

FOUR / THE *ZHONGYI* TRADITION OF LOYALISTS: WEN TIANXIANG AND THE MARTYRS, 1273-79

Song loyalists of the *zhongyi* tradition (loyal martyrs) shared one common feature: they died during or shortly after the collapse of Song (1273-79) because of their personal loyalty to that dynasty. The *yimin* (remnant survivors) are those who survived the dynastic collapse and lived through the early years of Mongol rule, generally in seclusion and without participation in the new government. This chapter is concerned with the first group, and below will first outline the ideological and historical background to the *zhongyi* loyalists and then present a composite discussion of the group. Next, the careers of Wen Tianxiang, Li Tingzhi, Lu Xiufu, Zhang Shijie, and Xie Fangde are examined separately. The relationships of Wen Tianxiang and Li Tingzhi with the lesser known followers and subordinates are dealt with next, followed by a brief look at the "virtuous women" associated with the *zhongyi* tradition. Finally, this chapter offers a perspective on some former Song officials and generals who defected to the Mongols.

Ideological and Historical Background

The notion of *zhongyi* (literally, the loyal and righteous) embraces two fundamental Confucian concepts: loyalty and righteousness (duty or obligation). *Zhong* (loyalty) normally describes a subject's allegiance to the ruler and country, but before the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A. D. 220) it was more often used in a general sense with other shades of meaning: trustworthiness and sincerity, faithfulness to oneself, and reciprocity with superiors and other men.¹ The reciprocal relationship as hinted in the notion of *yi* (righteous-

1. Julia Ching, "Neo-Confucian," 37-38.

Chapter Four

ness, duty, or obligation) between subject and ruler was a key concern to classical Confucian philosophy: while the people and subjects owed loyalty to the ruler, the latter had the implicit responsibility to nourish the former.¹ An absolute form of loyalty involving allegiance to one ruler and one country was not part of the teachings of the early Confucian philosophers, like Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (372-289? B. C.) who wandered from state to state offering moral instructions to any ruler who would listen.² But by the time of the Northern Song, leaders like Ouyang Xiu (1007-72) and Sima Guang (1019-86) expounded the more restricted view of loyalty--unilateral and absolute duty towards only one emperor regardless of his merits. Both men categorically condemned the disloyalty of Feng Dao (882-954) who had served five dynasties and ten rulers in succession.³ Feng Dao's service to successive dynasties and rulers was by no means unprecedented: apart from Confucius and Mencius, Yiyin (fl. 1700 B.C.), Taigong Wang (fl. 1050 B.C.), and many others served more than one ruler and dynasty without tarnishing their historical image.⁴

The Northern Song denounced Feng Dao's disloyalty but praised the *Zhongjing* (Classic of loyalty), attributed to the Han scholar Ma Rong (79-166) but long regarded by modern scholars as a forgery of the Northern Song

1. Wang Gungwu, "Power," 7.

2. Ching, "Neo-Confucian," 41.

3. See Wang Gungwu, "Feng Tao."

4. Feng Dao was singled out for heavy condemnation because he had been repeatedly disloyal. See Wang Gungwu, "Feng Tao," 205. Yiyin and Taigong Wang were recluses who despite having lived under former regimes became founding ministers of the Shang and Zhou dynasties, respectively. See Sarah Allan, 91-101, 108-17. On Yiyin and Taigong Wang, see also Herbert A. Giles, nos. 913 and 1862.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

period.¹ Like the *Xiaojing* (Classic of filial piety), the *Zhongjing* is divided into eighteen short chapters; each chapter relates loyalty to the hierarchical subject-ruler relationship and exalts unilateral and death-defying allegiance of subjects to the ruler in the face of national calamities, like rebellions and invasions. This narrow notion of absolute loyalty in fact grew in tandem with an absolutist monarchy during the Song; the concept became more exalted and revered to meet the need to counteract the vulnerability of the Song state to border incursions. At the same time, more emphasis was placed on integrity and morality. Zhu Xi (1130-1200) quoted the Neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi (1033-1107) in a statement that applied to a widow's chastity in a specific sense but incorporated general concerns of integrity and loyalty: "To starve to death is a very small matter. To lose integrity, however, is a very serious matter."²

It was within this political and intellectual context that the absolute loyalty of Yue Fei can be understood. Yue, the Southern Song general of humble peasant stock, was instrumental in regaining some lost territory from the Jurchen Jin.³ He could have won more victories, but instead, obeying his sovereign Gaozong, Yue halted his advance and then meekly allowed himself to be stripped of his rank and be executed. Although Yue might have been convinced that Gaozong was wrong and unjust, his loyalty did not falter. James Liu discusses Yue's loyalty as personal in nature entailing complete

1. The *Zhongjing* can be found in, *inter alia*, Tao Zongyi's *Shuofu*, 70. On its spurious origins, see Mote, "Confucian eremitism," 279-82; Xiao Gongquan, vol. 4, 506-07; Zhang Xincheng, 762-63. A summary of the *Zhongjing* can be found in Ching, "Neo-Confucian," 38-41. The work was translated into Mongolian, along with the *Xiaojing*, during the Yuan period. See Yang Shiqi, 720-21.

2. Wing-tsit Chan, xxiv-xxv, 177.

3. Yue Fei's biography is in SS 365.11375-95. Gaozong has been blamed for being the principal engineer of Yue Fei's death. His critics hinted that contrary to his sworn ambition to recover north China, Gaozong did not want Qinzhong and Huizong to return lest they jeopardize his own legitimacy as emperor. See Zheng Yuanyou, 1.23-24; Wen Zhengming's (Wen Tianxiang's descendant, 1470-1559) poem "On Gaozong's edict to Yue Fei," in Wang Rongchu, 438-40; Jin Yufu, "Yue Fei," 415-18. On his military campaigns, see Kaplan. See also Hellmut Wilhelm, and James T.C. Liu, "Yüeh Fei."

Chapter Four

submission to his sovereign; as such it departed from the "conscientious loyalty" that reflected broader concerns of ethnicity and state.¹ Yue may have been a victim of the powerful minister Qin Kui (1090-1155), or of Gaozong's sense of unease over his position as emperor; but he was first and foremost a victim of his simple and passionate loyalty.²

The concept of absolute loyalty did not originate in the Northern Song, but may be seen as a revival of political values prevalent in early historical sources. If classical philosophers did not define loyalty as absolute and unilateral, early pragmatic and moralistic historians did. They praised the actions of loyal men as mirrors for posterity. For example, in the Xia dynasty, Wuguang killed himself rather than serve the Shang (1700-1050 B. C.). Later, Boyi and Shuqi, princes of the Shang state of Guzhu, fled to the Shouyang mountains and subsisted on moss before dying of starvation rather than living under the newly established Zhou dynasty (1050-221 B. C.).³ The basic features of martyrdom were willingness to die in order to retain the virtue of *baoguo* (to repay or "requite" the country), refusal to serve two surnames (i.e., two dynasties) in succession, and aspiration for a place in history. The following passage prescribes a subject's duty: "Since a subject receives orders from the ruler, he should face death only and no other alternative."⁴ The *Shiji* (Historical memoirs) refers to the concern for one's image in posterity: "If a loyal subject abandons his country, his name will not be clean." The same work offers a more explicit example of the loyal subject risking death for the sake of loyalty to only one ruler: "The loyal subject does not

1. James T.C. Liu, "Yüeh Fei," 294.

2. Yue Fei's narrow and limited vision of loyalty has recently drawn much debate and criticism from Chinese scholars, such as Gong Yanming. Yue Fei's myopic vision of loyalty can be compared to the ideal of the new socialist man in China's hero, Lei Feng, who equated his unswerving loyalty to the Communist Party as a cog in a wheel or a reliable screw.

3. Wuguang, Boyi, and Shuqi's biographies are in Sima Qian, 61.2121-29. See also Allan, 89-91, 111-17; Giles, no. 1657.

4. See Lüshi commentary to *Liji*, in Wang Meng'ou, 31; it is also quoted in Chen Menglei, *juan* 706, vol. 311.36.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

serve two rulers; the chaste woman does not marry two husbands Given the alternative of life without righteousness, I definitely prefer to be cooked to death."¹

In a later historical source, the *Liangshu*, Mencius is quoted out of context to lend ideological support to the loyal subject preferring death to a blemished reputation: "Life is what I desire; righteousness is also what I desire. If the two cannot be obtained together, I will let go of life and take righteousness."² Here, "righteousness" specifically refers to the loyalty and integrity of the loyal subject, even though Mencius' intention had been more general. The *Shiji* and later standard histories contained biographies of loyal subjects, but it was the *Tsinshu* (History of the Tsin) which first set aside a separate category of group biographies for loyal subjects who died for their country and who were held up as models for future generations. The preface to the biographies states:

The ancients have these sayings: "The moral man kills himself to fulfill his moral sense and does not seek to live and [thereby] harm it." They also say: "Dying is not difficult; it is how to live [properly] that is difficult." How true were such words! This was because they knew a tarnished virtue is within easy reach; how could a righteous man begrudge his death! In sacrificing his body and obtaining a proper abode, the brave man does not begrudge his existence This is the reason why the former histories praised them highly and the later generations admired their valor.³

1. For these two passages, see the biographies of Yue Yi and Tian Dan, in Sima Qian, 80.2433, 82.2457.

2. Yao Silian, 43.611; Mencius, Gaozi chapter, in Legge, vol. 2, 411.

3. Fang Xuanling, 89.2297. Other similar categories of moral people in the standard histories are the *xunli* (upright clearks), *xiaoyi* (filial sons), and *lienü* (virtuous women).

Chapter Four

This overwhelming concern with posthumous fame became the motivating force for loyal men to lay down their lives for the ruler and country. After the *Tsinshu*, most standard histories followed the precedent of giving loyal martyrs group biographies, albeit with some variations in the titles: *jieyi* (integrity and righteousness) in the *Weishu*, *chengjie* (sincerity and integrity) in the *Suishu*, and *sijie* (integrity to the point of death) in the *Xin Wudai shi*.¹ To the traditional historiographers, loyalty and martyrdom for the state were long-ingrained traditions, abandoned temporarily during the turbulent Five Dynasties period when only three such loyal men were given biographies. An additional fifteen men were commended in another group biography for proving to be loyal at the end without being thus inclined at first. In the preface to the biographies of loyal men, the *Songshi* historiographers stress that the Song loyal men were outstanding enough to expunge the decadent morals of the Five Dynasties.² Song loyalist behavior was thus observed as a continuation of a long tradition of loyalty as well as a unique response to the threat of alien conquest.³ Deciding whether to surrender or die was the paramount concern of many of the loyal martyrs in 1273-79.

