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THE POSTWAR MONGOL STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY AND THE CHINESE RESPONSE

Chinese Recognition of Outer Mongolian Independence and the Arrival of the Eastern Inner Mongolian Delegation at Beiping

On January 5, 1946, the Chinese government formally issued a statement recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. This news led an excited Prince De to cut off his queue, which had been a symbol of Mongolian subordination to the alien Manchu power. In early February, the Ulaanbaatar government sent its vice-premier, Surungjab, to lead a delegation to Chungking to express appreciation for this recognition. On February 9, they were received by Chiang Kai-shek in his official capacity as the head of the Chinese government. On their way back, the delegation stayed in Beiping overnight, but they were "kindly protected," and none of the Mongols in Beiping were able to meet with them. Unexpectedly, while Prince De was strolling through Dong-an shichang, a shopping mall-like market, he encountered several members of the delegation who were also there buying things. Prince De introduced himself and congratulated them. But they only whispered in a very soft voice, "You must know that we are being followed. Good-bye," and turned away. This shocked Prince De. He had been glad because the Northern Mongols had achieved their independence, but his heart was now broken because he saw that the people in this newly independent country had no liberty at all.

Also in February, the Eastern Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government delegation, with Manibadara as the head delegate and Sangjiaijab as his secretary, arrived in Beiping. The mission of this delegation was to proceed to Chungking to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to petition for increased Inner Mongolian autonomy. Chinese military forces were still being hindered by the Soviet Union, and were unable to recover the Northeastern regions, including Manchuria.

General Xiong Shihui, head of the Military Committee, Northeastern Branch, had returned to Beiping from Mukden. He stubbornly refused to allow this delegation to proceed to Chungking, under the pretext that no problems could be settled until after the national troops had recovered the Northeast. Nevertheless, Manibadara insisted on proceeding to Chungking, but he warned his counterpart that the Chinese government should not confuse the Mongolian problem with the blockade by the Soviet Union, which prevented the Chinese troops from recovering the land in the Northeast. The Mongolian problem was a problem of domestic politics. The occupation by Soviet troops was a diplomatic and international problem. Although Manibadara earnestly negotiated with Xiong Shihui, the problem remained unsolved. At this time, Chu Mingshan, head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission, was appointed by Xiong Shihui to be the head of the Northeastern Mongolian Banners Rehabilitation Committee. It was understandable that Xiong's policy toward Manibadara's mission would have been negatively influenced by Chu Mingshan.

At the beginning of this delegation's visit, Xiong Shihui and his office decided to isolate the delegation from other Mongols in Beiping, but they failed. By then, except for Wubao and Kichiyeltumergen and a few followers of Chu Mingshan, all Beiping Mongols anxiously desired that Manibadara's mission be sent on to Chungking to express the Mongols' desire for autonomy directly to the highest authority of the central government. Of course, Prince De especially hoped that Manibadara would succeed in his mission, for that would demonstrate that what the prince expressed during his earlier personal talk with Chiang Kai-shek represented the general will of all Inner Mongolian people. The Beiping Mongolian Association threw a great welcome party for this Eastern Inner Mongolian Delegation. The journalists of the Beiping newspapers were invited so they could spread the news to arouse public support. Manibadara explained to the journalists that his goal was to go to Chungking and give reasons for the Mongolian demand for autonomy. He also emphasized that his desire was to institute self-rule, not to separate from China, though this autonomy would be a higher-degree autonomy, different from local self-rule. He noted that the central government would surely promote the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, and he argued that the will of the Mongols should not be mixed with military affairs and diplomatic problems. Following Manibadara's speech, many expressed their agreement. I too supported Manibadara and made a speech backing him up. To avoid trouble, neither Prince De nor Bai Yunti attended this conference.

Because my speech at the party was very well received, General Xiong Shihui asked me to come over for a talk. The result was disappointing; there was no way to reach a compromise. Xiong desired that I and the other Mongol intellectuals be more realistic. I tried to convince the general of the justice of our national aspirations, but after these talks, I realized that his thinking was outdated and rigid. He desired only to bribe individuals, without attempting to understand the nationalist movement. That the Chinese government had chosen so backward a man to face so modern a problem guaranteed its failure.

The KMT Decision on the Mongolian Problem

On March 1, 1946, the KMT held its Second Conference of the Sixth Session of the Central Committee in Chungking. Bai Yunti left Beiping to attend the meeting. Before he left, he discussed the forthcoming conference several times with Manibadara who hoped that Bai would convey his ideas to the KMT central authorities, from whom he hoped to receive an answer. After Bai arrived in Chungking, he discussed the matter with the Mongol elite in that city and with the Mongolian members of the KMT central committee. These Mongols allied with the Uighur members of Xinjiang Province and the Tibetan members of Xikang Province in a joint call for the grant of national autonomy. After a lengthy debate, on March 17, the conference passed the "Resolution for Frontier Problems." The text reads as follows:

The people of the three nationalities—Mongol, Tibetan, and Islamic—favor the formation of the great *Zhonghua* [Chinese] nationality; the areas these peoples occupy are integral parts of our national domain. . . . This Conference . . . formulated the following points, which may facilitate the realization of a harmonious unification of all our nationalities on a foundation of peace:

Article 1: According to the doctrine of the People's Three Principles and a constitution of five powers [*wuquan xianfa*], there should be established a unified democratic nation, and under these principles a clear guarantee for the right to autonomy of the frontier nationali-

ties.

Article 2: Members of the National Government and the Executive Yuan should include faithful and experienced comrades drawn from the Mongol, Tibetan, and Islamic nationalities.

Article 3: The brilliant and capable elites of the three nationalities should . . . join in the real work of the *yuan*s, ministries, and commissions.

Article 4: Additional members from the three nationalities should be selected by the central authorities as delegates to the newly enlarged national assembly.

Article 5: The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission should be reorganized into the Frontiers Committee and staffed with capable trained elites from the three nationalities. . . .

Article 6: In the frontier areas, all schools should honor the writings of their own people, but also require a course in the Chinese language

Article 7: As for the autonomous institutions of the frontier areas, the central government should establish settlements in a responsible fashion according to local circumstances.

(A) As for Inner Mongolia, the original Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council should be reestablished, and the right of the leagues and banners should be clearly separated from those of the provinces and *xians*. . . .

Article 8: As for the economy, community, transportation, education, public health, relief, and other matters of the frontier areas, a separate budget should be provided. . . .

Article 9: The national defense troops stationed in the territories along the frontier should be concentrated at several strategic points. Their support should be provided by the central government. These troops should not interfere with the local administrations.

This resolution was one of the most favorably worded statements ever made by the KMT toward minority nationalities. It guaranteed the rights of minorities. This important document clearly reflected Sun Yat-sen's teachings in the fourth article of *Outline of Nation Building*, which says, "The Government should foster the weak and small nationalities, so they can carry out self-determination and self-rule." This resolution seemed to deal with the unsolved problems of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Islamic peoples.

Li Yongxin, head of the Border Area Party Affairs Bureau of the KMT Central Committee, immediately ordered his followers to carry out active propaganda on behalf of the party to win the hearts of the Mongols and the other minority peoples. In Chungking, the Mongols from the various factions were satisfied with the KMT's great compromise. In the Yekejuu League, the leaders of the Suiyuan Provincial Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Commission were all happy with the seeming prospect that the original Mongolian Political Council would be restored under their leadership. Bai Yunti, who returned to Beijing from Chungking, was convinced that this success was the result of his endeavors in Chungking. Wu Heling, usually pessimistic, was also satisfied, because the articles clearly showed that the powers and the functions of the leagues and banners would be separated from those of the provinces and *xians*.

Prince De, however, realized that Mongolia was no longer the Mongolia of 1933. The demand of the Mongols was now no more than to restore the original Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Commission. Unless the Chinese government recognized a much higher degree of autonomy in a self-ruling Mongolian domain, Prince De felt it could not meet the demands of the Mongol people. The advocates of the higher degree of autonomy also realized that the KMT promise did not satisfy their expectations. Manibadara, who was still waiting for an answer from Chungking, was also somewhat disappointed. Surely the radicals at Wang-un sume could not be satisfied with this solution.

The great majority of the Mongols still felt that this policy of the KMT regime would solve the Inner Mongolian problem. In any case, compared with the period before

the war, this resolution seemed to be more progressive and reasonable. Consequently, when the Mongol elites negotiated with Xiong Shihui and Fu Zuoyi, they usually accepted this resolution as a basis for their discussion. Nevertheless, those KMT government officials who had solid regional military and administrative power in their hands openly rejected the resolution. "This was a party document," they said, "not a government law. It places no constraints upon us, and we are not obligated to uphold it." Although they were members of the central committee of the KMT, they consistently neglected the resolution of the party conference as mere empty words. Apparently, the powerful central leaders of the KMT and the Chinese government did not sincerely share a desire to carry out such a resolution. The resolution, which could have won the hearts of the Mongols, instead became an obstacle separating the Mongols from the KMT.

Struggles in Eastern and Western Inner Mongolia

The eastern Inner Mongolian delegates headed by Manibadara returned to Wang-un sume greatly disappointed. Manibadara had hoped to establish a relationship with the KMT government. His failure decisively severed the Wang-un sume group from Chungking. When he returned, Manibadara agreed to bring Togtakhu back with him and some Chinese military intelligence agents. This plot was discovered, and Manibadara's career came to an end. (It was rumored that Togtakhu was executed immediately, but later in 1950, he appeared at the court in Ulaanbaatar to testify against Prince De as a collaborator with Japan.) Manibadara's failure caused the Mongol activists in Wang-un sume to establish even more contacts with the Chinese Communists. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese Communists easily occupied Kalgan with the support of the Soviet forces. Ulanfu, leading a group of Mongol cadres, came in along with the Chinese.

The group in Sunid, after receiving their delegation returning from Ulaanbaatar, realized that the opportunity for unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia had passed. It was impossible for the Outer Mongolian authorities to assist Inner Mongolia. The Outer Mongolians had no reliable information about eastern Inner Mongolia and no way to establish formal contact with it. Although a government was nominally established in the east, in reality it had no authority; and after Buyandalai's death, the regime found it even more difficult to function. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Ulanfu invited the group to come to Kalgan and establish the Mongolian Autonomous Allied Institution (*Khamtaral-un Khural*). With the support of the Soviet forces, the Chinese Communists were now able to expand their influence into Shilingol and the eastern half of Ulanchab. As a result, the Mongol Government in Sunid dissolved itself and joined with Ulanfu's group.

In Inner Mongolia, especially the eastern half, an unfortunate and bloody incident broke out during this transition period. At Wang-un sume, a group of radicals tried to sweep out all the moderate elements so as to facilitate a socialist revolution. This high-handed attitude forced moderate people to organize and protect themselves with arms. The struggle between the two groups eventually led to bloodshed, and many moderate people left their native land to escape from the control of the leftists, moving to areas still occupied by the KMT forces.

The conservatives of both Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues were influenced by Wu Heling and his group. They refused to make contact with the organization under Chu Mingshan, and instead established direct contact with the Mongol-Tibetan Affairs Commission in Chungking and the Military Affairs Committee in Beiping officially headed by General Li Zongren. They were able to carry out some rehabilitation work in these same

areas under the influence of the Chinese government. The people who did the real work locally were Suchungga, head of the General Affairs Bureau, Josotu League; Yu Huachen, head of the General Affairs Bureau of Juu-uda League; and Yang Zunsheng (Sechenchogtu), head of the Civilian Affairs Bureau of the same league.

There were also those who desired to use armed violence and struggle against the Wang-un sume group and the Chinese Communists. In Jerim League, these included Han Sewang and Bao Shanyi. In the Josotu League, there were Chinbudorji, the *jasag* of Tumid Right Banner, and Yondansangbu, the *jasag* of the Tumid Left Banner. In the Juu-uda League, there was an influential lama, Tarba of Aru-Khorchin Banner, and also Chingjorigtu (He Zizhang) of Baarin Left Banner. They all recruited local armed forces and aimed to carry out a decisive counterattack against the leftists.

As already mentioned, Wu Guting also expanded his activities by recruiting a cavalry brigade under the name of the Northeastern Allied Mongolian Banners Defense Forces. The internećine struggles were especially heavy in the Juu-uda league. Tarba Lama and his followers were especially cruel to the agents sent from Wang-un sume. This excessive violence caused the common people to lose sympathy for the anti-communist groups.

In western Inner Mongolia, many irrational incidents also occurred, most begun by the violent activities of Oljeiochir and his followers. In order to demonstrate their revolutionary spirit, they adopted a violent attitude toward conservatives and moderates. First, they killed Dewagenden, an aged politician of Dorbed Banner of Ulančhab. Following this, Nasunbayar, a senior official of Sunid Banner and faithful follower of Prince De, was tortured and killed, along with his wife. These incidents only stiffened the resistance of the local people.

In the Shilingol league, the first anti-communist forces were organized by Rinčhindorji, the headman of the Buriyad Mongols who had migrated from Hulun-buir region to Modeng-yin-shili of the Shinlingol League. Later, during the Japanese occupation, these people had been under suspicion by the Japanese military, had been specially "protected" by the Abaga special services office and isolated from the rest of the Mongols in that area. After the arrival of the Soviet Red Army, they were accused of being traitors against their mother country, the Soviet Union, and were forced to move back to Siberia. Those who had studied in Japan or who had contact with the Japanese were arrested or executed. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Rinčhindorji escaped with a group of his followers and hid in the desert. After the retreat of the Soviet-Mongolian forces, Rinčhindorji came out of hiding, recruited the conservatives of the eastern banners of Shilingol League, and struggled against the communists and those Mongols who cooperated with them.

In the Ujumuchin Right Banner of Shilingol, Khuturungga also gathered a group of hard-headed conservatives, and continued the anti-communist struggle even after Rinčhindorji's forces were destroyed. His violent activities also caused numerous casualties among the people of both sides.

Chinese and International Events that Affected Inner Mongolia

The most important event in China during the early postwar period was the beginning of peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This event had a great impact on the development of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. In mid October 1945, through the intervention of United States Ambassador Patrick Hurley,

Mao Zedong visited Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking, raising great hope for peace. By the end of December of the same year, President Harry Truman dispatched General George Marshall to China to mediate between the KMT and the Communists. In early January of 1946, a special executive organization for managing an armistice was established, which included delegates of the United States government, the Chinese government, and the Chinese Communist Party. Based on the agreement between the KMT and the Communists, a Political Consultative Conference was convened on January 10, in Chungking. This conference included not only delegates from the KMT and the Communists, but also from minor parties and nonpartisans.

While this conference was at its peak of activity, the Inner Mongolian leaders, who were excluded from these important talks, were eager to know what was being decided. Manibadara wanted to go to Chungking to voice the desires of the Mongol people. He and his supporters hoped that Mongolian autonomy would be recognized as one of the important matters facing the nation during the peace talks.

However, the peace talks gradually cooled off. At first, both sides restrained their activities, in accordance with the preliminary agreement they had already reached. But while the peace talks continued inside, the war escalated outside. Of course this also had a great impact on Inner Mongolia. In the areas that the military forces of the Chinese government could not reach, the Chinese Communists became more active. At the same time, where the influence of the Chinese government did reach, anti-Communist activities also increased and with heightened vigor. Rinchindorji's anti-Communist forces were caught up in these contradictory circumstances.

Meanwhile, James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in a move to block Soviet intervention in Inner Mongolia after the grant of independence to Outer Mongolia, issued a statement affirming that Inner Mongolia was an integral part of China. Although this had no direct impact on the autonomy movement, it did create a very negative attitude among the Mongols toward America.

Fu Zuoyi's Occupation of Kalgan

In the early part of April, at the suggestion of the Chinese Communist Party, the leaders of the Mongolian regimes in Kalgan and Wang-un sume, Ulanfu, Buyanmandu, and others, met at Chengde, the capital of Rehe district. They issued a joint communiqué favoring the unification struggle being waged for the well being of the Mongols under the leadership of the Allied Association and the Mongolian Autonomy Movement. They urged that two separate headquarters be established, one in east and one in west Inner Mongolia.

Following the breaking off of the peace talks and the renewal of the war, the KMT forces occupied Chengde in the latter part of August 1946 and occupied Kalgan on October 11. This had great impact on both pro- and anti-Communist Mongols. With the KMT occupation of Kalgan, the Beiping-Suiyuan railroad was repaired, uniting the Mongolian leagues and banners of the non-Communist areas. The various leagues and banners still had differences, but they were willing to work together for the common cause of national autonomy. This made it possible for Prince De and the former Mongolian government leaders to contact the banners of both Shilingol and Chahar. The local people were able again to unify under their former leaders and move toward the common goal.

Of course, this also heightened the prestige of Prince De, allowing him to better negotiate with the Chinese government. At the same time, KMT central headquarters also

moved to strengthen the party headquarters of the Chahar banners. It appointed Yu Dechun head of this headquarters, and he made the younger of the former Mongolian government office workers secretaries at the banner party headquarters. Soon began the struggle against the Communists. These newly appointed party secretaries were mostly the former followers of Prince De. Although they were anti-Communist, their first priority was Mongolian autonomy, not the KMT's power. Yu Dechun nominally led them, but he was unable to win their allegiance.

