

Part I

THE NATIONAL SURVEY

Chapter 2

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND DESCRIPTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF KOREAN PEASANTS

Some Technical Points

It is unfortunate that the history of the world's cultures is written in terms of the Great Society, with hardly an indication in some of the cultural and historical chronicles of what was occurring in the Little Society. The meager descriptive apparatus of the older histories, insofar as they touched on the countryside at all, consisted mainly of such terms as "famine," "flood," and "rebellion," or in times of relative plenty, of indifference. The Introduction provided some historical context to the condition of the Korean peasants who were never in authority, were forever dominated by others (and in the rare event one of their own rose to the pinnacle of power, he no longer remained a peasant), and had almost always been in a state of subjugation.¹ In modern and transitional societies, these conditions have not much improved and, compared to his urban counterpart, the peasant seemingly occupies a sort of backwater of cultural lag. Karl Marx was neither the first nor the last to point out the reasons for the peasants' seeming lack of impact on the culture of the Great Society, but he did put it into a strikingly concise formulation:

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. . . . Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name.² The peasant, then, constitutes a group that Dahrendorf calls a quasi-class,³ a large group of persons in a common situation who have not yet arrived at a form

of organization that can break down the communications barriers that still exist in the countryside, in spite of modern communication systems and the emphasis, in such countries as Korea, on roads. Peasant interests generally remain latent interests because organization that would raise them to the level of manifest interests is difficult to form.⁴ This is a social and historical condition that makes the peasant the underdog *par excellence*. Throughout the history of all traditional societies it has been the peasant who has provided the resources necessary for the political and social system. So vital to the continuing existence of society and yet so removed from the accoutrements of the Great Culture, the peasant, when the light of literature or poetry occasionally illuminates his life for us, is often treated as a member of another race, scarcely human, scarcely to be distinguished from the oxen which he might be fortunate enough to own to plow his fields. While the percentage of peasants initially possessing above-average intelligence must have been as great as that of any other social group, lack of schooling, constant manual labor, and the process of social conditioning certainly have made this appear otherwise.⁵ On rare occasions only, such as in the Chinese classic *Shui-hu chuan* (Water Margin) and the unique English poem by John Lackland, *Piers Plowman*, does the peasant appear in a more favorable context.

This study attempts to cast some light upon the contemporary status, conditions, and attitudes of the Korean peasant, mainly by describing peasant values and attitudes obtained from a national sample of responses to a questionnaire. Since this study deals with a single period it lacks a certain dynamism that would have resulted from several studies over a larger period of time. The nation is in a state of rapid change. Traditional culture and economy are being very quickly replaced and more and more evidences of a modern industrial society are dotting the countryside as well as the cities, making Korea a transitional rather than a traditional society. This process is not a phenomenon since World War II but dates back to the period of Japanese colonialism, particularly in the North. Abutting the fields of ageless villages, many with traditional thatched roofs, may be large, technologically modern factories. Most of the factories are at the fringes of urban conglomerations, but others rise like islands from the midst of an enveloping sea of rice paddies.

In addition to this descriptive purpose, however, analysis will be devoted to the problem of hypothesis testing. The status of this hypothesis testing must be clearly understood. The analysis covers only one "slice of time" because there is little or no comparable information from the past, and many parameters that affect rural attitudes must therefore be considered as constant. This means that a hypothesis, such as that persons with a predisposition to change as evidenced by certain attitudes also exhibit innovative behavior as indicated by the planting of new rice strains, may or may not be supported. If the hypothesis *is* supported, a clue to innovative behavior is provided; if it is not supported, however, it would be incorrect to conclude that attitudes do not contribute to modernizing behavior. While the conclusion is warranted that such attitudes apparently do not contribute to modernizing behavior *at present*, it may also be that they do not make a contribution because of social institutions over which the peasant has no control. Later studies might in fact show that the hypothesis has been supported, provided that the peasant could anticipate an improvement in his standard of living as a result of his modernizing behavior. There is ample support for the sensitivity of peasants to economic conditions.⁶ Since urban society and government control many of these economic factors, we can at best

test hypotheses against that economist's backdrop of "all other things being equal." It would be well to reconsider John Dewey's statement, quoted in the Introduction, to remind ourselves that human attitudes, although ultimately the attitudes of individuals, are nonetheless the products of the society in which they arise. Under different circumstances, different conjunctions of attitudes may well arise. There is certainly more than a grain of truth in the viewpoint of some economists that it is the anticipated rewards that motivate the peasantry much more than it is the individual attitudes of the peasant, whatever these may be.⁷ While it would be well not to exaggerate this proposition, it must always be borne in mind when faced with some of the negative findings that occur not infrequently in connection with the seemingly most obvious hypotheses. To some degree it will be possible to draw some comparative material from societies either somewhat farther ahead than Korea on the road to economic development or from those somewhat farther behind. But there are imposing problems here, too, for the variables that relate to one culture may not be the important variables relating to the Korean condition, and the questionnaire used in this study has not been applied, with the exception of some portions of it, to peasants in other societies. Thus in the hypothesis-testing portions of the analysis there is also an element of the strictly descriptive.

This leads to another methodological question concerning the choice of a questionnaire survey technique as against several other methods, some of them quite different. In some countries the use of a questionnaire consisting of closed responses would not be advisable because illiteracy would have precluded the administration of such an instrument without numerous interviewers. In Korea, on the other hand, the literacy rate is high, and only among older persons, especially women, is illiteracy a problem. About 95 percent of the population of Korea is literate, and while that does not mean that everyone regarded as literate is capable of reading and comprehending the daily paper, it does make it possible to use questionnaires. These questionnaires were at about the same level of difficulty as the booklets written for peasants by the Ministry of Education. They were, moreover, administered under conditions in which problems could be discussed and explained.⁸ In other societies it would have undoubtedly been better to conduct personal interviews, using open-ended responses that could be recorded and coded later, but this technique has other inherent difficulties.

Another chief methodological alternative is that used by the anthropologists, and a number of fine contributions to the understanding of Korean peasants have been made by anthropologists such as Brandt⁹ and Osgood.¹⁰ Living in a village and conducting daily research into the detailed interactions and behavior of villagers is of unquestioned value, and I have great admiration for the scientific acumen and the diligence of those who conduct research in this fashion. There is little doubt that the findings of these investigations are of great value, but their major shortcoming is the risk involved in generalizing peasant behavior in one village to other villages or regions. For example, Brandt conducted his research in a Korean fishing village and, while rice was also grown by the villagers, there is a possibility that fishing villages might differ in some respects from predominantly rice-growing villages. Osgood's study may have been conducted in a village and at a time (shortly after World War II) in some ways unusual. Therefore the questionnaire technique, with its shortcomings such as the closed nature of the responses and the formal atmosphere engendered by the process of answering questions presented in a "document," is not an alternative but rather a supplement to the anthropological technique of village studies. Rather than

advocating a replacement of these valuable investigations, I would recommend that more of them be conducted, particularly in this crucial period of Korean history.

At this point the critical reader is likely to respond, "If there are so many weaknesses in the methodology of the study, why bother with it?" The reported substance of the results themselves will have to serve as the chief answer to this query, but it is advisable at all times to be aware of the shortcomings of our study and the methods it employs. To emphasize these is not to suggest that the study is thereby rendered nugatory, but to put the reader on his guard against placing undue faith in results reported quantitatively. All human observations are plagued by inaccuracies, as the good Bishop Berkeley proved through impeccable logic two centuries ago.

