

Part II

THE VILLAGE SURVEY

Chapter 5

TWO KOREAN VILLAGES¹


Description and Hypotheses


In addition to the national sample reported in the preceding chapters, a survey was made of heads of households in two Korean villages. With the exception of a few families that had reportedly moved from one of the villages in the recent past, this survey was complete. These two villages were selected from among the 34,665 that are scattered throughout the countryside, surrounded by more or less fertile fields of rice or barley. Like individuals, each village has its unique personality and just as the soils on every field must differ somewhat from the soil on every other cultivated field, each village differs from all the others.

However, we did not want to choose just any two villages at random but to select two villages that were somehow representative insofar as any villages could be. Thus fishing villages were not selected because comparisons were to be made to a national sample of peasants. Villages that were too close to major population centers, particularly to Seoul, Taegu, or Pusan, were ruled out because some peasants would have probably become industrial workers in these areas, and we wanted to sample full-time peasants. Villages in the region of President Park Chung Hee's birthplace were ruled out as being possibly too supportive of the Saemaul movement. Villages in areas that had particularly good soils and climate as well as villages that were situated in arid or too mountainous regions were ruled out as possibly unrepresentative of the elusive "norm" of Korean villages. We wanted neither to study exemplary villages nor to focus on the worst possible cases.

With all of these criteria in mind, suggestions were elicited from Korean scholars, and a central region of the country was selected within which to choose two villages. The region had the reputation of being neither progressive nor backward. Innovations had sometimes been introduced here, with the idea that if they worked out well in such a representative region, they ought to succeed elsewhere in Korea. The region is relatively mountainous and drained by the Kum and Han rivers. The major crops were rice and barley, but considerable amounts of tobacco, silk cocoons and, in one village, ginseng for the government monopoly were also raised. The nearest city was a collection center for rice, tobacco, soybeans, and other commodities, and its major industry was food processing and textiles.

Having selected the region, we then determined that of the two villages, one was to be relatively progressive in terms of the projects it was able to complete within the Saemaul movement, while the other was to be a more backward village. Both villages were to be in the same county so as to assure that farming conditions were similar. By assuring the same climatic conditions and, with the advice of the *myŏnjang*, the same soil conditions, we hoped to control some extraneous conditions, so that those attributes and attitudes of interest in the





national study would be the most relevant remaining factors in explaining the difference between the villages in their innovative progress.² The final selection of villages was made on the recommendation of the deputy *myŏnjang*, a county official familiar with the villages within the region, who quickly selected the appropriate villages from the county map. A visit to the villages and discussions with the village heads corroborated the choices as most appropriate in terms of the requisite criteria.

We will call the progressive village Nae-il and the backward village Ŏje. They are located some thirty miles from the nearest urban area which is one of the smaller cities of Korea. Seoul, with over seven million inhabitants, is the major urban center, but unlike Thailand where Bangkok dominates any other competing urban area, or the Philippines where Manila and its environs is the predominant urban area, there are several urban concentrations throughout Korea with most villages within an hour's ride by bus. This is not to deny, of course, that Seoul is the cultural and administrative lodestone of the nation. As large and bustling as other Korean cities might be, they still have a provincial flavor, reflecting an urbanity and culture generated elsewhere. Yet these other Korean cities--Taegu, Taewon, Kyŏngju, Pusan, Kwangju, and Ch'ŏngju--are cities in their own right.

The city nearest our two villages was not the chief service center of the county. The market center and county seat, with some 3,000 inhabitants, had been the closest and most convenient source of entertainment, political discussion, and supplies. Until shortly before our survey, such towns had indeed been market towns, with market days at specified times each month, bringing together villagers from the surrounding countryside to sell produce, to purchase necessities and a few luxuries of late, to drink and gamble, and converse with friends. These market days, however, had been officially discontinued just prior to the survey taken in Nae-il and Ŏje, but too recently to have included questions eliciting peasant opinions on this official decree.

It was also not possible to ascertain the opinions of villagers concerning another restrictive law that had come to affect their lives, namely the law limiting expenditures on funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies. According to several sources, these celebrations used to deplete the peasants' resources for they had become socially competitive, and the burial of one's parents had been a matter of such importance that no family wanted to be regarded as unfilial, an attitude not unknown in other cultures. While some peasants may have felt relieved that they could now conserve their meager resources without social disapproval, others may have been resentful at the official tampering with a long-observed custom.³ These laws that stringently regulated traditional expenditures were passed shortly after these interviews in Nae-il and Ŏje were conducted. Thus a most opportune occasion was lost to determine attitudes toward governmental regulation. Political opinions were elicited, however, and these will be reported later in the chapter.

The maps of Nae-il and Ŏje on pp. 90-91 show their differences in physical characteristics and cultivation. Both were predominantly rice villages, but they also grew some commercial crops. The shed for drying tobacco was the most salient structure in Ŏje, while the new community center and the presence of more tiled roofs distinguished Nae-il. The number of households at the time of the survey in Nae-il was 79; Ŏje was slightly larger with 92 households. The survey was conducted by student interviewers from a nearby agricultural college.⁴

Most of these interviewers were from the same region as the villages surveyed. Since the first three months of the year are slack months in the Korean countryside, an effort was made to conduct the interviews before the heavy labors of field preparation and transplanting in April, May, and June. Unfortunately, this was not possible, so that a brief interim period just prior to transplanting in May had to be designated for the interviews. May is a very busy month, what with barley and wheat harvesting, rice transplanting, and silkworm raising,⁵ but the interviews were successfully conducted and all household heads were surveyed.

For some of the underlying attribute and attitudinal differences between the villages, several hypotheses will be presented that would seem to appropriately demarcate potential differences expected between an innovative village and one that is much less innovative. These hypotheses are of two kinds, one aiming at substantial differences in traits and attributes, and the other at attitudinal dimensions characterizing individuals in each type of village. In addition to these anticipated differences, a more general approach will attempt to amalgamate the two groups of hypotheses in the next section. Since these hypotheses have already been discussed in connection with the national survey, they will be only very briefly touched on here.