Notwithstanding the complexity of the situation, the changing hands of Kalgan had great impact on the people of Chahar and Shilingol. They thought that the Communists would eventually be forced out from their homeland; it was only a matter of time. Under that illusion, some joined the anti-Communist forces recruited by Rinchindorji and Khuturunga.

The recovery of Kalgan by the Chinese government forces did create a bigger hindrance to the development of Inner Mongolian self-rule. The appointee to the governorship of Chahar, a man named Feng, was an old follower of Song Zheyuan, the head of the 29th Army clique. He was also a friend of Prince De. However, Kalgan was recovered from the hands of the communists by Fu Zuoyi, the commander of the 12th War Zone. Subsequently, Chahar, together with its capital, Kalgan, came under the domination of this war zone and its commander, Fu Zuoyi. Once again, Prince De and Fu Zuoyi confronted each other over the Mongolian problem. Fu's goal was not only to throw De out of Mongolian politics, but also to put both Chahar and Shilingol under his own control. Soon after, Governor Feng resigned from his governorship, and Fu was appointed to replace him. This resulted in the headquarters of the commander of the 12th War Zone becoming the most influential institution within this district.

Although in formal terms Fu Zuoyi and his war zone were under the supervision of General Li Zongren, head of the Military Affairs Committee, Beiping Branch, Fu was too much for Li to handle. Especially on the matter of the Mongolian problem, Fu had his own ideas. Fu got Zeng Houzai appointed secretary-general of the Chahar provincial government. Zeng, a man from Zhejiang and a very shrewd manipulator and dealer, brought back all the old practices that Fu had employed against the Mongol banners under the influence of the Suiyuan provincial government in Kalgan as the blueprint for his own policy toward Chahar and Shilingol.

Under Fu Zuoyi's influence, the three provinces of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan joined to put down the Mongolian autonomy movement and resist separation of power between the Mongolian leagues and banners and the Chinese provinces and *xians*. This powerful group very actively tried to block the Mongols on every matter involving self-rule. These policies and activities of Fu Zuoyi were identical to those of Xiong Shihui in the Northeast. Fu and Xiong formed a very strong anti-Mongolian autonomy alliance within the administrative leadership of the Chinese government.

Following the fall of Kalgan, Ulanfu and the entire Mongol administration moved to Pandita-gegeen-keid. Although this was a withdrawal, it brought the Communist power directly into the heart of the Inner Mongolian territory. During this retreat, Jorigtu (Guan Qiyi), who had been made head of Shilingol League by the Communists, was killed by Fu Zuoyi's forces. Jorigtu was a man from Darkhan Banner of the Jerim League and a former follower of Prince De during the period of the Mongolian Autonomy movement at Beile-yin sume. Trusted by the Prince, he had been appointed head of radio communications. Later, after Japan's expansion westward, he left Beile-yin sume and proceeded to Yan'an. Jorigtu's death severed any possibility for Prince De to maintain contact with the Chinese Communist side.

Realizing there was no hope for peace, Ulanfu pushed for unification between his group and that at Wang-un sume, and this unification gradually formed the foundation for the later Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region under Chinese Communist domination.

Activities of the Mongol Local Elite

During the peace talks between the KMT and the CCP, the matter of the National Assembly and the drafting of a constitution became the focus of their debate. Later, following the failure of the peace talks, the KMT government decided to convene the Assembly in November to approve the constitution. This, of course, had great impact on the future of Inner Mongolia. October 31, was the sixtieth birthday of the chairman, Chiang Kai-shek. To express their congratulations to the chairman and to attend the National Assembly, the leaders of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council organized a delegation from the Mongolian banners in the Suiyuan region to go to Nanjing. They also wished to present their demands for Inner Mongolian Autonomy as well as for the separation of power and function between the leagues and banners on the one side and the provinces and *xians* on the other. In other words, their congratulations to the chairman on his birthday was merely an opportunity to voice their opposition to Fu Zuoyi.¹

When the delegation arrived in Beiping, some of its members suggested that they visit Prince De to exchange ideas on the Mongolian problem. However, Rong Xiang rejected this idea. He argued that since Prince De had collaborated with the Japanese, he should no longer play a role in Mongolian politics. But the other members of the delegation went to visit with the prince personally to inform him that they would struggle for the restoration of the Mongolian Political Council of the Beile-yin sume period. Prince De frankly told them, "The time of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Councils of the Beile-yin sume period has already passed. Now the goal of our struggle must be to attain a higher degree of autonomy. How else could we influence those who have already established their autonomous government in eastern Inner Mongolia? Although the Chinese Communists still have not fulfilled their promises, even if we judge the restoration of the Mongolian Political Council to be merely a propaganda move, perhaps saying this could not have any impact." He further said, "You call your group the Delegation of the Suiyuan Mongol Banners. And yet you people agree that the underlying reason for establishing the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council was to disrupt the unification of Mongolia. It also means that you recognize that the leagues and banners should be under the administrative supervision of a province. I feel that the title of your group should be reconsidered."

The visitors agreed with Prince De's idea. They returned and proposed to Rong Xiang that the official title of their delegation be changed. Although Rong Xiang himself disagreed with Prince De, he was still able to accept his opponent's admonition and

¹ This delegation was headed by Rong Xiang, the deputy chairman of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council and the *amban* of the Tumed Banner. Members were as follows: Ba Wenjun (Bayankhan), secretary-general of the Suiyuan Mongolian Council; Ochirkhuyagtu, vice-head of Yekejuu League; Shongno, the son of the head of Ulanhab League; Qi Quanxi, the nephew of the head of Yekejuu League; Kokebagatur (Hu Fengshan), delegate of four Chahar Right Flank Banners; Kang Jimin, delegate of Tumed Banner; and others.

changed the title of their group to the Delegation of Ulanhab and Yeke-juu Leagues.²

Two delegations were organized by Li Yongxin, head of the Border Area Affairs Bureau KMT Central Committee, who also instructed both Xue Xingru, head of the party headquarters of the Rehe Mongolian Banner Party Affairs, and Jin Chongwei, head of the party headquarters of the Liaobei Mongolian Banner Party Affairs, to organize similar delegations for the Josotu, Juu-uda, Jerim, and Hulun-buir areas to go to Nanjing to celebrate the birthday of Chairman Chiang and deliver the petition for self-rule of the Mongols to the central government authorities. Another of Li Yongxin's purposes was to make sure that Inner Mongolia would not be represented by Rong Xiang, Ba Wenjun (Bayankhan), and the other members of the western Inner Mongolian clique.

Two other Inner Mongolian delegations also arrived in Nanjing: One came from Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues, with Yondansangbu (*jasag* of Tumed Left Banner) as its head, myself as the spokesman, and Oljeibuyan, Mandukhu, Jorigtu, and other members. The other delegation came from Jerim and Hulan-buir Leagues, with Jin Yanghao (Jing-guleme) as the head, and other members including Jorintob, Saijirakhu and Bai Dacheng. The delegation headed by Rong Xiang was only able to represent one third of the opinion of Inner Mongolia at the conference.

After the arrival of these three delegations in Nanjing, their first activity, of course, was to celebrate Chiang's birthday. They then began to visit the concerned ministries and offices to express their sincere hope for autonomy. At that time, the minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was Luo Liangjian, a man with no political prestige or importance. Chu Mingshan, who was in Mukden, was summoned by Luo back to Nanjing to act as the head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the commission to help him deal with the three delegations. In reality, though, Chu's return to Nanjing was ordered by Xiong Shihui to prevent the Mongols from expressing their opinions directly to the top authority.

Because the national constitutional assembly was also going to be held in Nanjing, the representatives of the three provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe remained in the capital. Following the instructions of Fu Zuoyi, they openly expressed their opposition to the demands of the three Mongol delegations. Because of this pressure from outside, Rong Xiang changed his stubborn touting of himself to the other two delegations as a faithful anti-Japanese activist. So that all might struggle for the common goal, he was willing to cooperate with those who supported Prince De. The "gap" between eastern and western Inner Mongolia temporarily ceased to exist.

The Hope of the Inner Mongolian People

Before leaving Beiping, in an effort to attract national attention, to win the support of public opinion, and to influence the forthcoming Constitutional National Assembly, I published "The Hope of Inner Mongolian People" in *Dagong bao*, the authoritative non-KMT Chinese newspaper at that time, which usually presented an objective view of the Mongolian problem. My article was published in the *Dagong bao* in both Shanghai and Tianjin in the middle of November. Its contents are as follows:

The people of Inner Mongolia have their own blood origin, language, culture, customs, tradition, and history. After the First World War, the tide of national self-

² I was later informed of this personally by Mr. Kokebagatur.

determination rolled over the entire world. . . . [and] during the Northern Expedition period, the Chinese government also adopted as its slogan: "to foster the weak and the small nationalities inside the nation and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule." Recently, in many important world conferences, most nations have supported self-determination and self-rule for oppressed nationalities. These thoughts and actions deeply impressed the Inner Mongols and created in them a strong belief in self-determination and a zeal to carry out their demand for self-rule. . . . There should be no misunderstanding that because of the establishment of provinces, the Inner Mongolian problem has already ceased to exist.

Every time the Inner Mongols pushed for autonomy, the national authorities and the people eyed this with suspicion. But they forgot that this movement for self-determination was linked to the world political experience in the twentieth century. It is also the teaching of Dr. Sun Yat-sen—it is the great enterprise that the government should accomplish, but has not yet done. It is not a new invention of the Mongols, but a hope for the realization of the great promise.

Now I would like to point out some facts as a reference for those who are concerned with Mongolian affairs.

1. Article four of the "Outline of Nation Building" (*Jianguo dagang*) directs that "the government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the nation and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule."

2. A statement by the Chinese Kuomintang First National Congress reads: . . . "The KMT dares to sincerely announce its recognition of the right to self-determination by all nationalities in China."

3. More recently, the Second Conference of the Sixth Session of the [KMT] Central Committee passed the "Solution for the National Problems," in which it advises, "In the future, in the constitution, a clear guarantee for the right to autonomy of the frontier nationalities should be guaranteed."

At this time many people think that the independence of Outer Mongolia has already fulfilled the teaching of the National Founder on the part of Mongolia, and that Inner Mongolia should not demand self-rule. This is an erroneous assumption

The government's recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence brought great joy to the Outer Mongols. Even we, the Inner Mongols, expressed congratulations to and wished happiness for our fellow countrymen and great appreciation to the central government. However, the recognition of Outer Mongolian independence did not occur until after the Yalta Agreement was signed. On the one hand, we must consider it a defeat for the policy of the Chinese government; on the other hand, we must consider it a victory for the Mongols who wanted independence. We recognize that in the last thirty-six years, the Outer Mongolian attitude and its political movements have been entirely different from those of Inner Mongolia. Consequently, the result it achieved is also very different from ours. But now that Outer Mongolia has its independence, what will be the future for us, the Inner Mongols? This is a question that every Mongol should ask.

When we talk about Inner Mongolian autonomy, someone inevitably says, "We do not wish that you will become the second Outer Mongolia: with no freedom, false independence, and controlled by others." The Inner Mongols also understand that it would be very difficult to be a small nation squeezed between two giants. However, the present Inner Mongolian problem is not a problem of independence. Therefore, we hope that under the principle of freedom and equality among nationalities, and in the bosom of the Republic of China, we will receive self-rule in order to facilitate our future development. We have no desire to sever ourselves from the protection of the mother country and to throw ourselves into the hands of outsiders, to be fooled, and to bury ourselves in an environment without freedom.

Yet at the same time we would also like to ask, thirty-six years after the emergence of the Outer Mongolian problem, who has provided a better solution for the Mongols? . . . Who has concern for the sufferings of the Outer Mongolian people? Who has provided

protection for the Outer Mongolian countrymen against foreign oppression? Why now recognize "their false independence"? Who should take on these responsibilities? Just because there was no good solution found for Outer Mongolia and it has declined to its present state, you cannot deny the Inner Mongols their autonomy. Think of the road you will otherwise cause them to take.

The demand by the Inner Mongols for self-rule asks that Mongols manage their own administrative affairs while preserving the integrity of the national territory and sovereignty. After all, the members of the weak and small nationalities understand best their own sufferings and necessities. They would be able to manage their own affairs without causing misunderstandings, and could avoid unexpected results. The reason the government was not able to manage Mongolian affairs fairly and effectively is that the officials who managed these affairs were not members of the Mongol nationality. Due to the many years without success in Inner Mongolia, it is necessary to find an alternative and allow us to do something for ourselves. The Mongols have the right to demand that the government change its management of Mongolian affairs. If the government itself is not able to administer them properly and also does not allow the Mongols to manage for themselves, that would be very difficult to understand indeed. The push for Inner Mongolian autonomy is not a request for separation but for cooperation. The Mongols hope to achieve autonomy under the fostering care of the central government. . . . This is the type of self-rule the Inner Mongols demand.

Although it has created all kinds of suspicions, the higher-degree of autonomy that we, the Mongols, demand is different from the local self-rule of a provincial district. We hope that under the direct administration of the central government, a unified political organization will be established in Inner Mongolia. Matters including national defense, diplomacy, military affairs, national communication, and transportation are for the central government to administer. . . .

The opposing faction, in general, fears that if there were a unified Inner Mongolian institution, it might be utilized or controlled by outsiders to create some kind of unexpected incident. But if a unified Inner Mongolian institution may perhaps be manipulated by outsiders, why would our government be unable to control it and make it a cooperative institution? We cannot believe that our government is as pessimistic or as cowardly as this. . . . If Inner Mongolian autonomy and a unified autonomous organization should be rejected on the above pretext, it would greatly diminish Inner Mongolian confidence in the central government. . . .

After the collapse of the Mongol empire, Mongolia moved in the direction of separatism. During the Manchu period, the Manchu court split Mongolia into many small feudalistic units; Mongolian politics, economy, and culture consequently declined. In recent years, the Mongolian people have awakened and realized that unless unification takes place, there will be no way to maintain the existence and growth of the nation. A unified autonomy is the common desire of all Mongols. . . . We hope that the government is able to guide this movement reasonably, and not build dikes to stop the flow and cause a flood.

The confrontation of the leagues and banners against the provinces and *xians* is what created the present Inner Mongolian problem. The establishment of the league and banner system in the early Manchu period was originally a measure to split Mongolia. At the same time, a feudalistic "Mongolia ruled by Mongols" self-rule type of local institution was founded. The leagues and banners ran the Mongolian local administration, and were not interfered with by other local administrative organizations. During periods of . . . drought and disasters in China's inland provinces, under the pretext of borrowing Mongol land to nourish the Chinese people, the court persuaded the Mongol nobles to allow Chinese to migrate into the southeastern sections of Inner Mongolia to become tenants on their land. Following this, the Manchu Court established the *tings* (later changed into *xians*) to manage the affairs of these Chinese but not to interfere with the Mongols and their administration. . . . In order to supervise the Mongols and to put pressure on them, the Manchu court also established *jiangjun* [generals] and *dutong* [military supervisors] in the areas of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe to administer military affairs but not to interfere with the league and

banner administration directly.

After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the Beijing government issued "The Regulations for Mongolia's Treatment" to protect the ruling power of the leagues and banners. But the Republic also reinforced the functions and powers of the military governors of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan and of the *xians* under them to increase their influence over the leagues and banners. In [1928], the Chinese government changed these districts into Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, and Qinghai (Kokonor) provinces, and increased the ruling power of the *xians*. This intensified the conflict between the Mongols and the provinces and *xians*. In [1931], the government issued "The Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners" so as to protect the leagues and banners and to separate their powers and functions from those of the provinces and *xians*. But this law was never enforced, and the struggle between the leagues and banners and the provinces and the *xians* increased. Even worse, the governors of these frontier provinces maintained vestiges of the practices of the old warlords. . . . Therefore, when the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement began in [1933], its objective was to abolish the provinces and *xians*.

After more than ten years of occupation by the Japanese, Inner Mongolia has just now returned to the fold of the mother country. Today, in the land of Inner Mongolia, the leagues and banners that have represented Mongolian local self-rule for years still exist; the provinces and *xians*, which were always directed against the Mongols and aimed at the elimination of the leagues and banners, continue in the same region. We would like to ask if it is not reasonable for the Mongols to demand a clear-cut division of the territory, functions, and powers between the leagues and banners and the provinces and *xians*.

Some question why, in the twentieth century, the Mongols insist on maintaining their feudalistic and backward leagues and banners. This sounds reasonable, but such questioners do not realize that the demand of the Mongols has been to maintain the titles of the old leagues and banners and create within them instruments by which the Mongols may carry out their local self-rule. Just as the high officials of the frontier areas struggle to maintain the provinces and *xians*, the Mongols also struggle to maintain their leagues and banners to ensure local autonomy. If the government allows a unified autonomous institution to be established in Inner Mongolia and allows the territories of the autonomous region to protect the Mongols' right to carry out their self-rule, I believe the Mongolian intellectuals will not struggle to maintain the leagues and banners, those remnants of feudalism. . . .