The choice of methodology is also constrained by problems of time and costs that are faced by all researchers. The opportunity for a national survey occurred while I was a lecturer at Yonsei University in Seoul. The Saemaul movement was in its first stages, and the price support for agricultural products had been rising for some years. In 1972 the President of the Republic of Korea proclaimed a new constitution (the Yushin Constitution) which had been in preparation for some time, and to preclude the possibility of protest demonstrations in the universities, these were closed through much of the remainder of the fall term. The so-called revitalization (*yushin*) program was combined with the Saemaul movement, and it was at this point that the opportunity to conduct a rather large-scale peasant survey came about.

The Ministry of Education had planned to use the schools, closed during the mid-year academic break in January, for the purpose of promulgating the Saemaul movement at rural winter schools throughout Korea, and this was the administrative apparatus that made possible the nationwide distribution of questionnaires. The questionnaires, some 2,000 of them, were distributed in a "random" way to these winter schools throughout Korea through the facilities of the Ministry of Education.¹¹ The section in this chapter on peasant attributes will make clear how widely representative the responses were. This method of distribution afforded the additional advantage that each school was in the charge of a leader whose level of literacy was as high as or higher than that of the peasants who attended these schools, who would be able to explain the requisite directions if the need arose or interpret a question that might be ambiguous to the respondents. The questionnaire, in the original English, and the instructions provided to the Saemaul winter-school leaders are included in Appendix A.

Although the respondents in this study are not a true random probability sample of Korean peasants, the winter schools seemed to offer a representative group, since the schools were aimed at the largest possible proportion of peasants and not at any select group, such as village chiefs. Some 2.5 million peasants attended these schools during the course of the winter making it possible for all heads of household to attend, presumably on a voluntary basis. Since a true random sample would have been prohibitively expensive to obtain, the best available alternative to the method of distribution used here would probably have been a cluster sampling of *myöns*, villages within *myöns*, and random individuals within the selected villages, an alternative that would also have required substantially more resources than were available.

While I am convinced that a true random sample would not differ in important

ways from the respondents reported here, there is no way to support this conviction in terms of probability. Therefore, the statistics, used to assess the significance, or lack of it, of the findings reported in their applicability to a population, are not in a technical sense appropriate.¹² Given the problems of cost, time, and situation, the most appropriate research method seemed to be the questionnaire method selected, and the most appropriate means of distribution appeared to be the opportunity offered by the administrative apparatus established by the Ministry of Education. One thousand four hundred thirty completed questionnaires were obtained from winter schools throughout Korea. There is some reason to believe the respondents are fairly comparable to a random sample of peasants from the population. In terms of amount of land owned, religion, and several other attributes, these 1,430 respondents seem comparable to national averages. For this reason, statistics sometimes have been used as though the respondents represented a true random sample of the population, and these statistics will be interpreted with caution. They should be regarded as illustrative. It may be generally assumed that where relationships exist between attributes, that these relationships may also exist, with a degree of error, in the population of Korean peasants as a whole.

The construction of the questionnaire posed many problems. Surveys have indeed been conducted along the same lines in other countries, but nothing comparable to the questionnaire devised for this study has been developed for use in rural Korea. There was therefore the problem of selecting apt questions for inclusion in the study and the very difficult task of translating these, since most of them had been devised for use in other cultures. In a few cases, questions had to be omitted when a smooth Korean translation could not be devised.¹³ Among the innumerable decisions made in the translation was the appropriate form of "I." We opted for the Korean *na*, indicating social equality between speaker and hearer.¹⁴ Since there were many sources for the questions finally selected for inclusion, citation to these will be made in the course of the discussion of the hypotheses. A questionnaire is, of course, an instrument containing a large number of questions, selected on the basis of their contribution to hypotheses. A single question will occasionally be designated to stand for a concept of importance in testing these hypotheses, but more often and more adequately several questions will be selected to assess the pertinent concepts. The concepts involved in the hypotheses presented will therefore be discussed in terms of the clusters of questions that were selected to represent them.¹⁵

Concepts

Table 2.1 presents the concepts that were to be represented by the items on the questionnaire. The complete questions are presented in Appendix A. Some comments should be made, however, on some of the questions and their related concepts. The question on religion drew the greatest number of "no responses," which probably reflects the complex nature of religion in Korea rather than a real reluctance to respond. The query on the president of Korea, in the concept "political knowledge," ought to have been replaced with another national figure, for although villagers may have been out of contact with events in the capital in earlier years of the century, almost no peasant was so parochial as to be unable to recall the name of President Park Chung Hee.

There are two questions concerning health which called for a personal assessment. It would have been desirable to verify these subjective assessments with an actual physical examination that would have also benefited the peasants.

Table 2.1
A Conceptual Key to the Questions in the National
Korean Peasant Survey Questionnaire

A. Demographic Background Questions		F. Concern with Farm Problems	
SEX	(I-1)*	DISCUSS	(I-28)
SIZERES	(I-2)	MEETING	(I-29)
AGE	(I-3)	CONCERN	(I-34)
EDUCATE	(I-4)	PROBDISC	(I-35)
MARITAL	(I-5)	G. Membership and Service in Organizations and Government	
CHILDGIRL	(I-6)	OFFICIAL	(I-22)
CHILDBOY	(I-6)	DECISION	(I-23)
CHILDTOT	(I-6)	FOURH	(I-31)
RELIGION	(I-7)	MEMBER	(I-32)
MILITARY	(I-9)	POSITION	(I-33)
DURRES	(I-10)	H. Health	
B. Economic Questions		ENERGY	(I-20)
WETLAND, DRYLAND	(I-14)	SICK	(I-21)
PARCELS	(I-17)	I. Influence	
DISPAR	(I-18)	INFLUNCE	(I-39)
OTHERINC	(I-19)	MOREINFL	(I-40)
HIRE	(III-1)	J. Questions concerning Saemaul	
ROOF	(III-7)	SAESCHL	(III-21)
OTHRWORK	(III-11)	LRNSAE	(III-22)
OX	(III-12)	SAEPSYC	(III-23)
DEBT	(III-14)	SAEENVR	(III-24)
DEBTINC	(III-15)	SAEPUBUT	(III-25)
C. Contact with Urban Environment		SAEFARM	(III-26)
TOWNLIVE	(I-11)	SAEMNGMT	(III-27)
DURTOWN	(I-12)	K. Attitude Toward Farming	
TWNVISIT	(I-13)	FARMDRDG	(II-1)
D. Contact with Communications Media		FARMSTNG	(II-2)
NEWSPAPR	(I-24)	WORRY	(II-8)
RADIO	(I-25)	STANDING	(II-9)
AGLISTEN	(I-26)	ENJOY	(II-15)
MOVIE	(I-27)	DEPRIVED	(II-16)
PAMPHLET	(I-30)	DISADVTG	(II-22)
NATIONAL	(I-41)	MOVECITY	(II-23)
INTNATON	(I-42)	LESSED	(II-29)
E. Political Knowledge		UNINTST	(II-26)
AMERPRES	(I-43)	BESTPLCE	(II-43)
PREMJAP	(I-44)		
PRESKOR	(I-45)		

*The Roman numeral shows the section of the questionnaire, the Arabic numeral the number of the item in that section.

