2011

War and peace: assessing the impact of PMC's on the outcome of civil conflicts

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WAR AND PEACE:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PMC’S ON THE OUTCOME OF CIVIL CONFLICTS

By

Jessica Shea

Accepted in Partial Completion

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

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MASTER’S THESIS

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Jessica N. Shea
May 11, 2011
WAR AND PEACE:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PMC’S ON THE OUTCOME OF CIVIL CONFLICTS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of
Western Washington University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Jessica Shea
May 11, 2011
ABSTRACT

As a response to the proliferation of private military contractors (PMC’s) operating in the global marketplace today, scholars have increased the range and scope of their studies on PMC’s. Yet, to date there exists no body of literature that provides a comprehensive examination of how PMC’s may potentially impact the outcome to a civil conflict. My essay establishes that PMC’s may play very different roles within conflicts, which influence the outcome to a conflict, and does so by examining the cases of Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) in the Balkans, Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola and EO in Sierra Leone.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have come to fruition without the guidance of my committee members, and their support, comments and wisdom. My thesis chair, Dr. Amir Abedi, assisted me in not only refining my thesis topic, but in challenging myself to become a better writer and editor. I am thankful for Dr. Bidisha Biswas, who always offered thoughtful comments and made herself available to help me when I had a writer’s block or felt that I was writing without direction. And finally, I am grateful for Dr. Vernon Johnson’s assistance in writing my case study on Angola. Without his insights that particular case study would have lacked direction and focus.

I also want to acknowledge the Department of Political Science at Western Washington University for the Public Affairs Research Scholarship, and for the Departments unyielding support during my academic studies at Western. I must also thank my husband, Kyle Shea, for aiding me in editing my final thesis draft and for supporting me while I spent countless hours performing research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

With the proliferation of private military contractors (PMC’s) in the current era marketing their services to war torn governments there has been a rise in interest from scholars searching for answers to questions like, what is a private military contractor and how do they participate within a civil conflict? Yet, to date there exists no body of literature that provides a comprehensive examination of how PMC’s may potentially impact the outcome to a conflict. Shearer, an apologist of PMC’s, points to the cases of the Balkans, Angola, and Sierra Leone and states that, “[w]hile EO and MPRI have generally responded effectively to immediate crises, their ability to influence long-term conditions. . . is constrained”1. This essay challenges Shearer’s assumptions about PMC’s and their supposed inability to influence the overall outcome of the conflict, and I seek to address a gap in the literature by asking the questions, when a PMC enters a conflict, does it have any direct impact over the outcome of the conflict? Also, can a PMC a play different role in separate conflicts, or is PMC participation limited to only creating one outcome? Based on these questions I will test the hypothesis, when a PMC enters a conflict country that PMC has an impact on the outcome of that conflict. In order to test my hypothesis I will perform three case studies where I examine the role of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Yugoslav Wars of Secession and Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola (1991) and Sierra Leone (1999) by presenting a historical narrative of each conflict.

My analysis of PMC’s in civil conflicts demonstrates that PMC’s do provide a necessary service to their clients, giving them security and stability. More specifically, in testing my hypothesis on the cases of MPRI in the Balkans, EO in Angola and EO in Sierra Leone I have established that PMC’s may play very different roles within conflicts, changing the way the

1 Berndtsson, 32.
PMC influences the outcome. MPRI’s adeptness at training the Croatian military allowed the Croatian soldiers to launch an offensive against Serb forces, resulting in an outright military victory. Concurrently, the Bosnian military, inspired by the win of the Croatian military, attacked Serb forces within Bosnia-Herzegovina and created a mutually hurting stalemate. In this essay I argue that MPRI is responsible for the outright win and influenced the mutually hurting stalemate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. EO’s participation in Angola and Sierra Leone yields very different results from MPRI. In Angola, EO demonstrated that a PMC could not only bolster a failing government but that a PMC could also increase its clients war-making and state-building capacities, allowing the PMC to play an informal role in the creation of the state. The case of EO in Sierra Leone is less clear due to a lack of much needed information on the firm’s actions within the conflict. However, the Sierra Leonean case study sheds light on the problems and pitfalls one may have when analyzing PMC’s within civil conflicts, demonstrating that assessing PMC’s contributions’ is not as easy as one may think.

The form this essay will assume is as follows; first I will define PMC’s and how they are dissimilar from mercenaries and private security providers. I will then speak about the role of PMC’s in the Post-Cold War era in order to fully acquaint the reader with PMC’s and how their clients appropriate their services. Next, I will discuss what possible outcomes are possible for a civil conflict, and how a PMC may influence such outcomes. Then I will go through my case selection process. There will be in-depth historical analysis of three cases of PMC involvement, which include MPRI during the Yugoslav Wars of Secession (1991-2001), EO in Angola (1991) and EO in Sierra Leone (1999). A summary of my findings will complete the case study chapter. This essay will conclude by speaking about the implications drawn from my work and I will
formulate recommendations for policy makers and scholars on how best to use PMC’s in civil conflicts.

CHAPTER 2: DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING PMC’S

The Difference Between Mercenaries and PMC’s

The term mercenary has been in use for decades and has been applied to both individuals and groups of people fighting in a foreign country. Former UN Special Rapporteur Enrique Bernales Ballestros has declared that, “mercenary activities are a form of violence which has been used in the last 40 years to hamper the exercise of the right to self-determination of peoples and to violate human rights”\(^2\). Although he is perhaps correct about mercenaries in the modern era, mercenaries are not an altogether new phenomena and neither are private soldiers. The term mercenary has been used in association with the German mercenaries that fought with the British during the American Revolution, the French mercenaries who fought in African colonies only to secure their own private gain, and by individuals who have marketed themselves as, “gun’s for hire,” in the current era\(^3\). Avant makes an interesting observation when she notes that the term mercenary has changed in its use over time, which is quite clearly illustrated when looking at the various types of mercenaries that have existed historically. Recently, the term mercenary has been used when referring to modern private military firms. Critics of private corporations have labeled them ‘corporate mercenaries’, alleging that such corporations have linkages to arms dealers and mineral conglomerates, and that said corporations, as well as freelance mercenaries both train and work with persons who have poor reputations in terms of human rights records. Enrique Bernales Ballestros has also stated that private companies are ‘corporate mercenaries’,

\(^2\) Taulbee, 7.
\(^3\) Avant, 22.
despite UN contracts held with such companies throughout the Post-Cold War period⁴. Yet, the market for private soldiers and the existence of such men has existed for centuries. In the twelfth century, feudal lords hired well-trained soldiers to work with and supplement their own forces. Later, in the seventeenth century charter companies rose in prominence and were used by the Dutch, English, French and Portuguese to enforce the law in their respective colonies⁵. In the modern era private companies with corporate structures have responded to a market demand and have marketed themselves as being able to create and enforce security for standing governments. In addition to this, private corporations provide their clients with weapons, training expertise, and intelligence gathering. As other scholars have noted, it is incredibly difficult to catalogue the differences in both the levels of violence and the overall outcomes achieved by mercenaries and private corporations. This paper recognizes a difference between mercenaries and PMC’s mainly because many scholars have also drawn this distinction. Scholars that have drawn this distinction are, Avant (2005), Bures (2005), Singer and O’Hanlon (2004), Spearin (2005), Taulbee (2003) and Vègh (2008). I also believe PMC’s are not mercenaries because private firms operate within a corporate structure whereas mercenaries do not. When defining mercenary activities scholars generally rely on the definition put forth in Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I Article 47⁶. According to Article 47 a mercenary can be defined by these cumulative criteria:

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⁴ Bures, 538.
⁵ Avant, 27-28.
⁶ Brayton, 306-308; O’Brien 81-83.
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
   a. Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
   b. Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
   c. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
   d. Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
   e. Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
   f. Has not been sent by a State, which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

Although this definition has been widely accepted Ingrid Detter points out that paragraph (c) of Article 47 presents a complex problem. She asks, “who will decide what motivates a man?”8 I agree that it is difficult to determine whether money motivates a man, or if he has an all-together different agenda. Furthermore, it could be argued that a soldier is only motivated by monetary gain, but this alone does not make him a mercenary. I appreciate Detter’s contribution as it illustrates just how difficult it is to definitively outline what precisely constitutes mercenary activity. Quite simply I believe drawing a distinction between a mercenary and private firm is appropriate due to the corporate structure that private military contractors operate within. Private firms operate like other businesses as they distribute promotion material, each corporation has its own specific mission statement, and the process of hiring employees is rigorous and competitive. Tim Spicer, the former CEO of now defunct Sandline International has offered his own, albeit biased, views on what constitute PMC’s and mercenaries. Spicer states that a PMC is a cohesive group with a large base of knowledge that works together to achieve its client’s goals. If the PMC fails to do so, or if it violates the law, the corporation can be punished and those within it face accountability for their actions. Spicer says that PMC’s work hard because the image they present is extremely important in gaining future contracts. A mercenary, on the other hand, only performs one task, has no clear chain of command within a corporate structure, does

7 Nimkar, 3.
8 Berndsston, 12.
not operate with a mission statement, nor do they face ramifications for their actions if the actions are deemed unacceptable by their employer, therefore, they face no accountability. As biased as his definitions may be he makes a very good argument and I’m inclined to agree with Spicer’s distinctions.

*Separating Private Military Contractors from Private Security Providers*

Although on the surface it appears that within the private security industry all firms offer the same services and perform in the same way, there are intricate differences between all types of private corporations. The private security industry consists of multiple types of corporations providing services ranging from intelligence gathering, providing armed guards, offering training programs and participating in offensive combat. In general, private military organizations can fill a vacuum of roles, exist in very different sizes, and contain a broad array of capabilities and skills. A distinction between two types of firms becomes apparent, and I have separated the two types labeling one a private military contractor and the other a private security provider (PSP). Both contractors exist and function as corporations and their clients hire them because they are proficient in a certain field. I have created a detailed categorization of PMC and PSP roles below based on my understanding of both corporations’ available services. The distinctions I have drawn are also based off of the works of Berndtsson (2001), Bures (2005) and Spearin (2006):

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9 Spicer, 41.
10 Avant, 16-17.
Table 1: Categorization of PMC’s and PSP’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Military Contractor</th>
<th>Private Security Provider</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive Combat</td>
<td>Armed Security Services to Private Clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Security to Public/Int’l Clients including law and order operations</td>
<td>Humanitarian Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Protection</td>
<td>Military/Police Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Surveillance</td>
<td>Logistics and Supply for Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Hostage Advice/Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/Police Training</td>
<td>Supply Peacekeeping Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Advice/Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Peacekeeping Troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply arms and heavy military equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When looking at the above table one can see that the critical difference between PMC’s and PSP’s is that PMC’s are prepared to participate and support offensive combat, while PSP’s are not. Further deviations exist as PMC’s provide military surveillance and intelligence, and provide armed security to public figures, while PSP’s do not. Finally, PMC’s are also in a position where they can provide weapons and equipment like helicopters and tanks to their clients. Based on the differences in services offered by the two providers I have created my own definition of a PMC, so when using the term PMC in this essay this is the definition I will refer to. My definition of a PMC is a corporation that provides specific and specialized military and security services to its clients and has the potential to participate in offensive combat. In the existing literature there has been no general agreement on the definitions and distinctions of PMC’s and PSP’s like I have made above. Taulbee combines both PSP’s and PMC’s together under the term “Privatized Defense Service Providers” contending that because both PMC’s and PSP’s provide services traditionally offered by a national military they should therefore be combined and analyzed together\textsuperscript{11}. Singer, on the other hand, has created three separate types of

\textsuperscript{11} Taulbee, 3-4.
firms. A type-one firm only works to implement and command its clients’ forces. Type-two firms lend their expertise to their clients and provide training exercises for their clients’ soldiers, and type-three firms offer direct military support. Avant points out that Singers’ model is helpful in understanding the different ways a PMC can function within a country, but his model becomes difficult to understand because the same PMC can provide type-one services to one client, while providing type-three services to a completely different client\(^\text{12}\). I argue that because the same PMC has the capabilities to offer all types of services it should be viewed as possessing all of these capabilities all of the time, making it either a PMC or PSP. Hence, I find the distinctions between the two military providers both helpful and necessary in understanding what services are available for use. Now that a definition of PMC’s has been offered I will provide a history of the ascendancy of PMC’s in the modern era and speak about how they have been used in conflicts.

*A Brief History of the Private Military Sector*

Since 1989 the private military sector has witnessed an enormous increase in the amount of organizations competing in the marketplace. Three major factors have played a role in the proliferation of private companies in the modern age. The first is that developed countries downsized both their military manpower and defense budgets during the disarmament following the Cold War. Parallel to this occurrence, a vast amount of ex-soldiers flooded the private military market as domestic militaries began to downsize. The shrinking of state militaries in the developed world held consequences for less developed countries that had grown accustomed to receiving foreign assistance. This leads to the second factor, which is that the end of the Cold War changed the balance of power in the world, and areas that had previously been valued strategically by the world’s superpowers were no longer politically or militarily important. These

\(^{12}\text{Avant, 16-17.}\)
locations became hotbeds for low-intensity conflict and the governments of these states suffered greatly as the Cold War powers in the Post-Cold War world lacked any strategic interest in their failing countries and left frail governments to battle these violent insurgencies on their own\textsuperscript{13}. It was then logical for these states to enter into contracts with PMC’s because PMC’s were able to provide the needed security to these governments and in some instances shareholders and publicly owned enterprises demanded it. The third factor is that the UN and other inter-governmental organizations were either too slow or unable to meet the needs of their member states. This allowed private companies an advantage in the marketplace since budget, troop or bureaucratic issues did not restrict them. Although private companies have existed for decades, what differs in the contemporary era is the number of companies that exist, the wide variety of services they offer and the prominence they have gained in media coverage\textsuperscript{14}. Indeed, projected revenues for these private firms were placed around 202 billion US dollars for the 2010 fiscal year\textsuperscript{15}.