For many years, whenever problems in Mongolia occurred, . . . they were always linked to the problems of migration and cultivation. The Mongolian territories, located on the high plateau, are cold, dry, and unsuitable for agriculture. In this environment, the Mongols continued their lifestyle of pastoral nomadism. Although some parts of their lands (mostly in eastern and southern Inner Mongolia) are suitable for agricultural development, these had already been placed under cultivation. The rest of the land has remained uncultivated; so it can be used for pastoral functions. If cultivation expands continually, this would cause the Mongols to drive their herds into the arid desert area, and the Mongol people would eventually disappear.

The traditional [Chinese] cultivation pattern is to rotate fields, cultivating a piece of grassland one year, then leaving it fallow the next. But because of plowing, strong winds, and the destruction of grass roots, the topsoil is blown away, eroding [former] grazing fields into a manmade desert. These farming practices damage the pastoral economy rather than increase agricultural production. . . .

If China also desires to be an industrialized nation, it needs to preserve all kinds of resources, including those that give rise to pastoral products. Undoubtedly, the Inner Mongolian pastures should be protected from further development rather than be diminished by wool and dairy import products from Australia and America. Mongolian pastures and the people employed in the pastoral economy all contribute to the development of the nation; yet they are interdependent on the parallel development of inland China farmers and the industrialists of the cities

The Japanese occupation of Inner Mongolia changed the situation greatly; it is en-

tirely different from the way it was ten years before. Although the people have observed this, the government still wants to continue the old method and policy in ruling Mongolia. The government thinks that the Mongol people are still under the influence of the lamas and the orders of the feudal princes. . . .

From the beginning, they have failed to understand that the ecclesiastical power of the lamas is already gone and their feudalistic power bankrupt. The best of the feudalistic princes have realized that this institution has to be removed. Today, realization of the potential power of Mongolian society, found initially in the intellectual groups, has awakened the youth at large. Youth from all classes have already assumed leadership positions in Mongolia. They clearly appreciate the damage to the Mongol people caused by the Manchu court's religious policy and by feudalism. Therefore, if the central government were to now revert to conservatism, it would lose the confidence of the Mongolian masses. . . .

To resolve the Mongolian problem, the government should pay attention to what would benefit the Mongol masses rather than to what would benefit only certain individuals. The influence of the established institutions is great, but any institution established for selfish personal needs cannot provide a solution for the Mongolian problem. . . .

Time has passed since the victory over Japan, . . . but the Government still does not have a concrete plan for rehabilitation, even though many areas have rehabilitation centers. . . .

On the one hand, the KMT Second Conference of the Sixth Session Central Committee passed the Resolution for Frontier Problems; on the other hand, many administration officials (all KMT members) said, "This solution is very difficult to put into effect." Concurrently, another political party [the Chinese Communists] propagandized that "the resolution of the KMT will never be realized." These opinions confused the Mongols, and it became impossible for them to judge exactly what was occurring. . . .

Analysis of the problem was affected by each faction's prejudices. The Mongols and the top officials of the frontier regions hold conflicting opinions concerning the Mongolian problem, caused by the opposing standpoints each adopted during the confrontation. Naturally, it is impossible for them to reach consensus from an objective viewpoint. The central government should with a magnanimous spirit embrace the national platform based upon the *Outline of Nation Building*, and assume the position of a big brother toward the minority groups. It would be reasonable to accept the Mongols' demand that the central government directly administer the Mongolian districts. Mongolia's problems can be solved by a central government that can prevent interference by the top frontier officials.

Since the completion of the Northern Expedition [1928-9], not only has the Mongolian problem remained unsolved, but no serious attempts at resolution have occurred. These failures are the perverse result of the work of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, originally established to manage Mongol matters. This failure was not only caused by inefficiency and negligence by the organization, but also because the responsible leaders of this commission are not Mongols, Tibetans, or Uighurs. This commission is without any real influence in the central government. From now on, . . . this office needs to be infused with a new spirit. Not just token changes may be carried out. The commission needs to understand the frontier problem, and enthusiastically deal with frontier affairs and problems. . . .

Unfortunately, civil war broke out immediately after the victory over Japan. In the great household of the Republic of China, the big brothers fought among themselves and had no time to pay attention to other problems. Their younger brothers, the Mongols, were already disappointed and hoped they would not be pulled into the big brothers' struggle, be forced to side with one or the other of them in the war. We [the Mongols] oppose separating the Mongols by force and "liberating" them to one side or the other against their will. We hope that our big brothers will help us and foster our goals, but we are not willing or able to suffer their "struggles" and join their war. We hope the governmental authorities will be sympathetic toward the circumstances of the Mongols in these areas. . . . We will not agree to accept any names or titles as part of schemes to mobilize some Mongols to at-

tack members of their own race and create a blood bath among the Mongols. . . .

Inner Mongolia, after years of Japanese occupation, has looked to the government of the mother country. Mongols have thought that the day of victory over Japan would also be the hour of Mongolian freedom and self-rule that would abolish all old measures and establish a new policy for all nationalities. . . .

Now the National Assembly is going to be held. We sincerely hope the Government and the KMT will put into effect their promises based on . . . *The Outline of Nation-building, The Declaration of the KMT First National Congress*, and the recent solution of the frontier problems proposed by the KMT Sixth Session Second Conference of the Central Committee; and that they make it clear in the constitution that all the frontier nationalities must have the right of autonomy. It is also sincerely hoped that other nongovernmental political parties, members of societal elites, and our fellow countrymen will foster the Mongolian cause for the development of democracy, wealth, devolution of power, and happiness.

Activities of the Mongolian Delegates in Nanjing

After this article was published, it won public support, but also provoked antagonism. Both Fu Zuoyi and Xiong Shihui and other top government officials actively worked to place Mongolian administration under the control of provincial governments. Their activities had a great impact on the Constitutional National Assembly. As mentioned above, the three Mongolian delegations, after fulfilling their mission to celebrate Chairman Chiang's birthday, turned to support the Mongolian representatives who would attend the National Assembly. We altered our official title from "congratulation delegation" to "petitioning delegation." We remained in Nanjing and were invited to a tea party by Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Chinese government. Chu Mingshan, the head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, accompanied us. He repeatedly tried to discourage the Mongolian delegates by saying, "The time for the chairman to talk with you will be very limited. It cannot be longer than ten minutes, so I sincerely hope the spokesmen of your three delegations will limit their speeches to three minutes each."

When the delegations arrived and met with the chairman, we gave greetings according to age: Rong Xiang started the proceedings, followed by Jin Yanghao, and then myself. The purpose of this arrangement, planned by Chu Mingshan, was to ensure that my time would be limited. Nevertheless, I used my three minutes to address four of the Mongol desires:

(1) To honor the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen concerning the nationalities inside the nation; to achieve what was proclaimed in Article Four of the *Outline of Nation Building* ("As for the weak and small nationalities inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule"); to fulfill the promises that the KMT made to the Mongols; to put into effect the recent solution of the nationalities problem that was decided upon by the Sixth Session Second Conference of the KMT Central Committee.

(2) To establish a unified organization to achieve Inner Mongolian autonomy.

(3) To make a clear distinction between the functions and powers of the leagues and the provinces and banners and *xians*.

(4) To emphasize the importance of a pastoral economy and to prohibit Chinese immigrants from cultivating Mongolian soil.

After finishing this brief address, I presented to the chairman a written summary

of my words. Chairman Chiang kindly received the document but deferred an answer. Then he called his attendants to bring out the tea and cakes. This left some time for conversation, but for the sake of courtesy, those who had already spoken did not speak again. The chairman noticed a man with a long beard, Jorintob, and invited him to speak. Jorintob, not an eloquent person, stood up and said, "We Mongols are like sick people. We need to buy some medicine to heal maladies and save our lives. Chairman, Your Excellency has a drugstore, so we have come here to find the medicine we need. If your medicine is good and able to heal, we will buy it here, or else we will go elsewhere to find it." Although these words were sincere and frank, it made the entire party nervous. Fortunately, the host did not choose to notice any unpleasantness, but only smiled and said, "Good, good." This ended the meeting at which the Mongolian problem might have been discussed in depth but was not.

Later, the three delegations were invited to a dinner party by the Chen brothers—Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu—very powerful members of the central committee of the KMT and leaders of the CC Clique. Nevertheless, the more they talked, the more distant they became. The Chen brothers expressed the opinion that the Mongols should feel satisfied, but we delegates repeatedly asked whether the KMT authorities were sincere in carrying out the will and teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the party, and the KMT promises to Mongolia and the other minorities. These arguments brought an element of contentiousness to the party.

This dinner party was planned by Li Yongxin, whose purpose was to make the Mongolian guests realize that he had facilitated their visits with the high party authorities, and to make the Chen brothers realize that he could lead the influential Mongol elites. Nevertheless, the exchange of views was less than cooperative. Because of his official position, Li could not express any sympathy with the Mongols' cause. This only showed the Mongols that a high ranking Mongol official could not express the true Mongolian will to the party's top authorities.

Another important gathering of the representatives of the Mongol, Tibetan, and Xinjiang minorities was a banquet given by Wu Tiecheng, secretary-general of the KMT Central Committee. Many people spoke, but the Uighur leader, Aisa-beg, and I voiced the minorities' desires. We emphasized the rights and privileges needed by the minorities, and urged that the party not neglect its own promises.

Struggles at the Chinese Constitutional National Assembly

While these three Mongolian delegations were in Nanjing and were working actively for the solution of Mongolian problems, confrontation inevitably erupted between them and the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan representatives in the National Assembly. In November 1946, the Chinese government disregarded the demand of the Chinese Communist Party and opposition from the Democratic Alliance and convened the opening session of the Constitutional National Assembly. Twenty-eight Mongol representatives attended: Bai Yunti, Chen Xiaofan, Li Chunlin, Liu Zongping, Bai Fengzhao, Li Yongxin, Jin Zhichao, Wu Yunpeng, Dorji, Hang Jiaxiang (Damrindorji), Jakhunju, Pu Wenlin, Rong Zhao, Ba Wenjun, Jing Tianlu, Shongno, Qi Quanxi, Sodnamjab, Sugden, Chen Erdenibatu, Dawa, Radnapad, Wu Jingbin, Choijab, Jorintob, Urgungge, Bai Haifeng, and Rashidondog. The largest group of representatives came from the Josutu League.

These delegates had been elected in 1937, just before the Sino-Japanese war. At

that time the Mongols' attention had been riveted on the movement led by Prince De and as a consequence the election of these representatives had been neglected. Consequently, aside from the Tumed area, the Mongols staying in Beijing, Nanjing, and later in Chungking carried out most of these elections. Ulanhab, Yekejuu, and Hulunbuir had no elections, so their delegates were selected by the league authorities immediately before the opening of the Assembly.

Liu Zongping was the most active of the Mongol representatives. His real name was Liu Lianke, and he was then the head of the Education Bureau of the Rehe provincial government. During this period, he had assistance in resolving the complicated entanglements between the Josutu and Juu-uda Leagues and the Rehe provincial government. At the Constitutional National Assembly, Liu Lianke proposed to introduce a special chapter on nationalities into the constitution. However, other moderate Mongol representatives recognized this as too abstract. Finally, they agreed to demand the establishment of a unified autonomous institution.

Liu Lianke's speech to the assembly evoked severe disagreement by the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan representatives. To win popular support, Fu Zuoyi and the representatives from the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces held separate press conferences afterward. Aside from opposing Mongol autonomy, they also demanded that Mongol banners be put under provincial administration. Fu Zuoyi pointed out that "basically there is no Mongolia problem. The so-called problems are the creations of the Mongols' own foolish imaginations. [They] are entirely fabricated by those who take advantage of Mongolia and use it as their own rice bowl." Inside the National Assembly, aside from the representatives from Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces, the most serious opposition to Mongolian self-rule was led by Bai Chongxi, a Guangxi Moslem warlord, and Luo Jialun, an academic and politician. The proposals of the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan representatives, which follow, in reality only replicated Fu Zuoyi's opinion.

**Statement by the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan Representatives
at the Press Conference:**

Inner Mongolia, located on the northern frontier of China, is involved with the three provinces of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan. . . . Therefore, we will offer a detailed explanation of the true circumstances of these three provinces.

First, the Inner Mongolian situation differs from that of Outer Mongolia and Tibet. The population of Inner Mongolia—comprising Mongols and Chinese—has a quite complex history. When the *xians* were established, banners also existed. This means that on a piece of land, a *xian* and a banner might exist concurrently. This creates two different frameworks, but not "banner is banner and *xian* is *xian*." We cannot separate them. A village might incorporate both Mongol and Chinese residents. Moreover, Mongols and Chinese often live together in one residence. Inter-marriage further blurs racial lines. Not only in the area where the *xians* were established, but even in the banners where the *xian* is not yet established, the Chinese are often the majority. . . .

Second, the Mongols are similar to the Chinese because of their tradition of mixed dwelling arrangements. Only a few Mongols still maintain a nomadic life-style, mostly in remote areas, while many Mongols practice agriculture. All Mongols in the mixed dwelling areas can speak the national language and use the writing system [Chinese], and they readily become part of a unified friendly body.

Third, in matters of rights and duties, equality has existed between the two groups. What the Chinese enjoy, the Mongols enjoy also. The Mongols are usually well treated. In fact, perhaps it can be said they have had no burdens. All these assumptions are validated by concrete facts. . . .

Fourth, interrelationships between the Mongols and the Chinese . . . are very positive,

with no discrimination. . . . The Mongols and Chinese get along harmoniously.

Fifth, during the anti-Japanese war period, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan were occupied territories. For eight years, the people suffered under the oppression of the enemy regimes. After the victory, they were disturbed for more than one year by the Communist forces. . . . After experiencing disastrous separation [from China] and aggression by the Japanese, the Mongols do not wish for similar experiences.

Sixth, we, the representatives of the three provinces, . . . along with the local elites, are sympathetic in principle to Mongolian banner self-rule. . . . Nevertheless, the autonomy has to be a regional autonomy: this local autonomy has to recognize existing real situations and accept national unity as the framework for reasonable self-rule. . . . We advocate:

1. In the area where Mongols outnumber Chinese, Mongols should assume responsibility for local administration, even to eliminating the *xian* governments. We do not advocate the existence of two different administrative institutions in one district. This would cause endless conflict.

2. In the areas where *xians* are established, where Mongols live together with the Chinese and Mongols are the minority, we hope that the principle of political and legal equality will ensure appropriate rights and political positions for the Mongols, to enable capable Mongols to join in local self-rule and to become representatives on the local council. . . .

3. The rights and duties of the Chinese and Mongols should be equal

4. Certain schools already admit both Mongol and Chinese students, but this is not enough. While honoring the cultures of other nationalities, we feel that the government should establish schools so the Mongols can both teach the Mongolian language and educate those Mongols who do not understand the national [Chinese] language.

5. In the Mongol banners, there are still some areas good for husbandry. To protect these grazing fields and to develop the livelihood of the Mongol people, we advocate that these areas should remain uncultivated.

6. More health centers should be established to promote public health, to improve the breeding of domestic animals, to accelerate economic production, and to elevate the Mongolian standard of living.

In addition, we would like to explain the following three points:

1. The Republic of China comprises many nationalities, and solid unification of all is requisite to the flourishing of the nation. During this period of nation building, the Mongol and Chinese people of the three . . . provinces must move toward a more interdependent relationship and not toward a separation.

2. Because the Mongolian leagues originally organized as meetings of the banners. . . . the league is not an administrative institution and has no legally fixed form of organization. The banners are the formal administrative units. This point should be stressed.

3. Although the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces are located along the frontier, they have a great impact on the existence of the nation. This fact should not be ignored.

In order to refute these opinions, Liu Lianke suggested that I prepare a draft and then have Rong Xian and himself edit it. Then this document would be distributed inside the National Assembly Hall and be delivered to all news agencies for publicity. On December 12, the *Dagongbao* published the whole text under the following title:

The Mongolian Response to the Opinion of the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan Delegates on the Inner Mongolian Problem

At present . . . we, the Mongol people, sincerely hope to follow the brilliant instruction of the Founder of the Nation. His teachings provided a bright path for all the weak and small nationalities to march forward upon toward the goal of equal coexistence. . . . We want our league and banner institutions, along with our grazing fields, to be protected. We want to promulgate a new constitution that would provide coexistence with equality and common development for all nationalities in the Republic of China

Since your opinion was published in the newspapers, misunderstandings may result

... regarding the problem in Mongolia. Therefore, we must defend our position on the actual situation of the Mongols. ... First, we wish to clarify your reports:

1. Inner Mongolia, with the exception of the southernmost border areas and those near the railroad, is occupied by both Chinese and Mongols. Much of it has only a few Chinese merchants; in that land, there are no *xians*. As for the so called provincial territories, they are nothing more than different colors on a map: they have no administrative relations with us Mongols. In other words, even the land that has already been cultivated is still the possession of the Mongols. The Chinese tenants are still paying rent to the league and banner governments and to the Mongol people. The leagues and banners are traditional political institutions that have been established for several hundred years, but the *xians* were established only by the end of the Manchu Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic. The history of the provinces spans a mere ten years. Both the provinces and the *xians* deal only with the affairs of the Chinese people and should not interfere with the administration of the Mongol banners. ...