Table 2.1--Continued

MEETPEOP	(II-49)	P. Cooperativeness	
FARMRING	(II-55)	CONCERN	(I-34)
AGSCHOOL	(III-8)	PROBDISC	(I-35)
L. Propensity to Change		IMPROVE	(I-36)
RELLYWOR	(II-3)	DONATE	(I-37)
CHANGE	(II-10)	PASTDNTE	(I-38)
LERNWORK	(II-33)	SHUNCOOP	(II-7)
CONTENT	(II-39)	PROMOTE	(II-40)
BRTHCONT	(II-35)	WHOLECOM	(II-54)
PLANS	(II-46)	MINDBUS	(II-60)
M. Trust		PUTOWN	(II-64)
FRNDADVT	(II-4)	CARES	(II-12)
VILADVN	(II-20)	Q. Personal Morale	
HONEST	(II-51)	PROUD	(II-11)
INGRAT	(II-57)	FAILURE	(II-25)
TRUSTKNO	(II-61)	RESPECT	(II-32)
PUTOWN	(II-64)*	EXPRESS	(II-40)
N. Personal Efficacy		GOODLUCK	(II-58)
LUCK	(II-5)	HELPLESS	(II-17)
HELPLESS	(II-17)	ABLE	(II-18)
ABLE	(II-18)	FINDFRND	(II-62)
ADVANCE	(II-19)	R. Isolation, or Alienation	
CANTINFL	(II-24)	CARES	(II-12)
INFGOV	(II-31)	MOVECITY	(II-23)
CITYCOLD	(II-37)	CITYCOLD	(II-37)
PROTECT	(II-38)	EXPRESS	(II-40)
EXPRESS	(II-40)	PROMOTE	(II-48)
DONTCARE	(II-45)	MINDBUS	(II-60)
PLANS	(II-46)	S. Authoritarianism	
EDENJOY	(II-47)	DISAGREE	(II-14)
COMPLEX	(II-52)	WIFEOBEY	(II-21)
O. Village Morale		RESPAUTH	(II-28)
VILPEACE	(II-6)	LEADRARE	(II-44)
POLITE	(II-13)	LEADFIND	(II-50)
VILADVN	(II-20)	LEADSHAR	(II-65)
MOVECITY	(II-23)	TOOEDUC	(II-53)
VILCOOP	(II-27)	FAMCNTRL	(II-66)
KNOWALL	(II-30)	T. Future Orientation	
ATHOME	(II-34)	EXPECT	(II-26)
VILCRIT	(II-41)	FAILURE	(II-25)
LACKLEAD	(II-59)	LUCK	(II-5)
VILLOOK	(II-63)	HELPLESS	(II-17)
		PLANS	(II-46)

*A printing error omitted response categories for this item, which was dropped from the analysis.

Table 2.1--Continued

U. Familism/Traditionalism		W. Dependent Variables, Innovations and Output	
BRTHCONT	(II-35)	YIELD	(I-16)
FAMILY	(II-42)	YIELDINC	(III-10)
DISAGREE	(II-14)	WEED	(III-2)
WIFEOBEY	(II-21)	INSCTCID	(III-3)
RESPAUTH	(II-28)	UREA, PHOSPHT,	
MUDANG	(III-9)	and CALCCYN	(III-4)
LASTNAME	(III-18)	COMCROP	(III-5)
V. Attitude toward Government		THRESHER	(III-6)
DONTCARE	(II-45)	FLOW	(III-13)
INFGOV	(II-31)	TONGIL	(III-16)
PROTECT	(II-28)	TONGILYR	(III-17)
CANTINF	(II-24)		
COMPLEX	(II-52)		

Korea, like most rural communities of the world, is beset by many parasitical infections, some of which cannot but affect the attitudes and outlook of peasants. For instance, liver and lung flukes infest most of the rivers and streams of Korea, and some 60 percent of the school children in the area of one reservoir were found in 1973 to be infected. In the past it had been shown that infestation with hookworm, as in the American South, was responsible for the "lack of ambition" among many peasants, and it is surprising that little attention has been paid to this causal relationship.¹⁶

Among the questions under the concept of familism or traditionalism is one asking if the respondent calls upon a *mudang* when there is illness in the family. It might be objected that this question is paternalistic, and there was some discussion as to whether to include it. While there was no intention to ridicule practices such as the *mudang kut*, a shamanistic ritual to drive out sickness, some respondents might have been hesitant to answer this question frankly. I might add here parenthetically that the *mudang kut* is conceivably superior to a few Western medical practices I have come into contact with. As usually happens in a survey, it became evident after the survey was complete that another response choice on medical advice would have been more appropriate, since many peasants treat themselves by applying to the town pharmacist.¹⁷

Part II of the questionnaire consisted of sixty-six attitudinal questions, with responses based on three distinctions: agree, uncertain, and disagree. Experience in other cultural levels suggested that these distinctions were sufficient, and in the rural milieu to have extended the number of categories to the seven of the typical Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, and so forth) would have been of doubtful utility.¹⁸ Table 2.1 shows that the concepts tapped by these attitudinal questions included attitude toward farming, propensity to change, trust, personal efficacy, village morale, cooperativeness, personal morale,¹⁹ isolation (or alienation), authoritarianism, future orientation, familism (or traditionalism), and attitude toward government. Some overlap will be noted, with a single question appearing under two or more concepts. It would be expected that personal morale must have some affinity to the concept of alienation, and traditionalism certainly implies something about the propensity to change. This, however, is no disadvantage given the multivariate approach

adopted for the analysis of the questionnaire, namely, factor analysis, through which innumerable variables can enter a single analysis. It would certainly be much more disadvantageous to select single questions to stand for concepts because then there would be no way to check an item's validity by comparing its relationships with other cognate items. In survey research there is a tension between the length and the comprehensiveness of a questionnaire. On the one hand, the questionnaire should be short enough so that respondents do not find the instrument a tiring experience;²⁰ on the other hand, it should be comprehensive enough to allow the researcher an optimum number of attributes in adequate depth. Our questionnaire was an effort to balance these somewhat incompatible aims.

While attitudes could be designated, according to hypotheses to be presented shortly, as either dependent or independent variables (as "cause" or "effect") in the problem of agricultural innovation and modernity, most of them were considered independent variables, predicting to innovative behavior of various kinds, as will be explained in more detail. The two most important dependent variables in this study were those indicating the peasants' reports on yield and increase in yield. Other kinds of personal farming innovations were also listed under this heading (see Table 2.1, W) as were those showing a concern with village improvements and the desire to cooperate (see Table 2.1, P).

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that formed the basis for the questionnaire and the concepts it contained were drawn from a vast literature, and some concepts with their associated hypotheses replicated research that had been conducted in rural areas in other parts of the world. Much has already been written on modernization or innovation, and some of it reports on surveys such as this one. Many of these other surveys, however, have been carried out in areas where the socioeconomic conditions are not so far along the path to industrialization as those in Korea where only half, or slightly less, of the economically employed population is engaged in agriculture. Korea is in a unique stage of transition, and it is debatable whether this might have the effect of increasing the number of "innovative" responses and peasant morale or the opposite effect of demoralizing the peasants who sense that the stream of change is leaving them far behind and making them a residue of tradition, as it were, ultimately dispensable for the future of their country. Some of the concepts, particularly that pertaining to attitudes toward farming, have not been widely used in research of this nature. In the following pages the major hypotheses and some of the support for these will be set forth.

