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THE ALASHAN MONGOLIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT JANUARY - DECEMBER 1949

Prince De's Departure to Alashan and Contacts with the Northwest Chinese Authorities

The Alashan Mongolian Autonomy Movement began at Dingyuaning (now Bayanhot, the capital of Alashan) under the leadership of Prince De. This was the Prince's last effort in his struggle for Mongolian freedom. By that time, it was clear that no power existed in China capable of stopping the Chinese Communists. Although Prince De recognized this fact clearly, he nevertheless resolved to struggle anyway. The Mongol nation had become the symbol and embodiment of his indomitable will. It was not foolishness, but unselfishness and devotion to his people that led him to make one last attempt to free and vindicate the Mongol people.

With the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, Li Zongren's ascent to the presidency, and the overwhelming momentum of the Chinese Communist onslaught, Prince De felt that remaining in Nanjing would be of no use for the Mongol people. It would be best to return to his Mongolian homeland and work there for his people. Even though he knew that success was no longer possible, he hoped it might at least attract world attention to the Mongols' demands. It might even establish some kind of foundation for a Mongolian polity in the future.

Prince De went to the northwestern part of Mongolia under the pretext of having some task to perform there for the Chinese government. He asked Li Zongren to send him to Xi'an and then to Lanzhou via airplane. Li granted his request, and by the end of January 1949, Prince De, accompanied by Damrinwangchug (the younger brother of the Alashan *jasag*, Damzana), He Zhaolin, Tumendelger, and the Dayanchi Lama, went from Nanjing via Hankow to Xi'an, and stayed there for a few days, visiting General Hu Zongnan, the top commander of the Chinese government forces in that area. Prince De expressed his opinion that unification of the Mongolian banners under a system of Mongolian autonomy would be one measure to block further Communist expansion. General Hu felt that Prince De's opinions were correct and expressed support for them.

Prince De also met with General Zhang Zhizhong, Superintendent of Northwest Military and Political Affairs, and expressed his desire for autonomy. Earlier, when Zhang was in Xinjiang, he was well-known for his brilliant, nonchauvinistic attitude toward national minorities. At this time, he claimed to be a faithful follower of the Three Principles of the People and said he would willingly cooperate with and support Prince De's struggles for Mongolian autonomy. This was, of course, extremely satisfying to Prince De.

Prince De also met Ma Honggui, Ma Hongbin, Tao Shiyue, and other military and political Chinese leaders in Lanzhou. Ma Honggui, then the governor of Ningxia

Province, was the son of Ma Fuxiang, the Moslem leader in the Northwest. During the period while he was minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Ma Fuxiang had supported Wu Heling. This was because he hoped that if the Mongols were able to obtain some kind of rights, the Moslem people could then take this development as precedent for demanding their own rights. Consequently, Ma Honggui, in general at least, had no special prejudices against the Mongols or their demand for political autonomy. However, Ma Honggui's personal relations with Damzana, the *jasag* of Alashan, were very poor because of the confrontation between the provinces and *xians* on the one hand and the leagues and banners on the other. Nevertheless, Ma Honggui had no conflict with Prince De. When they discussed Mongolian autonomy, Ma's answer was, "Then if your demands are such, we should strive for Mongol-Moslem cooperation." This kind of answer greatly satisfied Prince De.¹

Damzana and the Situation in Alashan

After their arrival in Lanzhou, Damrinwangchug and He Zhaolin went to Dingyuaning. Prince De also showed his willingness to discuss the future of Mongolia with Prince Damzana. Soon after, Prince De received a warm welcome from Damzana, which was a great and important turning point for the Mongolian politics of that time. Damzana, the *jasag* prince of Alashan, had always occupied the top position of that area. Now he openly invited Prince De to come to Dingyuaning. This meant that he wanted to openly recognize Prince De's leadership of the Mongol people.

When Prince De arrived in the city of Dingyuaning, Damzana not only sincerely welcomed him but also those Mongols who had come to Lanzhou from Beijing (including the members of the MYA). Damzana said he would do his best to sustain all those who came to Alashan. Consequently, this small oasis city between the Helan (Alashan) Mountains and the great desert overnight became Inner Mongolia's political center and remained so until the arrival of the Chinese Communist forces.

The Alashan banner and the Ejine banner to its west were usually known among the Chinese as *Xitao Menggu*, or Mongolia west of the Great Bend of the Yellow River. They were special banners not under the jurisdiction of any league. In 1928, after Ningxia became a province, these two banners were drawn onto the map of Ningxia Province. And from that time on, confrontation between these two banners and the Ningxia provincial government was inevitable. Later, this confrontation turned into a personal clash between the governor of Ningxia Province, Ma Honggui, and the leaders of these two banners. Under these circumstances, the Ejine banner always looked to Alashan for leadership in their common struggle.

The princely household of Alashan had once accepted an imperial princess from the Manchu emperor, and thereafter they continued to intermarry with the Manchu imperial household. As a consequence, the livelihood of Alashan gradually had become sinicized in the Beijing style. The residents inside and outside the city wall of Dingyuan-

¹ Ma Hongbin was a military leader of Ningxia and a cousin of Ma Honggui. Tao Shiyue was the commander of the military forces sent to the Northwest by Chiang Kai-shek. Later, during the expansion of Communist power, Ma Honggui and his family moved to the U.S. Ma Hongbin negotiated the surrender to the Communists. Tao Shiyue moved to Xinjiang, where he too surrendered to the Chinese Communists.

ying, with the exception of the lamas of a temple, had lifestyles that were quite different from those of the nomadic population in the steppe and desert area. In other words, the Alashan lifestyle, cultural tradition, and way of thinking were all dualistic. Damzana himself was the husband of Zai Tao's daughter, and Zai Tao was the uncle of Puyi, the Manchu Emperor who had abdicated in 1912. Consequently, Damzana represented a Beijingized clique. Because the character of his conflict with Ma Honggui changed into a league vs. province, banner vs. *xian* struggle, it also turned into a kind of nationalistic struggle. However, regardless of considerations of lifestyle or political thought, Damzana still wanted to be known as a ruler who would struggle for Mongol self-determination.

Opposing Damzana was the *tusalagchi* Luo Batumongke, the idol of the nomadic population in the desert and of people in general living outside the city wall, even though he lived inside Dingyuanying and enjoyed the quasi-Beijingese lifestyle. His opinions always contradicted those of Prince Damzana. Because Luo Batumongke was a man of real power, Damzana was unable to push him out of the local political world. Luo Batumongke was also the leader of the Alashan peace preservation troops. Between these two antagonistic powers, the mediators were Luo Batumongke's relative, the *jakirugchi* Chen Erdeni, and his younger brother, the deputy *jakirugchi*, Chen Nasunbatu. Luo Batumongke was a zealous Mongol nationalist who had special regard for Prince De and great sympathy for the Mongols who had arrived from Lanzhou.

The Complicated Situation in Dingyuanying and Confrontations among the Mongols

Besides these complicated Alashan entanglements, other political factors must be taken into account. Although many Chinese merchants who lived outside the city wall of Dingyuanying posed no problem, the Moslem Ma family had dispatched one or two battalions of troops to camp near the Chinese merchant quarters. These troops kept watch over Damzana and the Alashan Banner. Although the military forces of Alashan were more than a match for the Moslem troops, the latter had available more reinforcements than did the Alashan troops. In addition, Major-General Luo Dawei was dispatched by the Second Bureau of the National Defense Ministry, which meant that he was from the military intelligence organization of the Military Statistics Bureau. Wang Junhui was also dispatched by the Kuomintang Central Committee Investigation and Statistics Bureau, more commonly known as the Central Statistics Bureau.

After Prince De and his followers arrived, they quickly became the object of these officials' surveillance. He Zhaolin was himself a high-ranking official of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, and also head commissioner of the Kuomintang Inner Mongolian Party Affairs Commission. He regularly sent in reports on Prince De to these organizations. These were transmitted either directly or through Wang Junhui. Influenced by the presence of personnel from the Chinese military statistics group and the Kuomintang Central Statistics group, Damzana organized his own personal espionage ring. Outside this organization there were also agents of Outer Mongolia, protected by Luo Batumongke.

Because of the arrival of Prince De, many Mongols of different political persuasions gathered in Dingyuanying and further complicated the political climate in the city. It seemed that following the shift in the general situation, a change was already occurring in the frontier city. The reason Prince De was able to persuade Damzana to accelerate the autonomy movement was, according to Prince De,

because we know that we should take advantage of the loss of control by the central government to establish control ourselves before the Chinese Communists arrive, while the Ma family warlords are still occupied with their own affairs. We should strive for autonomy and create a *fait accompli*; then the Chinese will be unable to put heavy-handed pressure on us. We will be able to preserve our own power and will have dignity even if we retreat. Thus will we make our mark in history.

When Prince De arrived in Dingyuaning, Bai Haifeng, who had instigated the rebellion of the Mongol Peace Preservation troops at Beile-yin sume in 1936, fled to Dingyuaning for his own safety from the advancing Chinese Communist onslaught. His suspicion-laden relationship with Prince De was already established because he had taken part in this earlier rebellion and also because of his personal relationships with Damzana and He Zhaolin. So from the beginning of the autonomy movement, there was a problem of conflict and confrontation among the leaders.

Later, He Zhaolin wrote with a crooked pen a deliberate distortion of these events, entitled "Outline from Beginning to End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy Movement." I reproduce the relevant part of it as follows.

Soon after Prince De's arrival in Alashan, he proposed a Mongolian autonomy movement to Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and Ba Wenjun. Prince De said, "We Mongols have consistently demanded autonomy, but our hopes for it have never materialized. But now, the Kuomintang is completely occupied with its own affairs and has no power to stop us. We should not be influenced by whether the Kuomintang assents to our plans or not. We should take advantage of this opportunity. This is our best opportunity and should not be missed." At that time, everybody recognized that the situation was very tense and wondered how a matter like this could be carried out. If it could only be carried out reluctantly, it would be a labor in vain, they thought. They expressed their opinions that this plan should be considered carefully before being acted upon. Prince De several times pushed for discussion of the problem, but the others always had some reservations because they feared that after liberation, there might be many difficulties for themselves.

Afterwards, Bai Haifeng secretly said to Damzana, He Zhaolin, and Ba Wenjun, "Right now, the situation is very tense, and the outcome is a foregone conclusion. As for Mongolian autonomy, it should not be carried out under the leadership of the Kuomintang. If autonomy were carried out on our own, it might accrue some advantage to us and help us gather together those armed Mongol military and political personnel who came here from the Northeast. We could assemble them and not let them scatter and create trouble everywhere. Even if the future sees the coming of liberation, it will be good. On the other hand, if liberation [i.e. takeover by the Communists] does not come immediately, the power of this group of people may be used to do some local construction work." Damzana, He, and Ba, after hearing these words, judged them reasonable and recognized that if in the future the liberation did not come, then the autonomous movement could not be attacked by the KMT as a rebellion; if liberation did come, it could be represented to the Communists as a prorevolutionary action aimed at holding these rebel bandits for the people's liberation army and thereby reducing the damage they could do to eastern Inner Mongolia. This would kill two birds with one stone. This kind of opportunistic, counterrevolutionary political scheming was in keeping with Prince De's feudalistic, counterrevolutionary ideology. After this discussion, everybody agreed to carry out the movement for Mongolian autonomy.²

² This passage makes it clear that He Zhaolin was attempting to give the Chinese Communists an account that would put all the blame on Prince De and make Bai Haifeng look like a political opportunist. In relating these lies, he hoped to be able to exonerate himself, Damzana, and Ba Wen-

In He's account above, the words that read "gather together those armed Mongol military and political personnel who came here from the Northeast. We could assemble them and not let them scatter and create trouble everywhere," could be related to the matter mentioned in an earlier chapter—how at the Chinese National Assembly in Nanjing, Bai Haifeng had desired to take over Wu Guting's troops but failed. In the fall of 1948, Bai carried out a similar plot, and it too failed. From these words of Bai in He's account, it appears that Bai may have intended to put these anti-Communist troops under his own leadership and create his own political capital. Nevertheless, his plan never succeeded. As for He's words on political opportunism, according to my own experience with both Bai and He, I think both of them might well have been involved in some opportunistic scheme. He Zhaolin was well-known for his cunning and treachery.

As for Damzana, no matter how He twisted the truth under his crooked pen, everyone still knew Damzana was a fervent patriot. When he first welcomed Prince De, Damzana was sincere. Although later he changed his inclination because of the impact of Bai and He, at the beginning he was not shifty on the matter of Inner Mongolian autonomy. As for Ba Wenjun, who was then using a Mongolian alias and was known as Bayankhan, he was also a zealous and faithful person. He tried hard to create an outlet for the Mongol people. His motive was entirely different from the motives of Bai and He.