2. The Mongols cooperate with the Chinese, and no prejudice surfaces between the two nationalities (except the prejudice of the province and *xian* officials against us). Nevertheless, there is no reason to oppose Mongol self-rule and our existence as a nationality merely because a few of us can speak Chinese.

3. As for the rights of the already-existing leagues and banners, the provinces and *xians* have encroached upon them unreasonably. The Mongols' obligations are therefore two-fold, but the provinces and *xians* offer them no concern and protection in return. In the past three decades, we have suffered through the preferential treatment of the provinces and the *xians*. Therefore, we dare not accept any further such treatment. ...

4. The existence of a nationality is a product of nature. It cannot be manufactured or destroyed by human will. ... It is also impossible to eliminate nationality problems through the denial of one side's subjective view. The nationality problem and the nationalities' demand for autonomy cannot simply be erased. ...

5. The livelihood of the Mongols is threatened. When a *xian* is established, many grazing fields are cultivated and destroyed. If this policy continues, then all Mongols will be forced onto the road to extinction. If the Mongols lack political liberation, then no one can ensure them economic stability.

Second, we wish to comment on the six points of your proposals.

1. The Founder of the Nation insisted on equality among the nationalities. His greatest suggestion was to "foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country and enable them to carry out self-determination and self-rule." Consequently, we hope that when you quote his teachings, you will not use them in a narrow sense. Equality and liberty cannot be separated from one another; the liberty of a nationality depends on the protection of its right to self-rule. If the Mongolian right of self-rule is eliminated, then how can we enjoy equality and liberty?

2. We vehemently oppose having two sets of administrative institutions in one area, especially when one of them heavily oppresses us. We hope for clear-cut territorial boundaries and limitations of power between the leagues and banners, and the provinces and *xians*. We wish to enjoy our own local autonomy.

3. As for the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth items of your proposals, you tried to consider them from our point of view, and this deserves our appreciation. We do demand real equality of rights and obligations among all nationalities, but we do not hope for a false equality that would submerge the Mongols and their land under the provinces and *xians*. ... The central government had planned to develop Mongolian education, and had sent money for this rehabilitation to the border areas. Yet the provincial governments siphoned away this money, so our schools did not benefit from it. Our grazing fields have been encroached upon, our pastoral enterprise violated. Mongolian economic life is bankrupt, hygienic conditions are deteriorating—all because of political oppression and extortion. ...

Third, we must explain the three points of our proposal.

(1) The Republic of China is a commonwealth of all its nationalities. It is not possessed

only by the Chinese, and the revolution led by the Founder of the Nation is not only for the benefit of the Chinese. Since the Founder of the Nation emphasized the common benefits which the national revolution would bring and recognized the right of self-determination and self-rule for the weak and small nationalities, true unification of the nationalities depends on their interrelationships and the protection of their political, economic, and cultural liberty and equality. . . . Forcefully placing the provinces and *xians* over the Mongols will jeopardize close and friendly intimate unification with the Chinese.

(2) As for the assertion that the league ranks with the province, we wish that you gentlemen would carefully read the *Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners*, and only then express your opinions in order to avoid embarrassing yourselves when you try to attract the attention of the public.

(3) Inner Mongolia is the first line of national defense. It is also a bridge to Central Asia. The Mongols' historical struggles show what they need to maintain long-lasting peace. But it is ludicrous to claim that the provinces and *xians* must subdue the Mongols to reach the goal of "final elimination of disastrous events."

We hope these explanations clarify your misunderstandings, along with those of our fellow citizens. We ask that you accept our admonition.

On the same day, December 1, the Mongolian representative to the national assembly and the three Mongolian delegations joined for a press conference. On the next day, the Nanjing newspapers published the opposing opinions of the Mongol side and the frontier provinces. Among them, *Wenhuibao*, the official newspaper of the Democratic Alliance (*Minzhu tongmeng*), gave a sympathetic and detailed view of the Mongols' position. The headline was "The Inner Mongolian Delegates' Demand for Autonomy and Proposal of Six Concrete Items for Autonomy." The newspaper reported that "Sechin Jagchid and others spoke out at the press conference." The following is the text of the front-page article:

Inner Mongolia demands autonomy, and it has submitted to the government a document resembling an ultimatum. If it is rejected, the people of Inner Mongolia will throw themselves into the embrace of the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union; they have no alternative.

In an effort to petition for autonomy, the Mongol delegations and the Mongol representatives in the National Assembly convened a joint international press conference. . . . Bai Yunti headed this conference. He stated that their hope for this National Assembly was outlined in six items, and these should be included in the constitution as amendments. They are as follows:

1. All the nationalities in the Republic of China should enjoy equality. Minority peoples should have a guaranteed right of autonomy.

2. There should be equal representation of the leagues and banners as well as the provinces and *xians* in the National Assembly. They should each enjoy equal rights.

3. The thirty members of the Legislative Yuan and the seventeen members of the Control Yuan should be elected by the leagues and tribes.

4. In the section on "Rights and Functions of Central and Local Government and Local Government Institutions," the position, functions, and powers of the league and tribe should be stipulated as equal to those of the provinces, and those of the banners equal to those of the *xians*.

5. The banners are the local units of Mongolian local self-rule.

6. In the section on the "National Economy," the husbandry industry must be specifically protected, and the well-being of the herdsmen and farmers should be honored equally.

Following this declaration Rong Xiang, . . . Jin Yanghao . . . and Sechin Jagchid addressed the present situation of Inner Mongolia. Along with their speeches, they handed out written statements. . . .

In addition, the Inner Mongolian associates in Nanjing issued a long joint statement to emphasize the following three points. They hoped: (1) to request the central authorities to carry out the "Resolution for Frontier Affairs" by the KMT Sixth Session Second Conference of the Central Committee; (2) to rehabilitate the unified Mongolian Political Council; and (3) to renew and reorganize the border affairs institute of the central government. . . . The following summarizes their statement.

Rong Xiang, the head of the Ulanbatai and Yekejuu Leagues Delegation, said, "After the victory over Japan, the Government's treatment of the Inner Mongolian people has been unfair—far worse than the Mongols suffered under the Japanese occupation during the war. . . . He pointed out that the Government periodically arrested and imprisoned Mongols, and he illustrated the contribution of the Inner Mongolians during the war. Then he said, "After the victory, . . . only Inner Mongolia was excluded from rehabilitation by the government. The relief materials the Mongols received were very limited. As soon as other regions applied, special funds were provided, but the Mongolian banners were again excluded. . . .

Jin Yanghao, Head of the Delegation of Northeastern Leagues and Banners, reported on the situation of Northeastern Inner Mongolia: "Last year we saw the Independence of Outer Mongolia. . . . In January this year, the Eastern Mongolian delegates gathered at Wang-un sume and dispatched their delegation to Chungking to petition for the right of Mongolian self-determination. When this delegation arrived in Beiping, the government . . . refused to allow the delegation to go on to Chungking. . . ." Then he gave a briefing on discrimination in the rehabilitation work of the twenty-two Eastern Mongolian banners and the great loss of the Mongolian people's rights and benefits as well as their suspicion of the central government's goodwill.

Finally, Sechin Jagchid . . . said . . . "The Inner Mongol Autonomy Movement embodies the unanimous demand of all the Mongols, who have decided to wage an unbending struggle and make great sacrifices to achieve self-rule. The desire for autonomy is a quest of all minorities. It is by no means a mere local issue." He then quoted the words of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the talks of Chairman Chiang and the articles concerning national self-determination in the Atlantic Charter.

He said, "At this point, someone whose political outlook was different from ours said that the Mongols do not really want self-rule. The so-called demands for self-rule are the ideas of the few who are eating from the Mongol rice bowl." Jagchid retorted, "This is a complete distortion. A Mongol has the right to eat from the Mongolian rice bowl. This is a privilege endowed by Heaven. The Mongol demand for autonomy is a holy obligation. The political position of the Mongol banners is much worse than years ago. After the revolution of 1911, the Mongols were still one of the five peoples that formed the Republic. Now we can no longer enjoy such a position; so from now on we demand autonomy. The provinces and the *xians* must maintain the Mongol banners and prevent intrusion of the plow onto the grazing fields. The feudalistic institutions of Inner Mongolia have already passed away. The class distinctions between the princes and the common people are not as vivid as before. Their positions are becoming equal. We demand that the Government not view these matters according to their old and biased perspective but instead make a new evaluation of Mongolian affairs. We firmly oppose the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission's backward policy. This must be reformed."

Jagchid frankly pointed out, "Today, the Inner Mongolian people have only two ways to go. The first way is the road of democracy. There is no need to mention the second way. I dare guarantee that no Mongol leans to the left only for the left's sake, is pro-Communist for the sake of communism, or pro-Soviet only for the Soviets' sake; but we must align ourselves with one or the other side in order to exist. We support the Three Principles of the People; nevertheless, none of the promises made by the government have been kept. We sincerely hope that the government will keep its promises to guarantee our autonomy. We hope that the mother nation will give us a place within her heart. I believe this time the government will not disappoint us, or pour cold water on our faces, which is the reason we are not running toward Moscow. We are not just looking forward from the present situa-

tion, we are looking forward to an extensive future. Our autonomy movement is not a separatist demand; even the people of Outer Mongolia, who already enjoy independence, do not oppose China. However, Mongolia bridges Asian society and has an important link to international matters and diplomacy; but how to take advantage of this position will depend on the decision of the central government. Our demand for autonomy is aimed at equal co-existence; it does not threaten the frontier provinces."

After the conference ended, he told a journalist, "We knock at the door of the mother country, while another group of people knocks at the doors of Moscow and Yan'an. If the door of the mother country does not remain open, Inner Mongolia will naturally seek better lodging elsewhere."

While the heated debate raged both inside and outside the Assembly Hall, Fu Zuoyi had Fu Sinian, a well-known Chinese historian and Director of the Academia Sinica, publish an article opposing Mongolian autonomy. It was published in *The Central Daily News*, the official newspaper of the KMT under the title "The Problem of Inner Mongolian Autonomy—A Clarification Opposing the Theory that the League Equals the Province."

After Fu's article appeared, the Mongolian delegates asked me to write a response to it, which was published in the Shanghai *Dagongbao* on December 19, under my pen name, "Serjimedug," with the title "Please, Give a Fair Judgment on the Mongolian Problem."

Of course, these two documents again clearly pointed out the sharp political confrontation between the Chinese frontier provincial officials and the Mongolian leaders.

The Constitutional Convention of the National Assembly's Solution to the Mongolian Problem

The national constitutional convention met in several sessions to review and consider the various proposals for the articles of a new constitution, but no consensus could be reached on the articles dealing with the Mongolian problem. The opinions of the Mongol delegates and those of the frontier provinces were still as contradictory as they had been before. Finally, Liu Jianqun (who represented the KMT), Xu Fulin (who represented the Democratic Socialist Party), Paul Yu Bin (who represented the nonpartisan delegates), and ten other go-betweens reached a compromise. The following articles, fully approved by the central government authorities, were incorporated into the new Constitution of the Republic of China:

Article 5

There shall be equality among the various racial groups in the Republic of China.

Article 26

The National Assembly shall be composed of the following delegates:

2. Delegates to represent Mongolia shall be elected on the basis of four for each league and one for each special banner.
3. The number of delegates elected from Tibet shall be prescribed by law.
4. The number of delegates elected by various racial groups in frontier regions shall be prescribed by law.

Article 64

Members of the Legislative Yuan shall be elected in accordance with the following provisions:

2. Those to be elected from Mongolian leagues and banners
3. Those to be elected from Tibet
4. Those to be elected by various racial groups in frontier regions

Article 91

The Control Yuan shall be composed of members who shall be elected by provincial and municipal councils, the local councils of Mongolia and Tibet, and Chinese citizens residing abroad. Their numbers shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

3. Eight members from the Mongolian leagues and banners
4. Eight members from Tibet

Article 119

The local self-government system of the Mongolian leagues and banners shall be prescribed by law.

Article 120

The self-government system of Tibet shall be safeguarded.

Article 168

The State shall accord to the various racial groups in the frontier regions legal protection of their status and shall give them special assistance in their local self-government efforts.

Article 169

The State shall, in a positive manner, undertake and foster the development of education, culture, communications, water conservation, public health, and other economic and social enterprises of the various racial groups in the frontier regions. The State shall, after considering the climatic conditions, the nature of the soil, and the life and habits of the people, adopt measures to protect the land and to assist in its development.

After this compromise was made and accepted by the authorities of the government, but before it became a formal resolution, the Mongolian delegates to the National Assembly hosted a dinner party and delivered a formal report to the three Mongol local delegations. The Mongol delegate Liu Lianke gave a thorough report, and the go-betweens expressed their views from various different perspectives. They all hoped that the articles in the new constitution would solve the Mongolian problem in a reasonable manner. Most Mongol delegates to the national assembly felt they had done their best, and were satisfied. But others, such as Rong Xiang, myself, and others who came from Mongolian lands, felt that Mongol hopes had been dashed. Although the matter was already a *fait accompli*, and complaining would be ineffectual, we still felt compelled to express our opinions that these articles did not satisfy the hopes of the Mongolian people.

I expressed deep disappointment that a unified Inner Mongolian Autonomous Organization was not provided for in the constitution. I proposed an amendment that would state how the articles should be read and interpreted; I also argued that since Mongolia and Tibet fall outside provincial jurisdiction, and that since their position was equal to or higher than that of a province, Article 119 (which read "The local self-government system of the Mongolian Leagues and Banners shall be prescribed by law") could be made to read, "In Mongolian territory, autonomous institutions shall be settled by law" by simply moving a single comma in the Chinese text. Through such a reading, some small measure of Mongolian autonomy might have been obtained, but the answer I received after submitting this suggestion was negative: "Although the question of the position of the comma in the text is an interesting one, the text cannot be altered. This article is clearly about local autonomy and not autonomy for Mongolia's localities."

After a long struggle, the only thing the Mongols received was a local autonomy on a par with the Chinese provinces and *xians*. The Mongols got little autonomy, except for the inclusion of the words "league" and "banner" in the constitution. This meant that they could not easily be abolished or ignored by the provincial and *xian* governments.

Another important part of this constitution was Article 169, included because of the Mongol delegates' proposal that the pastoral zones of Mongolia no longer be cultivated by agricultural settlers. Even though the phrasing of this article was not quite clear, it was a compromise provided by the opponents of Mongolian autonomy. Although the Mongols did not achieve all their goals, neither did the frontier provinces abolish the leagues and subject the banners to their desires. Therefore, until the establishment of a new law for the local autonomy of Mongolian leagues and banners, the Organizational Law of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners (as issued by the government in 1931) was again reinforced as the only law the Mongolian leagues and banners could depend on.

The reason the Mongol delegates could not reach their goals was that they lacked real leadership and cooperation with each other. They could not pursue their demands to the end. Although Liu Lianke waged a single-handed struggle, he did not have unanimous Mongol support; thus his goals could not be reached.

All through the constitutional convention, the Tibetan delegates expressed their contempt and disapproval by not participating in the proceedings. But in the end, they got good treatment in the constitution. The delegates from Xinjiang were led by one Ahmedjiang, a leader of the Soviet-backed Eastern Turkestan Independence Movement. Their spokesman was Aisha Beg, a longtime leader of the Uighur national movement. In the assembly meeting, other delegates under Ahmedjiang's leadership offered criticism but did not strive for any gains. Aisha Beg's delegates tried to achieve some gains, but received no special treatment for the Uighurs as a people because Xinjiang had already been established as a Chinese-style province. Later, after their return to Xinjiang, this unresolved situation fueled the pro-Soviet propaganda mill, which attacked the pro-KMT group among the Uighurs. The increased Soviet influence created by this situation was similar to that in Inner Mongolia.

Article 64 provided for the election of members of the Legislative Yuan from Mongolia and Tibet. Of course, other national minorities could state that this article applied to them too. In fact, this article had been included in the new constitution only because of the demands of the Mongolian delegates. Nevertheless, the term "Manchu people" was officially avoided.

After these disappointments and setbacks, the three delegations from Inner Mongolia returned silently to their homeland. Rong Xiang had not accomplished anything, and the central government could not solve the clash between Rong's own Tumed banner and the Suiyuan provincial government. Because of this, Rong decided to remain and continue his struggle to resolve this matter, but his hopes did not materialize until the winter of 1947.