Composite Biography of the Martyr Loyalists

The official history of the Song, *Songshi*, provides the primary source for a composite study of the *zhongyi* (martyrs) loyalists. All except four of the group loyalist biographies in this work are of the *zhongyi* tradition, and they supply sufficient information on the composition and activities of the

1. See Wei Shou, 87.1889; Wei Zheng, 71.1639; Ouyang Xiu, 32.347. The *sishi* (loyalty until death) biographies are in *ibid.*, 33.356.

2. SS 446.13149.

3. For a survey of loyal men across the dynasties, see Appendix B and Chen Menglei, *juan* 706-763, vols. 311-316. Chen and his associates gleaned biographies of loyal men from various official and local sources and grouped them according to the dynasties to which these men directed their loyalties.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

group.¹

The eighty biographies of loyal martyrs in 1273-79, found in the *Songshi*, do not represent a homogeneous group. They range from high-ranking central officials to an obscure tailor, a Buddhist monk, and a Daoist priest. Many were gentry members who responded to the *qinwang* edict and recruited armies and local militia to defend the Song. Of these men, 62.5% (50/80) were civil officials up to 1275; most were degree holders. Upon joining the defense against the Mongols, they temporarily adopted military roles. The other 37.5% (30/80) had purely military careers and included not a few who had earlier committed crimes, or were town ruffians who took the opportunity to redeem past misdeeds. Key personalities, like Wen Tianxiang, Li Tingzhi, Wang Lixin, and Xie Fangde successfully combined civilian careers with military experience. A sizable number were local men who defended their native districts before attaching both themselves and their units to centrally appointed officials like Li Tingzhi and Wen Tianxiang. One also notices a considerable role played by the relatives of the Song imperial family. The *zhongyi* came from many parts of the country, from several northern Chinese defectors to natives of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei. The presence of Jiangxi men is particularly conspicuous, attesting to the importance of this region in the resistance movement and the attention given to the home province of Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde. No loyalists from Guangdong and Guangxi are recorded, probably because local gazetteers of these provinces were unavailable to the editors of the *Songshi*. Later compilations such as the *Songji zhongyi lu* do have many entries from these two provinces. Age is often missing in the biographies of lesser known loyalists, but there is enough information to observe three adult genera-

1. The list of eighty includes seven separate biographies in the section for outstanding officials (Liu Fu, SS 405; Wang Lixin, SS 416; Jiang Wanli, SS 418; Wen Tianxiang, SS 418; Li Tingzhi, SS 421; Xu Zongren, SS 425; Xie Fangde, SS 425) and seventy-three in group biographies (sixteen in SS 450; eleven in SS 451; seven in SS 452; thirty-seven in SS 454; and two in SS 455). I have left out from SS 454 the four loyalists (Zhang Shanweng, Huang Shen, He Shi, and Chen Zijing) who survived the resistance and became recluses and taught or told fortunes for a living. The composite account is based on the above SS biographies, supplemented by unofficial sources, including the writings of Deng Guangjian, Zhao Jingliang, and Xu Dazhuo.

Chapter Four

tions--the old, the middle-aged, and the young--ranging from the seventies to the twenties. Families, friends, servants, and others were deeply involved with the individual's loyalist activities and martyrdom. In many cases, brothers, wives, sons, and other relatives chose to perish with the martyred victim.

These *zhongyi* loyalists shared certain behavioral patterns not unlike those found among loyal men of previous dynasties. The centrally appointed officials and local commanders fought to the bitter end, even after all supplies had been exhausted and others around them had surrendered to the Mongols. They instantly executed the messengers who tried to persuade them to defect; then they displayed publicly the corpses in order to boost morale and to deter others from capitulating. Many of these loyalists had recruited units from among their tenants, town ruffians, bandit gangs, as well as among the Yao and She peoples to unite with centrally appointed officials. They willingly exhausted family fortunes to pay mercenaries and supply food and clothing to the soldiers. Wealthy local magnates also donated large quantities of food and provided lodging for the loyalist forces. While some *zhongyi* served only as clerical assistants, the majority actually fought in hand-to-hand combat against the Mongol army.

With few exceptions, all were active participants in Song defense and loyalist resistance, but both active and nonactive participants met a similar fate--death--as the consequence of their loyalty and support for the Song. Most were captured and killed by the Mongols because of their unwillingness to surrender; the rest committed suicide in various ways (by drowning, burning, strangling, poisoning, starving or hanging) rather than suffer what they perceived to be the indignity of capture and the dishonor of clinging to life after the collapse of the dynasty. A few also died of distress and illness caused by the defeat of loyalist resistance. At the moment of death, most made a point of facing south to symbolize their resolute loyalty to the Song. Just before dying, almost all berated the Mongol conquerors and Song defectors; some did not stop until their tongues were cut off. They also left written and eloquent statements testifying to their loyal spirit at the moment of death. Most of the utterances were traditional phrases about the duty and obligation of the subject to fulfill his loyalty. One Lin Kongzhai (d. 1276) bit his finger and wrote on the wall with his own blood: "Alive, I am a loyal and righteous

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

subject; dead, I shall remain a loyal and righteous ghost. Though I can survive in the wilderness, I cannot bear to do just that."¹ Before leaping into the river, one Xie Xu (d. 1276) expressed his antipathy toward foreign conquest as follows:

My ambitions to pacify the barbarians not yet realized--
Do not say let my thoughts flow east in the river.
Who can rescue the innocent submerged in the world?
A thousand years will not erase the regret of one death.
The Xiang River will not sink the loyal and righteous spirit,
The Huai and Fei Rivers felt ashamed and smashed the Qin
conspiracy.
The Tiao River flows north, passes through the Gusai Mountain,
My loyal heart will be preserved to eradicate the barbarian
caitiffs and chieftains.²

In prison and awaiting execution, one Confucian scholar regretted being ill and not able to rail at the enemy. His last words were:

In this crisis I will certainly not wish to return alive
And preserve an empty name in the world.
Everywhere has been defiled by barbarian blood,
Be sure to collect my bones at the Shouyang mountain
[where Boyi and Shuqi starved to death].³

To get a clearer profile of the *zhongyi* loyalists, we now examine in more detail the lives and careers of five key loyalist personalities--Wen Tian-

1. SS 452.13309.

2. Xu Dazhuo, a.13b.

3. I use Deng Guangjian's *Wen chengxiang dufu zhongyi zhuan*, in Wen Tianxiang, 19.1a, rather than the SS version (454.13356), which has a milder tone and was based on the former.

Chapter Four

xiang, Li Tingzhi, Lu Xiufu, Zhang Shijie, and Xie Fangde--together with their followers and subordinates.

Wen Tianxiang and His Military Headquarters

As a historical figure, Wen Tianxiang stands out as the greatest loyalist exemplar both in his and all subsequent times of Chinese national calamity until the present century.¹ With virtually no exception, primary and secondary scholarship on Wen has been unstinting in praise and glorification, but the following account presents a more objective view.

Wen, the eldest of four sons, was born into a well-to-do gentry family originally based in Sichuan but which had relocated in Luling (Jizhou, Jiangxi province) for several generations before Wen's time. There had been no distinguished officials in the family, but as a child Wen had aspired to emulate prominent political figures from his place of birth, such as Ouyang Xiu. At twenty, he gained first place in the 1256 *jinshi* examination, an event which marked his first entry in the *Songshi* annals.² The eminent Confucian scholar and examiner Wang Yinglin congratulated Emperor Lizong for having acquired such a promising subject. Lizong was much impressed and bestowed on Wen the names by which he was later known--Tianxiang (Auspicious omen from heaven) and Songrui (Lucky sign of Song). From this famous examination year also emerged some other men who later distinguished themselves as loyalists--Xie Fangde, Lu Xiufu, Hu Sanxing, Huang Zhen (1213-80), Shu Yuexiang (1217-98), and Chen Zhu (1213-97).³ Wen did not

1. SS 418.12533-40. The biographical details in this account have largely been drawn from Wen's SS biography and his autobiographical poems.

2. SS 44.857.

3. The anonymous Song work *Dengke lu* lists altogether the names, birthdates, lineage and descent, and places of origin of 601 graduates in descending ranks under five categories. Wen Tianxiang, Lu Xiufu, and Xie Fangde were the most outstanding of the group, which also included two defectors to the Mongols, Wen Bi and Qian Zhensun (d. after 1290). A large number of imperial relatives also graduated in this examination year. For a comparative study of this list with the only other extant Song list, the one for 1148 when Zhu Xi graduated, see E.A. Kracke Jr., "Family versus merit."

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

maintain close contact with these graduates of the same examination year, except for his younger brother Bi (1238-95) and several obscure individuals who also passed the examination.