Supporters of the Movement and Formation of the Preliminary Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy

Both before and after Prince De's arrival in Dingyuaning, some other Mongol leaders also gathered there: Rinchinsengge, the head of the Ulanbatai League and his son, Shongno. Formerly, after Rinchinsengge had cut his queue, he had been humiliated by Prince De, and this created enmity between the two men. Now, hearing of Prince De's arrival in Dingyuaning, he came from Bayan-shangdu-yin sume, Urad Central Banner, to visit Prince De. His son, Shongno, was a member of the MYA.³

After the arrival of these people, Prince De's proposal for autonomy received greater support. Finally, after receiving the agreement of Damzana on April 13, 1949 in Dingyuaning, with these people and others as a base, Prince De, Damzana, and the others who had gathered convened an Inner Mongolian League and Banner Delegate conference to discuss how to gain Mongolian autonomy.

At this conference, because both Prince De and Damzana declined to preside, Bayankhan (Ba Wenjun) was nominated as chairman; Prince De, Rinchinsengge, Damzana, Dugurengsang (Bai Haifeng), Nasunmongke (He Zhaolin), and Urgundalai were elected as members of the presidium. Guests of honor were Zhou Baihuang, the secretary general of the Kuomintang Ningxia Provincial Headquarters; a delegate of Ma Honggui;

jun. I do not know whether He Zhaolin actually wrote this account himself or not, but I do know that Bai died in 1958 or 1959. This account of He's was published in Inner Mongolia in 1962 in *Inner Mongolian Literature and Historical Materials*, #1.

³ Several other MYA members were also there, such as Budbazar, Urad West Banner National Assembly Delegate; Dagwaodsar, Hulunbuir National Assembly delegate; Shonododub, acting head of the Shilingol League; Altanochir, *tusalagchi* of the Sunid Right Banner. Other important members were Agdungga, Ujumuchin Delegate for the National Assembly; Jagunnasutu, a former official of the Mongolian Government in Kalgan; Urgundalai, Ordos Right Central Banner peace preservation commander; and Gonchog (Bao Guomin), originally an officer of the Northeastern Peace Preservation Troops.

the governor of Ningxia Province; Major General Luo Dawei; a commissioner of the National Defense Department; and others. After Chairman Bayankhan delivered the opening speech, the guests of honor also delivered speeches one after the other. Both sides used very carefully worded speeches to avoid provoking the other factions. Even the Ma family of Ningxia did not want to appear to be opposing the others.

This greatly increased the courage of the opportunists. Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin had never used Mongolian names after joining the KMT, but now they were using their Mongolian names, Dugurengsang and Nasunmongke respectively, to show outwardly that they were moved by nationalistic aspirations. But in reality this was nothing but opportunism. If autonomy won out, they would have a place, and if it failed, they could claim to the KMT that they had never participated in the movement. The conference lasted three days. In addition to the outline of the work of the proposed Preliminary Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the conference also passed the following petition to the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission:

This is a request presented [to the Central Government] to secure permission to establish Inner Mongolian autonomy in order to stabilize the Mongolian banners and to fortify the national defenses. The territory of our nation is vast, and many national minorities are settled along its border areas. The safety of the national defense cannot depend only upon military preparations. There must be an increase in the national minorities' goodwill toward the central government in order to achieve true unity and produce a united front in struggling together for our nation. Then and only then will there be gains and success.

We, the Inner Mongolian people, are approaching two million people in number, and our culture, education, and economic standards are progressing steadily. It is possible for us to say that we can assume a portion of the nation's burdens. Moreover, we are able to be responsible and manage our own affairs. For almost ten years, we Mongols have been desperately seeking solutions and demanding Inner Mongolian autonomy. These demands are based on Mr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings in his *Three Principles of the People* and are similar to the demands by minorities all over the world for more political autonomy. Right now, in view of the current national situation, we Mongols need to unify and search for a way of self-salvation and national salvation. On the thirteenth of April, therefore, the Inner Mongolian League and Banner Delegate Conference was held, at which we discussed general plans and made the following resolutions:

a. Following the teachings of the *Three Principles of the People* that "the weak and small nationalities in the country should be fostered by the government, and it should be possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule," we petition the Central Government to authorize Inner Mongolian autonomy, making it possible for us to defend ourselves against invasions, and enabling us to fortify the national defense.

b. Before the establishment of the formal institutions of autonomy, we plan to establish a Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy in order to prepare for the transition to self-rule.

Therefore, following the resolution of the conference, we have already established the Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, have started preparing for self-rule, are fortifying national defenses and working for stability in order to relieve some of the Central Government's worry about the northern region. But because of the tense internal situation, we sincerely hope that your Honorable Commission will consider the national loyalty of us, the Mongol people, toward the nation and will perceive our enthusiasm for self-salvation; and that you will, in view of the nationwide situation, make a brilliant decision and assent to the declaration of Inner Mongolian autonomy. This will support national policy and will fortify the frontier areas. This will be a great benefit to the Mongolian banners and also to the entire country.

Therefore, prudently, we submit this to Your Excellency, Bai Yunti, minister of the

Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.⁴

Bayankhan, He Zhaolin, and Jagunnasutu probably drafted this document because, although they agreed on the need to establish Mongolian autonomy, they were absolutely unwilling to offend the Chinese government or the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. Thus, all these documents emphasize the leadership of the central government in unifying the nation for defense against enemy invasion.

As for the personnel arrangements, although Prince De advocated the autonomy movement, he did not wish that there be any indication that it was led or instigated by him, to avoid the misunderstanding that he was the one who initiated all autonomy movements. He hoped that Damzana might come forth and assume leadership of the movement. Damzana, however, was quite reluctant to take over the mantle of leadership. Consequently, Prince De and Damzana agreed to support Altanwachir, who was then the head of the Yekejuu League and the chairman of the disintegrating Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, as well as the chairman of the Preparatory Committee. In order to balance the personnel arrangements inside his own Alashan Banner, Damzana had his younger brother, Damrinwangchug, act as one of the deputy chairmen. Finally, through the support of Prince De and Damzana, Bayankhan became the secretary-general.

After this conference, without waiting for the Chinese government's response, the Inner Mongols founded their Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy in the city of Dingyuaning. The main tasks facing this committee were first, convening the Conference of the Inner Mongolian People's Delegates; second, drafting the Inner Mongolian Declaration of Autonomy; and third, writing the organizational law of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous government.

Prince De's Trip to Guangzhou

Although Prince De did not want to be chairman of the Preparatory Committee, he did want to go to Canton (Guangzhou) to take up the difficult task of persuading the leaders of the Chinese government to approve this new development. Because of the tense situation in the Ulanchar League, Rinchinsengge did not accompany Prince De to Guangzhou, nor did Ochirkhuyagtu go from Yekejuu. Only Jin Batudorji was able to accompany Prince De. Although Jagunnasutu had been fired from his post in the Kalgan Mongolian government, he was nonetheless appointed by Prince De as a personal attendant-secretary; Prince De realized that Jagunnasutu's eloquence would be useful. After everything was prepared, though, there was no money. The Mongolian delegates waited for a solution to this financial problem until the middle of May, and then proceeded via Ningxia, Lanzhou, Xi'an, and Chungking to Guangzhou.

Prince Altanochir had been planning to come to Dingyuaning to travel with Prince De, but during Altanochir's visit to the headquarters of the Kuomintang's Suiyuan Mongolian Party Headquarters, he suddenly died of a stroke. The people in Dingyuaning had hoped that Prince De would take the position of chairman of the Preparatory Committee and dispatch others to Guangzhou on his behalf. Prince De refused this re-

⁴ Appended are the names of the Mongolian league and banner delegates: Altanwachir, Demchugdongrob, Rinchinsengge, Bayankhan, Damrinwangchug, and others, for a total of forty-nine signatures.

quest; the people of Dingyuanying then selected Bayankhan as acting chairman, since he was the secretary-general of the committee. Prince De decided to go to Guangzhou as a representative of the committee.

Financial and political problems postponed Prince De's visit to Guangzhou again and again, and this delay created a confrontation among the Mongols in Dingyuanying just after they had joined together after a long-lasting rift. The delay also hurt the friendship between Prince De and Damzana. Earlier, during the days when he was in Beiping, Prince De had expressed great interest in the Political Consultative Conference (*Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi*). In this conference, the Chinese Communists agreed that the national minorities that were concentrated in one definite area should receive the right of self-rule, and Prince De had liked this suggestion. According to Prince De, the reason why the national minorities were entitled to self-determination was that each minority was a people (*minzu*). Therefore, he taught that the Mongols were justified in demanding autonomy because they were a people.

He Zhaolin recognized that if Prince De's demands were too high, self-determination would run up against a political taboo against fragmentation in central government circles so that it would be impossible to realize such a demand. Though Bai Haifeng tried to establish contact with the Chinese Communists, he also refused to offend the central government. So some of Prince De's options were cut off. As a result, He Zhaolin and Bai persuaded Damzana not to accept Prince De's proposals.

Damzana had his own personal motives. He had welcomed Prince De to his home to take advantage of the prince's reputation in an attempt to achieve his own political goals, which were the recovery of the rights and privileges of his banner and gain the finances for its rehabilitation. He was not necessarily interested in carrying out a decisive struggle for national self-determination of all the Mongol people. In other words, Damzana was a comparative realist, and after undergoing persuasion by He and Bai, he lost the courage to accept Prince De's proposal for self-rule.

At the same time, the active members of the MYA—Dagwaodsar, Shongno, Shonnudongrob, and others—pushed resolutely for the demands of national self-determination and produced a clear slogan to that effect. This kind of political romanticism on their part antagonized the politically realistic Mongols, and at every meeting confrontations between the two groups erupted into emotionally charged arguments. This finally produced an ideological split among the Mongols. Prince De thought that the realistic camp had no zeal for a nationalistic movement; Damzana and his group thought that the “wandering bums” he had welcomed to his home were impractical and doctrinaire and created problems for no good reason. Seeing the deadlock between the two groups, Bayankhan also lost heart and stopped all his preparatory work. This was the troubled situation in Dingyuanying when Prince De finally left for Guangzhou.

In January, when Prince De arrived in Nanjing from Beiping, President Chiang Kai-shek had already resigned and had made Vice President Li Zongren the acting president. By the end of March, General He Yingqin was appointed as head of the Executive Yuan. He Yingqin recommended that Bai Yunti be the minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. Soon after the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists collapsed in the latter part of April, the Communists took over Nanjing, and the Chinese government fled to Guangzhou. The main force of the KMT withdrew to Taiwan. In such chaotic circumstances, many of the Mongols in Beiping and Nanjing also withdrew to Taiwan. Soon after Prince De's arrival in Guangzhou, he sent a telegram to Wu Heling, Jirgalang, Wu Guting, and Tserengdorji (formerly Prince De's secretary), and me, requesting that we first come to Guangzhou to discuss the future, and then go to

Dingyuanying to promote the autonomy movement together. Beside these persons who were requested to go to Dingyuanying, Li Shouxin and others also went there through Guangzhou by their own will, having not been invited to do so by Prince De.

After Prince De's arrival in Guangzhou, Bai Yunti, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, hosted the prince's party and arranged lodging for them at the Hotel Fenghuang. Prince De immediately presented Bai Yunti with his petition for autonomy and asked him to present it to the Chinese government. In addition, he requested as a personal favor that Bai stand on the Mongol side to deliver this petition to the Chinese government and accelerate its realization. Although Bai agreed to give it his full support, he really did not have the power to push this petition through.

During his visit with Li Zongren, Prince De explained again and again that the Inner Mongolians must unite both to carry out self-defense and to struggle for national existence because of the Chinese Communist threat. Prince De asked Li to be sympathetic and authorize this autonomy. Li Zongren did not give any definite response to Prince De's request, but said, "This is a very important matter and needs more careful consideration and study." He then asked Prince De to negotiate with Li Hanhun, the minister of the Interior. Consequently, Prince De met several times with Minister Li Hanhun. In a conversation I had with Prince De, he said that Li had expressed his sympathy and recognized that the Mongol demands for autonomy were not excessive or unreasonable. He also declared that according to the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the matter should be pursued and that he would like to transmit the Mongols' opinion on this matter to his superiors.

Prince De also met with Qin Dechun, deputy minister of the National Defense Ministry. When Qin held the post of governor of Chahar Province, his personal relations with Prince De had been quite smooth. He now expressed sympathy with Prince De's requests and gave his support. But when Prince De requested a visit with He Yingqin, head of the Executive Yuan and former Instructional Minister of Mongolian Autonomy in the 1930s, he was refused. He Yingqin had strong prejudices against Prince De and used his busy work schedule as a pretext not to see him. Later, Prince De asked Xue Xingru, a Mongol legislator, to visit He and ask the reason for his refusal to see Prince De. Mr. He said to Xue, "Prince De instigated the autonomy movement and then collaborated with the Japanese. I'm afraid that he is unreliable." Because of this political factor, Prince De's activities in Guangzhou were doomed.