Formation of the Mongolian Youth Alliance

While the Mongol delegates were gathered in Nanjing, Rashidondog and I, who had been high school schoolmates during our days in Beiping, talked frankly with each other about the Mongolian problem and discovered that our opinions were nearly identical. Later, we invited Kokebagatur, once an important figure in the Mongolian Student Association in Beiping, and Urgungge Onon, educated in Japan and formerly a teacher in the Sunid Right Banner school, to talk about the future of Mongolia. We recognized that Bai Yunti had already lost the spirit of struggle. Li Yongxin and others dared not advocate ideas different from those of the Chinese authorities. Among the old conservatives in

Mongolia were many who were eager for compromise, while others had become slavishly obedient yes-men for the Chinese border officials.

Among the intellectuals, many had turned to the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, not realizing that nationalism is taboo in communist dogma. Moreover, such activities were basically adventurism, given the changing international situation. These people were naive enough to stake all their hopes on the changing world currents. For the future of the entire nation, we all felt the need to organize together to carry out a unified movement in times of need.

After several discussions to this effect, our opinions became more unified. We then invited Jakhunju (Ji Zenfu), a section head of the Bureau of Education of the Bailingmiao Mongolian Political Council, to meet with us and discuss these issues.³ We all recognized that time was passing and that we should organize a body immediately, which would be called the *Monggol Jalagus-un Andalaga* (The Mongolian Youth Alliance). The word *Anda* here means "sworn brothers," indicating the status of the members of this alliance. The alliance's main goals were (1) to struggle for liberty, freedom, and independence, and to shun alien (non-Mongol) domination; (2) to use nonviolent measures to promote democracy and cleanse Mongolia of the damage created by feudalistic institutions; and (3) to create a cooperative economy and struggle for equal development in the people's livelihood.

Following the decision to accept these points, the Mongolian Youth Alliance (MYA) was formally established on January 1, 1947 in Nanjing. The members, beside the five persons mentioned above, were Shongno (delegate to the national assembly, commander of the militia forces of the Urad Central Banner, and son of Rinchinsenge, head of the Ulanchar League); Qi Quanxi (delegate to the national assembly, *tusalagchi* of the Ordos Left Central Banner, and nephew of Tobshinjirgal, head of the Yekejuu League); Jorigtu (from the Naiman banner, Juu-uda League, who had studied in Japan and was a former official of the Mongolian government [Kalgan]); Oljeibuyan (from the Kharachin Right Banner of the Josotu League, a graduate of Nanjing Central Political College, and a former Mongolian government official [Kalgan]); Bai Dacheng (of the Khorchin Left Central Banner, a former official of the Shilingol League); and Namdag (a Torgud youth and member of the Mongolian Cultural Association of Xinjiang who was assassinated by a Kuomintang agent, soon after his return to Xinjiang). There were several other members, but out of consideration for their political and personal welfare, their names will not be given here.

We made the following four resolutions: (1) the word "Youth" in the name indicated youthful thought and action but did not limit membership to young people; (2) the members should not be guided by localism or localistic ideas; (3) the alliance should be enlarged and the political leadership of Inner Mongolia was worth struggling for, and (4) international friendship should be actively sought in order to bring international influence to bear in creating a counterbalance of power in Mongolia, thereby preventing any one-sided leanings or external power from controlling Mongolia.

In line with the fourth resolution, we also decided to establish contact with United States authorities to counterbalance the hegemonic influence of the Soviet Union. Soon after, these members left Nanjing and returned north. Branch organizations of the Mongolian Youth Alliance were gradually established at important places in Inner Mongolia. Because the main goals of this alliance were very clear, many nationalistic Mongol

³ Earlier, because of Prince De's contact with the Japanese, Jakhunju had followed Bai Haifeng, Yun Jixian, and most of the Peace Preservation Troops in a rebellion based in Bailingmiao.

youths gravitated toward the Alliance and its struggle for the future of Mongolia.

Turmoil in Inner Mongolia

After we returned to Beiping, we reported to Prince De and other Mongols on all aspects of our experience in Nanjing (but not the formation of the Mongol Youth Alliance). The responses we received varied. Prince De and those who had strong nationalistic ideologies were greatly disappointed. Wu Heling and moderate realists realized that the problem of establishing a unified autonomous institution could not be successfully concluded and was doomed to failure, and that even the mere guarantee of the existence of leagues and banners was actually an accomplishment. Wu was especially satisfied with this development, since he had been the promoter of the Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners while he was in Nanjing.

During this period, Nationalist forces recovered Kalgan from Communist occupation. Wang-un sume, renamed Ulanhot temporarily, became the political center of Inner Mongolia under the Chinese Communists. A few members of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, who had the support of the Mongolian People's Republic, now became the dominant force in this area. Later, on May 1, the Mongolian Allied Association for the Autonomy Movement was formally renamed the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. Although Ulanfu was made chairman, many eastern Inner Mongolian factions had more power. However, because Ulanfu and his group were part of the Chinese Communist Party, they were able to gradually gain more power.

Also at this time, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (*Neimindang*) was dissolved and subjugated to the Branch Political Bureau for Inner Mongolia of the Chinese Communist Party. Ulanfu and Khafengga were appointed as secretary and deputy secretary respectively to carry out a co-leadership. From this time forth, the leadership gradually turned into a clique led by Ulanfu. During the Cultural Revolution, Khafengga was greatly harassed, and the members of the *Neimindang* mercilessly purged.

After their loss of Kalgan, the Chinese Communists also lost control over the Chahar banners. Even the southwestern area of Bandita Gegeen Keid (present Shilinhot) slipped from the control of the Chinese Communists. Rinchindorji of Buriyad, taking advantage of this opportunity, contacted Sungjingwangchug, the former head of the Shilingol League, and Budabala, the former vice-head of the Shilingol League, to organize militarily to eradicate the remaining influence of the Chinese Communists in Shilingol. Prince Sung, a prudent person, advocated a wait-and-see attitude. However, his *tusalagchi*, Naidang, supported this plan wholeheartedly. According to what I heard, they dispatched an official of the banner, Radnashidi, to contact Rinchindorji, but Radnashidi was captured by the Communists on his way, and they decided to execute him. After receiving this report, Prince Sung himself interceded in his favor, saying, "I dispatched this man; he himself did nothing wrong. If there is any punishment, I would like to take it on myself. Do not punish an innocent man." Because Prince Sung was such a popular leader in Shilingol, Radnashidi was released, and Prince Sung was not held responsible for his actions. Nevertheless, Naidang, greatly frightened, committed suicide. Soon after, Prince Sung was invited to a conference in Ulanhot, and he died there of his sickness at age 63. The reason for the inclusion of Prince Sung and his death in this account is my desire to remember him as an honorable, beloved superior officer.

At the urging of Rinchindorji, Budabala prepared for action and sent his brother-in-law, Urgungge, to Beiping via Kalgan. Rinchindorji was to visit Prince De and ask for

his instructions. I was present at this meeting, having just returned from Nanjing to Beiping. Urgungge said, "Before the retreat of the Outer Mongolian forces, Duyinkhorjab, the head of the Inner Defense Bureau at Ulaanbaatar, personally gave an assignment to Budabala, Shonodondob (the *jasag* of the Abaga Right Banner), and me to spy for the Mongolian government." With a pair of scissors, they had cut jaggedly through an old Mongolian (Kalgan) bank note as a token of their cooperation. These two halves were to be joined at a later date in order to prove that they were of the same group.

Prince De told Urgungge, "I hope Prince Budabala will be careful not to do anything in great haste. He should wait and examine the situation for a while. His relationship with Outer Mongolia had best be kept secret. Both the Chinese Communists and the Mongolian communists are under the direction of the Soviet Union. Contact with Outer Mongolian intelligence organizations might achieve some protection under Chinese communist control, but you yourself must keep your visit to Beiping secret and not increase difficulties for Prince Bu. As for the Mongolian problem, right now there is no concrete solution. Further efforts are needed." Prince De also warned them that they should not rely on Fu Zuoyi's military power.

Rinchindorji's visit to Beiping was intended to secure the full support of Prince De and also to ask Li Zongren, head of the Military Committee of the Beiping branch, and Fu Zuoyi, the commander at Kalgan, for military assistance. Prince De introduced Rinchindorji to the Military Committee authorities of the Beiping Branch but admonished him to be prudent and careful, and not to shed the blood of other Mongols. However, Rinchindorji did not accept Prince De's advice. On the contrary, he felt that to ask for help directly from Fu Zuoyi would be better than disturbing Prince De. Of course, this thinking came from his long experience, which had showed him that it was best not to deal with the Mongolian government but instead to establish direct contact with the Japanese special service office. He himself had no interest in Mongol autonomy or the right or wrong of Fu Zuoyi's actions and policies. His goal was only to eliminate communism in the Shilingol area. So he soon split from Prince De and could no longer cooperate with other Mongols. He hoped that Fu Zuoyi might eventually provide support.

But how could a man like Fu Zuoyi, who was hostile toward the Mongols, help Rinchindorji become leader of a powerful body of Mongol troops during the Mongols' struggle against the Communists? Consequently, the more Rinchindorji became isolated from Mongol concerns, the weaker his goals became. At this same time, Mugdenbuu, the *amban* of the Bordered Yellow Banner of Chahar, who had once visited Ulaanbaatar and was quite pro-Communist, suddenly hoisted the anti-Communist banner. His troops, who were strong and disciplined and could maintain peace wherever they went, also changed their attitudes and followed his anti-Communist leadership efforts.

Therefore, the former Chahar leaders such as Serengnamjil, the vice-head of the Chahar League; Norbujana, the *amban* of the Right Taipus Banner; and others rushed to Kalgan. Their arrival in this city and the activities of the Chahar Mongolian KMT Headquarters again rendered Kalgan an active center of Mongol activity. However, Fu Zuoyi hindered their hopes for the rehabilitation of the Chahar League. When the Communists later took over all Inner Mongolia and North China, their hopes were completely dashed.

The central government had already agreed to the proposal to make the Chahar Tribe into a league, this with the resolution of the Eight Articles of Principles for Mongolian Autonomy as passed by the KMT Political Committee, and the establishment of the Bailingmiao Mongolian Political Council in 1934. Nevertheless, the Chahar provincial government stubbornly hindered this change. After the Japanese occupation, the Chahar Tribe was immediately reorganized into a league, and the league system persisted

until the end of World War II. After the government recovered Kalgan from the Communists, the Chahar leaders in Kalgan again expressed their old hopes that the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission would rehabilitate the Chahar Tribe and reorganize it into a league. Fu Zuoyi insisted that the banners of Chahar be subject to the jurisdiction of his provincial government, but he did agree to the rehabilitation of the Chahar's branch office (*banshi chu*) in Kalgan. Consequently, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was unable to resolve this matter.

Fu Zuoyi's assistance to the Chahar banners' anti-Communist efforts was ineffectual. While Rinchindorji of Buiriyad and the *ambans* of Chahar failed to receive satisfactory answers and help from Fu Zuoyi in Kalgan, the extreme anti-Communist activist Khuturungga, a former official of the princely residence of the Ujumuchin Right Banner, and Togtakhu, a minor commander of the former Peace Preservation Forces of the same banner, organized an anti-Communist military group and carried out merciless struggles against the pro-Communist military groups of that area.

Khuturungga also arrived in Beiping via Kalgan to visit Prince De. Although the Prince agreed in principle with Khuturungga's anti-Communist activities, he repeatedly warned Khuturungga not to shed blood. Khuturungga not only flouted this advice, he also cooperated with Fu Zuoyi. Khuturungga thought this was the only way he could obtain full support for his anti-Communist efforts. He only knew how to eliminate Communist elements; he knew nothing of Mongolia's real political problems. In any event, the small amounts of equipment he received from Fu Zuoyi were faulty, and this curtailed his activities.

In short, the anti-Communist efforts of Rinchindorji and Khuturungga failed because of their approaches and violent, unmerciful tactics. Because they killed so many innocent people, they gradually lost support and sympathy and came to ignominious ends.

Also during this period, Fu Zuoyi's troops pushed forward into the southwestern area of the Sunid Right Banner. Following this move, Altanochir, the former *tusalagchi* and later the temporary head of the banner, together with Dayanchi Lama, who was an intimate friend of Prince De and had given up his lamaship to return to lay life, left Chinese Communist control and arrived in Beiping. Others soon arrived: Shonodondob, the *jasag* of the Abaga Right Banner, and Jurkhaichi Lama Gungga, the abbot of the Jurkhaichi Temple of the Sunid Left Banner. Earlier, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese takeover of Kalgan, two young officials, Giljintei and Agdungga, both of the Ujumuchin Right Banner, had been in charge of the Shilingol League Branch Office in Kalgan. To obey the former league head Sodnamrabdan's desire to support the Chinese government, they both left for Beiping. Later, following the move of the government from Nanjing to Hankou and then to Chungking, they finally went to Xi'an. Now they had returned to Kalgan. Seeing the arrival of these people, Prince De, hoping for the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League, summoned Shonodondob, together with Giljintei, to come forth and negotiate with the Chinese authorities.

Contact with International Organizations

The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission had to seek Fu Zuoyi's approval for its solution to the Mongolian problem. Of course, Fu's answer was negative. Before the Sino-Japanese war (1937), the central government had already appointed Prince De as the head of the Shilingol League. They therefore demanded that Prince De, as the head of

the league, petition for the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League. In so doing, they could pull Prince De down from his Mongolian leadership position and make him equal to the other league heads. Prince De could not accept this request; he hoped that the government would appoint Shonodondob to be the head of the Shilingol League. However, Fu again hindered this request. He disagreed with having Prince Shon as a league head and said that since the territory of the Shilingol League was still not all recovered, not all of it should be rehabilitated immediately. These political and military setbacks provided good opportunities for the Chinese Communists to expound their propaganda, and they made many people feel that it was impossible to bring any fruit back from Nanjing.

On their return from Nanjing to Urumchi, the Xinjiang delegation passed through Beiping. Aisha Beg and several members of this Xinjiang delegation visited with Prince De. Their talks went smoothly and amicably; finally, they agreed that the Mongol and Uighur nationalities should jointly struggle for the preservation and self-determination of all national minorities in China.

Just before this, Owen Lattimore, known as a friend of the Mongol people and then serving as an adviser to Douglas McArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, arrived in Beiping and visited Prince De. Prince De asked him to convey to the U.S. government the Mongolian people's desire for a higher degree of autonomy. Soon after this, George Marshall came to China to mediate the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. During these negotiations, Frank B. Bessac, now a professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of Montana, was sent by the American government to Kalgan and other parts of Inner Mongolia to observe the situation. At Kalgan, Bessac met with Ulanfu and others. In Beiping, he met with Prince De. Because of his interchanges with these people, his interest in the Mongolian problem grew.

Togtakhu, who was then in Beiping, had previously established contact with the Military Statistics Bureau of the Chinese government; through this agency, he had made contact with a Mr. Richardson, who was then the Beiping agent of the American naval intelligence office, of which Frank Bessac was also a member. Togtakhu then brought Richardson to meet with Prince De, and they asked the Prince to recommend to them several trustworthy assistants who could operate radio transmitters. Prince De introduced two Mongol youths, Wang Guicong and Yi Guohuang, who were both from the Tumed area and had worked for Prince De's radio station. Later, these two recommended Nairaltu, a Dahur youth educated in Japan, and he was sent to work at Richardson's organization, which was responsible for the areas of Mukden, Changchun, and other northeastern Chinese areas. Nairaltu introduced to his employers Asau Tatsuo, also known to the Mongols as Maidarjab, formerly a high-ranking official of the Wang-un sume special service office, who was well-versed in the Mongolian language and literature. This also influenced Richardson and increased his interest in Mongolian political problems.

After returning to Beiping, I talked to my friend Dagwaodsar, a Hulunbuir man trained at the lama training center at Koyasan, and told him of the establishment of the Mongolian Youth Alliance. During the period of the Japanese occupation, Dagwaodsar usually passed on to me secret news he had picked up from the Japanese because he was then an interpreter for Japanese intelligence groups. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the Japanese military had wanted to assassinate Prince De; this Dagwaodsar had also told me. In my eyes, Dagwaodsar was a very active Mongolian nationalist. After the Japanese defeat and withdrawal from China, Dagwaodsar established some contacts with the members of the Soviet Embassy in Beiping. The famous Mongolist, Pankratov, was one of the people with whom he had contact. Dagwaodsar spoke to me about all his Russian contacts. It was for this reason that he was the first one I invited to join the MYA.

After this, we invited the following people to become founding members of the MYA: Magadburin Haltod, then also known as Madai (a mispronunciation of "Matthew"; Madai died in Germany in 1975, having been a teacher of Mongolian literature at the University of Bonn); Lubsangnorbu (Buyandalai's son); Unensechen (also known as Bao Guoyi; he taught Chinese and Mongolian at UCLA for years); Gombojab Hangin (late Professor of Mongolian literature, Indiana University; but at that time, Prince De's secretary); and Oyongerel (my wife). The second step of this group was to expand its activities in the Kalgan, Chahar, and Shilingol areas. Prudently, we decided to wait to report our activities to Prince De, and we did not immediately invite him to join the alliance. This was done to preclude Prince De's influence in the alliance from being too extensive.

