mother, Anna Freud, was Sigmund Freud’s sister. Freud’s wife, Martha Bernays Freud, was Edward Bernays’s aunt on his father’s side.
individuals. In fact, while working for the CPI, Bernays went so far as to call his work:

“psychological warfare.”

There was one basic lesson I learned in the CPI—that efforts comparable to those applied by the CPI to affect the attitudes of the enemy, of neutrals, and people of this country could be applied with equal facility to peacetime pursuits. In other words, what could be done for a nation at war could be done for organizations and people in a nation at peace.

Accordingly, following his tenure with the CPI, Bernays founded a public relations firm in Manhattan and began to incorporate Freudian techniques into commercial advertising. “While Freud sought to liberate people from their subconscious drives and desires,” explains his biographer Larry Tye, “Eddie sought to exploit those passions.” Bernays’s process rested upon his conviction that the average consumer was “incapable of reason,” and the PR expert was “a member of the ‘intelligent few’ who advises clients on how to ‘deal with the masses…just by applying psychology.’” In 1923 he revealed many of his secrets in Crystallizing Public Opinion, a book explaining how to trigger basic instinct-emotion pairs like “flight-fear,” “revulsion-disgust,” and “pugnacity-anger.”

Although Freud scarcely mentioned or corresponded with his nephew, it is clear that Bernays held him in high esteem. In the aftermath of WWI, he even went out of his way to publish and promote Freud’s books in the U.S., but beyond that, Freud declined his nephew’s

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additional offers, including a proposal to write a regular newspaper column at the modern equivalent of $12,500 per article.\textsuperscript{234} Even so, Bernays was quick to inform others that he was Freud’s nephew. “When a person would first meet Bernays,” comments social historian Stuart Ewen, “it would not be long until uncle Sigmund would be brought into the conversation. His relationship with Freud was always in the forefront of his thinking and counseling.”\textsuperscript{235} Indeed, Bernays claimed authority and prestige by bringing Freud to the masses, then associating himself with Freud’s acclaim.

Perhaps the most notorious example of Bernays’s use of Freudian tactics was his “Torches of Freedom” marketing campaign. In 1929 the makers of “Lucky Strikes” cigarettes hired Bernays to increase cigarette sales to women, who had generally avoided smoking in public. For this task he consulted a member of the Psychoanalytical Society living in Manhattan who advised Bernays that, in a world where women struggled to assert themselves, “Cigarettes, which are equated with men, become torches of freedom.”\textsuperscript{236} Accordingly, Bernays orchestrated a scripted media stunt in which he hired a group of debutantes to light-up cigarettes as they joined the 1929 Easter Sunday Parade. Of course Bernays had also hired his own press unit to cover the ‘event within the event’ and, after publicizing the footage, it fomented a national sensation. A sharp uptick in cigarette sales to women proved the effectiveness of Freudian psychology in advertising, but also the legitimacy of Huxley’s concerns.\textsuperscript{237}

Bernays’s example was precisely the kind of psychological abuse that worried Huxley.

\textsuperscript{234} Tye, \textit{Father of Spin}, 185, 189.; Inflation stats generated by usinflationcalculator.com.

\textsuperscript{235} Ewen, \textit{PR!}, 170.


Whether or not he agreed with the validity of Freud’s psychosexual theories, the mechanics of his method seemed to have a considerable effect on people’s minds, both individually and collectively. But, even though Huxley abhorred the idea of provoking minds with negative emotional triggers, Freud made him aware that a psychological technique can, in fact, be used to change minds. Thanks to Freud, Huxley began to consider the possibility that the means of a technique determines the nature of the ends it produces.238 In other words, since Freud’s technique worked to expose negative unconscious material, then perhaps other kinds of techniques could be used to expose the positive elements within the unconscious—the latent human potentialities. The fact that Huxley detested Psychoanalysis, yet remained open to integrating some Freudian concepts, shows that he did not judge individual ideas based on the systems in which they operated. This pragmatic approach allowed him to extract and explore ideas objectively, regardless of their dogmatic affiliations.

In the same way, some of Huxley’s most significant ideas about psychology spawned from an unlikely friendship with the writer D.H. Lawrence. Joseph Bentley explains:

The relationship between the two men is particularly strange, they seem, at least at first glance, to be so totally dissimilar in ideas, attitudes and personality. Huxley was the aloof and fastidious ironist…Lawrence, on the other side of the coin, was the intense and passionate prophet of the Dark Gods in nature.239

In terms of background, the two were also worlds apart. Far from the erudite reputation of the Huxleys, the Lawrences exemplified England’s working class—D.H. the product of an abusive, alcoholic coal miner and a lace-factory worker.240 Huxley first met Lawrence somewhat


passingly in 1915 through Ottoline Morrell. By this time Lawrence, who was ten years Huxley’s
senior, had already established a reputation as a libertine, iconoclast, and in some critics’
opinions, a blatant literary pornographer.241

Over a decade passed before the two reconnected, but this time on a more personal
level.242 Lawrence was not known as the ‘supportive type’, especially to promising young
writers, however, in 1926, seemingly out-of-the-blue, Huxley received a congratulatory letter
from Lawrence, commending his newfound literary success.243 In the letter Lawrence suggested
a meeting which, despite their contrasting styles and personal dispositions, initiated a devoted
friendship that lasted until Lawrence’s untimely death from tuberculosis in 1930.

Besides his many novels, poems, and collections of short stories, Lawrence also wrote a
personal philosophy and two short books detailing his eccentric views on human psychology.
His philosophy, which Huxley dubbed mystical materialism, rejected both the positivist position
that science would unveil life’s greater truths, and the rationalist perspective which favored
reason over experience. Inspired by Nietzsche, who argued, “there is more rationality in thy
body than in thy best wisdom,” Lawrence’s philosophy fixated on the primacy of the body’s
response to direct experience.244 “My great religion,” he explains, “is a belief in the blood, the
flesh, as being wiser than the intellect.”245 Accordingly, he agreed with Freud that primal forces
played an active role in behavior, but unlike Freud, who aimed to inhibit these urges, Lawrence

241 Ibid., 187, 361.
242 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 78.
244 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22.;
Sawyer, Huxley: A Biography, 51.
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thought that people should embrace their bodily wisdoms. In other words, he rejected the notion that primal human nature was inherently negative, insisting instead that it often contained the raw materials necessary for creativity and ingenuity. Equating ‘bodily wisdom’ with notions of ‘divine possession’ from antiquity, Lawrence viewed the Greek pantheon as a more accurate representation of human psychology than any of the modern systems.²⁴⁶ In short, he believed that creativity sprang, not from the ability to resist primal forces, but from one’s ability to accept, harness, and utilize them.

Lawrence outlined his psychological theories in two corresponding texts: *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and *Fantasia and the Unconscious*. In these works he argues that people had become too “mentally domesticated,” that consciousness originates in the body’s “four great ganglion nerve complexes.”²⁴⁷ He goes on to elaborate exactly how his system works, explaining which nerve center is responsible for any given emotional response, but despite Lawrence’s fanatical naïveté, Huxley could not help but wonder if, at least in some sense, D.H. was on to something. Reacting to *Fantasia*, he describes it as a “strange book, so true in its psychological substance, so preposterous in its pseudoscientific form.”²⁴⁸ Regardless of whether his schematics had actually convinced Aldous’s intellect, the way Lawrence seemed to draw inspiration from everything around him never ceased to amaze Huxley. He firmly believed that Lawrence “saw more than an ordinary human being ought to see,” and speculated that his


corporal sensitivities accounted for the impassioned nature of his work. 249

Following Lawrence’s death, Huxley reflected on how it felt to be in his presence:

To be with him was to find oneself transported to one of the frontiers of human consciousness…He was able to absorb himself completely in what he was doing at the moment…He could just sit and be perfectly content. And his contentment, while one remained in his company, was infectious. 250

This amiable representation was certainly an anomaly—over the years D.H.’s irascible antics alienated more people than they attracted. However, despite their glaring differences, the two forged a bond that thrived on a mutual fascination with each other’s methods and idiosyncrasies. Lawrence’s process was significant to Huxley’s developing views on psychology because it made him aware of a somatic, creative force beyond the scope of science—a human potentiality he believed D.H. had learned to tap.

By the late 1920s Huxley’s own concept of a psychological mind-body was beginning to take shape: Julian had influenced his views from a biological standpoint; Eastern philosophy had introduced the holistic concept of self-awareness; Lawrence and his somatic process had convinced him of an accessible creative force; and, as much as he questioned the sweeping claims of Watson and Freud, Huxley still managed to draw important ideas from their systems, such as a technique that elicits the unconscious and the effectiveness of conditioning.

But out of all the theorists of the 1920s, perhaps the most fruitful seed of inspiration came from a lesser known psychologist named James Leuba. Like William James, Leuba had an affinity for the psychology of religion, but, as an atheist, he strove to understand the cognitive

250 Ibid., 27-28.
mechanisms associated with the various traditions. For example, in his 1925 *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Leuba surveys several Eastern and Western styles of spiritual meditation and concludes that their “pragmatic function…is to reestablish mental wholeness or to unify consciousness,” and their aftereffect is “mental fortitude.” However, besides dropping the clue that their similarities include “relaxation, passivity, and mental simplification,” Leuba declined to speculate any further on how or why the psychological effects became actualized. Huxley’s letters and essays from the 1920s show that he was familiar with Leuba’s work, but the psychologist’s influence is unmistakeable in the pages of *Jesting Pilate*, Huxley’s philosophical travelogue from 1926 which contains his initial discourse on *human potentialities*.

It starts with Huxley contemplating the idea of gluttony—its common spiritual designation as a ‘sin’ and its psychophysical effects, specifically that “interminable and unnecessary digestion” often leads to adverse mental states. He suggests that commonly recognized sins such as contempt, greed, and pride, and their logical counterparts like compassion, charity, and humility, might be reassessed for their mind-body effects which either undermine or enhance cognitive function. “There are certain *human potentialities,*” he explains, which can only be developed into actuality when the mind is in a state of quiet. For those who live in a state of agitation, certain kinds of serene and lasting happiness, certain intellectual and and creative processes, are impossible.

Then, reflecting on Leuba’s analysis, he argues that extraordinary states of consciousness are not

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255 Ibid., 513.
the exclusive property of mystics, they are natural states that exist latently in the human unconscious. The only difference being that mystics have learned to cultivate these states while most ordinary people believe them to be nothing more than random phenomena.

Believing them to be divine, the religious mystic cultivates his experiences, makes use of them to bring him happiness and serenity. The others accept them as merely curious sensations, like giddiness or the hiccups, and do not attempt, therefore, to make a systematic use of their experiences in the conduct of their lives…Leading a virtuous and reasonable life, practicing the arts of meditation and recollection, we shall unbury all our hidden talents.256

The idea that spiritual values and practices can be viewed through a psychological lens for their practical benefits echoes Leuba’s analysis, but Huxley’s idea that physical and emotional wellness are biological preconditions for accessing higher modes of consciousness, and ultimately, actualizing human potential, reads like a rough antecedent of Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ concept. In Maslow’s pyramidal design, basic human needs like food, water, and sleep must be satisfied in order for individuals to advance to higher levels of fulfillment. The highest level, “self-actualization,” later described by Humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers as “man's tendency to actualize himself, to become his potentialities…to express and activate all the capacities of the organism,” is a definition that certainly reflects Huxley’s sentiments.257 Equally important is his choice of language—the essay marks his first recorded use of the phrase “human potentialities” to describe the latent capacities of the human mind. In the following decades Huxley would return to the phrase repeatedly, fleshing out its meaning and significance with each additional use.

In the summer of 1926, Huxley began to compile a collection of critical essays on various

256 Ibid., 513-514.
aspects of human nature, including personality, intelligence, and education, which he published that winter under the title, *Proper Studies*. Examining his assessments through several analytical lenses—the most prevalent being psychological, philosophical, and historical—he describes the essays as “separate and unconnected studies of a few aspects of human life,” which “make no claim to constitute a coherent system.”

Although he had previously published critiques on contemporary psychology, *Proper Studies* marks Huxley’s first attempt to articulate his own views, including their philosophical genealogies and representations in literature. For example, he discusses the ideas of Freud, Watson, Jung, and Adler alongside the philosophies of Aristotle, Descartes, and Spinoza, and ideas contained in the literature of writers like Shakespeare, Wordsworth, and Proust among others.

In *Proper Studies* Huxley also critiques Freud for a second time, targeting both his elementalism and theory of the unconscious. Taking a position more in-line with the Gestaltists, he compares Freud’s concept of the mind to a “box with compartments,” claiming that through excessive anatomization, Freud had lost touch with the holistic relationship of the mind and physical body. Reaching beyond the Gestaltists’ molar model of perception, Huxley argues that the mind and the body work together as a “whole organism,” constituting a single ground for all experience, memory, and cognition.

The mind, like the body, with which it is associated to form an individual whole, is a living organism, composed of interdependent parts, which we may for convenience of description name and classify as separate entities, but which have no separate existence in reality, apart from the whole to which they belong...Ideas do not associate themselves inside the box which is called the mind; they are associated by a living organism, whose

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259 Ibid., 94-95.
260 Ibid., 96-97.
dominating intellectual passion is for meaning and significance.\textsuperscript{261}

The idea that the “mind-body” serves as a single unit for consciousness became fundamental to Huxley’s views; and even though it had been overlooked as a psychological model in the 1920s, he acknowledges that Spinoza had first introduced the idea in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{262}

Huxley’s second critique addresses the Freudian unconscious, or the ‘Id’, defined as the part of the mind in which primal, instinctive impulses are manifest. This portrayal, he argues, overstates the destructive potential of the unconscious and fails to acknowledge its constructive attributes. In other words, he rejects the idea that the unconscious contains little more than suppressed sexual urges and base instincts, insisting instead that it contains both negative and positive human potentialities. In his own sardonic, way Huxley describes Freud’s Id as “a sort of \textit{basement}, in whose almost unrelieved darkness the vermin of the unconscious crawl and pullulate.”\textsuperscript{263}

Although Freud rarely modified the key elements of his theories, it is evident that he eventually became aware of the limitations of his Id concept. In a 1936 letter to the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, Freud also applies a ‘basement’ metaphor to describe his own views of the unconscious. “I have always confined myself,” he admits, “to the ground floor and basement of the edifice…If I still had a lifetime of work ahead of me I should dare to assign a place in my lovely little house to those highborn personages.”\textsuperscript{264} Later in life Huxley reflected on their shared analogy and speculates as to why Freud fixated on the negative features of the

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., “Spinoza’s Worm,” (1929), 320.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., “Education,” \textit{Proper Studies}, 196.
\textsuperscript{264} Freud, \textit{Binswanger Correspondences}, “Freud to Binswanger, Oct. 8, 1936,” 211-212.
unconscious:

Freud, the most popular and influential of modern psychologists, inclined to the bungalow-with-basement view of human nature. It was only to be expected; for Freud was a doctor and, like most doctors, paid more attention to sickness than to health. His primary concern was with the subterranean rats and black beetles, and with all the ways in which a conscious ego may be disturbed by the bad smells and by the vermin below stairs.265

In other words, in his pursuit to address the afflicted psyches of the masses, Freud focused on averse unconscious elements while giving little attention to their positive counterparts.

