

SEVEN / THE TRANSFORMATION OF SONG LOYALISM

Song Loyalism: Its Nature, Intensity, and Duration

In a broad perspective, this study has been concerned with the historiography of the Song loyalists, particularly in exploring the distance between myth-making and reality with regard to loyalty, dynastic succession, resistance to foreign conquest, opportunistic collaboration, and the varying responses of the intellectuals and their followers. Conquest and resistance are common themes in history; yet official and unofficial sources of the time of Song collapse make Song loyalism and loyalists appear unique in Chinese history.

Traditional views of Song loyalism give a one-dimensional image of the loyalists as uncompromising individuals who struggled against Mongol rule in either militant or passive resistance. These loyal sentiments have been conceived as unchanging and absolute in nature, and this conception has been more emphatic in exemplary loyalist figures such as Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde. Traditional history-writing about the loyalists has been chiefly concerned with identifying, classifying, and rejecting individuals as loyalists. In this respect, the collaborators and defectors have been seen as the loyalists' polar opposites and censured for their lack of integrity.

The preceding chapters debunk the myth of absolute loyalty; in fact, the popular tradition of Song loyalism was largely the result of the loyalists' sentimental portrayals of themselves and their cause. Uncritical admiration by their contemporaries and later sympathizers reinforced and perpetuated the idealization. These writers searched for historical parallels and model conduct to bring relevance into their times and consolation for their own plight. Their writings are responsible for the myths of Song loyalism and present an incomplete picture of the loyalists. Until now, attention has been focused on

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heroic examples of loyalism and consequently many loyalist personalities have been neglected. The suppression of unflattering details and embellishment of favorable facts has resulted in the representation of Song loyalism as absolute and uncompromising. Very little is known about the more obscure individuals commended for their loyalist activities. Contrary to popular tradition, rather than loyalty to the Song being the primary motivation in loyalist behavior, participation in the loyalist resistance was more often due to personal loyalty to an individual leader like Wen Tianxiang. Relatives, friends, tenants and mercenaries took part in the resistance for reasons other than political loyalty to the Song.

Surprisingly, the centers of strong military resistance were rarely the centers of *yimin* gatherings after the collapse of the Song. For instance, Xiangyang, Changzhou, and Yangzhou resisted most resolutely the invading Mongol armies, but after 1276 these prefectures do not appear to have become regional centers where loyalist survivors were active. The obvious deduction might be that there were no loyalist personalities in these districts after the defeat of the resistance, but it could also be supposed that many accounts of local loyalism depended on the enthusiasm of local historians. To be sure, many traditional writings on the Song loyalists were inspired and influenced by local perspectives and interests. For example, our knowledge of the loyalists in Qingyuan has been enriched by Quan Zuwang, whose interest in his ancestors' role in loyalist resistance led him to carry out extensive research on this subject. More recently, the debate in the 1950s among Hong Kong scholars on Song loyalist activities in that region was much affected by their keen concern to establish Hong Kong's significance in Song history. The information thus collected often carries a strong provincial bias which reduces its value as source material.

Song loyalism has traditionally been conceived as a single body of values opposed to dynastic transition and alien rule. After having studied official histories and the loyalists' own collected works, I suggest that Song loyalism was not so simple. Three separate traditions have been identified: the *zhongyi* loyalists who died for or because of the Song cause, the *yimin* loyalists who survived the Song collapse and loyalist resistance and lived during the first generation of Yuan rule, and the marginal loyalists whose loyalty to the Song was doubted by traditional historians because of some compro-

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missing position. Song loyalism embraced a range of conduct from absolute intransigence to grudging accommodation. In the years immediately after the Song demise, loyalists engaged in active military resistance, participated in the recovery of the imperial relics, ignored Yuan reign titles, rejected friendships with Yuan officials and Song defectors, withdrew from political life and refused to serve the Yuan government. However, the intensity and duration of such loyalist behavior gradually eroded and became transformed over time. We find that even the loyalism of Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde--the paragons of loyalist virtue--was in the final analysis not absolute but later involved a degree of compromise. Wen Tianxiang associated himself with Wang Yuanliang and Deng Guangjian who were in Yuan service; moreover, he expressed some doubt about his determination to die and become a martyr. Xie Fangde would have reconciled a life as a loyal survivor and continued his friendship with northern scholar-officials in Yuan office had he not been forced to take up Yuan employment. With few exceptions, most loyalists socialized with Yuan officials and wrote commemorative essays for personal and financial obligations. They certainly regarded some as close friends; not a few fully approved of their children serving the Yuan.

After the Song demise, the local elite in some prefectures such as Fuzhou maintained their economic and social position; however, this stability was not apparent in other places. For example, in Davis' study of the Shi lineage in Qingyuan, while 240 members held office in the Southern Song, only ten occupied positions in the Yuan.¹ The ravages of war and loss of positions in the Song government caused the loyalists to move with their families in search of employment and subsistence opportunities. Being suddenly forced to sell essays and accept food donations made it impossible for most loyalists to uphold absolute loyalism; thus Yuan rule seemed less objectionable. Traditional historians ignored this fact and praised only the exemplary loyalists while dismissing those who later served.