The hypothesis that education has a major effect on innovative behavior may seem generally appropriate but not in a society like Korea where the literacy rate was well over 90 percent. Indeed, as seen earlier in this book, the national survey showed that education played little or no role in peasant attitudes or behavior. Educational differences do not relate importantly to differences in modern beliefs because, as has been suggested earlier, schools do not necessarily teach or inculcate those beliefs that might be appropriate for innovative behavior among a farm population.⁶ Even if schools raised through textbooks the level of aspirations, this may contribute only to aspirations toward urban goals. Textbooks used by ghetto children in other countries may very well raise the level of their aspirations, but if no appropriate social clues for the realization of these aspirations are provided, they may lead to effects on belief systems different than initially intended. In fact, the real effect of education may not be to convey substantive content or to develop a modern pattern of attitudes affecting behavior, but to open the media to the newly-educated. Thus if differences are created through education, it may be that these exist between the educated at any level and those receiving no education at all, a situation no longer common in Korea.

With these reservations in mind, we would still expect the young to be more innovative than the middle-aged and the old, partly because they are receiving more education. The young might innovate regardless of the rewards society gives for successful innovation, because they have not yet directly experienced any sense of frustration at unrewarded increases in output. As society changes from a primary-producing economy to an industrialized nation, we would expect the transmission of the more modern attitudes supposedly accompanying such changes to be more frequent among the younger than the older peasants. The results of the national survey, however, suggest that age may not have been a vital attribute in terms of innovation.

Media contact had greatly increased in Korea, and it was a rare peasant who did not have his own radio. In addition, there were many newspapers, over a dozen published in Seoul alone. The Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture also

made use of other media materials, including movies, slides, and pamphlets. It is assumed that as contact with the media increases, so do modern outlooks and innovative and cooperative behaviors. Attendance at meetings where farm problems are discussed should also increase innovative behavior.

Holding some position, official or informal, in an organization ought to contribute to innovative behavior, but some village organizations might not induce innovation. Thus there is no immediate reason why some *kyes* should be conducive to innovative behavior, although other types of *kyes* have long been associated with village innovation. There are other indications that in single-name villages, strong organizations of this type may even afford barriers to innovating behavior.⁷ Nevertheless, the point here is that any position of leadership, through the experience and responsibility it imparts, is conducive to innovative behavior. A village in which individuals have better opportunities to attain some office will tend to be more innovative than a village in which they have fewer opportunities. While the leadership pattern in the national sample was a complex association of leadership traits and village activities and interest, no major evidence of innovative behavior with respect to farming was associated with this factor, as will be recalled. This dampens the expectations concerning this hypothesis.

We would expect a somewhat superior incidence of ego-strength, personal morale, orientation toward change, village morale, and a positive attitude toward farming in the progressive village and somewhat stronger traditionalism, family orientation, and authoritarianism in the less progressive village. Among these attitudes, those toward farming may be regarded as potentially quite important. Despite their expected impact on the villages, education, the media, and governmental exhortation were deemed less likely to produce any perceptible innovative behavior in peasants if they failed to motivate them to improve their farming, a motivation that would appear associated with a positive attitude toward farming as an occupation. Without such a positive attitude, it would even be more likely that the stimulation of innovative attitudes induces a peasant to move to the city. Even given the potential to innovate, as evidenced by the existence of "right attitudes" or receptive attitudes, there must be some feeling of attachment to the occupation of farming in order to tie these attitudes to innovative behavior. Thus it was assumed that the progressive village would harbor more positive attitudes toward farming than the more backward village. These hypotheses will be explicitly analyzed in the next section.

As in the national sample of responses, innovative individual behavior was determined by the responses to questions concerning such matters as the use of insecticide and weedicide, the growing of a commercial crop, the planting of Tongil and the nature of the roof on one's home. It is, of course, possible though unlikely that individual innovative behavior might be entirely unrelated to behavior of the kind that would provide evidence that an entire village was innovative. For instance, villagers might join in group projects, such as building a community center or constructing bridges, but not personally innovate in their farming techniques. This division in innovative and cooperative behavior between village and individual was, however, not anticipated.

Nae-il appeared to be the better organized village, and the physical evidence suggested that it had almost fulfilled its community projects for the first year of the Saemaul movement; it was on the verge of being redesignated a self-sufficient village. A drainage system through the center of the village, a new

road that ran down to the nearby stream (some villagers had had to donate a small portion of land to this project!), and an impressive community building attested to the labor that had been expended for the benefit of the village. No bridge had as yet been built over the stream to the peasants' fields, but expectations seemed high that it would be shortly completed. The community building had a small hall that was used for gatherings, some of which pertained to innovation and the Saemaul movement--the brother of the *lijang* was the movement leader in the village--but another room housed a wine shop which undoubtedly raised village conviviality while contributing little to the Saemaul spirit.

Ŏje, by contrast, had no such projects in evidence. It seemed to be a village at rest. These obvious physical differences indicated that one village was indeed progressive, while the other, like most Korean villages at the time of the survey, was still correctly categorized as "self-preparatory," or backward.⁸ This physical evidence was buttressed by organizational differences, with Ŏje being relatively less organized in a formal sense and its *lijang* imparting less positive leadership to village affairs.

Although the national categorization of Nae-il and Ŏje indicated that these villages indeed differed in their level of modernization, the modern village might possibly not have harbored innovative practices among its members. Figures on several farm practices, however, showed that the overall progressiveness of Nae-il was reflected in the practices of individual peasants. Most peasants throughout Korea used insecticides, and this turned out to be also the case in both Nae-il and Ŏje. The two villages did, however, differ in their use of weedicide which was not so widely used in Korea. Weedicide was used more commonly in Nae-il where only 39.2 percent of the peasants weeded by hand only, while 39.2 percent used weedicide and 11.4 percent made use of both techniques. In Ŏje some 73.9 percent of the peasants still weeded by hand only, while 17.4 percent used weedicide. The use of urea and phosphate fertilizers was both common and similar in the villages, but calcium cyanamide was somewhat more heavily used in Ŏje.

Rogers found that subsistence farmers have lower rates of achievement motivation than commercial farmers living in the same village.⁹ While nearly all Korean peasants are closely tied to the commercial marketing system through rice agriculture, there are other varieties of crops, such as tobacco or ginseng, classified specifically as commercial crops which are grown solely for the market. Almost half the peasants in Nae-il grew these commercial crops, while somewhat less than a third did so in Ŏje.

The tile roof is a symbol of departure from tradition and penury and marks the use of resources to somewhat improve the standard of living. In villages along the major superhighway that connects Seoul with Pusan, tile roofs may also be indicative of a government intervention to improve the landscape for the benefit of urban travelers and tourists, but in Nae-il and Ŏje, lying as they did far from main thoroughfares, the nature of the roof represented a personal choice. It was a matter of pride with the *lijang* of Nae-il that over half the houses (57 percent) had tile roofs, with only 19.0 percent of straw and 24.1 percent of slate or corrugated. In Ŏje this home improvement was less perceptible, with 22.8 percent of the houses tiled, 39.1 percent of straw, and 38 percent of slate or corrugated.

