

THE OYROT UNDER MANCHU RULE:
SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES

Keith Scott
University of Saskatchewan

In this paper I propose to examine quite briefly some of the circumstances surrounding the transfer to Manchu sovereignty in the mid-eighteenth century of those areas of steppeland to the west of the Altay which had formed the pastures, or were under the control, of Züünger or Oyrot clans. Under what kind of social and administrative arrangements did the Manchus envisage accommodating their new subjects, once the "pacification" of these areas had been completed?

It must appear that, by choosing such a topic, I have laid myself open to the serious charge which every responsible historian seeks to avoid: that of dealing with the irrelevant, of indulging in vain speculation about "what might have happened if . . ." For it is well known that after the 1755-59 pacification campaign only a small remnant of the Oyrot peoples survived, and though this remnant became subject to the Manchu emperor, its allegiance was a mere formality, a minor item of business for the attention of the hastily constituted military administration of the Western Regions.

My intention, however, is not to speculate about a non-existent Oyrot settlement and its equally hypothetical consequences, but to suggest that there is some profit to be gained from going further back in time and retracing the historical byway that leads to this particular dead end. The conventional wisdom has it that the annexation of Züünger lands by the Manchus was the realization of a long-range strategy, an objective kept constantly in view, despite periodic changes in short-term tactics, throughout the first century of Manchu rule from Peking, and consistently pursued from the time of the war against Galdan in 1690-96. This position, implicit in much Western historiography, has found no less favor with Soviet historians who, in discussing the 1755-59 campaigns, use such phrases as "the fulfillment of their [sc. the Manchus'] expansionist plans,"¹ and with contemporary Chinese apologists who see the campaigns merely in terms of the "suppression of rebellion" and the "restoration of national unity."² My own reading of early eighteenth-century Chinese materials has impressed me rather with the indecision attendant upon so much Manchu policymaking in this area, and has persuaded me that at no time--not even when the campaigns referred to had already gotten under way--was their eventual outcome intended or foreseen. I have elsewhere propounded this view on the basis of an examination of the debate at the Manchu court, conducted throughout the reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor, on economic policies and military attitudes toward the Züünger.³ Perhaps some further light might be shed if a brief attempt were made to trace the evolution of Manchu attitudes towards Züünger society in the pre-conquest period. Hence the present inquiry, an inquiry that must be inconclusive but is not, I would hope, entirely futile.

The Ch'ien-lung (*Tengeriyn tetege*) reign period began in 1736, the new

emperor having succeeded to the throne late in the preceding year. At this time the interest of the Peking government in Züüngar affairs was centered upon the negotiations aimed, at least from the Manchu standpoint, at achieving a military disengagement and some form of peace settlement along the Altay frontier between Züüngar and Khalkha lands. The negotiation process had already been initiated in 1734 with the dispatch of a Manchu mission to Ili, residence of the Choros khan Galdantseren whose envoys in turn reached Peking early in 1736.⁴ Certain elements emerge from imperial edicts and official reports issued during the course of negotiations that shed an instructive light on the Manchus' understanding of Züüngar social dynamics, and on their perception of actual and possible future Manchu-Züüngar relations. To start with, there was apparently no disposition to regard the tribes known to them at that time under the collective designation Züüngar as anything other than a unified people under the leadership of Galdantseren; no distant memory remained, for example, of the discrepancy acidly noted by Nurhachi in 1619 between Ligdan's claim to hegemony over forty *tümen* and the polycentric reality of post-Yuan society.⁵ Instead, the Choros khan is repeatedly enjoined to act as the benevolent patriarch of all the people (sc. the Oyrot) and to conclude the peace which would serve their long-term interests better than war.⁶

The general approach adopted by the Manchus in their direct dealings with the Züüngar during the negotiations of 1736-40 is well represented by such paternalistic tenders of advice. On more than one occasion in the course of his correspondence with Galdantseren, the Ch'ien-lung emperor emphasized the common interests shared by the Züüngar and the Manchus rather than the issues that currently divided them. His expressed willingness to treat them on the same basis as the Khalkha⁷ or the people of China⁸ may be interpreted, if one so chooses, as an invitation to move into a closer formal relationship. On the other hand, the model which the Manchus favored as the basis for a settlement was the treaty concluded with the Russians at Kyakhta in 1727 rather than the Doloonnuur convention of 1691 which made the Khalkha princes vassals of the imperial throne. I submit that the Manchus chose the Kyakhta model for three reasons. First, its emphasis on frontier delineation accorded best with the immediate geopolitical concern, that of keeping the Khalkha and the Züüngar physically apart.⁹ Second, the Manchus harbored the illusion that one man, Galdantseren, spoke (like the Russian tsar) for all his people, and that it would be pointless to conclude individual agreements, as at Doloonnuur, with all who could be identified as tribal leaders and clan heads. Third and perhaps most importantly, the Manchus thought that the Züüngar were profoundly unwilling at this time to make the requisite sacrifice of autonomy and that they could not be pressured into making such a sacrifice, even had the Manchus wished to do so.

