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A Political History of the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1099 to 1187 C.E.

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Introduction:

The first Crusade, a massive and unprecedented undertaking in the western world, differed from the majority of subsequent crusades into the Holy Land in an important way: it contained no royalty and was undertaken with very little direct support from the ruling families of Western Europe. This aspect of the crusade led to the development of sophisticated hierarchies and vassalages among the knights who led the crusade. These relationships culminated in the formation of the Crusader States, Latin outposts in the Levant surrounded by Muslim states, and populated primarily by non-Catholic or non-Christian peoples. Despite the difficulties engendered by this situation, the Crusader States managed to maintain control over the Holy Land for much of the twelfth century, and, to a lesser degree, for several decades after the Fall of Jerusalem in 1187 to Saladin.

During the twelfth century the four crusader states consisted of the Principality of Antioch, the counties of Edessa and Tripoli, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. There also existed several vassal counties within Jerusalem itself, including Jaffa, Ascalon, and Sidon. Among these political bodies, the Kingdom of Jerusalem held de-facto leadership, and the King (and occasionally Queen) of the Kingdom was the highest secular political position in the Holy Land. The Kings of Jerusalem were strong personalities, and were to a large degree responsible for the relative longevity of the crusader states. They, their vassals, and the other important political figures of the twelfth century in the Levant, all faced a unique set of challenges in attempting to maintain a (Catholic) Christian hold in the Holy Land. This paper will look at the challenges

faced by the Kingdom of Jerusalem in particular, and the methods the crusaders and their descendants employed to overcome these difficulties.

The source material for this paper will come from both primary and secondary sources, but will primarily off of the accounts of four main authors. The primary source material will include the writings of Albert of Aachen, William of Tyre, and Fulcher of Chartres. Their works are contemporary to the time period under discussion, and also serve as the basis for many of the secondary source materials which will be cited. Each has a unique perspective and bias on the events in question, and these biases will be examined in a separate section. The secondary source materials include general encyclopedias of the First Crusade and its aftermath, as well as more focused accounts of the Crusader States. Notable historians include Jonathan Riley-Smith, Jean Richard, and Malcom Barber.

This essay is organized to analyze the different kinds of political issues facing the Kingdom during the twelfth century, and to provide examples of how these problems were approached and resolved. The kings of the Kingdom of Jerusalem are each a fascinating study in leadership and personal charisma, and their stories will serve as a foundation and introduction to this analysis, but otherwise will only appear where their personal actions were relevant to solving political problems. The paper is not organized in a chronological fashion, but an appendix with a timeline of rulers is included to provide context. A glossary of important figures will also be included. The types of politics the Kingdom was involved in will be presented in the following order:

1. Internal royal politics, including successions and a king's political powers
2. The political situation of vassals, and their relationship to the king.
3. The political situation of religious leaders and their relationships with the nobility.
4. International relations and dealings with the other crusader states.

Section 1: Royalty and Successions

The crusaders took Jerusalem on July 15, 1099, and immediately set to pillaging the city. Over the first few days several massacres took place, with the victims including both native Christians and non-Christians. William of Tyre describes the event in the following terms:

“After the other leaders had slain all whom they encountered in the various parts of the city, they learned that many had fled for refuge to the sacred precincts of the Temple. Thereupon as with one accord they hurried thither. A crowd of knights and foot soldiers was introduced who massacred all those who had taken refuge there. No mercy was shown to anyone, and the whole place was flooded with the blood of the victims”¹

Once the dust had settled, however, it became clear that someone needed to be put in charge of the city, or else it would quickly fall back into the hands of the Saracens. The leaders of the crusade held a council to elect a ruler (but not necessarily a king) of Jerusalem. The exact nature of the council differs depending on the source consulted. According to Albert of Aachen, the council first asked Raymond of Toulouse to take command, and when he refused they asked every other lord in turn, before finally asking Godfrey of Bouillon. Although he accepted only reluctantly, Albert claims his investiture was God’s will, and was fated to occur.² Fulcher of Chartres tells a similar story, although his emphasis lies more on Raymond’s modest refusal to rule the holy city, and he makes no mention of the position being offered to anyone other than Raymond and Godfrey.³ The *Gesta Francorum* simply states that Godfrey was unanimously elected to the office.⁴ Regardless of the circumstances, Godfrey was chosen with little dissent.

¹ William of Tyre, Babcock and Krey edit, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond The Sea vol. ii*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 371

² Albert of Aachen, Susan Edgington Trans. *Historia Ierosolimienta*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007), 445-447.

³ Raymond d’Aguilers, *The Frankish Triumph*. Edward Peters, Editor, *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 259-260.

⁴ Ibid

He chose not to be crowned in the city, ostensibly because he did not want usurp the title of King of Jerusalem from Jesus, but also potentially because he wish to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction with the Latin Patriarchs of the city, Daimbert, who had annexed the city in the name of the Church. Instead he took the title of “Defender of the Holy Sepulchre”.⁵ His reign was to be short however, lasting just under a year. During that time he undertook several important military campaigns to consolidate the position of the Kingdom, and actively worked to advertise the success of the crusade back in Europe. In the summer of 1100 he became sick, and died, unmarried and without heirs, on July 18.

Upon Godfrey’s death, an invitation to Baldwin I, who was Count of Edessa at the time, was made by Godfrey’s household and court to come and assume the throne. Baldwin was Godfrey’s younger brother, and since Godfrey had no sons at the time of his death, he was also the closest male heir. His primary rival for Jerusalem was the recently appointed Patriarch of Jerusalem, Dagobert (sometimes called Daimbert), who had been planning for a theocratic rule of the Kingdom even while Godfrey was still alive. Godfrey had actually promised the rule of the Kingdom to Dagobert, and personally believed in a religious rather than secular Kingdom.⁶ Godfrey’s household and court opposed this idea, wishing for a secular monarchy for the kingdom, and so summoned Baldwin. Dagobert was in Haifa at the time the summons took place, and so he sent a letter to Bohemond in Antioch, asking him to intercede on his behalf.⁷ Unbeknownst to him however, Bohemond was a prisoner of the Seljuk Turks at this time, and so was powerless to act. Baldwin reached the city after fighting his way through a Saracen ambush,

⁵ William of Tyre, vol i, 379

⁶ Richard, 79

⁷ Ibid

and then immediately left on a military expedition against Ascalon. William of Tyre attributes this action to Baldwin's dislike for idleness, stating:

*“He was a man who loved work and disdained idleness. Consequently, as soon as the affairs of the realm had been set in order satisfactory for the time being, he got together an expeditionary force from the people who had follow him thither...with this company, he appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before Ascalon.”*⁸

Baldwin was unable to capture the fortress, and on his return in late December 1100 he was crowned the first true Latin King of Jerusalem in Bethlehem.⁹ Further power struggles occurred between Baldwin and Dagobert for the next few years, and will be discussed in the section regarding political relationships with religious figures.

One of Godfrey's first acts as king had been to attempt to strengthen his political position by exercising authority over his subjects. This took the form of summoning Tancred to explain himself for the seizure of the fief of Haifa, which Tancred had taken by force from Geldemar earlier in the year. Geldemar had been granted this fief by Godfrey, and Tancred had no prior claim to it, but he refused to answer the summons, setting a shaky precedent for royal power in Jerusalem.¹⁰ Baldwin was an adept negotiator however, and he did manage to get Tancred to appear in Jerusalem after offering him temporary rule of Antioch in Bohemond's absence. Tancred agreed to forfeit his claims in the territory of the Kingdom, under the condition that if he returned within a year and three months, all the territory he had claimed would be returned to him.¹¹ This demand set a precedent for dealing with absentee vassals in the future, and allowed the king a means of insurance that his vassals would not leave their lands unattended for long.

⁸ William of Tyre, vol i, 426

⁹ Richard, 80

¹⁰ Malcom Barber, *The Crusader States*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 65.

¹¹ Ibid

Baldwin I had a relatively straightforward succession compared to his own heir, Baldwin II. Whereas Baldwin I was the natural heir to Godfrey, and only had to compete with Dagobert due to the unusual situation of establishing Latin rule in the East, Baldwin II was not the direct heir of Baldwin I. When Baldwin I died on April 2nd, 1118 he left no children behind, despite three marriages. His closest male relative was his remaining brother Eustace of Boulogne, who was currently in Europe administering his lands there. Upon Baldwin I's death an assembly of important officials including major vassals and church officials was called in Jerusalem, and, in a somewhat contentious decision, Eustace was chosen to succeed him. A group of the assembly departed to request this of him, and although he was reluctant, he did begin the journey back with them. In the interim however, a second assembly had been called by the current patriarch of Jerusalem and one of Baldwin I's cousins. They used the opportunity of the missing members to call for a new vote, and elected that Baldwin of Bourcq, Baldwin I's cousin and successor in Edessa, be the next king.¹² Baldwin of Bourcq accepted, and was made King immediately, although he was not crowned until two years later in 1120. Eustace received this news at Apulia, and decided to turn back, both to avoid a scandal and because his own enthusiasm for the post was not particularly great.

The plot to make Baldwin II king instead of Eustace was led by one of his cousins, Joscelin of Courtenay. Joscelin was very ambitious, and desired to advance his family's standing by getting his cousin on the throne, while taking advantage of the compelling argument that an immediately present ruler was more effective than an absent legitimate one. William of Tyre describes the proceeding in his work:

¹² Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 94.

“In the conference then held on the matter in hand various opinions were advanced. Some thought they ought to wait for the arrival of Count Eustace and not interfere with the ancient law of hereditary succession... Other said, ‘The affairs of the realm and the exigencies constantly arising do not permit these delays or allow us to indulge in interregnums of this kind. On the contrary, haste is imperative, that measures for the good of the land may be speedily taken. If an emergency should arise, there would be no one to lead forth or withdraw troops or to attend to the affairs of the realm.’... [Joscelin] said ‘The count of Edessa is present. He is a just man and greatly revered...It is far wiser to take him for our king than to wait for dangerous uncertainties.’”¹³

In the event, his plan succeeded and he was rewarded Baldwin II’s former county of Edessa. His family also received the fiefs of Galilee and Jaffa, and another member was made abbot of an important monastery.¹⁴ This example is indicative of Baldwin II’s reliance on family connections to maintain the security and legitimacy of his throne. His reciprocation for gaining the crown earned him trustworthy allies in these family members, and they were directly responsible for the success of his reign. During his lifetime he furthered strengthened his family’s ties in the Holy Land by marrying two of his daughters to the rulers of Tripoli and Antioch.¹⁵ The somewhat questionable circumstances of his own election led Baldwin II to ensure his own succession before his death; because he had no male heirs, he named Fulk V of Anjou, the husband of his daughter Melisende, heir to the Kingdom.¹⁶ When he died in 1131, after a long and successful reign, the throne passed to Fulk and Melisende relatively peacefully and without incident.