While a few more persons in Nae-il used a mechanical plow (11.4 percent to

2.2 percent in Ōje), the percentage of individuals owning certain farm implements such as plows, winnowers, threshers, wagons, hand sprays and water pumps was slightly higher in Ōje. Power sprays and power plows were present in Nae-il, although few were in use. Table 5.1 shows the quantity of various capital resources in both villages. For most items, Ōje was as well as or better off than Nae-il. It must be remembered, however, that Ōje had a larger population.

Table 5.1
Village Capital, in Absolute Numbers

	Nae-il	Ōje
Clocks	51	52
Sewing machines	30	40
Radios	71	83
Bicycles	31	29
Working oxen	38	52
Non-working oxen	17	18
Mechanical plows	31	47
Carts	11	9
Winnowers	19	31
Threshing machines	24	33
Hand wagons	43	62
Hand sprays	31	47
Power sprays	7	none
Water pumps	12	24
Power plows	4	none

Tongil, the new rice strain, has been described previously; it is the government's eventual goal to stimulate its growth wherever appropriate. In the 1972 harvest season, some 200,000 acres were sown to Tongil, making it still experimental and somewhat risky to use. Tongil rice was introduced in 1972 in both Nae-il and Ōje, but in keeping with their somewhat more progressive stance, 13.9 percent of the peasants in Nae-il had planted Tongil while only 3.3 percent had planted it in Ōje.

With some reservations, induced by the somewhat higher incidence of ownership of certain farm implements in Ōje, we may conclude that the categorization of Nae-il as a self-sufficient village also generally reflected certain innovative practices on a sub-village level. Nae-il seemed to be a more innovative village inhabited by somewhat more innovative peasants. It may be interesting to review some other differences between the two villages to see whether they support hypotheses advanced earlier.

The two villages differed greatly with regard to debts. Some 63 percent of the respondents in Ōje, compared to only 26.6 percent in Nae-il, admitted to being in debt. Among those in debt, some 26.1 percent of the respondents in Ōje said that their debts were increasing, while the figure for Nae-il was 6.3 percent. This may be a major reason why some 43.5 percent of the respondents in Ōje said that they would like to move to the city, compared to the somewhat smaller figure of 35.4 percent of the respondents in Nae-il. These figures for

both villages were low compared to the national sample where to a somewhat differently worded question 53 percent responded that they would move to the city for financial advantage. When asked why they would like to move, only nine persons in Nae-il but thirty-one persons in Ōje gave financial reasons or "a better life." The peasants of Nae-il cited educational expenses and the small size of the farms as the chief reasons for being in debt. Other reasons included the low price of farm products. In Ōje, too, educational expenses and farm size were highest on the list of reasons for debt, but unspecified "other" reasons were also mentioned frequently. It was obvious that peasants in both villages did not regard ceremonial expenses as among their major problems.

Among other basic differences between the two villages was age. There were almost twice as many respondents in Ōje than in Nae-il between sixteen and twenty-five years of age, but only about half as many were twenty-six to twenty-nine years old. The older age bracket was somewhat underrepresented in both villages, possibly because of the draft which recruits men in this age grouping. Thus some young men, who would otherwise be heads of households, may have been absent from the villages. No immediate reason was apparent, however, for differences between the two villages in representation in the various age categories. Ōje seemed to be underrepresented (14 percent to 26.6 percent) in the 30-39 year group, but slightly more represented in the 60-year-and-over group (19.6 percent to 8.9 percent). While it might be thought that age differences could be part of the explanation of some of the differences between the progressiveness of one village and the relative backwardness of the other, it should be borne in mind that in the national analysis age turned out to be a category indifferent to modernity.

While nearly all questions were answered by most interviewees, many peasants did not respond to either the education or religion questions. Those who did respond to the education question had mainly elementary school training.¹⁰ Although not differing greatly from Ōje, Nae-il had somewhat more respondents with at least a junior high school education. Small as the villages were, there were a few persons who had attended college, and most of them were in Nae-il, as expected if education is to have some part in explaining village progressiveness. In view of the results on the national analysis, however, it would be difficult to see education as an important factor in village differences.

Birth control, being generally accepted throughout Korea, did not have an appreciable correlation with change, morale, or attitudes toward farming in the national survey; most Koreans apparently agreed at least verbally with the practice of birth control. While agreement with the attitude was similar in both villages, the mode (the category with the highest figure, as distinguished from the average) for the number of children was four in Nae-il and five in Ōje. This may bear a relationship to some of the age difference, although it was Nae-il that had a higher representation of persons between thirty and thirty-nine years of age. It might also be conjectured that the number of children may have contributed somewhat to the relative difference in debt between the two villages.

Age differences between the two villages may also explain why over half of the respondents in Nae-il had military service but only 29.3 percent in Ōje. Military service would be expected to expand the peasants' cultural and social horizons, although it is no longer difficult to travel extensively and quite cheaply as a civilian in Korea. To the degree that military service might have

contributed to innovative attitudes and behavior, Nae-il was once again favored. However, the analysis in the national returns did not suggest any contribution of military service to innovation.

Dryland holdings were rather alike, the mode being 1,501 to 3,000 *pyŏng* for both villages, but wetland holdings tended to be somewhat larger in Nae-il where the mode was six to eight *majigi* as compared to three to five in Ōje. This difference may be one reason for Ōje's greater incidence of debt. The villages also differed markedly in yields of rice. While the mode for Ōje was only five *sŏk* per *majigi*, that for Nae-il was 11 to 20 *sŏk*. This big difference suggests that there may have been a significant relationship between innovativeness and farm output. To be sure, Rogers comments on the difficulty of relating innovativeness to output because it is very difficult to obtain output figures directly from peasants. In the case of Korea, however, peasants may be better aware of their outputs and maintain more adequate records; they certainly do so in the case of family finances.¹¹ That the rice yields were higher in Nae-il was also indicated by the answers to another question, to which 67.1 percent of Nae-il respondents said that their yields had increased, while 24.1 percent claimed that their yields had not changed. In Ōje some 45.2 percent said that their yields had increased, while 31.5 percent stated they had remained the same. Thirteen percent claimed a decrease in Ōje but none in Nae-il.