There are two main types of dependent variables of interest in this research. One set quite obviously consists of innovative farming techniques. Questions of this type include those in Table 2.1, W, Innovation. In a sense, the questions about yield and increase in yield are the most interesting, because while the others are indicative of innovative behavior, the ultimate test of the effectiveness of innovation must lie in the yields obtained by the peasants. Thus it does not follow that adoption of various innovations necessarily leads to an increase in crop yields, although this presumably is the goal of innovation. It is the yield and the increase of that yield (in terms of the peasants' perceived profits) which provide the necessary social reinforcement for innovative behavior. The chain of events would be the causal attributes and attitudes that lead

peasants to adopt innovations, the innovations leading to an increase in output, and the rewards of an increased output that reinforce the causal attitudes and attributes. The last link in this chain is the "feedback" of the systems analyst. It is easy to see that the weak link in this chain has been the social reinforcement of innovative behavior. Through the manipulation of prices, governments have often insured that the rewards for innovative behavior will be meager, therefore making it irrational for peasants to innovate.

A second set of dependent variables is concerned with the peasants' willingness to participate in village improvement projects, one of the major aspects of the Saemaul movement intended to improve the quality of village life. The questions intended to assess actual cooperativeness among peasants are those from Part I of the questionnaire, listed in Table 2.1, P. While villages could possibly be developed and the quality of life improved through coercive measures, the literature of development amply attests to the failures of community development efforts that have not enlisted the voluntary support of villagers. Without such support a community movement can be adjudged a failure, for when coercion is removed, such projects generally fall into disrepair and the community development program ceases to have any import. While some tangible improvements probably resulted from the brief enthusiasm of the rural development programs of 1958 and the democratic interlude of 1961, these efforts ultimately failed because they never succeeded in providing continuity through enduring village cooperation. Thus the relationship of villagers' attributes and attitudes toward village cooperativeness will be assessed in some of the proposed hypotheses.²¹

It will be seen that we use Rogers' definition of innovativeness. In order to be considered an innovator, a peasant need not invent or be the first in his village to introduce a practice but only that he had adopted a practice regarded as progressive. Modernization is both the sum of the innovative practices and techniques adopted by the peasant as well as his progressive attitudes. Modernization in outlook is associated with attitudes commonly accepted as progressive by urban industrial societies; the acceptance of birth control might be an example. While it should be stressed that we have no intention of valuing the modern outlook over the traditional one, the hypotheses generally suggest that modernization and innovation may lead to higher outputs and more positive outlooks overall. This result may or may not be supported. Like Rogers, I regard modernization as a complex phenomenon, not as a single dimension and certainly not as a single variable, and the technique of factor analysis used in Chapters 3 and 5 is admirably well suited to the recognition of the complexity of these data. Of course there may be several possible social conditions in which traditionalism may be warranted as being rational and perceived by the peasants as rewarding.

Let us now spell out the hypotheses used in our study.

(1) Age is positively associated with personal innovativeness. Except insofar as the Saemaul movement has penetrated the countryside, age is not associated with village cooperativeness. Cooperativeness is a traditional rural pattern, but the young might be influenced by the Saemaul movement to emphasize this trait. One would expect age to be positively associated with propensity to change, negatively associated with traditionalism. One would generally expect age to be related to an increase in conservatism and a growing tendency to cling to traditions, a relationship that has frequently been found in voting studies. Rogers points out that in more modern villages, the leaders are often somewhat younger

than their followers, while in traditional villages they are usually older.²² Galtung goes so far as to state emphatically that no measure of modernization can be valid that does not correlate positively with age.²³ There is reason to be more reserved than this, however, because if it is accepted that peasants will rationally innovate provided they receive adequate rewards, then factors other than age may be more important in generating innovative behavior.

(2) Education is positively associated with personal innovativeness in behavior and attitudes. This seems to be the generally reported association in a number of studies, although for at least one chief reason this relationship in a rural context may be moot. As Galtung says, "it is not education as such, but what is taught that counts."²⁴ In Korea as well as in most presently developing societies, schools teach a curriculum that is divorced in every possible way from the problems of agriculture. While this phenomenon is widespread, it may be particularly marked in Korea where the Confucian tradition has for centuries geared education to the aim of attaining mandarinal status in the government bureaucracy. The contemporary peasant may still regard education in this light, and to determine this several attitudinal questions relate to the issue of whether education is desirable for peasants. Thus, while the hypothesis will be tested as stated, there is some reason to suspect that it may stand in no particular relationship, either positively or negatively to farm innovativeness, because the educational system is divorced from peasant interests and oriented to urban concerns. In all countries it is an urban elite that dominates the curriculum and the ends of the educational process. It is interesting to note that education seems to be a source of egress from farm life, according to statistics of educational attainment and employment, as shown in Table 2.2. Although peasants are to be found at all levels of educational attainment, most are to be found at the lowest levels.

(3) Protestantism and Catholicism are associated with personal innovativeness in behavior and attitudes, but there is no relationship between religion and cooperativeness. This hypothesis is based on the principle that a change in religion from those associated with Korean tradition, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, marks an individual with a propensity to change in other ways. Such an individual tends to be more receptive to changes in other role areas of his life. This is not to say that Buddhism is necessarily a conservative force, for Buddhists have been reinterpreting their role in social and political development since World War II and some have adopted modern and reform-oriented positions. Many precepts of Korean Won Buddhism, a reform movement of this century, stress "a life of reliance on self-ability" and "public interest."²⁵ But in a general sense, and in the special case of Korea, it is expected that a change to a Western religion may well imply a desire to change to a Western concept of progress. Among the Korean elite, at least since the end of the nineteenth century and even prior to that, the pronouncement that one had accepted the ideas of progress and science has sometimes been symbolized by adopting a Western religion. The motivations leading to contacts with missionaries, and the frustrations involved in these cultural contacts, are poignantly presented in Younghill Kang's autobiographical classic, *The Grass Roof*. By becoming a Christian, one seemed to renounce the stagnation of Korean society and the conservatism of its regime, and some individuals probably also hoped that the spread of new religions throughout Korea would bring a new spirit of reform. There is little doubt that the missionaries stimulated this belief and in some instances acted to introduce innovation. For example, the raising of potatoes, a new crop in Korea, had originally been introduced by Korean Christians, who in the face of persecution fled into the mountains

Table 2.2
Educational Attainment and Entry into Occupation
for the Year 1972

Level of Education	Professional and Technical Workers	Clerical Workers	Sales and Service Workers	Agriculture and Fishery Workers	Production Workers	Others
Primary school				101,247		9,346
Middle school		853	3,827	5,579	5,973	668
General high school	124	2,452	2,021	1,446	2,350	468
Vocational high school	3,084	11,048	4,447	3,964	12,842	1,010
Junior college	270	82	150	3	59	3
Junior technical or vocational college	646	285	56	383	751	
College and university	7,222	2,513	1,130	326	1,430	2,457
Graduate school	1,274	361	66	28	131	76

Figures are from the *Annual Survey of Education* (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Education, 1972), pp. 56-59.

where the potato rather than rice became their sustenance.²⁶ Missionaries were also influential in extending education to women and founded the first educational institutions for girls at the end of the nineteenth century.

(4) Military service is positively associated with personal innovativeness and cooperativeness. Among Korean social institutions, the military unquestionably harbors many of the attitudes associated with reform and innovation. General arguments have been advanced that military regimes may often be more oriented toward progress than civilian regimes, but there is some reason to believe that military regimes, whatever their original motivations might have been, are no more successful in accomplishing economic development than other regimes faced with the same problems. While there is no need to debate this controversial issue here, it is possible that service in the armed forces has expanded the Korean peasant's outlook beyond what it would have been had he remained in his village. The recruit, however unmechanized his home village might have been, is inevitably confronted with a technically impressive array of weapons and machines, and he learns at least something of their potentialities. His service also takes him to other parts of the peninsula, and with the expansion of his geographical horizons, his social and cultural horizons are probably widened too. This hypothesis assumes that cooperation needed to carry out military functions is transferred into civilian life, making it more likely that those who served in the military are also among those who participate willingly in village projects.