¹³ William of Tyre, vol i, 519-529

¹⁴ Riley-Smith, 96

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ (Note courtesy of Peter Diehl, PhD.): Fulk’s son Geoffrey, who succeeded him as Count of Anjou, married Matilda, daughter of Henry I of England. Geoffrey and Matilda’s son Henry would become Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou, Duke of Aquitaine (in 1152, through marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine) and King of England (in 1154). As Duke of Aquitaine, Henry was lord to the Lusignans, and his relationship with them (and his sons’ relationship with them) was rarely friendly. Fulk himself had spent a good deal of time in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the early 1120s and was one of the first patrons of the Templars. The Anglo-Norman chronicler Orderic Vitalis

Fulk began his reign in a slightly unorthodox fashion, being co-crowned regent alongside his wife, with their son Baldwin III assuming the official kingship. Fulk was the first ruler not directly related to Godfrey by blood, and his administration began by breaking a tradition of the previous kings: he was crowned in Jerusalem rather than Bethlehem.¹⁷ By being the first ruler of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to be crowned in the city itself, Fulk established that the struggle for power between the church leaders and secular rulers was over: the kings would not defer to the patriarchs. Aside from the coronation, Fulk also replaced the administrative court of his predecessor with his own associates. This action caused more far more problems for him than changing the coronation site, because it brought him into direct conflict with Hugh of Jaffa. Hugh was one of Baldwin II's family members who had received a fief in exchange for supporting his claim, in this case receiving Jaffa, one of the largest fiefs in the Kingdom. His family, the Montlherys, had essentially controlled the Kingdom under Baldwin II, holding the major fiefs, administrative posts, and several major clerical roles as well. By alienating them Fulk had lost the support of a powerful faction in the nobility of the Kingdom.¹⁸ The Montlherys would conspire with Melisende to restore their power by making her the paramount ruler, actions which would not come to fruition until after Fulk's death. During his own life Fulk was able to stay in power, and was secure enough in his role to attempt military expeditions outside the borders of his realm.

In the aftermath of Fulk's death, Melisende was able to effectively take control of the kingdom with the support of the Montlherys. She had established a separate administration

discusses Fulk in his work—see *The ecclesiastical history of Orderic Vitalis*, trans. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969-80).

¹⁷ Riley-Smith, 98

¹⁸ *Ibid*

during her husband's lifetime, complete with separate charters and military commanders, and this infrastructure allowed her to swiftly establish a regency, ruling in the name of her young son, who was only 13 in the year of Fulk's death.¹⁹ Her goal was to establish herself permanently as ruler of the kingdom, but as the young Baldwin III grew older he also worked actively to strengthen his own position. In 1152 he mustered enough political support to seize power from his mother, although she remained influential in court politics.²⁰ Baldwin III proved to be as energetic and effective as his earlier namesakes, and he embarked on several successful campaigns, notably in the defense of Antioch against Nur Al-din, and the conquest of Ascalon. His reign lasted 11 years, during which time Nur Al-din began to strengthen his kingdom in Syria, a process which would eventually lead to the loss of Jerusalem for the Latins.²¹ The Second Crusade also occurred during his reign, which ultimately proved to weaken Jerusalem rather than strengthen it. Baldwin III died at a relatively young age, and was childless, and so the throne passed to his brother Amalric.

Amalric proved to be the last ruler of the kingdom before the fall of Jerusalem who was able to wield power effectively for any length of time. He continued to fight the growing power of Nur Al-din in Syria, and strengthened the Kingdom's ties to the Byzantine Empire. He also created legislation tying minor vassals directly to the king, preventing conflicts of interest when major lords rebelled against the monarchy.²² During his life he married twice, and had children by both wives, precipitating a succession conflict that would weaken the Kingdom even further,

¹⁹ Phillips, Jonathan. *The Latin East. The Oxford History of the Crusades*, Jonathan Riley-Smith, edit. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 120; William of Tyre, vol ii, 137.

²⁰ Riley-Smith, 99

²¹ Ibid

²² Phillips, 120-124

culminating in the loss of the city of Jerusalem. He died in 1174, the same year as Nur Al-din, and the throne passed to his son Baldwin IV.²³

Baldwin IV attempted to rule with the energy and competence of his forbears, but was prevented from being entirely effective by several factors. First among these was that he had contracted leprosy as a child, and the disease became progressively more debilitating as his reign progressed. In addition, his father's remarriage had caused a divide among the nobility of the kingdom, and he found himself jostled between factions that either supported his own mother, or his father's second wife Maria Comnena, a Byzantine princess.²⁴ These factions did not dispute his own right to kingship, but attempted to manipulate him into supporting either his sister Sibylla or his half-sister Isabella as the rightful heir after him. Originally he supported Sibylla, but in 1183 her second husband Guy of Lusignan caused a rift between them, and so Baldwin named Sibylla's son by her first husband, Baldwin V, his heir. Baldwin IV succumbed to his disease in 1185, and was succeeded by Baldwin V, who was an infant at the time.²⁵

Baldwin V did not live to rule the kingdom, dying while still a child in 1186, only a year into his reign. Upon his death the Kingdom of Jerusalem fell into civil war between the factions disputing which daughter of Amalric had the right to rule. Baldwin V's tutor, Raymond III of Tripoli, claimed that Sibylla had been disinherited by Baldwin IV when he made her son his heir, and therefore Isabella should succeed Baldwin V. Sibylla naturally disagreed with this point of view, and recruited her uncle Joscelin III, also Master of the Temple (leader of the Knights Templar), to help her crown herself and her husband Guy co-rulers of the kingdom.²⁶ During this

²³ Riley-Smith, 100

²⁴ Riley-smith, 101

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Richard, 81-82

period of infighting Nur Al-Din's successor Saladin decided to exploit the political turmoil and invade the kingdom. Saladin had been originally been one of Nur Al-Din's generals before his death in 1174, and had independently overthrown the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt in 1171.²⁷ He led frequent invasions of the Kingdom between 1170 and 1187, but never committed his full resources to the task, focusing instead on consolidating the fractured Muslim kingdoms. In 1187 he decided that taking the city would legitimize his own claim to rule, and was finally successful in capturing the city of Jerusalem and pushing the Latins back to the coast.²⁸ The Kingdom of Jerusalem persisted for another century, but would never regain its full strength or recapture the city it was named after.

The key lessons to be drawn from this overview of the rulers of Jerusalem is the importance of strong rulers and lines of succession to the strength of the Kingdom. Jerusalem benefitted from several generations of active, competent, and shrewd monarchs, most of whom had clear heirs living in the Holy Land. Although several succession crises did occur, until the death of Baldwin V the kingdom never went a year without a clear ruler being chosen. Even those who ruled under dubious legitimacy, such as Baldwin II or Melisende, had strong bases of power and were largely able to maintain the security of realm.

In addition to securing the realm from outside threats, the rulers of Jerusalem also needed to maintain the internal integrity of the Kingdom. Capable in more than military matters, these kings established a political and economic system that allowed them to finance their constant wars, and prevent their vassals from overthrowing them (though many tried). This political system is perhaps the most important factor in the longevity of the kingdom.

²⁷ Riley-smith, 106-107

²⁸ Richard, 81-82

Section 2: Kings and Vassals

Introduction

The main source of tension in the political structure of the Kingdom of Jerusalem stemmed from relations between the nobility and the monarch. Historians have held differing opinions over the nature of this relationship, with three main points of view currently recorded. According to Steven Tibble, these three points of view are embodied in the ideas of J. L. La Monte, Jean Richard and Joshua Prawer, and Jonathan Riley-Smith.²⁹ La Monte saw the kingdom as embodying "pure feudalism," wherein the king simply occupied the post of highest-ranking noble and was easily manipulated by the rest of the nobility.³⁰ Richard and Prawer placed more emphasis on the power of the monarchy to control the political situation in the Kingdom. Riley-Smith stands somewhere in the middle, believing that Richard and Prawer underestimate the power of the nobility, but that they lacked the full control La Monte attributes to them. There are arguments for each perspective, however there is greater evidence for the powers held by the monarchs than those held by the lords, and the relative stability of the monarchy is evidence to the effectiveness of those powers. This section will begin with a look at the political position of the nobility, and then move to a discussion of the monarchy's position and strategies.

²⁹ Steven Tibble, *Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1. Tibble's own opinion is that none of these historians were completely accurate in their description of the kingdom's power dynamics. He disagrees with La Monte, but gives more credence to Riley-Smith, although he is self-admittedly biased, as a former pupil. He did solicit an admission from Riley-Smith that Tibble's work on the subject was more accurate than his own.

³⁰ The term 'feudalism' is a contested term among modern medievalists. For the purposes of this paper it refers to a system wherein there is a clear hierarchy of nobility based on grants of land from the higher tiers in exchange for vows of loyalty and military service from the lower tiers. Under La Monte's interpretation the King would simply represent the highest tier in the system.

In the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem to the crusaders in 1099, the leaders of the crusade whom remained in the Holy Land had two major priorities: consolidating their gains by capturing coastal ports, and establishing a Latin state to govern the conquered territory. The first step was largely accomplished over the next five years, with the port of Arsuf being taken in 1101, followed by Acre and Haifa in 1104.³¹ The second step took less time initially, but the development of the political system that governed the Kingdom would become an ongoing process over the next 70 years.