Wen's confidence in his political future was greatly strengthened by obtaining first place in the examination and by the personal recognition of the emperor. But his political career was interrupted almost before it started. His father, who had accompanied Wen and his brother to the capital, fell ill and died; the two brothers subsequently brought the body back to Luling and withdrew into mourning. When Wen returned to the capital after this family matter, his career never seemed to get off the ground. He had few powerful friends in Hangzhou, most likely because of his presumptuous airs and lack of influential family ties. In 1259 he memorialized that the eunuch Dong Songchen (fl. 1250-60) be executed for suggesting the transfer of the Song capital, but he received neither support from other officials nor any response from the throne. The offices he held in the 1260s were mostly regional, undistinguished and frequently in his home province of Jiangxi. In the *Songshi* annals he is not mentioned again until January 1275, when he responded to the *qinwang* edict. Appendix C shows his phenomenal rise in prestige and responsibilities, from the ranks of 8b to 5B by 1270, to 3B in October 1275 and 1B in January 1276.¹

In the years before 1275 Wen served as a regional official and acquired a wide range of experience dealing with local bandits in Jiangxi. However, he wanted to play a role in the central bureaucracy, and it was perhaps with this goal in mind that he wrote congratulatory and flattering addresses to political figures of the time, including the chief ministers Jiang Wanli, Zhang Jian, and Ma Tingluan.² Jiang Wanli was the only prominent statesman with whom he had a relationship, who in 1273 reassured Wen of a potential role in the central government: "I am already old. Looking at the current climate and human affairs, there is certain to be an upheaval. I have observed many men in my time. As to the responsibilities [to ensure] human morals--much

1. The offices that Wen assumed in his career are compiled from SS 418.

2. Wen also wrote to Wen Jiweng, Li Tingzhi, Chen Yizhong, among others. These letters are found in Wen Tianxiang, 5-8.

Chapter Four

will depend on you. May you be encouraged."¹

Unlike many of his contemporaries, there is little evidence that Wen directly opposed Jia Sidao and consequently suffered a setback in his official life. In 1271-73, much frustrated and disillusioned with his undistinguished political career, Wen retired to his native Luling and indulged himself and his many guests extravagantly in his newly constructed residence on Mount Wen. They organized poetry recitals and literary discussions, and drinking bouts attended by singing girls became daily routines. Wen was affluent enough to pursue such a life-style, and during this period of retirement his wife and at least two concubines gave birth to several children. Such a life in spite of the Mongol threat was typical of wealthy officials including Jia Sidao. Like other officials, only when news about the collapse of Xiangyang in 1273 became known did Wen reemerge from retirement. He was appointed judicial intendant of Hunan, and a year later he was put in charge of the administration of Ganzhou.

But it was with the promulgation of the *qinwang* edict after the fall of Ezhou in December 1274 that Wen's extravagant life-style abruptly ended. Overnight his essentially civilian career took on a military turn. He gave instructions to subordinates, friends, and relatives to recruit soldiers from Jizhou and Ganzhou (Jiangxi province). Included in this 10,000 strong force were Yao and She aboriginal peoples and Huai mercenaries. Just when he was about to set forth for the capital his grandmother died, but Wen obeyed the court's command to forego the mourning and resumed his public duties. Upon arrival in Hangzhou, he was put in charge of the capital. During 1275, Wen was appointed to secretary, then president, of the Ministry of War, as well as to other offices. This marked his first and only entry into central government politics before the Hangzhou collapse. He was offered, but did not accept, the post of commissioner of Military Affairs (1B) to negotiate with Bayan.

Throughout that year and into January 1276, Wen was again overly confident of his abilities and morals, envisioning himself as the savior of the Song imperial house. His speeches were self-assured, proud and intolerant of

1. SS 418.12534.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

those with whom he disagreed. Colleagues and veteran officials saw him as an upstart and a newcomer to be distrusted. Wen, in turn, antagonized them further by pointing out their faults. Wen's lack of political experience is seen in the naiveté with which he approached Bayan, the Mongol general responsible for Song's final subjugation. Bayan was about to occupy the Song capital with relative ease, but Wen insisted that the Mongol army retreat to the other side of the Yangzi River before negotiations for a peace settlement could commence! At this time Wen's view of loyalty was an all-consuming passion overriding family obligations and all other commitments. He was convinced that "since antiquity the primary concern [ought to be] fulfilling loyalty and not filial piety."¹ He did not hesitate to cut short the mourning period for his grandmother in order to devote himself to saving the Song state. In February 1275, he could not or would not attempt to understand Lü Wenhuan's anguish over surrendering to the Yuan forces; instead, he self-righteously lashed out at Lü for protecting his wife and children instead of taking his own life.²

In the next three years of loyalist resistance, Wen did not emulate Yue Fei's limited loyalty, that is, render absolute loyalty to Gongdi and Empress Dowager Xie, the last sovereigns of the Song. His primary loyalty was to restore the Song dynasty and not to demonstrate simple allegiance to the present emperor alone. Therefore he did not see it as his sacred duty to accompany the imperial family to the Yuan capital; instead he escaped and repeatedly struggled to survive against great odds in the next few years. Apart from taking precedence over filial piety, Wen's loyalty was inspired and sustained by an ethnic consciousness. He saw the Mongols as alien intruders and "barbarian caitiffs" who violated his country: "The western barbarians [i.e., Mongols] have taken the Middle Kingdom / Humankind has been extin-

1. Wen Tianxiang, 15.4a-5a. The poem is entitled "Mourning Mother on the second anniversary of her death."

2. "Record of events," in Wen Tianxiang, 13.9a.

Chapter Four

guished."¹ Wen was indeed commended by the Song court for "swearing an oath that he would not coexist with the barbarian caitiffs."²

From the beginning of his active commitment to the Song defense in 1274, Wen was aware that the mission was doomed to failure; however, he loudly declared to his Mongol captors that he had to make the efforts in the same way that a filial son would have wished to continue medication for ailing parents in the hope that they would recover.³ He also knew that his course could only lead to death, but he intended to choose its time and place. Only when the slightest hope for a Song recovery was quashed would he resign himself to death to "requite the country." Though pursued by the Yuan forces, bandits, his loyalist colleague Li Tingzhi, and other hostile forces, he miraculously survived. Even when he attempted to take his own life, his decision sometimes faltered at the slightest glimmer of hope for escape and another chance for a more noble death. In January 1279, after capture by Zhang Hongfan he swallowed poison but did not die. He later regretted not taking the opportunity to kill himself in Guangzhou en route to Dadu because he thought he could escape.⁴ He also planned to starve to death at his native place of Luling, but after passing through it and still not dying, he decided to postpone his death and resumed eating.⁵

For three years Wen was incarcerated in Dadu and subjected to much pressure to serve in the Yuan government; even his former sovereign Gongdi tried to persuade him to take up a post in the new dynasty. The *Songshi* records an episode which puts Wen in an accommodating light. After refusing another tempting offer to switch his loyalty to the Yuan, Wen made it known

1. Wen Tianxiang, 15.9b-10a. The poem is called "To the rhyme of Boyi and Shuqi's Song of the Western mountains." Another poem which expressed his antipathy toward the foreign nature of the Mongols is "On the road to Gaosha," in Wen Tianxiang, 15.2a-b.

2. *Ibid.*, 17.14a.

3. *Ibid.*, 17.35b.

4. *Ibid.*, 17.39a-b, in a letter to his brother Bi.

5. "At Liujiang jun," in *ibid.*, 14.8a.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

that if he were released from prison as a Daoist priest, he would be willing to serve as a consultant at a later time.¹ Defendants of Wen's integrity vehemently denounce this account as a fabrication by the *Songshi*, meant to cast doubt on Wen's resolute spirit. However, I think the episode should not be so airily dismissed. It would have only been human for Wen to have experienced some misgivings during his long ordeal, when he felt guilty about neglecting his filial duties in the course of his single-minded devotion to the Song cause. He might well have made such a request in order to escape and revive loyalist resistance or to find a more noble way of death. At the same time, a defector from the loyalist camp, Wang Jiweng, and nine former Song officials who had entered Yuan service petitioned the throne to release Wen as a Daoist priest.² The plan was supposedly foiled by the former Song chief minister Liu Mengyan, who feared that Wen would surely rekindle the resistance and thereby place them in an awkward and risky position with the Mongol court.³

If Wen had wished to delay his martyrdom in hopes for a later Song revival, his followers did not. At least two close friends and loyalists exhorted Wen to die as soon as possible to preserve an untarnished spirit for posterity. Wang Yanwu was Wen's *landsman* who had joined his *qinwang* campaigns in 1274 while a student of the National University. Having donated his family fortune to the Song cause, Wang had urged Wen to do the same in order to build up the army with Huai mercenaries.⁴ Shortly thereafter, Wang obtained permission to quit the resistance because his father had just died and his mother fallen ill. During Wen's captivity after January 1279, Wang wrote an essay to urge Wen to accept the finality of the loyalist defeat and to im-

1. SS 418.12539.

2. For this account, see *ibid.*; Wen Tianxiang, 17.41a-b. For Wang Jiweng's biography, see YS 184.4229.

3. Deng Guangjian's account has Qingyang Mengyan rather than Liu Mengyan objecting to the petition. See Wen Tianxiang, 17.41b.

4. "Funerary address to Chief Minister Wen (before his actual death)," in Wang Yanwu, 4.1a-b.

Chapter Four

mediately commit suicide to stop speculation and questioning about his loyalty. Wang then made numerous copies of the essay and with a friend posted them in conspicuous places between Ganzhou and Yanzhou, hoping that Wen on his journey to Dadu would see at least one copy and thereby hasten his decision to die.¹

This essay, written in the form of an elegy to mourn Wen before his actual death, lists the reasons why Wen must as soon as possible take his own life. First, Wen's literary accomplishments had helped to maintain the status of Confucian scholars. Second, he had amply fulfilled filial piety towards both parents. Third, by ranking first in the *jinsi* examination at twenty years of age and by advancing to general and chief minister by the age of forty, Wen had put into practice what he studied. Fourth, he himself had stated that he was repeatedly close to death and expressed anxiety that if indeed he had died during any of those times, his virtue as a subject would not be glorious and untarnished. Wang argues that since Wen had already proven his loyalty in defending Fujian and Guangdong provinces, even if the attempted restoration failed in the end, his integrity was without doubt. What Wen now owed to the Song should be his own death:

Surely the chief minister [Wen] does not still wish to escape, or is your mind set at not yielding and your goal aimed at not dying? Or is it because the former ruler [Gongdi] is still alive and you cannot bear to let go of life? . . . Men of distinction and mark know what to do at the right moment. If even with the strength of the entire southeast [the Song] could not prevent the fall of Xiangyang, now as one man in a defeated country [how could you] hope to resist the [Yuan] empire? Furthermore, the orphan of Zhao has leapt into the sea . . . Now the situation cannot be helped, and the country and ruler have both been seized. Regarding the duty of subject and son towards ruler and father, in approaching great virtue

1. *Ibid.*, 4.2a-3a.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

and making a decision on a [national] calamity, if nothing can be done, then they should bend their purpose and endure a righteous death . . . Li Ling [d. 74 B. C.] capitulated but said: "If there is an opportunity I will then cut my own throat to show my [loyal] intentions." . . . Even if the chief minister is now not a Li Ling [i. e., defector or turncoat] . . . but as the days and months accumulate, your ambitions will dissipate and your spirit will rot, and then even if you had not been a [Li] Ling, you might turn out to be [like] him. Would that not be regretful?¹

It is not known whether Wen actually read Wang's essay. But in Dadu while Wen awaited his fate in prison, Wang Yuanliang, the former Song court musician and poet who had accompanied the imperial family to the North, also advised Wen to die quickly and become a martyr to the cause:

From Yaishan you were captured and taken to Yan [Dadu];
Here the decision to embrace virtue and attain
righteousness is difficult.
Live, you will be shamed next to Boyi and Shuqi
for partaking of Zhou grain;
Die, you will emulate Zhang Xun [709-57] and Xu
Yuan [d. 757], the Tang officials.
The snow is leveled, the garrison blocked--where
will be the abode of your soul?
The full moon passing through the Heng mountain--
the bones are not yet cold.
One strike of the sword is what you, sir, owe [to
the Song];

1. *Ibid.*, 4.3a-4a. On Li Ling, see Giles, no. 1171. After reading Wang's essay, the Yuan official and literary figure Jie Xisi (1274-1344) was convinced that Wen was of the same heart as Wang, and even if Wen's mind had not been set on dying, the essay would surely have moved him. See Cheng Minzheng, 1.2a-3a.