(5) Contact with urban environments is positively associated with personal innovativeness. It does not affect cooperativeness, or it may even decrease the propensity to cooperate. Like in the case of the military, although perhaps to a lesser degree, a relationship with a more urban life ought to inculcate attitudes and behaviors directed toward change and innovation. Rogers, citing several studies, uses "number of trips to an urban center" as his measure of cosmopolitanism.²⁷ There is also some evidence, although much of this is impressionistic, that it is the more progressive individuals who leave the farm for the city, hence causing a drain of leadership capabilities.

(6) The amount of land farmed is positively associated with innovativeness and yield per *majigi*. The number of parcels farmed is negatively related to yield and innovativeness. These hypotheses are argued from the position that the larger the farm, the more likely a peasant is able to introduce innovations and the more he attends to his business of farming. One of the problems encountered in the Korean countryside is that land is sometimes divided into several parcels, so that a peasant might have to spend a good deal of his day's labor in traveling from one plot to another. The traditional rationale for this land division is that it allows more villagers to farm some good land. A peasant might have several parcels of particularly fertile land and one or two that are less desirable.²⁹ While no one is completely satisfied, no peasant is entirely dissatisfied either. There is also a likelihood that while the maximum limit on riceland is not high, larger farms may indicate a wealthier peasant. Because, as Rogers argues, officials who advocate change tend to interact with wealthier clients, it may be the richer peasants who tend to adopt innovations most rapidly.³⁰ It should be understood, however, that unlike the rural situation in some other developing nations, the Korean countryside is relatively homogeneous. Extreme wealth and poverty are not as evident in the country as before the land reform.

(7) The status of a peasant's health is positively associated with innovativeness and cooperativeness. This hypothesis is self-evident; it is unlikely that one plans for change and the future in a condition of sickness or lack of physical energy.³¹

(8) Increasing contact with the media fosters innovativeness and cooperative behavior. This hypothesis has been researched on many occasions, and the result seems borne out that the more media contact, the more an individual becomes progressive. However, there are different forms of media contact. Rogers states that illiterates may listen mainly to music and entertainment while literate listeners are mostly interested in news and information.³² To check this aspect of the hypothesis, questions about interest in national and international affairs were added to the questionnaire. The frequency of listening to agricultural programs was also ascertained because the Saemaul movement, a matter of current interest in 1973, was then being propagated through the media. While the hypothesis is intended to be general, the questions also focused on contact with media having specific reference to agriculture; thus it was not how many movies an individual attended, but how many government movies or slide presentations on agriculture the peasant viewed.

(9) Memberships, meetings, and official positions tend to make individuals progressive, innovative, and more cooperative. Of particular interest here were the 4-H clubs which were very popular in the Korean countryside after their introduction in the 1950s. Chung mentions 18,874 clubs throughout Korea by the end of 1962, with a sizable membership of 548,695.³³

(10) Influence and the desire for more influence makes an individual more likely to participate in village cooperation and be more innovative. These attributes would seem to relate to self-esteem and leadership, or a desire for more leading roles.

(11) Positive attitudes toward farming are positively associated with a desire for village cooperation and personal innovativeness. This is posited as a crucial independent concept, for if persons have education, interest in the media, and good land but lack the motivation for channeling their personal energies into farming as their occupation, they possess little motivation for innovation. In a certain sense, the attitude toward farming represents occupational morale, and if this is lacking, progressive innovations can hardly be anticipated.³⁴ It is also possible that given certain other attributes, such as education and ample land, attitudes toward farming may be a critical intervening factor predicting to the dependent concepts of farm yields. Peasant attitudes toward farming have not often been explicitly researched as a factor in modernization. The questions that were used to elicit these attitudes were derived from a scale developed by A. M. Myster.³⁵ This scale was intended to measure attitudes toward farming both as a vocation and as a way of life, but the two separate aspects of the scale proved to be highly intercorrelated. On the whole, the full scale from which some of these questions were drawn has acceptable reliability and evidence of validity. The results of the analysis corroborated Myster's results; among all the scales and attitude sets used in the research, the attitude-toward-farming questions were the most reliable, clustering on a single dimension or factor. Another question was asked regarding whether one would rather have his sons attend an agricultural or another kind of high school. This question not only seems to elicit attitudes about farming but also expectations about the future viability of the occupation: Would you want to commit your childrens' future to farming?³⁶ This is a critical question for a peasant who perceives alternatives.

(12) Propensity to change is positively related to innovative behavior and cooperativeness. This hypothesis suggests that attitudes affect behavior, a proposition that is not undebatable. Besides, as mentioned earlier, it should be remembered that attitudes affect behavior depending on social conditions.

(13) Personal efficacy is positively associated with innovative behavior, but

it has little effect on cooperative behavior.

(14) Trust has a positive association with cooperativeness. It has little effect on personal innovativeness. The second proposition may be debatable, for it probably takes a measure of trust to adopt innovations on the basis of some government official's claim that certain practices lead to increased output. Moreover, accepting Saemaul slogans enthusiastically entails some trust of government goals.

(15) Village morale is positively associated with cooperative behavior. It has little effect on personal innovativeness. To the extent that village morale represents "need affiliation," it may even depress innovativeness, for a peasant may hesitate to adopt new ideas that could make him appear deviant among his peers.³⁷

(16) Personal morale has a positive association with personal innovativeness. It may have a positive relationship with cooperative behavior.

(17) Alienation is negatively associated with personal innovativeness and with cooperative behavior.

(18) Future orientation is positively associated with personal innovativeness and with cooperative behavior.

(19) Authoritarianism is negatively associated with personal innovativeness. This argument is spelled out in some detail in several books on political and economic development. It is one of the chief attributes analyzed by Hagen.³⁸ However, since the concept was devised originally in the context of European and American culture, there is some difficulty in applying it to Korea. There is, in fact, some reason to hypothesize that, given the traditions of Korean villages, the relationship between authoritarianism and cooperativeness might be positive. As Castillo suggests, the authoritarian patriarch might decide *for* new agricultural ideas.³⁹ This hypothesis is therefore probably questionable.

(20) Familism, or traditionalism, is another concept that provides problems of ambiguous relationships. On the basis of Banfield's "amoral familism" the inclination is to posit a negative relationship between familism and personal innovativeness and cooperativeness. However, Galtung found familism connected to preference for the nuclear rather than the extended family and higher among young persons with at least minimal education. These persons were also more mobile.⁴⁰ Thus familism was related more strongly to behavior, some of it modern, than it was to attitudes, except for attitudes specifically concerning the family. On the other hand, insofar as familism in Korea is a traditional attitude, it might be expected to be related to other traditional behaviors. Among these traditional behaviors would be a propensity to cooperate. Village mutual assistance had already been observed by the earliest visitors to Korea.⁴¹ Lee states that "the habit of working in company with villagers is so persistently practiced that it may be said to characterize the life of Korean farmers."⁴² Given the ambiguous nature of familism, the very tentative hypothesis is advanced that familism is negatively related to personal innovativeness and cooperativeness.⁴³

(21) A positive attitude toward government is positively associated with personal innovativeness and village cooperativeness. The hypothesis is based on the argument that since it is the government that is propagating the Saemaul movement, which aims at the ultimate transformation of the Korean countryside, a positive attitude toward the central government also makes the peasant more receptive to its messages. The notion of political accountability takes some time to develop. Traditionalism would thus seem to diminish the acceptability of more positive attitudes toward government.