Soon after this, at Dagwaodsar's recommendation, the members of the MYA made contact with Bessac and Richardson's group. These people were important because they were intelligence agents of the U.S. government, and interchange with them would present the opportunity to bring Mongolia's aims and the seriousness with which they were held to the attention of the American authorities. Moreover, the main proposal of the MYA was to check the expansion of Soviet influence in Mongol territory. Also during this period, Colonel David Barrett, then the U.S. embassy's military attaché in Beijing had earlier traveled to the Beile-yin sume (Bailingmiao), and to Yan'an. He was also interested in Mongol problems, and visited Prince De. Thus the members of the MYA could also make contact with him.

Through Colonel Barrett's recommendation, I met George Soderbom, a Swedish man who had lived in Kalgan for many years. George's father was former minister of the Swedish Mongol Mission, and George had been born in Mongolia, so he was fluent in both Mongolian and Chinese. Soderbom had been the guide and interpreter during Sven Hedin's travels through Central Asia. He later became a merchant in Kalgan. During the Japanese invasion of Kalgan, he was subjected to Japanese torture and finally shipped off to a prison camp in Shandong.

After the victory over Japan, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) started its activities in China, and because of Soderbom's talent and knowledge of Mongolian culture, he was recruited into this group. When Soderbom came to Beijing and started his UNRRA work, I informed him that many Mongols had retreated from Kalgan and become refugees; their livelihood was difficult, and they had received no help. He asked me for a comprehensive list of the Mongols in Beijing. With this list, Soderbom had the UNRRA Beijing office designate some of their relief materials for the Mongolian refugees. The MYA decided to have Magadburin Haltod act as manager of these relief efforts under Soderbom's supervision.

Soderbom also introduced Dagwaodsar and me to Patrick, one of the top officials at the Shanghai general headquarters of UNRRA to gain his aid in getting relief delivered to Mongolia. At this time, Shongno and Qi Quanxi returned from Nanjing to Beijing and then went back to the Ulanchab and Yekejuu leagues. They also participated in talks subsequent to it being decided that part of their relief materials would be delivered directly to the banners of the Ulanchab, especially to the Yekejuu leagues, without outside interference. George Soderbom was assigned to supervise these matters. Before these arrangements were made, the municipal government of Beijing and the Suiyuan provincial government had delivered none of the UNRRA relief materials to the Mongolian poor. These relief efforts continued even after the final withdrawal of UNRRA and George Soderbom.

During this time, many Buriyad refugees realized that the activities of their old leader, Rinchindorji, could not bring results, and they decided to migrate to Kokonor.

Among these people were many from the Shilingol League. George Soderbom aided them and provided transportation to their destination, rendering his assistance out of a real love for the Mongol people. He was apolitical; he never discussed Mongolian political problems or issues. In 1976, after Soderbom's death, I visited a folklore museum in Stockholm. There I discovered many of his documents and materials. Among them were his plans to improve Mongolian animal herds and the animal husbandry industry. Regrettably, these plans were impeded by the civil war in China. The heart of this great friend of the Mongols is clearly evident in these materials.

By this time, the "rehabilitated" leagues and banners, or the banners outside the areas occupied by the Chinese Communists, had as their main problem how to distinguish clearly between the power and functions that belonged to the banners and those that belonged to the *xians*. For instance, some banners in the three leagues of Jerim, Juu-uda, and Josotu were rehabilitated at the same time as the *xians*. However, because the Japanese had abolished the *xians* and maintained the banners during their occupation, the division between the powers of the banners and the restored *xians* was unclear. This division was lost on the KMT authorities who recovered the Mongolian territories from the Communists. All public facilities, especially the schools established by the Mongol administrations earlier, belonged, of course, to the Mongols. Now that there were two conflicting political organizations in the same area, the allocation of responsibility for these public facilities became a matter of great controversy. In addition, land problems arose as all land rents were raised. This made the struggle between the leagues and the provinces more intense. In the areas where Mongols and Chinese lived together (such as Yekejuu, the Ulanab leagues, the Tumed banner, and the four Right Flank Banners of Chahar), there was no improvement in relations between the Mongols and the Suiyuan provincial government. As mentioned earlier, there was no progress in Chahar and little progress in the problem of rehabilitation in the territory of the Shilingol league.

In the latter part of April, the Chinese government was reorganized. It invited the members of other parties and nonpartisan elites to join the new government. Among them, Xu Shiying was appointed minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. Xu had once been the prime minister of the Beijing government but was never a member of the KMT. Before the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, he was the Chinese ambassador to Japan and had a good reputation in the Chinese political world. The two vice-ministers of the commission were Bai Yunti, a Mongolian, and Shirabjamso (Shes-rab-gya-mtsho), a well-known Tibetan lama from Kham. This reshuffling of personnel on the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, which was largely related to Mongolian affairs, resulted in the replacement of Chu Mingshan by Jakhunju as head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau. After Jakhunju took the position, he recommended that Oljeibuyan become the head of the first section of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau. These changes made it possible for members of the MYA to keep abreast of political developments concerning the Mongols in Nanjing and gave them at least some influence in these matters.

In Nanjing, the most pressing political topic was how to ensure the election of the delegates to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan, all of whom would help construct the new constitution. Prince De felt that the reshuffling of the personnel of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission might make it proper to continue rehabilitating the two leagues of Shilingol and Chahar. He also seemed to imply an anticipated solution to the Mongolian problem. He therefore mobilized the leaders from Chahar, Shilingol, and Kalgan to voice their demands for rehabilitation. Gombojab Hangin and I were appointed as delegates of the two leagues and went to Nanjing to petition the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to rehabilitate the two leagues and ex-

plain the Mongols' problems to the newly appointed minister, Xu Shiying. One of our main purposes was also to discover the Nanjing authorities' attitudes toward Mongolia.

After the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, the entire situation in China worsened. At the end of May, the Baitag-obao (Baitashan) Incident broke out, which disrupted Sino-Mongolian relations. To hinder or stop the expansion of communist power in China and to decide on an effective China policy, President Harry S. Truman sent General Wedemeyer to study the situation and give advice to the Chinese government. Prince De and the MYA both recognized that this was a prime opportunity for the U.S. government to become aware of the Mongolian situation and the hopes of the Mongol people, because the national minority problems contributed to the struggle between the KMT and the Communists. However, while Wedemeyer stayed in Beijing, neither Prince De nor other Mongol leaders in that city had an opportunity to visit the American general or to deliver a statement of their positions to him. So, when Hangin and I went to Nanjing, Prince De told us to attempt to deliver the opinions and hopes of the Mongols to this special envoy from the United States. In actuality, this move had originated with the MYA.

Before our departure, we asked Frank Bessac to introduce us to someone he knew in the U.S. Embassy in Nanjing. Through Bessac's introduction, we met Ruth Bean of the embassy. Because of her help, Rashidondog, Gombojab Hangin, Urgungge Onon, and I were introduced to the political councilor, Mr. Schulties (originally a professor at the University of Washington in Seattle), and became acquainted with him. We spoke in detail of the Inner Mongolian situation and the Mongolian desire for a national existence and autonomy. Schulties was quite sympathetic to our situation. General Wedemeyer soon arrived in the Chinese capital. The members of the MYA, at their own initiative, produced written documentation of their opinions and had their friends in the U.S. Embassy deliver it to the general. The content, aside from emphasizing the need for national survival, explained how the Mongol people had been cheated and oppressed by the Chinese frontier officials; that this had caused most of the Mongols to ally themselves with the Chinese Communists. All Mongols hoped for autonomy. This hope implied no specific political affiliation or persuasion; its main goal was national existence and independence.⁴

Contacts with the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and Prince De's Response

The new minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Xu Shiying, had no special bias toward one side or the other in Mongolian affairs. During his interview with Hangin and me, he expressed hope that our petition for rehabilitating the two leagues of Shilingol and Chahar would be carried out. He expressed no objection to Mongolia achieving autonomy. Moreover, he said that the provinces and the *xian* institutions should be listed in the law of self-rule of the provinces and *xians*. This would comply with the constitutional statement that "the self-rule institutions of the Mongolian

⁴ Wedemeyer's memoirs make no explicit reference to Inner Mongolia. His 1947 report to President Truman notes that Outer Mongolia might recognize a de facto Chinese Communist government over Manchuria. To avert this he proposes a UN Trusteeship over Manchuria. This would also have separated eastern Inner Mongolia from China. However, a trusteeship was never a realistic possibility. Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958) p. 465.

leagues and banners should be decided by law." Nevertheless, we waited in Nanjing more than a month without receiving an official answer from the commission. We heard that although Xu Shiying intended to make the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission a powerful institution and to effect a solution for the Mongolian problems during his tenure as minister, realistically, there was no hope for such a goal to be accomplished.

In matters regarding the two leagues of Chahar and Shilingol, Xu was unable to go against Fu Zuoyi's wishes. Fu, a strong opponent, was an important military figure and anti-Communist fighter, prized by the central authorities. After many negotiations, Fu agreed only to establish a preliminary office of league affairs and to wait until all banners were recovered from Communist domination. The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission also drafted a law of self-rule for the Mongolian leagues and banners. Nevertheless, there was no way to submit this, because Fu was vehemently opposed to the matter. Although difficulties kept arising, Xu Shiying did not forsake his original position; he continued to hope for a breakthrough in the Mongolian problems that had been festering for so many years.

After receiving a report of these Mongolian activities in Nanjing from Hangin and me, Prince De wrote a long letter to us:

Demchugdongrob sends greetings to his dear brethren Sechin Jagchid and Hangin. I have received your report. Regardless of the matter of the Shilingol League, your petition must be authorized and entered into the file. If this is impossible, then you may put the matter aside. Regardless, you should not accept the establishment of a temporary office—absolutely not! Their statement that it is impossible to deal with this matter according to the petition of the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group [*Menggu xuandao-tuan*] headed by Wu Heling is very unreasonable. You must push for Shilingol's petition. How could they take other documents as a pretext to prolong this matter? As they said, not one banner in Shilingol has yet been rehabilitated. This is only an excuse: witness the fact that the provinces of the Northeast have already had their governments established, even though their territories have not yet been recovered. If it is said that this is the ordinance of the central government, then it is correct to deal with Shilingol according to the same principle. But they deliberately stalled on this matter and said that a document from some organization cheats us in some enormous way.

In sum, the authorship of the petition determines whether it is acceptable or not. There is no reason to impede the petition simply because of who wrote it. If Shilingol is reformed and receives an official seal, then accept it. If it is not, then cease your efforts. There is no room for discussion. This is the point which I wish you, my brothers, to know, and I hope you will strive to realize it. At this point, there is no room for compromise.

Recently I have been thinking that we should suggest convening a conference for all Mongols. Then we could issue demands according to the opinions that the people voice. Only in this way can we establish that there is no such thing as a distinction between high and low status people's demands among the Mongols. In dealing with the Chinese, it is better to negotiate according to the will of the entire body of the Mongols. Then it will be difficult for the Chinese not to agree. If there is any possibility for this proposal to be implemented, then I wish you to follow through on it. It would be beneficial if the government would not make any decisions concerning Mongolia before this Mongolian conference issues its petition; I do not want the desires of an entire people to be ignored. Our demand is for self-determination. When the time comes to advocate the convening of this conference, we will have to talk about it in a direct, but firm manner. I think you should explain that for the following reason, the Mongols' hope is that each will have free speech. Many Mongols have individual demands, and the government cannot determine a consensus of these demands *unless* this conference is convened. If this conference is convened, Mongolian de-

mands could be expressed in a coherent manner and be resolved. This will enable the central government to understand the consensus among the Mongols, while the Mongols can come to understand the stance of the central government.

Again, there is something you must be very careful of: when you talk of this matter with other Mongols, you must be very careful when expressing your ultimate goals and desires. Unless others are very trustworthy and can keep secrets, you should not discuss this matter with them. As Huang Shigong has stated, "Because one soul divulged secrets, the entire enterprise ended in failure." You must be very careful in this regard! If this conference can be held, then our demands, high or low, can be explored at our convenience. I think we should depend on the endeavors of the entire body to make this conference a permanent organization; this conference should have the power to approve or reject any policy decision made by the central government. In other words, we should struggle for the right to veto. If this is decided, it would be a great success for our nation. I hope that we can produce a national people's conference somewhat akin to the system used in India. I hope you will carry this out secretly. My wise brothers, what do you think of my idea? Please do think it over carefully."

—August 7, seven-hundred forty-second year of the Holy Khan Chinggis

A brief explanation will help the reader understand the background of Prince De's letter. First, the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League office was not achieved because of Fu Zuoyi's interference. There was, in fact, a temporary office of the Shilingol league in Kalgan that had been established earlier, before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. After the war, Giljintei headed that office. During the war, he went over to the Chinese, but still supported Prince De's proposals. Fu tried to drive a wedge between De and Giljintei but failed.

Second, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission dissolved the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group under Wu Heling's leadership because of pressure from Fu Zuoyi. Before its dissolution, Wu sent the commission a petition pleading for rehabilitation aid to be sent to the Shilingol League. Unfortunately, the commission, being under Fu's thumb, could not help the Shilingol league because they could not openly oppose Fu. Some officials at the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission told Hangin and me that Xu Shiying was angry because of Fu's interference; Xu even decided to resign.

Third, Prince De's desire to convene a discussion of the issues facing Mongolia was unanimously ratified by the Mongols in Nanjing. Rong Xiang, who was still in Nanjing, also showed his support. Of course, they did not realize that Prince De's motive was to demand national self-determination, or to struggle for a veto right. The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission also did not express opposition, but felt that because of the tense war situation, it would have to await a more opportune time to act. In fact, even the Mongols' proposal was not openly opposed; nevertheless, it did not become a reality.

Fourth, Prince De quoted in his letter from the ancient Chinese strategist Huang Shigong, showing that he had a thorough understanding of Chinese strategy.

Elections and the Mongol Response

No matter what the Mongols did, Fu Zuoyi always did his utmost to stand in their way. Because of this, Xu Shiying, not to disappoint the people of Shilingol and Chahar, argued that according to the election regulations for National Assembly delegates and legislators of the Legislative Yuan, the supervisor should be the governor of the province. He also argued that the institution for general supervision should be the interior

ministry, the chief of the league should be the local superintendent, and the general supervisory institution should be the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. Xu recommended that elections in Shilingol and Chahar be carried out and that the two leagues each be allowed to establish an election office and appoint those qualified for the positions of league head and superintendent. In this way, he reasoned, Shilingol and Chahar would be in a position equal to that of the other rehabilitated leagues. Shonodondob and Serengnamjil were appointed superintendents of this election within the Shilingol and Chahar leagues. Nevertheless, in Prince De's words, this was nothing but a "resultless result."

In the winter of 1947, Jirgalang realized that Chinese Communist control over Inner Mongolia was becoming stronger and tighter and that the prospect of unifying Inner Mongolia with Outer Mongolia was weakening. His experience in Ulaanbaatar also disillusioned him. Following the military setback suffered by the communists, he escaped from Pandita Gegeen Keid and fled to Beiping, where he informed Prince De and other trustworthy friends of his experience and opinions. Those who heard him felt that the future of Inner Mongolia should not be handed over to the Communists and that other roads should be opened.

As mentioned earlier, the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group, under the leadership of Wu Heling, was disbanded. After this, Wu Heling was again attacked by Fu Zuoyi and Rong Zhao, who accused him of holding very high positions during the Japanese occupation and insisted that he be punished. There were further accusations against Wu to the effect that he had been using the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group to interfere with the progress of Mongol political affairs. Consequently, Wu was summoned by the Military Committee to go to Nanjing to answer to higher authority.

After Wu's arrival in Nanjing, he contacted Yu Jishi, head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Committee and the man who had previously been the go-between for Wu Heling and Chiang Kai-shek in 1936. At that time Yu Jishi had secured Chiang's agreement to allow Wu to return to Inner Mongolia. Wu now asked Yu to refresh Generalissimo Chiang's memory of this incident and he finally received Chiang's pardon. However, Chiang asked Wu to stay on in Nanjing until the summer of the next year. Therefore, during this period, Wu had no influence over Mongolian politics at all.

At this time, the most important problems for the National Assembly were stopping the military expansion of the Chinese Communists and smoothly carrying out the national elections. These two problems were interrelated. The success or failure of the election could influence morale, and military losses or gains could influence the outcome of the election. This situation had a great impact on all regions of Inner Mongolia, except those occupied by the Chinese Communists. After several discussions, the Mongolian Youth Alliance in Nanjing decided that besides giving support to Prince De and helping and encouraging its members to participate in the electoral struggle for seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, they would also struggle to protect the rights and privileges of the Mongol people. From the latter half of 1947 on, the situation in North China and the Northeast became more and more tense. Even though the civil war as a whole was being lost to the Chinese Communists, Fu Zuoyi's troops always gained the upper hand in their engagements. Thus, Fu's reputation grew by leaps and bounds.