In the modern era military analysts have noted that private military companies are increasingly sent along with UN contingents to conflict areas to assist peacekeeping forces. These firms have made themselves readily available to the UN for peacekeeping efforts for years now, and Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General at the time, had called for their use in ending the Rwandan conflict\textsuperscript{16}. Those who support the use of PMC’s state that hiring a private firm is less expensive than relying on UN troops, requires less manpower and reduces morbidity and mortality during civil conflicts. It is also argued that PMC led troops are better trained and more effective at stopping violence and forcing rebel groups to negotiate due to their extensive

\textsuperscript{13} Taulbee, 3.
\textsuperscript{14} Avant, 8.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Brayton, 317.
military training\textsuperscript{17}. Looking at the involvement of PMC’s in peacekeeping operations it becomes evident that their use by the UN since the Cold War has hardly been a secret. The UN has contracted PMC’s to protect UN field offices and UN personnel, and PMC troops have also been used to uphold UN mandates. Additionally, PMC’s build bases for peacekeepers, are typically the sole providers of water purification systems, demining activities, maintaining infrastructure, operating and guarding airfields, managing transportation systems, providing military intelligence and they often operate their own private helicopters which are responsible for moving UN peacekeepers and equipment in and out of conflict regions where the UN considers it too risky to use their own UN pilots\textsuperscript{18}. There are multiple examples illustrating UN usage of PMC’s. A Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) was responsible for supporting American troops in Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq\textsuperscript{19}. Defense Systems Limited provided the UN troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with security services, and DynCorp was the sole provider of logistics for the UN during its mission in East Timor\textsuperscript{20}. Sandline International has been employed by the UN to assist in activities ranging from demining, water purification, training domestic troops, and supporting and protecting UN convoys in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea\textsuperscript{21}. Another PMC, International Charter Incorporated, was hired by the UN to transport personnel, troops and supplies within Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria during peacekeeping activities. In 2005 Sandline International, a firm that was used by the Sierra Leonean government was registered with the UN and existed in the UN’s Common Supply Database\textsuperscript{22}. Finally, in 2009 on a list of registered vendors for the UN, one can find such names as Aegis Defense Services Limited, Dyncorp, Hart Security, Ronco

\textsuperscript{17} Brooks and Laroia, 123.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{19} Avant, 20.
\textsuperscript{20} Isenberg(a), 1.
\textsuperscript{21} Avant, 17.
\textsuperscript{22} Bures, 538.
and Steele North America, all of which are private military firms. It is clear that the UN needs to step forward and either stop using PMC’s while labeling them mercenary corporations, or the UN needs to accept PMC’s and redefine the organization’s perception of them. The United States Congress has asked the UN to do just this and called the UN to action, stating that the organization can no longer ignore its own inefficiencies and should employ private companies more frequently given their expertise. See the below excerpt taken from a recent Senate appropriation bill:

The Committee is aware that, in some cases, private companies can carry out effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the funding the United Nations requires to carry out the same missions. At a minimum, such companies should be utilized to supplement the number of blue berets and blue helmets which, in these turbulent times, the United Nations is having a difficult time recruiting. The United Nations can no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings that private companies with proven records of good service and good behavior offer.

With a record number of PMC’s operating today I agree with the above statement and my findings provide some proof that PMC’s do indeed supply much needed security and stability to war-torn countries. Now that this chapter has highlighted what services PMC’s offer I will discuss what specific role a PMC can play while employed in a conflict country. In other words, I will discuss the number of ways a PMC can impact the outcome of a civil conflict.

CHAPTER 3: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PMC PARTICIPATION ON THE OUTCOME OF CIVIL CONFLICTS

As mentioned previously, this essay focuses on three case studies, which contain an historical analysis of PMC participation within a particular civil conflict. To date, no work exists which examines and describes the role a PMC played in influencing the outcome to a civil conflict. Therefore, this essay is the first of its kind. I will follow the approaches of other scholars who work on civil conflict studies, as I will provide a historical narrative of each.

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23 Isenberg(a), 1.
24 Brooks and Laroia, 123-124.
conflict and then I will analyze and break down the conflict in order to understand how the PMC played a role in the final outcome and I will support my findings with the appropriate theory.

Methods

The questions posed in this essay are; when a PMC enters a conflict, does it have any impact over the outcome of that conflict? Furthermore, can PMC’s play different roles in different conflicts, or is PMC participation limited to only influencing one outcome? I have formulated my hypothesis based on the above questions and so my hypothesis becomes; when a PMC enters a conflict country that PMC has an impact on the outcome of that conflict. There are three ways that the PMC could potentially influence the outcome. The first possible outcome is that the PMC would lead its client to an outright victory over its opponent. The second, is that the PMC would assist in creating a ripe moment where the warring parties believe it is more propitious to negotiate rather than continuing war. The third, is that the PMC has some degree of influence over the state-making process because of its ability to increase the war-making capacity of its client. Finally, it is possible that the PMC would have no impact over the outcome of the conflict in any way. In this chapter I will explore what conditions lead to the creation of a ripe moment, and I will specify how war-making and state-making are intricately linked together and how a PMC can affect both.

Ripeness theory affirms that three elements must be present for a ripe moment to occur, a mutually hurting stalemate, an avoided or experienced catastrophe, and an alternative way out. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate is identified as a key component that facilitates negotiation in conflicts. This uncomfortable position in which parties find themselves illustrates how the warring factions in a conflict discover that both actors cannot escalate into military

25 Derouen Jr. and Sobek, 304.
26 Schrodt, Yilmaz and Gemer, 2.
victory, and the resulting deadlock is both painful and costly to them (this pain does not necessarily have to be of equal degree). It is costly because it is believed that the longer the parties wait to take action, the more power over their opponent they lose\(^\text{27}\). The parties recognize that by not making an immediate decision, their choices further down the road will be significantly limited. Thus it proves less costly to them to make a move as soon as the deadlock occurs, causing them to seek alternative policies. At this point parties may see proposals that have been available to them for some time as legitimate, whereas previously they did not because the proposals did not appear attractive to them at that earlier time. Zartman asserts that the hurting stalemate model is a cost-benefit analysis where parties move from a perception of a prisoner’s dilemma to what he calls a ‘chicken dilemma game’. The parties themselves must perceive that they are in a chicken dilemma game, and they must recognize the ‘evidence’ that they are in a gridlock, otherwise a mutually hurting stalemate has not yet taken place. For the parties to act on this moment, something Zartman refers to as a ‘ripe moment’, Zartman claims that they do not need to identify a specific solution, but rather need to be vaguely aware and willing to search for a negotiated settlement. However, this can only happen if the parties feel that their concessions will be reciprocated\(^\text{28}\). In order to establish that a mutually hurting stalemate is present Zartman maintains that one must look at subjective expressions of pain or expressions of a way out, and the objective evidence such as the cost of the conflict in economic terms for both the military and government, and the number and the nature of casualties. When Zartman refers to expressions of pain he is speaking about the warring parties indicating that they are locked in a painful situation. Indications of this can be observed through the actor’s

\(^{27}\) Zartman, 8.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 8-9.
rhetoric or their actions\textsuperscript{29}. The mutually hurting stalemate is only present if the parties perceive that they are in a deadlock. Zartman also claims that this is the only key factor that determines whether a mutually hurting stalemate occurs. To quote, he states that, “if [the parties] do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the ‘evidence’, the MHS is present.\textsuperscript{30}” It is then appropriate to base the existence of the mutually hurting stalemate simply on the parties’ perceptions of being in one. The second needed element is that of a catastrophe, in ripeness theory, which occurs when the situation of one party greatly deteriorates\textsuperscript{31}. Finally, the last element that must be satisfied is that of a mediator who steps up and provides a way out of the conflict for all parties. All of these elements must exist in order for the ripe moment to be present.

Now, turning to Charles Tilly’s work on states as war-makers, I would like to first define a few terms that the scholar uses frequently. When Tilly speaks of a government he defines a government as, “an organization, which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within its population.\textsuperscript{32}” A government will begin to feel threatened, and may even lose its coercive power, when a contender steps onto the stage and challenges the government’s claims of legitimacy. Tilly defines a contender as, “a group within the population which at least once during some standard period applies resources to influence that government.\textsuperscript{33}” Contenders are able to influence the government by utilizing resources at their disposal and by mobilizing. Resources contenders often use are labor, money, weapons, information, and access to natural resources. As the contenders dexterity in extracting these resources increases the government begins to lose both control over its resources and its coercive capacity. In a civil conflict the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{31} Schrodt, Yilmaz and Gemer, 2.
\textsuperscript{32} Tilly(a), 437.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
government and its contender will fight each other for access to these resources and the amount of territory they are able to control, and the more proficient one is in making war the more advantageous a position that organization will enjoy over the other. Now, it is extremely important to understand just how intricately linked war-making and state-making are in order to understand how war-making effects the outcome of a conflict. Tilly’s literature draws largely from the Weberian model of the state, where collective violence is a right enjoyed by both the government and the contender during a conflict. Collective violence, according to Tilly, is a direct by-product of one organization laying claims to certain resources and the other organization, most often the government, strongly resisting its contender’s claims. But in war the government is able to strengthen itself and its claims to collective violence. The government itself witnesses a surge in resources and is able to increase its scope, which is illustrated by certain institutions either being formed or being expanded. For example, national budgets increase, the number of people employed by the state increase, and revenue from taxes typically increase. The military and police forces are also made more powerful and enjoy an increase of control over the general population. From this detailed description of war-making and state-making one can see that as the rate of extraction increases the ability of the state to protect itself also greatly increases, the result of which is, war-making and state-making are fully interdependent. Finally, when the general population resisted the government’s war-making efforts the government was forced to make concessions. These concessions take the form of guaranteed individual rights, the creation of courts and institutions to protect the people and private business.

In the case of MPRI in the Balkans I find that the PMC assisted the Croatian military in

34 Ibid., 437-446.
35 Tilly(b), 182-183.
an outright military victory and influenced a mutually hurting stalemate between the Bosnian and Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At this time, a ripe moment for negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina is identifiable. I will rely on Zartman’s methods enumerated above to test for the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate, and I will identify the Serbian forces loss against the Croatian and Bosnian militaries as a catastrophe incurred by the Serbs, as well as the ability of the United States to mediate a negotiated settlement to prove the existence of a ripe moment. As for EO in Angola, I will rely on Tilly’s literature to demonstrate how EO increased the war-making capacity of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and I will describe at length how this action affected the creation of the Angolan state. Unfortunately, this essay lacks needed information on EO in Sierra Leone, and without it I could not discern what EO’s contribution to the outcome of the Sierra Leonean conflict was. The obvious difference between the two corporations as well as the geographic variation of the conflicts allows for greater accuracy in testing my hypothesis.

CHAPTER 4: CASE SELECTION

It would be beneficial to this essay and future studies to be able to apply my hypothesis to each instance of PMC involvement in a civil conflict. However, limitations exist due to the availability of data, which unfortunately results directly from the secretive nature of PMC’s. Since many scholars have performed their research on EO and MPRI, and the media has paid close attention to both companies, I also will study EO and MPRI in three separate case study chapters. I will have to rely on secondary sources for my information since I don’t have privileged access to the inner-workings of these firms, and I am under financial and time restraints. It would be logical to place the case studies in chronological order, however because my cases have overlapping time frames I felt compelled to speak about MPRI first and place the
case studies where EO was the actor together so that I did not have to reintroduce the firm. Because my cases have been selected based on the players in the conflicts, rather than the conflicts themselves, it is pertinent to understand who these specific actors are so that later in the case study chapters the reader is already as intimately familiar as is possible with these PMC’s.

_Military Professional Resources Incorporated_

MPRI is an American firm based in Alexandria, Virginia that provides services to both public and private clients. Most notably, the United States Department of Defense is MPRI’s largest client. It is challenging to find information on where MPRI has held contracts, but one source claims that MPRI works in over forty countries. Eight former United States Army officers created the corporation in 1987, and currently the firms President is retired General Bantz Craddock of the US Army. Other large names now working for MPRI include General Carl Vuono who was responsible for leading the gulf war, General Crosbie Saint, and General Ron Griffith. In all, MPRI has claimed it has access to 10,000 former US military personnel and the company also claims that it brings in over 100 million US dollars in revenue each year. In the past few years MPRI has made strategic business decisions, and was sold to L-3 Communications in June 2000. Later, in 2004, L-3 Communications also acquired Civilian Police International and added the new corporation to MPRI. The corporation is a very interesting one as it offers a wide variety of services to its clients. One such service, part of a contract with the US Department of Defense, is that MPRI is responsible for running over 200 ROTC programs at American universities. Another US contract makes MPRI responsible for training local police forces using driver simulation programs, which had been owned by GE but was bought by MPRI recently. Although these contracts make MPRI appear like a PSP, the firm

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36 O’Brien, 90.
37 Wayne, 1-2.
has been used abroad for very different purposes. In 1999 MPRI was hired by the government of Colombia to train and work alongside its soldiers in order to combat the drug war. Both the Croatian and Bosnian governments hired MPRI in the mid 1990s to train their troops, assist in intelligence gathering, and some rumors have circulated that MPRI participated in offensive combat\(^{38}\). Finally, MPRI has been awarded more than twelve contracts in Iraq with its most prominent being its security services provided to employees of the Iraqi Defense Ministry\(^{39}\). On the companies website MPRI’s claims that, “at the core of who we are and what we do is our staunch belief that we make the difference in contributing to global security, justice and human dignity\(^{40}\).” My case study of MPRI upholds the corporations’ own staunch beliefs in its abilities as it demonstrates how MPRI’s success in retraining the Croatian military led the military to an outright victory with the military reclaiming 27 percent of land the Serb forces had held since 1992. This was the first victory the Croatian military enjoyed over its opponent\(^{41}\). Inspired by this win the Bosnian military launched their own offensive with the aim of recovering area’s the Bosnian government had been promised in previous failed negotiations. Large enough catastrophes were incurred by the Serb forces, and the Bosnian military stopped its offensive when their military goals were achieved because they did not have the training, arms or expertise to further engage the Serbian soldiers. This created a mutually hurting stalemate between the parties. During this offensive Bosnian forces were supplemented by the Croatian military, which for the first time since the conflict began worked alongside the Bosnian military rather than against it\(^{42}\). Concurrently, the United States stepped in as a mediator making this moment ripe for negotiations. Finally, MPRI functioned in a different capacity than EO, as it did not provide

\(^{38}\) Avant, 18.
\(^{39}\) Merle, 1.
\(^{40}\) What we believe makes the difference [article on-line]
\(^{41}\) Holbrooke, 1.
\(^{42}\) Brayton, 310.
troops for offensive combat (although it was rumored that MPRI employees did in fact participate). In fact, the official response of MPRI in regards to participating in offensive combat operations is, “if you want Executive Outcomes you don’t want MPRI”\(^{43}\).