Traditional scholarship also overlooked the fact that for the loyalists who died shortly after the Song collapse and whose loyalty did not need to be tested through extreme poverty, it was much easier to retain a reputation as

1. See Hymes, 216; Davis, 181.

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ardent and intransigent loyalists. For others who lived ten, twenty or thirty years after the imposition of foreign rule it was more difficult to adhere to the same uncompromising standards without being seen as eccentrics or neglecting family and social commitments. For instance, whereas Lu Xiufu (who died in the resistance), Ma Tingluan (a retired veteran Song official), and Zhou Mi (who had a wealthy patron) did not have to worry about eking out a living, Qiu Yuan and Dai Biaoyuan endured poverty and served the new government only after 1300. By gradually rationalizing Mongol rule, it was much more acceptable in the eyes of the loyalists themselves and society to take up service in 1300 than in 1280. As indicated in the profile of Zhou Mi and his extensive network of friends, accepting the new government became a salient feature of Song loyalism in the late 1280s and 1290s. By 1300, few Song loyalists still adhered to absolute loyalty. Indeed, loyalist activities had largely lost direct relevance and what remained was nostalgic reminiscing about loyalist conduct in the aftermath of the Mongol conquest.

The loyalists and their contemporaries recognized that loyalism was a relative concept, but they criticized what they considered to be questionable loyalist behavior. The followers of Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde prescribed for their leaders the utmost unblemished and absolute form of integrity and loyalty. In order to obtain that goal, they exhorted them to commit suicide and leave no doubt to posterity about their exemplary conduct. At the same time, they demanded of themselves less absolute manifestations of loyalty and continued to live decades after the collapse of the Song. Zhou Mi mocked the defectors' fickleness and disloyalty. He, in turn, was criticized by Yuan Jue for keeping company with eminent Yuan officials, but Yuan Jue himself took up employment with the Yuan government and became friendly with higher Mongol dignitaries. Fang Hui was treated with contempt by Zhou Mi for surrendering and prostrating in front of northern Chinese and foreigners; but a few years after resigning his Yuan post Fang chided Cheng Jufu for carrying out a commission by the Yuan throne.¹ Zhao Mengfu, himself a Song clansman and in Mongol service, ostracized Liu Mengyan, a high-ranking chief minister, for deserting the Song government. Apparently, by up-

1. "Poem to bid farewell to Cheng Jufu," in Fang Hui, *Tongjiang xuji*, 12.5b.

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braiding others for dubious loyalty and lack of integrity, those who were themselves criticized on the same basis consoled themselves that their own conduct was more honorable than that of others. One former Song official who later served the Yuan was exceptionally honest in evaluating his flight from the Song court during its last days: even though he did not "flee a hundred paces," he admitted that the pertinent point was that he did after all flee from his responsibilities.¹

Efforts to minimize their guilt about disloyal behavior caused some of these individuals, who still felt loyalty to the former Song, to leave their Yuan positions after a brief period of service. Deng Guangjian and Wang Yuanliang, who had been forced to serve, resigned and returned to South China in order not to further compromise their principles. During the first generation of Yuan rule not a few loyalists, because of poverty and a commitment to keep up the scholarly tradition, compromised their integrity and wrote essays for Mongol officials and taught foreign students; some worked in official schools and took up positions as directors of local schools. They served because they felt that teaching positions did not involve them directly with the Yuan government and thus did not compromise their loyalty to the Song. With this view some loyalists thus refused promotions to instructors in prefectures, as this position would weigh more heavily on their conscience. This type of rationalization was also used by Qiu Yuan, Dai Biaoyuan, and many others who served as instructors but still considered themselves subjects of the former Song by calling themselves "*jinshi*," "surviving subject," "fleeing," or "refugee subject" of the former dynasty. Simply to dismiss these men as nonloyalists and collaborators who could not maintain their integrity to the end is to ignore the whole range of loyalist behavior and its transformation over time and circumstances.

Among the loyalists, the meaning of loyalism also varied according to the traditional Confucian values of *zhong* (loyalty), *xiao* (filial piety), *zheng-tong* (legitimate succession) and *huayi* (ethnic distinction between Chinese and foreigners). The notion of loyalty was the most important for *zhongyi* loyalists such as Wen Tianxiang, Lu Xiufu, Li Tingzhi, and Zhang Shijie. In

1. "Mourning poem for Xu Zongren," in Wang Yi, 1.9b-10a.

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general, they rejected the narrow and myopic vision of loyalty to one ruler and sovereign (as was the loyalty of Yue Fei) in preference for a broader definition of loyalty to the dynasty and its survival in the face of total conquest. Had their loyalty been directed solely towards their sovereigns, Gong-di and Empress Dowager Xie, they would have obeyed their last edicts to surrender immediately and accompany the imperial entourage to the Yuan capital. As Xie Fangde noted, Empress Dowager Xie wished to perform her duties as sovereign by preventing further bloodshed and harm to her people, but as a subject of the Song, his commitment and duty were to sustain the empire. In the same way Wen Tianxiang replied to criticism of his abandonment of the captured sovereigns to enthrone the two Song princes, declaring that his greater responsibility was to the survival of the Song empire. To some leaders loyalty meant that the Song state took priority over all other commitments and the consequence of their devotion to this principle was death. Many personal followers and family members died with them but the nature of their loyalty was different. Whereas Wen Tianxiang and Li Tingzhi saw it as their political duty to die for the country, those who voluntarily accompanied them to their death did so out of a personal loyalty and duty to their leaders, husbands, fathers, patrons, and masters.