In actuality the 1740 agreement does not stand comparison with Kyakhta. Even after its conclusion, it remained apparent that the Züüngar had little interest in, or appreciation of, the concept of a precisely delineated border line,¹⁰ and the most that could be expected was that unilateral observance by the Khalkha of the line theoretically determined through the negotiating process might by itself contribute to a lessening of tensions in the frontier zone.¹¹ The distinction between Khalkha and Züüngar is emphasized more than once in Manchu government statements after 1740. Officials are chided for confusing the Mongols in allegiance to the Manchu throne, who are to be referred to as

Meng-ku, with the Züünger who are *i* ("barbarians") and thus outside the emperor's dispensation.¹²

The first sign that this attitude was about to undergo some modification may be detected in an edict of 1743 in which Galdantseren is described as *wai-fan* rather than *i*.¹³ This change in terminology does not seem to me too significant in itself. I am not convinced that the Ch'ing regarded all those whom they called *wai-fan* as being in at least a nominally feudatory relationship with the imperial throne, as Fairbank and others have suggested.¹⁴ The term seems, on occasion, to be used in a much looser geographical sense.

Later in the same decade, however, a Züünger envoy was received at court and addressed in terms which would not have been inappropriately directed towards the representative of a vassal prince. The emperor declared his satisfaction with the tone and content of the letter sent by Tseveendorzh Namzhil, Galdantseren's successor. He commended the new khan for his efforts to keep the peace among his subjects, though by now he must already have felt considerable uncertainty concerning the extent of the latter's authority, both titular and actual, over the Oyrot *tümen*.¹⁵ Manchu and Khalkha officials had increasingly to deal with refugees--one of them a defector from the very mission that brought Tseveendorzh Namzhil's letter--¹⁶ refugees whose reports furnished a detailed picture of rivalries and dissensions within the Züünger steppe. We may reasonably infer that voices were now beginning to be raised in Peking in favor of bringing every identifiable Oyrot group into vassalage, although I have no evidence from this date explicitly supporting such an inference. But some indirect indications may be found in the official reaction to Züünger moves towards renewing their links with Tibet.

Tseveendorzh Namzhil wisely decided to allay Manchu fears by involving the imperial government in his plans and by presenting his interest in Tibetan affairs as arising from purely religious motives. This indeed had been the burden of the letter just mentioned which so pleased the emperor. Since a constant flow of Züünger subjects to and from Tibet could not be permitted for security reasons, an alternative offer was made to Tseveendorzh Namzhil; young men might be selected and sent to Peking for three or four years to be trained as lamas, presumably at the Yung-ho kung.¹⁷ The khan did not respond, and the offer was almost certainly never taken up, but the Manchu government must have been aware that the mere act of making it carried at least two implications of moment. First, the Manchus now accepted, and would be recognized as accepting, some responsibility for the internal evolution of Züünger society inasmuch as they sought to impose a particular direction upon the development of its religious institutions. Secondly, the extended presence of the young trainees in the capital would bring to an irreversible end the previous isolation of the Züünger from the Sino-Manchu cultural milieu, and would in all probability lead to the creation of an influential body of opinion within the Oyrot community advocating formalization of the Manchus' role as protecting power.