**Executive Outcomes**

Executive Outcomes was a South African based PMC that was comprised of former soldiers from the South African Defense Force and was created by Simon Mann, Eeben Barlow, Michael Grunberg, Tim Spicer and Nic Van Den Bergh\(^{44}\). The major players, however, were Simon Mann and Eeben Barlow who formally created the company in 1993. Prior to EO’s creation Eeben Barlow had been a lieutenant colonel in the South African Army, and in 1989 as the South African government began shutting down the South African Defense Force, Barlow privately began to put together Executive Outcomes within the ranks of the army, staffing his company with special forces soldiers who had been relieved of their duties. He had close ties with Germany and Eastern Europe, as he had been stationed in Europe during the 1980s, and after EO’s formation Barlow used these connections to acquire European weapons and Russian helicopters\(^{45}\). EO existed in its infancy to assist the South African Defense Force (SADF) units but when the SADF was disbanded in 1990 EO sought to broaden its activities. Interestingly, SADF forces had worked alongside UNITA in the 1980s supporting Savimbi’s military goals\(^{46}\). Simon Mann registered EO in the UK as a business in September 1993, and the firm began marketing itself to governments in civil conflicts. The PMC consists of fourteen permanent members with access to some 2,000 private troops, all of whom either served in the SADF Special Forces unit, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts or the Koevoet\(^{47}\). EO, in the 1990s, claimed to

\(^{43}\) Cilliers and Douglas, 114.
\(^{44}\) Moore, 1.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
\(^{46}\) Howe, 310.
\(^{47}\) O’Brien, 84-85.
provide military training, airline transport, security services including the protection of gold, diamond and oil areas, para-medical support, intelligence and photo reconnaissance. EO had advertised itself as the protector of African states and had guaranteed they could defend their employers\textsuperscript{48}. Indeed, EO had stated that its services could successfully guard such governments because it relied on pre-emptive military assaults, something the UN could not do\textsuperscript{49}.

The company was dissolved in 1998, an aim by the newly united South African government, to limit what they perceived were mercenary activities. But before being disbanded the company was part of a conglomerate under Global Security and claimed that they provided strategic and tactical military advisory services\textsuperscript{50}. Eeben Barlow and SAS veteran Tony Buckingham negotiated EO’s contracts, the most notorious being with the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{51}. Buckingham oversaw two companies that were owned by Global Security. These companies, Heritage Oil and Gas, and Branch Mining also held contracts within Angola and Sierra Leone, and EO not only protected the companies and their employees, but was also paid by them in Angola when the government could not deliver. Use of EO by the UN was considered by Kofi Annan during the Rwandan genocide but was dismissed by Boutros-Boutros Ghali. UN consideration of the firm perhaps speaks to EO’s reputation at the time, and also illustrates the dire situation the UN was in. Despite not having held any contracts with the UN the firm has enjoyed employment by the governments of Zambia, Ghana, Algeria Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Namibia, Angola and Sierra Leone. Two cases stand out much more than the others because nearly all of the narrative literature related to private firms rests on Angola and

\textsuperscript{48} Howe, 307.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 309.
\textsuperscript{50} Avant, 16.
\textsuperscript{51} Moore, 1.
Sierra Leone, and reflects analysis of the private firms impact on both peacekeeping operations. The cases of Angola and Sierra Leone share many similarities. Both countries experienced civil war between government and rebel groups. During both conflicts neither negotiations resulted in immediate successful settlements and both countries resumed war after the initial negotiations broke down. Additionally, the reason for resuming military conflict was the same in both countries; both rebel groups, the RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola, did not accept the outcomes of the elections, nor did they view the UN as a credible third party intervener after EO had left both countries. Finally, both the RUF and UNITA specifically requested that EO leave their countries when UN troops arrived. EO’s role in the Angolan conflict increased the war-making capacity of the MPLA government, who prior to EO’s contract had been losing resources and territory to UNITA. With a reversal of their fortunes the MPLA’s state-making capacity also increased, and UNITA was forced to make concessions in the final negotiated settlement that it would not have considered earlier in the conflict. This case study finds that because EO’s assistance allowed the MPLA to expand its war-making abilities EO indirectly influenced the state-making process and played some role in the formation of the post-conflict state. Sierra Leone’s government was in a similar predicament when it contracted EO. Before the firm entered Sierra Leone the government has steadily lost access to resources, territory and lost credibility as an actor. However, unlike Angola, EO would face more problems in Sierra Leone and had a much harder time successfully fulfilling the terms of its contract. Although most circumstances within the conflict are well documented, EO’s actions remain murky and it is not clear if and how EO impacted the outcome of the Sierra Leonan conflict. The work I put forth

52 Brayton, 312-317; Cleary, 141-167; Francis, 319-332; Howe, 308-330; O’Brien, 84-91; Reno, 1-28; Selber and Jobarteh, 90-93; Taulbee, 11-12.
53 Francis, 327; Howe, 314-315; Selber and Jobarteh, 92.
in this particular chapter illustrates that EO was able to respond to RUF military attacks, but there are no clear theoretical implications that can be drawn about the firms work.

My case studies show that two PMC’s working in three different countries can lead to two very different outcomes, and the next three chapters shed light on the diverse role PMC’s play in civil conflicts. Each case study will follow the same format. First an introduction will address and summarize my findings. Next, a background section offers the reader information on how the conflict began and introduces the major actors. A historical narrative includes all of the information I have found during my research about the conflict and concludes with the final agreement or victory. Based on the happenings outlined in the historical narrative I offer my interpretation of each PMC’s actions and I supplement my findings with the appropriate theory. The first case to be studied is MPRI in the Balkans, followed by EO in Angola and concludes with EO in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY OF MPRI IN THE BALKANS

Introduction

The case of MPRI in Croatia is a complex one that demonstrates how a PMC can assist its client in an outright military victory and can influence a mutually hurting stalemate between Serb and Bosnian forces. MPRI’s participation in the Balkans adds to the literature on PMC’s because it shows that without MPRI’s participation and support the Croatian military could not have erased the Croatian Serb advantage\(^54\). A result of this outright military win over the Serb soldiers was a newly inspired Bosnian government launched its own military assault against Bosnian and Croatian Serbs with the aim of reclaiming Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. The Bosnian military’s assault recovered these areas, which had been guaranteed to it under previous

\(^{54}\) Thompson, 3.
negotiations, but stopped short of taking more territory because its military did not have the expertise, weapons or training to do so. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate can be seen as the Bosnian Serb forces were losing battles on all fronts for the first time during the war. As a result of these multiple devastations the Serb forces had lost nearly 21 percent of the Bosnian territory they had controlled as recently as July 1995. The United States seized this opportunity to step in as a mediator and offered a way out of the conflict through peace negotiations. All of these pieces, that of a mutually hurting stalemate between Serb and Bosnian forces, the catastrophes incurred by the Serbs, and the leadership of the US as it offered a way out of the conflict, led to a ripe moment that allowed for the Dayton Accords to be signed and adopted by all parties. Finally, MPRI’s overall performance in Croatia was viewed as a success and the firm was contracted to retrain and rearm the Bosnian-Muslim Croat Federation’s Army during the implementation of the Dayton Accords55.

In order to best discern how this moment was ripe for negotiations it is critical to evaluate why the past peace negotiations had failed and why this particular moment was different in its appeal for substantive talks. It is equally important to understand why the conflict began in the first place. Therefore, this chapter will first offer a background into the conflict and highlight the reasons why Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Then, I will provide a historical narrative of the conflict that focuses primarily on why the peace negotiations prior to Dayton where unsuccessful56. Finally, the theoretical implications section uses information from the historical narrative in conjunction with objective data to support my findings that MPRI helped the Croatian military achieve a military victory over the

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55 Brayton, 310.
56 When referring to peace negotiations, success can be qualified as the extinguishing of armed conflict and the signing of a peace accord or agreement that has begun to be implemented. Johansen, 38.
Serb Army and that Bosnia-Herzegovina in November 1995 was ripe to achieve a peace agreement.

**Background**

The Yugoslav Wars of Secession began shortly after nationalist groups in Slovenia and Croatia voted for independence from the Yugoslav nation in the summer of 1991\(^{57}\). These nationalist parties favored and promoted secession from greater Yugoslavia making them an easy target for the political elites under Slobodan Milosevic’s command, who encouraged ethnic hate against Slovene’s, Croats and later Bosnian-Muslims\(^{58}\). Although the conflict did not begin as an ethnic war, elites quickly found a scapegoat in persons who touted nationalist views. Nationalist views in this paper are defined as, “the primacy of the national over any other interest in political activities and as a doctrine, which has the creation of a homogenous nation-state as its core.”\(^{59}\)

Ultimately, these actions functioned as a catalyst for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and partition war raged until 1995. Croats and Bosnian Muslims battled Serbs, and Croats often fought Bosnian Muslims in the bloodiest war Europe had witnessed since World War II\(^{60}\). To best understand why these groups were willing to risk armed conflict in order to create their own independent states, it is crucial to analyze what issues precipitated the wars in the Balkans.

Western leaders heralded the creation of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of World War I in 1918 as a powerful attempt to dissolve nationalism in the Balkans\(^{61}\). Yugoslav leaders hoped to create a state that would have a shared culture and ideology among its diverse peoples, however, this task proved arduous. During World War II the Nazi’s with the help of Italian authorities enacted policies through a group called the Ustasha Revolutionary movement in Croatia. These

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\(^{57}\) Ullman, 10.
\(^{58}\) Jovic, 104.
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) Ullman, 1.
\(^{61}\) Tierney, 197.
policies included race laws, which targeted the Roma, Serbs and Jews and often resulted in either outlawing or murdering these minority groups\(^{62}\). After the war, in 1974, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which made Yugoslavia a federal republic and allowed the states within it to act as somewhat sovereign republics. Under this new constitution Jovic finds that these states were both weak and at the same time relatively strong. Jovic claims that they were weak because they had to adopt an anti-statist ideology that viewed nationalists as criminals. Yet, they can be seen as strong because states had to promote a non-ethnic Yugoslav identity, in essence diminishing ethnically driven retaliation\(^{63}\). Two key figures advanced the idea of a shared Yugoslav identity, Josip Broz Tito and Slobodan Milosevic. The Republic was largely forged under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito who served as the country’s Prime Minister from 1943 to 1963 and later served as President from 1953 until his death in 1980\(^{64}\). Tito’s ideology, that the ethnic groups within Yugoslavia could coexist peacefully under socialist rule, informed all government policies and led to practices that were aimed at eliminating ethnic differences to form one Yugoslav identity among the people\(^{65}\). Tito’s policies were viewed so synonymously with Yugoslavia that Tito himself ended up perceiving himself as the state. After his death, power was transferred to Slobodan Milosevic who relied largely on policies of continuity. Under Milosevic regional leaders who relied on coercion and violence were appointed to ensure that Tito’s ideology lived on. Due to the frighteningly effective suppression of the people under their control, it became apparent that these regional demagogues held considerable power because minority groups rarely challenged their policies. Their efficacy rested with their ability to cast blame for Yugoslavia’s problems on groups considered to be the others (Slovenes, Croats, and

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\(^{63}\) Jovic, 105.

\(^{64}\) Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010 ed., s.v. “Josip Broz Tito”.

\(^{65}\) Ullman, 9.
Bosnian-Muslims). These problems referred to were experienced throughout the 1980s and were complex but consisted of economic worries, injustices and fears that accompanied a greater-Serbia expansion. Despite such despotism the demagogues’ effectiveness did not hamper nor prevent the secession of various groups within Yugoslavia. Croatia and Slovenia’s steps for independence, which began on June 25, 1991, provoked the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) while it simultaneously frightened Serb groups. Indeed, the YPA became the Yugoslav state’s instrument for preserving nationalism as the state attempted to stop its dissolution. The military also worked to protect the interests of the Serbs who would become minorities in the newly created states. The YPA was responsible for the first violent offensive of the war as it launched attacks on Slovene citizens on June 27, 1991, effectively shattering peace in the Balkans.

Although Croatia and Slovenia sought independence at the same time, Croatia is the main focus of this chapter because Croatia’s military received expert training and arms from MPRI. The firm entered the Balkans in 1994 with a contract totaling 100 million US dollars to train and supply equipment to the Croatian army.

Croatia’s demographics illustrate that the state is primarily ethnically Croat with Serbs making up only twelve percent of the population. However, the Krajina region of Croatia was composed primarily of Serbs, and was the most fought over territory in Croatia during the war. Despite a large Croat majority, prior to 1991 Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian nationalist propaganda campaigns controlled democratically held elections within Croatia. Additionally, puppets of Milosevic, who had been strategically placed in Serbian minority area’s within Croatia beginning in 1989, were extremely loyal to Milosevic’s cause and worked to place Serbian loyalists in government positions. Therefore, elections often did not represent the wants

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66 Jovic, 104-113.
67 Ullman, 10.
of the ethnically Croat majority. This led to rising ethnic tensions in the early 1990s. This resentment ultimately prompted the Croat majority to vote for Franjo Tudjman in Croatia’s first multi-party Presidential elections in 1990. Tudjman was a well-known dissident who often criticized the Tito ideology. His party, the Croatian Democratic Union, promoted Croatian nationalist dreams of forming a Croatian nation-state and often advanced anti-Serbian propaganda that appealed to ethnic Croats. Tudjman and his colleague’s would soon discover their life’s work would become a reality. Tensions increased as Croatian Serbs left the Croatian parliament after Tudjman’s win and formed their own state apart from Croatia, named the Republika Srpska Krajina. All of these actions and responses between the Croats and Croatian Serbs contributed to the secession of Croatia in 1991. Krajina Serbs refused to live in an independent Croatia because they believed the republic was a re-creation of a World War II era Nazi puppet state (the Nazi’s had ethnically cleansed roughly 70,000 to 100,000 Serbs during World War II). Thus, the Serbs formed militia groups with the support of the YPA and violently lashed out against the Croats using Ustase tactics in an attempt to protect their interests. War had come to Croatia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina followed in the steps of Croatia and Slovenia and voted for independence in March 1992. Like Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was comprised of multiple ethnic groups, with Muslims and Croats voting to secede from Yugoslavia, and Bosnian Serbs strongly opposed to independence. In March 1992 the demographic makeup of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 44 percent Muslim, 17 percent Croat, and 31 percent Serbian. With overwhelming support, a monumental 99 percent of valid votes, the Bosnian government approved the resolution for independence. Quickly after, violence began between the three ethnic

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68 Gompert, 124.
69 Rohde, 1.
groups in Bosnia and the Serb paramilitary groups resorted to ethnically cleansing Muslims and Croats that lived in predominantly Serb areas. Similarly to Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs did not wish to be the minority in a new Bosnia-Herzegovina and moved to protect their interests and secure land by relying on genocide and violence. Unfortunately, the relationship between Croats and Muslims who lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly deteriorated and the two groups began fighting each other, allowing the Serbs a considerable advantage over the predominantly Muslim government and military. Due to this situation Serb nationalist groups were able to control 70 percent of the country until the summer of 1995.70

As the Balkans war intensified multiple actors attempted to broker peace agreements and offer alternative ways out of the conflict. The European Community, later represented by the European Union, issued multiple warnings to the actors after recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as newly independent countries on the 16 of December, 1991. The EU later stepped aside and allowed the US to fill the leadership role. Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic and Serbia deemed the US as inconsistent in its policies and military actions. The Bush administration thought it best to allow the EC to handle the Yugoslav conflict because the administration feared the US would be left with the sole responsibility of propping up the newly created states.72 The Clinton administration constantly flip-flopped between two very different policies. The administration would propose a military “lift and strike” policy using NATO forces and then would back away from such proposals and stating it would not commit any funds or US troops to support a military strike. Additionally, the US was unwilling to send US personnel to the Balkans as part of UNPROFOR and instead relied heavily on NATO forces for its military prowess. However, since the US continually altered its policies its military might was often questioned by the Serbs

70 Paris, 97.
71 Hoffman, 98.
72 Gompert, 130.
whose violent actions were never really penalized by NATO until August 1995. When NATO led bombing raids against the Serb forces in August and September 1995 the world experienced the alliances first ever shots fired in anger.