Chapter Four

A pure page of history you must retain for posterity.¹

More important than whether Wang Yanwu and Wang Yuanliang influenced Wen's determination to die is their motive for writing the elegies. They were concerned that Wen, the hero and justification for their loyalism, should not be blemished, but be a shining example to the movement they identified with. His martyrdom would thus lend dignity to the Song cause that they believed in. It was imperative that Wen become a martyr immediately because they were now resigned to the fate of total conquest and felt not the slightest hope for a Song restoration. Furthermore, in view of the defection of Wen's brother, genuine doubts may have been circulating at the time about whether Wen could maintain his loyalty to the end.

Wen in his conversations with Yuan authorities insisted on his desire not to serve two dynasties and not to waver from his determination to die. But from 1276 until his first two years of imprisonment in Dadu, Wen vacillated between hopes of escape and a wish for an early death; only by 1281 was he finally reconciled to the hopelessness of a Song revival. Incarcerated in a small, dark, damp room, he sustained his faith by writing about the personalities and events of the loyalist resistance. What in particular kept his spirit intact was a keen awareness of his historical role among the ranks of praiseworthy predecessors. In his immortal poem, "Zhengqi ge" (Song of the upright spirit), he avers that the upright spirit manifests itself in the cosmos as well as in human affairs.² He lists twelve historical figures who had been his inspiration and guiding lights. Among them were the Grand Historian Qi and his three brothers who were executed because they had insisted on an accurate portrayal of a regicide; Su Wu (d. 60 B. C.) who did not capitulate after nineteen years of imprisonment even though his erstwhile friend, Li Ling,

1. Wang Yuanliang, *Shuiyun ji*, 35b-36a. This poem is entitled "Mourning Chief Minister Wen (before his actual death)." On Zhang Xun, see Giles, no. 63.

2. Wen Tianxiang, 14.39a-40a. For a translation of this poem and a brief description of these historical personages, see Carsun Chang, 348-53. Chang is mistaken on some points; e.g. on p. 35 he translates *jian* as a surname rather than "bamboo slips" and on p. 353 he transcribes *Tsin* as *Qin*.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

had defected; Yan Gaoqing (692-756) who berated the rebels to the Tang throne until his tongue was cut off; Zu Ti (266-321), who, vowing to return home, i.e. North China, launched a successful battle against the northern invaders; and Zhuge Liang (181-234), whose military campaigns symbolized the reunification of the country.¹ Interestingly, Wen did not mention Song exemplars, not even Yue Fei, among his heroes.

In prison Wen also pondered his losses and sacrifices for the Song cause. He had used up his personal wealth and involved his entire family in his convictions and loyalist activities. During the war years he had lost his wife and two concubines, sons and daughters to either death, disappearance, or capture by the Yuan forces. His two brothers-in-law perished in battle after joining his armies, and he especially felt guilty towards his widowed sisters, who together with his wife and daughters were enslaved by the Yuan authorities. Left without a living son, Wen in 1280 adopted as his heir the son of his younger brother Bi; like Bi, this adopted son and his descendants later took office under the Yuan. Wen's guilt towards his family was poignant, and he wrote poems to express his distress and helplessness about their fate.² Through such personal experience of guilt, Wen now understood the dilemma some of his friends and relatives had encountered and why they had capitulated and later served the Yuan. Certainly by 1280 his criticism of the defectors had toned down. While in prison he received several visitors, all of whom then had some direct contact with the Yuan administration. For instance, Deng Guangjian was in the service of Zhang Hongfan, Wen's captor and the general responsible for inflicting defeat on the loyalist forces at Yai-shan. Jia Xuanweng was detained in Hejian and employed as an instructor. Wang Yuanliang was an official at Qubilai's court. Towards such men who found themselves in these compromising positions, Wen's affections did not change. He acknowledged that Bi, for instance, had to look after family affairs and ensure a proper burial and mourning for their mother, who had died in 1278. In a poem about the meeting, Wen regrets that the two brothers

1. On Su Wu, Yan Gaoqing, Zu Ti, and Zhuge Liang, see Giles, nos. 1792, 2467, 2033, and 459.

2. Wen Tianxiang, 14.23a-24a.

Chapter Four

were about to part forever but admits that alternatives existed for individuals, as in the case of the three virtuous ministers of the Shang who criticized King Zhou (r. 1050 B. C.) for his excesses. Later, Weizi served the conquerors and lived, Jizi pretended to be insane and survived, but Bigan resisted and was killed. The poem reads:

Last year we parted and subsequently I took leave
from the peaks.
This year you also have arrived at Yan [Dadu].
Brothers--one imprisoned and the other riding [freely] on a horse--
Father and mother we shared but our fates are [now] different.
Pity us brothers, together and apart
In this life it has not yet been fifty years.
The Three Virtuous Ministers lived and died according
to their choice,
Distant is the white sun across the grey mist.¹

In sum, in the last three years of his life Wen's loyalism had become less self-righteous than before, harsh experience making him more realistic and pragmatic than disillusioned and frustrated. To former followers and subordinates who had deserted him, Wen's words were not bitter. But to those with whom he had no personal relationship and men he judged to be without morals such as Liu Mengyan, Wen remained critical.

Although he experienced some poignant doubts and could tolerate a less pure form of loyalty among his friends and acquaintances, Wen himself could not avoid death. In addition to his political loyalty to the Song dynasty, Wen felt other personal loyalties which would not permit him to have doubts cast on his integrity. Having always been convinced of the great impact his conduct would have on both the present and the future, death had to come sooner or later for the sake of maintaining glory for his family, his place of birth, and even for his fellow graduates from the civil service examinations. Two events finally alarmed Qubilai about keeping Wen alive. One was of an

1. "Upon hearing the arrival of Bi," in *ibid.*, 15.15a-b.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

astronomical nature: the conjunction of Saturn with the constellation of Hercules, interpreted by the Yuan court to be an inauspicious omen. The second was the revelation of a clandestine uprising that implicated Wen.¹ Suspicious of subversion, Qubilai immediately transferred Gongdi to Shangdu and ordered Wen to be executed. Facing death in the market quarter of Dadu, Wen showed tranquility and relief that his long ordeal was about to end. In a self-evaluation, Wen expressed his satisfaction that he had fulfilled his life's purpose and attained the morality of the Confucian sages.²

When Wen died in early 1283, most of his subordinates and followers had predeceased him. While Wen was unpopular among the veteran court officials and other leaders of the resistance, paradoxically he had no trouble mobilizing support at the lower levels each time his forces were destroyed in battle. The first recruitment campaign took place in January 1273 in Ji and Gan prefectures where he was officially based; in the next few years he launched operations in Pingjiang, Nanjian, Tingzhou, and Chaozhou, all of which received local popular support.

Appendix D contains the names of forty-four personal supporters of Wen who died during their loyalist activities.³ Most of these men were from Wen's native province of Jiangxi, but others came from Anhui, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Guangdong. In most cases they were locally based people who, in 1275-79, responded to Wen's appeal to restore to Song loyalist control regions which had been captured by the Yuan forces. Almost two-thirds had civilian careers or backgrounds before taking up arms, i.e., they had either passed their *jinshi* or district examinations or were Confucian scholars. Only one-third had purely military training or experience either as military officials or town ruffians who had earlier been engaged in physical combat. This proportion of civilian to military backgrounds is strikingly similar to the *zhongyi* loyalists with biographies in the *Songshi*, 63.6% as com-

1. SS 418.12539-40.

2. SS 418.12540. For a translation of this self-evaluation, see Carsun Chang, 347.

3. The source for this appendix is Deng Guangjian's *Wen Chengxiang dufu zhongyi zhuan*, in *Wen Tianxiang*, 19.41b-52b.

Chapter Four

pared to 62.5%. All had personal relationships with Wen and willingly acknowledged his leadership. One-half were "followers," or local men who recruited troops and voluntarily attached themselves to Wen's military headquarters, while another quarter were *landsmen* with whom he had been acquainted earlier. There were also poet friends and acquaintances from the 1250s to the early 1270s, fellow graduates of 1256, a teacher, relatives and colleagues in the resistance efforts. Finally, as to the cause of death, two-thirds were killed in battle, and the rest died by suicide or from illness and distress caused by the defeat. The fate of several men was unknown to Wen and the *Songshi* compilers, but they are presumed to have also perished soon after the defeat at Yaishan.