Xie Ao, one of the *yimin*, directed his loyalty to Wen Tianxiang; his commitment to the Song state was of secondary importance. Thus Xie Ao's lavishly praised essay was actually a personal mourning tribute to his leader and patron to whom he was grateful for showing interest in him, a mere commoner. Most *yimin* felt that the Song collapse did not necessitate actual participation in military resistance, but simply a feeling of loyalty and nostalgia towards the former dynasty and quiet withdrawal from direct political co-operation with the new government. This type of loyalism was exhibited in the early years of Yuan rule by Wang Yinglin and the personalities and groups described earlier. Some of these had been Song officials who had been criticized by the Song court for deserting it just before or during its surrender. At the start of Yuan rule, they decided to stay loyal to the former dynasty by devoting themselves to its culture and civilization; thus they spent much of their lives in scholarship and teaching. Zhou Mi's efforts to preserve the memory of the customs and practices, arts and poetry of the former era, and Wang Yinglin's prolific writings on textual criticism and the Confucian

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classics are examples of this dedication and ideal of loyalty.

To account for some former officials who later served the Yuan or communicated with its officials and Song defectors in social, economic, and personal ways, it could be said that they showed their devotion to Chinese civilization by attempting to sinicize the foreigners in the hope of softening alien rule. As one such former Song official who took up a Yuan appointment quotes from the ancient Confucians: "When medicine is practiced, people live; when Confucianism is practiced, the empire and posterity survive."¹

Also indicative of the various forms of loyalty are the different historical heroes adopted by the loyalists to justify their conduct or misconduct and raise their morale. For instance, Wen Tianxiang admired immensely the heroic generals and advisors who defied death and opposed the enemy to the end. To justify his "latent" martyrdom Xie Fangde drew a parallel between himself and Boyi, Shuqi and Gong Sheng, who died by starvation many years after the dynastic crisis. As for the *yimin* loyalists who survived into the first generation of Mongol rule, they followed Tao Qian, who did not disdain poverty and refused to use the reign titles of the alien dynasty.

Filial piety to one's parents and ancestors and loyalty to the ruler have traditionally been seen as complementary concepts and as harmonious with each other, as expressed in popular sayings like "to be loyal is to be filial" and "the loyal subject must first be a filial son." However, among the Song loyalists the demands of filial piety and loyalty conflicted and necessitated a painful choice of one over the other. Wen Tianxiang and the martyrs who participated in military resistance and died instead of surviving to look after their parents or enter a period of mourning considered their loyalty to the state their first priority. But for Xie Fangde and Wang Yanwu, filial piety took precedence; they quit the resistance to attend to their filial commitments. In fact, Xie Fangde did not approve of Wen Tianxiang, Li Tingzhi, Chen Yizhong, and the others who during their mourning periods responded to court summons to resume their political duties. The choice of filial piety over loyalty was also made by defectors such as Wen Tianxiang's brother Bi and Lü Wenhuan. For Zhou Mi and the *yimin* loyalists, filial piety meant at-

1. "Descriptive essay of Quansheng hall," in Wang Yi, 7.12b.

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taining high political office and ensuring that the family name and honor were not blemished through personal misconduct. To serve the succeeding dynasty would have amounted to a serious betrayal of Zhou's family which for many generations had included Song officials.

At the end of their life, most loyalists were satisfied with their choice between filial piety and loyalty, but Zheng Sixiao was different. He desperately wanted to join the resistance in 1275, but his mother's illness and death interrupted his ambitions to engage in physical combat with the Mongol forces. After mourning his mother for the entire compulsory period, Zheng spent the rest of his life in political and social seclusion out of intense devotion to the Song. At his death he regretted being the most "unfilial and disloyal" subject of the Song because not only did he not play an active role in loyalist resistance, but he had no heir to continue the family name and attend to the ancestral rites.

Because South China had never been under foreign rule the outlook of the Song loyalists is of particular importance to an understanding of the Chinese response to foreign conquest. Their collected writings, with the exception of Zheng Sixiao's *Xinshi*, are generally mild towards the Mongols and other foreigners who are called barbarians, barbarian caitiffs, chieftains, northern peoples, or northern visitors. In contrast, the Song imperial edicts of 1274-75, drafted by the erudite loyalist Wang Yinglin, contain much stronger language, referring to foreigners as swine, dogs, and snakes. The collected writings of the loyalists discuss alien rule in more subtle tones by the use of historical analogies. For instance, the virtues of Cai Yan and Su Wu, whose loyalty to the indigenous Han dynasty remained unchanged over many years, are alluded to in order to reinforce the loyalists' antipathy to the alien government. Some, but not all the loyalists, expressed ethnic and racial prejudices against foreigners, whom they considered incapable of ever behaving like Chinese. Their views contrasted to earlier traditional beliefs of culturalism, a conviction that foreigners could be assimilated into Chinese culture and civilization.

At the start of the resistance, it was the threat of an unprecedented foreign conquest and rule of all of China that motivated active loyalists such as Wen Tianxiang and Wang Lixin, as well as more obscure figures, who swore to die rather than be "contaminated by barbarian blood." There were

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also several who sought unoccupied territory on which to die or left instructions to be buried in other lands. Apart from Wen, both Empress Dowager Xie and Xie Fangde perceived early that the Mongol conquest, if victorious, would be an unprecedented disaster. In appealing for widespread support for the throne, the 1275 edict for the *qinwang* campaigns in fact emphasized that never before in Chinese history had the whole of China been conquered by a foreign people.