At the end of May, General He Yingqin resigned as head of the Executive Yuan because he had lost the support of the KMT in Taiwan. Yan Xishan, an important actor on the political/military stage ever since the founding of the Republic, took his place. In the earlier chapters of this book, I mentioned Yan's views on Mongolian politics and his machinations against the Mongolian autonomy movement of 1933. His appointment as head of the Executive Yuan caused Prince De's trip to Guangzhou to end in failure. Yan did not like either Prince De or Bai Yunti. To please the legislators from the Northeast area, he expelled Bai from the cabinet and placed Guan Jiyu, a northeastern person and former minister of Finance, as minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. In addition to this step, Yan also had Zhu Jiahua appointed deputy head of the Executive Yuan, in order to tighten his own web of relations with the central cadres of the KMT. During this reshuffling of the Chinese government, Li Hanhun, who had a close relationship with Li Zongren and sympathy toward Prince De's demands, left his post as minister of Interior Affairs.

This high level administrative reshuffling obliged Prince De to explain his positions and demands all over again. Of these new personnel, Guan Jiyu was unwilling to

assume any risks for important matters such as Mongolian autonomy. He yielded to Yan Xishan control of all matters pertaining to Inner Mongolia. Even before the formal visit between Prince De and Yan Xishan, the prince realized nothing would come of it.

As expected, Yan again used his old tactic of delaying matters. "Right now," he said, "the most important matters are military. It would be best to wait for an improvement in these matters before undertaking a discussion of Mongolian autonomy." Despite these delaying tactics, Prince De persisted in his demands; but Yan did not budge. So their meeting came to an end with nothing accomplished. After this meeting, Yan put on a banquet in Prince De's honor. During the banquet, Prince De argued that Sun Yat-sen's teachings regarding minorities—that the central government should foster weak and small minorities inside the country and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule—were sufficient precedent for his demands. Yan responded, "This is a far-reaching tenet, but my own responsibilities at the moment are limited to matters immediately at hand." Thus it was that this second meeting between Yan and the prince ended on an unpleasant note.

Subsequent to these meetings, Prince De discussed Mongolian issues with Zhu Jiahua, the deputy head of the Executive Yuan. Zhu was usually known among the Chinese as a man with broad-minded attitudes toward the national minorities. Although he expressed personal sympathy to Prince De, he did not give a definitive official opinion for or against the issue of autonomy for Inner Mongolia. He agreed only to make available to Prince De 10,000 silver dollars and 200 rifles. Prince De, greatly disappointed at this, realized at this moment that the KMT and its Chinese government were completely ignoring Inner Mongolian concerns.

After Prince De's arrival in Guangzhou, the Chinese civil war greatly intensified. Yan Xishan came to see that complete neglect of Mongol concerns might lead to Mongol loss of faith in China and a host of other attendant problems. It was out of these concerns that he decided to give a superficial reply for Prince De to carry back to Alashan. It is a classic example of his tactics of vagueness and decisive indecisiveness:

Permission is hereby granted for the preliminary committee for Inner Mongolian League and Banner Autonomy to be established. It is possible that when certain preconditions for the implementation of autonomy (such as an accurate population census, educational attainment, and cultural and economic development) are met, autonomy might be authorized.

This answer clearly showed that while the preliminary committee was recognized, it was to have no authority to implement any autonomy without further authorization.

Gui Yongqing, the commander of the navy and an old friend of Prince De, also felt that complete disappointment for Prince De would lead to an irreversible loss of the Mongol people's faith in the KMT. He personally presented one hundred handguns to Prince De and said to him, "I am unable to support you openly and officially in your important concerns. President Chiang has retired, and nobody is currently able to make decisions on important matters. I regret that I cannot be of more help to you than this. Do forgive me."

When he later returned to Dingyuaning, Prince De took 10,000 silver dollars and the handguns given him by Gui Yongqing. Because of space limitations on the airplane, the 200 rifles had to be left behind in Guangzhou. The material assistance given by the central government to Prince De was limited to what could be stuffed into his small airplane! This cynical gesture did not amount to even a symbolic expression of concern

over the impending Chinese Communist threat to Mongolia.

While Prince De was in Guangzhou, the military forces under the leadership of Wu Guting had broken out of the Communist encirclement in the Northeast and arrived in the vicinity of Dingyuaning. For this reason, Bai Haifeng again became interested in incorporating Wu's troops into his own armies. Bai was, however, unsuccessful in this.

When Li Shouxin arrived in Guangzhou, he thought that by virtue of his past relations with Prince De, he might be able to establish a position second to Prince De's, should the latter achieve a breakthrough. Li also thought that his former position in the Mongolian army might enable him to gather all Mongolian military forces and place them under his command. It was because of these arrangements that Li, having heard that Prince De was going to Guangzhou, went there to see the prince without having received an invitation.

From Guangzhou, Li went to Ningxia. One of Li's old friends, Gao Yajie, a rich merchant in Beijing, had introduced him to Ma Dunjing, son of Ma Honggui, the acting governor of Ningxia Province. Ma wanted Li to come to Ningxia to gather his former troops and confront the threat posed by the Communists. In Ningxia he learned that Ma was not really serious in his anti-Communist resolve. Moreover, the Mongolian troops from the Northeast who had gathered in Ningxia were unenthusiastic about accepting Li's leadership or fighting for the Moslem warlord Ma Honggui. Their main purpose was to establish a Mongolian autonomous region in Dingyuaning. Li had no choice but to proceed to Dingyuaning and await the establishment of the Mongolian autonomous regime.

Prince De had in good faith invited Wu Heling to Guangzhou. But Wu Heling differed with Prince De on Mongolian national issues. Wu was more realistic than Prince De. He recognized that Mongolian autonomy could only be achieved with the Chinese government's approval. He suggested that a compromise be reached. In other words, though Wu's stance was quite different from Prince De's, he was still willing to act as a middleman during negotiations. Since 1928, Wu had often acted as a mediator between the Mongols and the Chinese government. As a result, Wu was able to convince the Mongols that only he fully understood the mentality of the Chinese central authorities. He had also succeeded in convincing the Chinese government that only his proposals could be both acceptable to the Mongols and coincide with the interests of the government. In Guangzhou, Wu negotiated with Prince De and had interviews with the leaders of the Chinese government. After Prince De's return to Alashan, Wu remained in Guangzhou for quite a long period.

After Jirgalang and I arrived in Guangzhou, Prince De told us about the situation in Alashan and told us that because of issues concerning national autonomy, a conflict among the Mongolian leaders had erupted there. I admonished the prince not to create a rift with Damzana and argued that as long as there was a definite territory designated as an autonomous region, it would not matter whether the autonomy was referred to as national or regional. Prince De agreed with my analysis and agreed that after his return to Alashan, he would not again insist on the term "national autonomy." He also pointed out that in order to bring together the two conflicting groups, it would be necessary to draw up a draft of the declaration of autonomy, the organizational law of the autonomous government, and plans for a conference. He urged Jirgalang and me to leave Guangzhou and proceed to Alashan immediately in order to take preliminary steps toward these ends.

Prince De's Contact with the Americans in Guangzhou

To open an international line of contact and to struggle for American support of the autonomous movement, Prince De, accompanied by Rashidondog, met with Schulties, the political counselor of the American embassy in Guangzhou. Prince De explained to Schulties the situation in Alashan and expressed hope that Schulties would convey to the United States government the desire of the Mongols for national self-determination. At this time, there was no ambassador in the U.S. embassy in Guangzhou; John Leighton Stuart had already returned to the United States. The top political official in the embassy at that time was Schulties, who said to the prince, "The hopes that you expressed earlier have already been conveyed to the United States government by Stuart. The American government recognizes you as the representative of the Mongols. If you are able to achieve a breakthrough, perhaps we will dispatch a man to be stationed in your area. I will report your hopes to the United States government." After receiving such a response, Prince De was satisfied.

While in Guangzhou during this time, Prince De and I also met in the suburbs with Raymond Meitz, an American intelligence officer. The prince, hoping that Meitz would convey the hopes of the Mongols to the American government, explained to him the situation in Alashan and the purpose of his visit to Guangzhou. Meitz expressed his personal sympathy for the Mongolian movement for self-determination and self-rule and his desire to support it. He said he would see to it that our concerns and hopes were conveyed to the proper people in the American government. He also said, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, that he would like to see some trained radio communication experts dispatched to Alashan, and that he was negotiating with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to have all of this organization's remaining relief materials, communications equipment, and trucks sent to the Mongolian autonomous organization in Alashan.

Before Prince De had even arrived in Guangzhou, Raymond Meitz's organization was already training several young Mongol intellectuals in radio communications. A Mongol agent, Nairaltu, was instrumental in organizing these efforts and coordinating them with Meitz's group. The purpose of these activities was to provide liaisons between the United States government and the Mongolian autonomous activists under Prince De's leadership. They had already determined that if the Communists took over Western Inner Mongolia, these liaisons would go underground and continue their intelligence work.

Prince De, of course, wanted to use the services and materials of this group of young Mongol communications experts. It was, however, necessary to find a pretext for taking them to Alashan. The MYA decided that one of their number, a man named Oljeibuyan, head of the first section of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, should take this communications group to Ningxia under the guise of delivering relief materials, and that they should proceed from Ningxia to Dingyuaning. This was a very risky undertaking, especially in view of the fact that they would be in territory controlled by the Ma family of Moslem warlords. Oljeibuyan, however, was willing to make this risky attempt to establish Mongol contacts with the outside world. Long since disillusioned with the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, he felt that it could only deal very superficially with the Mongols and Mongol issues.

Prince De's other Contacts in Guangzhou

Authorization of the Preliminary Committee for Mongolian Autonomy was Prince De's only accomplishment in Guangzhou. Most of the Mongols there were very sympathetic with Prince De's goals, but they thought that the momentum of the times was against the realization of these goals. For this reason, they were not as unified in action in 1949 as they had been during the autonomy movement of 1933. One of their number, Xue Xingru, was anxious to act as a middleman for Prince De. Another man, Bai Rui, a former member of the Control Yuan, decided to go to Alashan to join the autonomy movement there. Bai was an old man, in his eighties by this time. As I related earlier, Bai was one of the most zealous supporters of the 1933 autonomy movement. Rashidondog, the liaison between the Prince and the American embassy, also decided to go to Alashan. But after Rashidondog's arrival in Lanzhou, the war took a turn for the worse and the roads were blocked, so he was unable to proceed to Alashan.

After Jirgalang and I left Guangzhou for Alashan, Prince De had Wu Heling and Jagunnasutu deliver a document in his name to the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, announcing the establishment of the Mongolian League and Banner Allied Committee of Defense.

The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission did submit this proposal to the Executive Yuan. Yan Xishan ordered a joint examination of the matter by the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, National Defense Ministry, and the Ministry of the Interior. The result was that these three organizations agreed that if the Mongolian League and Banner Allied Defense Committee could achieve its aims of gathering anti-Communist military leaders of the Mongol banners, organizing the military forces of the Mongol banners, and defending against westward expansion of the Chinese Communist forces, it would be a good thing and would lead to the approval of its establishment.

Prince De, however, had returned to Alashan by this time, and the situation had greatly changed. Even though this Yuan decision existed, it was no more than a few vain words committed to paper. All told, the accomplishments of Prince De's trip to Guangzhou were the central government's approval of the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for Mongolian Autonomy and his contacts with the Americans, which enabled him to get political sympathy, materials for radio communications, and a chance to receive the remaining materials and trucks of UNRRA in the northwest area.

Prince De left Jagunnasutu in Guangzhou to continue negotiating for the formation of the allied defense committee and to demand more military equipment and financial aid. Wu Heling was also ordered to keep pressing the government over these demands. Prince De took with him the other delegate, Jin Batudorji; his aide-de-camp, Tumendelger; and his former secretary, Tserengdorji and departed for Lanzhou on July 10. Prince De arrived in Alashan via Ningxia. In Lanzhou, he met with the military commander of the Northwest, Ma Bufang; and in Ningxia with Ma Dunjing, the ad hoc governor of Ningxia. These Moslem leaders expressed support of Prince De's efforts at self-rule, and at the same time they spoke of the cooperation between the Mongol and Moslem people.

The Situation in Alashan Before Prince De's Return

After our arrival in Dingyuanqing, Jirgalang and I were warmly received by the brothers Damzana and Damrinwangchug, who arranged a suite of rooms for us in the

residence of the Alashan Prince. These quarters were also used as the office of the open-minded Bayankhan, chairman and secretary-general of the preparatory committee. Although Jirgalang and I were not members of the preparatory committee at that time, we were often asked for our opinions. Damzana and his brother also had no prejudices against us. We visited with Luo Batumongke on several occasions and had good conversations. Nevertheless, we were informed that Luo, a powerful Alashan *tusalagchi*, was friendly to Damzana, the *jasag*, but unfriendly to Damrinwangchug. To avoid creating trouble and becoming embroiled in local politics, we kept our contacts with this man to a minimum. We also tried to alleviate the tension that had developed between Prince De and Damzana's group over the issue of "national autonomy." Our arrival, however, attracted the attention of He Zhaolin, Wang Junhui, and Luo Dawei. It was even said that they made many false reports about us to the Investigative Bureau of the Kuomintang Central Committee and the National Defense Ministry.