The structure of this network of relationships closely suggests the traditional *mufu* system (tent or military administration).¹ The forty-four loyal martyrs were part of Wen's personal retinue, which consisted of his guests, friends, colleagues, classmates, fellow graduates, *landsmen*, and relatives--relationships which had a social or familial basis. It also consisted of a large number of local officials, scholars, and town ruffians who found it convenient and opportune to join his campaigns. Wen used some military experts as consultants in operations and sent others to various prefectures to recruit aborigines, mercenaries, town ruffians, as well as tenants and slaves. Because Wen had an official appointment, first as military supervisor of Jiangxi and later as commissioner of Military Affairs, he also appointed his personal advisers and stalwarts to various offices. In his writings they are referred to by the titles which he had given them.²

All of these men were personally connected with Wen in one way or another; their loyalty was thus not merely directed to the Song state and emperor, but especially to Wen himself. The relationship was to an extent reciprocal: while Wen's followers remained loyal to him, he was fair, generous, and protective towards them. He did not criticize severely those who deserted him, but merely noted that such and such a person had fled and taken

1. For a broad historical outline of the traditional *mufu* system, see Kenneth E. Folsom, 1-39.

2. Wen Tianxiang, 16, *et passim*.

some gold.¹ Such an attitude might have been responsible for the personal devotion that Wen received from his supporters who obviously felt that they owed him something that they must repay. While in prison he paid final tribute to them by commemorating their loyalist deeds in his writings.² Although both Wen and his followers prescribed death as the ultimate end for Wen himself, he permitted other alternatives for his followers, such as resignation if they had certain obligations to meet.³ But Wen was a strict commander and demanded unyielding discipline from his men. In 1277, in order to restore order and set an example, he did not hesitate to court-martial two corrupt generals.⁴ His strictness with the unruly bandit Chen Yi may have caused the latter to turn against him and become informer to the Yuan general Zhang Hongfan who captured Wen. The sources indicate that Wen's men did not molest the local population but offered payment for food and supplies. It was partly due to such discipline that the local population supported Wen's resistance efforts.

Li Tingzhi and His "Little Court"

I have earlier argued that Li Tingzhi's role in Song defense and loyalist resistance was much more significant and crucial than previously acknowledged. Among the loyalist leaders Li actually had the most distinguished career and the longest experience in his dual roles as civilian and military official as well as central and local administrator. Li's family was

1. See, e.g., "Arrival at Yangzhou," in Wen Tianxiang, 13.37b-38a.

2. They appear mostly in the *Ji Dushi* (Wen Tianxiang, 16), which forms the basis for Deng Guangjian's *Wen chengxiang dufu zhongyi zhuan*.

3. For instance, Wang Yanwu was readily released of his political duties to look after his mother. See Wang Yanwu, 4.1a.

4. "At Meizhou," in Wen Tianxiang, 16.20b-21a.

Chapter Four

based in Bianliang (Kaifeng) but had moved to Suizhou (Hubei).¹ Both his literary talents and military skills were demonstrated early. In 1240 when the Yangzi fortifications were threatened, Li approached the much admired Song general Meng Gong (1195-1246) with his military proposals.² Meng was immensely impressed and sent him to Sichuan, where in a subprefecture Li excelled in supervising agriculture and recruiting militia units. Several years later he sat for and passed the *jinshi* examination, whereupon he returned to Meng's service as an archivist and clerk. Meng was appreciative of Li's talents and just before he died, he made a special request to Jia Sidao to appoint Li as his successor. Li, in turn, was devoted to Meng and spent the next three years mourning him.

Li subsequently became a close associate of Jia, who was then garrisoning the Jing-Hu region. After Li had completed his mourning period, Jia hired him as a consultant in the regulator's office.³ Li was later transferred to the Huai region, where he had the opportunity to plan its defense and administration with Jia. Ten years later when Jia was promoted to pacifying commissioner of Jing-Hu, Li was left to take charge of the Huai region including Yangzhou. After the Mongols retreated from Ezhou in 1259, Li resigned to mourn his mother who had just died but was summoned to return to office to assume Jia Sidao's former position, regulator of the Huai region where in 1260-61 he repelled Li Tan's incursions. He also brought about quick economic recovery in Yangzhou after a catastrophic fire and drought.

Li's administration of the Huai throughout the 1260s was considered benevolent and he therefore gained the confidence of scholars and talented people who flocked to his *mufu*. Himself a product of the *mufu* of Meng Gong, he now gathered around him a retinue of individuals whose skills he

1. Li Tingzhi's biography is in SS 421.12599-603. Unofficial biographies of Li, such as that in *Zhaozhong lu*, are few and do not add to the SS account. The only modern study of Li is Li Qingyai's "Shu Li Tingzhi." It is highly laudatory in nature, solely based on traditional accounts, and does not provide additional information about Li.

2. Meng Gong's biography is in SS 412.12369-80.

3. SS 421.12600.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

fostered. Among his men with a background of civil service were Lu Xiufu, Hu Sanxing, Gong Kai, Yin Gu (d. 1274), and Zhong Jiyu (d. 1274); those with military training were Bian Juyi, Jiang Cai, Su Liuyi, and Ruan Kesi.¹ Zhang Shijie had begun his career in the Huai, thus he most likely also had a personal relationship with Li Tingzhi.² Lu, Gong, Bian, and Juan were Li's *landsmen*; Jiang Cai and Zhang Shijie were defectors from the North who had started their careers as obscure soldiers in the Huai army that Li controlled. All these individuals later distinguished themselves as loyalists; all except for Gong Kai and Hu Sanxing died as *zhongyi* martyrs to the loyalist cause.³ After Li's death in 1276, Lu Xiufu, Su Liuyi, and Zhang Shijie continued to play prominent roles in the loyalist resistance. With this large talented group, it was no wonder that Li's *mufu* was called a "little court."⁴ Apart from developing their special talents, Li recommended them to the Hangzhou court, as he did with Lu Xiufu, Su Liuyi, and most certainly Zhang Shijie.⁵ There can be little doubt that Li influenced his protégés and reinforced their commitment to the Song; his distrust of Wen Tianxiang in March 1276 must have also affected their attitude to Wen and accounted for Wen's sharp criticism of Li.

In 1269 Li was ordered to relieve the siege of Xiangyang, but his efforts were gravely undermined by Fan Wenhui. Li thus shared the blame with Lü Wenhuan for its collapse and was demoted while his subordinates, includ-

1. For the connection with Li Tingzhi, see the biographies of Bian Juyi, Jiang Cai, Yin Gu, Lu Xiufu, and Zhong Jiyu (SS 450.13250, 450.13257, 451.13268, 451.13275, 454.13344). For the relationship to Gong Kai and Hu Sanxing, see Wan Sitong, *Songji zhongyi lu*, 15.1; Chen Yuan, *Tongjian*, 409-10.

2. Zhang Shijie and Su Liuyi could well have been acquainted through a mutual connection with Lü Wende in the 1260s.

3. Hu Sanxing and Gong Kai survived as *yimin* loyalists.

4. SS 451.13275. See also Gong Kai, 13b.

5. SS 451.13275.

Chapter Four

ing Su Liuyi, were banished.¹ When Li was restored to his rank shortly thereafter, he persuaded the court to let Xia Gui, a veteran general, take charge of Huaixi while he concentrated on the defense of Huaidong. In 1275, after the fall of Ezhou, Li and his subordinates constantly mobilized men to strengthen Yangzhou's fortifications; even several months after the occupation of Hangzhou, they continued to resist the Mongol forces. By then the many years of warfare had taken their toll in Yangzhou: food supplies dwindled and many inhabitants drowned themselves in the river or starved on the roads. In spite of several edicts by the Song imperial family to surrender, Li did not relent but continued to resist the conquest with support from his dauntless and faithful generals, Miao Zaicheng (d. 1276) in Zhenzhou and Jiang Cai in Yangzhou. Unlike Yue Fei, who would have immediately laid down arms when requested by his sovereign, Li's loyalty was directed at the survival of the Song dynasty and thus he persisted in that goal to the end. Only in June 1276, after Li and Jiang Cai set out to join the loyalist court in Wenzhou, did Yangzhou surrender under its local administrator. Li's wife was taken hostage to persuade him to surrender. Unflinchingly, he tried unsuccessfully to drown himself; he was later captured at Taizhou and taken to Yangzhou when both he and Jiang were executed.²

The sources dealing with Li's relationship with the population of Yangzhou are contradictory. On the one hand, we are told that the people were grateful to him for restoring Yangzhou's economy in the 1260s and that after his death they wept profusely for him.³ On the other hand, the local administration which surrendered to the Mongols condemned Li for having put the city through many years of hardship. The surrendering official asked that Li be executed in revenge for having inflicted this calamity on the people. Thus the two groups responded differently to loyalist resistance, but both perceived Li as a central official who put state interests above local concerns. Li had an irascible temper, shown often when he killed emissaries who came

1. SS 421.12601.

2. SS 421.12602.

3. SS 421.12600, 421.12602.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

to persuade him to surrender. His general attitude towards his subordinates, however, was generous and apparently fair. To feed his soldiers adequately he exhausted the grain reserves of civilians, local officials, and officers, and perhaps thereby incurring their resentment. The soldiers, in return, fought bravely and stood by him.¹

Lu Xiufu and Zhang Shijie in the Refugee Court

Of the talented men patronized by Li Tingzhi, Lu Xiufu achieved the greatest stature as a loyalist leader.² A native of Zhenjiang, Lu was a fellow graduate of Wen Tianxiang in the 1256 *jinshi* examination, but the two did not meet again until 1275 in Hangzhou or 1276 in Foochow at Di Shi's enthronement.³ After attaining his *jinshi* degree Lu did not quickly become a distinguished civilian official, but later found himself in the personal retinue of Li Tingzhi. In about 1274 Lu was recommended to and accepted by the central bureaucracy in Hangzhou. He soon advanced to a high position, and in 1275, as vice-president of the Ministry of Rites, his initial mission was to negotiate peace with the Mongols.⁴ A year later he escorted the two Song princes to the southeast and together with Zhang Shijie joined Chen Yizhong in Wenzhou. Lu was a placid man and got along with most loyalist leaders, even Wen Tianxiang. At first he had a working relationship with Chen Yizhong because the latter relied heavily on his military experience gained from his close contact with Li Tingzhi.⁵ However, in late 1276 the two quarreled and Lu was exiled to Chaozhou. As a result of Zhang Shijie's mediation, Lu was soon summoned back to the loyalist court.

1. SS 421.12602.

2. Lu Xiufu's biography is in SS 451.13275-77. There are indications that it was based on a fuller biography by Lu's friend, Gong Kai; see Cheng Minzheng, 10.8b-12a.

3. The SS is mistaken in stating that Lu gained the *jinshi* degree in 1260. Lu's name appears in the *Dengke lu* which contains the 1256 graduate list.