The *yimin* loyalists, however, had diverse views. Some, like Zhou Mi, simply lamented the change of dynasties but showed few fierce antiforeign sentiments in their writings. Others, like Lin Jingxi and Deng Mu, displayed heart-rending emotions about foreign rule, albeit using allusions rather than outright condemnation. However, in his *Xinshi*, Zheng Sixiao abused without restraint the Mongols, whom he regarded as inhuman, untrustworthy and insatiable. His racial views on foreigners call to mind scholars like Chen Liang, who earlier held similar opinions, and anticipated those of Fang Xiaoru (1357-1402).¹ It is difficult to determine exactly how much ethnic and racial prejudice was in Song loyalty because we cannot be certain whether the loyalists' writings have survived intact from self-censorship in the Yuan and from the literary inquisitions in the Qing. One thing is certain: some racial and ethnic hostility existed among individual writers during and immediately after the Song conquest.

However, most loyalists who survived and lived under Mongol rule, including Xie Fangde before his martyrdom in 1289, were gradually impressed by the degree of sinicization in the Yuan dynasty and among its officials. Former Song officials, like Jia Xuanweng who was forced to live and teach in Hejian, modified earlier antiforeign sentiments as they became aware of the high standard of Confucian learning in North China despite centuries of foreign rule. Such warm sentiments towards northern Chinese acquaintances and scholars reduced somewhat the resentment southerners in general harbored against northern Chinese and foreigners, who they felt were better treated by the Yuan government. The Mongols' political reunification of the country also gradually mollified the loyalists. The mournful feelings about

1. On Fang Xiaoru, see Xiao Gongquan, vol. 4, 526-37, and Mi Chu Wiens.

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the Song demise, already waning, were further reduced as people regained opportunities to travel widely and as the cultural and scholarly traditions of the North and South became reintegrated. Except for a few loyalists such as Lin Jingxi, loyalists looked at reunification positively and thereby softened their antipathy to foreign rule.

After some years, loyalists such as Wang Yinglin compared the Mongol Yuan to the short-lived Qin dynasty. They became convinced of the permanence of Chinese culture and civilization through the transmission of Confucian teaching, and after a period of adjustment looked confidently to the future. In that respect, their feelings were not much different from some northern Chinese scholars who served the Yuan and felt that the foreign origins of the ruling dynasty were irrelevant; what was of crucial importance was the ruler's enlightenment. Thus in 1260, Hao Jing advised Li Tingzhi:

At present, he who can employ scholars and practice the way of the Middle Kingdom should be regarded as the ruler of the Middle Kingdom. If scholars in this [favorable] time do not apply themselves, then the people will be subjected to the executioner's knife and abandoned in dejection; there will not be half a survivor left.¹

The concept of legitimate or orthodox succession constituted the final component of Song loyalism.² Traditionally it was regarded as Heaven's prerogative to grant the mandate of rulership to a dynasty, which must thereupon be worthy of it by carrying out benevolent rule. Only when rulers were evil and depraved was the mandate withdrawn and given to another imperial house. The Song collapse raised many unanswered questions. Since the Song

1. Hao Jing, 37.13a, in a letter to Li Tingzhi to convince him about Qubilai's enlightened rule.

2. For a survey and discussion of the concept of legitimate succession in Chinese history, with particular regard to the Song and Yuan periods, see Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese official historiography," 68-74, and Rao Zongyi, *Zhongguo shixue shang zhi zhengtong lun*, 28-42, 105-62.

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emperors were generally considered thrifty and benevolent rulers, the cause for the dynasty's collapse was perplexing to the loyalists. Xie Fangde blamed a lack of filial piety among officials during the last years of the Southern Song, but most loyalists, like their contemporaries and traditional historians, put the major responsibility on Jia Sidao. At the same time, they felt obliged to obscure their close relationship with Jia. Many key loyalist figures had been his protégés or at one time benefited from his patronage: they included Li Tingzhi, Liu Fu, Chen Yizhong, and Hu Sanxing. Zhou Mi's writings suggest that even he had been one of Jia's close friends. The loyalists also blamed the defectors and collaborators but they did not rail against those with whom they were personally acquainted. In their opinion, Jia and these renegades, and not the Song imperial house, were responsible for losing the mandate of Heaven.

The succession of the Mongol Yuan dynasty posed a problem of legitimacy to the loyalists.¹ The conquest of North China by the Jurchens necessitated the removal of the Song capital to the southeast and the relocation of the Song court. With another ruler enthroned, the legitimacy of the Song continued in South China; in that respect the loss of the North, humiliating as it was, was not tantamount to losing the entire country to foreign rule. But after the defeat of loyalist resistance in 1279, for the first time in history there was no Chinese-ruled territory. Fearing this impending situation Xie Fangde, Wen Tianxiang, and Empress Dowager Xie declared that never before had the Middle Kingdom seen total foreign conquest and hinted that in their opinion the Yuan, despite its military superiority, was not legitimate. Zheng Sixiao's remarks in the *Xinshi* were more direct and inflammatory. He rejected reigns by foreign rulers, together with those by women and usurpers, as illegitimate and equivalent to the rule of animals who pretended to be human beings. He argued that legitimate succession did not need to be based on territory; the Middle Kingdom should be treated as still in existence and legitimate despite the fact that its territory was totally occupied by foreigners. The for-

1. Surprisingly, there is relatively little on this topic among loyalist writings. Zhou Mi quotes his friend Chen Guo's theory of legitimate succession based on seven breaks and six continuations, but this framework covers only up to the Tang dynasty.

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eigners then controlling China should be considered illegitimate usurpers. He felt that since the Mongol dynasty was alien it did not have the mandate of Heaven and would be certain to disintegrate shortly.