At this time, the situation in the Northwest was changing rapidly. Zhang Chizhong, supreme military commander of the Northwest and the delegate of the Chinese government to Beiping, refused to return and surrendered to the Communists. In May, the Chinese government replaced Zhang with the Moslem warlord Ma Bufang, and stationed him in Lanzhou. Hu Zongnan, the commander of the KMT's forces in the northwest, who was stationed at this time in Xi'an, was moved to another place. The northwest of China was coming rapidly under the power of the Ma family. Ma Bufang's son, Ma Jiyuan, defeated the Communists in the vicinity of Xi'an, but soon afterward the situation changed and became tense again.

Alashan was far removed from other areas. The only source of knowledge of the outside world was Damzana's Zenith radio. The source of the news was the Chinese edition of the BBC broadcasts originating in London. Every day after supper was the time to hear the news. Damzana always invited Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, Jirgalang, and me to hear these broadcasts. We would make analyses together and then discuss what policies would be best in light of the international situation. These were nonofficial gatherings but of much significance. Persons at these gatherings exchanged views freely, and this reduced the knowledge gap among them. One night, Bayankhan suggested that there should be no delay in important matters because of a mere difference of opinion. As the ad hoc chairman, he appointed himself, He Zhaolin, Damringwangchug, Jirgalang, and me as drafting committee members. This decision hastened the work of the preparatory committee. I was assigned to draw up the declaration of autonomy. Jirgalang and I together were assigned to draft the organizational law of the autonomous government, and other documents were assigned to other members. The five members were then to hold discussions and agree upon the final drafts.

During the drafting of these documents, He Zhaolin never shared any of his viewpoints or opinions. When the declaration and organizational law drafts were almost complete, Damzana suddenly spoke to me and said, "When you were drafting the declaration, were there any disputes or differing opinions?" I answered no. Damzana said, "Because you did not ask my third brother what his opinion was, he felt that you were ignoring him. Because of this he is planning to resign from the drafting committee. Would you please visit him and remove this misunderstanding of his?" I agreed with this request, although I felt that the situation was a little strange. I went to visit with Damringwangchug, who revealed his complaints to me and then said, "You may go to discuss these matters with He Zhaolin." I thereupon had a talk with He Zhaolin, who emphasized his dissatisfaction with Damringwangchug and then said, "Your draft of the declaration is very good. There is no need to make any changes. The only problem is you did not say a

few words to help the central government escape from its responsibility. This might create some trouble later. Do you think it would be possible to add a phrase like 'The central government is occupied by military matters day and night and has had no time to concern itself with this matter?'" Of course I agreed, because both Damringwangchug and He Zhaolin were drafting members. Therefore, in the Chinese edition of the declaration, these words of He Zhaolin, written in the literary style, were inserted into the colloquial text of the document.

This, of course, was He's way of making it appear that Damringwangchug was the one who disagreed with me. This ploy also made it possible for He Zhaolin to keep from severing his old ties with the Kuomintang Central Committee in case the Chinese Communists failed. In that event, he could maintain that he had not been eager to write these things. In He Zhaolin's writings on the Alashan autonomy movement, he claims that he, Prince Damzana, and Bai Haifeng, advocated using the words "Western Mongolia" instead of "Mongolia," and that this gave rise to a serious debate with Prince De.⁵ But to my knowledge, there was never any such debate. This shows that He was distorting the record to obscure the nature of his relationship with Prince De. Of course, these writings of his were penned during the dark days of the Cultural Revolution.

When the war in the Northwest turned from bad to worse, all the people in Dingyuaning realized that occupation by the Communists was only a matter of time. But as nobody was able to come up with a reasonable solution for dealing with the inevitable; a mood of hopelessness and passive submission to fate pervaded the city. Damzana himself was wavering in his resolve. During the nightly hour of news and discussion, I often recalled the last-resort measures Prince De told me about while I was in Guangzhou. I tried to convince Damzana that passively awaiting doom at the hands of the Communists was not the only available alternative. I argued that it would be best for us to move into the great desert and enter Tibet via Kokonor. If Tibet could not preserve its own national existence, I continued, we could pass over into India, establish a government in exile, and attempt to channel world opinion in our favor. Jirgalang supported these alternatives, and Damzana was also moved by them. Bayankhan, with some reluctance and with reservations, also supported these alternative plans. Only He Zhaolin and Bai Haifeng refrained from expressing their opinions. Damzana discussed this matter with the leaders of his own banner, including Luo Batumongke. Damzana said that if we could mobilize some trucks, it might be possible to flee toward Tibet as a last resort. I therefore leaked to him a bit of information to the effect that Prince De might be able to obtain some trucks from the UNRRA. This became an important consideration in later discussions.

Prince De's Return to Alashan

In the middle of a night in mid-July, Prince De returned to Dingyuaning from Ningxia. Because Prince De's arrival was delayed for almost seven hours, Damzana and others had been greatly concerned about his whereabouts and welfare. They even worried about Prince De being captured by the Ma warlord family. The atmosphere became very tense. At his arrival, all the members of the Preparatory Committee lined up to meet him, and Luo Batumongke had the peace preservation troops of Alashan banner receive Prince

⁵ He Zhaolin, *Outline from the Beginning to the End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy Movement*. [We could find no more detailed bibliographic information on this work. —Editors]

De with military music. Although Prince De's visit to Guangzhou did not result in any concrete improvements or breakthroughs, his return still lifted the spirits of the people. Before Prince De's departure for Guangzhou, it had been decided that the Mongolian convention would be held on July 20. This was the reason for Prince De's return.

After returning to Alashan, Prince De began attending the evening news sessions and engaging in the discussions about what to do in the worst case scenario. He agreed with my proposal to enter Tibet through Qinghai (Kokonor). It seemed, therefore, that this matter was settled and that the rift among the Mongolian leaders in Alashan over the issue of "national autonomy" was resolved. Nevertheless, as the discussions on matters of achieving autonomy continued, the possibilities for both a high and a low degree of autonomy still proved divisive. As usual, He Zhaolin rarely said anything during these discussions.

While these discussions were progressing, Wu Heling telegraphed that he had arrived in Lanzhou and that he would soon be proceeding to Alashan. Prince De indicated that he would welcome Wu Heling, but Damzana said he would not welcome him, and even sent him a telegram telling him not to come. However, this unwelcome guest soon arrived in Dingyuaning and disregarded his host's cold welcome. Bayankhan was also very suspicious of Wu's intentions, regarding him as an agent sent by Yan Xishan.

During Wu Heling's visit with Damzana, Wu stated that prospects for autonomy should be considered realistically. This immediately changed Damzana's attitude toward Wu. Prince Damzana saw that Wu's arrival was no threat to him. Consequently, he invited Wu to the news discussion groups and also asked about his opinions concerning the worst possible scenario. When the retreat to Tibet as a government in exile was brought up, Wu expressed his reservations. This alternative he regarded as very unrealistic, and he said, "Mr. Demchugdongrob and other outsiders may have come up with this plan, but you, Prince Damzana, and your family members are here. How could you just cast them aside and leave? This is your homeland! This is an impossible thing. I think it would be better to think this over from a realistic point of view."

After these words, He Zhaolin, finally broke his normal silence, stared at me as he began speaking boldly and excitedly: "Mr. Wu, since you are here, I dare to say what has been on my mind for a long time. Today you have expressed my sentiments eloquently. If you hadn't come and said these words, I would not have dared to speak out for fear of being beaten!" Bai Haifeng, taking advantage of this opportunity, also argued that it would be better *not* to make plans to establish a government in exile. It would be necessary to work out a plan for remaining in Mongolia, he argued.

Thus, my plan for fleeing to Tibet and establishing a government in exile there was destroyed in a moment by the officious tongue of Wu Heling. The end result of Wu's meddling was to make it impossible for Prince De to leave Dingyuaning in a formal manner. By staying in Mongolia, Prince De would eventually be subjected to the injustice of being branded a political criminal by the Chinese Communists, and he suffered greatly from the Communists during the last years of his life. As I write these words, feelings of frustration, resentment, regret, and bitter sorrow well up in my soul.

After this discussion of plans, Prince De and the members of the MYA who had advocated high-degree autonomy and a government in exile in the worst possible scenario had to revise their plans. Although Prince De and I insisted on our original plan, it was impossible to overcome the strenuous and cynically realistic arguments of Wu Heling. He Zhaolin, Bai Haifeng, and eventually Damzana decided to accept Wu Heling's stance against planning for a government in exile.

Shortly thereafter, Bayankhan took me aside and said, "Wu Heling has certainly

been working for Yan Xishan ever since the days of the Batukhaalag autonomy movement. He has always tried to situate himself between the central government and the Mongolian leagues and banners. During the Mengjiang period, he was doing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's bidding. And now he is here! It is impossible that he has no direct ties to the central government!" Bayankhan's accusation, though very plausible, will perhaps always remain unverified.

These decisions in Dingyuaning did not delay preparations for opening the convention, but it turned out to be delayed because all the delegates from the banners and the Chinese government did not arrive on time. The people in Alashan hoped that Guan Jiyu, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, would personally attend the conference because that would indicate official recognition of the convention. Their hopes had some apparent basis in fact—Guan Jiyu had been dispatched by the Chinese government to attend the coronation of the tenth Panchen Lama at the Kumbum monastery in Kokonor—and so they reasoned that he would also attend the Dingyuaning conference.

That the Guangzhou government also realized the significance of these Mongol political activities is evidenced by its formal decision *not* to send official delegates to the Alashan convention. By refraining from sending delegates, the government was asserting its authority to withhold recognition of this, or any other, Mongol conference. This decision was delayed and was not delivered until the last possible minute. After it arrived, the people in Dingyuaning realized that there were no more reasons for further delay.

The Mongolian Conference in Alashan

The convening of the conference and the selection of delegates had to be flexible because of the daily changes in the war situation. The Yekejuu and Ulanab Leagues, the four banners of Right Flank Chahar, and the three special banners of Tumed, Alashan, and Ejine were able to send delegates to the conference; but the leagues and banners in the East had already been occupied by the Chinese Communists, making it impossible for them to send their delegates. However, people from these Communist-occupied areas who had fled their homelands and gathered in Alashan began electing representatives from among their number to attend the conference. The Xinjiang and Kokonor Mongol areas, cut off from the outside world and in political upheaval, were also unable to send delegates. After it became clear that these several areas would not be sending delegates, it was decided to convene the conference without further delay.

The elections in Dingyuaning were carried out smoothly, although there was some competition and divergence of views. Only one misunderstanding occurred. Li Shouxin thought that if Prince De were the leader, he would naturally become second in command under Prince De. The Mongols, however, saw him as having no prestige or record of struggling for Mongolian independence. It was, therefore, impossible for him to occupy the second highest position or even to be elected as a delegate. Li, originally a native of the Tumed Right Banner of the Josotu League, had left in his teen years. After his departure, he had had no contact with the Tumed banners or the Josotu League. It was not surprising, therefore, that the people of the Josotu League did not want him as their delegate. This rejection made the situation difficult for everyone. Even Prince De was at a loss about what to do. Fortunately, Bayankhan suggested that both eastern and western Tumed were part of one family. Now, because there was no possibility for Li to become a delegate for Tumed of the Josotu League, Bayankhan wanted to nominate him as a dele-

gate from the Tumed in Suiyuan. So the problem was solved. I was selected to represent the Shilingol people in Dingyuaning.

The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference was finally convened on August 5, at 9:00 in the morning in the auditorium of a school outside the city of Dingyuaning.⁶ The outside and inside of the school's auditorium were decorated with white, blue, and red. The flag of the Republic was everywhere, and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen was prominently displayed. On both sides of the portrait was the inscription "The Revolution is still not complete. Our comrades must be diligent," and its Mongolian translation. This decoration was arranged by Damzana. The day before the opening session of the conference, Damzana invited Prince De, Bayankhan, me, and others to preview these decorations. There was no picture of Chinggis Khan, and Prince De started to ask Damzana why not. But Damzana interrupted and said that with a picture of Sun Yat-sen only, it would be impossible to make accusations of rebellion. Prince De still persisted in trying to make some changes in the decorations, but I quietly took him aside and advised him not to make another "national autonomy" type of fiasco out of this issue. Prince De took my advice, but throughout the conference he had bad feelings about this omission. Many other people felt the same way.

At the opening ceremony, Bayankhan, as the chairman of the Preparatory Committee for Mongolian Autonomy, declared the conference convened. Prince De then delivered the keynote address. His main theme was that the Mongols had in recent times endured a fall from glory to weakness, but that all peoples had the right to self-government in the twentieth century, and that the threat of a Chinese Communist takeover rendered self-government all the more indispensable.