In September, the Chinese government appointed General Chen Cheng to replace Xiong Shihui as the chief of the Military Committee Northeastern Branch. Chen's style, though very different from Xiong's, did not bring about any change in the Mongolian problem in the northeast area. Chen was a great supporter of Fu Zuoyi, and they

formed a front from east to west to stop Communist expansion. Thus Fu's influence in Mongolian matters greatly increased. Although the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission under the leadership of Xu Shiying wanted to solve the Mongolian problem, it did not produce any results.

Because of the civil war, the Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic Alliance (*Minzhu tongmeng*) announced they would not put forward candidates for the National Assembly election. The KMT's supporters in the election were the Democratic Socialist Party, the Chinese Youth Party, and nonpartisan elites. To satisfy these supporters, the KMT yielded some electoral seats to them. Where the election of candidates from these two parties had been decided, the KMT would support them, and no KMT candidates would compete. On the other hand, the competition for nominations was keen inside the KMT. Because of this internal struggle, the people's hearts and soldiers' morale suffered greatly.

As for political influence in Inner Mongolia, Li Yongxin, head of the Frontier Party Affairs Bureau of the Central Committee Headquarters of the Kuomintang, arranged the election districts as it suited him, with the support or at the direction of Chen Lifu. Li appointed He Zhaolin as special commissioner for Inner Mongolian Party Affairs and the heads of the Mongolian Banners' Party Headquarters as special commissioners to run the elections of each electoral district. But even though Li and his group occupied leading positions in the party, they conflicted with the "Western Inner Mongolian Clique" and other leaders who had shunned the anti-Japanese camp. The MYA's decision to insist on a part in the election led it to clash with Li's group from the beginning. Because the eastern Inner Mongolian leagues and banners were primarily under Communist occupation, the election would be carried out among the refugees and defectors from these localities, creating problems that otherwise would not have arisen. At any rate, in early 1948, fifty-three Mongolian delegates for the National Assembly were elected. Thirteen of the fifty-three belonged to the MYA.

Competition, compromise, and conflict characterized the election. To push his KMT candidates through, Li Yongxin had gone to Beiping to ask for Prince De's help. Prince De rejected the request, saying that he would not interfere in the election. Li Yongxin and He Zhaolin then went to Kalgan to try to persuade the local leaders, but this backfired; Li's efforts were a complete failure.⁵

⁵ The following were elected:

- from the Hulun-buir Tribe: Kogjintei (member, Mongolian Youth Alliance—hereafter abbreviated as MYA), Dagwaodsar (MYA), Ji Xiaowei, and He Zhaolin; from the Yeke-mingghan Special banner: Bai Shangqin;
- from the Jerim League: Bao Jinqi, Jorigtu (Kuan Yinnan), Jin Chuanwei, and Yang Lijun;
- from the Josotu League: Suchungga, Bai Haifeng, Xing Fuli, and Shi Binglin;
- from the Juu-uda league: Jorigtu (MYA), Urgunbu, Bai Yunti, and Tudub;
- from the Shilinghol League: myself (MYA), Oyongerel, my wife (MYA), Agdunga, and Chogbagatur (Chen Shaowu); from the Chahar Tribe: Jakhunju (MYA), Bayanbilig (MYA), Kokebagatur (MYA), and Gombojab Hangin (MYA);
- from the Ulanhab League: Buu (He Shouye (MYA), Ba Yunying, and two others; from the Yekejuu League: Oyunbilig (MYA), Erdenibolod (Qi Zhongyi), Jia Wenhua (MYA), Ayurtazana (Qi Wenqing) (MYA), and one other;
- from the Tümed Special Banner: Jing Tianlu;
- from the Alashan Special Banner: Chen Batudorji;

Following the election of these National Assembly delegates, twenty-one Mongol legislators were also elected: five of them were MYA members.⁶ As for the election of the members of the Control Yuan, because the competition was so entangled, and in order to alleviate the resulting tension, the local leaders decided not to continue the confrontation with Li Yongxin and his KMT group. The requests from the KMT for appointments were therefore accepted as a compromise.

While the Mongols were busy in the election contending with one another, the Chinese government, in early December, 1947, ordered the establishment of the Northern China Bandit [Communist] Extermination General Headquarters to direct the war against the Communists in the five provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan. Fu Zuoyi was made the commander-in-chief of this front and was also appointed as the deputy chief of the Military Committee, Beiping Branch. By the first part of January, 1948, this new arrangement made Li Zongren, chief of the Military Committee, Beiping Branch, a powerless figurehead. In like manner, the great bulk of military and administrative power gradually fell into the hands of Fu Zuoyi, and his influence over Mongolian matters increased.

The Mongolian Delegates and the First Chinese National Assembly

After this confusing election, the Mongolian Youth Alliance decided that the right to Mongolian autonomy should be clearly spelled out in the constitution of the Republic of China and that a special article to assure the autonomy of the national minorities should be clearly incorporated into the constitution. At the same time, they decided that they had to cooperate with the other national minority delegates to struggle for common goals. Prince De also talked to those delegates who were traveling through Beiping on their way to Nanjing and encouraged them to struggle for the goal of Mongolian autonomy. He asked me, Gombojab Hangin, Kogjintei, and Chogbagatur to struggle for veto power over Mongol problems and for a higher standard of Mongol autonomy than had existed in the 1930s.

The First National Assembly of the Republic of China was convened on March 29, 1948, just as the civil war took a turn for the worse. As its first order of business after convening the assembly was to elect a president and a vice-president and add words to the constitution to ease mobilization of force against internal disorder. The KMT wanted

from the Ejine Special Banner: Nidun;
 from the Kokonor Right and Left Leagues: Rashisereng, Guan Baojia, and six others;
 from the Mongolian District in Xinjiang: Jia Zixin, Hai Yuxiang, Dugur, Xi Mouzhen
 (Bombuge), and Tsedendorji;
 from the Gansu Mazongshan district: Bobura;
 and from the Mongolian Women's Association: Ni Chunyi and Duo Shuxiu.

⁶ From the Hulunbuir Tribe: De Gulai (Jirgalang) and Bai Lianzhen (Narangerel MYA); from the Yeke-mingghan Special Banner: Xu Zhankui; from the Jerim League: Bai Dacheng (MYA) and Jin Yanghao; from the Josotu League: Li Yongxin and Xue Xingru; from the Juu-uda League: Wu Yunpeng and Yang Junsheng (Sechenchogtu); from the Shilingol League: Giljintei; from the Chahar Tribe: Rashidondog (MYA) and Hang Jiaxiang; from the Ulanhab League: Batubilig (later joined the MYA); from the Yekejuu League: Qi Huaifu (later joined the MYA); from the Tumud Special Banner: Rong Zhao; from the Alashan Special Banner: Damrinwangchug (younger brother of Damzana); from the Ejine Special Banner: Dawa; from the two Kokonor leagues: Sugden and one other; and from the Xinjiang Mongolian district: Choijab and Wu Jinbin.

to gather all power and concentrate it in the hands of the elected president, thus giving him a free hand, unrestrained by the constitution.

The Mongolian delegates had no special plans for the presidential election. We thought it a foregone conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek would be selected as president, and we had no special prejudices against any of the vice presidents elect, Li Zongren, or others. The Mongol delegates thought we could vote for each of them as we pleased. Who we voted for would be determined by the candidates' attitudes toward Mongol problems. As the Mongol delegates came through Beijing on their way to Nanjing, Li Zongren, as host, provided us with banquets and facilities and spoke of Mongolian autonomy, saying that he wanted to give us reasonable hope. By not expressing any opposition to the other hopes of the Mongol delegates, he was able to win their good will.

After our arrival in Nanjing, the Mongol delegates, especially those with little or no experience, began to sense that something was strange. They realized that some of their own countrymen serving as Nanjing officials would like to use them as political capital. Li Yongxin was the one who first invited the Mongolian delegates for what the Americans would call a caucus. As the host, Li expressed welcome and hope that all Mongolian delegates would follow the instructions of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and manage their affairs prudently. Then he assured us that the assembly was not intending to make any amendments to the constitution, and therefore the Mongolian delegates should concentrate their strength and work for something realistically achievable. He did not mention the problem of autonomy; he merely asked all of us to put our signatures on a document to petition for expansion of the troops under Bai Haifeng and to put the Mongolian Cavalry Brigade and the Peace Preservation troops in the Northeast (under the command of Wu Guting) under the control of Bai Haifeng. Li wanted to first concentrate the Mongols' core military power and talk about other things later. Other than the people of Li's own group, and He Zhaolin, Xing Fuli, Jin Chongwei, and a few others, most of the Mongolian delegates disagreed with Li's proposals. We insisted that we were delegates elected by the Mongol people and could not just put the matter of autonomy aside and talk only of the concerns of one individual. The talks ended in dispute.

Soon after these talks, Li Yongxin, with Bai Yunti, convened another caucus. Because Li Yongxin could not speak Mongolian, he asked the several delegates from the Xinjiang Mongols who did not understand Chinese, to speak in Chinese. Following this, several members of the MYA, who were already dissatisfied with Li Yongxin, said, "A meeting of the Mongols without the Mongolian language—what an absurd meeting that would be! From now on, the discussions should be carried out in Mongolian." In reality, this was meant to shut the mouths of Li Yongxin, He Zhaolin, Jin Chongwei, and the others who could not speak Mongolian. Thus the caucus ended on an unhappy note. After this setback, Li Yongxin got the mistaken impression that I had instigated this motion for the deliberate purpose of embarrassing him. From then on, Li did not make any public appearances. All public discussions by and meetings of Mongolian delegates of the National Assembly were controlled by He Zhaolin from behind the scenes. Xing Fuli was put in charge of espionage operations to check everyone's activities and report them to KMT headquarters.

After the opening session of the assembly, the Mongolian delegates held luncheon talks every noon to exchange opinions. At the same time, the KMT Central Headquarters also organized the Mongolian delegates into one group of the Assembly Conference organization. He Zhaolin was appointed as the presiding official; Xing Fuli was appointed as secretary. They were charged with controlling the activities of the entire

Mongolian delegation. Though this was a common procedure for meetings between the KMT and the Chinese government, it made the Mongolian delegates, who had no experience with such an arrangement, feel strange, and consequently we refused to accept He's and Xing's leadership. As a result, many conflicts and confrontations arose that should never have happened.

The first sign of conflict was an announcement by the members of the MYA: "Our obligation is to struggle for the right to Mongol autonomy. We do not have to be involved in anybody's personal matters." In so saying, we clearly expressed that we would not sign the document petitioning for the expansion of Bai Haifeng's military forces. The second conflict was over how to present the proposal for amendments to the constitution. This was supported by the members of the MYA but rejected by Bai Haifeng and several other active KMT members under the pretext that the KMT Central Headquarters' principle was not to make any amendments to the constitution. But the amendments were agreed to by the great majority of the delegates; Bai Haifeng and his followers had no choice but to yield.

At this moment, Guan Baojia and seven other delegates from the Kokonor Mongol leagues suddenly stood up and attempted to walk out of the proceedings. Their reason was that they had come to vote for the president and vice president, and not to discuss other matters. Then several young hot-headed delegates led by Jorigtu (of the MYA) closed the door and said, "Any Mongolian delegate who leaves this discussion of the struggle for the Mongolian people's rights and privileges will be beaten to a pulp." Threatened by these militants, Guan Baojia's group came back to the discussion but did not participate in it. Later, Guan Baojia said to me, "The Kokonor Mongol delegates had no other choice but to follow the instructions of the delegates sent by the warlord Ma Bufang. Why else would a Mongol be unwilling to struggle for the protection of Mongolian rights? Ma had told us *not* to struggle for Mongolian rights." This is clear evidence that the Kokonor Mongols were being subjected to brutal, high-handed pressure by the Moslems.

The high demands of the proposal were mainly the idea of the members of the MYA, and were not accepted by Bai Haifeng's or Li Yongxin's groups. Bai's group, being realistic, realized that the central government would simply not agree to this kind of request. Because of this confrontation, the two sides could not reach a compromise. Then the MYA members announced that if it were impossible for them to present the proposal, and if they had come to Nanjing merely to cast meaningless votes, then it would be better for the Mongols to return to the steppes. Bai Yunti then demanded that both groups be more moderate. He insisted that such important problems be discussed with other Mongols in Nanjing and that discussions not be carried out in an excessively emotional manner. Both sides then agreed to have Bai Yunti summon another caucus.

The caucus summoned in the name of Bai Yunti continued the discussion for several sessions. Li Yongxin, Wu Heling, Wu Yunpeng (the head of the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates), and the newly elected legislators such as Xue Xingru, Rong Zhao, Rashidondog, and others were all invited. After several harsh debates, the caucus appointed Chogbagatur and me to prepare a draft of the proposal, which would later be polished by Wu Heling.

At this moment, carrying out personal political agendas had become more important than ideology. Chogbagatur was also a long time follower of Prince De, but he and Li Yongxin were fellow bannermen of the Kharachin Left Banner. Chogbagatur wanted to use this opportunity to establish better relationships with Li Yongxin and his group. Chogbagatur also made secret contact with Xing Fuli to supply Xing with infor-

mation about the activities of the Mongolian nationalists. Wu Heling had confronted Li Yongxin's group for years over their differing views on Mongolian politics, but he now took advantage of this opportunity to criticize the proposals of the MYA as unrealistic and branded me and my group as a "lunatic fringe." Li Yongxin and his group also used this opportunity to attack Li's opponents and branded the members of the MYA as "separatists," hoping that these attacks would attract the attention of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters.

The Mongolian Proposal for the Assembly

Finally, though the MYA continued to press for its own proposals, they had to reach an agreement which would be satisfactory to all the other Mongol delegates, including those based in Nanjing. The following is the original text that the Mongolian delegates presented to the National Assembly.

Proposal to amend Article 119 and Article 168 of the Constitution. . . .

A. Reasons

1. The first Article of the Constitution already clearly states that "*The Republic of China should be a democratic republic of the people, by the people, and for the people.*" The meaning of this article is undoubtedly that the character and function of the entire constitution is to carry out the doctrine of the Three Principles of the People. . . . It clearly incorporates . . . concrete measures for the realization of the two parts of Democracy (*min quan*) and People's Livelihood (*min sheng*) of the Three Principles. As for Nationalism (*min zu*) . . . article 5 of the constitution says, "*All the nationalities of the Republic of China should enjoy equality without discrimination.*" It is very regrettable that there has been no concrete decision on how to obtain the equality among the nationalities.

Now the adherents to democracy have two viewpoints, both interrelated: "equality among the nationalities" and "self-determination for the nationalities." In other words, if the nationalities are unable to obtain self-determination, then there will be no way for them to achieve equality among the nationalities. The two are as closely related as lips and teeth. It was for this reason that the founder of the nation, Mr. Sun Yat-sen, solemnly stated in his doctrine of nationalism [*min zu*] and in the Declaration of the First Congress [of the Kuomintang] that the nationalities within the country are all equal. He recognized the rights to self-determination for all nationalities and also proposed that all the nationalities organize into a free and unified Republic of China. Moreover, the Fourth Article of the *Outline of Nation Building* states explicitly, "As for the weak and small nationalities inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule." This clearly states that equality among the nationalities should materialize under the formula of self-determination and self-rule of the nationalities. We should not twist or garble the words of Mr. Sun by arguing that self-determination and self-rule for the nationalities apply only to ordinary local autonomy and that Articles 119 and 168 are abstract non-entities.

2. A great republic does not just melt all different nationalities with many different cultures and make them into a truly unified and pluralistic body. All the nationalities have their own national characteristics and special histories and cultures. They also have different lifestyles and thus can make contributions to enable our nation to increase its wealth, strength, and prosperity. Therefore, in the basic law of the nation, expressions must be made of the real spirit and foundation underlying the creation of the state. All the nationalities in the country should be helped to develop and preserve their own traditions and specialties and to contribute their good points in an endeavor to provide the necessities for the entire nation.

3. The national defense of our country is divided into naval and land defense. We will not discuss naval defense here. As for land defense, the Southwest, Northwest, Inner Mongolia, and the Northeast are all important areas, inseparably related to the national security of our country. The nationalities that inhabit these areas have lived there for many generations and have borne the heavy responsibilities of guarding the doors and gates to our nation. In view of the tense world situation, it is especially necessary to provide an opportunity for self-rule for each of the nationalities that live in the frontier areas. Their capacity for self-rule should be encouraged, and they should be helped to stand on their own to develop their own strengths in watching and defending the national boundaries. . . . Especially at present, the northern national defense districts are under severe threats. These threats are dual in nature—both internal and external. A physical national defense line cannot be constructed at this time. It is very necessary to foster the hopes and aspirations of the frontier nationalities. Their rights should be clearly enumerated in the constitution. . . . The establishment of a spiritual national defense to assist in the timely quelling of the [Communist] rebellion and in working toward national construction is an important task that should not be set aside any longer.