By the late 1280s and 1290s it was evident that there was no hope for a revival of the indigenous Song. Most loyalists had, therefore, rationalized permanent alien rule. Their use of Yuan reign titles by that time indicates their acceptance of the dynasty's legitimacy. Certainly by 1300 the Song loyalists no longer formed a separate and visible social group, and were not much different from the larger sector of southern scholars, including many collaborators, in their perception of loyalty to the Song and changing attitudes towards the Yuan dynasty.

A question asked at the beginning of this study was whether the southern Chinese responded differently than their northern compatriots when the Jurchen Jin occupied North China in 1126-27. At the time the Jurchens had remarked that there were few loyalists in the Song compared to the conquest of the Liao.¹ Emperor Shizong of the Jin (r. 1161-89) also commented on the different attitudes of northern and southern Chinese:

Since antiquity, those among the natives of Yan [i.e., the Dadu region] who were loyal and honest have been few. When the Liao army came, they submitted to the Liao; when the Song came, they submitted to the Song; and when Our present dynasty [i.e., Jin] arrived, they submitted to Our present dynasty . . . [Thus] although they have undergone several dynastic changes, they have not been ravaged for these reasons. The southerners are unyielding and intransigent. Those who dare to speak and admonish frankly are many; [if through such conduct] one man is put to death, there will follow another who will still admonish. [This attitude] is highly admirable.²

1. Biography of Li Ruoshui, SS 446.13160-62.

2. Toghto, *Jinshi* 8.184. See also Yanai, 95.

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The Chinese literati under Jurchen rule cooperated with the new government because survival of tradition and culture was foremost in their minds and they hoped to use Chinese learning to "civilize" or transform alien rule.¹ When the Mongols took over the government in 1234, North China had already been subjected to foreign rule for centuries, and northern scholars had become accustomed to foreign conquest. In addition, because the Jurchen Jin mistreated its Khitan and Chinese subjects, military and civilian officials found it easier on their moral conscience to submit to the Mongols.² Some Song contemporaries wrote about the hopes of the northern Chinese to reunite with the Southern Song and noted their crushing disappointment during its collapse in 1276. However, by that time northern Chinese who had submitted to the Yuan or were born under its rule felt loyal to the Yuan and not to the Song, in spite of the common ethnic and cultural identity with the South.³

This is not to say that there were no loyalists during the Mongol conquest of North China. Indeed, there were some who joined Daoist sects in protest and to preserve Chinese values and culture under Mongol dominance.⁴ However, like northern scholars and generals under Jin rule, they

1. On northern scholars who wished to preserve tradition and culture, and therefore cooperated with Jurchen rule, see Peter K. Bol.

2. A primary reason for Jin defections to the Mongols was the general hatred of the Jurchens by their Khitan and Chinese subjects. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and personalities," 142, and "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai." Hao Jing's *Linchuan ji* also expresses deep resentment of the Jin regime. After the collapse of the Jin, common people reportedly massacred large groups of Jurchens. See Zhao Yi, 20.589.

3. See, e.g., Zhao Mengfu's poem "Yue Fei's grave," in Zhao Mengfu, 4.42. Sun Kekuan remarks that Liu Yin, as a northern Chinese, was disappointed with the Mongol conquest which dashed any hopes of reunification with the Southern Song regime. Liu Yin was sympathetic to the Song, but his refusal to serve the Yuan was not related to loyal feelings toward the Song. See Mote, "Confucian eremitism," 262-79.

4. On these Daoist sects and their concerns with preserving Chinese civilization, see Chen Yuan, *Nan Song*; and Yao Congwu, "Jin Yuan."

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soon felt it more constructive to cooperate with the Mongol rulers in order to soften and transform alien rule into a more compassionate system. Compared to these northern brothers, the Song loyalists were more profoundly affected by the Mongol conquest and thus put up a relentless resistance for three years. But eventually they, too, adjusted to the idea of alien rule and a generation later they had come to terms with it. Their change of mind was helped by the high degree of sinicization they perceived as possible in their Mongol conquerors.

In spite of decreasing antipathy towards the Mongol dynasty, in each individual the essence and significance of loyalism to the Song remained unique and varied with particular circumstances. For instance, the martyrdom of Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde was inspired by different historical figures. To them, as to other loyalists such as Xie Ao, Zhou Mi, and Zheng Si-xiao, loyalty and filial piety meant different commitments and resolutions. As a group, however, they realized that they were only stepping into the shoes of exemplary heroic figures of the past and would in this way attain some fame in posterity; they did not consider that they were setting a precedent with their loyalty to the Song.

Impact of Song Loyalism on Later Generations

Popular tradition tells us that the Song loyalists generally forbade their children to serve the Yuan dynasty and maintains that only with the establishment of the indigenous Ming dynasty did their descendants take up service. Biographies fitting this interpretation are easily found in sections of gazetteers dealing with loyalist personages. As shown in this study, however, these cases were the exceptions rather than the rule. Although many loyalists did not themselves reemerge from political withdrawal due to their commitment to the former dynasty, they allowed their children and pupils to accept official appointment in the Yuan government. Even Mou Yan, who never left his home for thirty-six years after the Song demise, saw nothing wrong with his sons and son-in-law entering Yuan service. The sons of the exemplary loyalists Xie Fangde and Wen Tianxiang also held office under the new government. While restricting themselves to political withdrawal or martyrdom, they perhaps saw it as their filial duty to ensure that the family did not lose its scholar-official gentry status. In this respect, they possibly even played an

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active role in arranging their sons' appointments through former colleagues like Liu Mengyan who had risen to high positions in the Yuan bureaucracy.