After Prince De's keynote address, Mr. Gong, the delegate sent by Ma Bufang, superintendent of the Northwest Military Administration; Zhou Baihuang, chief commissioner of the Kuomintang Ningxia Party Headquarters; and the delegate of Ma Dunjing, the acting governor of Ningxia; delivered their speeches, and the opening session was

⁶ The people in attendance at the meeting included Demchugdongrob, Damzana, Buyanjirgal, Sungdui, Sainjiya, Jamsu, Tsana, Buyandureng, Luo-Aldarchogtu, Qi-Temberbayar, Damrinwangchug, Luo Batumongke, Luo-Buyantegulder, Jin Batudorji, Zhang Darijab, Zhang Ermongke, Li-Sechinbilig, Yidam, Chojjamsu, Tserengdorji, Gombo, Mashibatu, Wu Mengzhou, Bai Anshan, Bai Jinming, Huang Jiming, Yangstu, Rinchinsengge, Dobjai, Batuoljei, Sodnambaljur, Chilagunbatu, He Shouye, Jirgalang, Tu Yaxiu, Han Shujuan, Li Tiesheng, Amurtu, Galsang, Lubsang, Kesigdalai, Dorjisureng, Lubtsang, Sumbur, Temursuke, Oljei, Choiji, Agdungga, Erdenochir, Serengnamjil, Norbujana, Sodnam, Gungsang, Monggutei, Radnabazar, Huang Weishi, Giljintei, Dobdan, Tumenoljei, Urgan, Amurmendu, Gungga, Nadna, Surungjab, Galbagatur, Nasunbatu, Khafungbo, Gungsang, Lobsangnorbu, Dobdan, Batu, Erinchin, Többayan, Sedma, Unggai, Oljeibadarakhu, Jambal, Baljinima, Seden, Jirmed, Dungdub, Magsur, Gao Jichang, Shijiawangsum, Togtakhusang, Nasuntogtakhu, Sainbayar, Dambijalsan, Zhao Jirantai, Dongrob, Erdeniochir, O Xingde, Wu Heling, Bai Rui, Aminboke, Tobshin, Wang Yinqing, Goshingga, Jungnai, Bao Goudong, Han Yixiu, Bayankhan, Li Shouxin, Chen Yingquan, Cheng Shouzhi, Yun Binchang, YunYingfei, Bao Guoliang, Nasundelger, Orgen, Erdemtu, Chen Jianrong, Yun Linge, Urgundalai, Chogbagatur, Jirgalang, Namkhajab, Ombagatur, Tegshi, Duureng, Sagarajab, Almas, Genjin, Burindalai, Mongsel, Sulechun, Oljei, De Guiyi, Buyankeshig, Gerel, Khaserdeni, Radnabagatur, Sechen, Zao Jiwu, Wu Tianshou, Baldangjamsu, Dansurung, Shirab, Erinchindorji, Dagwaodsar, Tarba, Darijab, Tumendelger, Rabdanr, Gesel, Tserengdorji, Urta, Bagator, Gabingga, Namur, Erkimbayar, Gongchog, Sengge, Wangchinjab, Sechin Jagchid, Oljeibuyan, Wu Guting, Hai Fuquan, Bai Haifeng, Shongno, He Huaru, Bokenasun, Altanchilagu, Balchingjab, Sangdugurent, Suchungga, Doljing, Badma, Choguirob, Jorintob, and Gombojob.

ended.

To the large majority of the people in attendance, Prince De's keynote speech emphasized the necessity of achieving autonomy. Autonomy is a natural right, Prince De argued, and there was nothing wrong with that. But Bai Haifeng disagreed with Prince De's speech. Bai asked, "What era is this? The current political market is not completely understood. There are still attempts being made to blame the Communists." As it turned out, Bai had already sent someone to contact the Communists. This was why he did not want to hear any anti-Communist rhetoric at this conference. Bai's secret moves and contacts were unknown to Prince De or to others at the conference.

The guest of honor was Mr. Gong, the delegate sent by Ma Bufang, who was merely a section head in the Political Training Bureau of Ma's office, but his arrival symbolized Ma's approval of the conference. This made Wu Heling, He Zhaolin, and Damzana feel comfortable because they had originally feared that Ma would not approve of the conference at all or would send someone to disrupt the conference. The Ningxia delegate, Zhou Baihuang, was a man who had quite an open mind toward the nationality problem. Earlier, after his attendance at the founding conference of the Preparatory Committee for Mongolian Autonomy, he had submitted a proposal to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang advocating that the Mongol demands for self-rule should be accepted. He was still of the same opinion at the Alashan conference. Besides Gong and Zhou, Major General Luo Dawei, a special officer sent from the National Defense Ministry in Dingyuaning, and Wang Junhui, a specially dispatched member of the Kuomintang Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau, were present.

In addition, there were several international guests: a Reverend Prube, a minister stationed in Dingyuaning; Frank Bessac, the representative of UNRRA, another American; and an English journalist with his interpreter, Tsedendorji. Frank Bessac was an American intelligence officer from Raymond Meitz's group. While in Canton, the prince had gotten Meitz's promise to transfer various materials and several dozen big trucks to the new Mongol authority from the UNRRA branch office in northwest China before it closed its operations. Bessac said he would try to get these materials delivered to Alashan. Bessac was authorized to receive these materials and see them transferred to the Mongols. However, this never happened. A man surnamed Circassian, in charge of closing down the UNRRA office, instead delivered the trucks and remaining materials to the Gansu Provincial Government in Lanzhou. Bessac brought this bad news to Alashan. This failure was one of the main factors that led Damzana and his group to lose confidence in Prince De.

Tsedendorji, who had studied in Germany, was one of the representatives to the Chinese National Assembly in Nanjing from the Mongol banners in Xinjiang. Damzana asked him to attend the conference as a delegate of the Xinjiang Mongols, but he had no interest in politics and refused Damzana's invitation.

After the opening ceremony, the preparatory conference got under way. The delegates elected Prince De, Damzana, Bai Rui, Bayankhan, Wu Heling, and Bai Haifeng to be members of the presidium, and I became the secretary-general. After the conference, Damzana secretly talked to me and said, "I felt that He Zhaolin was passed over and was very embarrassed. For the sake of unity, please yield the post of secretary-general to him. Would you be the vice secretary-general, do the work, and allow him to take the credit? You are a man careful in every respect. I don't know whether you can accept my advice." In order to reduce friction, I agreed to Damzana's suggestion. At our first formal meeting, I nominated He Zhaolin to be secretary-general in my stead, and myself to be the vice secretary-general to assist the secretary-general in accomplishing

the mission of the conference. Although opposed by many, it was finally accepted.

During the discussion of how to advance toward autonomy, Bai Rui, Wu Heling, Jirgalang, Ombatur, and I gave our speeches, pointing out that the Chinese government had not carried out Sun Yat-sen's teaching of granting the Mongols self-determination and self-rule. Then Bai Haifeng and Damrinwangchug emphasized that after the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition of 1926-27, there had been continuous domestic chaos and external aggression, and hence much good legislation had to be postponed. This was said to moderate the atmosphere of the meeting and avoid hurting the feelings of the guest of honor and his Kuomintang superiors. It also kept Luo Dawei and Wang Junhui from sending unfavorable reports to their superiors. At this moment, He Zhaolin, who was still the special commissioner in charge of Inner Mongolian KMT Party Affairs, stood up and said a few words in favor of the KMT. He talked about how loyal the Mongol party members were and about the sincerity of the Kuomintang authorities. He explained that because of the disturbances of the warlords as well as the invasion by Japan and then the Chinese Communist rebellion, the KMT's goals could not be reached. As he spoke, tears streamed down his face.

After his address, Monggutei unexpectedly stressed the natural right of the Mongols to self-determination and self-rule, and rebuked the KMT for its failure to carry out its promises. Because of this failure, he continued, the KMT had lost the faith of the Mongol people. Then he said in a voice thick with emotion, "Such a man as He Zhaolin, a special commissioner of Inner Mongolian Party Affairs, has no concern for the future of the Mongol people. We have been cheated many times by men of his type. Even if we want to weep, we have no tears remaining. I do not know with what face so high-ranking a person comes here and blubbers with crocodile tears?!" This rhetoric mortified He Zhaolin, who volunteered to resign from his post as secretary-general. The atmosphere of the conference became very tense.

Fortunately, Bayankhan did his best to smooth ruffled feathers, making it possible for other proposals to be voted on. There were three main tasks for this conference: (1) passing the Mongolian Autonomy Law; (2) electing the chairman, vice chairman, and other important leaders of the autonomous government; and (3) passing the Declaration of Mongolian Autonomy.

The Law of Mongolian Autonomy follows:

The Conference of Mongolian Delegates realizes that the invasion from the outside is becoming more serious with each passing day. Inwardly, because administration and education are not in order, the livelihood of the people has declined. Mr. Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen] taught that the government of China should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule. The sincere hope of our Mongol people is to struggle for continued national existence, reform our livelihood, struggle for freedom, and endeavor to achieve national autonomy. We have established the Law of Mongolian Autonomy and promulgated it all over Mongolia. We wish every person to respect and obey this law. Because of military struggles and because many banner administrations have not yet been recovered, the laws and regulations still have many loopholes and imperfections. After the situation has settled down, it should be completely and thoroughly revised by all the Mongolian people. We wish to reach the goal of peace and development.

Chapter I—General Outline

Article 1—It is the common desire of all the Mongolian people to see Mr. Sun Zhongshan's teachings implemented: the Government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country, making it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.

Article 2—The region of Mongolian Autonomy shall cover the original territories of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners.

Article 3—The people inside the territory of Mongolian autonomous areas shall not be discriminated against because of race, religion, sex, or class. All are to be equal under the law.

Article 4—Foreign affairs and national defense shall be administered by the central government. All other administration shall be carried out by the Mongolian Autonomous Government.

Article 5—The Mongolian Autonomous Government is responsible for the general establishment of autonomy: the internalization of democracy, the development of the economy, the elevation of the people's standard of living, the greater accessibility of education, the development of culture, and unification for self-defense.

Article 6—The armed forces of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners shall be reorganized, and a Mongolian self-defense army established to fortify the self-defense forces in struggling against enemies of our national existence.

Chapter II—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference

Article 7—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall represent the Mongolian people by implementing instruments for exerting political power.

Article 8—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be organized by the following [criteria for selecting] delegates: **Item 1**—Two people's delegates from each banner; if the population of the banner comprises more than 20,000 people, then each 10,000 people shall elect one delegate. If the population does not exceed 10,000, then banners with above 5,000 people can elect one delegate. **Item 2**—Each special banner shall elect eight people's delegates. If the population exceeds 40,000, then each 10,000 people shall elect one delegate. If the population does not exceed 10,000, then banners with above 5,000 people can elect one delegate.

Article 9—The functions and powers of the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be as follows: (1) establish and amend the Law of Mongolian Autonomy, and (2) elect and recall the chairman, vice chairman, and speaker of the conference of the Mongolian Autonomous Government.

Article 10—A presidium of nine to fifteen people from the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be elected by the delegates to administer the agendas and affairs of the conference.

Article 11—At each meeting of the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference, one member shall be elected by the presidium to preside over the meeting.

Article 12—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference hereby establishes its Secretariat. The secretary general and one vice secretary-general shall be nominated by the Presidium and be approved by the conference. The secretary-general shall administer the affairs of the conference according to the orders of the Presidium. The organization and the administrative regulations of the Secretariat shall be decided upon by the Presidium of the Conference.

Article 13—The regulations governing the deliberations of the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be proposed by the Presidium and then determined by the Conference.

Article 14—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be adjourned after its tasks are fulfilled.

Article 15—The term for a Delegate of the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall be four years.

Article 16—The Mongolian People's Delegate Conference shall convene once every four years. However, a provisional meeting shall be held if one third of the delegates sign a request for a meeting or the chairman of the government considers it necessary.

Article 17—Until order is restored, the time between convening conferences stipulated in the preceding article, may be extended by the chairman, but such extensions must be approved by the Mongolian congress.

Chapter III--The Autonomous Government

Article 18—According to Article 1 of this law, the Mongolian Autonomous Government is established.

Article 19—The Mongolian Autonomous Government's Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be elected by the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference from among persons of forty years of age or older with superior reputations. Their terms shall be four years, and they may be reelected only once.

Article 20—The Chairman of the Mongolian Autonomous Government shall be the supreme head of the military and civilian administrations.

Article 21—The Chairman shall promulgate laws and ordinances, but must have the counter signature of the concerned heads of the administration.

Article 22—If the Chairman is absent, the Vice Chairman shall take his place. When the Chairman is unable to fulfill his duties, the Vice Chairman shall be responsible for the Chairman's duties. If neither the Chairman nor Vice Chairman can fulfill their duties, one member shall be elected by the Political Affairs Members to take charge of the Chairman's activities. The Vice Chairman's succession to the chairmanship [before the latter's term has ended] shall be limited to the remaining period of the Chairman's term. If the Chairman's duties are taken over by a Political Affairs Member, such term of duty shall be limited to four months.