This summary of contacts between the Manchu court and Tseveendorzh Namzhil has entailed some telescoping of events; the latter's first mission to Peking arrived there early in 1746, but the offer to undertake the training of lamas was not put forward until some four years later. Tseveendorzh Namzhil died soon afterwards in a coup engineered by his half-brother Lamdarzh, who then found himself embroiled in a struggle for supremacy with Davaazha, a distant

cousin whose main support came from non-Choros *taizh* and *zaysan* (most notably the Khoyd Amarsanaa). This intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot clans, while rendering the Manchu offer inoperative and irrelevant,¹⁸ nevertheless strengthened the hands of those Manchu officials who advocated implementing a more active and constructive policy. The illusion of Züünger unity, and the trust in one man's capacity as overall khan to enforce that unity,¹⁹ could no longer be sustained. By early 1754, Peking had broadly accepted that some format for relations with individual Oyrot groups must now be established, and the only questions that remained to be settled concerned the precise timing and the specific modalities of the approved course of action. The idea of military intervention, either in support of Davaazha or to impose a general settlement, was still firmly rejected,²⁰ but the recent surrender of heads of leading Dörvöd clans²¹ appeared to offer a practical alternative. After a substantial segment of each Oyrot *tümen* had come over to place itself under Manchu protection, the emperor should invite the khan of that *tümen* to become his vassal, and any logistical support required to enable the Oyrot of the *tümen* in question to recover and consolidate their position in their traditional pastures should be made available.

It soon became evident that an effective settlement would, after all, involve some commitment of Manchu military forces; by June 1754 preparations were already under way for an expedition to Ili in the following summer.²² Yet the objectives remained the same, and it is to these that we ought in the present instance to devote our attention, rather than to the methods used to attain them. The historical concept of the four Oyrot *tümen* was adopted, but as the Manchus themselves recognized to a certain extent, this was a very general and ill-defined concept--it still remains a fruitful source of scholarly controversy--²³ and an unsuitable basis for a framework of feudal relationships which would be recognized by all the Oyrot peoples. Four *tümen* had to be selected arbitrarily from several contenders with good historical claims. Even these four differed from one another in their degrees of social cohesion, with the Choros (at least until latterly) displaying a more clearly defined feudal structure than the loosely federated Dörvöd for instance. Besides, there were the twenty-four *otog* which had formed part of the appanage of the Choros khans but were not of the same lineage. One assumes that the Manchus expected the four khans, chosen by themselves since none (with the possible exception of Amarsanaa) was self-evident, to play a role in the imperial system similar to that of the four Khalkha khans, but conditions in the two Mongol groups, eastern and western, were by no means analogous. By the time the Khalkha khans were accepted into vassalage, their ascendancy over their subjects had long been established through diplomacy and force of arms, and made permanent through the system of subinfeudation they themselves had created.²⁴

Despite these difficulties and differences of circumstances, the Manchus went ahead with designating four *tümen* on the basis of their own interests and incomplete information: the Choros, chosen in recognition of their historical leadership of the Züünger empire; the Dörvöd who had already surrendered in substantial numbers and were thought to exhibit a touching loyalty to the imperial throne--though some were already hurrying back to the northwest to take part in the struggle for land and power;²⁵ the Khoyd, since Amarsanaa was clearly a force to be reckoned with; and the Khoshuud, presumably because the Manchus relied on their kinsfolk in the Tibetan borderlands to help maintain the

stability of that sensitive frontier region.

At first the pieces of this tidy scheme seemed to be falling neatly into place. Amarsanaa, the unchallenged leader of the Khoyd, gave allegiance in September 1754.²⁶ Tseren was thought to be the most distinguished and most compliant of the Dörvöd *taish*, and his colleagues Tserenubash and Tserenmönkh seemed unlikely to dispute his confirmation as khan of this *tümen*. There were strong indications that Tserenmönkh, far from having ambitions in the Dörvöd political arena, was in fact casting covetous eyes upon the pastures of the Khoyd.²⁷ This was understandable, the Dörvöd having been most seriously afflicted by the land shortage that had latterly developed in the Züüingar steppe. Banzhil, grandson by primogeniture of the renowned Lazhan Khaan who had ruled Tibet for more than a decade earlier in the century, was the natural choice for the leadership of the Khoshuud. Only the Choros khanate was left vacant, pending the removal of Davaazh who represented the old order and was, on that account, unacceptable to the Manchus.²⁸ In any event, upon proclamation of these new administrative arrangements in February 1755, his status became by definition that of rebel, since he had not previously come forward to tender his allegiance.²⁹

Throughout 1755 the Manchu government stuck doggedly to the basic concept of the four khanates; only the list of nominees changed from time to time as one *taish* after another incurred their disapproval on account of actions that showed little respect for the symmetry of Peking's grand design.³⁰ But as more precise information was received about the diverse character of Oyrot internal relationships, the authorities grudgingly but realistically admitted certain modifications to the original plan.