The US was not the sole international arbiter pushing for a peaceful resolution in the Balkans. Cooperation among the US, Russia, Britain, France and Germany resulted in the creation of the “contact group,” a group who worked multilaterally as mediators among the warring parties beginning in late 1992. Despite Russia’s participation in the “contact group” the country worked unilaterally to diffuse the war, though not deceitfully. Russia worked more closely with Serbia and often functioned as the voice of Serbia during “contact group” meetings. Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin was a visible actor for Russia during the Balkans crisis. Finally, the UN whom had been active in the Balkans since 1991 and maintained a presence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina also represented these countries. The UN sent a peacekeeping contingent to the Balkans in 1992, which consisted of 14,000 soldiers tasked with acting as a buffer between the Serbs and Croats. The United Nations Protection Force, termed UNPROFOR, constituted 50,000 soldiers, police officers from nearly 36 countries and 3,000 civilian personnel and cost an estimated 2 billion US dollars annually. This force received no cooperation from Croats or Croatian Serbs. With peacekeepers on the ground the UN also worked diplomatically to diffuse the conflict. In September 1991 the UN supported an arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These actors worked unilaterally and worked with each other towards a shared goal, so why did securing a peace settlement among the warring parties evade them? The historical narrative answers this question and demonstrates how, without the assistance of MPRI,

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73 Ullman, 22-32.
74 Weiss, 60-72.
the Serb advantage would have prevailed. It also explains why November 1995 was ripe for negotiations.

**Historical Narrative**

Nearly four years after Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence the parties finally agreed to a negotiated settlement on December 14, 1995. The Dayton Accords were in fact the culmination of efforts by the US and NATO, but other attempts had been made throughout the war. Four previous peace plans; the Carrington-Cutiliero plan, Vance-Owen plan, the Joint Action plan and the Washington Accords had all failed prior to the signing of Dayton. Why had these plans fallen short? I believe the answer to this question is in fact quite simple. Up until March 1995 diplomatic means were favored over military options, however, after March 1995 four things changed; MPRI trained and assisted the Croatian army in its efforts to oust the Serbs from Krajina, the UN relocated its forces from the Krajina cease-fire line to the Croatian-Serb border, the Bosnian military re-conquered areas the Serbs had taken by force, and NATO led bombing attacks against Serb strong holds escalated. These actions led to an increased military presence that signaled to the Serbs that the only feasible option was a negotiation settlement. In order to substantiate my claims I will analyze the events surrounding the failed negotiation attempts, the proposed settlements attached to the failed negotiations, and the actions directly prior to the signing of Dayton. In the case of Croatia I will specifically examine the role of MPRI in training and supporting the Croatian military and how MPRI helped the Croatian military eliminate the Serbs advantage.

The wars of secession in the Balkans officially began on June 27, 1991 when the Yugoslav People’s Army initiated attacks against Slovene citizens shortly after Slovenia had

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75 Ullman, 25.
76 Weiss, 63.
voted to secede on June 25\textsuperscript{77}. Fearing that the war would spread into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Community called for a cease-fire and issued a statement condemning the use of force in early July\textsuperscript{78}. Additionally, Yugoslavia was suspended from OSCE membership; a symbolic move that the European Community hoped would pressure Serb nationalists and the YPA to stop the use of violence. Indeed, the Slobodan Milosevic was using the YPA as a violent nationalist tool, and the YPA had declared itself, “obliged to act in defense of ‘federal assets’ and the union.”\textsuperscript{79} These measures did not work in halting the advances of Serb forces against Slovenes, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. The European Community, fearing that Bosnian Muslims would retaliate against Serb aggression, instituted an arms embargo that primarily hurt Bosnian Muslims because they could no longer acquire arms, and benefitted the Serbs who had access to, and controlled nearly all of the existing equipment and arms of the YPA\textsuperscript{80}. The UN believed that if the newly created Bosnian military did not have access to military equipment it simply would not fight. The UN was not the only international actor hoping to avoid war. The European Community spent the latter half of 1991 debating whether to grant Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina recognition as countries. The EC was caught between supporting the right of self-determination by those seceding from Yugoslavia, and disapproving of such actions. Either choice, members of the EC reckoned, would foster greater conflict and encourage violence. So the EC simply did nothing while the YPA bombed Vukovar and Dubrovnik in Croatia throughout November and December 1991 with little retaliation from Bosnian Muslim and Croatian paramilitary forces.

\textsuperscript{77} Ullman, 10.
\textsuperscript{78} Hoffman, 98.
\textsuperscript{79} Gompert, 126.
\textsuperscript{80} Weiss, 72.
As altercations continued Germany made a bold move to recognize the newly formed countries of Slovenia and Croatia on December 18 without European consensus. Still trying to avert widespread war the European Community emulated Germany’s actions and recognized both Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries on January 15, 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina had not met certain benchmarks put forward by the EC in order to be recognized. Despite a cease-fire agreement brokered by Cyrus Vance on February 11, 1992, brutal attacks from Serbian nationalists within Bosnia-Herzegovina tore the cease-fire apart. This Serbian aggression was a response to the Bosnian peoples vote for independence on March 18. Although UN troops had been sent to the Balkans, the majority of the 14,000 troops were acting as a buffer between Croatian Serbs and the Croatian paramilitary in Krajina. Only 1,000 soldiers were sent to Sarajevo by the UN as a gesture of the UN’s commitment to peace in the Balkans and to prevent nationalist groups from escalating into full-scale war. As many scholars have noted, however, symbolic policies and simple rhetoric were not persuasive tools when dealing with the Serbs, and the UN troops strategically placed in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not stop further escalations. Partition war loomed and the first peace plan proposed in the Balkans came to fruition.

The first plan, the “Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan,” was crafted in 1992 by Portugal’s ambassador Jorge Cutileiro along with Lord Carrington from Great Britain. Essentially, this plan hoped to limit a partition war between the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia. Carrington and Cutileiro argued that if a peace settlement where Bosnia-Herzegovina’s central government was strong, and ethnic groups remained separate from one another the country would fall back into war. Their plan proposed creating a weak Bosnian central government with district level

81 Hoffman, 100-117.
82 Weiss, 72.
83 Kumar and Pacheco, 1.
governments that would be in control of most administrative powers. These districts would be
drawn to include all three ethnic groups so that no one group would be the majority. Despite the
draw that no ethnic group would remain in the majority, the Bosnian government was not
interested in relinquishing control of the country, especially at a time when mounting Serb
aggression threatened the government. The Bosnian central government rejected the plan and
Bosnia-Herzegovina moved for independence without Serb consent in early 1992. The Serbs,
wanting partition from Bosnia-Herzegovina boycotted Bosnia’s referendum on independence
and after the European Union recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent country in
April 1992 the Serbs unleashed a brutal offensive against Bosnian Muslims that swept from
northwestern Bosnia to Bosnia’s eastern border. The partition war that many had feared had
now begun.

Early in the conflict the Croatians, Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs favored military
options. The West was not interested though, and continued to push for diplomatic settlements
and negotiations free of military mandates. Indeed, the 14,000 UN troops sent to the Balkans
were sent without heavy weapons and with no military mandate. Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegovic asked for the selective use of force by the United States or NATO to support his
troops, but the US rejected his proposal in mid-1992. The US had made it clear that it would
not use decisive military intervention to end the wars, and perhaps more troubling, had made it
very well known to all actors that it did not wish to be the major third party mediator, avoiding
nearly all responsibility. The Bosnian government felt extremely vulnerable without US or UN
protection and moved to act militarily themselves against the Serbian nationalists and presumed

84 Ibid., 2.
85 Weiss, 72.
86 Gompert, 132.
87 Ibid., 131-132.
their citizens would incur harm from the YPA and Serb paramilitaries. Perhaps these feelings of vulnerability were legitimate. The UN and its delegates were not even adequately protected. In May 1992 ICRC delegate Frederic Maurice was assassinated in Sarajevo despite the UN having designated Sarajevo a UN protected safe area. Additionally, Weiss stated that the safe areas were in fact considerably less safe than other areas in the Balkans. Because Serbian aggression often went unpunished by the US and UN, and Serb groups began blocking UN aid deliveries and safely ignored warnings and condemnations from the UN and its international members. Throughout these developments, Cyrus Vance had been working to obtain a cease-fire in the Balkans for much of 1992, and eventually he pushed for a new negotiated settlement, which he hoped would lead to the demilitarization of Serb controlled areas.

The second peace plan offered in 1992 was the “Vance-Owen peace plan”. Recognizing that the Bosnian central government would not support a plan that substantially limited its power, this plan moved from a decentralized central government with small districts to a country that would be comprised of larger provincial units. The “Vance-Owen” plan also worked to stop the ethnic partition of Bosnia. However, because the provinces were so large it allowed the already formed paramilitary groups to control and dominate particular territories. Essentially, the Serbian paramilitary would control Serb held regions while the Croatian paramilitary groups continued to push Croatian Serbs into Bosnia, which had been a source of great animosity between the two countries and the YPA since the war had begun. Serb enclaves controlled most of the border and the Croatian paramilitary troops had worked tirelessly to push the Serbs further.

88 Weiss, 84.
89 Ibid., 64.
90 Gompert, 133.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
into Bosnia and out of Croatia, in effect igniting a war between Croats and Bosnian Muslims\textsuperscript{93}. David Owen may have undermined the peace plan when he met with the Croatian government and Croatian Serb forces hoping to create a settlement where the Serbs would be able to link territories they held in the east and west of Bosnia, and the Croatians would gain all the territory on the western border of Croatia\textsuperscript{94}. Additionally, the Croatian paramilitary would cede control over the Sava River to the Serbs, and the Bosnian government would give up control of the Bosnian-Croatian border to the Croatian government. This plan was eventually rejected for two reasons. First, the Serb nationalists did not see any strategic reason to give up these territories because at the time the only areas they did not control were Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. And second, the Bosnian central government felt that such large concessions would only further strengthen the Serb nationalists. The Bosnian government rejected this plan because it would have limited access to this northern border of Bosnia\textsuperscript{95}. Instead of reaching an agreement the Serbian paramilitary groups and the Croatian paramilitary pushed to escalate the conflict further using military attacks in order to gain territories they believed were theirs. The YPA, Croatian and Bosnian paramilitary groups, and Serbian nationalist groups were all guilty of not complying with existing no fly zones and cease-fire agreements. Indeed, between mid-1992 and mid-1994 nearly 2,665 violations of the no fly zone that had been established in October 1992 were documented\textsuperscript{96}. With trust dwindling between the warring parties and the Western actors, the West made a third bid for a negotiated settlement.

The third attempt at brokering a peace deal between the Serbian nationalists, Croatian government and the Bosnian government was in May 1993 when the contact group allowed

\textsuperscript{93} Paris, 98.
\textsuperscript{94} Rohde, 3.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Chayes and Chayes, 200.
UNPROFOR to close off and protect Bosnia-Herzegovina’s borders as well as Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla⁹⁷. Additionally, the contact group attempted to reconcile territory disputes between the three warring parties by proposing a three-way partition under the “Joint Action Plan.” The Serbian nationalists in the Bosnian countryside responded by sending a map of their new Serbian Republic to the contact group. This Republic was comprised of around 60 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. International negotiators continued to bargain with the parties until September 1993 when all parties were able to reach an agreement over the allocated territories. The Serbian Republic would be composed of 53 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina while the Croatian Republic would gain 17 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, the Bosnian Muslim Republic would be comprised of the remaining 30 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo and Mostar would remain under UN and EU administration and protection⁹⁸. Although the Serbian nationalists and Croats viewed this plan as feasible the Bosnian Muslims were less than pleased. Their country would be fragmented with Bihac isolated in the northwest with the only connection to the rest of the republic would be on one road that went through the Serbian Republic. Additionally, the Bosnian Muslim Republic would be landlocked. After reviewing the Joint Action Plan the Bosnian parliament rejected the proposal and the war continued on⁹⁹.

It is unfortunate that the previous attempts at brokering a peace deal in the Balkans failed as the violence escalated greatly in 1994. It is extremely probable, however, that it took such violence and use of force by those warring with each other to push the US into a leadership position, finally allowing for NATO to use force against such aggressors. The US, until 1994, had been influential in the Balkans, albeit remotely. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations had hoped that European countries would lead the efforts to stop the war, since the US lacked

⁹⁷ Ibid.
⁹⁸ Ibid.
⁹⁹ Ibid.
any strategic interest in the Balkans\textsuperscript{100}. However, as the war became more turbulent and hostilities increased Europe ceded leadership efforts to the US in 1994 and the European community practically vanished as an actor\textsuperscript{101}. With the US leading negotiation efforts the Clinton administration adopted the “lift and strike” policy, utilizing NATO aircraft, which targeted and bombed strategic areas\textsuperscript{102}. Serbian nationalist aggression continued to build and on February 5, 1994 a Serbian shell killed 68 people and injured nearly 200 in Sarajevo (a city that was supposed to be a UN ‘safe area’). Bosnian Serbs had also blocked all land routes to Sarajevo and refused to allow UN human rights monitors into areas where reported ethnic cleansing had occurred\textsuperscript{103}. This offensive finally elicited a military response from the West and in February 1994 NATO aircraft shot down four Serbian aircraft for violations of the no-fly zone\textsuperscript{104}. NATO then sent two American F-16s to the Balkans in April tasked with bombing Serbian ground positions outside of Gorazde\textsuperscript{105}. Meanwhile, Russian diplomat Vitaly Churkin attempted to work out a deal with the Serbs and after an eleven hour meeting was finally successful in lifting the siege of Sarajevo\textsuperscript{106}. Shortly after the NATO bombing attacks the Serbs called NATO’s bluff and engaged in ethnic cleansing practices in Prejiar and Banja Luka. The Clinton administration faced mounting pressure at home to end the genocide and proposed using force through NATO to counter Serbian aggression. Unfortunately, the commander of UNPROFOR refused\textsuperscript{107}. Instead, in July the UN sent 135 peace observers to monitor a new peace proposal that allowed the UN to lessen sanctions against Serbia.