Article 23—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish nine to eleven political affairs members and one secretary general.

Article 24—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish a Secretariat as well as Bureaus of Internal Affairs, Finance, Industry, and Education, and a Peace Preservation Committee. The heads of these Bureaus and this Committee shall be concurrently Political Affairs Members. The organizational laws of the Secretariat, the Bureaus, and the Committee shall be decided separately. The Bureaus and Committee members may increase or decrease in number according to the decisions of the Mongolian Congress.

Article 25—The Political Affairs Members, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman and approved by the Congress.

Article 26—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish the Political Affairs Meeting. It shall be organized by the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Political Affairs members, heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee. The Chairman shall preside over the Political Affairs Meeting.

Article 27—The Chairman, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee shall establish administrative policies pertaining to their own unit. Matters involving common interests of the Bureaus shall be submitted to the Political Affairs Meeting for approval.

Article 28—The Chairman, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee shall have the responsibility to submit policy items to the administration, reporting on the results of policies to the administration, and answer inquiries of the Members of the Mongolian Congress.

The Chairman shall have the authority to ask the Congress to reconsider laws and budgets that have been passed. If the Congress disagrees with important policies of the Chairman, the Bureaus, and Peace Preservation Committee, it shall have the authority to pass an act demanding that the policies be altered. However, the Chairman shall have the authority to have the Congress reconsider its demands. If two-thirds of the Congress still insist, their former law and budget decisions must be accepted immediately by the Chairman. However, the Chairman shall have the authority to order the resignation of all the Political Affairs members or the concerned heads of Bureaus.

Article 29—The Mongolian Autonomous Government may establish a Consultative Committee to [help] make decisions on important policies, to assess popular opinion, to propagandize in favor of its political policies, and to spread understanding of the actual situation involving each issue.

Chapter IV--The Mongolian Congress

Article 30—The Mongolian Congress shall consist of thirty-one members elected by the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference.

Article 31—The functions and powers of the Mongolian Congress shall be as follows:

1. Exercise the legislative power of the Mongolian Autonomous Government.
2. Review each decision concerning the budget and allocation of revenues, including other policy decisions of the Mongolian Autonomous Government.
3. Approve the personnel nominated by the chairman: the Political Affairs members, heads of the bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee.
4. Demand that the chairman, the heads of the bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee deliver to the Congress their administrative reports and [and facilitate inquiry by the Congress] into the administrative acts conducted by them.

Article 32—The term of a Member of the Mongolian Congress shall be four years; members may be elected to subsequent terms indefinitely.

Article 33—The Members of the Mongolian Congress shall hold no other concurrent position in the government.

Article 34—The Mongolian Congress shall establish one Speaker and one Vice Speaker, elected by the Members of the Congress.

Article 35—The Mongolian Congress shall meet twice a year. The first session shall be from the beginning of March to the end of May. The second session shall be from the beginning of September to the end of November. No formal convening of the Congress shall be required, but in times of necessity, the chairman or more than half of the Members of Congress may demand that an interim session be held.

Article 36—During periods of recess, if urgent matters listed in Article 31 above arise, the Government may deal with them first, then subsequently ask the Congress to recognize these measures.

Article 37—For the Congress to convene, more than half of the members must be in attendance.

Article 38—The Mongolian Congress shall establish a Secretariat under the Secretary-General to administer its affairs under the orders of the Speaker.

Article 39—The regulations of the Secretariat of the Mongolian Congress shall be established separately.

Chapter V--The Judiciary

Article 40—The judiciary system shall be established separately.

Chapter VI--Local Political Systems

Article 41—For the local political institutions, the names and titles of leagues and banners shall continue to be used. Their organization shall be established separately according to democratic principles.

Chapter VII--Bylaws

Article 42—The laws specified in this document shall be reported to the central government [of China] for the record, after resolution to that effect be passed by the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference.

Jirgalang and I drafted the articles of this law. The introduction was drafted by Bayankhan and He Zhaolin. During the discussion, the wording and phrasing were polished by Wu Heling. As for the section dealing with the Mongolian Congress, I urged that its members be elected by the People's Delegate Congress. This I suggested because I had drafted the *Organization of the Mongolian Government* to submit to the Mongolian Association in Beiping to bring to the second Mongolian Congress held in Hohhot in 1937. At that time I recommended that the legislators of the Mongolian organization be elected by the congress. But by this time, I no longer insisted that these members be delegates to the Delegate Congress. As for Article 33, which holds that the members of Congress should not serve concurrently as officials in any other government position, this

was proposed by Jirgalang and supported by Damrinwangchug. This separation of administration and legislation was influenced by the Chinese institution of the Legislative Yuan, of which both Jirgalang and Damrinwangchug were members.

The second important item of the conference was the election. According to the agenda, members of the Mongolian Congress should have been elected first; then the chairman and vice chairman of the autonomous government should have been elected. The results were that Wu Heling, Chen Erdenibatu, Giljintei, Tserengdorji, and twenty-eight other people were elected as members of the Mongolian Congress. These people then elected Wu Heling as the speaker and Chen Nasanbatu as the vice speaker. Although Chen Nasanbatu was not a delegate of the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference, he was the *meren-janggi* (deputy administrator) of the Alashan banner. His election was based entirely on the principle of balancing personnel and establishing closer contacts with the local authorities.

The method of electing the chairman and the vice chairman had been discussed repeatedly when the conference was not in session. Most of the persons in attendance refused to approve of a nominee by acclamation. Instead, they wanted to use the secret ballot. As for the nominees, they unanimously agreed that Prince De should be the candidate for chairman, while Damzana should be the candidate for vice chairman. Prince De felt it would be inappropriate for him to be nominated as the only candidate. He wanted to have an opponent for the sake of form. So I was sent to ask Bai Rui to be the other candidate because he was the oldest member of the congress. Bai Rui agreed but demanded that he get some votes if he ran. I failed to get an opponent to run against Damzana. Finally, of the 175 votes, Prince De got 160. The other 15 votes went to Bai Rui. These fifteen votes included the votes of Prince De and myself. Damzana did not vote for himself, so he got 174 votes. This election was the high point of the conference.

The last item was the passing of the Declaration of Mongolian Autonomy. As mentioned, I did the original draft. He Zhaolin later added the words "because for so many years the nation has been continuously disturbed by war and rebellion, the central government has been occupied with military affairs day and night and has had no time to consider this matter." At the time of the discussion, however, no change was made; the text passed without hitch, as follows:

Mongolia is a land with its own people, political organizations, and strong nationalistic consciousness. Our ancestors once established the mightiest nation on earth, and they bequeathed to us a glorious and splendid history.

In recent years, most of the oppressed peoples of the world have thrown off their yokes and recovered their freedom; they have begun marching on the pathway toward self-determination and self-rule. Unfortunately, however, we Mongols continue to be influenced and disturbed by domestic troubles and external calamities. At times, the territory of our people has come under the iron hoofs of foreign enemies, and our people have been indiscriminately slaughtered by others. The lives and property of the people have been unreasonably and tyrannically destroyed. These hardships have given birth to the nationalistic consciousness of every Mongol and as well have led Mongols to feel that defense against enemies and struggle for existence can be achieved only through unification and self-rule.

Especially since the end of the Second World War, the world situation has become more troubled and unstable day by day. Internal worries and external calamities have also become worse with each passing day. The last turn by which existence or extinction of the Mongolian people will be determined has been reached. This leaves us with no other choice but to unite immediately and struggle for our national existence. The main current of the history of the twentieth century is that nationalities are demanding liberation while governments move toward democracy. The Mongolian problem is one instance of the world-

wide nationality problem. A reasonable solution to this problem, based on the principle of democracy, will strengthen the base of national and international peace and democracy.

On the thirteenth day of April, the delegates of the Mongolian leagues and banners held a conference in the banner of Alashan. Here they decided to establish the Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, paving the way to achievement of autonomy and establishment of permanent peace and democracy. The aims of this committee included working toward the following goals: creating a stable existence for the Mongolian people, finding a reasonable solution to the nationality problem inside the country, and concentrating the hearts and wills of the Mongolian people.

With these objectives in mind, the Mongolian People's Delegate Conference convened. The results of the careful and considered deliberations by the entire body of this conference are based on the common desire of the Mongolian people and on Mr. Sun Yat-sen's teaching that "the government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country, and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule." The Conference has implemented national autonomy by passing the Law of Mongolian Autonomy, establishing the Mongolian Autonomous Government, and designating all the original territory of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners as our autonomous domain. We support Mr. Demchugdongrob as government chairman and Mr. Damzana as vice chairman as they lead all our people in the struggle to realize our hopes and ideals.

From now on, the basic political principles of Autonomous Mongolia should be as follows: Politically, we shall surely guarantee the basic rights of our people, carry out true democracy, and regard all people inside the territory of Autonomous Mongolia as equal. We shall not discriminate against people or give them unequal treatment on the basis of differences of race, religious belief, sex, or class. Economically, we shall guarantee the people's property. We shall increase our impoverished compatriots' standard of living and strive for the equal development of the national economy. As for education and culture, we shall strive mightily for the dissemination of education and impart to our people the new world culture to help the development of our own indigenous culture. Militarily, we shall strengthen our national self-defense forces, protect our Mongolian people, both establishing local order and fighting against aggression.

We recall the past. The central government has said that it will make a commitment as soon as possible to weak minority peoples, especially toward establishing the Mongolian people's autonomy. [Here, He Zhaolin's words, as given above, were later added.] Now the entire country faces a very serious situation. In order to fulfil our obligations as citizens of our nation, we must relieve the central government of its worries and concerns about the North. Thus we hope that under the leadership of the central government, we can sincerely unify all of the nationalities of this country, establish close relations with the provinces near Mongolia, and work and struggle together to maintain democracy and freedom. As for the problems between the leagues and banners as well as the provinces and *xians*, these should be reasonably adjusted after the situation has settled down.

This particular Mongolian People's Delegate Conference represents the general will of all our people and decisively marks our embarkation on the new road toward autonomy, democracy, and freedom. At present, all Mongol people have stood up courageously for the existence and identity of our nation. We are carrying out this sacred obligation and are diligently pressing forward. We hope that compatriots throughout the nation will understand that Mongolian autonomy is not a separatist movement, but a centripetal movement that will give us all proper support. We especially hope that fair-minded people of the world will have sympathy for us and help us.

From the beginning of his political activities, Prince De had advocated that independence or self-rule needed final approval by and recognition from the legitimate government of China. This had always been his consistent policy. And in Dingyuanqing, he still emphasized this point. He hoped that the Chinese government would, before its collapse, satisfy the Mongolian desire to see Sun Yat-sen's teaching concerning minori-

ties implemented. At this point, if the Mongols were able to get such recognition, then no matter what kind of changes occurred in China, this approval of a high degree of autonomy would eventually work for the good of Mongolia. Therefore, Prince De cited with approval the provisional extraordinary motion made at the conference. He had the delegates agree to send copies of the Declaration of Autonomy and the Law of Mongolian Autonomy to Acting President Li Zongren and Yan Xishan, head of the Executive Yuan.

The conference ended formally on August 10. After the closing ceremony, the celebration of the founding of the Mongolian Autonomous Government took place. Chairman De and Vice-Chairman Damzana were inaugurated at the same time. In the evening, there was a banquet, along with Chinese drama and Mongolian plays and Mongolian music. The Mongolian plays emphasized the unbreakable unity of many arrows. However, this happy banquet turned out to be a last supper.

Everyone had the feeling that this time of good feelings would not last. During the conference, the war situation had become very bad. The important city of Xi'an fell to the Communists; Lanchow was set to fall any day; and Dong Qiwu, governor of Suiyuan, had already been persuaded by Fu Zuoyi and was preparing to surrender to the Communists. The Ma warlord family in Qinghai and Ningxia was unable to stop the Communists' progress. Obviously, the fate of this newly founded autonomous government was sealed. Moreover, at the banquet there were already some who were conspiring to sell out the new organization. All the persons in attendance were pessimistic about the future. Prince De's own feelings could be seen in his constant drowning of his sorrows in wine. Nevertheless, all were able to control their emotions and hid their worries by drinking wine and making merry.

Military Organization

While the conference was still in the preparatory stages, the anti-Communist Mongol forces in the Northeast led by Sukhbaatar arrived in the vicinity of the city of Dingyuaning. Those who welcomed Sukhbaatar's forces noticed that even though it was the end of summer, the soldiers were still wearing the winter uniforms they had donned the previous winter during their breakthrough from the Chinese Communist encirclement. Their felt boots were torn and tattered. The people's hearts ached at this sight, but there was no way to give them new equipment. Even in their deprived condition, their morale was still high. Sukhbaatar and his comrades accepted the welcome happily.