As previously discussed, the first order of business for the crusaders was to choose a leader, with Godfrey emerging as the first ruler, although not the first king. There was a belief among earlier crusaders historians, possibly emerging from the cases of Godfrey and Baldwin II, that each king was elected by the nobility.³² This belief has since been proven false, and apart from the two mentioned above each king was chosen via family-based lines of succession. The nobility did meet to decide other major issues of state however, holding a formal *parlement*, which also included prominent clergy and the leaders of the military orders. According to Jean Richard, the *parlement* most likely did not meet regularly, but was instead summoned by the king when he wanted counsel on important decisions.³³ Among the issues that the *parlement* voted on were the levying of taxes, which were typically quite large to support the frequent wars, the marriages of wealthy heiresses, and legislative policy, although in the last they typically deferred to the monarch.³⁴ These issues illustrate the defining feature of the political system in

³¹ Phillips, 112

³² Richard 79

³³ Richard 93; Richard also notes that in the thirteenth century these *parlements* would come to dictate policy through the king, who functioned largely as a figurehead.

³⁴ Phillips, 118; (Courtesy of Peter Diehl, PhD.): In France in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, wardship over an heiress to a fief belonged to the lord from whom the fief was held, and this included the right to arrange a marriage for her. In England the king claimed wardship rights over all heiresses of nobles and knights, even those who did not hold their fiefs directly from the king. Kings often then auctioned off wardship rights or gave them to

the Latin East: the adaptation of western norms to an eastern environment. The marriages of wealthy heiresses were important affairs in the west, but in the east they were doubly so because the wealth needed to stay in circulation to fund military campaigns. Maintaining a tight-knit aristocracy was also important to the kingdom's political integrity, and these marriages were a way to cement alliances between important families. Allowing the king default control over legislative, legal, and military decisions may have been similar to declaring a permanent state of emergency; oftentimes the political situation changed too quickly for a voting body to respond, and so it would make sense to have a strong executive in the monarch.

In addition to the functions of the *parlement*, the political system in the Kingdom of Jerusalem manifested itself in many other forms that illustrate the kingdom's unique circumstances. Two examples in the 1120's during Baldwin II's reign show how the political leaders adapted. The first is a law passed by Baldwin II in 1120, which repealed all taxes against people wishing to bring grain, barely, or legumes into the city of Jerusalem.³⁵ This law applied universally to all merchants, irrespective of religion, and allowed them to sell whenever and to whomever they wished. Giving up a significant source of income in favor of moving goods demonstrates the priorities that the kings had to consider. As a state constantly under siege, the Kingdom of Jerusalem had serious problems in producing sufficient crops, especially to feed its large cities such as Jerusalem. Removing the taxes shows that Baldwin II needed to ensure that

allies, friends, or cronies. (In all cases wardship only applied if the heiress's father had died.) For England Scott L. Waugh, *The Lordship of England: Royal Wardships and Marriages in English Society and Politics, 1217-1327* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) is the best study; my understanding of wardship issues also benefitted from courses with Professor Waugh when I was in graduate school.

³⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, Harold S. Fink Edit. *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem*, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 232.

incentives existed for farmers and merchants to bring food into the city more than he needed their capital to fund his armies.

The second example is indicative of a common problem in the crusader kingdoms. In 1123 Baldwin II was captured by Syrian forces from Damascus, leaving the kingdom without a king. The *parlement* then took on the duty of electing an interim king (as well as raising the ransom), with stress being laid on the assumption the Baldwin would be returned. The lord chosen was Eustace, who held the fiefs of Caesarea and Sidon, two of the largest in the country.³⁶ In the event, Baldwin was eventually ransomed and returned to the throne without further incident. He was hardly the first or the last political leader in the Holy Land to be captured, but since the leaders were very rarely actually killed, it became part of the established political system to elect interim leaders. A similar situation occurred during Baldwin I's reign, when Tancred was offered leadership of Antioch in the absence of Bohemond, who had been captured. The flexibility of the lords in passing leadership of the states between important nobles, and the fact that they were usually returned to the original ruler upon their release, is another important factor in the longevity of the Latin East.

Perhaps the most important element in the political power of the nobility rested in the aristocratic cohesion of the ruling families in the Holy Land. These families held immense power, especially given that palatinates on the outskirts of the kingdom had relative autonomy in matters of justice and foreign affairs. The origins of the aristocracy in the Kingdom of Jerusalem lay in the original crusaders, many of whom either brought their families to the Holy Land or married locally. They were joined, however, by a great influx of pilgrims, including immigrant

³⁶ Fulcher, 240

nobles who settled in the newly conquered territory. The arrival of the immigrants resulted in several decades where fiefs were constantly being exchanged, divided, and reshaped, but by 1130 the situation had settled down.³⁷ The rest of the twelfth century saw the gradual strengthening of aristocratic cohesion, and by 1175 only 10 families held the 24 largest and most important fiefs in the kingdom.³⁸

Certain powers of the monarchy also transferred to the nobility during this time. By the beginning of Baldwin II's reign only the minting of money and the control of ports were explicitly royal prerogatives, and these were surrendered to the lords as well within a few decades.³⁹ The kings themselves did not have a court in the traditional western sense, leaving them (according to Riley-Smith) very much reliant on the obedience of their vassals. They could only enforce their executive orders through the lords, since the crown had a severely limited central government which had been superimposed on the existing Islamic system.⁴⁰ Being in control of the major administrative powers of the kingdom put the lords in in a very powerful position, and lend weight to La Monte and Riley-Smith's assessment of the power balance. The nobility's advantages were counterbalanced by the monarchy, however, in a few significant ways.

The concept of vassalage was alive and well in twelfth-century Jerusalem, and indeed it was of critical importance since a functioning military was the kingdoms most important asset. The kings were very much aware of this fact, and so set rules that ensured they could rely on the nobility fulfill their vows. The first rule, and a key departure from certain western practices that

³⁷ Riley-Smith, 93

³⁸ Barber, 53; The most powerful of these were the Ibelin family, the Montlherys, and the Grenier family

³⁹ Riley-Smith, 93

⁴⁰ Riley-Smith, 92

were beginning to emerge, was that the nobles were forbidden from substituting currency or goods for military service when called upon as vassals.⁴¹ This was critical for ensuring that every capable fighting man was present during battles, since the Muslim armies usually outnumbered the Latins, and the lords could field the best equipped and trained soldiers.

A related problem was finding replacements for the inevitable deaths from battle or natural causes. Traditions of lineage often meant that the "heir-apparent" for a lord was in Europe, meaning that the deceased lord's territory might lack administration for a year or more while waiting for the heir to arrive, if he chose to appear at all. Baldwin I simultaneously solved this problem and set a precedent for greater royal authority by mediating the succession of Raymond of St. Gilles.⁴² One of Raymond's successors named William Jordan had appealed to Tancred, by now Prince of Antioch, for support in his claim. The other claimant, Bertrand of St. Gilles, in turn appealed to Baldwin. Baldwin summoned Tancred in the name of the church of Jerusalem to treat with him, and the two struck a deal to satisfy both sides. By placing the decision of inheritance in the hands of the monarch, rather than following familial lines, Baldwin provided a reason for aristocrats to stay in the Holy Land, and ensured that military and economic resources from their fiefs were kept readily available. His ability to summon the Prince of Antioch, who was not technically a vassal of the kingdom, is another testament to the influence he commanded as monarch.

Over the course of the twelfth century, as aristocratic cohesion increased, the power of lesser nobles diminished. Part of the problem for poorer or less well connected lords was simply the cost of living in a hostile land. By the 1140s the cost of maintaining fortifications and losses

⁴¹ Phillips, 118

⁴² Riley-Smith, 90

in battle forced most nobles to sell their lands to the church or the military orders.⁴³ The consolidation of the remaining lands and resources into the hands of a few major families led to closer ties between the monarchs and the lesser nobles. In 1166 Amalric confirmed these ties by declaring that lesser vassals would swear additional oaths of fealty directly to the king, strengthening the monarchy's military backing in the event of a rebellion and giving the vassals a direct line of complaint if they were abused by their lords.⁴⁴

The most powerful tool the monarchy possessed to exert power of the nobility, and to keep them in check before they got too powerful, was the manipulation of seignuries, lordships, and fiefs. Enfeoffment procedures began as early as the spring of 1100 with Godfrey granting lands to Tancred, Gerard of Avesnes, Robert of Apulia, and Geldemar Carpenel.⁴⁵ Other lords quickly followed suit, and over the following decades the kingdom was divided, and then constantly re-divided into various lordships. Beginning with Godfrey, the rulers of the kingdom quickly realized that these lordships were among the most important and valuable political tools available to them. Godfrey set a precedent for royal involvement in managing lordships by issuing an edict stating that a written record should be kept of those lords who personally managed their fiefs for a year and a day.⁴⁶ The edict was aimed at preventing nobles from leaving the Holy Land and then returning to reclaim their property after an extended absence. Providing incentives to have lords remain in their lands meant they would be available for

⁴³ Phillips, 119

⁴⁴ Ibid; (Courtesy of Peter Diehl, PhD.) Possibly inspired by the oath of loyalty required of all free men in England by William the Conqueror in 1085 or so, and subsequently by all later kings of England. There was nothing of this sort in France in the twelfth century, though by the early 1200s, the king encouraged the vassals of his vassals to bring complaints against their lords to the king's court if their lord refused to give them justice. Philip II used this principle very effectively against John in his role as duke of Aquitaine when he stole Isabelle of Angoulême, the betrothed of his vassal Hugh of Lusignan and married her himself. Hugh got no compensation when he complained to John and so appealed to the judgment of Philip, whose vassal John was for the Duchy of Aquitaine.

⁴⁵ Barber, 53

⁴⁶ Barber, 54

combat, and legal battles over territory could be settled more quickly. Later rulers would find even more complex and shrewd ways of using control of the lordships to protect the kingdom from its own inhabitants.