\textsuperscript{100} Gompert 131-132.
\textsuperscript{101} Hoffman, 101.
\textsuperscript{102} Gompert, 137.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ullman, 22.
\textsuperscript{105} Gompert 138.
\textsuperscript{106} Ullman, 30.
\textsuperscript{107} Weiss, 65.
Shortly after the fourth peace proposal was offered. The Washington Accords were proposed on March 1, 1994 by the contact group and included a map of the allocated territory between the Bosnian federation and the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian-Muslim federation would receive 51 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs would be given 49 percent. Although the Bosnian government accepted the plan the Serbian nationalists attached so many conditions to the peace plan that it was impossible to implement it. The West went back to the drawing board and the UN punished the Bosnian Serbs by increasing sanctions against them. Attacks against the Serbian nationalists continued to grow as the Bosnian army finally won a battle in Bihac, only to have the Serbs retaliate by committing genocide against Bosnian Muslims. Cease-fire violations jumped to 212 in October 1994 involving the use of heavy weapons by Serb forces. In November, NATO bombed the Serbian controlled airport in Krajina hoping to send a message to the Serbian nationalists that their use of violence was unacceptable, however the UN again stepped in and asked NATO to stop the bombing raids, fearing that Serb forces would lash out against UN troops. At this point in time the Croatian government was so distraught with the performance of the UN that President Tudjman ordered 12,000 UN troops to leave Croatia by June of 1995. He along with other top Croatian officials thought that the UN troops acted as a safety buffer between the Croatian paramilitary and the Serbian nationalists in the Krajina province of Croatia, and were only allowing the Serbs to be shielded by the UN, in effect making peace settlements impossible. Throughout the failed peace negotiations Tudjman had stated that the UN lacked any coercive power and played no role in the Balkans except to protect the Serbs. Tudjman’s beliefs were not unfounded. Just two

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108 Weiss, 65.
109 Ibid., 66.
110 Pushkina, 395.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 67.
months after ordering UN troops to leave Croatia, 350 UN soldiers were taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs and were chained to NATO targets. This was not the first time Serb forces had controlled UN troops, In April 1994 Serb forces had not only taken 200 UN soldiers hostage but had also marched up to UN safe areas and demanded their weapons, which had been taken by UN troops, be returned to them. The UN was pinched because it badly needed Tudjman’s support in order to remain in Croatia. Not wishing to leave the Balkans the UN agreed to reduced its troop size to 8,750 and redeployed these troops to monitor the border between Serbia and Croatia rather than monitor the cease-fire lines in Krajina. Additionally, the UN force was given a new name, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO). With UN troops away from Krajina the Croatian government began secretly acquiring weapons and training their military with the help of an American based firm, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated.

The Croatian government requested US military assistance on March 24, 1994 so that it could retrain and model its military after that of the US military. Indeed, the Croatian government had repeatedly lost to the Serb nationalists since 1991 and operated with little resources and equipment reminiscent of the USSR. Although the UN arms embargo did not allow the US to directly assist the Croatian government in arming and retraining its troops, Washington worked to help what it saw as a potential ally by referring Croatia’s Defense Minister to MPRI. When MPRI entered into a contract with the Croatian government in February 1995 the firm tasked itself with what it termed the “Democracy Transition and Assistance Program,” which aimed to educate military officers and non-commissioned officers.

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113 Ullman, 23.
114 Ibid., 32.
115 Ibid.
116 Cilliers and Douglas, 114.
117 Nimkar, 8.
118 Cilliers and Douglas 115.
so that these leaders would be more effective managers, leaders and military operators. In addition to MPRI’s leadership training, Croatia had been able to accumulate and stockpile weapons by moving them through their border with Hungary and also by sea thanks to the lax patrolling of NATO ships. Rohde reports that among the military equipment amassed by the Croats were 15 Hind MI-24 attack helicopters, 20 MIG-21 fighters, surface-to-air missiles, T-72 and T-55 Soviet tanks and small arms. All of this was possible, states Rohde, because the US and Germany provided much of the 2 billion US dollars in cash to buy these weapons. With these arms and the help of 15 retired senior American officers and numerous enlisted level personnel staffed with MPRI the Croatian paramilitary was able to organize and enact military operations typically only seen in the developed world. Before MPRI’s involvement the front lines in Croatia had been unchanged since early 1992 because of the UN troops who had been positioned strategically on the Krajina province border separating Serb nationalists from the Croatian paramilitary. Between August 4 and 8, 1995 Croatian government forces launched Operation Ulja (Storm), “a five pronged offensive, the Croatian commanders integrated air power, artillery and rapid infantry movements to target the Serb command and control networks,” which sent the Serb nationalist army into retreat. This offensive also erased the advantage the Serbs had enjoyed up until this point in time. In fact, the Serb retreat was documented as the largest refugee flow of the war. According to Gaul these developments helped strengthen Croatia’s military status in the region. It is debatable as to whether MPRI directly planned or participated in Operation Ulja, however Nimkar notes that the CEO of MPRI visited the Croatian Ministry more than ten times in the week leading up to the offensive. MPRI denies participating in the

119 Ibid.
120 Rohde, 1.
121 Ullman, 16.
122 Holbrooke, 1.
123 Cilliers and Douglas, 115.
124 Weiss, 70.
operation directly and claims to have little involvement in planning *Operation Ulja*. Nimkar also asserts that MPRI’s contract can be viewed as a success because the desired outcomes were secured. Critics of Croatia’s increased military presence argue that instead of balancing Serb power it fostered conflict. Both Nimkar and her critics may be right since the Serb forces retreated from the Croatian military, but their exodus from Croatia into Bosnia cultivated widespread violence between Serbs and Muslims on Bosnia’s border with Croatia.

In July 1995 Serb forces had led a violent strike in Bosnia-Herzegovina to recover the safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde by massacring Bosnian Muslims. Angered by these attacks and emboldened by the Croatian military’s success the Bosnian military moved to regain Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde and was successful as it re-conquered these areas as well as areas guaranteed to them under previous peace plans. The Bosnian government also had the help of Croatian forces, which moved with the Bosnian military to beat back Serb aggressors along the Bosnian-Croatian border. However, the Bosnian military stopped fighting Serb forces after regaining these territories because it lacked the training and equipment it needed to escalate the conflict further, due to the UN arms embargo that had been instituted in September 1991.

While Croatia had found a way around the embargo Bosnia-Herzegovina had not. The only arms it was able to accumulate came through Croatia since it was landlocked, and the Croatian military would take a 40 percent cut on all weapons sold to the Bosnian military. In a classified report the Pentagon had determined that the Muslim-Croat federation had needed 50 tanks, artillery, anti-mortar weapons, and similar numbers of light arms plus basic military items.

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125 Nimkar, 9.
126 Weiss, 70.
127 Ibid., 69.
128 Paris, 98.
129 Hoffman, 109.
130 Rohde, 2.
like boots and bullets to erase the Serb nationalist advantage in both countries. Therefore, it is fair to state that the Bosnian military lacked basic equipment and training that it desperately needed. Throughout August and September 1995 NATO led bombing raids against Serb forces to punish the Serbs for not complying with the previous cease-fire agreements. As a result of the NATO bombing attacks and the victory of the Bosnian and Croatian militaries, Serb forces went from controlling 70 percent of Bosnian territory to only controlling 49 percent of Bosnia.

In November 1995 the US convened peace talks in Dayton, Ohio and the parties signed the formal agreement, the Dayton Accords, on December 14 in Paris. This settlement included eleven annexes, which specified the responsibilities of the previously warring parties. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed out of areas controlled by Croats and Muslims, while the Republika Srpska was created out of areas Serbs controlled. The partition that many had worked to prevent finally happened. The agreement included national elections for Bosnian political institutions and presidential with three equal presidents, one from each major ethnic group. The goal for Bosnia and Herzegovina was to convert it into a liberal democracy where civil rights would be appreciated and leaders would utilize democratic institutions.

Other features of Dayton related to processing war criminals, repatriation and a new cease-fire agreement. Peacekeepers were granted the right to arrest and detain persons who had violated the law during the conflict, and if need be a war crimes tribunal could be created to try these persons. Dayton also sought to resettle roughly 2.7 million refugees in three phases over two years time. Finally, the parties agreed to a new cease-fire but were not required to fully demobilize. Instead

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131 Hoffman, 109.
132 Ullman, 17.
133 Ibid., 24.
135 Ibid.
they were still allowed to arm and retrain their militaries\textsuperscript{136}. Another provision of the Dayton Accords allowed for arms to begin flowing into the Balkans in mid-March 1995. US leaders believed that peace would not be sustainable unless the Bosnian government was able to defend itself against aggressors. With this proper training and equipment no party would emerge from the war with the ability to have a decisive military victory if fighting were to resume\textsuperscript{137}. The European community disagreed with the US, but arms did begin coming into Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1995\textsuperscript{138}. Additionally, as a result of MPRI’s success in Croatia, the Bosnian government hired MPRI to retrain its military\textsuperscript{139}. The Dayton Accords were officially implemented on December 20, 1995 by IFOR troops who were sent to the Balkans to see that the eleven annexes included in the agreement were seen through\textsuperscript{140}.

Based on the evidence presented in this historical narrative I believe that ripeness theory can account for why November 1995 provided a propitious atmosphere for peace talks. To support my claims I point to two key factors that had changed in Croatia in 1995. First, UN troops had been removed from the cease-fire line in Krajina making them vulnerable to Croatian military attacks. And second, the Croatian military, drawing on the training and help given to them by MPRI, led a complex military operation against the Croatian Serb nationalists in Krajina. The Croatian Serbs retreated in the largest documented refugee flow of the conflict, and military power shifted hands from the Serbs to the Croatian government and military. The Serb defeat in Croatia set the stage for peace talks, but other factors led to negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Three elements within Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed for negotiations: first, the Croatian military with MPRI’s training beat the Serbs in Krajina in a decisive military victory.

\textsuperscript{136} Chayes and Chayes, 201-214.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{138} Thompson, 1.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{140} Paris, 99.
Second, the success of the Croatian troops both encouraged the Bosnian government to militarily challenge Serb forces, and it fostered a better relationship between the Croatian military and the Bosnian military who worked together to oust Serb forces from Croatia and pushed them back in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And third, NATO began bombing raids that specifically targeted Serb held areas. Subsequently the Serb forces lost control of territory they had held in Croatia, and lost 21 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of these actions are discussed further in the next section and are used to support my claims that November 1995 provided a ripe moment for negotiations, and that MPRI did impact the conflict as it played out in Croatia.

Theoretical Implications

When studying the complicated interactions and relationships between all of the actors present in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina I saw that MPRI did not provide the sole explanation as to why the Dayton Accords were successful, and the firm’s participation in Croatia moderately influenced the actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within Croatia it was the concurrence of MPRI and the repositioning of UN troops that shifted the balance of power and eventually suspended the fighting in Croatia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina peace negotiations came to fruition because of the success of the Croatian military against Serb forces, the NATO bombing raids targeting Serb forces, and the Bosnian military’s ability to regain territories that had been sequestered by Serb forces. It is inevitable that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina be studied simultaneously with the activities that occurred in Croatia for two reasons: first, all the peace plans offered in the Balkans aimed at bringing peace to both countries. And second, the Bosnian government also had the assistance of Croatian forces, which moved with the Bosnian military to beat back Serb aggressors along the Bosnian-Croatian border\(^1\). These actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina created a situation where the Serbs lost considerable territory and the Bosnian
military gained it, however the military could not escalate the conflict to have an outright military victory. This predicament was viewed as a mutually hurting stalemate for both parties and is supported by ripeness theory which maintains that when one party slips and the other party gains pain occurs for both parties because neither is able to gain militarily. Instead, both parties are deadlocked and are unable to escalate into a military victory\textsuperscript{141}. Indeed, William Zartman has called for research looking into why November 1995 was ripe for a negotiated settlement in the Balkans when the previous years of the conflict were not\textsuperscript{142}. I will supplement my findings with objective evidence based on casualty numbers and subjective expressions of pain, expressions of a way out, and the inability to escalate the conflict further to confirm that a mutually hurting stalemate was present in Bosnia in late 1995. Some of this data is not readily available, such as the cost of operating the Bosnian military and Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups, and specific casualty numbers of civilian and military personnel. First, I will speak about the outright military victory in Croatia and then I will tackle Bosnia-Herzegovina and the events in November 1995 that led to a ripe moment.

Until MPRI entered the conflict the Croatian paramilitary had been relatively unsuccessful in engaging the Serbian nationalists. When UN troops had been relocated from the Krajina cease-fire border to the Croatian-Serbian border in early 1995 the Croatian paramilitary finally had an opportunity to militarily combat the Serbs. Around the time that UN troops were being relocated, the Croatian government entered into a contract with a private military firm so that their military could match that of the US. Ultimately, this training made the Croatian military more credible and more effective\textsuperscript{143}. The Croatian military’s \textit{Operation Ulja}, and later their wins in Grahovoc and Glumoc in August 1995, were the first decisive military victories for

\textsuperscript{141} Zartman, 8.  
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 10.  
\textsuperscript{143} Nimkar, 9.
the Croatian military and led to a power shift among the players. Prior to receiving training from MPRI Croats were openly hostile towards UN troops because they believed that the UN only acted to protect Serb forces. However, Croats also came to believe that the UN bought them time to retrain and rearm. In 1991 the Croatian military was just a rag-tag paramilitary group, but in 1995 after MPRI began its work, Jane’s analyst Ripley stated that, “they [the Croatian military] can field a force of perhaps 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers who are equipped to professional Western standards.” To support my assertions that an outright military victory can and does lead to a power shift, I point to Gray who finds that an outright military victory can affect the outcome of the war, though it may not end the war at that particular time. Gray defines a decisive military victory as, "a victory, which decides the outcome to a campaign, though not necessarily to the war as a whole." In the case of Croatia the power changed hands from the Serb nationalist forces to the Croatian government and military. This power shift ultimately turned the Croatian military into a coercive power and demonstrated to the Serbs that the Croatian government was a force to be reckoned with, thus making the government a credible actor in the conflict. After this victory, the Croatian government was so confident in their military competencies that it knew it could easily overtake Eastern Slavonia. However, recognizing that they now held the power, the government decided to resolve this issue and other remaining disputes at the negotiation table. Although the training, and perhaps the participation, of MPRI in Croatia definitely impacted the conflict, other actions in conjunction with the Croatian military’s outright victory resulted in the signing of the Dayton Accords.