The first important innovation was the creation of *chuulgan* (councils), theoretically to advise the khan, but in practice to provide some recognition of other interests within the *tümen*. As early as November 1754 the Dörvöd *chuulgan* had been constituted, and the appointment of Tserenubash as head of one of its two wings helped to clarify his status, previously undefined and therefore potentially threatening, in relation to Tseren.³¹

By the end of the following year, the structural diversity and variety of interests within each *tümen* had been further recognized by the designation of the *chuulgan* as the central *tümen* institution. The khan would not, after all, be a hereditary chieftain or the emperor's nominee, but would be elected by the members of his *tümen* and would serve as *chuulgany darga* "chairman of the council."³² A similar system had been introduced into Khalkha in 1728. There, however, the positions of khan and *chuulgany darga* were often kept separate, presumably as a means of encouraging a creative tension between traditional and elective authority, one that could be expected to serve Manchu interests.³³ The merging of the two positions in the Oyrot situation may, I think, be taken to reflect an appreciation of the need to weld the Oyrot into fewer, more cohesive units, and to discourage any growth of the practice of subinfeudation endemic among the Khalkha. Nevertheless, since it was predicated on the survival of the Oyrot and the need to support their efforts to manage their own affairs, it is hard to accept that the long-range intentions of the government which took such a socially constructive step, even at this late stage, included the establishment of direct administrative control over Oyrot territory and (as some have suggested, arguing retrogressively from subsequent events) the virtual elimination of its occupants.

The Manchus were also made aware of, and addressed themselves to, the question of the twenty-four *otog* which had formed a part of the Züünger empire as direct dependencies of the Choros khan.³⁴ The original assumption that these, like all other groups falling under the general rubric of "Oyrot," would be neatly absorbed into one or another of the four designated *tümen* was now seen to be unrealistic and, indeed, undesirable since it was a much simpler matter to preserve them as separate administrative units, and for the Manchu emperor to assume the seignorial rights. At the same time, it came to be appreciated that these rights were accompanied by certain special responsibilities, particularly with respect to the boundaries of the *otog* pastures. It was the enforcement of these boundaries that had formed the basis of the *otog*'s relationship with the Choros khan, since the *otog* was characteristically a small, economically defined unit, its member households linked one to another by the bond of copasturage rather than kinship. Only strong, effective Choros leadership of the Züünger empire had, while it lasted, prevented serious encroachments on the *otog* pastures by numerically stronger and more powerful Oyrot groups such as the Dörvöd and Khoyd.³⁵

Yet a third indication of the growing sophistication in the Manchus' knowledge of Oyrot affairs is seen in the elaboration of special administrative arrangements for the *zhas* or monastic institutions.³⁶ One integral and noteworthy feature of these arrangements was the decision taken in September 1755 to proceed with the appointment of a head lama,³⁷ even though a few years earlier, before the evident disintegration of Züünger power, the prospect of a second *khutagt* west of the Altay had been one which the Manchus scarcely dared to contemplate.³⁸

Even as the policymakers and bureaucrats in Peking were busily refining their administrative proposals, the irrelevance of these proposals to what was actually taking place on the Central Asian frontier became increasingly clear. Amarsanaa, of course, had his own ideas about the future of the region, predicated upon the elimination of every vestige of traditional Choros power. His eventual goal being a restored Züünger empire under Khoyd leadership, he was nevertheless willing to accept the establishment of four separate khanates as an interim measure. But a fear that this arrangement might become inconveniently permanent was apparently aroused in his mind when a *taish* of the Choros, Galsandorzh, came forward as a willing candidate for the vacant position of khan and was eagerly embraced by the Manchu court. This was before Peking had adopted the concept of an elective *chuulgany darga*, but Amarsanaa himself proposed that a *chuulgan* of Choros *zaysan* and *demch* (administrative officers) should be convened to elect as khan someone of the lineage of Galdantseren, an operation over which he undoubtedly felt capable of exerting some influence. At the same time, however, he put forward as an alternative plan his own desire to see a unitary Oyrot state, suggesting that the Oyrot, unlike the Khalkha, were incapable of managing their own affairs peaceably and, in particular, of defending the frontiers of the empire against external threats without strong leadership--leadership which he, of course, stood ready to provide.³⁹