Lordships

The Kingdom of Jerusalem during the twelfth century was, like many of its contemporary states, composed of a large number of semi-independent territories ruled by members of the nobility. The territories went by several names, the most common being 'lordship' or 'seigneurie', with the ruler of each owing taxes and military service to the king. This 'feudal' system was somewhat more fluid in the Holy Land than in Europe because of the high turnover rate of territories. A territory might change hands because its owner was killed, because they had left the Holy Land, because they had been forced to sell it, or because the monarchy had forcibly repossessed it for one reason or another. The kings exploited this fluidity to increase their own power, and to keep their subjects in check. To do so they relied primarily on four processes that allowed them to exercise influence over the system: the creation of new lordships, the reversion of lordships to the royal domain, the retention of lands in that domain, and the exercise of deliberate limitations on the extent of existing territories.⁴⁷

The most important of these elements was the process of lands reverting to the royal domain. This could occur when a family died out, when it had to be sold if the owner went bankrupt, or if it was taken by force during a rebellion. A good example of this process occurred when Tancred was approached by the nobility of Antioch, who wished him to assume leadership in the absence of Bohemond, who had been captured. Tancred agreed to turn over the

⁴⁷ Tibble, 6

city of Haifa, his largest fief, to Baldwin I, on the condition that it revert to him if he returned within a year and three months.⁴⁸ In the event, Tancred did not return and the lands remained under Baldwin's control. When the lands came under royal purview, the king could change the nature of the lordship to better suit him, by dividing it or reducing its military potential by destroying fortifications for instance.⁴⁹ At the very least, the king could ensure that the lordship's next occupant was someone loyal and obedient, typically either a family member or a close friend.

A less commonly used tactic was for the monarchy to deny newly conquered lands to lords they felt were either too dangerous or not as politically expedient as another vassal. Haifa again provides an example; Godfrey granted the city to Tancred in 1100, before it was captured, but then had a change of heart and promised it to Geldemar instead.⁵⁰ This angered Tancred and led to him forcibly seize the city from Geldemar in the same year. The crises fell to Baldwin I to resolve, since Godfrey died before the city had fallen, and he began his reign by summoning Tancred to account for his actions.⁵¹ Tancred refused, and the situation was only defused by Tancred leaving for Antioch, as previously mentioned. In future cases the kings would try to preempt these conflicts either through force or a redistribution of lands.

The lordship of Jaffa provides another good example of the royal manipulation of territory. In this case, the first conflict over ownership stemmed from Daimbert, Patriarch of Jerusalem in the early part of the century, who claimed the territory of Jaffa as part of his personal holdings, as well as the city of Jerusalem which had been granted to him by Godfrey.

⁴⁸ Fulcher, 150

⁴⁹ Destroying fortifications would likely have been undertaken less frequently, since these fortifications were needed to deal with external threats as well.

⁵⁰ Tibble, 9-11

⁵¹ Barber, 65

Despite his claim to the lands, Steven Tibble asserts that the city remained under royal control for several years after its capture.⁵² This is supported by the fact that in 1110 Baldwin confirmed that he had granted the Hospitallers “one good oven and also lands and houses” within the city.⁵³ Baldwin II similarly granted the Monastery of Josephat lands within the city in 1130. These grants of land by the monarchs indicates that the exercised practical control over Jaffa, despite Daimbert’s assertions of ownership. Having control over important cities, especially ports, provided an important resource for the crown, since even small land grants could be worth a great deal to organizations such as the Hospitallers, ensuring their continued military and political support.

The monarchy had more subtle means of exerting political control than deliberately carving up their lordships. One method was to create lordships out of several land-fiefs that did not share borders, keeping vassals from centralizing their economic and military resources.⁵⁴ The vassals would still be able to provide all of these resources in war against enemy states, but would have a much more difficult time consolidating them for an insurrection. As previously stated the monarchs also could, and frequently did, grant major holdings to their own family members and political allies to ensure stability, such as Baldwin II granting Jaffa and Galilee to Joscelin of Courtenay and his family in thanks for their support.

A strategy that was particularly oriented towards controlling lords with large landholdings was to either acquire large tracts of land within the lordships of a vassal, or to

⁵² William of Tyre, Tvrnholti, *Chronique*, (Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii 1986), 441-42

⁵³ Cartulaire general de l’ordre des Hospitallers de St-Jean de Jérusalem, ed J. Delaville Le Roulx Paris 1894, cited by Tibble 38.

⁵⁴ Tibble, 66; (Courtesy of Peter Diehl, PhD.) William the Conqueror did this when he parceled out English lands to his followers after 1066. In the next several generations, some noble families managed to consolidate holdings in particular regions, giving them great power locally and reducing royal control.

actively withhold territory within specific lordships. An example of this is the Lordship of Oultrejourdain, a large and somewhat undefined territory east of the Jordan River which was established in 1127 under Baldwin II and granted to Pagan the Butler. Oultrejourdain continued to contain royal castles and holdings until 1178 when Melisende relinquished the last *recorded* royal holdings.⁵⁵

In addition to the kings and the nobility, the church and the military orders also played a significant part in the fluidity of the seigniorial system. They would often purchase fortifications, sections of cities, or entire territories from the monarch or lords who needed liquid assets or simply could not afford the upkeep. The city of Arsuf was sold to the Hospitallers in 1157 by the Humphrey II, lord of Banias. Although the Hospitallers did not actually take control of their lands due to concerns over its defensibility and a raid on their supplies, they had been granted the legal rights.⁵⁶ Other examples of properties being transferred to the ownership of the Military orders include Calansue in Caesarea to the Hospitallers in 1128, Assera in the lordship of Bethsan in 1149, and Rehap and Ardelle in Betshan to the Teutonic Knights in 1173. The latter two sales were made by the king rather than the lord of Betshan, as the lordship had at this point returned to the royal domain.⁵⁷ The military orders were perhaps the kingdom's most useful unofficial asset, providing two very important services to Holy Land. The first was the unusual role of what amounted to bankers, purchasing defaulted assets and keeping them maintained. The second role was a ready source of some of the best trained and equipped military forces in the Holy Land, with much of the wealth used to provide these soldiers stemming from the lands purchased from the monarchs and nobility.

⁵⁵ Tibble, 82-83

⁵⁶ Tibble, 16-17

⁵⁷ Tibble, 69

Although the kings were very effective in exercising political control through influence on lordships, political unrest was still a major problem at certain points throughout the twelfth century. The practice of granting major fortress-fiefs to a single commander became a major liability, precipitating attempts at independence on several occasions such as that by Gervase of Basoches in 1106.⁵⁸ Through these rebellions, which were always ruthlessly suppressed, and the previously mentioned methods, every major lordship in the Kingdom of Jerusalem reverted to the royal domain at least once in the twelfth century, giving the monarchs ample opportunities to alter the political landscape. The need to do so was often precipitated by insubordinate nobles, who threatened the integrity of the entire Holy Land.

Dealing with Insubordination

Part of what had made the First Crusade such a remarkable endeavor was the complete lack of European royalty among the ranks of the crusaders. A consequence of this was that the each of the crusader states was populated by a *mélange* of European nobility. A large portion of the nobles in the Kingdom of Jerusalem were Norman, but some were French Norman, others Sicilian Norman, some were from Germany, others from England or other parts of France. The variety of backgrounds and previous loyalties, as well as dissent over the actual power of the monarch, led to tension and occasionally outright rebellion in the kingdom. The scale of these rebellions varied from simple disobedience to military conflict. Until the end of the century the kings maintained control, however, either through political maneuvering or violent suppression of dissent.

⁵⁸ Richard, 92-94

The disobedience of vassals began in the opening months of Godfrey's rule. During the siege of Ascalon Godfrey commanded the various lords of Jerusalem to march on the fortress to reinforce his own army against an Egyptian relief force. Eustace and Tancred responded immediately, but Robert the Norman and Raymond of St. Gilles would not move their forces until their own scouts had verified that there actually was an enemy army marching upon Ascalon, ensuring the prospect of battle-loot.⁵⁹ Raymond of St. Gilles may have still harbored resentment towards Godfrey for being removed from the Tower of David, and he developed a habit of ignoring royal commands. Although the magnitude of this insubordination was small, it illustrates lasting dissension among the original crusaders over the role of leadership in the East. Godfrey had also not styled himself as a "king," and so the implicit power of royalty was not at play. The implications of his choice and the dissent of his nobles would not become clear, however, as his reign lasted only a year.

Baldwin I endeavored to break away from Godfrey's style of rule, and chose to start his reign by cementing his royal status immediately. As was previously mentioned, his first act was to call Tancred to account for his actions in taking the city of Haifa from Geldemar. Baldwin also summoned the holders of every fief in the kingdom for two purposes: to account for their holdings so that a record could be made of every lordship, and so that each could swear fealty to him personally.⁶⁰ In this way he was able to consolidate all the lordships under specific individuals, helping prevent conflict over territory and giving the nobility a better sense of the hierarchy that was forming.

⁵⁹ Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere* by Peter Tudebode, Peters edit, 278

⁶⁰ Barber, 54

Baldwin II further strengthened the power of the monarchy to deal with internal conflict by enacting a decree to punish lords who committed certain "felonies" against him. Specifically it stated that if a lord took up arms against him they would be denied any chance of a trial and their lands would be forfeit to the royal domain.⁶¹ Preventing a trial meant that the king could deal with traitors directly, and with less expenditure. According to Jean Richard this was a significant step for the kings, but Riley-Smith disputes this, claiming that the decree was mostly symbolic and lacked enforcement mechanisms.

The revolt of Hugh of Jaffa in 1134 is one of the best examples of violent rebellion in the kingdom. Steven Tibble suggests that Fulk had goaded Hugh into revolting by increasing royal holdings in Jaffa and convincing his step-son to accuse him of treason, and then using the rebellion as a pretext to exploit Baldwin II's decree to return Jaffa to the royal domain.⁶² Fulk gathered an army and defeated Hugh, and then split the seigneurie into several parts, including creating a lordship for the Hospitallers. In doing so he ensured that Jaffa (which had been one of the largest lordships) would never be powerful enough to threaten royal control again. He further took advantage of the reversion of territory to his domain by constructing fortifications in the southern region of Jaffa to protect against Egyptian hostility and prepare for his own offensive into Egypt. Hugh's rebellion offers a case-study not only of insurrection, but also of royal manipulation of the fief system to serve their political needs.