Accordingly, Huxley argued that because of Freud’s overarching influence, the early history of human psychology evolved asymmetrically, leaving it grossly unbalanced for the first half of the twentieth century. This same observation would eventually become essential in defining the Humanistic psychology movement of the 1960s; and while most historians credit the assessment to Maslow, Huxley actually published the critique in 1927.266

Moving on from Freud, in Proper Studies Huxley also expressed his dissatisfaction with Behaviorism, citing its top authority, J.B. Watson, and his controversial “Twelve Infants” statement. In 1924 Watson made waves in psychology with his “guarantee” that, given any one of any “twelve healthy infants,” he could systematically mold it to become a “doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, beggar-man, and thief.”267 Watson’s position, that heredity has nothing to do with human character, conflicted with Huxley’s understanding of evolutionary biology.

Huxley maintained that, although heredity did not account for an individual’s entire personality,
it provides a unique biological framework upon which the personality develops.\footnote{268} It is likely that Julian’s 1926 article, “The Biological Basis of Individuality,” which arrives at the same conclusion, influenced Aldous’s opinion.\footnote{269}

Despite both Huxley brothers’ objections, Watson’s claim held considerable acceptance in psychology until a Gestaltist named Kurt Lewin published Principles of Topological Psychology in 1936. Lewin argues that neither inborn tendencies nor life experiences fully account for behavior and personality—both nature and nurture interact continuously to shape the whole individual. Lewin presented his idea with a simple formula: \( B = f(P, E) \) (behavior is a function of the person and their environment) which became known thereafter as “Lewin’s Equation.”\footnote{270}

Huxley’s second point of contention was Watson’s questionable research methods, specifically that most of Watson’s research evaluated the behaviors of infants and toddlers instead of adults:

\begin{quote}
It is on the grounds that all infants are very much alike that the Behaviorists deny the hereditary transmission of special aptitudes, attributing the enormous differences of mental capacity observable among grown human beings exclusively to differences in environment, internal and external.\footnote{271}
\end{quote}

Huxley’s assertion, that the younger the child the less physical and psychological differentiation, begs the question: how does one arrive at conclusions on heredity using subjects who are too young to express their genetic variations? “The mind of a young child,” he writes, “is as much undifferentiated and unindividualized as its body. It does not become completely itself until the

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body is more or less full grown.” In other words, since the expression of both physical and mental attributes occur in later stages of human development, they cannot be fully or properly assessed in infants and toddlers. Huxley did not deny that environmental factors influenced mental development, but concludes that “to study human psychology exclusively in babies is like studying the anatomy of frogs exclusively in tadpoles.”

So, by the end of the 1920s, Huxley had pronounced his misgivings for both Freud and Watson, but to who, if anyone, did he lend credibility? The answer is complex because he never subscribed to any single doctrine, preferring instead to collect viable ideas from several outlooks. It can be said, however, that William James was a major influence; Huxley regularly cites James throughout the 1920s in essays ranging from jazz to insanity to mysticism. One reviewer in the late 1920s even argued that Huxley’s thoughts demonstrated “a revival in the spirit of William James’s pluralism,” adding that Huxley consistently exhibited “the principle that man, who should be as diverse, undulating and supple as the infinitely varied reality in which he plunges, is forever enslaving himself to some artificially simple system in the hope of dignifying his existence by an artificial consistency.” In other words, not only did Huxley echo James’s pluralism, he also shared his aversion for ideological conformity, demonstrated by his pragmatic approach to systems of knowledge. Another psychologist who influenced Huxley in the 1920s was James Leuba. Leuba’s assertion, that mystical states are humanistic in nature, played a significant role in leading Aldous to his concept of human potentialities. But besides Leuba, the

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272 Ibid., 158.
273 Ibid.
only other contemporary psychologist Huxley applauded in the 1920s was the former Freudian acolyte, Carl Jung.  

In Jung Huxley did not see another psychologist posing as a hardened scientist; he saw an intuitive, philosophical thinker who, like William James, accounted for the mind’s spiritual dimensions. “Reading [Jung’s] books,” he writes, “you feel that here is a man who genuinely understands human beings in the profound intuitive way in which a good novelist, like Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky, understands them.”

Considering Huxley’s veneration for those Russian novelists (in one interview he said that Dostoevsky was six times as profound as Kierkegaard), one can hardly imagine a higher compliment. It is likely that Huxley saw somewhat of a self-reflection in Jung—an intuitive thinker, unafraid to traverse disciplinary boundaries, or, in his own words, a “psychologist…possessed by a multiplicity of talents.”

Another similarity between Huxley and Jung is that they both augmented the Freudian model of the unconscious. While Jung’s model also included the collective unconscious, containing cultural symbols and archetypes, Huxley’s included the realm of human potentialities, which contains latent elements like insight, creativity, and inspiration. “The unconscious,” Huxley explains, “can in all circumstances work to our advantage or to our disadvantage—it is both negative and positive, creative and destructive.”

Notably absent from Huxley’s writings on psychology at this time were the contributions

277 Ibid., “Varieties of Intelligence,” 170.
280 Huxley, The Human Situation, 152.
of Otto Rank, who, after a traumatic break with Freud in the mid-1920s, introduced his own approach called *Will Therapy*. For nearly twenty years Rank had been one of Freud’s most loyal disciples, but, eventually, began to question some of Freud's most essential principles. For example, in Freudian doctrine the Oedipus complex signals the beginning of all psychological conditions, but Rank preempted this starting point with another occurrence: the traumatic ordeal of birth. Secondly, in contrast to the Freudian rule that analysts should remain emotionally detached from their subjects, Rank argued that such a impersonal approach isolates patients, restricting their ability to reconcile psychological breakthroughs. He also challenged Freud’s method of constantly dredging childhood experiences; instead, he encouraged his patients to embrace the ‘here and now’ of emotional experience. Finally, Rank believed that the antagonistic *inner-struggle* between Ego and Id carries the unfortunate side-effect of inhibiting the patient’s creative abilities. In summary, Will Therapy promotes emotional *familiarization* rather than emotional *inhibition*, a concept which not only represents a departure from Freud’s emphasis on inner-struggle, but also, according to Rank, engenders more creative ways of thinking, feeling, and living in the moment.

After breaking with Freud, Rank relocated to Paris where he compiled his theories on creativity in *Art and Artists*. The book was an instant hit and became considerably influential in the libertine Parisian art scene of the 1930s, attracting a cult following of emerging artists like

A case can be made that Rank’s ideas reflect D.H. Lawrence’s from *Fantasia of the Unconscious*: Although Rank made no claims about the primacy of the body, his thoughts on familiarizing the self with raw emotional experience for artistic purposes echoes Lawrence’s claim that inspiration emerged from embracing one’s primal nature—both views equate creativity to the recognition and acceptance of unconscious material.

Though it would seem that Rank’s more positive framing of the unconscious (and its creative potentialities) would have drawn praise from Huxley, this was not the case. In his later writings Huxley actually criticizes him for his reluctance to recognize psychophysical holism, explaining that Rank (along with Freud, Jung, and to a lesser extent, Adler) “seem to have imagined that they could understand human minds without taking into account the bodies with which those minds are indissolubly associated.” As dismissive as his critique appears, it illustrates the gravity to which Huxley assigned his mind-body concept—an idea, he thought, that even a non-psychologist like D.H. Lawrence had intuitively understood.

Sadly, perhaps the greatest irony of Lawrence’s life was how it ended. As much as he insisted upon the primacy of the body, he certainly neglected to care for his own, especially after contracting tuberculosis in 1929. Throughout his life, Lawrence had dealt with a host of illnesses, but regularly refused medical care because of his aversion to physicians, and science in general. “His dislike of science,” lamented Huxley, “was passionate and expressed itself in the most fantastically unreasonable terms.” On several occasions both Aldous and Maria begged Lawrence to see a physician (they also implored his wife Freida, who, according to Bedford,

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287 Ibid., 76.
only enabled D.H.'s obstinance), but by the time he finally agreed, the prognosis was not good: “one lung was practically gone and the other affected.”\textsuperscript{288} Less than a year later, Aldous received a postcard from D.H. indicating that he had finally “submitted” to a sanatorium. Sensing the urgency of the situation, the Huxleys rushed to be at his side, but by this point D.H.’s condition gave “the impression that he was living by sheer force of will and by nothing else.”\textsuperscript{289} With Aldous and Maria present, Lawrence died within a few days.

Over thirty years later, in an interview given shortly before his own death, Huxley reflected on the single-minded worldview that hastened his Lawrence’s demise. “We have to make the best of both worlds,” he says,

> The blood and the flesh are there—and in certain respects they are wiser than the intellect...but on the other hand, we have to do a lot of things with the conscious mind...This in the whole art of life: making the best of all the worlds. Here again is one of those fatal examples of trying to make everything conform to the standard of only one world. Seeing that we are amphibians—it’s no good.\textsuperscript{290}

To “make the best of all worlds” is the single precept that underscores Huxley’s life and work in the twentieth century. Lawrence’s premature death, as he pointed out, resulted from his vain attempt to force all of reality into a single ideological system. Huxley, though he learned a great deal from Lawrence’s philosophy, came to realize that the true power of ideas is their adaptability—an outlook that allows flexibility in a world that is ever-changing.

Following Lawrence’s death in 1930, the Huxleys purchased a small cottage in the bohemian commune of Sanary-sur-Mer on the southern coast of France. With the rise of Italian fascism in the 1920s, and German Nazism in the 1930s, the sunny French village, known for its

\textsuperscript{288} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 213.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 224.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid., 211.
coved beaches and permissive social attitudes, became a haven for several well-heeled European intellectuals.\textsuperscript{291} The combination of French liberalism and affluent intellectualism engendered somewhat of a hedonistic society in which the Huxleys participated.

Sanary residents surely would have noticed the young couple cruising along the narrow streets in their cherry-red convertible Bugatti Roadster, which, Bedford writes, was “their one great personal extravagance,” purchased thanks to Huxley’s most recent contract with Chatto and Windus.\textsuperscript{292} But since Aldous’s poor vision prevented his driving, Maria always took the wheel and quickly became an auto-enthusiast, notorious around town for her heavy foot.\textsuperscript{293} Pushing the car’s limits became the couple’s favorite pastime and Aldous encapsulated their exhilaration writing, “When the car has passed seventy-two, or thereabouts, one begins to feel an unprecedented sensation—a sensation which no man in the days of horses ever felt. It grows intenser with every increase of velocity.”\textsuperscript{294}

Besides pleasure cruising with Maria, Aldous noticed many other lively distractions along the French Riviera in the 1930s, and, since the moral ambiguities of polite society was a common theme in his novels, this sort of unbridled sensualism became a special interest. From feasting, dancing, and the ‘talkies’, to the more degenerate excesses like gambling, prostitution, and narcotics, Huxley detailed the local elations in an essay titled, “Wanted, A New Pleasure.” It amazed him that with all the technological advances in the past century, so few had produced new pleasures—the gramophone and the talkies, though novel inventions, were merely devices

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 274.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 213.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 146.
that allowed larger groups to enjoy age-old amusements like music and theater. Pursuant to this observation, the following thoughts helped inspire what eventually became his most popular and critically acclaimed work: “So far as I can see the only possible new pleasure would be one derived from the invention of a new drug—of a more efficient and less harmful substitute for alcohol and cocaine.”

Though he concluded that the best new pleasure technology had produced was the sensation of high velocity in an automobile, his idea for a new, nontoxic wonder-drug had sparked the idea of ‘soma’—a central theme of his next novel, *Brave New World*.

While researching for this dystopian fantasy, Huxley stumbled across an “unpromising-looking treasure” in his local bookstore: an English edition of a German book named *Phantastica*. Published in 1924 by a pharmacologist named Louis Lewin, *Phantastica* is among the first scientific surveys of psychotropic substances, while also one of the earliest works of ethnobotany. From the kava-kava root of the south Pacific to the peyote cactus of northern Mexico, Lewin meticulously catalogues all known mind-altering substances from every corner of the world and chronicles their cultural significance, chemical composition, and psychological effects. After identifying nearly fifty drugs, Lewin classified them into five groups based on their cognitive effects: inebriantia, exitantia, euphorica, hypnotica, and phantastica.

Recounting his excitement for the book, Huxley comments that, despite its density, “I read it from cover to cover with a passionate and growing interest.”

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295 Ibid., 260-261
thought, was the common drive that people seemed to possess for exploring alternative states of consciousness for religious purposes, citing alcohol in the cults of ancient Greece, tobacco and peyote in indigenous American ceremonies, and mushrooms in the shamanic cultures of Siberia. “How many of the current ideas of eternity, of heaven, of supernatural states,” he asks, “are ultimately derived from the experiences of drug takers?”

Figuring that perpetual drug use would have eventually proved an unsustainable practice, he reasons that “the devotional exercises of the later mystics are all designed to reproduce the drug’s miraculous effects by purely psychological means.” He concludes with the warning that “all existing drugs are treacherous and harmful…the heaven into which they usher their victims soon turns to a hell of sickness and moral degradation,” but adds, “the man who invents such a substance [an effective nontoxic drug] will be counted among the greatest benefactors of suffering humanity.”

Inspired by this idea, over the summer of 1931 Huxley wrote *Brave New World* in which he appropriates the word “soma” from a mythical drug portrayed in the ancient Indian book of Vedic hymns known as the *Rig-Veda*. However, in his iteration, the “euphoric, narcotic, pleasantly hallucinant” substance is physically harmless. He describes its use in the year 2540, a time when citizens voluntarily dosed themselves with soma to escape stressful and/or unpleasant emotions. In addition, using soma was not stigmatized—the opposite was true. People expected those with troublesome thoughts to use the drug in order to prevent spreading their negative feelings to others. In this way the citizens of Huxley’s dystopia psychologically

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299 Ibid., 304
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
conditioned themselves to perpetuate a eugenically stratified, consumer driven culture that worshipped pleasure and feared nonconformity.

*Brave New World* struck a deep nerve in the collective attitudes towards applied psychology in the rapidly changing world of the early 1930s. One review from a biochemistry professor states that “Mr. Huxley, whether consciously or not, has incorporated the views of many psychologists.” Citing Freudian and Behaviorist techniques, he explains that “methods of education by continual suggestion and all the possibilities of conditional reflexes are brilliantly described.” 303 The professor concluded that “Huxley, of course, sees so clearly what the psychologists do not,” namely, that such a society “is incompatible with the pursuit of truth, with love, with art, with spontaneous delight.” 304

In another review by the social critic Rebecca West, she indicates that Huxley’s dystopia “is actually the kind of society that various living people…in connection with the Bolshevist and Behaviorist movements, have expressed a desire to establish.” 305 West concludes that Huxley “is attacking the new spirit which tries to induce man to divert in continual insignificant movements relating to the material framework of life all his force, and to abandon the practice of speculating about his existence.” 306

Not all contemporary reviewers, however, appreciated Huxley’s satiric vision. One such example was a review contributed by Granville Hicks, a registered communist, who took offense to Huxley’s disparagement of utopianism. “With war in Asia, bankruptcy in Europe, and

304 Ibid., 203-204.
306 Ibid., 202.
starvation everywhere," he writes, “what do you suppose Aldous Huxley is worrying about? He is worrying about the unpleasantness of life in the utopia that, as he sees it, that is just a century or two ahead.”