Although some *yimin* loyalists accepted office themselves due to poverty and other reasons, many others did not but continued to engage in teaching and scholarship. In that capacity they definitely influenced the young generation's attitude towards alien rule, sharing with them at the same time their own political experience before the Song demise. Their students and sons developed an admiration and nostalgia for the upright spirit of Wen Tianxiang and other exemplary loyalists. In this way the loyalists provided the younger generation with a bridge to the future as well as to the past. Through their offices and contacts with other Yuan officials in the 1290s and 1300s, sons and pupils in turn helped the more stubborn loyalists come to terms with the new dynasty.

In subsequent generations Song loyalists existed only in the memory of stories told to the grandsons and young pupils of the loyalists. While they were influenced by the loyalist spirit, their loyalty was not to the Song but to the Yuan dynasty in which they were born, and under which they served. These men deeply admired the Song loyalists and wrote of their virtues and zeal, but their sympathy did not mean that they were anti-Yuan.¹ Thus in the long run, the Song loyalists' impact on the younger generations lay essentially in the teaching and transmission of Confucian values and culture.

After the defeat of loyalist resistance in 1279, the Yuan was confronted with banditry and uprisings which were most rampant during the reigns of Qubilai and Toghon Temür. The unrest in the late 1270s and 1280s was particularly alarming in Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi, which had in fact been centers of loyalist resistance under Wen Tianxiang and Zhang Shijie.² Several uprisings claimed connections with the Song imperial family and one was led by Chen Diaoyan (fl. 1270-90), a former associate of Zhang Shi-

1. For example, the writings of Yang Weizhen and Tao Zongyi are pro-Song but not anti-Yuan. See Franke, "Some aspects," 118, 128-29.

2. For a list of these rebellions recorded in the annals of Qubilai in the *YS*, see Wan Sitong, *Songji zhongyi lu*, appendix.6-12; Chen Banzhan, *Yuanshi jishi benmo*, 1.1a-7b.

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jie.¹ On that basis certain Ming and Qing scholars and modern nationalistic historians have hailed these rebellions as organized patriotic pro-Song activities.² Some even asserted that they were secretly planned by the *yimin* loyalists.³ This claim is tenuous and uncorroborated by evidence. After 1279 most of the active participants in the loyalist resistance had died; the remnant loyalist forces were incorporated into the Yuan armies and the bandit groups simply dispersed as quickly as they had been assembled for short-term profit. Many such movements claiming to be pro-Song were in fact instigated by men who had taken up Yuan office but who later rebelled. Among the loyalists included in this study, there is only one or two who are said to have been participants in these later rebel movements. The uprisings of Chen Diaoyan, the She people, and several others invoking the Song banner were but isolated incidents operating without the support of the *yimin* loyalists. In fact, loyalists such as the Qingyuan scholar Shu Yuexiang condemned these bandits and outlaws who caused chaos and suffering.

The notion that these uprisings were related to the Song loyalist resistance might first have arisen because the Yuan government overreacted, suspecting without sufficient cause that the last Song pretender to the throne, Di Bing, had not drowned but had fled safely to Champa. After 1279 the Yuan court did not really fear a revival of loyalist resistance but wanted to prevent Song clansmen from being used as figureheads by rebel groups to instigate revolts. A fact overlooked by those who interpreted these uprisings as loyalist activities is that in South China more natural disasters occurred annually during Yuan rule than any other dynasty.⁴ Such calamities as floods and famine partially accounted for the rebellious mood of the times. To allocate

1. In 1283 Huang Hua organized a rebellion in Fujian, claiming to restore the Song. See Chen Bangzhan, *Yuanshi jishi benmo*, 1.3a. On the revolt of Chen Guilong and Chen Diaoyan in 1280-83, see SS 451.33274. Chen Biaoyan is said to have responded to Zhang Shijie's loyalist call in 1277 during the latter's siege in Zhangzhou.

2. Chen Bangzhan, *Yuanshi jishi benmo*, 1.6b; Wan Sitong, *Songji zhongyi lu*, appendix.12.

3. See Sun Kekuan's *Yuandai han wenhua*, 342, and his "Yuanchu Nan Song," 14.

4. Deng Yunte, 18-20.

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full responsibility to the Song loyalists is to misinterpret reality and create myths such as the "moon cake" campaigns to drive out the Mongols in the late Yuan.¹

Although late Yuan rebel leaders (including Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming) often used the Song banner as the cause for revolt, few if any of the Song loyalists and their descendants included in this study can be shown to have taken part.² It can be said that the Song loyalists did not play a military role after the defeat at Yaishan. In fact, in the late Yuan many individual scholars of the third or fourth generation under Mongol rule supported the Yuan despite the establishment of the indigenous Ming dynasty. The generation of scholars who experienced the collapse of the Yuan dynasty had not lived under Song rule but were led to admire Song loyalism through the writings of the loyalists. These men loyal to the Yuan included not only Mongols and Central Asians but also southern Chinese. There were many cases of Chinese gentry who recruited their tenants, family servants and slaves to repel rebellious movements.

The Yuan loyalists who survived dynastic collapse in 1368 lived a life-style very similar to that of the Song loyalists during the first generation of Yuan rule. Individuals such as Tao Zongyi (ca. 1316-ca. 1402), Yang Weizhen (1296-1370), and Dai Liang (1317-83) considered themselves subjects of the former Yuan and refused to serve the Chinese rebel leaders.³ What impressed these men the most about the Song loyalists, whom they

1. Legend and tradition wove the myth that in 1368 the Song loyalists instigated the Han race to rebel against the Mongols on the fifteenth day of the eighth month, i.e. the Mid-autumn Festival. This secret message was written on pieces of paper inserted in moon cakes. Moon cakes were traditional gifts to friends and relatives during the Mid-autumn Festival. See also Serruys, *Mongols in China*, 22.