The outcome of the aforementioned internal conflicts illustrates that, although the political system in the kingdom was not always stable, the monarchy had several means of dealing with insubordination. In the words of Riley-Smith "the kings were still kings, and

⁶¹ Richard, 92

⁶² Tibble, 50

retained at least the suggestion of God's will, public authority, and power of legislation."⁶³ The kings had the advantage of always being richer than their subjects, thanks both to the reversion of lands and the taxes from Acre and Tyre, both royal fiefdoms. The extra income meant they could hire mercenaries in the event of rebellion, and the default return of lands to royal domain meant they suffered less than their subjects from territorial losses. The combination of these factors leads me to conclude that the monarchy was ultimately more powerful than the nobility, although it derived much of its strength from loyal vassals. The ability of the kings of Jerusalem to exploit their advantages allowed them to maintain a cohesive state, a major contribution towards the longevity of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

⁶³ Riley-Smith, 93-94

Section 3: The Church in the Holy Land

Introduction

The First Crusade was, at its core, a religious endeavor. It was sparked by a call to action from Pope Urban II, and the crusading armies were accompanied by a papal legate. The kings and nobles in the Holy Land were also keenly aware of the power of the church, and indeed most of them had joined the crusade for religious reasons. Although the monarch enacted God's will as a leader, he also derived some power from the recognition of the church. The church was also a powerful landholder, sometimes receiving gifts of land from monarchs or nobles. Baldwin I, for instance, granted the canons of the church of the holy sepulcher 21 villages in north Jerusalem.⁶⁴ Once the crusade was over, the church endeavored to make itself a political force within the Holy Land. These efforts were led by the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, the highest Christian authorities in the east.

According to the records of Raymond of St. Gilles, during the council that eventually elected Godfrey as the first ruler of Jerusalem, the clergy who had accompanied the crusade demanded that the nobles first elect a spiritual leader of the kingdom.⁶⁵ The clergy had little political power at this point, however, especially since the papal legate had died during the siege of Antioch. Because of this, and likely because the nobles were unwilling to subordinate themselves to the remaining clergy, the council refused and elected a king first. The refusal of the nobles seems to indicate that they felt secular leadership was more important towards consolidating their conquests than establishing a formal religious structure. Priests typically did

⁶⁴ Barber, 54

⁶⁵ Raymond d'Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, Peters edit, 260

not engage in combat, and in 1099 the Latin position in the east was far from secure, so it would be natural that a military leader would take precedence over a religious one.

Having elected Godfrey, the nobles turned their attention to helping reestablish the Christian hierarchy in Jerusalem. This was especially necessary since the previous Latin patriarch of Jerusalem had died immediately after the fall of the city, leaving Christianity with no clear religious leader in the Holy Land. A council of princes met and named Arnulf of Choques to be an interim chancellor for the church, but Albert of Aachen specifically notes that Arnulf was not considered a replacement patriarch due to questions about his eligibility for the post.⁶⁶ Arnulf himself was a charismatic preacher, and the last remaining clergyman who had been sent on the crusade under orders from Urban II, making him an obvious choice as an interim leader.

Interestingly, Raymond d'Aguillers, a follower of Raymond of St. Gilles, wrote expressively against Arnulf, stating that he was undeserving of the position because he was allegedly the son of a priest, and describing him as a scheming and immoral individual.⁶⁷ The source of Raymond's objections to Arnulf lies in a dispute that arose during the crusade itself. Arnulf was one of the chief sceptics against Peter Bartholomew, a soldier who claimed to have found the Holy Lance in Antioch. Raymond of St. Gilles had believed Peter's claim, and when Peter volunteered to undergo a trial by fire due to Arnulf skepticism, and subsequently died of his wounds, Raymond came to dislike Arnulf. The implication of d'Aguillers' writing is that the bad blood remained after the crusade ended, and that this made Arnulf's election unpalatable for

⁶⁶ Albert of Aachen, 453-455

⁶⁷ Raymond d'Aguillers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, Peters edit, 263, (Courtesy of Peter Diehl, PhD.) This accusation would have carried significant weight c. 1100. From the mid-eleventh century onward, ecclesiastical reformers had pushed strongly for the enforcement of mandatory clerical celibacy. Urban II was part of the reform party in the church and presumably the crusaders would have shared his views on celibacy. Technically, a son of a priest would be illegitimate and thus not eligible for ordination into the priesthood himself unless he had received a dispensation from the pope.

Raymond. His feelings did not have time to manifest into political conflict, however, as Arnulf was replaced before the end of the year due to doubts about his relative standing in the church. Daimbert of Pisa was named in his place, and would prove to be one of the most politically active Patriarchs, despite only serving for five years. He will be used as the main example of the political role the church played in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Daimbert

Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa, had been named a papal legate prior to leaving for the Holy Land with a massive fleet of ships, and used the influence of both the title and the ships to have himself named Patriarch, taking advantage of the doubt over Arnulf's status.⁶⁸ Since Arnulf had been a temporary chancellor, Daimbert was invested as the first true Patriarch. His first action as Patriarch was to add his name to a letter that Godfrey and Raymond St. Gilles had drafted to Pope Paschal II, Urban II's successor. The majority of the letter informed Paschal of the extent of crusader's accomplishments, but its main point was to remind him that Urban had promised to remit the sins of the crusaders who succeeded in their vows, which they diplomatically addressed with the following lines:

*“Therefore, we call upon you of the catholic church of Christ and of the whole Latin church to exult in the so admirable bravery and devotion of your brethren, in the so glorious and very desirable retribution of the omnipotent God, and in the so devoutly hoped-for remission of all our sins through the grace of God.”*⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Barber, 56

⁶⁹ Godfrey of Bouillon, Raymond of St. Gilles, Daimbert; *Letter to Pope Paschal II*, Peters edit, 295-296

It seems probable that Daimbert put his own name in the letter in part to curry favor with Godfrey, since Godfrey was now the only person in the kingdom who outranked him. It was also likely necessary as a part of his office, and helped establish him as the legitimate papal authority in Jerusalem.

Daimbert asserted his authority immediately by investing Godfrey and Bohemond in their kingdom and principality respectively.⁷⁰ The idea that it was the Patriarch's role to grant the secular leaders their lands was likely supported by Bohemond, as he used his investiture by Daimbert as a pretext to seize Antioch for himself, in violation of an oath he made to Alexius I during the crusaders' crossing at Constantinople. Godfrey had a motivation to accept investiture from Daimbert, since the fleet Daimbert had brought with him could provide critical assistance in taking the coastal ports that were still in Saracen hands. Part of the agreement that led to the investiture also granted Daimbert personal control over a large portion of the city of Jerusalem, which functioned as the payment for the fleet's services.⁷¹ The agreement also stipulated that Godfrey would leave the kingdom to a legitimate male heir upon his death. Since he had no children this meant that the kingdom would go to one of his brothers, which led to Baldwin I supporting Daimbert's election as Patriarch. Malcom Barber depicts the process of drafting the agreement between Godfrey and Daimbert as fundamentally a struggle between secular and religious control of the Holy Land, a struggle that would continue for most of the twelfth century.⁷²

Although Daimbert was papal legate and had received Godfrey's homage, he was not the pope himself, nor did the pope grant the kings any more religious authority than was necessary to

⁷⁰ Barber, 56

⁷¹ Barber, 58

⁷² Barber, 59-60

establish official church organizations in the east.⁷³ They technically lacked direct religious claims to power, therefore, which may have been what led Baldwin I to seek official approval for his office from Paschal II in 1100.⁷⁴ This was not a prerequisite to his rule, nor did he consider himself a vassal of the Pope, but the power of the church as a political and motivational force in the Holy Land likely convinced him that papal recognition would strengthen the legitimacy of the monarchy. Baldwin was also conscientious of relations with the local church. William of Tyre writes that Baldwin I's coronation, in addition to religious objections, was held outside of Jerusalem in order to avoid confrontation with Daimbert over the ownership of the city.⁷⁵

Fulcher of Chartres implies in the following passage that, because Daimbert was ultimately the one who granted Godfrey and Bohemond the right to rule, the church therefore had the power to distribute fiefs in the kingdom:

*“Besides it was in Jerusalem that Duke Godfrey and Lord Bohemond received their land from Patriarch Daimbert for the love of God. From time to time Pope Paschal confirmed these privileges and transmitted them to the Church of Jerusalem.”*⁷⁶

In reality, however, this power remained firmly rooted in the monarchy, and this may have provoked Daimbert to return to Europe in an effort to receive official papal recognition of his own office. He died on the return journey in 1105, however, and so the formal recognition of this right was delayed. In 1111 Paschal II once again confirmed that the church did have the right to distribute fiefs, and also (as mentioned in the above passage) transferred jurisdiction of the Holy Land to the patriarchs of Jerusalem, rather than those of Antioch who had jurisdiction

⁷³ Richard, 87-88

⁷⁴ Riley-Smith, 93-94

⁷⁵ Barber, 64

⁷⁶ Fulcher, 269

traditionally.⁷⁷ This essentially granted the office the recognition Daimbert had sought, but the actual execution of fief distribution remained largely a secular activity.

There were a greater number of patriarchs of Jerusalem than kings of Jerusalem, and so noting all of them would be impractical. Instead, Daimbert serves as a somewhat exceptional example of how the patriarchs interacted with the politics of the kingdom. The relationship between secular and religious leaders was sometimes competitive, but also revolved around the exchange of lands and resources for recognition. In the event, both church and state received papal recognition, and the common goal of retaining the holy land led to coexistence. The patriarchs typically tried to exert as much power as they could without endangering the kingdom or coming into direct conflict with the monarchs. Although the church complicated the political situation, it also drew in and helped organize the pilgrims who provided funds and manpower for the kingdom. The organizing of new crusades and supply fleets from Italy were another boon for the Holy Land originating with the church. Therefore, though ambitious patriarchs such as Daimbert could cause grief for the nobility, the reciprocal relationship that developed between the church and state likely had a greater impact on the longevity of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Military Orders

The Military Orders, more commonly known by the specific names of each order, were a major institutional development in the Holy Land. Over time they gained sufficient land and resources to function as independent sovereign states. During the period prior to the fall of Jerusalem, however, they were primarily concerned with providing support to Latins in the East, and maintaining holy sites. The Hospital of St. John, more commonly known as the Hospitallers,

⁷⁷ Ibid

and the Order of the Temple of the Holy Sepulchre (Templars) were the two primary orders established in the twelfth century. Until the fall of Jerusalem the Hospitallers were uneasy about taking up arms at best, preferring to focus on practical and spiritual service to the kingdom. The Templars had their origins in a group of unattached Crusaders present at the fall of Jerusalem, who attached themselves to the office of the Patriarch as a sort of household guard.