Hicks goes on to describe the world, “where mass production methods have been perfected [and] Freudian psychology has triumphed,” then questions Huxley’s privilege and cynicism, pointing out that, with his “money, social position, talent, friends, [and] prestige…he is effectively insulated from the misery of the masses.”

Considering Huxley’s undeniably posh lifestyle during a period so steeped with human hardship, such a critique was probably inevitable—what right had he to mock utopian ideals?

Historian R.S. Deese explains that the trend of utopian idealism “reached a heightened pitch in the 1930s when the global economic collapse seemed to expose the weaknesses of classical liberalism and underline what many saw as the necessity of social and economic planning on an unprecedented scale.”

He concludes that competing visions for the ideal society would be the “ubiquitous element in the great ideological and geopolitical conflicts” in the years to follow, citing “the Second World War, the Cold War, and the plethoras of local revolutions and proxy wars that punctuated the global trend of decolonization after 1945.”

It can be argued, therefore, that Brave New World was not explicitly an attack on utopian thought, but an attack on the popular ideas of the time which, if implemented in the name of some misguided utopian ideal, could result in the perpetuation of psychological conformity and destroy the human spirit. On the other hand, Huxley argues that in a more “humanistic model of

308 Ibid., 219-220.
309 Deese, We are Amphibians, 58.
310 Ibid.
society,” even mind-changing drugs could be put to moral, practical use.\footnote{Huxley, \textit{Complete Essays Vol. II}, “Science and Civilization,” (1932), 155.} Indeed, Huxley remained a student of utopian experiments such as the Oneida colony and the Llano del Rio colony insisting, in pragmatic fashion, that even failed experiments “contributed to our knowledge of that most difficult and important of all arts—the art of living together in harmony with benefits for all concerned.”\footnote{Huxley, \textit{Complete Essays, Vol. V}, “Ozymandias,” (1956), 309.}

In the 1930s Huxley’s voice was not the only one that rallied against psychological conformity. In 1934 Carl Jung published “The Development of Personality,” an enthused discourse upholding the value of individuality while showcasing his own thoughts on human potential. Jung initiates the article with the thesis: “the ultimate aim and the strongest desire of all mankind is to develop \textit{personality}”—a word he imbibes with a far loftier significance than its common definition.\footnote{Carl Jung, “The Development of Personality,” from \textit{The Essential Jung,}, Ed. Anthony Storr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 191.} According to Jung, personality is the optimum development of the whole individual and the full realization of authenticity, which, he wisely acknowledges, is an unattainable ideal.\footnote{Ibid., 196.} In other words, one may strive towards personality, but never fully posses it.

Like Huxley’s notion of latent human potential, Jung’s ‘personality’ dwells somewhere in the depths of the unconscious mind— theoretically available to everyman, but realized by few. Using the “basement” metaphor, Jung explains that, due to the prevalence of Freudian psychology, many are “frightened by the possibilities lurking in the subterranean chambers of
their being.” Personality, he explains, not only requires faith in oneself, it manifests only when one detaches from the common consciousness of the masses. Additionally, Jung argues that since personality is the root of individual significance, its suppression invariably leads to neuroses.

Reflecting Lawrence’s thoughts, Jung claims that in antiquity, those who had developed personality were thought to have been possessed, divinely inspired, or supernaturally gifted—an understanding which accounts for the word ‘inspired’, which in Latin translates roughly to ‘inhalation of a spirit’. Psychologically speaking, Jung argues that those who have realized ‘personality’ have actually established a conscious connection to an “inner-voice,” which he calls vocation. Awareness of one’s vocation, he continues, “destines a man to emancipate himself from the herd,” but conversely, he warns, those with a pathological understanding of their vocation “will be swept away by the blind flux of psychic events and destroyed.” In other words, individuals lacking a healthy recognition of their inner-voice may develop schizophrenic symptoms instead of personality.

In his concluding remarks, Jung argues that personality is equivalent to the Eastern idea of enlightenment—that “Personality is Tao.” It is likely that Huxley appreciated Jung’s analysis as it dovetailed in many places with his own thoughts on human potential, but Jung failed to provide any practical instructions for how one accesses personality besides faith, trust,

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315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., 206.
317 Ibid., 199.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid., 209.
and fidelity in oneself. Jung admits to this shortcoming explaining, “I should like to regard all I say here as a tentative attempt to approach the problem of personality without making any claim to solve it.” Nevertheless, Jung’s conclusion that “personality is Tao” aligns with Huxley’s presentiments about “real individuality, Lao-Tsu’s individuality,” as he had observed in 1925.

Also in 1934 professor Leuba published his latest book: God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man. Perhaps anticipating that Leuba might follow through on his concluding remarks from Psychology of Religious Mysticism, namely, that mystical practices might be secularized and used for psychological gain, Huxley devoured the book within a month of its release. In a review titled, “Religion, Science and Man,” he reports Leuba’s thesis, “that believers derive great psychological and even physiological benefits from the practice of their respective religions,” and that those same benefits can “be obtained in other, non-religious ways.” Essentially Leuba argues that, through secular revisions of religious teachings, individuals can fulfill their ideal purposes more effectively. However, Huxley’s dissatisfaction was apparent—he criticizes Leuba’s failure to recognize that “Most human beings feel a strong desire to believe in something certain and unquestionable…to feel themselves associated with other human beings in a common cause,” but in modern times, he explains, this human impulse has been commandeered by nationalism, which he mocks as “a crusading pseudo-religion.”

Besides this sizable critique, Huxley also seemed frustrated in Leuba’s failure to address the psychophysical mechanisms of spiritual techniques. Although some psychologists had begun

\[320\] Ibid., 205.

\[321\] Huxley, Letters, 245.


\[323\] Ibid., 163
to touch upon mystical, and even Eastern religious themes, to Huxley, they all seemed to avoid making any claims about the mind-body connection to spiritual exercises.

Finally, much to his excitement, in the summer of 1934 Huxley discovered a new book written by a practicing psychologist, and fellow Oxford alum, named Geraldine Coster. Coster’s book, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, features the very material Leuba had so disappointingly omitted in *God or Man*. Wisely, however, before unpacking the psychology of spiritual techniques, she opens by outlining the strengths and limitations of Psychoanalysis. Coster points out that although analysis gives patients “a means of distinguishing between reality and fantasy,” allowing them to shatter “their most comfortable and anesthetizing delusions,” it often leaves them with “an awareness of acute dissatisfaction…driven to hunt for something more satisfying.”[^324] This critique is analogous to Huxley’s opinion that analysis makes the subject “conscious only of the worst part of themselves,” leaving them fragmented and “unable to realize individuality to the full.”[^325] Addressing this shortcoming, Coster argues that Psychoanalysis provides only a [partial] solution to the healing process. “Analytical treatment,” she writes, “ought to be a precursor of a continuous phase of development.”[^326]

In the following pages Coster introduces the “six recognized systems of Indian philosophy,” and emphasizes that their approaches range “from the atheistic and purely materialistic…to the opposite view.”[^327] Given these variations, she decides to focus on one particular system called *Sankhya* because, “more than any of the other Eastern systems [it] has

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[^326]: Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, 7.

[^327]: Ibid., 9.
been applied to practical problems of individual psychology” and “can be fruitfully used as the basis for individual experiment.”\textsuperscript{328} After citing a Sankhyan philosopher named Patanjali, whose yogic sutras are considered “the most authoritative expositions of the science of yoga,” Coster states her thesis: “Yoga contains the clue needed by the West if the analytical method and theory is to reach its fullest scope as a regenerating and re-creating factor in modern life.”\textsuperscript{329} She goes on to detail how the “clearing and cleansing of the mento-emotional nature is accomplished by certain [yogic] exercises,” and concludes that a \textit{systematic combination} of analysis and yoga “may well result in an enlargement and intensification of consciousness which will inaugurate a new and more hopeful era for mankind.”\textsuperscript{330}

Coster addresses many of the questions that Leuba raised in \textit{Psychology of Religious Mysticism}, but failed to resolve in \textit{God or Man}. Where Leuba dithers and offers vague suggestions, Coster provides solid and informed assessments. By first pointing out the limitations of Psychoanalysis, \textit{then} explaining how yogic practices address those limitations, she shows how the two systems compliment each another and form a more complete approach to applied psychology.

Huxley’s enthusiasm for Coster’s work was palpable in a letter to Julian from the summer of 1934. After summarizing her thesis, he writes:

\begin{quote}
I’ve always felt that it was vitally necessary for people to have some efficient technique for personal development…It seems to me quite possible that some modification of this yoga technique may provide what’s needed—the more so, as the author of this book points out, since it is as entirely independent of religion as Freudianism—many Indian yogis being in fact atheist.\textsuperscript{331}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 10-11.
\textsuperscript{330} On ‘clearing and cleansing’, Ibid., 34; On ‘systematic combination’, Ibid., 247.
\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Letters}, 382
Indeed, in *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Leuba made the false assumption that all mystical practices were invariably tied to religion; and while this is almost entirely true in the West, Coster’s more comprehensive analysis of Eastern philosophy dispels that illusion. Her knowledge that there were dozens of approaches to Eastern metaphysics, both religious and atheistic, signaled to Huxley that mystical techniques could be explored without having to accept any religious dogma.

In addition, it is significant to point out that Jung, who many regarded as psychology’s top authority on Asian traditions, actually criticized Westerners who attempted Eastern spiritual practices, writing that they “lose [themselves] in a midst of words and ideas that could never have originated in European brains and could never be profitably grafted upon them.” But, Coster avoided Jung’s assumptions and explains the mind-body dynamics of yoga in terms that Huxley could understand: the language of applied psychology. In doing so, she lowered many of the cultural barriers surrounding yoga and demystified it as a psychophysical technique.

*Yoga and Western Psychology* marked a significant turning point in Huxley’s approach to psychology: not only did it confirm his assumptions about the flaws of analysis, it provided the intellectual tools he needed to approach spiritual techniques from a secular psychological position, emboldening Huxley to investigate their therapeutic qualities. In short, Coster opened the doors for Huxley’s next phase of psychological examination.

Aldous read Coster’s book in 1934—fifteen years after writing *Crome Yellow*, the novel that launched his career. In that time he had ascended not only as a novelist, but as a

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psychological critic and amateur theorist as well. In 1925 he began publishing critical essays on contemporary psychology, and although he contested the full legitimacies of the most popular systems, he used a pragmatic lens to salvage serviceable ideas from each approach. His status as an informed outside observer also freed him to consider and integrate unconventional ideas from beyond disciplinary boundaries—an advantage that allowed his own perspectives to evolve. Additionally, Huxley used his imagination and foresight to do what none of the contemporary psychological theorists could: speculate about the moral and societal implications of Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism drawn to their absurd conclusions. In summary, Huxley spent a good ten years critiquing the theories and contingencies of contemporary psychology, but, until reading Coster, his engagement was strictly an intellectual pursuit. Coster’s work inspired Huxley to take the next step in substantiating the ideas he had compiled in the last decade. In the years that followed, Huxley utilized his body as much as his mind as he initiated a more participatory inquiry of human psychology.
Chapter III - Methods

Inspired by Coster, starting in the fall of 1934 Huxley began to study and personally investigate a series of mind-body techniques to gauge their psychological effects. Embracing the Jamesian spirit of radical empiricism, he remained receptive while evaluating the results of each new trial. For years Huxley maintained this approach, exploring methods such as meditation, yogic breathing, the ‘Alexander Technique’, dietary regimens, hypnosis, and the ‘Bates Method,’ and compiled many of his initial thoughts and observations in *Ends and Means*—his most philosophical book of essays to date.

But as signs pointed towards another total war in Europe, the Huxleys relocated to Los Angeles in 1937 where Aldous published a book on the Bates Method titled, *The Art of Seeing*, which includes his theory of psychophysical dynamics. Thanks in part to his experience with mind-body techniques, and also to his growing interest in mysticism, in the years between 1937 and 1945 Huxley added considerable depth to his psychological views and, to his great satisfaction, began to notice an early vanguard of psychologists touting holistic theories that reflected many of his own long-held beliefs.

The years following WWII saw a rise of interest in Eastern philosophies and Huxley’s 1945 *The Perennial Philosophy*, a book the philosopher W.R. Inge called, “probably the most important treatise on mysticism that we have had for many years,” tied Eastern and Western mystical strands to James’s *Varieties* and Huxley’s own collected insights.333 The trend to imbue Western systems of knowledge with Eastern ideas gained steam in the late 1940s and Huxley’s

work played a significant role, especially concerning emerging trends in psychotherapy.

In the fall of 1934 Aldous and Maria left their beloved cottage in Sanary and moved to London. Although the couple preferred the sunny Mediterranean climate, they were eager to reconnect with family and friends in the British capital. Huxley’s most significant new friendship at this time was with Gerald Heard, an eccentric Irish polymath praised by E.M. Forster as “one of the most penetrating minds in England.” Huxley first met Heard in 1929 when he, Julian, and H.G. Wells agreed to sponsor Heard’s literary enterprise, The Realist—a monthly journal about scientific humanism. Like Huxley, Heard was an intellectual prodigy whose interests included history, mystical philosophy, anthropology, religion, and science.

Within months the two had become inseparable. On several occasions their afternoon walks extended well past midnight as they wandered along the London streets, lost in conversation and oblivious to time. At the time, Aldous had been struggling with a case of insomnia, which persisted despite using sleeping pills, and he appealed to Heard who had been practicing meditation and yogic breathing techniques for years. Gerald agreed to teach his friend, but after a few weeks Aldous realized that achieving actual results was much harder than he had expected. Soon after initiating his practice, Huxley declared in a letter to the poet Robert Nichols, “I have a considerable belief in such psychophysical methods of mind and body control,” but complains, “The bore of this yoga mind-control is that it’s rightfully difficult and

335 Huxley, Letters, 302.
337 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 291.
Many scholars have argued that “it was Heard who converted Huxley, in the 1930s, from skepticism to mysticism.” A contemporary literary named W.Y. Tindall took a similar stance, but predated Heard’s influence, asserting that “D.H. Lawrence had prepared Huxley for transcendentalism and after his death, Heard appealed where Lawrence had left off.” However, Huxley’s writings from *Jesting Pilate* and others indicate that his interest in mysticism emerged at least as early as 1926 (predating his friendship with Lawrence) with evidence suggesting that it stemmed from Western mystics like Böhme and Blake, and, of course, psychologists like Leuba and James. Furthermore, it is significant to note that Huxley’s abrupt decision to initiate his period of mind-body trials came directly after reading Coster’s analysis of yogic practices. In other words, Huxley’s interest in mysticism, as both a philosophy and a practice, was not the result of some magnetic personal influence; it resulted from his opinion that contemporary psychology was largely incomplete, and that, through mystical practices, its shortcomings might be addressed.

Huxley remained dedicated to his new practice, but it took a full 18 months before he realized any psychological effects. In a letter to T.S. Eliot he writes, “I find, as one persists, one is able to keep the mind directed, focused, one-pointed more easily, after a few months than at the beginning.” Despite his modest gains, Huxley’s belief in the value of meditation and breathing techniques remained: “A great deal could be done, I believe, to make this immensely

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valuable spiritual training more easily available…”

Aldous continued to practice meditation for the remainder of his life and, as time went on, he became increasingly convinced of its psychological benefits, especially after his in-depth study of mysticism in the 1940s. However, in the 1930s his immediate goal was to investigate several mind-body techniques, and, accordingly, he became eager to begin his next trial.