The emperor firmly rejected Amarsanaa's propositions; the Manchus were quite satisfied to see the Khalkha system extended to the Züünger steppe, with the sole difference, already mentioned, that the positions of khan and *chuulgany darga* would be merged. Partly to allay Amarsanaa's alleged anxieties, but also to keep a watchful eye on the very type of ambitious Oyrot that he himself represented, it was decided that assistant military commanders (*fu-chiang-chün*) and

resident liaison officers (*chu-ta ta-ch'en*) would be appointed by Peking to each of the *tümen*.⁴⁰

The parallel with the Khalkha situation was formally and publicly enunciated in the premature "victory proclamation" of November 21, 1755.⁴¹ This official declaration is of interest, if only because it draws attention to the complete transformation which Manchu policy had progressively undergone in less than twenty years, away from the determination to differentiate at all costs between Oyrot and Khalkha which was paramount at the time of the negotiations with Galdantseren.

In fact, at the moment when the victory proclamation was issued, the pacification of the Northwest remained a distant dream. Amarsanaa was in open revolt, and instead of helping to create a stable framework for the new social and administrative order, what remained of the Manchu expeditionary force was desperately fighting for its own survival. After its senior commanders were ambushed and killed by partisans of Amarsanaa,⁴² the Manchu authorities devoted their entire attention to the exigencies of the military situation. No new administrative proposals were forthcoming, though we need not conclude that a firm decision had yet been taken to dismantle completely the old social system. But by the spring of 1756 a note of bitterness and betrayal is already detectable in official statements on the Züünger situation. Amarsanaa had shown gross ingratitude, of course, but it was implied that even loyal and cooperative Oyrots such as the Dörvöd *taish* Tseren and Tserenubash shared some of the blame for their weakness and inability to provide effective leadership.⁴³

Then, in August of the same year, it becomes evident that a new policy had begun to take shape. The concept of the four *tümen* had been tacitly abandoned--though this is not confirmed in official documents until a year later⁴⁴--and attention had shifted to the lower level *angî* as the effective unit of social administration, with executive authority entrusted to clerks (*tüshmel*) and magistrates (*sargach*).⁴⁵ It seemed likely, too, that Manchu garrisons would now have to be maintained in the Northwest on a regular basis.⁴⁶

A particularly interesting commentary on the entire process of policymaking during the first twenty years or so of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign was an edict which he issued in January 1757 in response to court criticism of the Manchu military involvement in Oyrot affairs. In it he pointed out that, though his hopes for peace and stability had unfortunately not been realized, he had taken all decisions as part of a carefully considered and relatively modest plan. He had to resettle the four *tümen* in their original pastures if the Khalkha were to be left undisturbed and the burden of supporting refugees deprived of their traditional livelihood lifted from the shoulders of the imperial treasury. Though *post hoc* apologetics are not uncommon in the Ch'ing annals, this statement is consistent with the course of events which we have been examining and thus has an unusual ring of honesty about it. "In sum," said the emperor, "our attitude has not been one of seeking glory; it has been entirely dictated by the exigencies of the situation."⁴⁷

We may fittingly terminate our inquiry at this point, for we have reached the end of the byway we set out to explore. Subsequent events are too well known to warrant repetition here, and the context in which they took place is that of warfare, geopolitics and diplomacy. At this stage no worthwhile social policies could have been devised for the Oyrot as a whole, though an edict declaring them

to be an endangered species and imposing a closed season on hunting them might not have been inappropriate.

By way of summary, I suggest that the following stages may be identified in the development of Manchu policies concerned with Oyrot social organization.

1. Up to 1740 the only concern of the government in Peking was to disengage itself, and its Khalkha vassals, from unnecessary involvement in Züünger affairs.
2. Between 1743 and 1750, i.e., during the reign of the khan Tseveendorzh Namzhil, the Manchu court decided that the Züünger khanate should be treated as if it were an outlying vassal state, though this relationship was never formalized.
3. After 1750, with the intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot and the increasing flow of refugees, the Manchus moved towards establishing relations with individual Oyrot groups.
4. By 1754 four Oyrot *tümen* had been identified; these were to become vassals of the Manchu emperor in a similar fashion to the Khalkha khanates.
5. In 1755 the Khalkha model was modified to take account of features peculiar to the Oyrot situation, i.e., the diversity of status and interest within the *tümen*, the traditional relationship between the Choros khan and the twenty-four *otog*, and the semi-independent status of the monastic lands.
6. In 1756 the Manchus abandoned the *tümen* system in favor of direct control over the *otog* and *angi*, and finally:
7. Sometime during the following year, all previous plans were jettisoned as the traditional Oyrot social structure broke down completely and the Oyrot themselves faced extermination. The Züünger steppes became a military territory of the Manchu empire, and the new masters of this territory were faced with a major problem of an entirely different order from those of the preceding hundred years of Manchu-Oyrot relations. Instead of concerning themselves with trying to understand and to regulate a complex social system, they were suddenly forced to find ways of filling up huge tracts of empty pasture land from which it appeared that man, the "social animal," had altogether disappeared.