The Hospitallers formed as an organization around the time of the fall of Jerusalem, and achieved full papal recognition as an arm of the church in 1113.⁷⁸ The earliest Hospitallers were laymen and women who lived in a similar lifestyle to monks and nuns, but without taking vows to fully dedicate themselves to a religious life. They focused on tending to the poor and sick instead of fighting battles. The Templars, by contrast, took a decidedly militant attitude from their official founding in 1120. Their leader, Hugh of Payens, dedicated the order to the defense of roads to pilgrimage sites that still lay in areas rife with bandit activity.⁷⁹ Both orders received early patronage from the kingdom, including Baldwin I granting a tenth of his spoils from the battle of Ramla to the Hospital.

In the thirty years following the founding of the Templars both orders attracted high profile members, such as Thierry I, count of Champagne, as well as grants of land in Europe, including the entire kingdom of Aragon, willed jointly to the two orders by King Alfonso I in 1131.⁸⁰ The rapidity and quantity of wealth gathered by the orders allowed them to channel manpower and currency in to the Latin East. By 1154 both orders had received several Papal bulls allowing them to establish their own churches, appoint Masters, and collect taxes. They became ever more popular with the lay knighthood, but also attracted the ire of the conventional

⁷⁸ Andrew Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States*, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), 79

⁷⁹ Jotischky, 80

⁸⁰ Ibid

clergy, who saw them as infringing on their political and social territory while simultaneously violating clerical doctrines against violence.

While the Templars had engaged in military campaigns as early as the 1129 siege of Damascus, the Hospitallers were slowly pressured into a military role by outside pressure. Military duties only became part of the Order in the Constitutions of 1182, where fighting was justified as an extension of alms-giving and care for the poor.⁸¹ By 1187 both orders could field approximately three hundred knights, which amounted to nearly as many as the King could call on from his own lands. Their resources became a significant source of added strength to the power of the kingdom, and Amalric especially relied upon them during his extensive campaigns in Egypt during the 1160s and 70s.⁸²

The accumulation of territorial and material wealth in the hands of the Orders provoked some political conflict both in Europe and the Latin East. Over time, however, the Orders were seen as a solution to the recurring problem of financing in the kingdom. The Orders had the patronage and influence to maintain fortifications and large numbers of soldiers in the East, something the individual lords lacked. By collecting tithes and donations from the West, the Templars, Hospitallers, and later the Teutonic knights were all able to convert pious support in Europe into reliable strength in the East. Unfortunately for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, creating this system took the majority of the twelfth and into the thirteenth century, and was insufficient to prevent the fall of the Holy City.

⁸¹ Jotischky, 82

⁸² Jotischky, 83

Section 4: International Relations

Introduction

The Kingdom of Jerusalem was geographically situated in a land that had been, and continues to be, the meeting place of Asian, African, and European cultures. It also represented a political foothold for Latin Christianity which had previously been absent from the region. Furthermore, the resources available in the Holy Land were hardly sufficient for the kingdom to be self-sufficient, especially in terms of military strength. For these reasons and more the relations that the Kingdom of Jerusalem maintained with other political bodies both within and outside the Middle East were critical to the state's continued existence.

When the city of Jerusalem fell the crusaders found themselves in a precarious position, in part due to a large Egyptian relief army that arrived in Syria and camped at Ascalon late in 1099.⁸³ Although they had fulfilled their vows and were able to drive off the Egyptians, the last drive to the city had extended their supply lines, and in September of 1099 any single Muslim-held port in the Holy Land contained more soldiers than the entire crusading army.⁸⁴ Returning crusaders would make this situation apparent in Europe, which deeply worried Godfrey, since reinforcements from the west were the only source of new troops at the time. In order to counteract these reports therefore, Godfrey wrote highly embellished letters and proclamations about the wealth and achievements of the crusaders.⁸⁵ His letters, and those written by other crusaders, were evidently successful as the number of pilgrims visiting Jerusalem increased dramatically after the city fell.⁸⁶ It is quite possible that the only reason the crusaders managed to

⁸³ William of Tyre, vol i, 393

⁸⁴ Barber, 55

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Phillips, 117

hold on to their gains were thanks to the new recruits and extra funds furnished by these pilgrims. Once the situation became more stable, however, the numbers began to diminish again.

In the aftermath of Baldwin I's accession, all pilgrims to Jerusalem came by sea and arrived through the port of Jaffa. Fulcher of Chartres mentions that the pilgrims came mainly from England, France, Italy, and Venice, and though they were a diverse group, the numbers were relatively small. Worse, very few of the pilgrims actually remained in the kingdom, leaving the kingdom chronically short of manpower.⁸⁷ Although a new group of Crusaders would arrive every year, the inconsistency of their numbers meant that the kings of Jerusalem were eventually forced to ask for help directly from their kin in Europe.

In the first three decades of the kingdom's life, the situation remained relatively stable, thanks in part to the lasting disunity of the bordering Muslim states. In 1140 however, the military situation began to deteriorate, as Zengi, a Seljuk Turk, began to conquer and unite the northern Muslim territories. Zengi captured Edessa in 1144, prompting the Second Crusade, but was assassinated in 1146, and replaced by his son Nur al-Din.⁸⁸ In order to pre-empt him, Amalric attempted to conquer Egypt, first in the 1140s, and then again several times in the 1160s.⁸⁹ Each time ended in failure, and the military losses led to a constant stream of letters from the East to Europe entreating westerners to come and protect the Christian holy places. The reinforcements that did come failed to be sufficient, and so the Crusader States turned to a closer Christian power: the Byzantines.

⁸⁷ Fulcher, 149; The native population of the Kingdom was not severely diminished by the First Crusade, however it was composed mainly of non-Latin Christians and Muslims, neither of whom were relied upon for military service.

⁸⁸ Jotischky, 87

⁸⁹ Phillips, 122-123

Baldwin III had been the first king of Jerusalem to try and forge direct ties with Constantinople, first by marrying one of the emperor's daughters, and then allowing him to buy what remained of Edessa.⁹⁰ In 1169 Nu al-din succeeded in capturing Egypt, leaving the Crusader States effectively surrounded, and so in 1171 Amalric personally travelled to Constantinople and offered homage to Emperor Manuel.⁹¹ The Emperor sent soldiers and supplies to the kingdom in 1177, allowing Baldwin IV to continue resisting the advances of Nur al-Din's successor, Saladin. Further support from the West before Jerusalem fell was complicated by the civil war between Isabella and Sibylla.

Italian Fleets

Pilgrims from Western Europe as well as support from the Greeks in the later years proved to be an important, if ultimately insufficient, source of strength for the kingdom. In addition to these volunteers, however, the more economically minded Italian city-states also provided auxiliary forces and support to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Fleets from Pisa, Genoa, and Venice arrived in the Holy Land several times during the twelfth century, especially during the first several decades. They struck deals with the monarchs and nobility to provide naval support for military campaigns and direct supply lines back to Europe in exchange for generous land concessions, trading privileges, and shipwreck rights.

The first major fleet to arrive after the fall of Jerusalem was the Pisan fleet, which landed in Laodicea around the same time that Bohemond was making his journey to Jerusalem to fulfill

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Phillips, 124

his vows. The fleet was according to William of Tyre, transporting approximately 20-25,000 people, as well as Daimbert and the bishop of Ariano.⁹² They attached themselves to Bohemond's group, and swelled the ranks of Christians in Jerusalem at a time when many crusaders were planning to return home. The fleet itself set sail in April of 1100, and was replaced by an even larger Venetian fleet.

The first Venetian fleet to reach the Holy Land arrived in June 1100, under the command of Doge Vitale Michiel. Warner of Grez and Tancred negotiated a treaty with them which granted them a church and a square for markets in any coastal city captured by the combined forces. Booty would go one third to the Venetians and two-thirds to the crusaders, seeing as they were in greater need of funds. They also received insurance on their merchandise being imported to the Holy Land.⁹³ This set the tone for future agreements with the Italian states; the city-state would receive a grant of land, rights to some amount of loot, and special trade privileges in exchange for naval assistance.

In the winter of 1101 a fleet of Genoese ships arrived, and negotiated a deal directly with Baldwin I. The terms were similar to those made with Venice: the Genoese would assist Baldwin in taking coastal cities in return for a third of the treasure in the city and a section within the city under their jurisdiction.⁹⁴ According to Fulcher, when the Genoese and Crusaders took the town of Caesarea (also called the Tower of Straton), they also installed a new archbishop that was chosen jointly by the two parties:

⁹² William of Tyre, Babcock and Krey edit, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond The Sea vol. i*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 401; This number is probably inflated, but William was a more objective observer than most of his contemporaries, and the figure may not be too far off.

⁹³ Barber, 60

⁹⁴ Fulcher, 152

*“After we together with the Genoese had done as we pleased with Caesarea and with everything that we found in it, we installed there an archbishop whom we had jointly chosen.”*⁹⁵

This implies a further extension of the negotiating power that the Italian fleets acquired through assisting the crusaders.

One of the most important examples of naval assistance from the city-states occurred during the siege of Tyre in 1123. A fleet of 120 ships arrived from Venice bearing one of the most coveted resources in the Holy Land: lumber that could be made into siege weapons for assaulting cities.⁹⁶ Wood was scarce enough for day to day life in the kingdom, and the amount required for siege weapons was usually hard to come by. In exchange for their assistance, when the city fell in 1124 the Venetians were permanently granted a third of its land, which was under the jurisdiction of Venetian authorities in a form of extraterritoriality.⁹⁷

The monopoly that the Italian city-states held over critical resources and sea-trade between Europe and the Crusader States put them in a very lucrative position. The magnitude of the concessions that the kings of Jerusalem were willing to make in exchange for their assistance is indicative of how necessary naval assistance was for capturing coastal cities. However, although the city-states did profit considerably, they did not cheat the crusaders. Their help, especially in situations such as the Siege of Tyre, usually tipped the scales for the kingdom's armies, and shortened the length and expense of sieges. In addition, by maintaining the sea-lanes to Europe, the Italian fleets ensured that pilgrims, and their money, could quickly and safely reach Jerusalem, helping maintain the treasury. The economic trade-off was certainly worth it for

⁹⁵ Fulcher, 155

⁹⁶ Fulcher, 238

⁹⁷ Fulcher, 270

the kings of Jerusalem, and the benefits the fleets provided were a major contribution to the longevity of the kingdom.