In the winter of 1935 playwright George Bernard Shaw told Huxley about a charismatic Tasmanian-born therapist named F. Mathias Alexander who had successfully treated him with an original mind-body method called the *Alexander Technique*. Essentially, the practice consists of subtle physiological adjustments designed to reduce respiratory and kinesthetic tensions, however, many clients also claimed to experience profound psychological effects including mood elevation and enhanced confidence. Similar to other psychophysical techniques, no one knew exactly how or why Alexander’s technique worked, but enthusiastic testimonies from esteemed intellectuals like Anthony M. Ludovici, John Dewey, and Sir Charles Sherrington were too considerable for many, including Huxley, to ignore.

The mind-body aspect of the Alexander Technique was undeniable: its initial effectiveness depended on the subject’s ability to maintain their awareness of respiratory and kinesthetic operations. Alexander believed that by enduring an extended period of cognizance

344 The philosopher Anthony Ludovici’s 1933 publication, *Health and Education through Self-Mastery* was the first book advocating the “Alexander Technique” *not* written by Alexander; the American psychologist and educational reformer John Dewey contributed forwards to several of Alexander’s books; Sir Charles Sherrington, the 1932 Nobel Prize winner in physiology, was a student of Alexander and praised his technique in his book *The Endeavor of Jean Fernel* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1946), 89.
and compliance of his instructions, the adjustments would eventually become second nature, initiating a new and improved default mode for bodily operations. Of equal importance, he thought, was faith in the technique; like hypnosis or Psychoanalysis, he insisted that the subject must enter a state of passivity at the beginning of each lesson. A suitable analogy is that of a mechanic—even the most skilled technician cannot fine-tune an engine while it is running. Similarly, the subject should remain passive while the instructor makes the necessary adjustments. Alexander believed that charisma was also important—since results hinged on the subject’s acceptance, an instructor exuding confidence achieves higher rates of success.

Considering the importance of this two-way dynamic, one can see why the technique often failed with overly skeptical subjects. These seemingly arbitrary but essential conditions led many to label Alexander an “inspired quack,” however, like Psychoanalysis, the quantity of patients experiencing real results prevented the technique from being labeled a hoax.

Perhaps the most notable proponent of the Alexander Technique was the esteemed American psychologist John Dewey. Dewey came to Alexander in 1916 after a string of personal and professional difficulties had triggered an assortment of stress-related health issues. The restorative effects of Alexander’s sessions had impressed him to such a degree that Dewey risked his professional reputation by writing enthusiastic prefaces for three of Alexander’s books, including the following excerpt from Alexander’s 1923 *Constructive"

346 Leonard Woolf said, Alexander “was a quack, but an honest and inspired quack”: Bedford, *Aldous Huxley*, 312.
Conscious Control of the Individual:

Through modern science we have mastered to a wonderful extent the use of things as tools for accomplishing results upon and through other things. The result is all but a universal state of confusion, discontent, and strife. The one factor which is the primary tool in the use of all these other tools—namely, ourselves—in other words, our own psychophysical disposition...And this indispensable thing is exactly what Mr. Alexander has accomplished.348

Although many of Dewey’s contemporaries criticized his support of Alexander, Dewey continued to defend the technique until his death (he lived to be ninety-three) insisting that it was responsible for 90% of his overall health.349

Between Shaw’s testimony and Dewey’s psychological stamp of approval, the Alexander Technique was the perfect fit for Huxley’s next mind-body trial. He started lessons in 1935, but the first report of his progress came months later in a letter written by Maria. “He goes to [Alexander] each day since the autumn,” she writes to a friend. “He certainly has made a new and unrecognizable person of Aldous, not physically only but mentally.”350 Aldous’s improvements were so convincing that Maria also began lessons, but knowing that so many judged Alexander a fraud, she implored her friends: “Probably you will think we have gone cracky, so did I think of Aldous until I saw the results and particularly since I went myself.”351 In fact, Aldous and Maria were so impressed, they even made their son Matthew take lessons over the summer. In short, as a psychophysical method, Huxley rated the Alexander Technique

350 Huxley, Letters, 400.
351 Ibid.
highly effective and, like meditation, continued its practice indefinitely.\textsuperscript{352} In the near-term, however, circumstances for Aldous and his family began to look a lot less certain.

1937 was a critical juncture for the Huxleys as German aggression and the resulting European volatility temporarily sidelined Aldous’s mind-body trials. In the previous year the world watched as Hitler violated the terms of Versailles and remilitarized the Rhineland. With tensions escalating between Great Britain and Germany, Huxley shifted his attention to politics.

Believing at the time that diplomatic solutions should be pursued to prevent the miseries of another world war, Aldous and Gerald became key figures in the “Peace Pledge” movement, though they faced considerable popular opposition.\textsuperscript{353} Responding to one of Huxley’s pacifist articles, the poet Cecil Day Lewis lashed-out at his former Eton professor, calling Huxley’s ideals “nothing more than a great, big, beautiful, idealist bubble—lovely to look at, no doubt; charming to live in, perhaps: but with little reference to the real facts and inadequate protection against a four-engined bomber.” To add insult to injury, Lewis concluded that Huxley was content to “while away the time with [his] ‘spiritual exercises.’”\textsuperscript{354}

Considering that the Peace Pledge movement was already unpopular in 1936, Hitler’s decision to support Spanish fascism by bombing the Basque city of Guernica in 1937 made Huxley’s pacifism even less tenable. With the saber-rattling in Britain approaching deafening levels, Heard convinced Huxley to join him on a lecture tour in the United States where the pacifist movement was still strong. Accordingly, in the spring of 1937 the Huxleys packed their belongings and accompanied Heard aboard the S.S. Normandie en route to New York, hardly

\textsuperscript{352} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 313.

\textsuperscript{353} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 310-311.

realizing at the time that their move would be permanent.\(^{355}\)

Arriving in the U.S. without accommodations, the first couple months consisted of Aldous, Maria, Matthew, and Gerald touring the country by car, stopping occasionally to visit various sites and individuals. For example, in North Carolina they paused to see the recognized founder of parapsychology, Dr. J.B. Rhine; in Chicago they met with the psychologist W.H. Sheldon; and in New Mexico they paid a visit to Freida Lawrence.\(^{356}\) After almost a year of wandering, the British expatriates finally settled in Los Angeles—the Huxleys in Hollywood and Gerald just minutes away in Laurel Canyon.\(^{357}\)

The Huxleys had no problems striking new friendships in Hollywood. Soon after their arrival, they fell in with a rather eclectic group including Hollywood notables Charlie Chaplin, Paulette Goddard, and Anita Loos; the astronomer Edwin Hubble and his wife Grace; the Vedantic guru Swami Prabhavananda, and the self-proclaimed *anti-guru* Jiddhu Krishnamurti.\(^{358}\) Aldous also published two books that year, *An Encyclopedia of Pacifism* (editor and contributor), and *Ends and Means*, a book of essays containing the subtitle: *An Enquiry Into the Nature of Ideals and Into the Methods Employed for Their Realization*.\(^{359}\)

In *Ends and Means* Huxley reports on his mind-body experiments but, in its entirety, he describes the book as a “synthesis, starting from a metaphysical basis and building up through individual and group psychology to politics and economics.”\(^{360}\) The central thesis, however,


\(^{357}\) Ibid., 358.

\(^{358}\) Ibid., 358-361.

\(^{359}\) Ibid., 757.

\(^{360}\) Huxley, *Letters*, 408.
closely relates to the following statement from William James’s *Pragmatism*:

> I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds.\(^{361}\)

Similarly, Huxley argues that every individual, over the course of their life, constructs a unique philosophical system or ‘personal metaphysic,’ which not only interprets one’s reality, but also determines one’s ethics and conduct.\(^{362}\) Pursuant to this, the book contains a series of practical *means* (including, but not limited to mind-body techniques) with which individuals may construct their truest and most comprehensive personal metaphysic. Essentially, *Ends and Means* does not moralize, but offers methods designed to increase personal awareness.

Concerning the title, Huxley explains, “the ends cannot justify the means, for the simple and obvious reason that the means employed determine the nature of the ends produced.”\(^{363}\) In other words, Huxley invites his readers to take a fresh look at the *ends* they have come to accept in themselves and their world, then offers a series of practical *means* to examine those precepts.

In addition to psychophysical exercises, *Ends and Means* also promotes other kinds of awareness techniques which, he believes, should be included in standard education. For example, citing psychological training through the arts, he writes that by learning to play music students will develop awareness, coordination, harmony, and shared emotion.\(^{364}\) Another skillset is the ability to identify and resist psychological suggestion, insisting that students “be taught to examine all personifications, all metaphors, and all abstractions occurring in the articles they


\(^{363}\) Ibid., 334-335.

\(^{364}\) Ibid., 283-284.
read, [and] the speeches they listen to.”

One example he identifies is the deliberate personification of nation-states during times of war: “Britain is an imperial power—she must defend her empire.”

With the rise of psychological tactics in both propaganda and advertising, Huxley argues that a basic education should arm students with the ability to detect and deconstruct loaded words and phrases.

Of all the methods mentioned in *Ends and Means*, Huxley’s review of the Alexander Technique stands out in particular. Instead of simply listing his perceived psychological gains, he begins with the premise that “mind and body form a single organic whole,” and “what happens in the mind affects the body; what happens in the body affects the mind.”

Building upon this holistic thesis, he considers how negative physical conditions influence one’s state of being. First, he reasons that individuals with maladjusted bodies experience regular physical pain, forcing an expenditure of mental energy on disassociation just to get-on with everyday life, but, when pain increases to the level where disassociation becomes too costly, it begins to take a toll on one’s personality. “The body is the instrument used by the mind to establish contact with the outside world,” he explains, “[when it is] under strain, the mind’s relations, sensory, emotional, intellectual, conative, with external reality are likely to be unsatisfactory.” He concludes that the Alexander Technique is the only known system of education that prevents physical tension in everyday life while simultaneously strengthening conscious awareness.

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365 Ibid., 290.
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid., 293.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid., 294.
370 Ibid., 295.
Unsurprisingly, the contemporary reviews of *Ends and Means* varied wildly. Cyril Connolly cerebrated it as “Huxley’s most important book,” commenting that although none of his ideas were particularly new, “What is new is Mr. Huxley’s analysis on how they can be applied today.” Charles I. Glicksberg commented that *Ends and Means* “marks the beginning of a new ideological current.” David Daiches, however, charged Huxley with being a “frustrated romantic,” in the sense that “his attitude is based on a search for sources of value among phenomena.” Other were even less kind: a certain contingent from England, still incensed at his pacifist stance, labeled his Huxley’s writings as “self-righteous” and him as “the most dangerous kind of false prophet.”

However, the holistic mind-body approach that Huxley had so passionately defended in *Ends and Means* (and a decade prior in *Proper Studies*), gained a new level of psychological acceptance in the late 1930s, especially after a German physician named Kurt Goldstein published, *The Organism*. Goldstein, a practicing neurologist, was among the first to incorporate Gestalt theory into a physiological context—an idea which eventually became a critical point of reference for Abraham Maslow and the Humanistic psychology movement. During WWI Goldstein had devoted his medical expertise to the physically and emotionally traumatized soldiers returning from battle, but after Hitler seized power in the 1930s, the Jewish doctor’s

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military service was not enough to save him from persecution and imprisonment. Released under conditions of exile, the Rockefeller Foundation allocated funds to relocate the talented physician to Amsterdam. While he awaited authorization to emigrate to the U.S., Goldstein compiled his life’s work in a book titled, *The Organism*. 

In his experience with wounded soldiers Goldstein noticed that physical injuries were often accompanied by corresponding psychological effects, which he interpreted, not as isolated expressions of nerve damage, but as the whole organism coming to terms with a new reality. Accordingly, Goldstein argues that trauma simultaneously affects both mind and body; that the basic tendency of the sick or injured organism is to utilize its existing capacities in the most advantageous way. Conversely, the completely healthy organism strives to maximize its full potential according to its environment. This self-actualizing drive, he concludes, is the primary force that determines behavior. However, in order to draw this holistic connection, Goldstein adopted the Gestaltist’s molar model of perception and applied it to the whole biological organism. Although Huxley’s mind-body appeal from *Proper Studies* did not specifically cite Gestalt psychology, his notion that mind and body has “no separate existence” but forms a single experiential ground, agrees with Goldstein’s thesis.

Huxley and Goldstein had both arrived at the same mind-body conclusion, but from two

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379 Ibid.

380 Ibid., 222-225.

separate perspectives—Huxley from the humanistic angle and Goldstein from the physiological.

“Huxley’s modernity,” concurs Harvard professor Winfield Rogers in 1935, “is his reconciliation of the psychological and humanistic points of view.” On the other hand, “the holistic paradigm of Kurt Goldstein,” writes medical historian James Morley, “integrates biological constructs with a non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic understanding of life. In so doing, it points the way of the future development of humanistic thought in psychology.” Morley concludes that “the principle of holism,” which Goldstein and Huxley had both come to adopt, “is the historical and theoretical cornerstone to Humanistic psychology.”

At the time that Goldstein published Organism, Huxley had just arrived in Hollywood and was about to infuse his holistic views with a heavy dose of mysticism. Heard had discovered that the Vedantists—one of the six major schools of Hindu philosophy—had established a local chapter just miles away. Intrigued, the two drove across town to meet with Swami Prabhavananda, the elder of the society who, in short time, initiated the new arrivals.

Huxley was eager to enhance his knowledge of psychology through Vedanta—at that time, the idea that Hindu philosophy could somehow inform Western psychology was almost entirely dismissed. But by the 1960s many respected psychologists hailed it as “one of the great psychological achievements of all time.” In this sense, Huxley was well ahead of the curve.

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“Theology is mainly an obstacle race,” he writes to Julian in 1938,

In the intervals theologians make the most remarkable psychological discoveries… The modern psychologist has no such obstacle; but on the whole how shallow and how incomplete he is! To find a psychology covering the whole range of human potentiality…one must study the religious philosophers.386

As far back as 1925, Aldous saw that Western psychology stood a lot to gain from Eastern philosophy, especially concerning the mind-body relationship. Through the Vedanta Society, Aldous welcomed the opportunity to integrate this knowledge and experience, but many of his critics simply could not understand Huxley’s increasing interest in mysticism and believed his fiction suffered because of it. Psychologist Floyd W. Matson points out that “critics wrote [Huxley] off for the most part as a pathetic divagation from the main stream: a rather shocking example of failure of nerve quite unrelated to the basic drives and tendencies of contemporary thought.”387 Historian Hal Bridges argues that Huxley’s “divagation” was part of a larger trend that “exemplified the rising American interest in mysticism, especially oriental varieties, that was evident in the age of anxiety after the second world war.”388 Another viewpoint, and one that his contemporary critics failed to recognize, is that, by this point in his career, Huxley’s interests had begun to depart from fiction, in favor of coming to terms with a more comprehensive understanding of the human mind.

Before long, however, it became clear that Huxley and Heard disagreed about what constituted an acceptable level of commitment to the Vedanta society. The Vedantists maintained that, in order to learn the more mystical aspects of its practice, one must commit to a guru.