2. On Zhu Yuanzhang's founding of the Ming, see John W. Dardess.

3. On Tao Zongyi's loyalist views, see Mote, "T'ao Tsung-i," 20-22. On Yang Weizhen and Dai Liang, see their biographies in Goodrich and Fang, 1547-53 and 1234-37. Some of these men treasured former possessions of the Song loyalists in order to inspire their own loyal spirit. These objects have included Wen Tianxiang's inkstone and Xie Fangde's lute. See Fu Lo-shu, "Yudai sheng yu haozhong."

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wrote about extensively, was their loyalty to the collapsing dynasty and not their antforeign sentiments about Mongol rule. Thus they later declined to serve the Ming rulers. Men like Song Lian who entered Ming service, instead of showing exhilaration about the restoration of an indigenous Chinese dynasty, very often expressed in their writings a nostalgic sadness about the end of the Yuan dynasty and an uncertainty about the future of Ming rule.¹ Even the Qing scholars Zhao Yi and Quan Zuwang commented on the large number of individuals who died for the Yuan cause or who refused to served the Ming government in spite of the different racial and ethnic background of the Yuan rulers.² Quan felt that this phenomenon reflected the influence of Song loyalism and morality on the men of the Yuan, rather than an indication of the gratitude they expressed to the Mongol rulers for their arguably benevolent rule. The loyalty of these Yuan literati thus refutes the view that the late Yuan rebellions were the culmination of ethnic nationalistic resistance against an alien dynasty. In the transitional period between the Yuan and the Ming, scholar-officials influenced by Song loyalism were more affected by loyalty to the ruling house than loyalty to the Chinese race.

Recent scholars have in fact indicated that the racial factor during the dissolution of the Mongol Yuan was over-emphasized by Ming, Qing, and modern nationalistic scholars. They show that during the early Ming period there was neither blatant racial discrimination nor xenophobic sentiment expressed towards the Mongols, many of whom chose to stay under Ming rule rather than follow the Mongol court to Mongolia in 1368.³ In spite of the racial overtones in Zhu Yuanzhang's proclamation of succession to the Yuan, the founder of the Ming dynasty acknowledged the legitimate status of the al-

1. See Qian Mu.

2. Zhao Yi, 30.645-46 and 32.677-78; Quan Zuwang, *waibian* 18.907-08 and 18.908-09. On Yuan loyalists, see also Li Zefen, vol. 4, 109-56. A descendant of Chen Yizhong, Chen Da (fl. 1368), refused to serve the Ming and tried to drown himself (Li Zefen, vol. 4, 156). On ethnic Mongols who preferred to stay in China under the Ming, see Serruys, *Mongols in China*, 34-46.

3. Serruys, *Mongols in China*, 54-62.

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ien dynasty.¹ According to these scholars, it was the reckless Tumu Incident of 1449 (in which the Mongols inflicted a humiliating and catastrophic defeat on the Ming court) that intensified anti-Mongol feelings.² This incident also led to a revision of the histories of the Song, Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties in order to deny legitimate status to all foreign governments of China.³

Although Song loyalism had some impact on the Yuan loyalists, it was during the transition from Ming to Qing that a large number of parallels may be drawn. The obvious one is that both the Song and Ming loyalists were confronted with foreign rule. As with the Song loyalists, the Ming loyalists also put up a fierce military resistance to the Manchu conquerors, but they received even more popular and local support than during the Song collapse and posed a greater threat to the succeeding dynasty.⁴ The Ming loyalist movement was much more widespread and involved many more personalities. While the *Gujin tushu jicheng* recorded almost seven hundred names and biographies of Song loyal subjects, over five thousand biographies of Ming loyal personages are included.⁵ We earlier discussed the dissent in leadership during the Song resistance which undermined its strength, but this cannot be compared in magnitude to the rifts and conflicts in the Ming loyalist movement.

Many martyrs and survivors of the Ming loyalist resistance compared themselves with the Song loyalists and looked to the Song for precedents and ideological support. It was alleged, for instance, that Zheng Sixiao's *Xinshi*

1. For the text of this statement proclaimed in 1367, see Meng Siming, quoting from *Mingda zhengyao* (1.17a-18a), 222. For a partial translation, see Wiens, 3-4.

2. On the historical background and details of this event, see Mote, "The T'u-mu incident of 1449." On its impact on anti-Mongol sentiments, see *ibid.*, 271-72.

3. Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese official historiography," 96-105.

4. On Ming loyalist activities, see, *inter alia*, Frederic Wakeman, Jr.; Jerry Dennerline; and Lynn A. Struve.

5. Even allowing for the question of a higher degree of survival of sources on the Ming period, the figures for the Ming loyalists are still impressive. These biographies are in Chen Menglei, 735-63.