Other Crusader States

By necessity the interactions between the four crusader states were frequent and often grand in scale. Their fates were tied together by the mutual threat of destruction from the surrounding Muslim territories. Because of the interconnectedness of the states, noting each instance of political interaction between them is not feasible for this paper. Instead this section will give a short summary of the relationships each state had to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and how these relationships manifested themselves.

The four Crusader States that emerged in the aftermath of the First Crusade were the counties of Edessa and Tripoli, the Principality of Antioch, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Of the four, Jerusalem was the largest, and Tripoli was considered a vassal state of the kingdom. Edessa paid homage to the kingdom as the leader of a confederation. The relationship between Antioch and Jerusalem was not formalized in the same way as with Edessa and Tripoli, because Antioch technically owed formal allegiance to Constantinople, due to vows Bohemond had made during the crusade.⁹⁸ However, as the two largest states, there was frequent interaction between the two.

The relative proximity of Antioch to the Seljuk tribes meant that the principality found itself in frequent conflict with a powerful Muslim enemy. Because Bohemond decided to renege on his vows to Alexius I, Antioch also frequently found itself in conflict with Constantinople in the first half of the century. The state's continued survival, therefore, often depended on support

⁹⁸ Phillips, 121

from its neighboring states. Because the King of Jerusalem was formally recognized as the leader of a confederation consisting of Jerusalem, Tripoli, and Edessa, it was the king's prerogative to dispatch troops to assist Antioch.⁹⁹ In this capacity troops were sent from Jerusalem to Antioch 16 times between 1110 and 1158. Baldwin I committed forces in 1110, 1111, and 1115 to assist against the Byzantines, and Baldwin II and Fulk dispatched troops an additional 13 times in their combined reigns.¹⁰⁰ In the same period, Antioch only sent troops to assist Jerusalem three times, illustrating a significant imbalance of power between the two states.

Although Jerusalem typically found itself sending its forces to assist the other states, rather than the reverse, they did provide an important buffer between the kingdom and Damascus. The kings of Jerusalem usually had their hands full combating incursions from Egypt and so the benefits of allies to the North were readily apparent. The direct benefit of the other Crusader states to the longevity of the kingdom was simply their presence; the more Christians in the Holy Land, the stronger the position of the kingdom.

The Second Crusade

The largest organized effort to assist the Crusader States from outside the Holy Land came in the form of the Second Crusade. In response to the capture of Edessa in 1144 Pope Eugenius III decided to follow the precedent set by Urban II and call for a crusade. For the first time, organized forces headed to the Holy Land were accompanied by European monarchs, specifically Conrad III of the Holy Roman Empire and Louis VII of France.¹⁰¹ Despite the

⁹⁹ Riley-Smith, 91

¹⁰⁰ Phillips, 121

¹⁰¹ William of Tyre, 164-164

presence of royalty, the Second Crusade was fated to be far less successful than its predecessor. Conrad's forces suffered severe losses while attempting to travel overland to the Edessa via Asia Minor, and ended up retreating back to Constantinople. Louis arrived at the city much later than Conrad, but also attempted to make an overland transit in part due to false rumors of German success.¹⁰² He too suffered losses and was forced back to Constantinople. The leaders appealed to the Emperor, who provided them with a flotilla. The monarchs therefore took much smaller forces to the Holy Land, with Conrad landing at Acre and travelling to Jerusalem, and Louis arriving at Antioch.

William of Tyre notes that both Antioch and Jerusalem desired the presence of the Conrad and Louis' armies in their own territories, and were willing to undermine the efforts of the other states to accomplish this.¹⁰³ Conrad had already travelled directly to Jerusalem, and the nobles endeavored to keep him there. Louis, however, was in Antioch, but bad blood developed between Louis and the local rulers, and so he left the city. Upon hearing of this the nobles of Jerusalem dispatched the current patriarch, named Fulcher, to persuade him to come to Jerusalem. He was successful in convincing Louis, and the two returned to Jerusalem together.¹⁰⁴

Once both monarchs were in the city a general council was held involving the major nobles, church leaders, Baldwin III, and Louis and Conrad. The goal of the council was to determine a method of increasing the territory of the kingdom, and eventually they agreed on the ambitious goal of capturing Damascus.¹⁰⁵ The western kings were told that the city would fall quickly, and in any event the crusader armies could be fed completely by the fruit orchards

¹⁰² Riley-Smith, 127

¹⁰³ William of Tyre, vol ii. 182-183

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ William of Tyre, vol ii. 185-186

surrounding the city. Once the armies arrived at the outskirts of Damascus both these suppositions quickly proved false. Additionally, it appeared that an influential noble (it was never determined who) was in the pay of the cities rulers, and had sabotaged the army by changing the position of its camp, allowing food to flow into the city.¹⁰⁶ For these reasons both Conrad and Louis lost trust in their eastern allies, and returned with their armies to Jerusalem, refusing to take part in further campaigns.

The massive losses the armies took en-route to the Holy Land, the failure to both reconquer Edessa and capture Damascus, and the breakdown of relations between the western royalty and eastern nobility all marked the Second Crusade as a failure. Both Conrad and Louis realized this, and Conrad returned to Europe immediately after the siege of Damascus failed, with Louis tarrying for an extra year.¹⁰⁷ At the time blame for the failure was apportioned across all parties involved, from Baldwin III to Conrad, to the Military Orders for allegedly taking bribes from Damascus, and to Louis for alienating the Crusaders by promising the city to one of his vassals, Thierry of Flanders.¹⁰⁸ The consequences of Second Crusade have also been the subject of much debate, with most sources agreeing with William of Tyre's statement:

*“From this time, the condition of the Latins the East became visibly worse. Our enemies saw that the labors of our most powerful kings and leaders had been fruitless, and all their efforts in vain.”*¹⁰⁹

After Conrad left for Europe, Nur al-Din seized the initiative from the Latin's defeat and invaded Antioch, laying waste to the countryside. The current ruler, Prince Raymond,

¹⁰⁶ William of Tyre, vol ii. 192

¹⁰⁷ William of Tyre, vol ii. 195-196

¹⁰⁸ Jotischky, 90

¹⁰⁹ William of Tyre, vol ii, 196

immediately rode to meet him, but Nur al-Din surprised his forces and killed him outside a fortress called Neva.¹¹⁰ Another consequence was a souring of relations between the Latins and Damascus. Previous to the Crusade there had been an alliance between the Damascenes and the Latins lasting from 1140 to 1147. Although after the siege the rulers of Damascus asked the Crusaders for assistance against Nur al-Din, who marched on the city in 1150, his eventual conquest of the area was made easier by ill feeling left behind from the Crusade.¹¹¹

Although the crusade had begun as one of the most promising sources of support for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the actual benefit proved to be limited. The early months of the crusade may have distracted the kingdom's enemies for a time, but the eventual arrival of these forces led to decisive defeat at Damascus. The temporary loss of trust between the East and West also marked the crusade as a political failure. Without any military or political gain, the Second Crusade contributed very little to the continued survival of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

¹¹⁰ William of Tyre, vol ii, 197

¹¹¹ Jotischky, 90

Section 5: Conclusion

The primary focus of this paper has been to illustrate the political realities in the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1099 to 1187 C.E, and to analyze the methods the Latin inhabitants of the kingdom employed to deal with those realities. The nature of the subject, however, makes it impossible to cover every aspect of the topic in a paper of this length. Certain prominent elements of the politics of the Holy Land are missing, especially those concerning the political actions of the Muslim rulers. In the Islamic states dynasties rose and fell, alliances were made both with other Muslims and the crusaders, and lands changed hands. Nur Al-din, and his successor Saladin both fought and negotiated with the crusaders, and eventually brought about the re-conquest of the city of Jerusalem. All of these events and more were influential in the politics of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, but did not fit in the scope of this paper. With this addendum in mind, this section will illustrate the impact of the *internal* politics of the kingdom.

In each of the previous sections a clear factor has stood out that provides evidence for how the Kingdom of Jerusalem managed to maintain its structural integrity over almost a century. The common thread throughout the first section has been the strength of the character embodied in each of the monarchs until Baldwin V. From Godfrey to Baldwin IV, each king (and queen) ruled with great personal energy and ambition. The importance of a strong monarch is made even more evident by the swift collapse of much of the kingdom as soon as the strength of the crown was weakened by civil war, a collapse that was only halted by a third crusade. The constant military, economic, and religious conflict of the Holy Land necessitated strong leadership in the kingdom, and perhaps living in the region forced each king to develop into an effective ruler. The consistency of strength of character between monarchs for nearly 90 years is

what makes the Kingdom of Jerusalem remarkable. The thread of effective leadership is visible in every section of this paper, and is perhaps the most important factor in the kingdom's survival.

Perhaps the most effective element of leadership the kings displayed was in handling the nobility through the lordship system. The kings were able to deftly manipulate the system to strengthen their own treasuries and landholdings, which they could then turn towards keeping the kingdom secure. The nobles themselves were often also competent and politically deft, and the competition between the monarch and the nobility prevented either side from becoming complacent. By constantly assessing and altering the state of political geography in the kingdom, the kings kept their territory consistently working to the best advantage of the state, very rarely allowing inefficient use of the land. In addition, the political leaders of the kingdom adapted to the unique circumstances of living in the East, setting aside old traditions such as rules of succession in favor of practical solutions. These solutions helped maintain clear lines of command and loyalty, and kept resources moving where they needed to go. The political adaptability of the Kingdom of Jerusalem is, therefore, another major factor in its survival.