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386 Huxley, Letters, 438.
Huxley, though eager to learn, was intellectually opposed to all forms of devotionalism; Heard, on the other hand, became fully committed to Prabhavananda and, before long, began spending most of his time chanting and meditating in solitude.\textsuperscript{389} According to Huxley biographer Dana Sawyer, both Aldous and Maria expressed concern that Gerald had become “too wrapped up in his private experience.”\textsuperscript{390}

As wary as Huxley was about Heard and Prabhavananda, he never rejected the teachings of Vedanta and continued to write articles for the society’s newsletter. But as far as his own spiritual growth was concerned, he decided to pursue a less rigid approach. This route became available in 1938 through a budding friendship with another Indian expatriate named Jiddhu Krishnamurti, a spiritual philosopher whose distaste for devotionalism reflected Huxley’s sentiments.

Unlike the guru-disciple relationship pursued by Heard, Krishnamurti requested that Huxley meet him as an equal. Although he had dedicated his life to the study of spiritual matters, Krishnamurti loathed adulation and styled himself as an “anti-guru.” As a young boy the “Theosophical Society” had recruited Krishnamurti and attempted to groom him as their spiritual figurehead. But he eventually rejected their agenda, proclaiming that, ultimately, everyone was responsible for their own spiritual growth—it could not be declared by some mortal authority.\textsuperscript{391} This nonconformist approach suited Huxley’s needs perfectly. Soon after their introduction in 1938, the two became extremely close and the friendship remained strong until Huxley’s death twenty-five years later.

\textsuperscript{389} Sawyer, \textit{Huxley: A Biography}, 110.

\textsuperscript{390} \textit{Ibid}.

Krishnamurti’s humble yet profound insights intrigued Huxley. Maria also commented on his ingenuous appeal writing, “He is charming and amusing and so simple. How he must suffer when he is treated as a prophet?” As such, Huxley was happy to honor his new friend’s request to be treated as an equal, though he once admitted that Krishnamurti’s enlightened persona “called to mind the historical portrayal of the Buddha.” The two frequently walked for hours along the nature trails near Krishnamurti’s house in Ojai, sometimes in complete silence, and other times engrossed in discussions about the metaphysics of time, spiritual paradoxes, and the higher reaches of human consciousness.

Impressed by Huxley’s eclectic knowledge of art, nature, and philosophy, Krishnamurti described their friendship as “strange, affectionate, considerate, and largely non-verbal.” Although Huxley came to Krishnamurti seeking to expand his understanding of spiritual awareness, their exchanges were anything but one-sided. To Huxley, Krishnamurti revealed secrets for enhancing consciousness through practices like yoga, meditation, and fasting; in return, Aldous shared writing techniques and assisted with the production of Krishnamurti’s first manually written book,* which, of course, includes a forward by Huxley.

The style of meditation that Krishnamurti taught Huxley was completely different than the Vedantic method practiced by Heard. Whereas Prabhavananda’s technique required specific positions, locations, and/or concentration upon an object or deity, Krishnamurti’s approach

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*Krishnamurti was credited as the author of earlier books, but their contents consisted almost entirely of transcriptions from speaking engagements.

395 Ibid., 57, 87.
required nothing of the sort. He claimed that meditation hinged on one’s ability to clear the mind of language, thoughts, and symbols with the intent of releasing the ego by submitting to and engaging with the immensity of the present moment. Additionally, Krishnamurti’s method defied the quietism that dominated Heard’s life under Prabhavananda. “Meditation,” he writes, “can take place when you are sitting in a bus or walking in the woods full of light and shadows, or listening to the singing of birds or looking at the face of your wife or child.”

Through his friendship with Krishnamurti, Huxley learned the art of “alert passivity,” a psychological stratagem that encourages the subject to replace his or her thoughts with the spontaneity of the present moment, a practice yielding a mental state that Krishnamurti dubbed *creative reality*. The ubiquity of this wisdom struck Huxley deeply—though an unlikely comparison, Krishnamurti’s spiritual philosophy coincided with one of Aldous’s favorite quotations from his scientifically hardened grandfather:

> Sit down before a fact like a little child, and be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses Nature leads or you shall learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this.

Remarkably, at the core of both Krishnamurti’s and T.H. Huxley’s philosophies was the principle of clearing one’s mind of preconceived notions: for T.H. it was for the sake of objective scientific investigation; for Krishnamurti it was a spiritual device for engaging with higher states of

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397 Lutyens, *Krishnamurti*, 172.
conscious awareness. For both the scientist and spiritualist, the method of ‘alert passivity’
engendered a state of serenity, detachment, and psychological equanimity—a reconciliation
between two seemingly opposed worlds which became paramount to Aldous’s views on human
psychology.

When Huxley first met Krishnamurti in the spring of 1938, his general health seemed to
be in decline. To start the year, not only had he been hospitalized with bronchial pneumonia, his
already compromised vision, which had remained stable for twenty-five years, was, in his own
words, “steadily and rapidly failing.”

Since his initial bout with keratitis punctata, Huxley’s eyes had been treated by various optometrists who had all prescribed chemical drops and
hideously thick lenses for daily use—for reading purposes he required an additional, specialized
lens which resembled a watchmaker’s loupe. Feeling somewhat desperate, Huxley began to
research alternatives for visual improvement and stumbled across the writings of an obscure
American ophthalmologist named W.H. Bates.

In the early 1900s, Dr. Bates had become dissatisfied with the symptomatic treatment of
eyesight. Optometry, he claimed, fixated entirely on the eye’s physical anatomy while neglecting
the associated psychological operations. Also, similar to the premise of the Alexander
Technique, Bates hypothesized that he could improve defective vision through a systematic
process of visual re-education that aimed to reduce unnecessary mental and physical tensions. In
other words, by breaking bad habits and replacing them with correct modes of coordination, he

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402 Huxley, *Letters*, 442.; Huxley writes that he was prescribed bifocals with 8 and 10 diopter lenses. His
special reading glasses were 15 diopters. For comparison, a 1 diopter lens represents 20/40 vision, 2
diopter represents 20/80, etc.

403 Ibid., 25.
believed organic defects could be reduced and even reversed.\textsuperscript{404}

While reading Bates’s \textit{Perfect Sight without Glasses}, Huxley immediately recognized the similarities between the Bates Method and the other psychophysical techniques he had learned. He commented that Bates “understood the principle governing the acquisition of any psychophysical skill, the principle by which I have given the name of \textit{dynamic relaxation}…that paradoxical combination of relaxation with activity.”\textsuperscript{405} In January of 1939, Huxley located a disciple of the late Dr. Bates in Los Angeles named Margaret Corbett, and, using his knowledge of mind-body skills as a foundation, started taking lessons.

Described by Maria as “inventive, patient, intelligent and sympathetic,” Corbett formed an instant chemistry with Aldous, who spent hours in her studio learning the visual exercises and even more time practicing at home. By the beginning of summer, Maria described her husband’s visual improvement as a “miracle.” Not only could he read the standard eye chart at fifteen feet, the cloudy scar tissue in his left eye had cleared and was also beginning to subside in his more-affected right eye. Another incredible development was that Huxley regained the synchronic coordination of his eyes’ muscular movements, curing the effects of the strabismus that had plagued him for two dozen years.

Beyond his visual gains, Huxley’s overall health also began to improve. “He has put on a lot of weight and with it a different air,” Maria remarked. “If you saw him you would understand—He is somehow smoothed out. His moods and his depression have smoothed along with it… he can even read the paper without glasses, and above all he can read without fatigue.”\textsuperscript{406} In a

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\textsuperscript{404} Huxley, \textit{The Art of Seeing}, 7.

\textsuperscript{405} Laura Huxley, \textit{This Timeless Moment}, 45.

\textsuperscript{406} Bedford, \textit{Aldous Huxley}, 373.
letter to Julian, Aldous exults, “I am now wearing no glasses, seeing much better at a distance, reading, and all without strain and with general improvement and health and nervous condition.”

Out of all his trials with psychophysical techniques, Huxley’s experience with the Bates Method the most rewarding. His defective eyesight had been the bane of his physical existence, but his drastic improvements reaffirmed his conviction that latent human potentialities existed and, with proper psychophysical training, could be actualized:

For individuals there remain enormous potentialities, both physical and psychological—potentialities which, in the ordinary course of events, remain completely unrealized, but which, if one knows how and is prepared to take the trouble, one can realize.

Linking the premise of the Bates Method and Alexander Technique to spiritual practices, Huxley explains, “These two techniques have demonstrated the possibility, on the physiological plane, of a complete reconditioning, analogous to that which takes place through the techniques of mysticism on the psychological and spiritual planes.”

Huxley’s coinciding visits with Krishnamurti almost certainly aided his progress with the Bates Method. Krishnamurti’s meditative principle of alert passivity is, in all respects, analogous to Huxley’s dynamic relaxation, and there can be little doubt that the two discussed the psychological parallels at length. In fact, even though Krishnamurti had perfect vision, he asked Huxley to teach him the Bates Method. Krishnamurti claimed that by practicing the exercises for a few minutes daily, he maintained his ability to read without glasses, even at the

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408 Ibid., 445.
409 Ibid., 473.
Dedicated to Margaret Corbett and the memory of Dr. Bates, in 1942 Huxley published *The Art of Seeing*, which he called “a little book of pure utility,” but the book was also an attestation, explanation, and vindication of the Bates Method as a psychophysical technique. In the introduction he explains that his intent is “to correlate the methods of visual education with the findings of modern psychology and critical philosophy,” but, after reading the book, a friend astutely remarked, “there may be more of Huxley than of Bates’s theory in his work. Sections on visual retraining are mixed with meditation and Hindu mysticism to reach the goal of seeing clearly.” In actuality, both statements are true. Huxley’s views on human psychology were an amalgamation of humanistic, physiological, Romantic, and mystical ideas. The *Art of Seeing* sold-out its British first edition of 10,000 copies within the first three days of its release. So, even though some critics complained that Huxley had become too mystical, Chatto & Windus were probably less concerned.

As Huxley delved deeper into mysticism in the early 1940s, emerging ideas in psychology such as W.H. Sheldon’s theory of relating personality to physique, and Abraham Maslow’s landmark, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” edged the discipline closer towards psychophysical holism. Maslow’s paper, which uses Goldstein’s *Organism* as a key source, establishes a hierarchy of human needs built upon a foundation of basic physiological requisites. Reflecting Huxley’s idea from *Jesting Pilate*—that physical and emotional agitations inhibit

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higher intellectual and creative processes—Maslow argues that ascending levels of human motivation and behavior become accessible with the satisfaction of corresponding physical and emotional needs.\footnote{414}

Much to Huxley’s applause, these accredited shifts in theory represented a deeper consideration of the mind-body relationship, a subject largely neglected by social and analytical psychologists. As late as 1959, former A.P.A. president, Dr. Gordon Allport, admitted that most psychologists still “avoid the mind-body problem” in favor of establishing new “brain models.”\footnote{415} Since Huxley had been writing about the psychology of the mind-body largely without the support of credible sources, he welcomed Sheldon and Maslow’s new developments with enthusiasm. In fact, he would cite both theorists in his eventual compendium on latent human potentialities.\footnote{416}

In the meantime, however, Huxley had begun to compose another type of compendium, or more precisely an anthology, which would eventually become \textit{The Perennial Philosophy}. Through his studies of mysticism, he began to recognize a single recurring psychological phenomenon, an experience William James described as the “mystical experience.” In \textit{Varieties} James organized and defined the common elements of this experience, but in Huxley’s new endeavor, he assembles and analyzes an anthology of mystical writings relating to this experience from sources as diverse as Saint Augustine, the \textit{Bhagavad-Gita}, Plotinus, and the \textit{Tibetan Book of the Dead}.\footnote{417} He argues that the mystical experience (which he interchangeably


\footnote{417} James, \textit{Varieties}, 380-381
calls the ground or divine reality) is a psychological bridge to a singular source from which all plurality arises. However, he explains, “no amount of theorizing…can tell us much about divine reality as can be directly apprehended by a mind in a state of detachment, charity, and humility.” In other words, intimate knowledge of the divine reality is strictly experiential.

Drawing a comparison, Huxley explains that the properly conditioned mind is a tool like a telescope. Just as a telescope allows one to perceive astronomical information that the naked eye cannot, a metaphysically conditioned mind perceives psychological data that the unconditioned mind cannot. He argues that, through psychological experimentation and conditioning, “we can discover the intimate nature of mind and its potentialities. In the ordinary circumstances of average sensual life these potentialities of the mind remain latent and unmanifested.” Reinforcing this notion, he offers a quote from James: “Practice may change our theoretical horizon, and this in a twofold way: it may lead into new worlds and secure new powers.” Clearly this “practice,” or psychological conditioning, alludes to the many mind-body exercises Huxley had investigated over the last eleven years—methods, he argues, that strengthen the intellect and emotions, increase self-knowledge, and positively modify character.

In addition, The Perennial Philosophy is also an acknowledgment of psychological data accrued by mystical philosophers before the advent of Freudian psychology. Huxley underlines

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419 Ibid., 5.
420 Ibid., 3,5.
421 Ibid., 2.
422 Ibid., 315.
this notion explaining, “One of the most extraordinary, because most gratuitous, pieces of twentieth century vanity is the assumption that nobody knew anything about psychology before the days of Freud. But the real truth is that most modern psychologists understand human beings less well than did the ablest of their predecessors.”

Huxley was certainly not the only scholar in the twentieth century to recognize that mystical philosophy held certain metaphysical truths that could be used to advance the scientific perspective. In her book, *Aldous Huxley and the Mysticism of Science*, professor June Deery explains that many scientists, including Oppenheimer, Heisenberg, Eddington, Bohr, Einstein, Pauli, Jeans, and de Brogli, “specifically named mysticism as a bridge between religion and science.” She adds that “Schrodinger, the father of quantum mechanics, even shared Huxley’s particular interest in Vedanta and was impressed by Huxley’s *Perennial Philosophy*, referring to it as a ‘beautiful book’.” Like these accomplished physicists, in *The Perennial Philosophy* Huxley uses mystical philosophy as a lens to explore the theoretical fissures and voids left unattended by contemporary theorists, such as the significance of mystical states, how and why they modify behavior, and the methods used to procure them.

By the late 1940s, a few psychologists had also begun to recognize the significance of Eastern metaphysics. In 1946 Swami Akhilananda, an Indian psychologist and Vedantic scholar, published *Hindu Psychology, Its Meaning for the West*, and proclaimed the book as the first

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423 Ibid., 132

legitimate book of psychology written from an Eastern frame of reference. Including a flattering introduction by Gordon Allport—one of the most established and prolific American psychologists of the twentieth-century—, Akhilananda’s book articulated two key features: “the achievements of the science of psychology by both Hindus and Buddhists” and “the methods adopted in India to develop the mind itself.” In his introduction Allport confesses:

> It is inexcusable that we who think in the Western frame of thought should be as ignorant as we are of the frame of thought of the East. Year after year we have spent our time thinking exclusively in the thought forms of our own western culture…and in evolving our own Western theories of mind.