4. SS 451.13275.

5. SS 451.13275-76.

Chapter Four

In spite of his military experience, Lu served only as a civilian official during the loyalist resistance. Throughout the three years he taught the two princes the Confucian classics and kept the court records and diaries. After Chen Yizhong's departure from the loyalist court, Lu was the key person in both financial and personnel administration, drafting edicts and official documents, while Zhang Shijie was in charge of military decisions and operations. After Di Shi died in April 1278, the entire loyalist court was about to disperse, but Lu rallied sufficient support to enthrone yet another successor, Di Bing.¹ At the battle of Yaishan, when defeat was imminent, rather than subject the prince to capture and undignified incarceration, he first forced his own wife and children to jump into the ocean before himself leaping in with Di Bing.² This was a bold move, as it could have been construed by future generations as an act of regicide. Lu's loyalty to the Song dynasty has not, however, been questioned because he made himself and his family martyrs to the Song cause.³

Of all the loyalist leaders, only Zhang Shijie had a purely military career; biographical details about him are also the sparsest.⁴ He was a native of Fanyang, a clansman of the eminent general Zhang Rou who defected from the Jurchens to the Mongols. After committing a crime in North China, Zhang Shijie had defected to the Southern Song. Like Jiang Cai, another defector to the Song, Zhang was attached to the Huai army, then under the con-

1. SS 451.13276.

2. Luo Xianglin doubts whether Di Bing had perished with Lu Xiufu. See his "Song wangtai," 140-41. Luo draws upon Zheng Sixiao's *Xinshi* for supporting evidence, yet in his *Pu Shougeng zhuan* he emphatically declares the *Xinshi* to be a Ming forgery (pp. 12, 31-32). I think Gong Kai's information is accurate, because he obtained it through an eyewitness, albeit by way of several other informants. See also Huang Jin, 3.6a.

3. Lu's descendants survived through a son left behind in Chaozhou, where Lu was exiled for a brief period in 1276. See Jiang Yixue, 6-7.

4. Zhang's biography is in SS 451.13272; the fullest account of Zhang is in connection with the Yaishan defeat in *Zhaozhong lu*, 34-36.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

trol of Li Tingzhi.¹ Zhang was already active in the late 1250s, when his military prowess attracted the attention of the veteran general Lü Wende (d. 1269). Another loyalist figure, Su Liuyi, was then in Lü's service and likely made Zhang's acquaintance. Zhang also fought in Ezhou with Jia Sidao, and from 1268 to 1275 distinguished himself defending Song fortifications against Mongol advances.²

During the period of Song defense and loyalist resistance, Zhang felt that as a northerner he was discriminated against and suspected by Chen Yizhong. Chen was then commander-in-chief who took Zhang's personal troops from his command and assigned him to other units; in addition, Zhang, who was an expert in land warfare, was put in charge of the naval forces while Liu Shiyong, the naval expert, was given control of the army.³ It turned out, however, that the Huai soldiers who were dispatched to Foochow and Quanzhou continued to be loyal to Zhang.⁴

Just before Empress Dowager Xie surrendered Hangzhou, Zhang took some troops to join the two princes, passing Qingyuan on the way, where he failed to rally support for the loyalist resistance. Zhang's crucial role in recovering Fujian and Guangdong was commended by Wen Tianxiang.⁵ However, Zhang took the entire blame for conceiving and executing the strategy of Yaishan, which resulted in a colossal defeat for the loyalist fleet. Zhang escaped with a remnant force but was soon killed in a typhoon on his way to Champa where he had hoped to continue the resistance.⁶ Because of his val-

1. SS 451.13267-68, 451.13272.

2. SS 451.13272-73.

3. *Songji sanchao* 5.59; Bi Yuan, 181.4944.

4. SS 47.943.

5. Wen Tianxiang, 16.11a-b.

6. SS 451.13274. However, Zhou Mi indicates that Zhang Shijie was killed by a subordinate, Zhou Wenying (fl. 1270-1290) who then surrendered to the Mongols. See Zhou Mi, *Guixin zazhi*, xu b.18b-20a.

Chapter Four

iant military record and his death in pursuit of his goal, Zhang's martyrdom has also taken on heroic dimensions.

Xie Fangde: A "Latent" Zhongyi Martyr

Xie Fangde was a native of Xinzhou and a *jinshi* graduate of 1256.¹ Considered together with Lu Xiufu and Wen Tianxiang as one of the most brilliant graduates, he did not develop a relationship with either Lu or Wen after gaining the degree. A short and ugly man, Xie's outstanding literary talents and his eloquent if blunt discourses on politics were well known to his contemporaries.² He also acquired military skills from an early age. After several obscure and brief appointments, Xie returned to his native Xinzhou and nearby Fuzhou to persuade powerful gentry members to strengthen the local militia. In this endeavor he was later implicated in Jia Sidao's auditing regulations in the early 1260s; he fell into disgrace and ended up repaying the expenses rejected by the auditing teams. Xie also criticized Jia Sidao's land reform scheme, an act for which he was further demoted.

Xie's next appearance on the political scene was in 1274 when, because of his close friendship with Lü Shikui (nephew of Lü Wenhuan, a defector to the Mongols), he convinced the Hangzhou court of Lü Shikui's loyalty to the Song. Xie also volunteered to persuade Lü Wenhuan to return to the Song, the court having agreed to absolve the latter of the crime of surrendering Xiangyang. To carry out his mission as an official of the Song court, Xie was appointed supervisor of Jiangzhou and later pacifying commissioner of Jiangxi, in charge of Xinzhou.³ When Lü Shikui defected to the Mongols and Xie did not even meet with Lü Wenhuan, Xie was embarrassed but not penalized by the Song court. He continued to supervise military defenses in Anren and Xinzhou against Lü Shikui and the Yuan army. The defenses of

1. Xie's biography (SS 525.12687-90) seems to have been based on the earliest (ca. 1289) account of him in the *Zhaozhong lu*, 36-39. In 1318 Xie's son also obtained a biography of Xie by Li Daoyuan.

2. *Zhaozhong lu*, 36.

3. SS 425.12688.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

Xinzhou collapsed shortly before the capitulation of Hangzhou, whereupon Xie went into hiding.¹ When he heard about the enthronement of Di Shi, he reemerged and was appointed regulator of Jiangdong, relying on the militia units he had earlier built up in his native subprefecture, Yiyang.² By August 1276 most of his units had disbanded; after handing over the remnants to another loyalist general, Xie fled to the Jiangxi and Fujian border with his aged mother. There, he changed his name and lived in dilapidated hostels; wearing hempen clothes and straw sandals, he wailed uncontrollably in public --so strange a sight that passersby regarded him as mad.³ His wife, two sons, a daughter, a nephew, an uncle, and maids were soon captured and all except for his sons were killed or committed suicide because of their uncompromising attitudes towards their captors.⁴ The sons were compelled to serve as family tutors to Yuan officials and were released after six years. After having located their father, the elder son looked after the grandmother while the younger son stayed with Xie and sold shoes for a living.

From 1276 to 1289 Xie spent his life in Jianyang (Fujian province) as a fortuneteller, scholar, and teacher. In fact, it was not a drastic change in his life from scholar-official to recluse, for despite a political career lasting twenty-one years, he was actually in office for less than eight months.⁵ During

1. *Ibid.*

2. There is some confusion as to whether Xie fled from the Song battles, either just before Hangzhou surrendered or in mid-1276 after he had joined the loyalist resistance. I think the latter is correct: Xie later wrote that he did not obey Empress Dowager Xie and surrender in February 1276 after the capitulation of the Song imperial family because he saw it as his duty to continue to defend the country whereas Empress Dowager Xie saw it as her obligation to save lives by requesting her subjects to surrender. See Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 4.10b (letter to Liu Mengyan). Only sixteen out of sixty-four original *juan* of Xie's collected writings survive. There has also been doubt as to whether all of the surviving sixteen *juan* were in fact Xie's own writings. See Zhang Xincheng, 1161.

3. *SS* 425.12688.

4. *Zhaozhong lu*, 37; *SS* 425.12690.

5. Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 4.1b, in a letter to Cheng Jufu declining appointment to office.

Chapter Four

this period, his primary concern was to look after his mother, and because he made only a meager living by telling fortunes he gratefully accepted gifts of food, clothing, brushes, and paper.¹ He maintained close contact with loyalist friends in Jianyang, such as Xiong He (1253-1312), a former Song official who repeatedly refused Yuan employment.² Xie, however, associated himself mostly with other fortunetellers, medical healers, and Daoist priests; he later taught many students. In order to console himself over the demise of the Song and to develop his talents, Xie became a literary critic, educator, poet, and annotator of the Confucian classics and other literary writings.³ His grief over the dynasty's collapse is poignantly recorded in his annotations on the *Shijing* (Book of poetry), in which he described the fall of the Eastern Zhou (771-221 B.C.) as the enormous shame of the Middle Kingdom and likened it to the present plight. In this work he also commented on the concepts and practice of loyalty, filial piety, and antiforeign sentiment.⁴

After living for ten years under the new dynasty, Xie became increasingly sensitive to the abuses of officials and administrators, many of whom were northerners, and personally championed the plight of the former Song scholar-officials whose economic and social status had sharply declined. He wrote that nine out of ten Confucian scholars had escaped into occupations such as Buddhist monks, Daoist priests, medical healers, and carpenters because the salary of a scholar-official was not adequate to keep him from hun-

1. Xie's collected writings, *Dieshan ji*, contain many poems and essays thanking his benefactors for their generous donations. See especially *juan* 3.

2. Xiong He's "Reply to a suggestion to quit drinking," in his *Xiong Wuxuan xiansheng wenji*, 5.63-64, compares his refusal of Yuan employment to someone who would not give up drinking to serve an enlightened ruler.

3. Other extant writings by Xie are mostly annotations and commentaries: on Tang and Song prose, see his *Wenzhang guifan*; on Tang regulated poetry, see his *Xie Dieshan Tangshi jueju zhujie*; on miscellaneous notes about poets, see *Bihu zaji*.