(22) Debt contributes to a lack of innovativeness and village cooperativeness.

Debt is expected to relate to a whole body of deleterious attitudes and behaviors, particularly if the peasant perceives his debt as increasing. On the other hand, some debts might be contracted in order to purchase modern equipment, a possibility easily assessed in the analysis.

(23) Clan villages tend to be less capable of stimulating personal innovativeness but may be better able to bring about cooperativeness.⁴⁴ As Osgood remarks, "at its best, the clan is the source of invisible security, at its worst it turns all eyes backward on the past, limiting opportunity for complete individualism and demanding greater personal courage of him who would originate something new or change the age-old customs."⁴⁵

These are the chief hypotheses that were built into the questionnaire. Additional subsidiary hypotheses and some considerations of intervening variables will appear in subsequent chapters. Of some 2,000 questionnaires distributed to peasants through the Saemaul winter schools, 1,430 were returned completed. Had the respondents represented a true random sample of the population, roughly 95 percent of such samples would have fallen within less than 3 percent from the true value of the population. In other words, 1,430 questionnaires are a relatively adequate number on the basis of which to make inferences about Korean peasants. Since ample reservations have already been made with regard to the randomness of our sample of respondents, it might be well to conclude this chapter on a more upbeat note, calling attention to the fact that survey research in Korea, focusing attention on individuals as separate and independent units, makes more sense than it would in a more heterogeneous society such as India, Burma, or Indonesia. Korea is, in fact, a homogeneous society by comparison with most other less developed nations of the world, and this fact ought to contribute to the external validity of the analytic results.⁴⁶

In the following section, the responses on the questionnaire will be treated in a descriptive manner so as to suggest the attributes held by Korean peasants. The hypotheses will be tested in Chapter 3, and comparable data from two Korean villages related to the hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 5.

General Attributes of Korean Peasants

Korea is a relatively homogeneous country, with no sizable minorities. Even the Chinese do not comprise a significant ethnic minority, as they do in some Southeast Asian countries, and there is only a scattering of other non-Koreans. The nation is divided into nine major provinces and, as Table 2.3 shows, peasant respondents in our sample were located in all of them, including thirty-seven individuals in Cheju-do, an island some distance to the south of the Korean peninsula. While there are differing character traits attributed to individuals from various areas in Korea, it is unlikely that any of these differences would be perceived by an outsider, except for the difference between the Seoul sophisticate and the provincial from elsewhere in Korea. The folklore of differing character traits is intrinsic to all cultures, but there is no sharp division among persons from different regions such as, e.g., in Burma where several quite distinct cultural groups coexist. Although linguists can discern some local differences in the Korean language, these distinctions are minor compared even to those existing in Germany. Korean is mutually comprehensible from one area to another. Certainly there are fewer differences in most outlooks among the peasants than probably exist between peasants and the urban population.

Table 2.3
Respondents by Province of Origin

Province	Number	Percentage
Kyōnggi	191	13.4
Kangwōn	171	12.0
North Ch'ūngchōng	157	11.0
South Ch'ūngchōng	186	13.0
North Kyōngsang	157	11.0
South Kyōngsang	166	11.6
North Chōlla	154	10.8
South Chōlla	211	14.8
Cheju	37	2.6
Total	1,430*	100.0

*One thousand three hundred seventeen were male and 113 were female respondents.

There were some differences among respondents between the provinces, according to several dependent variables of innovative behavior. For instance, the yield reported from the various provinces was rather similar, with the modes for yield ranging from six to thirty *sōk*. Five provinces--Kyōnggi, South Ch'ūngchōng, South Kyōngsang, North Chōlla, and South Chōlla--generally reported eleven to thirty *sōk*, while Kangwōn, North Ch'ūngchōng, and North Kyōngsang reported modes from six to twenty *sōk*. In South Ch'ūngchōng, several peasants reported yields in the upper ranges, from thirty to over sixty *sōk*. In reporting a yield increase, however, provinces were somewhat similar, ranging from a low of 66.2 percent in South Chōlla to a high of 82.5 percent in South Ch'ūngchōng.

There were some differences in technological innovations, such as the use of weedicide, with North Kyōngsang and North Chōlla reporting 60.1 and 66.4 percent use of weedicide over hand-weeding. Of course, many of those using weedicide also hand-weeded. Kangwōn registered a low of 28.7 percent using weedicide, so that the respondents from the various provinces did differ in adopting technology. Insecticide was in such general use, however, that the main distinction was whether the peasant used it before or only following an attack by insects. Almost 90 percent of the peasants in all provinces said that they used insecticide before their plants were attacked. Plows were not yet in universal use, and about four-fifths of the peasants in all provinces did not own any. Threshers, however, were more widely used. North Ch'ūngchōng, South Ch'ūngchōng, and Kyōngsang had over 70 percent of the respondents owning threshers, while in the remaining provinces about half the peasants owned them.

Tongil rice was planted by over half the farmers of four of the provinces--Kyōnggi, Kyōngsang, North Chōlla, and South Chōlla--with the last-named having the highest percentage, 64 percent. Less than half of the respondents in the

other provinces had planted Tongil, with the lowest percentage being in Cheju. The number of thatched roofs, picturesque to the foreigner but less desirable to the peasant, had gradually given way to corrugated or tile roofs. Yet quite a few thatched houses remained in the villages, and about one-third of the respondents from Kangwŏn, South Ch'ŭngch'ŏng, North Ch'ŏlla, South Ch'ŏlla, and Cheju continued to have their homes thatched.

There were no sizable differences in the various provinces of willingness to donate time to village projects. The expression of willingness was quite general, ranging from a low of 62.4 percent in North Kyŏngsang to a high of 76.5 percent in Kangwŏn. Kangwŏn is sometimes said to be the most backward province, so that it is possible that the tradition of mutual help has lasted longest there. While the Saemaul movement attempted to stimulate village projects on the basis of village cooperation, tradition was undoubtedly an aid to this modernizing effort. The impression to be gained is that considerable support for village improvement existed in the countryside. This view is supported by the evidence of donations of time in the past, showing little difference among peasants of the various provinces. In North Ch'ŏlla, where the responses were lowest in this category, 59.1 percent reported having donated some time while in most of the other provinces the figure was 70 percent. Well over two-thirds of the peasants said they were from villages that had cooperative arrangements with neighboring villages.

Finally, there were marked differences as to whether peasants wanted to see their sons continue in agricultural high schools. Only in Kyŏnggi (53 percent) and Kangwŏn (60.6 percent) did more than half the peasants want to see their sons continue the profession of farming. In all other provinces, peasants were more negative about this, with South Ch'ŭngch'ŏng and South Ch'ŏlla expressing over 70 percent negative responses. Table 2.4 summarizes these regional differences. On the basis of the responses, no salient patterns can be discerned. For example, it did not seem to make much difference how a province rated on the dependent variables, yield and increase in yield, the decision whether to send sons to agricultural schools did not seem to rest on these considerations. Kyŏnggi, for instance, which rated rather higher than some other provinces and at least with the norm on others, indicated a greater desire to see sons attend agricultural school, but in North Ch'ŏlla, which in some respects appeared to be the most progressive province, the feeling was negative about agricultural school. Moreover, the desire to donate time to village projects and the past behavior in doing so were not associated with any other perceptible patterns, although it should be remarked that the least progressive province, aside from Cheju, also registered the highest tendency to cooperate. These are of course all relative assessments, within the Korean context, and a cooperative spirit would seem to prevail.