Possibly as a result of the somewhat higher educational level in Nae-il, 22.8 percent of its peasants read a newspaper daily, as compared to a mere 10.9 percent in Ōje, and for those who read once a week it was triple, 15.2 percent. Some 81.5 percent of the respondents in Ōje, in fact, claimed to read a paper seldom, while in Nae-il this figure was a little over 50 percent. We can assume from these figures that peasants attending Saemaul winter schools were somewhat more sophisticated than the average peasant, and the "no responses" on educational level seem to support this assumption. Unlike many of the newly independent nations, Korea is a highly homogeneous culture, with no important ethnic or linguistic minorities. The vital role of radio in producing a national consensus may therefore not be as important as in other countries, even though radios and radio-listening are ubiquitous in Korea. This fact was evident both in a national sample and in the two villages. Nae-il surpassed Ōje in contacts with media other than radio. More persons in Nae-il listened to agricultural programs on the radio, and many more of them had seen movies or slides, a quantitative difference that was quite striking. Some 57 percent of the villagers in Nae-il claimed a subscription to an agricultural magazine compared to 21.7 percent in Ōje. Even discussion of village problems was more frequent, according to the respondents, with some 50.6 percent of persons in Nae-il saying that they often discussed village problems as against only 30.4 percent in Ōje. Many more persons in Nae-il attended meetings, and many more read pamphlets distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture. It is indicative of the stronger and more immediate influence of the media in Nae-il that 12.7 percent of these respondents claimed to have heard first of the Saemaul movement by way of the newspaper, 70.9 percent on the radio, and 2.5 percent through pamphlets. By contrast, 5.4 percent of the respondents in Ōje said that they had first heard of it through the radio, and none that they had first read of it in pamphlets. Some 7.6 percent had heard of it through friends, but only 2.7 percent in Nae-il, and 34.8 percent had learned of it through officials, compared to 10.1 percent in Nae-il. It is apparent that in Nae-il villagers were more media-oriented than their neighbors in Ōje. In seeking advice about farming, both villages indicated that

the popular sources of information were the *banjang* (a head of a neighborhood), the *lijang*, and the farm village guide. The same persons and the leader of the Saemaul movement served as sources of advice for problems concerning both villages.

Besides being more involved in media contact, more persons in Nae-il belonged to organizations; in fact the percentage was double that of Ōje, with some 35.4 percent as against 16.3 percent being members of at least one organization. Together with this greater involvement in organizations, more persons in Nae-il had some experience in officering organizations, with some 24.1 percent having held an official position of some kind, while only 7.6 percent had in Ōje. There was apparently more opportunity or more motivation to attain some degree of leadership in the progressive village. This may have led to a greater communicativeness about village problems, with 10 percent more peasants stating concern for their village problems and discussing these problems with others.

Thus some real differences in backgrounds and some forms of behavior seemed to exist between the two villages, and these differences can be seen in all cases to support the expectations suggested by the innovation and cooperation hypothesis. However, peasants in both villages overwhelmingly agreed that something could be done to improve their respective villages and, although somewhat less overwhelmingly, that they would personally be willing to donate time to the improvement of their village. While it may have been somewhat naive to ask a question of this nature, the response was more favorable in the two villages than in the national sample. These differences suggest the existence of a village culture that distinguished Nae-il from Ōje, creating a more media-oriented and communicative village population. In addition to the major distinction between the Great Culture and the Little Culture, the urban and the rural, there were sufficient distinctions among the two villages that made each of these an unique cultural environment. This quality of uniqueness in village life has obviously not been overlooked by the anthropologists who first posited the Great and Little cultures, but it is well to acknowledge here the individuality of villages.

More contact with the media and greater communicativeness may explain the significantly greater knowledge of political leaders in Nae-il, including those representing the district in which these villages were located. Table 5.2 shows that villagers in Nae-il were considerably better informed than those in Ōje. We might also point out in passing that they were also better informed than Americans. A typical Gallup poll, taken in 1967, showed that fewer than 31 percent of Americans could name their senator, although they did better in naming the mayor (57 percent in ages 21-29, 72 percent in ages 30-49 and 73 percent in ages 50 and over).¹² These figures indicate that the villagers in Nae-il were well attuned to the political system.

On the other hand, it is puzzling to find that the notion that it is the officials' duty to serve the public, as opposed to performing favors, received overwhelming support from the villagers of Ōje. Studies of civic cultures have shown that persons who regard themselves as citizens are usually better informed, participate more at all levels and are generally more capable than those who regard themselves as subjects.¹³ One explanation for the surprising finding in Table 5.3 is that increasing political efficacy and more information in the Korean political context resulted in the realistic assessment that the peasant was, in fact, a subject who operated politically not by stressing his rights but by

Table 5.2
Percentage of Correct Responses
on Political Leaders

	Nae-il (%)	Ŏje (%)
American president	74.7	34.8
Japanese premier	45.6	14.1
President of Korea	98.7	75.0
District representative (Min Ki-Shick, DRP)	93.7	71.1
District representative (Lee Min-Woo, NDP)	51.9	14.1
Myŏnjang	65.8	16.3

obtaining favors. If this were true, we would expect that aside from having more political information, the villagers of Nae-il also regarded themselves as more efficacious politically than their neighbors in Ŏje. According to Table 5.4 this was certainly the case. In a peasant culture political efficacy is dependent on playing with the right rules of the political game. Apparently the political culture of the village dictated that officials be regarded as extending favors rather than according villagers their rights. Whether this perception was objectively accurate or not, many of those who held it regarded themselves as more politically effective. Any hypothesis based on these village results would be that the Korean political culture is subject-dominated.

Table 5.3
Is it the duty of public officials to provide services
to people like myself, or is it a personal favor?

	Duty (%)	Favor (%)
Nae-il	36.7	46.8
Ŏje	63.0	30.4

Table 5.4
Perceptions of Political Efficacy

	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
A. An ability to influence government decisions			
Nae-il	60.8	24.1	13.9
Ŏje	27.2	37.0	35.9
B. Government and politics seem too complicated			
Nae-il	49.4	25.3	25.3
Ŏje	67.4	13.0	19.6

Finally, to prelude the findings of the next section, some 32.9 percent of the villagers of Nae-il, the progressive village, preferred to send their sons to an agricultural high school, which compared favorably with the results in the national sample. In Ōje, however, this figure dropped to a meager 12 percent. This difference on a question that the national survey results showed to be so critical is quite interesting.