4. See, in particular, his comments on the "Shuli" and "Yuanyou tao" poems in *Shijing*, in his *Shi Zhuan zhushu*, a.8a-9a and a.18a-19a.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

ger and cold.¹ He sighed that scholars were ridiculed for their lowly socio-economic status, being in the ninth category, one rank above beggars and one below prostitutes.² Although this has been proven by several modern scholars to be an unsubstantiated statement, the decline in the scholarly profession's prestige and privilege was there for all to see. Xie wholeheartedly supported his friend's decision to become a recluse in order to "transcend the ten [social] classes."³ Xie associated himself with a wider circle of acquaintances that also included Yuan officials. In 1286 he bade farewell to the local subprefect, a northerner from a military family, and commended him for his three years of benevolent administration. He strongly approved his plan to go to Dadu to seek a better post and asked him to convey his regards to his former friends Liu Mengyan, Lü Shikui, Jia Xuanweng, and Qingyang Mengyan (fl. 1270-90) who were then serving in the Yuan government.⁴ Xie also wrote to Yuan officials to recommend a great-grandson of Zhu Xi for an appointment as director of a local school.⁵ Xie already knew the official, for whose father he had written a funerary inscription.⁶ These contacts with the Yuan government indicate that, contrary to popular tradition, Xie Fangde's loyalism was not absolute to the point of total isolation from the new government.

Such a life was typical of a *yimin* loyalist living under the Mongols but still feeling loyal to the former Song dynasty. Although Xie dealt with Yuan officials and approved of his sons and friends serving the new govern-

1. "Preface to bidding farewell to Fang Bozai who is returning to Sanshan," in Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 6.4a.

2. *Ibid.*, 6.3b. Cf. Zheng Sixiao, *Xinshi*, 129.

3. Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 6.4b-5a.

4. "Preface to sending off Subprefect Shi to the capital," in *ibid.*, 6.2b.

5. "Letter to Administrator Mu of Jianning recommending School Director Zhu," in *ibid.*, 5.3a-4a.

6. "Funerary inscription for Mr. Mu," in *ibid.*, 8.1a-4b.

Chapter Four

ment, his loyalty to the Song did not permit him to take up an appointment. He felt strongly about the Mongols being foreigners, and often expressed in his writings his resentment that since the "Middle Kingdom was established by the Five Emperors and Three Kings," there had never been a case of total subjugation of the dynasty under alien rule until the Mongol conquest.¹ As a subject of the former dynasty, he believed it was improper to serve the new conquerors. He considered that his duty should have been to die or commit suicide in order to requite the Song, but filial obligations to his aged mother took precedence over loyalty. His sense of filial commitment was so extreme that he felt he was not released from it until the mourning period for his mother was over and some means were found to bury her properly. She died in 1286. Immediately after that came the first of at least five attempts to recruit him for service in the Yuan government, most probably because of his reputation as a scholar and fortuneteller.

Cheng Jufu (1249-1318) was the Yuan official involved with the 1286-87 mission to recruit southern Chinese.² Cheng was himself a southern scholar who had been taken as a hostage to the Yuan capital when his uncle surrendered to the Mongols. Xie did not reproach him for serving the new government but begged him to understand his own reasons for refusing employment.³ He would be opposing Heaven and Earth to accept an appointment while in mourning; moreover, as a subject who had lost his country, he should not even continue to live. Xie further asserted that the Song had collapsed because filial piety was not fostered by the state after 1274. Ministers such as Jia Sidao, Wen Tianxiang, Chen Yizhong, and Liu Fu were not permitted to complete their mourning periods but were recalled to service. In Xie's view, this moral decay had hastened the Song demise and therefore the Yuan should take this neglect of filial obligations as a lesson to avoid its own

1. "Preface to sending off Huang Liuyou who is returning to Sanshan," in *ibid.*, 6.6a-b.

2. Cheng Jufu's biography is in *YS* 171.4015-18. On the 1286-87 mission to recruit talented men from south China, see Yao Congwu, "Cheng Jufu yu Hubilie;" Sun Kekuan, "Jiangnan fangxian yu Yanyou ruzhi," in his *Menggu hanjun*, 345-63; Yuan Ji, 41-57.

3. Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 4.2a-3b.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

collapse.

Later, after his former teacher Liu Mengyan recommended him to office, Xie was incensed and sarcastic. In the letter rejecting Liu's offer, Xie launched a caustic attack on Liu's service to the Yuan despite the high offices he had attained under the Song:

The fact that there are no talented men in Jiangnan [South China] has never been as shameful as today You, sir, were a top graduate in your youth; in late life you became chief minister. In merits, titles, wealth, and prestige--it can be said that your ambitions have been fulfilled. You then galloped four thousand *li* to Dadu to pay respects to the Great Yuan--could it be because you wanted to inquire about the [Song] emperor and empress dowagers, and let the world and posterity know that the righteousness between ruler and minister could not be deserted Recently . . . the provincial government of Jiang-Huai brought down an imperial order to the South to seek good men Once this order was proclaimed, everyone laughed. Why? It is because there have not been good men, proper men, in Jiangnan for a long time. Those who say that [i.e., you] are all deceiving [the Yuan] . . . The reasons why I absolutely cannot serve are threefold. First, my old mother died at ninety-three and is still buried in shallow soil . . . My wife, daughter, and maids died in prison because of their relationship to me . . . and five [other] persons, my nephews and younger brothers, who died for the country--their spirits cannot be found and their wandering souls cannot be summoned. . . The second reason is . . . in 1276 after I was relieved of military command, abandoned my office and fled afar, I did not surrender Even if Boyi and Shuqi did not serve the Zhou dynasty and ate moss at the Western mountains, they must have also known about the grace of King Wu [of the Zhou who conquered the

Chapter Four

Shang]. ... [The third reason why I reject your recommendation is] because the grace I have received from the late [Song] empress dowager had indeed been great¹

In 1288 the local administrator, Wei Tianyou (fl. 1280-1300), wanted to collect a reward for recruiting Xie and thus escorted the latter under heavy guard to the Yuan capital. Xie escaped once but after recapture, realized that he could not in the end avoid forced employment with the Yuan and thus made his final decision to die and leave his loyalty intact.² The historical precedent he used to justify his delayed martyrdom was Gong Sheng (68-11 B.C.), who starved to death fourteen years after Wang Mang's (45 B.C.-A.D. 23) usurpation.³ Boyi and Shuqi also died some years after the Shang had collapsed; thus they too became his models for not immediately committing suicide. On his journey to the Yuan capital, Xie's students urged him to take the final step to ensure an untainted reputation in history. One such poem reads:

Thirty years of persistence to perfect your conduct,
Now comes the test to truly show a Confucian immortal.
All others have bent their knees and compromised themselves,
Only you sir, loudly reviled [the captors] directly [to their face].
In this journey, be sure to use your three-inch tongue,
If you return [alive] you will not be worth one cash.
To the end your purity is left intact
And a fragrant name is retained for transmission to
posterity.⁴

1. *Ibid.*, 4.5b, 4.6a, 4.9a-11a.

2. *Ibid.*, 4.11b-14a. Xie also wrote to Wei Tianyou stating his case for refusing an appointment to office.

3. Account of conduct written by his student Hu Yigui, in *ibid.*, 16.7a.

4. *Ibid.*, 2.7b. This was written by his student Zhang Zihui.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

By that time Xie too saw no alternative to death. He eloquently declared his reason for dying: "I only wish to die quickly and leave a name . . . in history, so that I can shame the disloyal subjects of the empire in ten thousand generations."¹ Upon arrival in Dadu, Xie prostrated and mourned Empress Dowager Xie; soon after he refused all food and died from starvation.² For Xie, death occurred thirteen years after the capitulation of Hangzhou, and thus he could be called a "latent" *zhongyi* loyalist. Because of this delay in martyrdom, Xie was able to feel no guilt about abandoning filial obligations. He angrily lambasted those who would not leave him alone and who insisted on recommending him to office:

Let me query you several sirs--to allow one Xie to be a lazy man of the Great Yuan--what harm will it do to the government and the way of the Great Yuan? To kill one Xie to fulfil his martyrdom to the Great Song--what benefit will it reap for the government and the way of the Great Yuan?³

The Women Zhongyi Loyalists

Throughout the accounts and biographies of the Song loyal martyrs, we find numerous cases of whole families dying together for the Song cause. While the male relatives of the family often have separate or attached biographies, the women are mentioned only in passing.⁴ In the *Songshi* six of these women are given biographies in the *lienü zhuan* (group biographies of virtu-

1. *Ibid.*, 4.13a.

2. SS 425.12690; *Zhaozhong lu*, 39.

3. Xie Fangde, *Dieshan ji*, 4.12b.

4. On hagiographies of virtuous women in Chinese history, see Jennifer Holmgren and Xu Bingyu.

Chapter Four

ous women) to commend them for their virtuous conduct in regard to chastity, filial piety to the in-laws and loyalty to the state.¹ All but one were wives (the exception being a concubine) who refused to cooperate with the Yuan administration and died as a result. Their behavior included being filial to in-laws and faithful to husbands, sacrificing their lives to help their husbands escape death, refusing to have sexual relations with their captors, scolding them, and dying or committing suicide. In other sources, daughters followed their fathers to death, as in the case of the university student Xu Yingbiao; mothers also chose to die with their sons, as in the case of the loyalist leader Chen Wenlong.² There were also former palace women who did not submit to the Mongol captors, the reason being that they had already been favored by the former Song emperors or princes. These women were loyal not because of some commitment to the Song cause but because of chastity and filial piety. Loyalists such as Wen Tianxiang and Zhao Maofa were the first to praise their wives for accompanying them in their loyalist mission and for not hesitating to die.³ The foremost concern of these women was not loyalty to the state, but fulfilling their roles as expected by their husbands and fathers. Their death or suicide can thus be observed as complementary acts to the loyalty of their husbands, as conveyed in the traditional dictum: "The loyal subject does not serve two rulers; the virtuous woman does not marry two husbands."⁴

Other sources, however, portray some women as being directly and independently loyal to the Song. In one case a She woman, Xu Furen (Lady

1. These biographies are in SS 460.13489-93.

2. On Xu Yingbiao, see Chapter 2; on Chen Wenlong's mother, see SS 451.13280-81.

3. "Mourning my wife," in Wen Tianxiang, 15.5a; SS 450.13259.