The monarchy and nobility were kept functioning by the support of religious and economic allies. Although these allies, especially the patriarchs and Italian city states, often competed with the state for the resources of the Holy Land, their best interest ultimately lay in maintaining Christian control. To this end they provided currency, raw materials, and new recruits to replenish the constantly depleted stores of the kingdom. Without the inputs provided by these allies even the most competent rulers would have had a difficult time preserving an outpost in hostile territory. By compromising with their allies, and seeking help when it was needed, the kings of Jerusalem ensured that they always had outside support for their campaigns. This support provided a significant contribution towards the survival of the kingdom. It is

important to note, however, that the single largest *potential* source of support, the Second Crusade, was a major failure for both the kingdom and its allies. Although not directly leading to the fall of the kingdom, it also failed to provide any substantial benefit.

Each section of this paper has ended in an explanation of how an aspect of the political history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1099 to 1187 C.E. contributed to the kingdom's survival over that time period. The implication is that the political history is relevant in a greater context than simply explaining the politics of the region. The political history offers an explanation of how the kingdom was able to function for nearly a century in unique circumstances. Although the military accomplishments of the Crusader States were impressive in their own right, simply winning engagements on the field would have been insufficient to sustain the crusaders in the holy land for that long. Competent political control provided the supplementary force that made the Kingdom of Jerusalem possible.

Section 6: Discussion of Sources

The sources consulted for this essay include a variety of general encyclopedic histories of the crusades, focused studies on certain aspects of the Crusader States, and a number of primary sources in translation. The secondary sources, however, share a common pool of source material from which they draw from. This pool includes a variety of letters, legal documents, and other informal records dating from the time period. Each secondary source also invariably includes three major primary sources that are almost universally consulted by historians of the first crusade. These are the great contemporary histories of the First Crusade and its aftermath: the *Historia Hierosolymitana*, *The History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, and the *History of the Expedition to Jerusalem*.¹¹² The authors of these histories are Albert of Aachen, William of Tyre, and Fulcher of Chartres respectively.

Of the contemporary historians mentioned above, only Fulcher of Chartres was actually present during the First Crusade and its aftermath. Fulcher was chaplain to Baldwin of Boulogne, later to become Baldwin I of Jerusalem.¹¹³ His account takes place from the beginning of the crusade until 1127. Fulcher was a pious and devout priest, a disposition that gave him no sympathy for the Turks or Arabs. He was also a staunch admirer of Urban II, and was hostile towards Emperor Henry IV for opposing the pope.¹¹⁴ In the years that Fulcher was writing his history he was mainly concerned with popularizing the crusade and generating new support for it. For this reason his history ignores many of the internal political problems facing the crusaders in the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem, and those issues he does cover are given short passages

¹¹² See also *Robert the Monk's History of the First Crusade = Historia iherosolimitana*, trans. Carol Sweetenham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006),

¹¹³ Fulcher, 3

¹¹⁴ Fulcher, 36-37

and then quickly forgotten. Fulcher also either deliberately ignored or is perfunctory in dealing with any relationship or alliances with Muslim states.¹¹⁵ His attitude towards the rulers of Jerusalem was notably quite honest, noting for instance that Baldwin I expressed greater joy than grief at hearing of his brother Godfrey's death, since it meant he inherited the kingdom.¹¹⁶

Fulcher's impact on crusades history is very important, as his is one of the few eyewitness accounts that survive. His identity and role in the events are also well documented, something that cannot be said of the anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum*. Most contemporaries and later historians, including Riley-Smith and Jean Richard, consult Fulcher's work to some degree. His text is less relevant to this paper however, as it only covers the first third of the time period before Jerusalem fell, and Fulcher actively avoided including political issues. His personal insights on the founding of the kingdom and the personal traits of Baldwin I are invaluable, however, for understanding the origins of the political situation in Jerusalem.

Writing around the time of Fulcher's death in 1127, Albert of Aachen differs from Fulcher and William of Tyre in that he never visited the Holy Land, and his account was based on interviews with crusaders who returned to Europe. His *Historia Ierosolimitana* covers the time from the beginning of the crusade until 1119, soon after the death of Baldwin I. Albert himself lived in the landholdings Godfrey of Bouillon owned in the Rhineland, and this influenced the nature of his text significantly. His loyalties are very clear in the attention he devotes to the deeds and virtues of Godfrey versus those of other crusaders, and he also spends significantly more time on the German crusaders than his contemporaries.¹¹⁷ Apart from this bias Albert's account is remarkably impartial to most other parties, including the Turks and Saracens

¹¹⁵ Fulcher, 38-39

¹¹⁶ Fulcher, 137

¹¹⁷ Albert of Aachen, xxxii

(whom he could distinguish between with accurate detail), the Byzantines, eastern Christians, and even women. He actually seems to have been more critical of other crusaders such as Raymond of St. Gilles and Bohemond than the leaders of the Saracen armies.¹¹⁸

Albert is perhaps one of the more undervalued early crusade historians, having been largely written off by other historians until the last hundred years. His text was somewhat influential in his own time however, including serving as one of William of Tyre's references for his own history. Albert's account covers less time than Fulcher's, but is more objective and fills in many of the gaps Fulcher deliberately created either out of prudence or prejudice. The authenticity of his information only goes as far as it can be corroborated by sources actually present in the Holy Land however, and he presents that information through the lens of the German crusaders. His coverage of political events in the early decades of the kingdom is quite comprehensive, however, making his text an excellent supplement to Fulcher's history.

The major primary source consulted for this paper was William of Tyre's *Historia*, a latin chronicle spanning the beginning of the First Crusade until 1184. William himself was born in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1130, studied law and theology in Rome and Constantinople, and served as archbishop of Tyre from 1175 until 1185. He was also chancellor of the kingdom from 1174 until his death, and served as a tutor and advisor to Baldwin IV.¹¹⁹ Most of what is known of his life comes from legal documents, as his contemporaries rarely included him in their own writing.¹²⁰ William's writing style was influenced by his education, being described by the editors of one edition of his work as containing the moral judgment of a priest combined with the

¹¹⁸ Albert of Aachen, xxxiv-xxxviii

¹¹⁹ William of Tyre, vol i. 4

¹²⁰ William of Tyre, vol i, 26. Babcock and Krey are of the opinion that past historians have made several errors in attempting to reconstruct William's life, and that many of these errors are now permanently embedded in crusades scholarship.

objectivity of a lawyer.¹²¹ When writing his history William consulted the chronicles of the previous generation, including the *Gesta Francorum*, Fulcher's chronicle, and Albert of Aachen's own *Historia*. His goal in writing was similar Fulcher's in that he was writing to gather support for the kingdom, having been tasked to do so as Baldwin's advisor.¹²² Despite this William was remarkably generous in his praise for the accomplishments of the non-Latin inhabitants of the East. Although his earlier works display traces of western prejudice, in his *Historia* William displayed an appreciation for the wisdom and virtues of Greeks, Armenians, and even Muslims.¹²³

William's chronicle is by far the most comprehensive contemporary account of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. It covers nearly the entire period that the Latins controlled the city of Jerusalem, as well as the First Crusade. William's objectivity, his knowledge of the law, and his detailed accounts of the religious organization of the Holy Land also make him an excellent source for political knowledge. His observations on conflict between Latins, such as the disagreements between the patriarch Stephen and Baldwin II, are as honest as those between Latins and Muslims.

¹²¹ William of Tyre, vol i. 28

¹²² William of Tyre, vol i. 31

¹²³ William of Tyre, vol i. 32

Appendix A: List of Rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099-1187 C.E.¹²⁴

➤ **Godfrey of Bouillon, 1099-1100**

- Although Godfrey only ruled the Kingdom for less than a year, he had a lasting impact on the Kingdom. Later rulers looked up to him as a model of chivalry and piety, and his choice to be crowned in Bethlehem rather than Jerusalem became a tradition kept by the following two rulers.

➤ **Baldwin I, 1100-1118**

- A strong personality, a ruthless and self-interested leader, and widely recognized as the paramount ruler of his time. He was also left no heirs despite three marriages. His death on April 2nd, 1118 provoked a succession crises.

➤ **Baldwin II, 1118-1132**

- A pious, competent leader, but also miserly and sired only daughters. He adopted an aggressive stance towards the Muslims (perhaps to deflect criticism about his questionable legitimacy). He ensured his throne was passed to Fulk by marrying his eldest daughter to her.

➤ **Fulk V Count of Anjou, 1132-1143**

- A relatively powerful nobleman, who, once he was jointly crowned with wife and son when Baldwin II died in 1132, began to change royal precedent. He was crowned in Jerusalem instead of Bethlehem and replaced several key ministers with his own people, which led to conflict with Hugh of Jaffa, a relative of his wife and member of a rival family.

➤ **Melisende, 1143-1152**

- Between 1143, when Fulk died, and 1152 when Baldwin III asserted his claim, Melisende, Fulk's wife and mother to Baldwin II, ruled as regent, and attempted to strengthen her own position to become a permanent ruler.

➤ **Baldwin III, 1152-1163**

- Another vigorous and determined king who proved himself early by assisting Antioch against the Muslims and finally conquering the citadel of Ascalon, but died young in 1163.

¹²⁴ Descriptions derived from *Oxford History of the Crusades*, 96-100

➤ **Amalric I, 1163-1174**

- Amalric succeeded his brother, and was another capable ruler. He established the direct line between minor vassals and the king, and attempted to conquer Egypt. He died and passed the throne to BIV in 1174 (99-100)

➤ **Baldwin IV, 1174-1185**

- Despite his leprosy, Baldwin IV attempted to be a strong and energetic king, but was jostled between feuding factions of nobles who sided either with his mother or the faction that had supported Baldwin III's remarriage. He supported and rewarded those that sided with his mother, but the reign was complicated by his disease. He supported his sister Sibylla over his half-sister Isabella until 1183 when Sibylla's husband Guy of Lusignan angered him, whereupon he granted Sibylla's son from her first marriage, Baldwin V, the kingship when he was still a child.

➤ **Baldwin V, 1185-1186**

- An infant at the time of his coronation, Baldwin V lived only a year into his reign, leaving behind a kingdom caught in a succession struggle between his mother Sibylla, and his aunt Isabella.

➤ **Isabella and Guy of Lusignan, 1186-1187**

- Although in control of the greater part of the Kingdom, Isabella and Guy's reign was marked by the power struggle between them and Isabella's half-sister Sibylla. Their internal struggles assisted Saladin in his invasion of the Kingdom, and the end of its original form came on July 4, 1187 with the capture of Jerusalem.

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