The respondents indicated a high degree of stability in residence. Only some 14.9 percent (213 respondents) reported living in their present village less than five years. While 53.6 percent had never lived in a larger town or city, 45.9 percent reported having lived in a more urban locale, although all of these were for periods of less than two years. Only one respondent reported living in a town or city for more than two years.

Some 41.9 percent of the respondents had held some official position at one time. About the same percentage (41.6 percent) had held some office in an organization. This might seem to be a high percentage, but village life provides possibilities of this kind beyond what is usually imagined. We must disagree

Table 2.4
The Attributes of Peasants by Province

Province	Attributes*										
	YIELD	YIELDING	WEEDICID	INSECTICID	THRESHHER	PLOW	ROOF	TONGIL	DONATE	PASTIDNT	COOPNEIG
Kyōnggi	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	0	0	0
Kangwōn	0	0	(-)	0	0	0	0	-	+	0	+
North Ch'ūngchōng	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Ch'ūngchōng	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0
North Kyōngsang	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Kyōngsang	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	0	0	0
North Chōlla	+	0	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	-	0
South Chōlla	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0
Cheju	NA	0	(-)	0	0	0	-	-	0	0	-

* + = somewhat above the average; 0 = about the average (which in the case of ROOF, DONATE, and INSECTICID is generally high; - = somewhat below average. Parentheses indicate a very slight difference from the average. The names of the full variables can be found in Appendix A.

with Marx's famous comment, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that village life has "no wealth of social relationships." In some respects the fabric of modern urban life may be more drab. Besides a *lijang*, or village chief, there is likely to be a Saemaul leader and several persons heading various committees within the village.⁴⁷ Such committees--as in Nae-il, a village to be reported on more fully in Chapter 5--might be in charge of combating superstition and various other village projects. There are other village-level organizations such as the *kye*, some of which have little bearing on agriculture and play only a small role in village-level affairs. Others, such as the *wu kye*, might provide credit by lot, so that members will have enough money to purchase an ox.⁴⁸ Observed closely, the Korean peasant in the 1960s and 1970s was not quite a politically apathetic individual. There were numerous opportunities for participation, although his influence did not generally extend beyond the village level.

Media contact among these peasants was considerable, with almost all reporting that they read the newspaper daily (73.9 percent) and owned a radio (97.8 percent). This might seem a remarkably high figure, setting off these winter-school respondents from other Korean peasants, but this is not so because the literacy rate in Korea is quite high. Moreover, there is a very active provincial press, aside from the large number of papers published in the capital and the larger cities. Only among older Koreans is illiteracy still a problem. Higher education for women was not common earlier in the century, except for the few who attended Ehwa University and several other women's colleges founded by missionaries. The Korean alphabet, a most remarkable system invented during the reign of King Sejong with the aid of Chinese linguists, was a great boon to those who wanted to teach themselves to read and write, and some older peasant women, in their forties and fifties, used it to become literate. In rural households in 1931, for example, only 22.5 percent of the Korean farm women could read Korean, compared to 57 percent of the men, and only 3.6 percent could read Chinese compared to over a third of the men.⁴⁹ These percentages improved during and after the Japanese occupation, although there is still some educational disparity between rural men and women. It was, of course, known that the radio had already become ubiquitous, and the figure cited earlier suggests just how widespread this media form is. Not only in Korea but in the Philippines and other less developed nations, the radio has furnished a cheap and modern form of communication fundamental to the process of nation-building.

Most respondents (86.9 percent) believed that it was possible to improve conditions in their villages, and most (67.8 percent) were willing to donate some of their time for this purpose, while others (26.9 percent) advanced a more tentative "maybe" in response to this query. Most peasants (67.5 percent) had already participated in village projects. Once again, a preconception was verified, for village cooperation, while sometimes exaggerated, had been a long-standing tradition. Heavy farm tasks enlisted five or more neighbors in a form of cooperative labor called *pum-asi*. For a day's work done for a neighbor, a peasant could claim the same amount of time later. The host was responsible for providing the best available food. Heydrich was told that this system was "a real democratic assembly line system" in which everyone competed.⁵⁰ As a formal arrangement among neighbors *pum-asi* has declined, but the spirit of cooperation is still in evidence.

Table 2.5 reports the age distribution of these respondents. The age distribution did not, of course, resemble the general population because there were

Table 2.5
Respondent's Age

Age Category	Number	Percentage
16-25	96	6.7
26-29	158	11.0
30-39	596	41.7
40-49	460	32.2
50-59	101	7.1
60 and over	15	1.0
Total	1,426*	99.8*

*There were four "no responses."

fewer persons thirty years or younger. Many of these younger peasants did not yet have their own farms and thus did not have the incentive to attend the Saemaul winter schools, while some may have been in the military service. It will be seen later that age explained very little innovative behavior. Perhaps Korea had had a money economy long enough so that older peasants responded to market conditions and changed their farming practices if they saw an advantage in doing so, making age a less important factor in rural modernization.

The educational level of these peasants is given in Table 2.6. The level of education in Korea seemed to be considerably higher than that in many another less developed country, attesting to the transitional status of Korea as it has moved closer to industrialization. As explained in the note to the table, these peasants were much more responsive to this question than those in the two villages surveyed in 1973 where there was a substantial minority of "no responses."

Table 2.6
The Education of Korean Peasants

Level of Education	Number	Percentage
Elementary	324	22.7
Junior High	328	22.9
Senior High	553	38.7
College or university	216	15.1
Graduate school	3	0.2
Total	1,424*	99.6*

*There were six "no responses" for this question in the national sample. Comparison with a village study done later, in which there were substantial "no responses," suggests the direction here of some bias toward at least a higher degree of responsiveness. Since the interviewers were students from a nearby agricultural college, it is possible that some degree of "face" was involved on the part of the respondents. A good guess, therefore, would be that Saemaul attendance was increased with education.

Since the land reform the maximum amount of farmland a peasant could own had been three *chǒngbo* (one *chǒngbo* equals 2.45 acres). The mode of the land farmed was 1,500 to 2,999 *pyǒng* (3,000 *pyǒng* equal one *chǒngbo*), while most farms ranged from 1,500 to 5,999 *pyǒng*. Most peasants generally agreed that they did not want more land and, given the technology of rice farming, farms of the size of those in the modal categories were probably optimal for Korea's labor-intensive farming. These peasants grew mainly rice, although many also owned some amount of dryland. The distribution of land owned is shown in Table 2.7. On this land the mode for yield was eleven to twenty *sǒk* of rice, with the categories for output ranging from six to thirty *sǒk*. Yet, as Table 2.8 indicates, the distribution ranged up to sixty *sǒk* and above, probably because some farms in the South were able to harvest two crops of rice in a season. Some 1,031 peasants (72.1 percent) reported an increase in yields as against only 5 percent reporting a

Table 2.7
Farmed Land of Korean Respondents, Wetland and Dryland

<i>Pyǒng</i>	Wetland		<i>Pyǒng</i>	Dryland	
	Number of Peasants	Percent		Number of Peasants	Percent
Less than 899	138	9.7	Less than 899	427	29.9
900-1,499	208	14.5	900-1,499	291	20.3
1,500-2,999	445	31.1	1,500-2,999	327	22.9
3,000-5,999	347	24.3	3,000-5,999	171	12.0
6,000-8,999	62	4.3	6,000-8,999	21	1.5
9,000 or over	28	2.0	9,000 or over	5	0.3
Total	1,228	85.9*		1,242	86.9*

*The remainder did not respond to the question.