B. Measures

For these reasons, we petition that Articles 119 and 168 of the Constitution be changed as follows:

1. The original text of Article 119 should be changed to read: Self-rule for the Mongolian leagues and banners should be settled by law according to the following principles.

a) The original position of the leagues and banners should be guaranteed. In each league, a league government should be established, and in each banner, a banner government should be established.

b) Above the leagues and banners, a unified self-rule institution should be established.

2. The original text of Article 168 should be changed to read: As for the position of all the nationalities in the frontier areas, the country should provide legal guarantees and assist them and make it possible for them to carry out self-rule. In the sessions of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, legislation concerning national minority matters should have the approval of the representatives of the national minority or minorities concerned.

In the Reasons section of the proposal, national self-determination was strongly emphasized, but in the Measures section, only self-rule was mentioned. This logical contradiction was a result of the compromise between the two positions. The goal of the first article of Measures was to avoid the phrase "local autonomy"; another goal was that "the original positions of the leagues and banners should be guaranteed." This second goal was the idea of Prince De, who was not satisfied with the Organizational Law of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners that failed to emphasize the original position of the leagues and banners. The phrase "in each league, a league government should be established, and in each banner, a banner government should be established" was meant to make the leagues' position vis-a-vis the provinces and the banners' position vis-a-vis the *xians* equal. Although the phrase "in the sessions of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, legislation concerning national minority matters should have the approval of the representatives of the national minority or minorities concerned" does not explicitly include the words "veto power." Veto power was, however, the ultimate goal. Again this was the idea of Prince De, and was put into this proposal by the delegates from the MYA.

Although a final proposal like this did not meet the hopes of Bai Haifeng and his group, they nevertheless had to agree outwardly to the compromise. All these struggles among the Mongols were reported to the KMT by He Zhaolin and Xing Fuli. The zealous

Mongolian delegates brought this proposal before the Assembly. On the first day alone it got more than 400 signatures to second it. The next day, more than 100 additional seconds were added. These signatures were obtained easily because many delegates had their own unrelated proposals for amendment to the constitution, and so they gladly traded signatures on each others' petitions, performing what the Americans call "logrolling." No sooner had this large number of signatures been obtained than a severe hindrance appeared. The Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang ordered all party delegates to refuse to sign any proposals for constitutional amendments. Although this measure was not for the sole purpose of blocking the Mongolian proposal, it stopped the further obtaining of signatures. More than 3,000 delegates were present, and the requirement that one-fifth of the delegates approve such petitions meant that only 700 signatures had to be obtained. They lacked only one hundred of the required number of signatures before the KMT issued this order. This action aided the plans of the KMT to see that the constitution was not amended.

The delegates from Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan criticized the confrontation among the Mongolian delegates as creating further rifts among the Mongols. They concentrated their attacks on me and several other delegates from the MYA, arguing to the central government that we should be punished. On the other hand, because the KMT could not control the MYA, He Zhaolin and Xing Fuli also put the blame for their failure to control the Mongol delegates on the MYA. Consequently, the Party's Central Headquarters and the concerned departments of the Chinese government ordered Xu Shiying, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, to take care of the matter.

One day at noon, Xu invited Oyongerel, Gombojab Hangin, Dagwaodsar, Jorigtu, a few others, and me for lunch and a talk. Xu openly stated that we young Mongol delegates had been denounced, then said, "You people have no need to worry. Continue what you are currently doing. It is proper for Mongols to struggle for Mongolia's right of autonomy. For your long-range plan, do not regard these kinds of activities as separatist movements. Once, at the time of the founding of the Republic of China, I did propose a federal system, but Mr. Sun Yat-sen supported the system for a greater degree of unification. If at that time a federal state system had been enacted and Mongolia had become one of the states, these problems would have been solved. Your proposal has still not reached the degree of local power of a federal state. How could it be called a separatist movement? You may put your hearts at ease. Do your best. I will assume all responsibility for your actions." In this way, through Xu Shinying's brilliant open-mindedness, the accusations against the MYA members came to an end.

At any rate, the MYA proposal was not submitted to the full body, and the MYA members were greatly disappointed. They were nevertheless still able to articulate the demands of the Mongols. I, together with Tudub, the son of Prince Gungsangnorbu and not a member of Li's clique, delivered one speech after another to emphasize that the Republic was a country of many nationalities. The substance of these speeches was simple: the Chinese government should strive to put into effect Sun Yat-sen's promise of moving "toward the weak and small nationalities inside the country; the government should foster them and enable them to carry out self-determination and self-rule" to enable all nationalities to enjoy the same rights and privileges. In one geographic area, there should not be Chinese provinces and *xians* placed over Mongolian leagues and banners; there should not be an administrative system of two layers that confront each other in the same area. The position of the leagues and banners should be protected, and their functions should be clearly distinguished from those of the provinces and *xians*. The Mongol demand for autonomy is deserving; it should not be neglected. Why would we come here

if we truly had separatist intentions? Why would we even bother submitting petitions at all?

Following the second of the speeches of two Mongol delegates, two delegates from the Uighur people, Mutiyi and Uighur, also delivered speeches on the principle of national self-determination and self-rule. Their proposals were similar to those of the Mongol delegates. These animated speeches attracted the attention of the greater part of the delegates, and many foreign journalists came to interview us.

To confront the proposal for constitutional amendments by the Mongol delegates, the delegation from Chahar, Rehe, and Suiyuan offered many contrary proposals. When these proposals came to the floor, many more hot debates ensued. The Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan proposals were all opposed by the Mongol delegates, so none of the proposals or counter-proposals passed. During these debates, Bai Yunti, Bai Haifeng, and He Zhaolin and their group spoke not one word.

As for the election, there should have been no problem. Of the vice presidential candidates, the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang originally intended to secretly support Sun Ke. Most of the Mongol delegates recognized that Sun Ke's father, Sun Yatsen, had made a very clear promise that "the government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country and enable them to carry out self-determination and self-rule." Therefore, it was worthwhile for the Mongol delegates to give his son a vote, or so they thought.

They gathered a group and visited him officially. Sun also had stated that the Mongols should enjoy their right to self-rule. In this congenial and problemless atmosphere, He Zhaolin delivered the secret order of the Kuomintang's Central Headquarters, which demanded that all Mongol delegates vote for Sun Ke. Then somebody asked He Zhaolin whom he would vote for. He answered, "For the convenience of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, I must vote for Li Zongren. But mine is a special case. Others must obey the instructions of the Kuomintang Headquarters in voting." A debate ensued. There had been no problem before, but this statement caused a debate. Then Xing Fuli threatened each delegate separately and said, "Those who do not vote according to the instructions of the Party Central Headquarters will be punished." This angered and frustrated most of the Mongol delegates, so they voted for Li Zongren. This situation had nothing to do with the Mongolian problem, but it increased friction among the Mongolian delegates.

The Mongolian Youth Alliance and Its Contacts with the U.S. Authorities

While the National Assembly was in session, Bai Yunti, Li Yongxin, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, Xue Xingru, and their group gathered secretly to plan an attack on the members of the MYA. They did not fear that their positions on the problems of Mongolia would be questioned at the time, but worried that some time in the future the leadership might fall into the hands of those strongly nationalistic individuals. At this moment, they still did not realize that their opponents had already organized the MYA as an official body. At any rate, for their own benefit, they had to use all their connections and power to attack the members of the MYA. Li Yongxin and He Zhaolin depended heavily on Xing Fuli, having him collect information secretly and create rumors against the members of the MYA. Later, after the Chinese Communist Government was established, Xing Fuli wrote an article about his memories of the National Assembly in an effort to protect

himself. He was very talented at distorting the facts; in reality, most of what he wrote about the Mongols in this article was pure fabrication.

At this time, by arrangement of Schulties and Ruth Bean, the members of the MYA—Rashidondog, Gombojab Hangin, Urgunge Onon, Oyongerel, and I—had a meeting with John Leighton Stuart, ambassador of the United States to China. We told Stuart that Inner Mongolia was currently sandwiched between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, and that the hopes and aspirations of the Mongol people should not be neglected. Ambassador Stuart expressed his sympathy and concern for the unfortunate experience of the Inner Mongolian people. He promised that he would find an appropriate opportunity to admonish the Chinese government to address and improve the situation.

Soon after this meeting, news arrived from the United States that Owen Lattimore was directing an institute at Johns Hopkins University and needed Mongol scholars who could teach the Mongolian language and literature. The MYA members in Nanjing decided to send Hangin and Onon to make contact with the United States and promote international propaganda on the Mongols' behalf. They also decided at this time to inform Prince De about the existence and purpose of the MYA. He might have heard about it earlier, but this was a formal decision to let him know; however, it was not an invitation for him to join as a member.

During the late summer and early fall of 1948, following a series of victories by the Chinese Communist forces, both Prince De and the MYA members felt that time was not on their side. Staying in Beijing would not help the situation. They thought it proper to go farther northwest while the Communist forces were still unable to reach that area. This area was also too remote for the Chinese government to worry about at such a time. It might be possible, they thought, to take advantage of the extra time to win the sympathy of the local authorities and have them carry out some action to secure Mongolia's future, and also to try to find international assistance. In May, the Beijing Branch of the Military Committee was dissolved, and power in North China gradually fell into the hands of Fu Zuoyi, Commander in Chief of the North China Bandit Extermination General Headquarters. Prince De sensed there was no longer any chance for discussion of the Inner Mongolian problems, and Beijing was no longer a suitable place for him to stay.

At this moment, Ruth Bean was sent by the U.S. Embassy to Beijing to interview Prince De. At my initiative, the two met at my house. Prince De expressed his hope that while the American authorities aided the Chinese government, they would also honor public opinion of the Mongolian people and provide moral support for the Mongolian demand for autonomy. Finally, he argued that the current continuing struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang might create a climate amenable to Mongolian autonomy. Bean expressed her personal sympathy with Prince De's requests, adding that she would convey these matters to the proper U.S. authorities.

In order to strengthen Prince De's contacts with the Americans, Rashidondog, after his consultation with Schulties and Raymond Meitz (who succeeded Richardson as head of the U.S. naval intelligence group), arrived in Beijing to visit Prince De and deliver the opinion of these two Americans to him. Later, Rashidondog conveyed Prince De's opinions to these two Americans.⁷ During this tense period in Beijing, Meitz arrived from Shanghai. Through my introduction, he had a long conversation with Prince

⁷ Lu Minghui said in his book that Rashidondog brought two million Chinese dollars to Prince De, which was provided by the American side. This is patently false. In order to look further into this matter, I interviewed Rashidondog on April 24, 1984; his response was negative—no money was given.

De. Prince De also told him about his plan to move to the Northwest. Meitz showed willingness to support him as much as possible in this adventure.

Prince De's Withdrawal from Beiping

During Prince De's stay in Beiping, Chiang Kai-shek visited the city several times. Any time he came to the old capital, Prince De always tried to visit with him. Sometimes Chiang would dispatch a man to comfort and console him. But after his talk with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking about the Mongolian problem, Prince De had no further discussions with him.

From the autumn of 1948, the situation in north China greatly changed. The fall of Beiping and Tianjin was imminent. The sound of peace initiatives arose both in Beiping and Nanjing. Fu Zuoyi, who had consistently been a hard-line anti-Communist, now began to waver in his anti-Communist resolve. In Nanjing, people openly expressed their desire for Generalissimo Chiang's retirement. During this period of declining KMT morale, military pressure by the Chinese Communists became greater and greater. Prince De then became the focus of interest for those who had interest in the Mongolian problem. Dayanchi Lama, who had secret contacts with the agents of the Soviet consulate in Beiping, suddenly informed Prince De that the Soviet consulate wanted to protect the Prince in any time of necessity. Prince De did not reject this offer, but he also did not ask Dayanchi Lama to make further contacts with the Soviets. On the other hand, the MYA members contacted Meitz and negotiated with him to "rent" two airplanes to aid in withdrawing MYA members and other members of the Mongol elite, along with their families to Lanzhou and Taiwan.

After a discussion among the alliance members, Dagwaodsar flew with a group of MYA members to Lanzhou in early November 1948 to make the preliminary arrangements for resettling their political movement. In the middle of November, I and another group flew to Shanghai and then to Taiwan to escape the crisis in Beiping and to plan for our next move. We also discussed with Prince De our hope that he would leave Beiping before its fall to the Chinese Communists. Prince De, while agreeing to have a group of people embark for the Northwest to prepare for the future, insisted that he would remain in Beiping until he could leave together with all his old followers. Among these were Chogbagatur, who opposed Prince De's departure most strongly. I am still unable to discover Chogbagatur's motive for insisting that Prince De stay behind. Fu Zuoyi also sent someone to restore relations with Prince De and the Mongol leaders in Beiping and console them. He said that if needed, they could go with him from Tianjin to southern China by sea. Of course, Prince De and most of the Mongols did not trust Fu. After my departure from Beiping, Makhashiri and others arrived in Beiping from Communist-occupied Kalgan and advised Prince De to stay and await peaceful liberation.

When a group of Mongols withdrew from Beiping, Wu Heling went with them to Nanjing, reporting the current Mongolian situation to Chiang Kai-shek through Yu Jishi. At the same time, he asked for a special airplane to bring Prince De from Beiping to the capital in the south. Chiang was quite generous to Prince De. Wu's request was authorized. By the time the plane reached Beiping, the airport outside the city had come within range of Chinese Communist artillery, so the plane had to land inside the city. This was on January 1, 1949. On the same day, Fu Zuoyi openly started peace talks with the Chinese Communists. Prince De thus left Beiping under straitened circumstances. Because Chogbagatur refused to follow, Prince De had only Tumendelger (his assistant

for many years), the Dayanchi Lama, and a few other followers when he left Beiping. He Zhaolin, in his role as special commissioner for Inner Mongolian Party Affairs of the Kuomintang and head of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, accompanied the prince to Nanjing. Before Prince De's departure from Beiping, Li Shouxin had already rented an airplane and flown with his family to Taiwan via Shanghai.

After Prince De's arrival in Nanjing, he visited President Chiang Kai-shek to express his thanks for sending the airplane to get him. Chiang invited Prince De to dinner at his official residence, but at this dinner they did not discuss Mongolian problems. Prince De's arrival in Nanjing greatly excited the Mongols in the city. Prince De also discussed with Wu Heling his sincere desire to go to the Northwest to create a situation favorable for Mongolian autonomy before the arrival of the Chinese Communist military forces. Wu recognized that this was a solid plan, and he had Wu Yunpeng, Wu Heling's intimate friend and head of the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, visit Bai Yunti, then Minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, to persuade Bai to agree to facilitate this adventure in Northwest China. Bai agreed and planned to recommend that the Chinese government appoint Prince De as the minister-superintendent of Mongolian league and banner autonomy. But Prince De insisted that his obligation was to struggle for the self-determination and self-rule of the Mongol people. How could he become an official of the Chinese government and superintend himself? He politely refused this gesture of goodwill.

Rashidondog arranged for a meeting between Prince De and the U.S. ambassador, John Leighton Stuart, and with Schulties, the political consultant. Prince De explained to them his plan for establishing autonomy in the Northwest. The ambassador and Schulties regarded Prince De highly and were especially interested in De's pro-American, anti-Soviet attitude. Ambassador Stuart agreed to convey Prince De's hopes to the U. S. government. Schulties also expressed his willingness to offer any help he could.

Before the situation in Beiping became extremely tense, Prince De's trusted old friend, the *Dilowa Khutugtu*, had gone to Nanjing and planned to go to Tibet through India; however, he instead accepted an invitation from Owen Lattimore to join Lattimore's Johns Hopkins University program to assist in research. Prince De recognized that this was a good opportunity and had Giljintei, a legislator from the Shilingol League, write a document making the Diluwa Khutugtu his personal representative and give him the right to carry on the movement for Mongolian independence after his arrival in the U.S.

While Prince De was contacting all sorts of political leaders, a great change occurred in the leadership of the Chinese government. President Chiang Kai-shek announced his resignation on January 21, 1949, and Li Zongren, the vice president, took over the presidency. Prince De felt that this showed the Chinese government's loss of a coherent center; it would be better to go immediately to the Northwest and there do something for the Mongolian people. So Prince De abandoned his resolve, maintained since August 1945 and the Japanese surrender, not to involve himself in politics. He again plunged into the whirlpool of political intrigue.⁸

⁸ Perhaps more could be said about these events, but I was in Taiwan at the time and was not party to any discussions during this period. I have decided not to incorporate into this book any information I did not garner through personal experience and contact with the people mentioned in my narrative. Lu Minghui's book, supposedly based on three years of interviews conducted in Beijing with Prince De, does have more material on these events. But these interviews conducted by Lu

ended in October of 1965, just six months before Prince De's death. Perhaps because of his declining physical and mental condition, statements by Prince De as recorded in Lu's book were embellished and distorted, or misrepresented chronologically. I have, therefore, chosen to regard these statements as suspicious and unreliable.