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was forged by Ming loyalists in order to spark loyalist resistance during the Ming collapse. If they were not responsible for the forgery, they certainly hailed its discovery and responded to its appeal to resist foreign conquest. In their writings, the loyalist personalities frequently referred to Song loyalist exemplars such as Wen Tianxiang, Xie Fangde, Xie Ao, and Zheng Sixiao. In particular, the antiforeign views of Wang Fuzhi and Gu Yanwu bring to mind Zheng Sixiao's strong statements about the inhuman nature of foreigners.¹ Huang Zongxi was deeply moved by Xie Ao in his loyalist sentiments and by Deng Mu in his political thought.²

Lü Liuliang (1629-83) is an example of a "latent" loyalist who developed racist feelings against the Manchus after he had obtained a degree from the new dynasty.³ In that respect he was like Wang Yuanliang and Deng Guangjian who resigned after a period of service to the Yuan. Among the Ming loyalists, there were eccentric painters like Zheng Sixiao and poetry circles which lamented the end of the dynasty.⁴ Ming loyalists also moved to other parts of the empire in the course of their military resistance, the most noteworthy among them being Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong, 1624-62) who chased out the Dutch and continued his operations in Taiwan.⁵ Following the example of Li Yong from Dongguan, who went to Japan after the Song

1. See Wiens, 9-15. On Wang Fuzhi, see Xiao Gongquan, vol. 5, 636-40; and Ian McMorran. On Gu Yanwu, see Willard J. Peterson.

2. On Huang Zongxi, see de Bary. Huang Zongxi's *Song Yuan xue'an*, completed by Quan Zuwang, is a monumental work on the intellectual schools of the Song and Yuan. The Song loyalists discussed in this study are mostly classified under the following schools: Shuixin (*juan* 54-55), Longchuan (56), Cangzhou (69-70), Beishan (82), Shenning (85), Dongfa (86), and Sunzhai (88).

3. On Lü Liuliang, see Xiao Gongquan, vol. 5, 640-46; and Tom Fisher. Lü Liuliang's preface and poem on the painting "Ruci jiangshan" makes a moving comparison between the Ming collapse and the Song demise. See Chen Dengyuan, 466.520-21.

4. See the symposium volume on Ming loyalist painters edited by Rao Zongyi, *Ming yimin shuhua yantao hui jilu zhuankan*.

5. On Koxinga, see Ralph D. Croizier.

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collapsed, the scholar Zhu Shunshui (1600-82) departed for Japan and An-nam where he taught and served.¹ As in the case of the Song loyalists, voluminous scholarship poured from the pens of the Ming loyalists; but unlike the relative freedom of expression during the Mongol period, strict censorship during the Qing proscribed many of their writings. Even in the mid-Qing period Quan Zuwang still had to exercise caution when he wrote; his high praise of the Song loyalists disguised favorable statements about the Ming loyalists.

With regard to the changing nature of their loyalism, the Ming loyalists drew examples from the Song loyalists. One instance was the decision to reenter public service. While Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Lü Liuliang did not actually take up appointments in the Qing, they encouraged their children, relatives, and students to do so.² Although Huang Zongxi refused to participate in the Ming history project, he did not forbid his student, Wan Sitong, to take part; he actually made available his private library to ensure a thorough job. This accommodating attitude undermined their loyalism in the eyes of contemporaries, who criticized each other for less than adequate manifestations of duty to the former dynasty and ruler. In fact, the Ming loyalists were more strict in their demands of unchanging loyalty. For this reason many saw Song loyalism as more absolute and Song loyalists as more resolute than had actually been the case. For instance, Wang Yinglin, who was not criticized in his own time for being wanting in loyalty, came under fierce attack by the Ming loyalists.

During the last dynastic collapse in 1911 that ended the Chinese imperial system, a new set of factors changed the meaning of loyalism. Song and Ming paragons of loyalism became exclusively identified as ethnic and nationalistic heroes.³ Those who embraced traditional models of loyalism towards the former dynasty may have felt socially displaced, because loyalist

1. Ching, "Chu Shun-shui."

2. See He Guanbiao.

3. Zhang Binglin edited Wang Yinglin's *Sanzi jing*. On Zhang, see also Wiens, 18-19; and Li Runcang.

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sentiments to the Manchu rulers were not regarded in a positive light nor respected in the midst of China's turbulent struggle to enter the modern era. The eminent scholar Wang Guowei felt loyalty to the Qing which he had served, and in 1927 drowned himself in the former Qing palace grounds.¹ This act, and those of others like him who showed a lingering loyalty to the Qing, have received traditional praise in the *zhongyi* biographies in the draft history of the Qing. Furthermore, the Song loyalists have been drawn upon as a source of inspiration in this century in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism as well as of the country's current political division. A case in point is Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), who highly praised the Song and Ming loyalists, expressing his antiforeign sentiments and nationalistic thought in his reminiscences of the erudite loyalist Wang Yinglin. Chen Yuan conveyed his nationalism as he annotated Hu Sanxing's work. At present in Taiwan, Wen Tianxiang and the exemplary loyalists are interpreted to have been more fiercely anti-Mongol than had really been the case. In the People's Republic, they are also observed to be praiseworthy men, but the nature of their loyalty and ethnic views are deemphasized to comply with the government's long-standing policy of stressing the country's ethnic complexity and of fostering harmonious relations among all ethnic groups. In fact, the landlord-gentry status of Wen Tianxiang, Deng Mu, and other loyalists has been exaggerated and the limited visions of their loyalty to the Song dynasty criticized. Such an interpretation of loyalism to apply to situations of national significance other than dynastic change reflects a departure from the traditional concept of loyalty to a dynasty.

1. On Wang Guowei's loyalist feelings and suicide, see Schneider, 97-98. Chia-ying Yeh Chao argues that Wang's suicide was motivated by purity of ideal and general disillusionment with the times rather than loyalism to the Manchu regime. See her *Wang Guowei*, 71-84.