Table 2.8
Yields of Korean Peasants, in *sǒk*
(one *sǒk* equals about 5 bushels)

<i>Sǒk</i>	Number of Peasants	Percentage
Less than 5	89	6.2
6-10	214	15.0
11-20	311	21.7
21-30	249	17.4
31-40	121	8.5
41-50	71	5.0
51-60	70	4.9
61 or over	96	6.7
Total	1,221	85.4

decrease. There were heavy rains in August of 1972 which flooded some regions of Korea and destroyed the crops of some peasants. Whether agriculture is modernized or traditional, the weather is still a major factor related to output, and modern science has not altered this situation much. Unlike peasants in some other countries, Korean peasants keep meticulous records of their finances and their agricultural production, and the responses may thus have been fairly accurate.⁵¹ On the other hand, depending on the context in which they were questioned, peasants may have tended either to exaggerate their output or to understate it. The same reservation must be stated concerning the amount of land farmed, for while it is illegal to own more than three *chŏngbo* of riceland, there are probably many peasants that have surreptitious arrangements of ownership unreported to the authorities.

Several questions were asked in order to assess political knowledge. Few respondents (9.5 percent) were unable to give the name of the American president at the time of the survey, fewer still (1.2 percent) the name of the president of Korea, Park Chung Hee, although 29.9 percent did not correctly identify the Japanese premier. The last figure may possibly have been influenced by reasons other than lack of knowledge. Twenty-five years after Japanese colonial occupation ended, feelings against Japan as a former oppressor still ran deep.⁵² In any case, the great number of correct responses showed that a more subtle series of indicators of political knowledge ought to have been included and so, reluctantly, these responses were dropped in the later analysis.

A large minority of peasants (39.3 percent) were in debt, and 150 of them reported that their debts had increased over the previous year. As has been shown before, debt has been the nemesis of the Korean peasant although conditions are now at least as favorable as they have ever been for him. Later in 1973 and, unfortunately, after our village survey had been completed, the government moved to eradicate at least one source of debt in the countryside by banning any ostentatious exhibition of splendor and limiting the cost of gifts that could be offered in weddings, funerals, and village festivals. On the one hand, it might be regretted that these rare occasions of color and pageantry were to be eliminated from the drab routine of the peasants' existence. On the other hand, it provided an excuse, possibly sought by some peasants, for marshaling their small savings against the pressures of their neighbors to provide a respectable showing when burying a parent. In fact, expenses of this type were cited in the village survey as only a minor source of debt there. From a strictly economic rationale, the elimination of this form of expense was quite likely beneficial. But because one of the ends sought by the Saemaul movement was an increase in the cultural as well as the economic level of peasant life, the disappearance of pageantry was deleterious. The traditional market days, which had featured gambling and heavy drinking, were also discontinued in 1973 by order of the central government.

Table 2.9 reports in aggregate figures the technological adaptations of the Korean peasant. It is an impressive showing, with high rankings in the use of insecticide, weedicide, and several kinds of fertilizers. Almost half of the peasants grew various kinds of commercial crops, two-thirds had threshers, and their homes had been improved by the addition of slate, tile, or corrugated roofs.⁵³ Almost half of them grew the Tongil rice. Twenty-five had begun growing it in 1970, 102 in 1971, 577 in 1972, and seven were planning to plant it in 1973. This does not mean, of course, that they had switched entirely to the new

Table 2.9

Technological Adaptations of the Korean Peasant
(percentages show responses in the "innovative" direction)

Innovation	Number of Peasants	Percentage
Weedicide	680	48.0
Insecticide	1,220	85.3
Urea	1,232	86.2
Phosphate	943	65.9
Calcium cyanimide	152	10.6
Commercial crop	704	49.2
Thresher	891	62.3
Roof: tile, slate or corrugated	1,025	71.6
Tongil, new rice (25 in 1970 or before, 102 in 1971, 577 in 1972, and 7 in 1973)	694	48.5
Attended Saemaul school	930	65.0

rice strain which was still in an experimental stage. The success in rice output that was anticipated by the introduction of Tongil did not come about in 1972, as we have seen, for the weather conditions in much of the planted areas were adverse, providing too much rain prior to harvesting. In any case, the table provides a good indication that Korea was not a nation of primitive peasants but had gone some distance toward modernizing its agriculture, and the peasants themselves undoubtedly deserve a large share of the credit for this. This also shows, by the way, that Marx was wrong in his proposition that science is inapplicable to peasant small-holdings.

A large number of the respondents already had attended a Saemaul school, probably during the summer; they were, of course, attending one at the time of responding to the questionnaire. Interestingly, some 41.5 percent of the respondents had first learned of the Saemaul movement over the radio, and another 20.5 percent had read about it in the newspapers. This attests to the growing importance of the media in the countryside. An additional large percentage (19.2 percent) had been informed of the program by an official, probably a *myŏnjang*, or county official. Only a few (4.8 percent) had first learned of the movement through a pamphlet or a friend. While some studies of modernization, such as Rogers', suggests that most innovations in traditional agriculture come about through interaction with one's peers, this may be no longer the case when conditions have advanced to the stage where most persons are literate and read the papers or listen to the radio to the extent done in Korea. Face-to-face communication, while still significant, is probably not now the predominant way that peasants learn of new developments in Korea.

Finally, several interesting results should be pondered for the possible

significance they may hold for future developments in the countryside. Overwhelmingly (79.8 percent), these peasants would have liked to have more influence in the operation of their villages. The increase in organizational skills, literacy, and agricultural skills generated a desire to participate more than they had done in the past. These respondents had obviously not sunk into apathy but had developed notions of how their conditions could be improved. They would have probably liked increased opportunities of putting their ideas and goals into effect. Another interesting result, already noted by province, was the small number (38.0 percent) who would have liked their sons to attend an agricultural high school. While conditions in the countryside had improved perceptibly, they still had not achieved by 1973 the economic well-being possible in the city. This is shown by the one response that was almost unanimous in the attitudinal section of the questionnaire: 1,131 peasants agreed that "the standard of living of peasants is below that of most other persons in Korea." There was still the perception, undoubtedly accurate in 1972 and 1973, that peasants had simply not done as well as other sectors of the population. To succeed, the Saemaul movement will have to provide the conditions necessary to allow peasants to raise their living standards to that of their urban compatriots. Until then it is unlikely that most peasants will want to see their sons follow in their own profession. Moreover, this attitude has a very special relationship to some of the ends that the Saemaul movement is trying to achieve, as we will see in Chapter 4.

Responses to the question on influence suggest that the peasant would have liked it, if at all possible, to increase his social power. It has been suggested that social power is a process with positive feedback in system terms. If one attains a little, the inclination will be to try to attain more, and from a position of some power, a position of more power will be easier to attain.⁵³ If the Saemaul movement works in accordance with its original intent, it might have this effect but might then also displease some of its urban initiators. In any case, there were some improvements in the years following this survey, and in 1974 farm income for the first time reached 104.57 percent of urban income. By 1975 the income of peasants and fishermen had reached 106 percent of the income of urban workers. According to government sources, which in this case were probably accurate, the drain of resources from the countryside into the manufacturing sector, characteristic of the 1960s, had been reversed.⁵⁴