One result of the outright military victory in Croatia was that Bosnian Muslims and Serbian nationalists found themselves in a ripe moment where third party mediators could

144 Rohde, 2.
145 Gray, 11.
146 Pushkina, 406.
successfully bargain with each side and provide a way out of the conflict. This ripe moment was a result of both party’s perceptions of being in a mutually hurting stalemate where neither the Bosnian Muslims nor the Serbian nationalists believed they could militarily escalate the conflict any further. Mediators including the US, UN and the EU had attempted to broker peace agreements with these parties four times before the successful Dayton Accords but the parties had only recognized being at an impasse, not being in a mutually hurting stalemate. Additionally, leading up to Dayton, two other key factors had changed; the Bosnian military had recovered territory the Serbs had recently captured by force, and the NATO bombing raids targeting Serb strongholds left the YPA and the Serb nationalists groups tremendously weakened\textsuperscript{147}. It was no secret that both the Croatian and Bosnian governments applauded the bombing raids against their foes. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic stated shortly after the bombings began that, “the world has finally done what it should have done a long, long time ago.”\textsuperscript{148} As the Serbs retreated from Croatia the Croatian and Bosnian militaries moved to occupy territory that had been guaranteed as theirs in previous peace negotiations\textsuperscript{149}. It may appear that the Bosnian military experienced an outright military victory over the Serbs, however with further analysis it is apparent that a mutually hurting stalemate was present. Ripeness theory states that pain can occur for both parties if one party slips while the other party gains more ground because neither party is actually gaining militarily, but rather they are both deadlocked unable to escalate into an outright victory\textsuperscript{150}. Although the Bosnian military had been quite successful in attacking Serb forces it moved only to acquire the territory guaranteed to the Bosnian government under the earlier peace negotiations, it did not seek to obtain additional land\textsuperscript{151}. I believe the military

\textsuperscript{147} Cilliers and Douglas, 115.  
\textsuperscript{148} Weiss, 91.  
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 70.  
\textsuperscript{150} Zartman, 8.  
\textsuperscript{151} Gompert, 138.
stopped its offensive because although the military had successfully pushed the Serb forces back, it lacked the proper equipment and training it needed in order to escalate the conflict further as a result of the UN arms embargo that had been in effect since September 1991. Indeed, as stated in the historical narrative, a classified report by the Pentagon found that the Bosnian military lacked essential equipment and training it needed to have an outright victory over its aggressors. Therefore, the Bosnian government was deadlocked because it perceived that it could not militarily escalate the conflict any further. At this point in time Serb leaders indicated that they were ready to sit down for serious peace talks and Bosnian Muslims agreed to stop using their heavy weapons.

In addition to analyzing the rhetoric and expressions of pain or self-assurance of the actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina it is pertinent to also analyze the number of fatalities that occurred leading up to these events in 1995. While I could not find data that distinguished between civilian and soldier deaths by year or month, I was successful in finding data that broke down total fatalities by year as Ball, Tabeau and Verwimp had compiled such data. This data is helpful in demonstrating that a hurting stalemate existed because it helps illustrate that a change in the conflict occurred. This change, evidenced below in Table 1, is a more reliable indicator of a mutually hurting stalemate than a simple escalation of violence, as supported by the empirical findings of Schrodt, Yilmaz and Gemer. I’ll demonstrate how the actions of the Serbs acted as a catalyst for change in the conflict, which ultimately led to Serbian experienced catastrophes. Throughout 1995 the rate of casualties held relatively stable, but in July an increase occurred and

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152 Hoffman, 109.
153 Ibid.
154 Paris, 98; Ullman, 24.
155 See their publication, “The Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the Database.”
156 Ball, Tabeau, Verwimp, 15.
10,125 persons lost their life. This upsurge can be attributed to a Serb led offensive to recover the safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde in July by massacring Bosnian Muslims\(^{157}\).

**Table 2: Total Fatalities by Month in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The widespread violence perpetrated towards Bosnian Muslims at the hands of Bosnian Serb nationalists acts as a change in the conflict because the Bosnian government was driven to action so that it could protect its people and recover these areas. The mass killing also provoked a response from NATO who, in August 1995, conducted bombing raids against Serb held areas and Serb strongholds until September 1995 as a direct response to the Bosnian Serb acquisitions of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde\(^{158}\). The Bosnian military fought to recover the areas Serb

\(^{157}\) Weiss, 69.

\(^{158}\) Ibid.
nationalists had taken and ultimately were successful in their efforts\textsuperscript{159}. Thus, the single movement of Serb forces to acquire those territories while executing Bosnian Muslims brought about a change in the conflict, which led to the Serbs slipping and the Bosnian government gaining. Both sides perceived they were in a deadlock because both of them recognized they were in a painful situation. The Serbs had lost land they had controlled, and although the Bosnian government gained territory it could not escalate the conflict any further.

The second element that must be satisfied for a mutually hurting stalemate to exist is that of an avoided or experienced catastrophe. A catastrophe, in ripeness theory, can be witnessed when the situation of one party greatly deteriorates\textsuperscript{160}. Indeed, the Serbs had plenty of catastrophes starting in August 1995. First, the Serbian nationalists in Croatia had to retreat from Krajina after being beaten by the Croats in August. Second, the Serb paramilitary groups and the areas they controlled were the targets of NATO bombing raids throughout August and September 1995. And third, after taking Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde the Bosnian Serb nationalists were ousted by the Bosnian military who reclaimed those territories, forcing the Serb nationalists back. All of these actions taken against the Serb nationalists were catastrophes since the Serbs had rarely lost battles against other government troops. Finally, NATO used sticks instead of carrots against the Serbian forces and ended once and for all the debate about whether NATO was a serious coercive power\textsuperscript{161}. To sum, these actions against the Serb forces were indeed catastrophes because it sent all the Serb paramilitary groups into retreat, and as a result, Serb forces went from controlling 70 percent of Bosnian territory to only controlling 49 percent of Bosnia\textsuperscript{162}.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{160} Schrodt, Yilmaz and Gemer, 2.
\textsuperscript{161} Gompert, 138.
\textsuperscript{162} Ullman, 24.
The final element that must be satisfied is that of a mediator who steps up and provides a way out of the conflict for all parties. The United States recognized that a negotiated peace settlement was the only positive sum action. On August 9, 1995 a State Department official claimed that, “events on the ground have made it propitious to try again to get the negotiations started. The Serbs are on the run a bit. That won’t last forever. So we are taking the obvious major step.”\(^{163}\) The rhetoric and actions of the US at this time were extremely important because under ripeness theory a mediator must move in and use leverage either in the form of carrots or sticks to bring all actors to the negotiation table\(^ {164}\). The US moved in to head negotiations and the Bosnian government along with Serb forces agreed to peace talks with each other and Croatia.

In conclusion, the ripe moment for successful negotiations in November 1995 was the result of a culmination of multiple incidents in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After UN troops had been removed from the cease-fire line in Krajina, the Croatian military led a complex military operation against Croatian Serb nationalists with the training and assistance of MPRI. Because of the arms and expert training MPRI provided, the Croatian military was extremely successful in their goals and the Serbs retreated from Croatia into Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A result of this massive Serb defeat not only encouraged the Bosnian government to launch a military offensive against Serb nationalists in their own country but also aligned Croats and Bosnians for the first time during the conflict. The theoretical cause and effect is then this, the outright military victory in Croatia in addition to Serbian experienced catastrophes, the willingness of the US to offer an alternative way out, and the mutually hurting stalemate between

\(^ {163}\) Zartman, 12.

\(^ {164}\) Schrodt, Yilmaz and Gerner, 3.
Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian military led to a ripe moment where negotiations took place and were finally successful.

CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY OF EO IN ANGOLA

Introduction

Executive Outcome’s participation in the Angolan civil wars during the 1990s demonstrates that a private military contractor can not only help a flailing party regain control of its territory, but it can also work to expand that party’s war-making capabilities and state-building capacity. The fact that EO put the government back in power early on impacted the way in which the state was shaped and directly affected the organizational features of the government post conflict. The firm’s role in assisting with the MPLA’s war-making and state-making process is most notably illustrated by EO’s success in training FAA troops in 1994. These better-trained soldiers, equipped with new modern weapons and EO’s military guidance forced UNITA to give up considerable territory to the MPLA, which led to a negotiated settlement. Although this particular settlement would not hold, it indicated that with the MPLA’s gains in resources and territory, UNITA would have to make greater concessions. I will argue in this chapter that without the help from EO, the MPLA’s war-making and state-making potential would not have been able to expand.

This case study will first provide a background into the Angolan civil wars and will speak about the various parties competing for political power. Then an historical narrative will describe in depth what actions within Angola led to and continued to feed the war, and will offer explanations as to why the peace plans before the Luena Memorandum in 2002 were unsuccessful. Finally, a theory section will support my findings that EO was successful in
fulfilling the terms of its contract and I will draw largely on the works of Charles Tilly in order to validate my claims that EO built up the MPLAs war-making, and thus state building capacity.

Background

Tensions between political parties in Angola had persisted since the anti-colonial war waged against the Portuguese beginning in 1961. Under the Portuguese, policies of assimilation for the people of Angola were put in place, but failed miserably and instead worked to emphasize ethnic and gender identities. These social constructs fueled the anti-colonial war against Portugal and, after the Portuguese had been ousted in 1974, were adopted in different ways by the newly emerging parties\(^\text{165}\). These parties, including the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), vied for political dominance over the country’s government and did so by manipulating the identity of the Angolan people. This manipulation was accomplished by relying on ethnically divisive rhetoric in order to accentuate subtleties and differences among the major tribal groups. Although eight other liberation movements arose in the 1960s, by 1970 these three parties remained the most powerful, pitching both political and military battles with one another.

After Portugal’s withdrawal from Angola the MPLA took control of the country’s capital, Luanda, and their leader Agostinho Neto became Angola’s president\(^\text{166}\). Neto was a poet and doctor, and worked tirelessly to bring the MPLA international recognition as Angola’s legitimate power. He also crafted policies he believed would rebuild Angola’s economy without giving any more power to the bourgeoisie\(^\text{167}\). Most members of the MPLA were drawn together based on their shared Marxist ideological beliefs, and many followed in Neto’s foot steps, believing that

\(^{165}\) Campbell, 71.
\(^{166}\) Flashpoints, 1.
\(^{167}\) Colello, 1.
such ideology would unify the Angolan people. Most, if not all, members of the MPLA were also considered the urban elite, predominately concentrated in and around Luanda and Kimbundu. The leading cadres were either seminarians that had been educated in Catholic schools, or *assimilados*, people who had been born in Angola but who were educated in Portugal, and both groups were perceived to be surrogates to Lisbon by many rural and traditional Angolans. As the Portuguese withdrew from Angola they promoted members of the MPLA into positions within the colonial power structures, and thus the MPLA viewed their party as economically and socially superior. Although Neto had tried to remove both *assimilados* and *mesticos* (the term mestico refers to persons of mixed African and Portuguese backgrounds), but he was unsuccessful and in 1977 the MPLA forged a document that changed the rules for party membership. With the newly outlined party membership rules the MPLA changed their name to the MPLA-PT, the PT demonstrating that the MPLA was a workers party. In 1979, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos became the MPLA’s new president after Neto’s death, and he reinforced and played into the MPLA’s claims that its members were socially superior. This further exposed class divisions and incited a belief among many MPLA members that divisions existed between the urban and rural, ethnic tribal peoples. Movements that arose out of Bakongo areas also propagated ethnic differences. The FNLA, one such movement, opposed MPLA leadership and was pro-democracy. Although support for the party grew steadily in rural areas because the party pushed for a renewal of the Kongo Kingdom as a territory, something that appealed to the Bakongo people. But the party’s popularity began to wane due to mistrust from the Bakongo as the majority of FNLA members spoke French. When the movement lost considerable thrust most

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168 Cleary, 143-144.
169 Levinson, 110.
170 Colello, 1.
of its members moved to coastal towns and gained recognition for their trading skills and a new movement surfaced to fill the party void left by the FNLA\textsuperscript{171}.

UNITA, the party that replaced the FNLA, separated from the declining FNLA in 1966 and, as a means of consolidating its power, vamped up its ethnically divisive rhetoric\textsuperscript{172}. It was at this time that UNITA gained international recognition and stepped onto the world stage as a potential threat to the MPLA leadership. The party’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, had previously been a foreign minister in the transition government that held power prior to Angola’s complete independence from Portugal in 1974, but left Angola in 1965 due to disagreements he had with the others in government. During his time spent out of the country Savimbi travelled to China where he trained and acquired weapons. UNITA appealed greatly to rural Angolans, many of whom were illiterate and extremely poor, because UNITA’s philosophy drew largely from Maoist literature, which attests that peasants should be allowed the means to gain a political conscience. Savimbi worked to do just this by setting up regional courts and government structures and creating cooperative farming agreements among villages. He also appealed to rural Angolans by relying on ethnic language and nationalist symbols. Late in the 1960s UNITA’s followers were estimated to number around 31 percent, and when Angola’s independence was declared by the MPLA-PT, UNITA had the support of 40 percent of Angola’s people. Although Savimbi first gained his followers in Ovimbundu and Chokwe territory, UNITA’s support grew quite rapidly and many former FNLA sympathizers joined UNITA’s movement, making UNITA the MPLA’s biggest opponent\textsuperscript{173}.

These three liberation movements waged war against Portugal in 1961 for Angola’s independence and ultimately fought each other for political dominance of the country. Both the

\textsuperscript{171} Ottaway, 134.
\textsuperscript{172} Campbell, 79.
\textsuperscript{173} Colello, 1.
MPLA and UNITA received foreign support and funds for their military operations and some of these supporting actors came to be prominent players in Angola in the late 1990s. The MPLA was supported by Cuba and the USSR, while UNITA received help from the US, South Africa and the former Zaire. In 1976 the MPLA decisively beat the FNLA and took over Luanda, leaving UNITA as the MPLA’s only rival. UNITA and its followers continued to lash out towards the elitists and the MPLA, and often these outbursts warped into racially motivated crimes against *brancos* and *mulatos*. The MPLA returned these racially motivated crimes by attacking *pretas* and *mutumbus* (both groups were non-assimilated blacks) because those in the MPLA feared rural-traditional Africans. Fighting stopped briefly in 1988 with the signing of the New York Treaty in neighboring Namibia. This treaty focused on bringing peace to Namibia but the UN also included a stipulation that Cuban and South African troops had to leave Angola and it included a cease-fire agreement between the MPLA and UNITA. The UN sent UNAVEM I, United Nations Angola Verification Mission, consisting of 70 observers, into Angola to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops. The West hoped that democratic elections in Namibia would lead to similar results in Angola, however, it became clear in 1989 that neither the MPLA nor UNITA wanted to reach out to one another. Violence mounted in Angola and the United States, Portugal and Russia moved quickly to mediate a more permanent negotiated settlement.