The publication of *Hindu Psychology* was a significant moment in the history of psychology for three reasons: First, though many books on the psychology of Eastern thought had been written by Westerners, Akhilananda’s was the first by a legitimate psychologists and religious scholar from India. Second, given Allport’s credibility*, his sincere and commendable introduction validated the book in the eyes of Western psychology. Finally, by using the language of psychology instead of spirituality, Akhilananda introduced Vedantic philosophy to Western science in a more palatable and digestible context.

In *Hindu Psychology* Akhilananda critiques several aspects of both Western psychology and Western ideas of Eastern thought. For example, he criticizes the Behaviorists for their inability to recognize “mental forces” that “are often not reducible to scientific formulas nor

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426 Ibid.
* Allport maintained a professorship at Harvard for 39 years, served as A.P.A. president, edited several psychological journals, authored many books, and was awarded several A.P.A. awards for his contributions to the discipline.
subject to conclusive proof." Additionally, though he applauds Freud and his followers for recognizing the importance of the unconscious, he dismisses their reduction of human behavior based on sexual drives or the will to power. But, perhaps the most glaring oversight of Western psychology, he writes, is its neglect and misunderstanding of superconscious mental states which, in Eastern psychology, account for illuminations, i.e. the sudden assimilation of large pieces of knowledge. Although Akhilananda praises William James’s identification of spiritual mental states in *Varieties*, he criticizes contemporary psychologists for labeling these states ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’. From an Eastern perspective, he argues, they are considered healthy because they allow individuals to experience clearer forms of reality.

There are several consistencies between Akhilananda and Huxley’s psychological perspectives, especially in light of *The Perennial Philosophy*. First off, the Eastern idea of superconscious states corresponds with Huxley’s notion of human potentialities. Akhilananda explains that “superconscious experiences can be attained by anyone, providing he goes through the required exercises.” To this, he adds that the highest superconscious experience, known as *samadhi*, is equivalent to what James called the ‘mystical experience’—or what Huxley called ‘divine reality’ in *Perennial Philosophy*. The psychological benefits of having these peak experiences also align. Akhilananda contends that they illuminate the intellect, integrate the emotions, convey new knowledge, positively modify character, and cause the experiencer to

428 Ibid., 4.
429 Ibid., 7.
430 Ibid., 11-12.
431 Ibid., 18-19.
432 Ibid., 159.
radiate with peace and bliss.Indeed, Akhilananda’s portrayal of superconscious states and samadhi dovetails with Huxley’s notions of human potentialities and the divine ground, both in character and means of attainment.

By the end of the decade, Huxley’s Eastern views on psychology had also started to draw attention from a few practicing psychologists, especially ones endorsing the emerging trend of “psychotherapy,” as opposed to analysis. The idea of psychotherapy, writes Jung in 1947, is to “pay equal regard to the physiological and spiritual factors.” Additionally, “The function of psychotherapy,” writes former A.H.P.* president Floyd Matson, “is to assist modern man in his search for a soul…This emphasis,” he adds, “is reminiscent of the writings of ‘scientific mystics’ such as Gerald Heard and Aldous Huxley, who have sought to justify the spiritual experience of Asian mysticism in the language of Western science.” However, the clearest and most direct example of Huxley’s influence was with Dr. Hubert Benoit, a French psychologist who became interested in reconciling Eastern philosophy with his psychoanalytic practice. In 1949 Benoit requested that Huxley write the forward to his upcoming book, *The Supreme Doctrine: Psychological Studies in Zen Thought*—an opportunity Huxley readily accepted.

In his forward Huxley outlines what he believes is the appropriate relationship between Eastern metaphysics and psychology. Eastern philosophy, he explains, “is never pure speculation, but is always some form of *transcendental pragmatism*. It’s truths, like those of

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433 Ibid., 158.
modern physics, are to be tested operationally.”437 It is interesting that Huxley employs the phrase *transcendental pragmatism* to describe Eastern thought. At a glance, the words seem antithetical (as does Matson’s description of Huxley as a “scientific mystic”), but by establishing this construct, Huxley enforces the idea that Eastern philosophy is inextricably linked to a devoted practice. In his experience, one does not simply read-to-understand Eastern philosophy; one must come to know its truths psychophysically. Or, in Huxley’s words, its truths, “are known to be true because, in a super-Jamesian way, they work.”438

Huxley asserts that, although the practices of Psychoanalysis and Eastern spirituality both concern the treatment of troubled minds, the main difference is intent. The analyst’s intent, he writes, “is to help the troubled individual adjust himself to a society of less troubled individuals,” to achieve “a normality, which is defined, for lack of any better criterion, in statistical terms.” But psychological normalization, he cautions, contains pitfalls that are very real: “History and anthropology make it abundantly clear that societies composed of individuals who think, feel, believe, and act according to the most preposterous conventions can survive for long periods of time.” Statistical normality, he warns, “is perfectly compatible with a high degree of wickedness.”

Reflecting Jung’s analysis on personality, Huxley points out that when individuals are compelled to conform to a society, many live in discontent, “their potentialities unrealized, their nature denied its fullest development.”439 Therefore, rather than strengthening community,

438 Ibid.
439 Ibid., vii.
normalization arouses resentment in individuals who inevitably channel their frustrated emotional energy back into society. On the other hand, however, Huxley asserts that communities will come together when individuals encourage each another to discover their latent potentials instead of striving towards some fixed idea of normality. “There is another kind of normality,” he explains, “a normality of perfect functioning, a normality of actualized potentialities, a normality of nature in the fullest flower,” and, in Eastern spiritual practices, individuals attain this second kind of normality through self-harmonization. “There must be a constant self-reminder,” he explains, “that our all too human likes and dislikes are not absolutes, that yin and yang, negative and positive, are reconciled in the Tao.” By establishing a regular mind-body practice the individual alleviates “the ego’s frantic clutch on the mind-body,” enabling an awareness of behaviors that obstruct “the flow of life and grace and inspiration.”

He concludes that following this path does not guarantee enlightenment, but prepares one’s mind to recognize and receive potential blessings by strengthening awareness: “We are helpless without grace…but grace cannot help us unless we choose to cooperate with it.”

Huxley’s decision to write the forward for Benoit’s The Supreme Doctrine had multiple collaborative effects. First, his popularity ensured both an English translation (a first for Benoit) and an international audience—two conditions that effectively launched Benoit’s career. Second, by introducing a book on psychotherapy, Huxley further legitimized his voice in the discipline while also promoting his progressive views. Finally, the content of Huxley’s message did more than integrate Eastern ideas into Western psychology, it advocated a more personalized dynamic

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440 Ibid., viii.
441 Ibid., ix.
between patient and therapist—from the Freudian and Adlerian models of societal adaptation, to one centered around the individual’s need to harmonize mind and behavior. This shifting in applied psychology—from analysis to therapy—was advanced even further by up-and-coming theorists such as Carl Rogers who published his ground-breaking *Client-Centered Therapy* in 1951 and went on to become a leading voice in the Humanistic psychology movement.

By the middle of the century, sixteen years had passed since Huxley decided to personally appraise the effects of mind-body practices, but his new approach came only after Geraldine Coster expounded spiritual practices in the language of psychology. Her analysis was the piece of the puzzle that Huxley had been searching for ever since reading Leuba’s *Psychology and Religious Mysticism* in 1926. Contrary to most historians who cite either Lawrence or Heard as the prime influence that pushed Huxley towards mysticism, it was actually innovative psychologists like James, Leuba, and Coster that primed his interests.

The trend towards Eastern mysticism in the mid-twentieth century attracted Western scholars from several disciplines and enhanced their perspectives by integrating Eastern concepts. Huxley was certainly among this early contingent, but what separated him from other progressive psychological theorists was his *transcendental pragmatism*—his willingness to not only read Eastern mysticism, but *experience* it through the mind-body practices inextricably linked to its philosophy. An important aspect of this experiential knowledge was what Akhilananda described as “superconscious states”—human potentialities which, for the most part, had been either dismissed or pathologized in Western Psychology. In the following years, Huxley would use both spiritual and chemical means to explore this misunderstood realm of the human mind.
In the early 1950s, as a small contingent of psychologists began to slowly pull away from analytical methods in favor of therapeutic models, trends in applied psychiatric treatments also began to shift. Prior to the 1950s, public and privately funded mental asylums housed many of society’s most mentally disturbed individuals. Often stigmatized and considered hopeless, many of these patients received severe physical treatments for their conditions including ice baths, insulin shock therapy, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), and, in extreme cases, lobotomy or leukotomy. From a modern perspective these methods seem crude but, in the first half of the twentieth century, the scientific community celebrated them as breakthroughs—the developer of leukotomy received a Nobel prize in 1949, the developer of ECT, a Nobel nomination in the 1930s.

However, in 1948, an Australian doctor named John Cade discovered that regular doses of lithium-carbonate mitigated symptoms of bipolar disorder, depression, schizophrenia, and a host of other mood disorders. Three years later a French surgeon named Henri Laborit, who had been experimenting with drugs to aid anesthesia, discovered that chlorpromazine consistently induced a conscious state of indifference in his subjects. Anticipating its value to psychiatry, Laborit persuaded a few colleagues to administer chlorpromazine to their most difficult patient. The drug’s calming effects were so impressive that several researchers

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443 See www.nobelprize.org.

simultaneously initiated clinical trials on chlorpromazine and raced to publish their results.\textsuperscript{445} Medical historians claim that this discovery “changed the face of psychiatry,” that “chlorpromazine ushered in a radically changed biological and psychosocial psychiatry that saw an end to the neglect and desperate remedies of the asylums.”\textsuperscript{446} By the end of 1952, both lithium-carbonate and chlorpromazine held widespread acceptance in psychiatry, signaling not only a new age of psychiatric drugs and a tidal shift in patient relations, but also a new era of capital investment for drug developers eager to patent the next “miracle drug.”\textsuperscript{447}

Riding this new wave of pharmaceutical enthusiasm were two British psychiatrists, John Smythies and Humphry Osmond, who hypothesized a biochemical basis for mental illness. At the time, most psychologists deemed this approach radical—psychoanalysts thought childhood trauma caused mental illness; behaviorists blamed erroneous child-conditioning tactics. Smythies had conceived his biochemical approach after suffering an acute nervous breakdown which, at its climax, produced a vivid hallucination of “a small oval of clear white light,” followed by a sensation of being “enveloped in a great peace.”\textsuperscript{448} According to his autobiography, the experience was so intense, it compelled him to research the scientific causes and effects of hallucinations.\textsuperscript{449}

Smythies’s investigations led him to James’s \textit{Varieties}, Lewin’s \textit{Phantastica}, and the writings of a French pharmacologist named Alexandre Rouhier, whose account of the


\textsuperscript{448} John Smythies, \textit{Two Coins in the Fountain} (Charleston, SC: Book Surge, 2005), 25.

\textsuperscript{449} Ibid.
hallucinogenic peyote cactus included an illustration of the chemical formation for mescaline, the alkaloid responsible for the plant’s psychotropic effects. Smythies realized that mescaline’s chemical formula is almost identical to adrenaline, a neurotransmitter naturally produced by the human body. The similarities between the two compounds led Smythies to hypothesize that schizophrenia, whose symptoms appeared to mirror the effects of mescaline, might have a physiological basis: defective adrenaline production and/or metabolization. Seeking to expand on his theory, in 1952 Smythies sent letters to several select individuals he considered to be experts in the field of human consciousness. He received two interested replies: one from Carl Jung, the other from Aldous Huxley.

Smythies’s decision to reach out to Huxley illustrates how his public persona had outgrown that of a mere novelist. By the 1950s, Huxley had not only produced a considerable body of work critiquing contemporary psychology, his investigations of mind-body techniques armed him with a wealth of experiential knowledge that most psychologists simply did not have. In the study of consciousness Huxley was well-aware of the value of personal experience—in his 1939 novel, *After a Summer Dies the Swan*, he compares book-smart psychologists to “professional aestheticians [who have] never been inside a picture gallery.” It was because of his knowledge of and his experiences with extraordinary mental states that Smythies included Huxley’s name on his list of experts.

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When Huxley replied in November of 1952, the only article by Smythies and Osmond in circulation was their initial research proposal, “Schizophrenia: A New Approach,” which appeared in the *Journal of Mental Science*. However, in February of 1953, Smythies published a second article, this one in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, a journal to which Huxley subscribed. Unlike the research proposal, Smythies’s new article, “The Mescaline Phenomena,” features some of the more sensational and transcendent effects of the mescaline experience. “It is my aim,” he writes, “to give a brief account of its [mescaline’s] actions and to indicate their relevance to philosophy.”

One detail that surely caught Huxley’s eye was Smythies’s description of ego function under mescaline: “The boundaries normally separating the ego from its environment may be eroded.” This observation reflects Huxley’s claim from *The Perennial Philosophy* that “[mystical] union can be achieved only by the annihilation of the self-regarding ego, which is the barrier separating the ‘thou’ from the ‘that.’” However, although Smythies’s scientifically informed perspective undoubtedly raised Huxley’s eyebrows, it is important to note Aldous’s negative attitude towards drugs at this time.

In the epilogue of his 1952 book, *Devils of Loudin*, a non-fiction account of a well-documented outbreak of mass-psychosis in seventeenth century France, Huxley argues that mankind has always had an innate urge for self-transcendence, but warns against indulging in “toxic short-cuts”:

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456 Huxley, *Perennial Philosophy*, 44.
There are probably moments in the course of intoxication by almost any drug, when awareness of a not-self superior to the disintegrating ego becomes briefly possible. But these occasional flashes of revelation are bought at an enormous price. For the drug taker, the moment of spiritual awareness (if it comes at all) gives place very soon to subhuman stupor, frenzy or hallucination, followed by dismal hangovers and, in the long run, by a permanent and fatal impairment of bodily health and mental power.457

According to Gerald Heard, despite Huxley’s passion for exploring states of consciousness, he rarely touched alcohol and, prior to 1953, never experimented with drugs.458 Huxley maintained that self-transcendence had both upward and downward potentialities—that involvement with drugs, alcohol, crowd-delirium, and dispassionate sexual acts typified escapism, and therefore represent downward transcendence.459 On the other hand, psychophysical exercises represent an upward transcendence because they augment awareness in a way that is healthy and non-toxic. These sentiments illustrate Huxley’s skeptical and adverse attitude on drugs and self-transcendence leading to his initial mescaline experiment in 1953.

But despite his prior convictions, shortly after reading “The Mescaline Phenomena,” Huxley mailed a personalized copy of Devils of Loudin to Dr. Smythies containing a note expressing his interest to try mescaline, but only under medical supervision. Within a month Smythies’s senior partner, Dr. Humphry Osmond, contacted Huxley and mentioned that he was scheduled to attend an A.P.A. event in Los Angeles that spring. Huxley then replied, “I am eager to make the experiment and would feel particularly happy to do so under the direct supervision of an experienced investigator like yourself.”460

Osmond accepted the proposal and, in May of 1953, in the comfort of Huxley’s home, he

459 Huxley, Devils of Loudin, 264-266.
460 Huxley, Letters, 624.
mixed a single dose of mescaline in a glass of water for Aldous to consume. After about thirty minutes Huxley reported some light effects, but they were unlike what he had expected: “The other world to which mescalin admitted me,” he observed, “was not the world of visions,” but rather a realm of “being and meaning.” Over the course of the audio-recorded experiment, Osmond carefully monitored his subject while Huxley did his best to articulate the experience.