4. Sima Qian, 82.2457. Tao Zongyi's *Nancun zhuogeng lu*, 3.38-40, praises the chaste and heroic women active at the end of the Song.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

Xu, fl. 1270-85), led a force to fight against the Mongols.¹ One imperial concubine hanged herself rather than consent to have sexual relations with her Mongol captors, after declaring her personal commitment to the Song dynasty: "If the country cannot escape from contamination / I can fortunately still avoid tainting my body / Having received the benefits of the Song / I will be ashamed to be a subject of the northern [barbarians]."² In the writings of contemporary literati, singing girls and prostitutes angrily repelled the advances of the Mongol generals and soldiers because they did not wish to be "defiled by barbarian blood." After affirming their loyalty to the Song they committed suicide.³

Loyal martyrs of both sexes expressed their ultimate loyalty by death after berating the enemy and leaving self-righteous testimonies to their loyalty. For the men in general, loyal conduct was defined as direct commitment to the dynasty, but for the women, involvement in the loyalist resistance was mostly indirect but also voluntary. Except for a few like Xie Fangde, they lived and conducted themselves as if they were still under the Song and had no contact with the new order. But in all cases death was the final proof of their virtue and the vindication of any doubts about their behavior. Compared with the *zhongyi* men, a larger proportion of the women committed suicide. Involuntary death and suicide were both salient aspects of the *zhongyi* tradition of loyalists, and both manners of death were considered equally lofty and noble. Suicide certainly had no stigma of cowardice and mental illness. The long tradition of suicide as protest against current politics and wrongful judgment, as well as of a statement of one's noble intentions may be traced to the pre-Shang period, and certainly the Zhou. Qu Yuan's (343-277 B.C.) suicide drew the most attention and myth from history as a dignified form of

1. Lady Xu is mentioned with Chen Diaoyan in Zhang Shijie's biography in *SS* 451.13272. See also *YS* 10.206. She appears to have married Zhou Wenying, whom Zhou Mi believed to have killed Zhang Shijie. See Zhou Mi, *Guixin zazhi*, xu b.20a-b.

2. Zhao Jingliang, 5.17a; Wang Feng, 1.21a-22a.

3. For example, see Xu Dazhuo, b.20a-b.

Chapter Four

political and personal protest.¹ However, throughout various periods, his plunge into the river, while greatly praised, has been considered excessive. Even Southern Song moralists such as Zhu Xi believed that a better alternative for Qu Yuan might have been passive protest or withdrawal from society and politics.² During the Song resistance, there were some to whom the idea of suicide was not acceptable due to other commitments. Xie Fangde's latent martyrdom has been discussed in this connection; the alternative, the *yimin* tradition of loyalists, is the focus of the next chapter.

The Reluctant Defectors and Collaborators: Antithesis of Loyalism?

Traditional and secondary sources share a strong tendency to treat loyalists and defectors as polar opposites. A crucial point that has long been ignored is that both groups had similar experiences in defending the Song during its last years and in loyalist resistance. Some defectors, like loyalists, lost personal fortunes, families and friends in the course of their initial loyalty to the Song. It was accepting neither involuntary death nor suicide as the ultimate solution that divided the defectors and collaborators from the loyalists. What sustained most loyalists was their personal attachment to their leaders, while the latter looked forward to posthumous fame. Defectors and collaborators, by way of contrast, have been seen as pure opportunists without morals, who went over to the winning side to reap the most benefits. Thus in traditional accounts of the final years of Song, they are depicted as defecting as easily as "the wind sways trees." A list appended to the *Songji zhongyi lu* shows that 124 men defected in 1234-79; a modern study indicates 141 men defected in 1238-79.³ Both lists have been compiled from official

1. On Qu Yuan, see Giles, no. 503. His biography is in Sima Qian, 84.2481-91. A translation and commentary can be found in David Hawkes, 11-19. Lawrence A. Schneider's study of Qu Yuan focuses on the mythical lore surrounding him.

2. Sima Qian and Jia Yi (201-169 B.C.) felt that Qu Yuan could have served another state or withdrawn temporarily until the times were more ideal. See Schneider, 21-24. On Zhu Xi's views, see *ibid.*, 76.

3. These two lists are found in Wan Sitong, *Songji zhongyi lu*, appendix.12-19; Li Zefen, vol. 3, 150-59. Li includes even the Song sovereign, Gongdi, as a defector.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

sources, among them the *Songshi* and the *Yuanshi*. It seems that even these are not comprehensive lists. The defectors listed include military and civilian officials, although the former group far outnumbered the latter.

One reason for the large number of defections and surrenders was the Yuan policy of conciliation, which reinstated to high positions those who capitulated, but wiped out entire cities if they put up prolonged resistance. Faced with these clear-cut alternatives, the opportunists easily made their choice, and many even welcomed the arrival of the Mongols with offers of capitulation many miles from their defense posts. These men, pursuing selfish goals and personal gains, subsequently applied their military skills on the Mongol side in order to gain trust and further promotions in the Yuan government. A conversation Qubilai had with these collaborators indicates that many of them were indeed pure opportunists. When queried as to why they had gone over so readily, they replied that it was because Jia Sidao had discriminated against them and favored bureaucrats. Qubilai retorted: "Supposing that if [Jia] Sidao had really discriminated against you, that was only the fault of Sidao; furthermore, wherein did your ruler let you down? If it was really as you said, then Sidao's discrimination was most appropriate."¹

However, sources on these defectors and collaborators are inadequate to show the individual circumstances of each defection and the dilemma faced by the defector. None has been accorded a biography in the *Songshi*, not even in the sections reserved for treacherous officials and renegades. In the *Yuanshi* only several defectors who rose to high ranks in the Yuan have been given biographies.² However, in some cases, there is ample evidence that pure opportunism was not the primary motive for surrender. The circumstances of the surrender indicate that the differences between the loyal and the disloyal were not as distinct as previously believed. Take Lü Wenhuan as an example. His family had been involved in defending the Song against the Yuan for over twenty years. He was personally responsible for the defense of Xiangyang for six years and had no intention of capitulating until the very

1. YS 9.180.

2. For example, these were Liu Zheng, Gao Xing (d. 1313), Zhou Quan (d. 1305), and Luo Bi (d. 1299).

Chapter Four

bitter end. By 1273, his campaigns had exhausted food and military supplies, many people were dying on the roads, and the remaining population resorted to cannibalism to order to survive. Lü was well aware that by then there was not the slightest hope for victory, and it was clear that everybody would suffer the consequences of continued fighting. For him, surrender was not a private affair, but a decision that had an enormous impact on the people. Not only would his wife and children be spared atrocious deaths, the entire population of Xiangyang would survive. Having made the agonizing decision to surrender, Lü went into the city and wailed, not satisfied with his decision but faced with no other alternative. His heart remained heavy even when engaged in Mongol campaigns to conquer the Song. In 1276 when the "mercy-begging" officials on their journey to the Yuan capital attempted to curry favor with the Mongols by undignified conduct and criticism of contemporary Song officials, Lü reviled their fickleness and immorality.¹ After defecting, Lü's participation in the Song conquest was possibly affected by his son being held hostage in Dadu, a common Mongol practice to ensure the loyalty of their generals. It was perhaps partly this pressure that caused him to attract other members of his family to defect, including his nephew Lü Shikui, cousin Wenfu, and son-in-law Fan Wenhui. Yet, despite Lü Wenhuan's important role in the conquest of the Song, he does not have a biography in the *Yuan-shi*.

In other cases, many military and civilian officials surrendered only after Empress Dowager Xie had capitulated in Hangzhou. She had issued edicts ordering the Song territories to submit to the Mongol army, thus it could be said that Xia Gui and Fang Hui surrendered in compliance with her orders. Xia had been a loyal general with decades of military service to the Song; he was then already seventy-nine and his son had perished while defending the Song in 1275.² As for Fang Hui, what was unforgivable in the minds of his contemporaries was the fact that he wrote flattering prefaces to official Yuan works praising the conquerors. Fang, however, never re-

1. "The Liuyuan pavilion," in Wen Tianxiang, 13.16a.

2. On Xia Gui's son who was awarded posthumous honors for bravery, see Wang Yinglin, *Siming wenxian ji*, 5.36a-b.

The *Zhongyi* Tradition

nounced his loyalty to the Song; he justified his surrender by arguing that as the Song had already perished, it would have been futile to hold onto a small command. He insisted that his surrender had saved thousands of civilian lives.¹ Some of Fang Hui's poems expressed feelings so closely akin to those of loyalists that one was included in an anthology of loyalist writings in the Yuan.²

Wen Tianxiang's younger brother, Bi, was another reluctant defector. He had followed Wen to resist the Mongol forces, but while Wen had been completely preoccupied with the resistance movement, Bi had been left in charge of the family which included their mother, Wen's wife, concubines, and children.³ In 1275 when the grandmother died, it was Bi who transported the coffin back to Luling, their native county. Later, Bi was appointed administrator of Huizhou and again took the whole family with him. When their mother died in 1278, Bi arranged for a temporary burial before returning to his political duties. Only after Wen was captured and Yaishan fell did Bi finally surrender to the Yuan administration, his primary motive for staying alive being to carry out his responsibilities to the surviving family members and to attend to ancestral rites.⁴ Like Lü Wenhuan, he surrendered for reasons other than sheer opportunism.

After surrendering and holding office in Dadu, many defectors did not forget their former compatriots. Thus Wang Jiweng petitioned to have Wen Tianxiang released from prison as a Daoist priest, and Lü Shikui sought to care for Xie Fangde's daily needs, which Xie rejected.⁵ Others, like Liu

1. For an example of Fang Hui's flattering address to the Yuan, see Liu Minzhong, preface.2a-3a. For Fang's justification for his defection, see "Bidding farewell to my son Cunxin to Yan," in Fang Hui, *Tongjiang xuji*, 25.21a.

2. See Zhao Jingliang, 6.4a. This is a mourning poem to Lü Wenhuan ridiculing the latter's surrender to the Mongols.

3. From Wen Bi's funerary account of their mother, in Wen Tianxiang, 18.2b.

4. *Ibid.*, 18.3a.

5. On Lü Shikui's attitude toward Xie Fangde, see *Zhaozhong lu*, 39.

Chapter Four

Mengyan recommended some loyalists, their children and pupils to office, no doubt thinking that they were doing a favor for their former friends, whose friendship they still valued and whose understanding they desperately sought.¹

1. There exist studies of defectors in other historical periods. On defections to the Mongols during the Jin collapse, Igor de Rachewiltz shows that, besides pure opportunism, defectors were motivated by a desire to save as many lives as possible. See his "Personnel," 106-07. On the circumstances under which a loyal general turned traitor in the Tang, see Charles A. Peterson, "P'u-ku Huai-en." The sometimes subtle differences and narrow borderline between a loyal and disloyal subject in the modern context are discussed by Morton Grodzins.