Early in the 1990s the MPLA turned to a private military contractor for help in training and arming its military faction the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) so that it could achieve its military objectives of rendering UNITA powerless. Although other security providers had been involved in the conflict for some time (most notably Defense Systems Limited, Gray Security

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174 Paris, 63-64.
175 Cleary, 144.
176 Comerford, 15.
Limited, Alpha 5 LDa and TeleServices) none of these other corporations provided the services that by definition a private military contractor would have. Rather, these corporations provided security and asset protection operations including; protecting embassies in Angola, guarding hotels and corporations, securing warehouses, and protecting diamond mining areas, oil refineries and accompanying cash and goods in transit. Cleary states that because all of these security firms did not function or provide services that would be available through a PMC, EO was able to secure a contract with the MPLA easily because it faced no competition. MPRI, an American based PMC studied in the following case study on the Balkans, was also active in Angola beginning in 1997. MPRI worked for the MPLA after EO exited the country and provided services similar to EO’s corporate offerings including training services. However, O’Brien is the only scholar that refers to MPRI’s work in Angola, and does so limitedly. It would be beneficial for this study to obtain information on MPRI’s training activities, however I have been Unsuccessful in locating such information. In all, O’Brien estimates that there were over 80 private corporations and mercenary groups in Angola in 1997, but there is no available data to prove his assertions as many of these corporations names are not known outside their corporate circle. Therefore, it is impossible to include them in my historical narrative since I have no knowledge of their operations. EO will be the only private contractor studied because the information about this firm is available to me.

**Historical Narrative**

The first peace plan presented to UNITA and the MPLA-PT had been facilitated jointly by US assistant secretary of State Chester Crocker and the Portuguese Secretary of State for

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177 O’Brien, 92.  
178 Cleary, 147.  
Foreign Affairs, and led to the parties signing the Bicesse Accords\(^{180}\). On May 2, 1991 the Bicesse Accords were signed by the warring parties, and the peace agreement included a permanent cease-fire, elections, a civil rights clause, the demobilization of the militaries, a prohibition on purchasing arms, as well as the integration of all troops to form one national military\(^{181}\). No effort was made to create a transitional government that could have served to build trust between the players. Elections were scheduled for the fall of 1991 but UN troops had not been placed in areas UNITA controlled, missing their August 1 deadline. Early in 1992 elections were rescheduled for April 4, but again that deadline passed and elections were pushed to the 29 and 30 of September. Beginning in May 1992 the process of registering Angolans to vote commenced and the UN continued to push that the scheduled election dates of September 29 and 30 not be missed, despite the fact that only 65 percent of MPLA-PT troops and 26 percent of UNITA troops had been demobilized and processed to return to civilian life\(^{182}\). Elections took place finally as scheduled on the 29 and 30 of September 1992 with 92 percent of eligible voters casting a ballot\(^{183}\). But before the National Electoral Commission had released the results of the election, government media outlets began prematurely broadcasting victory for the MPLA-PT\(^{184}\). Indeed, the MPLA-PT won but did not pass the 50 percent threshold required to win the first round, and a second round of elections was necessary\(^{185}\). Savimbi, believing the election results to be fraudulent, broadcast a radio announcement on UNITA radio networks that the MPLA-PT could not win and, that UNITA was leading both the presidential and parliamentary elections. On October 3, UNITA and five other opposition parties still did not believe the MPLA-PT and Dos Santos’ win were legitimate, and they began protesting the election results. UNITA leaders

\(^{180}\) Cleary, 144.
\(^{181}\) Paris, 64.
\(^{182}\) Comerford, 15.
\(^{183}\) Paris, 66.
\(^{184}\) Cleary, 153.
\(^{185}\) Comerford, 16.
compiled a list of what they interpreted as election irregularities and gave this list to the UN. Shortly after receiving this list UN Representative Margaret Anstee declared the MPLA-PT and Dos Santos the victors. UNITA, under Savimbi’s orders, launched an attack beginning in Huambo against MPLA-PT members, an act that led to the resumption of violence in Angola and the bloodiest days of the entire conflict\(^\text{186}\). In part, the handling of the electoral results led to the parties abandoning Bicesse after only sixteen months, but this was not the only reason war resumed. According to scholars, four additional factors played a role in the disintegration of the Bicesse Accords. Mistrust between the players made it difficult for the parties to implement the agreement, and the winner take all electoral structure provided very little in the way of safeguards or incentives for those who were defeated. Additionally, the UN was unable to coerce the parties to comply with the Accords and allowed the parties themselves to implement the demobilization protocol instead of having UN troops oversee this process, which resulted in partially demobilized paramilitary groups, although UNITA had previously claimed it was fully demobilized. Finally, many in the international community viewed both parties as lacking the determination needed in order to create peace for Angola. Dos Santos and Savimbi both wanted total power, but the international community perceived Savimbi to be a spoiler because when he rejected the election results and initiated war, he acted as if the only legitimate option was for UNITA to win\(^\text{187}\). It is also important to note that from May 2 to September 30 no major violations of the cease-fire were documented, perhaps demonstrating both parties were sincere in their promises to respect the election process.

The continuation of military activity by UNITA prompted a quick response from the MPLA-PT. The MPLA-PT deployed its military units, the FAA which ransacked and destroyed

\(^{186}\) Paris, 67.  
\(^{187}\) Comerford, 16.
UNITA paramilitary residences and strongholds in Luanda, and captured many UNITA military members in the capital city in November 1992. The FAA’s purging in Luanda also resulted in the murdering of thousands of innocent people, people the MPLA-PT thought to be UNITA sympathizers. At the same time UNITA had strategically invaded Uige and Negage and acquired other key provincial capitals in the Angolan countryside. By December 1992 UNITA controlled two-thirds of Angola and continued to fight the MPLA-PT for control over Luanda. The sparring over the capitol city created even greater racial friction and racially motivated crimes increased greatly in the city. Of all the diamond mining areas in Angola the government only had control over Saurimo, Dundo, Lucapa and Nzaji, and UNITA worked to capture these valuable areas as well. In light of these activities UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed peace talks with the parties and Savimbi quickly agreed. But on January 6th 1993, just one week after Savimbi accepted Ghali’s proposition, FAA forces initiated violent attacks against UNITA sympathizers in N’dalatando, Caxito, Dondo, Lubango, Benguela, Lobito, Namibe and Cuito. Savimbi reorganized his men and led them in counterattacks on Huambo, Cuito, Menongue, Cuito Cuanvale, M’banza Congo, Saurimo and Soyo. From January to September heavy artillery in the Cuito region persisted between government and UNITA troops competing for control of the administrative area. The people of this region had a history of resisting colonization and a desire to preserve their cultural identity and thus had voted for Savimbi and UNITA in the 1992 elections. Savimbi had not been committed to serious peace talks beginning in January because he had hoped that his support from Cuito and its people would assist him in a military win, however by March 1993 he still lacked control over three

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188 Human Rights Watch.
189 Cleary, 153-154.
190 Pearce, 2.
barrios in this area\textsuperscript{191}. UNITA troops had also successfully taken control of an oil storage area in Soyo that FAA troops had guarded for the MPLA-PT. The FAA feebly recaptured it but the MPLA-PT feared UNITA offensives on Soyo would not cease. At this time Eeben Barlow and Simon Mann introduced the MPLA-PT to a small South African private firm, indicating that these men would be proficient in guarding and protecting Soyo. This small force ousted UNITA, but Savimbi’s men successfully recaptured this area after the South Africans left. The MPLA-PT then awarded a contract to EO, through their contacts with Mann and Barlow, to guard and protect Soyo\textsuperscript{192}. EO was allegedly paid by the MPLA-PT in oil concessions and a loan worth 30 million US dollars put up by a Canadian based mining firm named Ranger\textsuperscript{193}. Although Soyo was protected, UNITA persisted to initiate violent attacks on other territories the MPLA-PT controlled.

On March 6, Savimbi took Huambo and continued military advances. The same day the UN Security Council released a statement condemning UNITA for its violation of the cease-fire agreement and pushed for a negotiated settlement\textsuperscript{194}. The international community as a whole shifted its stance and began viewing the MPLA-PT as a legitimate actor, with the US granting official recognition to the party some time in 1993\textsuperscript{195}. Peace talks looked hopeful in April and May because Savimbi had been calling for a bilateral cease-fire agreement since the previous August and it appeared Savimbi’s past wins were enough to satiate his urge for continued war. Receiving no response from Dos Santos, UNITA acted alone and announced a unilateral cease-fire in Abidjan on September 14, 1993\textsuperscript{196}. It became clear, however, that Dos Santos and the FAA were only interested in militarily regaining territory they had previously lost to UNITA. By

\textsuperscript{191} Campbell, 73.
\textsuperscript{192} Brayton, 312.
\textsuperscript{193} O’Brien, 85-86.
\textsuperscript{194} Brayton, 312.
\textsuperscript{195} Comerford, 17.
\textsuperscript{196} Cleary, 145.
September 1993 UNITA was reported to control nearly 150 of the 164 of Angola’s municipalities, roughly 75 percent of the country. UNITA had also captured all the roads and diamond mining areas. Comerford asserts that at this time UNITA held the power to determine the outcome of the conflict. In September, while Savimbi held to his cease-fire, the MPLA-PT discovered offshore oil reserves and began drilling, allowing them to rearm and expanded their contract with EO. EO was then awarded a contract worth 40 million US dollars to protect the diamond mining areas of Kefekwena and Soyo, and the firm was given permission by the MPLA-PT to conduct pre-emptive military strikes against UNITA if they felt the mines were threatened. Three EO personnel were killed while protecting Kefekwena and Soyo and the firm allowed its personnel to choose whether they wanted to close their contracts in Angola with no penalty, or remain in the tumultuous country. Twenty-four chose to leave, and those who stayed were paid a three thousand dollar bonus (in US dollars). Pech states that EO was successful in fulfilling the objectives of this contract because EO did not allow UNITA to capture Kefekwena or Soyo. This particular contract between the government and EO expired in November 1993. With the expiration of this contract the Angolan government believed that EO’s abilities and expertise would be beneficial for other military missions, and the MPLA-PT signed another contract with EO. The firm would be responsible for training 5,000 troops with the FAA’s 16 Regiment at three training camps, Luanda Sul, Cabo Ledo and Dondo. EO would also provide thirty pilots for aerial support and bombing of UNITA strongholds, transport military persons, provide two small special forces teams, and direct front-line combat operations against UNITA. Cleary reports that one of these ‘special units’ was used in the Uige province.

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197 Paris, 67.
198 Comerford, 16.
199 Pech, 85.
200 Cleary, 156.
201 Pech, 86.
and the other in the Luanda Norte province in August of 1994\textsuperscript{202}. According to Pech, during EO’s operations in Angola between 1993 and 1996 the firm deployed helicopter gunships, L-39 jet fighters, Boeing 727 charter planes and Mi-17 troop carriers all to provide tactical support to the FAA. In all, 500 men were deployed by Executive Outcomes into Angola, most of whom were former private soldiers from the 32 Battalion Koevoet and had first hand knowledge of how UNITA operated since they had worked with UNITA in Angola in the 1980s as part of the SADF\textsuperscript{203}. Troops trained by EO were also given state-of-the art weapons and equipment that had not been available to any FAA troops prior to the arrival of EO. It is estimated that around two billion US dollars were spent on new equipment by October 1994\textsuperscript{204}.

With the help of EO the FAA pushed UNITA troops back and captured Huambo on November 6, and Uige on November 17\textsuperscript{th}. Both campaigns were considered to be successful with the assistance of EO airplanes, the ability of such planes to jam UNITA communications and aerial surveillance of UNITA areas, which led to the bombing of UNITA held territories\textsuperscript{205}. Just five days later, the FAA retook Cuito Cuanavale. From the end of November 1993 through November 1994, government forces along with EO Special Forces moved against UNITA to recapture other provinces UNITA held. The FAA and EO had launched what Cleary has called a, “war of attrition,” where EO and FAA troops would bomb strategic cities held by UNITA and their supporters\textsuperscript{206}. It is reported that both the MPLA-PT and UNITA endorsed brutal tactics where large civilian areas were targeted and shelled, whole towns and rural areas including farm land were burnt to the ground, and land mines were placed in the country side\textsuperscript{207}. In January, the 16 Regiment had retaken N’dalatando with EO’s assistance. EO and FAA troops had only four

\textsuperscript{202} Cleary, 161.
\textsuperscript{203} Pech, 86.
\textsuperscript{204} Cleary, 161.
\textsuperscript{205} Howe, 315.
\textsuperscript{206} Cleary, 146.
\textsuperscript{207} Human Rights Watch.
casualties during this military operation\textsuperscript{208}. By June 1994 the FAA had reclaimed the Cafunfo diamond fields in an operation that utilized EO personnel in offensive combat. Finally, in August the FAA took the oil fields of Soyo and Uige and by September they had successfully invaded Huambo. From September 1993 to November 1994 the UN estimates that nearly 1,000 Angolans were killed every day in the war, a number that totals over 500,000\textsuperscript{209}. Both the MPLA-PT and UNITA were guilty of committing human rights abuses and both parties’ troops looted and destroyed businesses and homes\textsuperscript{210}. Cleary finds that so many lives were lost as a result of the specialized training and new weapons EO proffered\textsuperscript{211}. Simply speaking, within months of receiving the training and equipment from EO the FAA had reversed nearly all of UNITA’s territorial gains, and the MPLA-PT believed now that it could win the war with a decisive military victory despite the enormous loss of life that resulted from these military campaigns\textsuperscript{212}. EO, according to Howe, acted as a, “force multiplier,” whose specialized training augmented the FAA\textsuperscript{213}. Dos Santos now had the upper hand but none-the-less agreed to talks with Savimbi in November 1994. Savimbi, now badly beaten and lacking military equipment, fuel and supplies due to a UN arms embargo, conceded to talks\textsuperscript{214}.

Talks in November facilitated by Alioune Blondin Beye, who had replaced Margaret Anstee, resulted in both parties signing the Lusaka Protocol on November 20, 1994\textsuperscript{215}. Human Rights Watch reports that because the MPLA-PT had gained much of UNITA’s territory, Savimbi was forced to make greater concessions during the Lusaka negotiations than in the

\textsuperscript{208} Howe, 312.  
\textsuperscript{209} Shearer, 98-146.  
\textsuperscript{210} Campbell, 75.  
\textsuperscript{211} Shearer, 98.  
\textsuperscript{212} Cleary, 163.  
\textsuperscript{213} Howe, 312.  
\textsuperscript{214} Cleary, 163.  
\textsuperscript{215} Paris, 67.
previous peace talks\textsuperscript{216}. This negotiated settlement drew from some of the agreements that were made in Bicesse, such as the integration of both parties’ armies, a prohibition on the purchasing of arms, a new round of Presidential elections and the repatriation of all mercenary firms in Angola, EO included\textsuperscript{217}. During Lusaka, Dos Santos was pressured by President Clinton to dissolve the MPLA’s contract with EO as the Clinton Administration thought of EO as a mercenary outfit, and threatened to hold back US aid Angola badly needed if EO remained. Dos Santos terminated EO’s contract and the MPLA formally asked EO to leave Angola on December 12, 1994 (although in 1997 they were rumored to be working independently for the FAA)\textsuperscript{218}. With EO’s departure from Angola, and despite the ban on arms sales, the FAA continued its military advancements. The MPLA wanted to completely wipe out UNITA’s military capability by capturing areas in Huambo and Uige and hoped to have a decisive military victory over their foes. UNITA had maintained control over these areas because it did not feel comfortable withdrawing its troops until UN peacekeepers were placed on the ground to protect them. However, Beye was told that, “no UN troops could be available for six to nine months,” because the UN was overstretched and entangled in a record number of peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{219}. UNITA, therefore, felt more secure remaining in control of these areas and not surrendering its arms. Ultimately, Savimbi succumbed to the FAA’s military pressure and abandoned Huambo city in November. Interestingly enough, although it was the FAA that had not fully cooperated under the Lusaka Protocol and did not halt military advances the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 834 on June 1, 1994 which stated that UNITA, “…[is] responsible for the breakdown of the talks and for thereby jeopardizing the peace process…”\textsuperscript{220}.