Responses to questions on energy and illness were in keeping with the hypotheses presented on the national sample. Forty and one-half percent of the villagers in Nae-il reported they were "often tired" as compared to 53.3 percent in Ōje, while only 7.6 percent were "sick often" as compared to 22.8 percent in Ōje. This difference between the progressive and backward villages was anticipated. It is unfortunate that these perceptual findings could not have been supplemented with direct medical evidence, but experience in the area suggests that one cause for the difference might have been parasitical infection. Another cause may have been the larger percentage of persons over 60 in Ōje.

We have discovered that in the progressive village, existing differences were generally in the direction hypothesized, and it would seem safe to conclude that these differences had a bearing on innovativeness. Although this in itself does not establish that these factors, such as newspaper readership or membership in organizations, *caused* villagers to be more progressive, our hypotheses have not been refuted. There were certainly more clearcut distinctions here than among the patterns of the national sample. While not denying the thesis that village progress must ultimately rely on a supra-village level of organization,¹⁴ these results tentatively indicate that the village environment itself can contribute significantly to village progress and innovativeness.

Finally, the *lijang*'s vigor and pride in the accomplishments of his village must be noted. He and his brother, head of the Saemaul movement in Nae-il, undoubtedly contributed much to the community spirit.

Discriminating Between Two Korean Villages

The purpose of this section is to determine those characteristics of Nae-il and Ōje that best discriminated between them. Discriminate functions analysis uses independent variables to allocate individuals, in accordance with their scores on these variables, into two or more groups. This technique helps us to ascertain whether the variables pertinent to innovation and cooperativeness are in fact salient discriminators, as they ought to be, between the progressive and the backward village. If a variable were a perfect discriminator, it would infallibly predict whether a person was from one village or the other. Thus the single attribute "race" could easily allocate individuals into an African village on the one hand and a Korean village on the other, although this would hardly be an interesting result and would certainly not assess those attributes germane to developmental progress that are of theoretical interest. Since we tried through choice of villages to control for what might be such extraneous affects, our allocation through discriminate functions ought to be more interesting than this.¹⁵

Some sixty-six attitudinal responses collected from the heads of households in Nae-il and Ōje have already been reviewed in several ways. Some of the responses may, as these analyses suggest, distinguish more readily than others

on the basis of differences of means between the responses aggregated for each village. A process of elimination was employed to obtain the ten best attitudinal discriminators from among the attitude schedule. The success of these discriminators was not impressive, but a degree of discrimination was achieved that would have been statistically significant if the assumptions of a significance test had been met.¹⁶ The confusion matrix in Table 5.5 shows that discrimination was achieved. The attributes of individual villagers differed sufficiently to allow their allocation into the progressive or the backward village with a fair degree of accuracy.

Table 5.5
Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Ōje
on the Basis of Ten Attitudinal Responses

Actual Villagers	Predicted Villagers		
	Nae-il	Ōje	Total
Nae-il	63	16	79
Ōje	19	73	92

Percent of correctly classified villagers: 79.5

Chi-square with ten degrees of freedom, $p < .001$

The "confusion matrix" shows that of the 79 villagers from Nae-il, 63, on the basis of their attributes, were correctly designated as from Nae-il, while 16 were mistakenly allocated to Ōje.

As hypothesized, there were some differences in the attitudinal climate of both villages, and most of these differences, shown in Table 5.6, were in the predicted direction. A major difference between the two villages, and one in which there should be some interest, was in the category of attitudes toward farming, which were more positive in Nae-il than in Ōje. The evidence on personal efficacy and personal morale was somewhat more ambiguous than the attitudes toward farming. There are several items in which Nae-il seemed to evidence a higher degree of personal morale (pride, efficacy in politics, efficacy against those richer, and finding friends), while Ōje did not tend toward personal isolation and "resignation." The cause of these attitudes is unascertainable through this analysis alone, but it might be conjectured that the differences in personal morale were related in some degree to attitudes toward farming, which could have been the chief difference between the villages. Certainly a peasant's disaffection with farming means a dissatisfaction with the major role in his life and, as we will see, has ramifications in other critical areas of attitudes and behavior.

It is also interesting that there was generally a more positive attitude toward education in Ōje than in Nae-il. There may be some cogent reasons for this result which is contrary to the original hypothesis. For instance, education might have been viewed in Ōje as an opportunity for youth to escape the village for better opportunities elsewhere, while peasants in Nae-il may have felt that remaining in the village still afforded good prospects for their young. Indeed,

as noted before, the educational systems of most lesser developed countries provided, for historical and social reasons, little or nothing in the way of practical instruction in farming techniques. In Korea, as in other countries affected by the Confucian tradition, education was not an accompaniment to an agricultural career but was looked on as an escape from the village into the city. It is possible that peasants actually perceived the irrelevance of much education to their immediate interests *as peasants*. The previous section made the point that many more peasants in Nae-il than in Ōje preferred to send their sons to an agricultural high school, which tends to support the argument here.

Table 5.6
Some Major Attitudinal Differences Between Nae-il and Ōje*

Farm work is drudgery.	Nae-il disagrees (more than Ōje)
Farming reduces one's social standing.	Nae-il disagrees
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.	Nae-il disagrees
No one else cares much what happens to you.	Nae-il agrees
Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education.	Nae-il disagrees
The average citizen like me can have an important influence on government decisions.	Nae-il agrees
Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer.	Nae-il disagrees
The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life and to be content with what comes your way.	Nae-il agrees
Most young people are getting too much education.	Nae-il agrees
Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were.	Nae-il agrees

*It might be of interest to provide here the standardized discriminant function coefficients which distinguish villagers from the two villages. In this predictor function a minus sign indicates attitudes on which Nae-il inhabitants are in more agreement than are villagers living in Ōje. The positive coefficients occur when Nae-ilians tend to disagree.

FARMDRDG	0.18
STANDING	0.17
PROUD	0.26
CARES	-0.43
DEPRIVED	0.19
INFGOV	-0.32
PROTECT	0.20
CONTENT	-0.21
TOOEDUC	-0.25
FINDFRND	-0.19

Ten attitudes generated a discriminate equation, shown in the note to Table 5.6, which distinguished villagers sufficiently to attain a result that would have been statistically significant were these respondents a sample from a population. While not spectacular, the results are nonetheless encouraging in suggesting the possible pertinence of attitudes, a pertinence that has not always emerged clearly from other studies of the factors contributing to modernization in villages.