Huxley’s experiential analysis became the subject of *The Doors of Perception*—the title borrowed from William Blake’s poem, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.” Blake, a Romantic Era poet, mused that “if the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.” This sentiment reflects Huxley’s observation that mescaline inhibits pre-existing cognitive associations, allowing the subject to experience an unadulterated version of reality. “I was seeing what Adam had seen on the morning of his creation,” he explains, “the miracle, moment by moment, of naked existence.” Reminiscent of Akhilananda’s description of super-conscious states, Huxley claimed to experience an amplified version of reality (instead of an escape from it) and, like Smythies’s notes from “The Mescaline Phenomena,” he also discovered that utilitarian and hierarchical distinctions seemed to dissolve, as did binaries like subject and object.

Huxley recalled Henri Bergson’s hypothesis that the function of the senses is not productive, but eliminative— they reduce an otherwise overwhelming flood of extant data into a manageable stream of conscious experience. Respectively, Huxley argues that under mescaline

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463 Huxley, *Doors*, 17.
464 Ibid., 24-26.
the “reducing valve” of the mind dilates, triggering a state he called: *Mind at Large*. He concedes that a normal restriction of sensory data is essential for day-to-day survival, but when the reducing valve is opened, the mind enters an expanded state where experience becomes “infinite in its significance.” Tying this phenomenon to his concept of *dynamic relaxation* (or what Krishnamurti called *alert-passivity*), he suggests that all psychophysical practices are essentially methods devised to condition and operate one’s own reducing valve.

In conclusion, Huxley warns that the mescaline experience is *not* enlightenment, nor is mescaline the perfect drug. Its value, he asserts, is that it shakes out “the ruts of ordinary perception, to be shown for a few timeless hours, the outer and the inner world, not as they appear to an animal obsessed with survival or to a human being obsessed with words and notions, but as they are apprehended, directly and unconditionally.”

With his knowledge of psychology, theology, and philosophy, combined with his experiences with mind-body methods, Huxley threw a great deal of light on the mescaline experience, but, unfortunately, his expertise also contributed to the account’s greatest weakness. In several instances he wrote in generalities about the “mescaline experience” or the “user of mescaline” without acknowledging that the average user, or even the intellectual user, would almost certainly lack the specific knowledge and experience that had enabled Huxley’s positive experience. Although the inclusion of such a caveat may have seemed pretentious, it might have

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465 Ibid., 23.
466 Ibid., 22.
467 Ibid., 24.
468 Ibid., 66, 73.
469 Ibid., 73.
served as a cautionary note against the psychedelic indulgences of later generations.

The mythologist Joseph Campbell often used a quote in his lectures that applies to Huxley’s experience: “The psychotic drowns in the same waters in which the mystic swims with delight.”\textsuperscript{470} Indeed, until the mid-1950s, the overwhelming consensus in the psychiatric community was that psychedelic drugs produced “a transient psychosis in all subjects,” but obviously, the mystically-inclined Huxley perceived its effects in a different light. Instead of defining his experience with the sterile terminology offered by psychiatric researchers, he employed philosophical and mystical expressions: hallucinations became visions; delusions became insights, and temporal impairments became timeless moments.\textsuperscript{471} Put simply, Huxley’s knowledge of transcendent states allowed him to deconstruct the experience and reframe it in the language of mysticism, negating the feelings of panic and otherness that unnerved ordinary test subjects. Moreover, Huxley’s mind-body training had conditioned his mind to remain in a state of alert-passivity while tending to the experience. On the other hand, it is not a stretch to assume that the ordinary test subject, whose very notion of sanity depends on familiar constructs of reality, might panic or struggle against the experience only to get swept away by its boundary dissolving effects.

For the most part, the medical community concurred with this assessment. One critical psychiatrist suggested: “In Mr. Huxley’s experience there was 99% Aldous Huxley and 1% half-


gram of mescaline...we, unfortunately, cannot afford to be Aldous Huxley.” In other words, Huxley’s analysis, if anything, should be considered atypical. Other scientists echoed this sentiment. “The recent excursion by Huxley,” wrote one pair of researchers, “is a reminder that much of the literature on drugs is derived from the experience of ‘volunteers’ with unusual psychological orientations and imaginative romantic proclivities.”

Other researchers, however, offered more constructive feedback. The renowned psychiatrist Karl Menninger commented that Huxley’s analysis revealed “the constructive aspects of the experience” which, he believed, were too often defined with pejorative terms like “intoxication, psychosis, and delirium.” An even more enthused researcher went as far as to say that Huxley’s description “indicates a new line of approach, the constructive angle,” concluding that his “dynamic implications are really the angles for clinicians to work through.” Surprisingly, it was the more upbeat reviews of Huxley’s account that foreshadowed the new path of psychedelic drug research that transpired in the following years.

Indeed, an argument can be made that The Doors of Perception altered the course of psychedelic research. Prior to its publication, nearly all of the clinical trials on mescaline and LSD classified the drugs’ effects as “psychotomimetic,” or psychosis-mimicking, and many researchers, including Smythies and Osmond, thought that a drug which induced a “model-psychosis” should be studied to gain insights to better understand mental illnesses like

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474 Proceedings on the Round Table, 67.
475 Ibid., 70.
schizophrenia.\footnote{Steven J. Novak, “LSD Before Leary: Sidney Cohen’s Critique of 1950s Psychedelic Drug Research,” \textit{Isis}, vol.88, (1997), 93-94.} But after \textit{Doors}, the scope and volume of the research increased significantly: the book arrived in stores in February of 1954, and by the end of the year new studies began to appear in scientific journals detailing the therapeutic and creative qualities of the mescaline and LSD experience.\footnote{Examples of paper titles published after \textit{Doors of Perception}: “The Effects of Mescaline and LSD on Cerebral Processes Pertinent to Creative Activity”; “The Therapeutic Value of LSD in Mental Illness”; “LSD As an Adjunct to Psychotherapy”; “Mescaline and LSD in Psychotherapy”; “LSD: the Effect of Intellectual Functioning by the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale.”} Although mescaline was first synthesized in 1918 (and LSD in 1943), in the six years following the publication of \textit{Doors}, researchers published over ten times more material on psychedelic drugs than in all the years prior.\footnote{Ericka Dyck, “Flashback: Psychiatric Experimentation With LSD in Historical Perspectives” \textit{Canadian Journal of Psychiatry}, vol.50(7), (June 2005), 383.} Surely, Huxley’s fresh analysis heightened scientific intrigue and helped establish a new frontier for the potential of the these complex and illusive drugs.

Following their experiment, Huxley and Osmond corresponded with each other constantly. Huxley’s collection of letters indicates that he wrote to Osmond at a higher frequency than anyone else from that point forward. Granted, Aldous wrote to Julian more often than any other recipient over the course of his life, but, to add perspective, over a span of forty-two years he wrote 82 letters to Julian,\footnote{Huxley, \textit{Letters}; (It should be noted that Julian and Aldous both lived in London from fall of 1934 to spring of 1937. They also met occasionally for family functions. Personal communications during these times may have decreased their rate of letter exchange).} from 1953-1963 he wrote 75 to Osmond.\footnote{All studies mentioned appeared between 1954-1955 (at least three months after, but no later than one year following the publication of \textit{Doors}).} Their relationship surely hinged on the nature of Osmond’s research, but their prolific correspondence demonstrates an undeniable intellectual affinity and also reveals the level of significance that

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Examples of paper titles published after \textit{Doors of Perception}: “The Effects of Mescaline and LSD on Cerebral Processes Pertinent to Creative Activity”; “The Therapeutic Value of LSD in Mental Illness”; “LSD As an Adjunct to Psychotherapy”; “Mescaline and LSD in Psychotherapy”; “LSD: the Effect of Intellectual Functioning by the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale.”
\item Ericka Dyck, “Flashback: Psychiatric Experimentation With LSD in Historical Perspectives” \textit{Canadian Journal of Psychiatry}, vol.50(7), (June 2005), 383.
\item Huxley, \textit{Letters}; (It should be noted that Julian and Aldous both lived in London from fall of 1934 to spring of 1937. They also met occasionally for family functions. Personal communications during these times may have decreased their rate of letter exchange).
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Huxley attributed to the mescaline experience.

Although Aldous had experienced altered states through meditation, prior to meeting Osmond, his knowledge of the mystical experience had always come secondhand. He believed in its existence because a handful of his closest friends, including Prabhavananda, Heard, and Krishnamurti, had all experienced the state through meditation. “It was not until 1953,” writes Heard,

that [Aldous] had found at last what for him was a fully effective aid to that total unwavering attention which permits the emergence of the highest quality of comprehensive consciousness, that complete, ego-less awareness of being…His long study and practice in states of meditation and contemplation had taught him how to avail himself of this perfect instrument.480

Indeed, his contentment was evident. “Aldous had changed,” writes Bedford after having seen him shortly after the experiment:

Never before had I seen Aldous look less vulnerable…there was a sleekness, a smoothed-outness; he was glowing with it, as it were, and this had an extraordinary peace-inducing effect…Aldous had tapped something, made a breakthrough.481

At this point, Huxley turned his attention to science for further explanations and his relationship with Osmond became symbiotic. Osmond kept Huxley informed of his latest research and, in return, Huxley assisted Osmond in four considerable ways: First, he used his contacts to link Osmond to various foundations and individuals to procure research grants; Second, he used his editorial skills to help write and revise several of Osmond’s proposals; Third, he enlisted Julian’s expertise and connections; And lastly, he offered insights and suggestions for premises for new clinical trials.482 Perhaps the best example of Huxley’s

480 Aldous Huxley, A Memorial Volume, 104.
481 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 551-552.
collaboration was his recommendation to use mescaline as a chemical aid to cure alcoholism, an approach that many regard as Osmond’s most significant and enduring work.\textsuperscript{483} Additionally, in 1956, Huxley and Osmond’s correspondences resulted in the coining of the term \textit{psychedelic} (mind-revealing)—a word they agreed exacted a more objective description than \textit{psychotomimetic}.\textsuperscript{484} Indeed, their relationship was highly collaborative; Osmond gave Huxley the latest material facts and analysis, and Huxley provided Osmond with connections, editorial assistance, and creative insights.

With Osmond in his corner, Huxley set out to write \textit{Heaven and Hell}, a long essay combining the history and science of humanity’s attempts to modify and explore altered states of consciousness. If \textit{The Doors of Perception} “had to do with perception,” writes Gerald Heard, then \textit{Heaven and Hell}, “was concerned with conception.”\textsuperscript{485} In other words, in \textit{Doors} Huxley describes the psychedelic experience, but in \textit{Heaven and Hell} he speculates about its humanistic significance.

Reflecting William James’s notion that there are several \textit{worlds} of consciousness, Huxley begins with an analogy that compares psychology’s knowledge of conscious states to the rough and sketchy world maps produced during the Age of Discovery.\textsuperscript{486} In this Eurocentric analogy the Old World represents ordinary consciousness; the east coast of North America represents the subconscious; the Far-West is the unconscious; and the most foreign and least charted terrains—

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\textsuperscript{484} Huxley, \textit{Letters}, 795.
\textsuperscript{485} Heard, “Poignant Prophet,” 65.
\textsuperscript{486} James, \textit{Varieties}, 509.
\end{flushright}
the Australias and New Zealands—represent superconscious states or, what Huxley calls, “the antipodes of the mind”—the world of visionary and mystical experience.\textsuperscript{487} Throughout history, he argues, exotic mental states have influenced culture—certain gifted individuals access them naturally and spontaneously, but others developed specialized methods to gain admittance.\textsuperscript{488}

Next, he describes the nature and variances of visionary states, explaining that they may manifest as either heavenly or demonic experiences. Dazzling and/or luminous aesthetics and heightened feelings of emotional significance are typical to the first variety. These experiences, he argues, are reflected in several cultures’ descriptions of heaven and paradise.\textsuperscript{489} After citing numerous examples from Abrahamic, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions, and also within cultural legends, folklores, and mythologies, Huxley argues that the “causal chain” of mankind’s fixation with glowing or light refracting aesthetics “begins in the psychological other-world of visionary experience,” and is expressed in artistic displays like fireworks, light shows, stained glass windows, and countless other examples.\textsuperscript{490} He points out that, from a strictly utilitarian perspective, these spectacles are impracticable, but retain humanistic value because they possess a psychological kinship with the visionary experience.

However, he continues, the visionary state may also manifest a negative experience where “the universe is transfigured—but for the worse,” and everything, “from the stars in the sky to the dust under their feet, is unspeakably sinister or disgusting; every event is charged with

\textsuperscript{488} Ibid., 99.
\textsuperscript{489} Ibid., 95, 98.
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid., 103.
a hateful significance.” Huxley contends that these darker visionary states are commonly experienced by paranoid schizophrenics and those who have taken psychedelic drugs under unfavorable psychological, physiological, and/or environmental conditions.

Lastly, Huxley explains that “visionary experience is not the same as mystical experience.” This corresponds with Akhilananda’s assertion that, “There are many experiences which cannot be regarded as samadhi proper.” While the nature of the visionary state is highly elaborate and dualistic, the mystical experience, or samadhi proper, is an unitive experience of binary reconciliation.

The final chapter of *Heaven and Hell* exemplifies what historian R.S. Deese calls “Huxley’s spiritual biology”—the idea that “Aldous explicitly rooted his idea of religious truth in biology.” Supporting this notion, Huxley writes, “in one way or another, all our experiences are chemically conditioned,” and individuals throughout history have sought means to cultivate altered states “by modifying the normal chemistry of the body.” For example, he explains that Christian ascetics in the Middle-Ages considered their practices of bodily mortification, like self-flagellation, to be expressions of devotion and humility. But, from a physiological perspective, these practices effectively introduce large quantities of histamines and adrenaline into the bloodstream—chemical compounds which, in excess, induce shock and hallucination. Add that to vitamin deficiencies incurred from fasting, and toxins produced in the festering wounds, and it

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491 Ibid., 135.
492 Ibid., 138.
493 Akhilananda, *Hindu Psychology*, 162.
496 Ibid., 149.
becomes clear why visions occurred so frequently in medieval monasteries. Huxley concludes that many mind-body techniques, including meditation, bodily mortification, sensory deprivation, abstinence, chanting, yogic poses, breathing exercises, and fasting, are essentially manual methods to adjust one’s biochemistry towards conditions that favor visionary experience.

Deese asserts that Huxley’s notion of spiritual biology “was derived from [his] early readings of William James and Bergson.” But this is only a piece of the puzzle; Huxley never would have arrived at this conclusion without also assimilating ideas from Romanticism, biology, mysticism, and his own experiences with mind-body techniques. Even ideas from Pavlov and Watson played a role in shaping Huxley’s views on psychophysical conditioning, as did Charcot, Breuer, and Freud’s ideas of using methods to access the unconscious. Most recently, his correspondences with Osmond and his own psychedelic experience added to the list of ideas Huxley needed to arrive at his conclusions. Perhaps most significant, by offering a scientific basis for spiritual aspiration, Huxley helped plant the seeds for Esalen and the nascent Humanistic and Transpersonal psychology movements.