Among them was a Chinese leader named Sun Haiming, whose rank was second to Sukhbaatar's. As mentioned, the purpose of Wu Guting's arrival in Dingyuaning was to make new arrangements for this group of soldiers who were originally under his command. Wu brought a former battalion commander of the Mongolian army, Darijab, who was also a veteran of Babujab's "Mongol Bandit" army. Darijab was in contact with Sukhbaatar, who wanted to reorganize all the Mongol soldiers into one large unit.

After his arrival in Dingyuaning, Li Shouxin wished to make himself powerful again by persuading these military refugees to join his camp, taking them as his capital, and procuring supplies for them from Ma Honggui, governor of Ningxia. However, this anti-Communist group had never had any ties with Li, and they neglected him at first. Bai Haifeng also had intentions quite early on to claim these courageous fighters. However, they had no good feelings toward Bai. In Dingyuaning, Bai talked face to face with Sukhbaatar and his men. Bai told him that since he had official Chinese military designation, it was possible for him to formally reorganize Sukhbaatar's troops. But Sukhbaatar's

group rejected this. They desired to come under Prince De's leadership, but Prince De had no way to secure supplies for them.

After the meeting, Wu Guting felt that the situation was hopeless. So he left Dingyuaning and went to Taiwan. Sukhbaatar finally discovered that there was no other way to get supplies, and since they had rejected Bai Haifeng's offer, they had to have Li Shouxin intervene to gain them permission to join the warlords of the Ma clan. Ma Dunjing, the acting governor of Ningxia, accepted this group in order to increase his military power. A cavalry headquarters was set up near the border of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia. Li Shouxin was appointed commander and Buyandelger chief of staff. Duguren-sang, who had graduated from the Japanese Officer Candidate School, was appointed as deputy chief of staff.

These troops had their manpower supplemented and were organized into three divisions. But in reality, only the first division was a real division. Sukhbaatar was the division commander, Sun Haiming the vice commander, and the Chinese Zhao Dianchen was the chief of staff. Ma Dunjing immediately recognized these newly organized units as military forces of the Mongolian Autonomous Government, hoping that would win the hearts of Sukhbaatar and his group. Nevertheless, all these measures were carried out too late. By this time, there was no way to stop the westward Communist advance. Even among the Ma clan in Ningxia, Ma Hongbin, who had great influence in the army, had already initiated contacts that would lead to his surrender to the Chinese Communists.

Prince De's Contacts with the Mongolian People's Republic

Just before the opening of the conference, Luo Batumongke, the real power in Alashan, secretly transferred a letter written by Dugursureng, the eldest son of the prince, to his father. It came with the blessing of agents of the Mongolian People's Republic. Its transmission suggests that some powerful leaders in Alashan were in contact with the Mongolian People's Republic. While I was in Dingyuaning, I met a Hulunbuir man who was a teacher at the primary school there, who was said to be an underground agent, sent by the Mongolian People's Republic and protected by Luo Batumongke.

Prince De showed me this letter and the photographs it contained. I still remember its main points: "Our whole family is well. The attached photographs are sufficient to show that the authorities of the Mongolian People's Republic have treated us quite well. Only Father is not with us. We have been assured that if you will not carry out political activities, you may come here, and your safety will be guaranteed."

Prince De, seeing the letter and the photographs, was greatly comforted. On the other hand, he was worried about how to reply to this letter. He told me, "Perhaps this is my fate in the end. I am a Mongol; to go to Khalkha [Outer Mongolia] is at any rate better than going to other places." I suggested that it would be necessary to be flexible in his answer. At the same time, I also admonished him that when things were at their worst, he might try to flee abroad and wait for an opportunity to return again. He sighed and said, "In the good old days, the Mongolian people treated me as their *noyan*. Now the times have changed for the worse; how could I leave them now and go to a foreign country?" These words came from the bottom of his heart. They suggest that from this time on, he had already decided not to try to dodge his problems by escaping to a foreign country. At the same time, it seemed that he had some longing for Ulaanbaatar. He recognized that we all were conscious of our Mongol nationality. Surely the Outer Mongols would not feel ill toward a man who had struggled for the identity and freedom of the Mongols.

My Assignment and Departure from Alashan

Before leaving Taiwan, I had received a letter from George E. Taylor, professor of Asian Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, which notified me that his university wanted me to teach Mongolian literature. Taylor also said that a formal appointment would soon be sent. While I was in Guangzhou, I reported this offer to Prince De, who told me that I should go to Alashan first and then to the United States. So after my arrival in Dingyuaning, I accepted the commissions as drafter, delegate to the Mongolian People's Conference, and vice secretary-general of the conference, but not any permanent government position. My visit to the United States was supported by Prince De, Damzana and Bayankhan, and even Bai Haifeng had no objections.

Just before the closing session of the conference, Prince De said to me, "Since you are going to America, I would like to assign you a mission. I wish you to be the representative of this autonomous government and do what you can do for the Mongol people." I answered, "If I can go, I will accept your assignment; however, the formal appointment is still not in my hands, and I do not know when it will arrive." The prince answered, "If you can go, you will be our representative. However, this matter should not leak out. Do not tell of this mission to anybody." Prince De then summoned Giljintei to write a set of credentials, orders, and appointments from the chairman of the Mongolian government.

Lu Minghui⁷ claims that "[Jagchid] carried a blank official document with the seal of the Mongolian Autonomous Government on it." This is a baseless lie. As it turned out, the well-known Mongolist Nicholas Poppe who had defected from the Soviet Union, arrived in Seattle, and the University of Washington immediately appointed him as professor of Mongolian literature and put my appointment aside. Consequently, I was unable to go to the United States and fulfil the assignment given me by Prince De. I did go to the United States in 1967 and taught at Brigham Young University, but circumstances had by then radically changed. The Mongolian Autonomous Government had long since dissolved, and Prince De had died a year earlier. I still possess the document Prince De gave me, as a memento of my ties to Mongolia.

After the establishment of the autonomous government, acting in his capacity as chairman of the government, Prince De appointed Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, Li Shouxin, Rinchinsengge, He Zhaolin, Jirgalang (from the Jerim League), Jirgalang (from Hulunbuir), Damrinwangchug, and Oljeibuyan as government officials. Bayankhan was again appointed as the secretary-general of the Secretariat, He Zhaolin as the head of the Internal Affairs Bureau, Bai Haifeng as head of the Bureau of Industry, and Oljeibuyan as head of the Bureau of Finance. Soon after, the Peace Preservation Committee was established, with Damzana, the vice-chairman of the government, as head, and Li Shouxin and Bai Haifeng as deputies. Their task was to strengthen and reorganize the local military forces and arrange for support of Sukhbaatar and his troops. Chen Yingquan, a Tumed Mongol and former deputy commander of Bai Haifeng's division, became chief of staff.

On August 12, 1949, Wu Heling, Jirgalang (from Hulunbuir), and I left Dingyuaning and went to Taiwan via Lanzhou and Guangzhou. Before we left, we had a farewell visit with Prince De, who saw us off outside the gates of his residence. He grasped our hands in his and seemed reluctant to let go. His countenance communicated impending personal loss. This was the last time I ever saw Prince De. This scene has

⁷ Lu Ming-hui, *Menggu "Zizhi yundong" shimo* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju: 1980), p. 392.

made an indelible impression on my soul. I shall never forget it.

The Last Negotiation with the KMT Government

Just before our departure, Prince De instructed us to cooperate with Jagunnasutu. He wanted us to urge the Chinese government to hasten its formal recognition of the Mongolian Autonomous Government and have them deliver military supplies to our troops. On our arrival in Ningxia city, the representative sent from the Communists to negotiate with Ma Hongbin lodged with us in the same hostel. We arrived in Lanzhou the night before the retreat of the Office of the Northwest Military and Civilian Administration Superintendent. The fall of Lanzhou was at hand, and the momentum was irreversible. After our arrival in Guangzhou, we immediately went to see Guan Jiyu, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, and submitted a document of instructions, with our signatures, from Prince De. This document contained a report concerning the conference, a demand for recognition of Mongolian autonomy, an outline of its government organization, and a request for military assistance.

When Yan Xishan had been head of the Executive Yuan, he was strongly prejudiced against the Mongols. A document like ours, which pointed out all the mistaken policies of the Chinese government, never received a response. The duties which Prince De left to Jagunnasutu also were never carried out. Everything dragged to a halt. The situation in the Northwest was becoming grimmer by the hour. Dong Qiwu (deputy superintendent of the Northwest Military and Civilian Administration, and governor of Suiyuan), and Sun Lanfeng (the commander of the army) were persuaded by their old superior, Fu Zuoyi, to surrender to the Communists. In Ningxia, Ma Hongbin's stance became very clear. In order to try to stop Dong, Sun, Ma, and others from surrendering to the enemy, Yan Xishan sent his old follower, Xu Yongchang, to Ningxia. Upon receiving this report, Prince De, Damzama, Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, and He Zhaolin also left for Ningxia to meet with Xu. Prince De's goal was to persuade Xu to forward their hopes to the Chinese government, to advise the authorities to authorize the establishment of the Mongolian Autonomous Government, and to provide financial and military assistance. But Xu's response was to stop them. He insisted that at such a time, it was not right to attempt to gain autonomy—especially higher-degree autonomy—and with that the talks broke off.

The Split among the Mongols in Alashan

While the Chinese Communists continued their westward expansion and Alashan came under ever more pressure, the Mongols there became divided over what to do. They were unable to reach a consensus about how to achieve a breakthrough. In order to urge the Chinese government to recognize the establishment of the Autonomous Government and to assist Jagunnasutu, Prince De dispatched Oljeibuyan as a representative to Guangzhou. Prince De and Damzana sent an urgent telegram to Guan Jiyu, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, demanding that he transfer by airplane the guns given earlier to Prince De. Guan, convinced by the tense situation, petitioned Yan Xishan to give 140,000 silver dollars to meet immediate needs. But it was too late; neither the money nor the guns were delivered.

Just before these occurrences, Damzana had sent his third younger brother, Damrinwangchug, to Guangzhou to try to maintain contact with the KMT. Damrinwang-

chug arrived in Guangzhou and met with me, but the news he brought to Guangzhou was not very encouraging. At this time, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin were helping Damzana split from Prince De's leadership. They were making secret contact with the Chinese Communists. Relations between Prince De and Damzana worsened. Thereafter, these two leaders made no effort to see each other. If there was a need to negotiate, Jirgalang (from the Jerim League) would act as go-between. Damzana had even demanded that Prince De pay for the expenditures incurred by the Alashan banner in providing relief for those who had fled to Alashan from other banners. Originally, Damzana treated these people in a friendly manner, but because they all supported Prince De's ideas, he now chose to adopt this policy of rejecting them. Since Prince De was also not willing to owe a personal favor to the Alashan Banner, he had the deputy pay with the money he had brought from Guangzhou. Prince De, seeing that he was becoming *persona non grata*, chose to leave Alashan.

On August 27, the Communists took Lanzhou. To deal with this new development, Prince De opened discussions with Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and Bayankhan. Prince De felt that however bad the situation, establishment of the Mongolian Autonomous Government must be pushed. It might be best for the new government to move away from the city of Dingyuaning to the steppes or desert of Alashan. If this succeeded, they could then proceed to Tibet via Kokonor (Qinghai). If Tibet could not offer protection, they would then flee to India as a Mongolian government in exile, and wait for a change in the world situation. Bai Haifeng argued that no matter where they went, the results would be the same—bad; there was no need to make plans for moving elsewhere. Rather, he wanted to change the Mongolian Autonomous Government into the *Western* Mongolian Autonomous Government, thereby showing that the political regime established in Dingyuaning need have no conflict with Ulanfu's Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government in Ulanhot (Wangin sume). Damzana, He Zhaolin, and Bayankhan all agreed with Bai's proposal. Although Prince De insisted on his concept, he could not change the opinion of Bai Haifeng's group.

As mentioned earlier, before Wu Heling's arrival in Dingyuaning, there was a plan to move into the desert and then proceed to Tibet and India via Qinghai. But He Zhaolin and Bai Haifeng had already decided to surrender to the Communists. Wu's objection helped Damzana agree to abandon the plan to move. Prince De's failure to obtain the trucks and supplies from the retreating UNRRA was, of course, one of the main reasons why Damzana became discouraged. Since it would be difficult to create a new government under such unfavorable circumstances, Damzana felt it would be better to seek a way to protect himself and his camp. This eventually caused him to break away from Prince De.

I myself had left Dingyuaning in the middle of August. After my departure, Prince De's subsequent activities were reported to me by Damrinwangchug. For matters not told me by Damrinwangchug, I depend on He Zhaolin's *Outline of the Beginning and End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy Movement*, and on the *Personal Narrative of Demchugdongrob Demuchukedonglupu Zishu*.⁸ Prince De's *Personal Narrative* came orally from Prince De and Tobshin (Tao Buxin), who originally used the names Togtokhu and Tao Libin. I do not know the conditions under which this second book was produced. The tone of Prince De's language seems authentic in places. However, quite a few changes must have been made by Tobshin or other editors, because in other places, the

⁸ Tao Buxin, ed., *Demuchukedonglupu zishu* Inner Mongolian Historical Materials, No. 13 (Hohhot: Inner Mongolian University, 1984).

language is clearly *not* the language of Prince De. I do not blame my old friend Togtokhu for writing with a crooked pen. Rather I sympathize with him because he had to protect himself by distorting parts of the book to satisfy the Communist censors. Since I criticized He Zhaolin earlier in this volume (p. 406), there is no need to criticize him again here. However, no matter how crooked his pen, he was never able to destroy Prince De's reputation among those who knew him.