But while a fair power of discrimination may be attained by means of peasant attitudes, it is also of interest to compare the efficacy of these variables to other distinctions that existed among individual peasant attributes, for which purpose another discriminate function analysis was carried out. Beginning with thirty-three variables, we gradually eliminated those less capable of discriminating the two groups until we had eight discriminators that allocated the villagers according to Table 5.7. The result was somewhat superior to the use of attitudinal variables alone insofar as fewer predictors distinguished equally well among the villagers. Once again a statistical test indicated a sizable relationship, significant if the respondents had been a true population sample. The salient discriminatory variables are shown in Table 5.8

Table 5.7

Second Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Öje on the Basis of Eight Attitudinal and Other Individual Responses

Actual Villagers	Predicted Villagers		
	Nae-il	Öje	Total
Nae-il	58	21	79
Öje	10	82	92

Percent of correctly classified cases: 81.9

Chi-square is 106.8 for eight degrees of freedom, $p < .001$

Table 5.8

Eight Discriminating Variables that Distinguish Between Nae-il and Öje*

How many children do you have?	Somewhat higher for Nae-il
How many times during the past year have you seen a government movie or slides on agriculture?	Greater for Nae-il
Besides the 4-H Club and the farmer's cooperative, do you belong to any other organizations?	Greater for Nae-il
Farm work is drudgery.	Greater for Öje
Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with people who are richer.	Higher for Öje
Are you in debt?	Much higher for Öje
Would you prefer your son (or sons) to attend agricultural high school or a non-agricultural high school?	Higher for Nae-il

Table 5.8--continued

The average citizen like me can have an important
influence on government decisions. Higher for Nae-il

*As in Table 7.2, the standardized discriminant function coefficients are shown.

CHILD	-0.10
MOVIE	0.60
MEMBER	0.26
FARMDRDG	0.10
PROTECT	0.27
DEBT	0.27
AGSCHOOL	-0.13
INFGOV	-0.21

In the complex network of relationships, causing morale to be higher in Nae-il than in Ōje, the smaller families in the progressive village may have played an indirect role. Two behavioral variables were in the hypothesized direction: one, that villagers in Nae-il seemed to belong to more organizations other than those to which all villagers belonged, such as the agricultural cooperative; and the other, that they had also been more exposed to government slide and movie presentations on farming, which may indicate that the government's efforts had had some effect. Three attitudinal variables were also in the direction hypothesized for the more progressive village: Nae-il had more peasants who were efficacious, who liked farming more, and who saw enough future in farming to send their sons to an agricultural high school.

It is quite remarkable that far more villagers in Ōje than in Nae-il reported being in debt. The higher mode for children in Ōje might have been partially responsible for some of this debt. Other reasons most frequently cited by villagers in both Ōje and Nae-il were educational expenses and insufficient farm size. An effort to reduce the problem of rural debt was made a month following these interviews. The government passed Draconian measures against spending on ceremonial or funeral occasions. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine the villagers' attitudes concerning this law, which affected rural customs of long standing, or to determine whether the law had any effect. While there were some respondents attesting to the effect of such customs on their financial resources, they were not numerous in either village, possibly because some ceremonial expenses occurred only rarely and some villagers may have forgotten their impact.

The results of the discriminant function analysis have by and large vindicated many of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and in the previous section of this chapter. Certain distinctions hypothesized there have served to distinguish peasants of a progressive village from those living in a more backward village. The individual attributes of villagers did differ predictably within villages categorized according to overall progressiveness. Ōje was certainly closer to the classic backward peasant village as portrayed by Rogers, Foster, and others. Evidence for this backwardness did not lie in the lack of farm machinery--Ōje was as well off as Nae-il in this respect--but rather in the apparent lack of cooperation in village projects.

Could the roots of this problem have lain in the attitudes of the villagers of Ōje? Let us examine this possibility more closely. One striking aspect about Ōje was that its inhabitants seemed to be more withdrawn from the course of national events. This conclusion is supported by the numbers of visits to town made in the previous year: while seventeen peasants in Nae-il reported ten or fewer visits into town, fifty-five Ōje villagers so reported, and while thirty-two of the peasants in Nae-il made over fifty such trips, only nine villagers in Ōje made as many visits. Other support comes from the answers to two attitudinal questions. Whereas 45.6 percent of the Nae-il peasants found it difficult to meet people on the farm (38.0 percent disagreed), 67.4 percent of the villagers in Ōje found this difficult (21.7 percent disagreed). Likewise, asked whether it was just as easy to make friends as it used to be, peasants in Nae-il agreed 57 percent, those in Ōje only 37 percent, with 25.3 percent and 45.7 percent, respectively, disagreeing. Still further support for this conclusion is found in the Ōje peasants' fewer media contacts, their lesser interest in national and international events and their lower level of political knowledge. This lack of knowledge apparently extended even to the *myōnjong*--fewer of the Ōje villagers knew his name. This suggests fewer contacts with public officials at any political level, even though the officials were chiefly responsible for conveying knowledge of the Saemaul movement to the villagers. It is as though the knowledge of the new movement had to seek them out. The peasants of Nae-il may have been more aggressive in their contacts with government officials, which might explain the somewhat odd result that they regarded an official's acts as a favor--they knew how the system worked.

What was the source of this difference among peasants of a progressive and a more backward village? A possible explanation might lie in the striking difference in self-esteem. When asked whether farming reduced one's social standing, 29.1 percent of the peasants of Nae-il agreed (55.7 percent disagreed), while as many as 55.4 percent of the peasants of Ōje agreed to this (23.9 percent disagreed). Moreover, 54.5 percent of the inhabitants of Nae-il believed they did not have much to be proud of (somewhat less than the 63.8 percent of the national sample), while 73.9 of the peasants in Ōje agreed to this item of self-esteem, well above the national sample results.

An additional difference between the two villages probably affecting the attitudes and behaviors was the larger debt in Ōje. While the evidence is not enough for anything but a plausible hypothesis, it is possible that both villages had originally been quite similar; after all, they had been selected because they were close to one another and equally accessible to the adjoining market town. We might further assume that while both villages had been backward at some time in the past, the peasants of Nae-il had broken away from this pattern. Helping them to accomplish this was a somewhat greater tendency to seek contacts with the world beyond their village, while the peasants of Ōje remained withdrawn. This may have increased the self-esteem of the peasants in the progressive village, and such attitudes enabled them to break the constriction of backwardness and improve their village, which in turn reacted to increase their self-esteem. One or two successes would probably have added to the momentum of progress, further supported self-esteem, and increased contact with the rapidly changing world of Korea. Thus Ōje's relative backwardness might be explained through such a highly complex interaction in which debt is likely to have played some exacerbating role. To untangle the true causal relationships would demand

a study of representative villages over a fairly long period of time. The most appropriate recorder of the events conducive to change or backwardness would be a Korean peasant charged with the fruitful task of compiling a detailed village history.