Notes

1. I.Ya. Zlatkin, *Istoriya Dzhungarskogo khanstva* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1964), p. 467.
2. See, for example, articles by Shih Li-tsu, Wang Hung-chün and Liu Ju-chung in *Wen wu* 1976, No. 12, pp. 59-74.
3. "The evolution of the forward policy in Central Asia under Ch'ien-lung," in *Papers of the XIX International Congress of Chinese Studies* (Bochum: Ostasien-Institut der Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1968), pp. 88-94.
4. Hsiao-t'ing tsa-chi 1.14a; Kao-tsung shih-lu (cited as K) 10.7b1-2.
5. C. R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 43.
6. K 12.16b1-18a7.
7. K 62.16a2-18a3.
8. K 110.12a5-13b3.
9. K 120.4a2-5b5.
10. K 121.17a1-18a9, 122.10a4-12b1.
11. K 116.2b3-3b1.

12. K 139.18a6-18b5, 253.8b5-9a1.
13. K 190.1a9-1b7.
14. John K. Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 7.
15. K 281.13b1-14a6.
16. K 292.21b5-23b2.
17. K 356.17b5-20a1.
18. Though it was repeated to Lamdarzh in 1751; K 383.16a5-19a1.
19. K 445.11b1-13a5.
20. K 456.8b5-11a1.
21. K 451.11a9-13a2.
22. K 464.8b9-11a6, 465.4b3-6b5.
23. See Akira Haneda, "L'Histoire des Djoungnar aux 16e et 17e siècles, Origine des Eleutes," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 42 (1970), pp. 119-126.
24. B. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des mongols: le féodalisme nomade* (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient/Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1948), pp. 199-200.
25. K 467.5b6-6a9, 12b9-13b3, 15b1-16a4.
26. K 469.6a5-6b9, 10b3-11b2.
27. K 472.5b4-6a8.
28. K 481.2b6-3b7.
29. K 480.22a9-24a8.
30. K 485.18a8-20b9, 496.26b5-28b1.
31. K 474.7a3-7b8.
32. K 492.8b1-10a6; see also K 498.11a7-11b5.
33. Jacques Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie Qalq-a* (Paris: Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1976), pp. 97-98; Bawden, p. 55.
34. See Chun-ko-erh ch'üan-pu chi-lüeh, cited in Paul Pelliot, *Notes critiques d'histoire kalmouke* (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient/Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1960), p. 12.
35. K 480.5b7-7a8, 485.6a3-6.
36. See Pelliot, pp. 12-13 and 73-74, n. 123.
37. K 494.19b3-21a6.
38. P'ing-ting Chun-ko-erh fang-lüeh ch'ien 54.9b4.
39. K 489.28b2-31a1. Courant, unusual among later commentators, was somewhat sympathetic to Amarsanaa's case. He suggested that, far from being ambitious, Amarsanaa had good reason in traditional terms to regard himself as the rightful heir to the khanate. Although the seal of office had not actually been transmitted to him, Davaazh had verbally designated him as his successor. The evidence in support of such a contention is unknown to me. See Maurice Courant, *L'Asie centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: empire kalmouk ou empire manchou?* (Lyon: A. Rey and Paris: Librairie A. Picard et Fils, 1912), p. 104.
40. K 490.1b8-3a8. Of course this move allayed no anxieties whatsoever. As Courant vividly expresses it, "les guerriers khoït et soungar n'étaient pas disposés à se laisser domestiquer comme les Khalkha." Courant, p. 106.
41. K 499.8a1-16a7.
42. K 502.37b8-39a1, 503.3a2-5a3.
43. K 510.3b8-7a2.
44. K 543.12a6-16b8.
45. See Vladimirtsov, pp. 198 and 210.
46. K 517.3a3-4a8, 570.26a3-26b4.
47. K 527.19b5-23a6 (the translation has been slightly paraphrased).