He Zhaolin's account says that to persuade Damzana to move toward Qinghai and Tibet, Prince De said, "The Communists originally did not have a single soldier or an inch of territory. Yet they were still able to rise to power. We now have many people and much land; can we not accomplish something? Let us not wait for failure. Let us struggle to the end. We will surely eventually succeed." No matter what Prince De had said, it was impossible to alter the proposals of the group headed by Bai Haifeng. On September 19, Dong Biwu, governor of Suiyuan Province, surrendered to the Chinese Communists. Prince De went to see Damzana and said, "Since you have decided not to move, I have decided to move. In the future, perhaps you may help me, or perhaps I will help *you*." Damzana expressed no desire to detain Prince De.

Prince De's Activities after His Exile from Alashan

At first light on September 20, Prince De, took up the seal and the outside name plate of the Mongolian Autonomous Government, and accompanied by his faithful entourage, left Dingyuanying. He headed toward the northwest part of the Alashan steppe. According to He Zhaolin's account, Prince De was accompanied by only a few attendants, and his departure was known to few. In my judgment, this would have been impossible. First of all, before his departure, Prince De made a farewell visit to Damzana. Second, the gate of Dingyuanying city closed at sunset and opened at sunrise. With no special order issued, the gate would not yet have been open at first light. Third, the large name plate of the Mongolian Autonomous Government could not have been carried out secretly by only two or three men. According to Prince De's *Personal Narrative*, his secretary (Tserengdorji) and *aide-de-camp* (Tumendelger) accompanied him.

Soon after Prince De's departure from Dingyuanying, everyone realized that Ningxia would soon fall. Li Shouxin, now isolated by the impending surrender of the Ma warlord family of Ningxia, led the anti-Communist troops of the Mongolian Autonomous Government from Shizuishan through Dengkou (Sanshenggong) to Tukhum-yin sume. There they met with Prince De, who had temporarily stopped there. Prince De, Li Shouxin, Giljintei, Sukhbaatar, Buyandelger, and others discussed matters and decided that instead of remaining passive, they would follow an active policy. They would use the title "Mongolian Autonomous Government," change the chronology dates to the years since Chinggis Khan's enthronement, name their armed force the Mongol Army, and establish a fixed headquarters for it. Prince De became commander in chief; Li Shouxin was made deputy commander; Buyandelger, the chief of staff; Dugurengsang, the deputy chief of staff; Sukhbaatar, the commander of the First Division, Sun Haiming, the deputy commander of the First Division; Zhao Tiancheng, the chief of staff of the First Division; Giljintei, the commander of the Second Division, with Tarba as his deputy commander; and Rashinamjil as chief of staff of the Second Division.

After these divisions were organized, Prince De and a contingent of his troops moved slowly westward. By the middle of November, they reached Guisin-gol (Guai-zihu), near the border of the Ejine Banner to the west and Outer Mongolia to the north.

The Chinese Communist army held Jiuquan and Yumen, thereby controlling the corridor west of the Yellow River, and blocking the way for them to move into Qinghai.

On the political front, on October 2, the Soviet Government formally recognized the Chinese regime, under Mao Zedong's leadership and with Beijing as its capital, as the legitimate government of China. On the sixth of the same month, the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China established official diplomatic relations with each other. However, I cannot judge whether or when word of this political change reached Prince De or was analyzed by his group.

Once Prince De had departed from Dingyuaning, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin finally persuaded Damzana and Bayankhan to change the name of the "Mongolian Autonomous Government" to "Western Mongolian Autonomous Government." According to He's account, they "planned to minimize their territory to reduce the potential for conflict with the autonomous organization in Ulan Khota (Wang-yin-sume), to lessen tensions among the Mongols in general, and to escape from accepting responsibility for the crime of rebelling against the people and the revolution. In reality, this scheme turned out to be nothing more than something that becomes 'more obvious the more you tried to cover it up.'" I believe He's words adopted this confessional tone to secure a pardon for himself from his readers, but his brand of despicable opportunism and selfishness is clearly evidenced here.

At this time I heard that Bayankhan's health had turned very bad and that his spirit had collapsed. He no longer desired to be involved in politics, but rather turned his fate over to others. This obliged Damzana to send a telegram to Beijing before the formal surrender of Ningxia, proposing an "insurrectionary surrender." Even so, he still feared the two battalions the Ma Family had sent from Ningxia and were still stationed outside the city of Dingyuaning. Although the city surrendered to the Communists, Damzana's group dared not act openly. On the night of September 21, one day after Prince De's departure, the Ma troops revolted, plundered the outskirts of Dingyuaning and escaped untouched. Now Damzana's Dingyuaning force got ready to surrender openly by telegraphing Mao Zedong and the Political Consultative Committee.

After the Chinese Communists occupied Ningxia city, the Dingyuaning group sent Luo Ruiguang, the deputy commander of the Alashan Peace Preservation Troops, to Ningxia as a representative of the Western Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to welcome the People's Liberation Army. On October 5, Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and Bayankhan went to Ningxia to surrender themselves to Yang Dechi, the commander of the Communist Nineteenth Army, and Li Chimin, the political commissar. At the same time, they placed under arrest the two leading spies of the KMT military and party investigation bureau, Luo Dawei and Wang Junhui, whom they had honored and feared for years. They brought these two spies with them to Ningxia.

From the middle of October to January 1950, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin, representing the Western Inner Mongolian Government, visited Lanzhou, Beijing, and Hohhot. These two men met with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Ulanfu, the chairman of the Mongolian autonomous regime, and reported Prince De's departure as well as their own "upright" surrender. Ulanfu ordered Bai and He to return to the west as soon as possible and do their best there to win over Prince De and Li Shouxin. If those two would return from the wilderness, their past would be forgotten and they would be pardoned. Ulanfu gave them a personal letter for Prince De, in hopes of winning him over. However, by the time Bai and He returned to Dingyuaning, Prince De had already entered the Mongolian People's Republic.

Before Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin returned to Dingyuaning, Cao Yousan,

deputy commander of the Chinese Communist Government in Ningxia district, had already arrived in the city. On Cao's orders, Damzana wrote a letter to Prince De, asking him to come to the city of Ningxia personally and discuss possible arrangements for his troops. Upon receiving his invitation, Prince De dispatched Tobshin (Togtokhu) to first go to Dingyuaning and then to Ningxia. Even from so unfavorable a position, Prince De still insisted on his proposal ceding a high degree of autonomy to Inner Mongolia. In his letter to the Communist authorities, Prince De proposed that they "agree to accept the results of a plebiscite to determine if Inner and Outer Mongolia should be united." Upon Tobshin's departure, the Prince ordered him, "You go there and just discuss the matters in my letter. Do not talk about my personal future and thereby cause others to look down upon me. I do not want to lose face."

After Tobshin's arrival at the city of Ningxia, he met with Pan Zili, chairman of the Ningxia's People's Provincial Government, and submitted Prince De's letter to him. After reading the letter, Pan explained to Tobshin the nationality policy of the Chinese Communist Party, the history of the formation and the future of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Pan then asked him to convey these policies to Prince De and invite him to come personally and discuss them face to face. The demands made on both sides turned out to be irreconcilable.

Although Tobshin went back and forth between the two sides three times, no conclusive result was reached. Lu Minghui's interview with Tobshin records Prince De's heartfelt feelings: "Prince De still stubbornly insisted on his policy to demand autonomy and refused to accept liberation, stubbornly insisting to Tobshin, 'In this world now, I am still the man destined to take responsibility for national survival as his personal obligation. Where can another such man be found? Moreover, what is the difference between the policy of the Communists for regional minorities and the Kuomintang policy of local autonomy? At any rate, they are all Chinese. To the Mongols, they are all the same.'"⁹ These words truly express Prince De's deepest sentiments, suggesting that he had no confidence in the words of the Communist negotiators. Given his idealistic mentality and the lack of supplies for his followers, Prince De decided to turn to Outer Mongolia.

Prince De's Exile to the Mongolian People's Republic

He Zhaolin also writes that

Prince De was a Pan-Mongolist. He often expressed his admiration for the Mongolian People's Republic, saying that the Outer Mongols were concerned about the Inner Mongols and took careful notice of them. "If we asked for help in time of need, they would give us timely aid." Therefore, when he fell into dire straits, he naturally would think about this. Even though Outer Mongolia was a foreign country, it was still populated by Mongols. It would be easier to negotiate with. Right now, it would be best to ask for help from the Mongolian People's Republic rather than surrender to the Chinese Communists.

Moreover, Prince De received another letter from his eldest son, Dugursurung. His trustworthy nephew, Altanochir, also contacted the agents of the Mongolian People's Republic, who expressed their welcome. Of course, in this desperate moment, they tried to create a breakthrough in Ulaanbaatar. On December 29, Prince De, accompanied by his sec-

⁹ Lu Minghui, p. 406

retary Tserengdorji, *aide-de-camp* Tumendelger, and two other guides, entered Outer Mongolia from Alashan. After Prince De arrived in Outer Mongolia, he invited Li Shouxin, Sukhbaatar, and Ombagatur to join him inside the Mongolian People's Republic.

After Prince De left, Giljintei, Jirgalang, Serengnamjil, Darijab, Tarba, Togtokhu, Sun Haiming, and others gathered to discuss their future. They decided to have Tobshin and Sun Haiming represent them by contacting Cao Yousan, the deputy commander of the Chinese forces in Ningxia (then stationed in Dingyuanqing), to discuss a peaceful liberation. Upon Togtokhu's return, he brought Ulanfu's letter addressed to Prince De. Because the Prince had left, they read it to his followers. Its main points were as follows: (1) those who desired to return home would be allowed to do so and would be given travel expenses; (2) those who wished to remain residents could settle in Dingyuanqing; (3) those who wished to continue their studies would be recommended for study assignments in the Mongolian Autonomous Region; (4) those who desired to work would be assigned jobs; (5) those who desired to join the military service would be reorganized into peace preservation troops.

Under these conditions, more than 1,200 people put down their arms and surrendered in the early spring of 1950. Among them, more than 400 joined the Alashan Peace Preservation Troops. While more than 400 returned home, sixty or seventy were reassigned for study in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region; more than 100 were employed in the Alashan People's Banner Government; about 100 were settled in the banner of Alashan; and another 100 people, under the leadership of Sagarajab, a battalion commander, refused to surrender and moved westward. Later, after this group arrived in the area of Mazongshan, north of Ejine Banner, they were wiped out by the Communist troops. Another 200 or more soldiers, under their battalion commander Dagwaochir, tried to move eastward to Ulanab League. Cut off, they surrendered.¹⁰ Such was the tragic end of the autonomy movement led by Prince De in Alashan.

Earlier, Prince De's personal delegate, Jagunnasutu, who accompanied the Chinese government's retreat from Guangzhou to Chungking and then to Taipei, was unable to reach Prince De via radio telegraph. However, working with the Mongols exiled in Taiwan, he continued to petition the KMT government to recognize the establishment of the Mongolian autonomous regime in Alashan. Later, in the fall of 1950, because Jagunnasutu was still searching for Prince De, he left Taiwan and returned to the continent via Hong Kong. According to Lu Minghui, Jagunnasutu was immediately arrested. Oljeibuyan, another delegate sent by Prince De, saw Chungking fall to the Communists after his arrival in the city. However, Oljeibuyan was able to reach Taipei one year later by fleeing through Vietnam. So his mission ended in failure too.

When Prince De left Alashan, he began a lonely, gloomy, and dangerous life's journey. But Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and their group were able to get superior positions and treatment by the newly established Communist regime because of their association with the autonomous regime created and led by Prince De. Damzana became one of the deputy chairmen of the Mongolian Autonomous Region; Bai Haifeng became a member of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Government and a deputy president of the Nationality Academy in Lanzhou. He Zhaolin was appointed Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

Damzana was purged during the Cultural Revolution and died in a military camp

¹⁰ Lu Minghui, pp. 407-09

in Dengkou. Bai Haifeng also departed this world in the late 1950s; He Zhaolin was still alive when this manuscript was first being written (1983). It is said that Bayankhan died soon after the surrender. Because of Luo Batumongke's reputation and real power, he was appointed the head of his own banner, but died from a stroke soon after.

These pages of Inner Mongolian history might be analyzed differently by people of different political persuasions. Nevertheless, the historical facts of Prince De's activities and the struggle for Inner Mongolian autonomy in Dingyuanying will never change. The immutable facts are available for honest men to examine.