As was done in the national survey, a factor analysis was run on attributes and variables involving 171 peasants in the two villages. Included in the factoring was the distinction between villages (LI) which was to distinguish those factors, if any, that were particularly descriptive of one village or the other. The 27-factor matrix was rotated to a Varimax solution which, like the result in the national survey, was not parsimonious. Variance tended to be scattered over a large number of uncorrelated factors,¹⁷ some of which will now be interpreted.

FACTOR 1	Education, Leadership
EDUCATE	0.61**
TOWNLIVE	0.48
DECISION	0.46
NEWSPAPR	0.64
PAMPHLET	0.53
MEMBER	0.60
POSITION	0.69
INFLUNCE	0.60
MOREINFL	0.32
NATIONAL	0.75
MINDBUS	-0.30
AGSCHOOL	0.39
DEBT	(-0.28)
TONGIL	(0.26)
SAESCHL	(0.29)

**As in the factor results for the national sample, some correlation signs have been changed to conform with the interpretation.

This factor contained limited evidence that attendance at a Saemaul school contributed to a modernizing set of attributes. Since education obviously preceded attendance at a Saemaul school, it is uncertain whether this experience affected any other attributes, such as a desire for more influence. It is more likely that individuals attending the Saemaul schools tended to be the more influential members of these villages in the first place. In any case, it was probably education that "caused" exposure, as shown here, to certain media through reading of newspapers and pamphlets, and interest in national affairs. According to the loadings of variables on this factor, these individuals likely considered sending their sons to an agricultural school; it was not necessarily the more influential peasants who wanted their sons to quit farming. There is evidence, albeit rather slight, that these individuals were not in debt and that they may have had some tendency to adopt the new rice strain Tongil. As members of organizations other than the 4-H clubs, these persons may well have felt that they had some influence in the village, and they desired more. They

had also the experience of holding some sort of leadership position within these organizations. One remarkable aspect of this factor is the relative absence of any attitudinal variables. While it might be assumed that these persons were doers and had influence, we cannot assume anything concerning their attitudes toward farming, modernization, or their villages. There was only a slight tendency to believe that persons ought not simply to mind their own business. The first factor contains some of the attributes that marked the leadership factor in the national sample.

FACTOR 2	Land
WETLAND	0.87
DRYLAND	0.56
YIELD	0.81
PARCELS	0.37
COMCROP	(0.29)
ROOF	-0.42
OX	0.37
PLOW	0.31
THRESHER	0.59
DEBT	-0.43

The associations in Factor 2, Land, seemed to have something to do with relative wealth, although there had been no great disparity in the Korean countryside since the land reform of 1950. Peasants with larger land holdings, in this case mainly wetland (although apparently also correlated with holdings of dryland), seemed to obtain a larger yield from their farms. These larger yields did not seem to have much to do with peasant attitudes since no salient attitude was related to this pattern. Possibly because these persons had larger land holdings, they also had more farm machinery, like plows and threshers, as well as oxen. They were not in debt and had somewhat better dwellings, as suggested by the nature of the roofs. This was a well-to-do type of pattern, but it did not apparently combine any modernizing attitudes nor did it provide evidence of any great interest or activity within the village. Commercial crops might be an aspect of modernizing attitudes, although in this survey they appeared unconnected with any modernizing outlook, perhaps as evidence of relative village opulence. It is interesting to note that the number of parcels tended to be greater than usual, which is probably explained by the size of the land holdings and by the holdings in both wet and dry land. It will be recalled that this was also the case in the national results. It does not appear, therefore, that land fragmentation inhibited yields, although without fragmentation these peasants might have further increased their yields. Fragmentation seems to serve a function in Korean villages in that it increases the probability of some land being fertile; a single parcel might be very fertile or it might be quite barren. Fragmentation also provides the obvious possibility of a peasant's expanding production into certain commercial crops while remaining fundamentally a rice grower. In the national sample yield was also associated with the size of holdings, but that sample showed no evidence that greater mechanization was induced. The village results are more complex and more encouraging from a theoretical standpoint.

FACTOR 3	LI
LI	-0.63
TWNVISIT	0.73
MOVIE	0.54
MEETING	(0.28)
CARES	-0.70
WEED	0.40
YIELDINC	-0.40
OX	(0.28)

Factor 3, LI, is most clearly related in the factor analysis to one or the other village. It indicates that peasants in Nae-il tended to visit the town (probably the nearby market town and county seat) more often, suggesting that they were more cosmopolitan, i.e., more attuned to supra-village affairs, and that they saw more movies or slide presentations about agriculture. There is slight evidence of more attendance at meetings. There was the jarring note that "no one else cares much what happens to you," a salient attitude that has been difficult to interpret in the discriminatory analysis. Insofar as innovation is concerned, there was the peasant's tendency to use weedicide and to perceive an increase in their farm yields.

FACTOR 4	Verbalization
DECISION	0.33
AGLISTEN	0.34
DISCUSS	0.80
MEETING	0.39
PROBDISC	0.43
INFLUNCE	0.34
COMCROP	0.30
SAESCHL	0.34

Factor 4, Verbalization, is interesting because of the nature of the attributes that it contains. Persons with high factor scores on such a pattern seemed to be verbally active, discussing issues and listening to agricultural radio programs. They felt that they exercised some influence and liked to make decisions when possible, although there is no direct evidence here that these respondents were influential either through wealth or official position. It is not fully evident how much of an impact this communication might have had on innovations, although commercial crops do load slightly on this factor. The articulateness of these individuals and their perception of influence and participation in decisions may have explained their tendency to have attended Saemaul schools. Peasants attending these schools may have served as conduits of information, as well as patriotic symbols, to those peasants who did not attend the schools.

FACTOR 5	Debt Increase
DECISION	-0.32
CONCERN	0.57
DONATE	(-0.28)
MOREINFL	-0.61
FARMDRDG	0.43
DEBTINC	0.78

Factor 5, Debt Increase, seemed to be a somewhat debilitating pattern indicating a sense of powerlessness and a lack of participation in the making of decisions, although concern about village matters was expressed. Moreover, the general attitude was that farming as an occupation is drudgery. These peasants might have been the same individuals who evinced a desire to leave the village, but there is no proof of this. This factor is somewhat akin to the concept of fatalism, analyzed by Rogers and others. Except for a slight tendency not to want to donate time to village projects, there was no evidence that this pattern was inimical to innovation.