Sadly, in 1955, the same year he wrote *Heaven and Hell*, Aldous could not escape a hellish reality of his own. Four years prior, Maria’s doctors had discovered signs of breast cancer and performed a mastectomy. Although the immediate prognosis was positive, in the following years Maria learned that the cancer had reappeared and had metastasized. According to friends, “she resolved to tell virtually no one, certainly not Aldous.” Some have speculated that Maria simply denied the severity of her condition, but others reported that she simply did not

497 Ibid., 152-153.

want Aldous to know.499

Regardless of these conjectures, while traveling in Europe towards the end of 1954, Maria suddenly felt extremely ill. At the time, the couple was en route to Switzerland where Carl Jung had invited Aldous to discuss Heaven and Hell. Instead, they found themselves rushing to Paris to see an oncologist who, after assessing Maria’s condition, advised them to return to Los Angeles immediately. Unfortunately, by that point the cancer had spread into Maria’s spine, and just months later her diagnosis was terminal.

Maria died on February 12th, 1955, at home next to Aldous and their son Matthew. Needless to say, her death was a devastating blow—Maria was insurmountably more than a loving wife, and without her Aldous admitted feeling “amputated.”500 As the one who managed all of her husband’s practical and social affairs, it was Maria who made “Aldous Huxley the public figure” remotely possible. Additionally, due to his eyesight, Aldous depended on her for transportation and, similarly, she read to him and sometimes typed for him when his eyes became too tired—a ceaseless task. Maria “saw herself as someone who always had to help Aldous,” but in his words: “[Maria] was more capable of love and understanding than anyone I have ever known, and in so far as I have learned to be human—and I had a great capacity for not being human—it is thanks to her.”501

After a period of mourning, Aldous spent much of his time attending and delivering speeches at various psychiatric conferences and symposiums. At most of these gatherings he was the only non-M.D. on the panel of speakers so, instead of trying to impress with his medical

499 Ibid., 105.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid., 83; Huxley, Letters, 740.
knowledge, he spoke about humanistic concerns in the new chemical age of psychiatry. For example, at a conference on tranquilizing drugs, he addressed the common historical pitfalls of tension, then outlined problems that might arise in a society too dependent on chemical solutions.502

It should be noted that in 1956 the entire notion of ‘psychiatric drugs for the masses’ had only existed for about three years—there were no official ethics committees in place and the FDA was not even required to prove the safety or effectiveness of new drugs until the Drug Amendments Act of 1962.503 Given this rampant and unrestricted environment, Huxley’s perspectives, though fascinating, proved polarizing to many of the researchers and capital investors in attendance. For some, his discussions inspired new ideas and approaches, but others questioned his motives and credentials. Despite the swarming opinions, Huxley’s reputation as a captivating public speaker spawned from these engagements.504

By the end of the decade, the demand for Huxley’s thought-provoking lectures had expanded well beyond the psychiatric circuit. In 1960 alone he delivered speeches at U.C. Berkeley, Harvard, M.I.T., Dartmouth, Boston U., Wellesley, the Menninger Foundation, and several other colleges and institutions.505 By this point he had prepared nearly twenty separate

504 Prior to his speaking engagements at psychiatric conferences Huxley’s only experience as a public lecturer was during his involvement with the Peace Pledge Union in 1936 and the brief U.S. lecture circuit on pacifism in 1937.
speeches covering topics as diverse as politics, art, the environment, and religion, but his lectures on human psychology formed the vast majority of his total material (roughly 40%), and outlined the humanistic positions he had assembled over the past three dozen years.  

A comparison of Huxley’s views and the concepts that had begun to define the emerging school of Humanistic psychology in the mid-1950s show striking similarities, but without knowing the historical evolution of Huxley’s set of ideas, it is easy to assume that he simply adopted the Humanistic platform. The fact that other non-psychologist writers, like Dostoyevski, Sartre, and Camus, are regularly cited in the histories of Humanistic psychology while Huxley’s name is left unmentioned in their indices seems to support this misconception. However, a deeper investigation shows that the psychologists credited for establishing the Humanistic model embraced not only Huxley's ideas, but also his critiques of the other branches.

Led by Abraham Maslow, the Humanistic psychology movement aimed “to stress the importance of enabling people to attain their human potential.” Maslow, in his critique of Psychoanalysis, writes, “It is as if Freud supplied us with the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half”—a statement that echoes Huxley’s much earlier commentary that “[Freud] paid more attention to sickness than to health.” Likewise, the Humanistic critique on Behaviorism, that it “ignores the richness of human experience” and “likens humans to robots,” reflects Huxley’s earlier statements that “[Behaviorism] dismisses so

508 Benjafield, A History of Psychology, 357.
cavalierly such enormous areas of human experience,” and “regards the intellect as only a
machine.” 510 Additionally, he Humanistic movement complained that psychology lacked the
“models and techniques” to help “individuals reach their full potential.” This is the same
observation that prompted Huxley to study Eastern models and a multitude of techniques in the
1930s and 1940s. 511 In Stanley Krippner’s introduction to Humanistic and Transpersonal
Psychology: A Historical and Biographical Sourcebook—another text lacking any references to
Huxley—he writes, “[Humanistic psychology] involves a crusade to explore, both scientifically
and personally, the highest reaches of human potential.” 512 Additionally, he explains, the
emphasis of transpersonal psychology (a late-1960s offshoot of humanistic psychology) was
“the pursuit of alternative forms of consciousness and spiritual awareness.” 513 Huxley had, of
course, advocated both of these pursuits in psychology decades prior.

When viewed side-by-side, the main tenets of the Humanistic movement and Huxley’s
set of ideas for psychology are uncanny. Starting in the 1950s, Humanistic psychology promoted
a holistic approach that emphasizes positive human potential, self-exploration (rather than the
study of behavior in others), spiritual aspiration as an integral part of the psyche, and a
therapeutic approach to counseling that promotes self-awareness and mindfulness. 514 Starting in
the 1920s, Huxley promoted a holistic approach to psychology that accounts for mental, spiritual,

Henley, History of Psychology, 534.; On ‘dismisses’: Huxley, The Human Situation, 10; On ‘machine’:
511 Hergenhahn and Henley, History of Psychology, 534.
512 Humanistic and Transpersonal Psychology: A Historical and Biographical Sourcebook, ed. Donald
Moss (London: Greenwood Press, 1999), xviii.
513 Ibid.
1964), 20-23.
and physiological wellness, the use of techniques and models designed to enhance awareness and creative abilities, and finally, a therapeutic (rather than analytic) style of counseling intended to alleviate the “ego’s frantic clutch on the mind-body,” engage with the present, and strive towards self-harmonization. Indeed, the similarities between the paradigm that Huxley constructed and what actually transpired in the Humanistic movement are too close to ignore, and, although he received little recognition in the official canons, a closer inspection shows even more evidence of Huxley’s conceptual fingerprints.

After several years of organizational legwork, in 1961 the A.P.A. agreed to formally recognize the Humanistic approach as an official branch of psychology. Appearing later that year was the first edition of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, which included the mission statement:

> The Journal of Humanistic Psychology is being founded by a group of psychologists and professional men and women from other fields who are interested in those human capacities and potentialities that have no systematic place either in positivistic or behavioristic theory or in classical psychoanalytic theory.  

Not only does the mission statement acknowledge individuals from outside field as founders of the new branch, the journal includes the name of only one non-psychologist on its list of contributing editors: Aldous Huxley.

In addition, there is no doubt that Huxley had a profound influence on Abraham Maslow, the journal’s founder and chief editor. After attending one of Huxley’s “Latent Human Potentialities” lectures in 1960, Maslow wrote in his diary:

> I was very flattered by [Huxley’s] attention and praise. Why? Same thing from psychologists pleases but not really as important. It’s as if his praise and use of my

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work really validates it… Huxley is clearly one of the gang. I think this should make my work less ephemeral.\textsuperscript{516}

The fact that Maslow felt more validated by Huxley than his own colleagues speaks volumes. Not only does it reveal his admiration for Huxley’s intellect, it suggests that Huxley’s opinion holds a degree of credibility and permanence that would help the humanistic movement flourish. Moreover, it shows Maslow’s satisfaction with being associated with the rest of Huxley’s ideas.

In the years to follow, Maslow would adopt many of Huxley’s perspectives and he gave them new currency by rehashing them in a systematized format. But, Maslow was also known to cite Huxley’s work even before this episode—in 1954 he referenced him in his landmark title, \textit{Motivation and Personality}. His biographer, Edward Hoffman, confirms Maslow’s admiration for Huxley. Describing a meeting between the two in 1962 he writes:

\begin{quote}
Especially memorable was a get together with the novelist Aldous Huxley, author of \textit{Brave New World}. During the past decade, Huxley had written with increasing conviction about the vast unknown range of human potentiality…Maslow enjoyed Huxley’s gentle manner and regarded him as a saintly visionary and self-actualizer.\textsuperscript{517}
\end{quote}

Maslow also used Huxley as the prime example of what he called a “self-actualizer,” made some of Huxley’s books required reading in his classes, and even confided to his diary that when got around to writing his own utopian vision that “it could take the form of simply re-evaluating and rewriting [Huxley’s] \textit{Island}.”\textsuperscript{518} Similar to historian Fredrick Carpenter’s claim that William James adopted and systematized the ideas of Emerson, this is solid evidence that Maslow used a similar approach with Huxley.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{517} Hoffman, \textit{The Right to Be Human}, 270.
\end{itemize}
Unfortunately, in 1970, just two years after serving as A.P.A. president, Maslow tragically died of a heart attack while jogging. At his funeral a friend and colleague eulogized that “Abe wrote about Aldous Huxley what I consider to be actually an accurate self-description of Abe Maslow.” Then he reads Maslow’s anecdote:

May I mention one more such technique that I saw at its best in Aldous Huxley, who was certainly a great man—one who was able to accept his talents and use them to the full. He managed it by perpetually marveling at how interesting and fascinating everything was, by wondering like a youngster at how miraculous things are, by saying frequently, ‘extraordinary, extraordinary!”

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Conclusion

The ready comparison between Huxley, the public intellectual, and Maslow, the psychologist, invites the larger historical question: How should historians frame those individuals whose work illuminates new directions for disciplinary growth, but who themselves exist in the grey areas between fields? Maslow himself conceded that “Many of the greatest discoveries in psychology have come from outside academic psychology.” Indeed this is true, but Huxley was not the typical outside contributor, nor was he responsible for any particular discoveries—his role as an inter-disciplinarian was far more discursive. Instead of contributing any single discovery, Huxley mined the histories of knowledge from multiple angles and from multiple fields, searching for serviceable ideas to address the shortcomings that he saw in contemporary psychology. By pragmatically linking these ideas together, he imagined a new paradigm for psychology and promoted it through his novels, essays, lectures, and contacts, producing a conceptual undercurrent that flowed beneath the surface of the discipline. “The sciences of life,” Huxley explains in his final book of essays, have need of the artist’s intuitions and, conversely, the artist has need of all that these sciences can offer him in the way of new materials on which to exercise his creative powers. And humanity at large—the race of multiple amphibians, uneasily living at one and the same moment in four or five different and disparate universes—has need of the syntheses which only the man of letters with ‘a heart that watches and receives’ and a bird’s eye knowledge of science can provide. Such fusions of public and private, of fact and value, of conceptual knowledge and immediate experience, of scientifically purified discourse and the purer words of literature, are possible in every domain accessible to perception, feeling, and thought.

Should academia encourage more pathways for those natural inter-disciplinarians who, like

\[^{520}\textit{Ibid.}, 67\]
Aldous Huxley, prefer to wander between the highly specialized, albeit increasingly isolated worlds of knowledge? Perhaps there are still new doors to be discovered—new humanistic connections and directions for the one world that we all share.

Huxley had his own term for inter-disciplinarian: pontifex. In antiquity the word signified a priest, but its Latin roots pons and facere, literally means “bridge-builder.” In his lecture titled “Integrate Education,” Huxley argues that while specialization is required “to penetrate more deeply into certain separate aspects of reality,” it is also essential to have individuals who specialize in coalescing ideas between fields with the intent of producing applicable knowledge for the problems of human existence.522 And while some criticized him as a “dilettante,” it was in this role as a bridge-builder that Huxley saw himself.523 An effective inter-disciplinarian must combine latitude with receptiveness, and “few major intelligences since William James,” writes religious scholar Huston Smith, “have been as open.”524

As a theorist of human nature, Huxley integrated ideas from psychology, philosophy, biology, spirituality, anthropology, literature, and other fields to fashion his unique perspectives, and, as a result, he assumed much of the intellectual labor required for a new paradigm in psychology to emerge. In a Darwinian sense, perhaps an academic discipline can be imagined like a species, but instead of replicating itself with DNA, it uses the ideas within its domain. Similar to how a species requires the occasional mutation to evolve in a changing environment, a discipline requires novel ideas to progress and remain relevant in changing times. These ideas

are often found outside disciplinary boundaries, buried in the vocabularies and abstractions of unfamiliar subjects. As he wandered between worlds, Huxley collected these obscure but relevant ideas and exposed them to psychology, making him a propitious mutagen and, therefore, a catalyst for disciplinary evolution.

The impacts of Huxley’s inter-disciplinary efforts did not conclude with the formation of the Esalen Institute or the Humanistic and Transpersonal psychology movements. Those movements led to other cultural trends, such as the “Human Potential” and “New Age” movements, which in turn, have helped spawn a $16 billion yoga industry and a $1.2 billion meditation industry the U.S. alone.\(^{525}\)

Additionally, modern scientific studies employing new neuro-imaging technologies like fMRI support Huxley’s notion of “spiritual biology,” specifically that transcendent experiences have a biological basis.\(^{526}\) According to modern research, the neural system known as the “Default Mode Network” regulates what is allowed into conscious experience from the outside world and performs the same essential duties commonly ascribed to ego function.\(^{527}\) Huxley would not have been surprised to learn that this neural system, which acts a lot like his “reducing

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\(^{525}\) Yoga Figure provided by *Yoga Journal* and Yoga Alliance, “The 2016 Yoga in America Study,” www.media.yogajournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016-Yoga-in-America-Study-Topline-RESULTS.pdf;


In a survey conducted by Marilyn Ferguson, results indicated that Aldous Huxley was the second most influential individual for New Age thought (just behind Teilhard and in front of Maslow). Ferguson was the author of *The Aquarian Conspiracy*, a book touted as the “Handbook of the New Age,” by USA Today. Marilyn Ferguson, *The Aquarian Conspiracy* (Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, Inc., 1980), 50.


valve,” is inhibited by both effective meditation and psychedelic substances. When this occurs, the brain as a whole becomes more integrated allowing new connections to form between regions that would not communicate under ordinary circumstances.

Currently, a modern renaissance of scientific inquiry into psychedelic substances—which is the subject of New York Times best-selling author Michael Pollan’s latest book, *How to Change Your Mind*—is compiling convincing new evidence to suggest that, in a controlled environment, the psychedelic experience provides distinct therapeutic results. This therapy, in Pollan’s words, facilitates a “mental reboot,” allowing subjects to break free from destructive mental patterns, or cognitive loops, which are thought to cause addiction, depression, and anxiety. Perhaps this is not so different from Huxley’s idea that the value of the experience is “to be shaken out of the ruts of ordinary perception.”

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530 Huxley, *Doors*, 73.


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