FACTOR 7	Luck
AGE	(-0.29)
POLITE	0.44
CANTINF	0.40
GOODLUCK	0.81
SAESCHL	-0.36

Factor 7, Luck, suggested a slight association with youth and with a lack of influence on the government, which may have also been associated with youth. These peasants apparently had little desire to attend the Saemaul schools. The failure of age to be of vital importance to modernization has been puzzling in both the national and village surveys which yielded quite comparable results. Since an ample number of variables and attributes were provided in the analysis, the unimportance of age, which seems to refute common sense is particularly distressing. Can Korea be an unique case, or are these results also found among peasants in other countries as far along in development as Korea?

FACTOR 10	Yield Increase
IMPROVE	0.79
DONATE	0.42
RELLYWOR	0.43
TOOEDUC	(-0.27)
YIELDINC	0.43

A somewhat odd pattern emerged in Factor 10, relating some attributes indicating an interest in village improvement and a willingness to donate time for

village improvement with a tendency to perceive an increase in crop yield. There was also a touch of conservatism in the notion that new things should be tried only when one is fairly sure that they will work; was this possibly why these peasants did not turn to Tongil? The slight loading by the education attitude takes issue with the idea that children received too much education. By itself this pattern would indicate that attitudes had something to do with increasing yields, but it is nowhere evident how this came about.

Factors 11 and 21 were interesting only because they contained assessments of the Saemaul movement. They indicated that the movement had failed to capture the imagination of the modernizers or those who had obtained increased crop yields. The movement had had only a light effect by 1973 and seemed to be perceived by most peasants as disembodied slogans, unassimilated as yet with any other pattern of attributes. Factor 12 had the attitude of moving to the city, but it was unrelated to any other salient attitude. It did not even seem to correlate with debt or with the notion that farm work was drudgery! This probably means that migration to urban areas is a complex and highly individual set of motivations.

FACTOR 13	Official
OFFICIAL	0.71
COMCROP	0.35
AGSCHOOL	-0.30
YIELDINC	0.34

Factor 13, Official, is a small factor that suggests that officials tended to innovate insofar as they had turned to some commercial crops. They also perceived an increase in their crop yields. At the same time, they evinced a slight tendency to steer their sons through education into occupations other than farming. An official or former official may have had aspirations for his sons that extended beyond the villages. Factor 16 related membership in a 4-H club to age but not to any innovation variables nor did it seem to predispose former members to participate more than others in village improvement. This is another result that corroborated the national findings.

FACTOR 19	Military
AGE	-0.67
MILITARY	0.66
ENERGY	0.66
SICK	-0.38
PAMPHLET	0.42
DONATE	(0.28)

Factor 19, Military, is interesting not only for what it says but what it does not say. Military experience, which under certain circumstances enhances modernizing attitudes, apparently did not have that particular effect in Korea.

While these peasants were not more attuned to most media than others, they did tend to read more pamphlets. The attribute of energy might have been an aspect of youth, but it might also suggest that better hygienic habits were taught in the military service. One result hypothesized earlier did show up slightly here: former soldiers were slightly more willing to donate their time to the improvement of the village.

FACTOR 25	Aglisten
DRYLAND	-0.31
PARCELS	-0.56
AGLISTEN	0.42
UREA	0.74
THRESHER	(0.28)

Finally, in Factor 25, there is a hint that listening to agricultural broadcasts may have predisposed peasants to make greater use of fertilizers. They owned few parcels, but this may have been related to the small amount of dryland held by these persons, for dryland is separated from the wetland for rice farming.

Considering the results of the various predictions that have been made about Nae-il and Ōje, it is probable that the peasants of Nae-il rated the present and future somewhat higher than did the peasants in Ōje. To test this hypothesis, a ladder, with rungs numbered from 0 (lowest) through 10 (highest), was shown to each respondent, and it was explained that "this ladder represents levels in life. The position marked '0' shows the worst possible level you could imagine yourself to be on. The position marked '10' shows the best possible position you could imagine. Now, looking back about five years, where would you place yourself on this ladder? . . . Where on this ladder do you think you are today? . . . Where on this ladder do you expect to be about five years from now?"¹⁸

As anticipated and as shown in Table 5.9, peasants in Nae-il rated the present and the future perceptibly higher than did villagers in Ōje. This is an important result because it signifies that the progressive peasants anticipated returns for their modernity. They had made many of the contributions called for by the government through the Saemaul movement, and the time had come to fulfill their expectations of an improved quality of life. It is also probable, in light of such evidence, that the efforts to make Nae-il a progressive village were offered voluntarily for the purpose of a brighter future. In addition, as other studies have shown, it is the progressive villages, not the more backward ones, that have higher hopes and greater optimism in the face of change.

This ladder technique was also used by Hadley Cantril in his cross-national survey among persons of several nations, and it is of some interest to compare our results with his (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10) even though the two are not entirely comparable. The Koreans were certainly not as depressed in their assessment of the past and present as peasants in the Dominican Republic, and they were certainly much more sanguine about the future, both in Nae-il and Ōje, than rural Indians. Nae-il came closest in the assessment of well-being to rural persons in Egypt. The very slight distinction made in Ōje between the

past and the present and the relatively moderate expectations for the future resembled rural responses in the Philippines and Panama. Neither village rated the past and the present as high as farmers in the United States, but Nae-il certainly had higher expectations for the future. These results seem to fit rough and impressionistic assessments of conditions in these various countries at the time of the survey, with Egypt experiencing under the impact of a modernizing leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the kindling of hopes for further improvements, while conditions in the Philippines did not seem quite so fortunate or rewarding for the future to peasants. This seems to make some sense and helps to place Oje and Nae-il in an international context.

Table 5.9
An Assessment of Personal Well-being on Cantril's
Ladder Scale of 0 to 10, Nae-il and Oje

	5 years ago	Present	5 years hence
Nae-il	4.2	5.8	8.0
Oje	4.6	4.7	6.9

The differences between Nae-il and Oje for the present and the future are statistically significant according to t-tests.

Table 5.10
Assessment of Personal Well-being on the Ladder
Scale in Several Nations
(Rural Respondents)*

	5 years ago	Present	5 years hence
Brazil	3.9	4.3	6.8
Dominican Republic	1.4	1.3	5.7
Egypt	4.7	5.4	8.0
India	3.3	3.6	4.9
Philippines	4.8	4.8	6.6
United States	6.3	6.5	7.7
Nigeria	2.8	4.7	7.4
Panama	4.5	4.4	6.7

*From Cantril, *Pattern of Human Concerns*, Appendix D, pp. 365-375, rural respondents only.