\textsuperscript{216} Human Rights Watch.
\textsuperscript{217} Howe, 312.
\textsuperscript{218} Pech, 105.
\textsuperscript{219} Cleary, 146.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 156.
When Lusaka was finally implemented, it was done so at an excruciatingly slow pace, and many deadlines were altogether missed. This sluggish pace was in part due to UNITA’s reluctance to give back areas it controlled and UNITA soldiers were returning old weapons they did not actually use\(^\text{221}\). Pearce also explains that UNITA was slow because the party’s leaders were trying to gain stakes in the diamond mining industry and would only relinquish control of territories where they had solid agreements with mining executives\(^\text{222}\). Although the UN sent another peacekeeping contingent of 7,000 soldiers to Angola as part of UNAVEM II in 1995, these troops were ineffectual at implementing Lusaka and lost credibility with both the MPLA and UNITA\(^\text{223}\). Accountability was lacking in all facets of the implementation process. The UN did little to nothing to coerce compliance from either UNITA or the MPLA, and the Angolan government continued to shield those that had committed crimes or abused their power. Fearing international prosecution for war crimes committed from 1992 until November 1994 the National Assembly voted for and passed an amnesty law on November 10, which stated that no crimes committed between May 1991 and May 9, 1996 by either military group be punishable\(^\text{224}\). Moves such as this undermined the peace process, eventually creating an environment of mistrust among the actors.

Uncertainty among the actors prevailed until 1997 when elections were finally held on April 9. Seventy UNITA members were sworn into the National Assembly, and on April 11 the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated\(^\text{225}\). Unfortunately, early in December 1998 the FAA under Dos Santos’ orders attacked Andulo and Bailundo, areas held by UNITA, igniting Angola’s third civil war. Campbell and Pearce offer explanations as to

\(^{221}\) Comerford, 17.
\(^{222}\) Pearce, 2.
\(^{223}\) Campbell, 75.
\(^{224}\) Human Rights Watch.
\(^{225}\) Cleary, 141.
why Lusaka failed and they both may be right as they point out different failures of the plan. Campbell finds that Lusaka did not hold because it was focused on creating a Government of National Unity, but did not include nor account for civil society and the well-being of the Angolan people. Pearce believes it broke down because the war was one for resources more so than about politics. According to Miall (1992) and Hensel (1994) peace settlements can fail because the agreement does not adequately resolve an underlying issue. These scholars find that while the settlement may stop a dispute at that given time, it does not solve the ultimate problem, and thus violence can occur again if the actors feel they can achieve their desired outcomes through war. Therefore, both the failure of the accord to account for civil society and its inability to account for both parties’ desires for natural resources are underlying issues that persisted despite the settlement. The accord, then, could not have held because it did not resolve such issues.

At the time that Lusaka was being implemented the MPLA held a contract with an American based private firm, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated. At the behest of President Clinton, the MPLA signed a contract tasking MPRI with training two paratrooper brigades and creating a military training academy for non-commissioned officers in Cabinda, tasks EO had performed earlier in the conflict. MPRI has refused to comment on its activities in Angola and unfortunately no other specifics are present in the literature. War continued between the actors and peace seemed even further out of reach when Alioune Blondin Beye perished in a plane crash off the Ivory Coast in June 1998. In February 1999 the UN officially

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226 Campbell, 75.
227 Pearce, 2.
228 Werner, 914.
229 O’Brien, 91.
230 Campbell, 75.
terminated its peace mission, believing that peace would continue to elude Angola\textsuperscript{231}. Indeed, war continued until 2002 and only dissipated when Savimbi was killed in combat in April. Rumors surfaced that UNITA, despite Savimbi’s death, wanted to push on and continue the war. But UNITA’s vice president, Antonio Dembo, was found dead not long after Savimbi’s murder. After losing their two leaders and feeling defeated, UNITA sought a negotiated settlement with the government. On March 13, the government officially stated that it would suspend all military activities and asked UNITA members to meet in order to establish a new peace plan\textsuperscript{232}. Shortly after, UNITA members and the MPLA signed the Luena Memorandum of Understanding on April 4, based on both the failed Bicesse and Lusaka Accords\textsuperscript{233}. The Luena Memorandum stated that all parties would abide by a cease-fire agreement, that UNITA would demilitarize its forces, UNITA arms would be collected and stored in government arsenals, and some UNITA members would be assimilated into the national police force and the FAA. Signing Luena did not go without problems though. The Angolan Civic Association had called on the government and UNITA to share the agreements made with journalists, and asked both parties to include provisions that would lead to democracy and the participation and protection of the Angolan people in this newly formed democratic country. The government replied days later that to include civil society in negotiations at that time would have been too complicated\textsuperscript{234}. The National Assembly then enacted a new amnesty law, this time pardoning all UNITA and FAA members of their crimes during the wars\textsuperscript{235}. All of these conditions under Luena were created as an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol. Earlier, I outlined that the agreements made under the Lusaka Protocol included the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA allowing

\textsuperscript{231} Paris, 68.
\textsuperscript{232} Conciliation Resources, 1.
\textsuperscript{233} Comerford, 17.
\textsuperscript{234} Conciliation Resources, 1.
\textsuperscript{235} Human Rights Watch.
government institutions to resume operations, including legal institutions and the national police. Lusaka also included a timetable for elections to be held, national reconciliation, a cease-fire, a clause that forced mercenaries out of the country, the promised free movement of civilians and goods, and the demilitarization of UNITA. Later on in this chapter, in the theoretical implications section, I will offer a theoretical explanation as to why Luena was geared only towards the cessation of hostilities between the MPLA and UNITA, and did not include any guarantees for the people of Angola. With the signing of Luena, and after a total of 27 years of war Angola and its people finally achieved peace.

In reviewing the detailed accounts of the war presented in this historical narrative it becomes evident that Executive Outcomes was successful in fulfilling the terms of its contract with the MPLA. What is perhaps less discernable is how EO’s presence in Angola played a role in expanding the MPLA’s war-making capabilities. Drawing largely from Charles Tilly, I will argue that without EO the MPLA was not an effective leader, and held little dominance over the territory the party claimed to be ruling. The fact that UNITA not only controlled seventy-five percent of Angola, but was also able to extract resources it needed to continue in its war-making effort further weakened the MPLA. When EO began its work in Angola the MPLA saw its fortunes reversed; the party was able to extract more revenue, which directly increased its war-making capabilities, and its claims of dominance over its territory began to be legitimized. Such legitimacy was also recognized in the international arena when world leaders announced that they viewed the MPLA as Angola’s legitimate government during the time of its expansion with EO’s help. Finally, Tilly states that, “states are war-makers, and wars are state-makers. . . the major increase in the scope and strength of national states. . . occurred as a direct result of war-

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236 Conciliation Resources, 1.
making or preparation for war.\textsuperscript{237} Therefore, I will illustrate how the MPLA’s war-making efforts directly affected its state-building capacity, and how EO came to play a role in both.

\textit{Theoretical Implications}

No doubt EO’s operations played a role in bringing Savimbi to the negotiating table in 1994 but the peace that resulted after Lusaka was frail and failed to be permanent. Ultimately, the death of Jonas Savimbi and the lack of clear leadership within UNITA after Savimbi’s death led to a mutual desire by both parties to actively seek a peace settlement and implement it. Although at first glance it appears that EO played no role in the final outcome of the Angolan war, after all the firm had seen its contract with the MPLA terminated in late 1994, it can be argued that EO did in fact contribute to the MPLA’s long-term success in the war, which eventually led to a decisive military victory over UNITA. From a military analyst’s perspective it is quite clear that EO’s effective military training of the FAA allowed the MPLA to reverse gains UNITA had made prior to EO’s contract with the MPLA. But I believe that EO did something more than simply re-arming and training a poorly equipped military. The reversal of UNITA’s military achievements was very critical to the MPLA’s war-making abilities; as the MPLA regained territory its war-making capacity increased, which in turn amplified its state-building capacity.

Charles Tilly argues that states are war-makers, and wars are state-makers, and that the two are dependent upon one another. In the case of Angola, the MPLA was nearly defeated when it hired EO, who worked quickly and efficiently to train the MPLA’s military faction. Remember that in September 1993 UNITA controlled 150 out of 164 municipalities within Angola’s borders, all of the roads and nearly all of the diamond mines\textsuperscript{238}. Later that month EO signed a

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{237} Tilly(a), 446.  
\textsuperscript{238} Paris, 67}
contract with the MPLA to launch offensive military attacks against UNITA in order to take the diamond mines back. With EO’s help the MPLA was able to regain these natural resource rich areas, free the roads that had long been blocked by UNITA and allow international aid to flow into the country. As EO and the FAA strategically beat back UNITA the MPLA grew in its capacity as a war-maker. Tilly states that, “the sheer size of the government varied directly with the effort devoted to extraction, state making, protection, and, especially war-making.”\textsuperscript{239} If one group was successful at extraction it would be able to eliminate its opponent, and would maintain its foothold on power by creating organizations that would enforce its legitimacy as the only power. Such organizations that would be formed include police forces, tax-collecting organizations, courts and financial managers within the national government.\textsuperscript{240} Tilly’s model supports my beliefs that EO increased the MPLA’s ability to extract, which then increased the party’s war-making proficiency. Prior to EO’s entrance into Angola the MPLA had lost a considerable amount of land to UNITA and was drowning in debt. It is very clear that the MPLA was not able to extract revenue, and thus was not able to take part in any of the above listed things; state-making, protection and war-making. Tilly depicts what a government that is failing looks like; he finds that the leadership within the government, as it fails to suppress its contenders, experiences increases in military inefficiencies such as, casualties and defections to the contending party while simultaneously it is unable to support claims of its dominance over a region, resulting in both a loss of revenue from extractions and the loss of its coercive capacity.\textsuperscript{241} Based on Tilly’s description it is fair to claim that the MPLA, Angola’s internationally recognized governing party, was severely weakened and lacking in its coercive capacity. Although at this time the world viewed the MPLA as Angola’s government, if one is to

\textsuperscript{239} Tilly(b), 182.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 183.
\textsuperscript{241} Tilly(a), 95.
use Tilly’s definition of a government it seems unlikely that the MPLA was functioning in this capacity. Tilly defines a government as an organization, which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the population\textsuperscript{242}. A contender is a group within the population that applies resources at its disposal to influence the government, allowing it to gain capacity to contend by mobilizing. To the world, UNITA was the contender, but in 1995 the party controlled more territory than the MPLA, and its rate of extraction far surpassed that of the MPLA.

Indeed, country reports from February 1995, prior to EO’s contact with the MPLA, indicated that UNITA controlled seventy-five percent of Angola. Soon after this report the MPLA discovered off shore oil reserves and began drilling. This increase in revenue allowed them to contract EO to train, arm and provide intelligence to the FAA. Both the increase in resources and subsequent training of the FAA, and 2 billion US dollars of new weapons brought in by EO, allowed the government to increase in size, as EO backed forces continually won battles against UNITA and pushed Savimbi’s men back, expanding the MPLA’s territory. Prior to this training the FAA had lost a battle over Kefekwena and Soyo, an oil producing area that the MPLA needed in order to fund its military operations through the FAA. Savimbi had announced a unilateral cease-fire that September and was confident that the MPLA would have to make large concessions in a new round of negotiations. The MPLA realized this as well, and instead of agreeing to negotiations they worked to improve the FAA’s military capabilities. With EO Special Forces the newly trained FAA troops reclaimed the Cafunfo diamond fields, Cuito Cuanavale (a region Savimbi had worked tirelessly to control), Huambo, and N’dalatando. The FAA and EO reversed nearly all of UNITA’s gains within months. During this time others have documented a significant rise in the rate of fatalities. I attribute this change to both EO’s efficacy

\textsuperscript{242} Tilly(b), 437.
in training the FAA and the state of the art new equipment the FAA was able to acquire with the 2 billion US dollars stipulated as part of the MPLA’s contract with EO\textsuperscript{243}. Additionally, EO provided aerial surveillance of UNITA camps, making FAA attacks on such camps more effective\textsuperscript{244}. UNITA, on the other hand, was subjected to a UN arms embargo and could not purchase weapons and when the opposition group had lost control of the badly needed Cafunfo diamond mines, it lacked the revenue from diamond sales and was pinched even further. Interviews with MPLA leaders at this time indicate that the government, because of its newly acquired military might, believed UNITA could be defeated. Drogin echoes these findings when he states that, “as a result [of international legitimacy and superior military capability], government hardliners insist that Savimbi can now be beaten, or at least pushed back into the bush. They want to force UNITA from diamond-producing areas and cut its supply lines to Zaire.”\textsuperscript{245} UNITA and the MPLA were vying for political and military dominance over Angola, both claiming sovereignty over particular regions of the country. These two parties were also competing for natural resources that they would use to fuel the conflict. The competition between UNITA and MPLA is exemplified in Tilly’s work when he states that power holders needed natural resources in order to make more war, and in order to solidify their claims to political and military dominance these power holders had to promote capital accumulation among persons that could aid them in borrowing and buying said resources\textsuperscript{246}. Tilly also claims that these power holders were not interested in creating national states, but rather wanted to beat their competitors so that they could enjoy unchecked power. But, in order to ensure their competitors were rendered powerless they had to make war more effective, which required more

\begin{footnotes}
\item[243] Cleary, 161.
\item[244] Howe, 315.
\item[245] Cleary, 163.
\item[246] Tilly(b), 172.
\end{footnotes}
capital. Therefore, these power holders had to expand to find more natural resources, or they had to promote the accumulation of capital\textsuperscript{247}. This is precisely what the situation in Angola looked like prior to EO’s arrival and while the firm was employed by the MPLA. UNITA and the MPLA were competing for natural resources, and the MPLA was losing as UNITA expanded into MPLA territory and took the resources the MPLA had been relying upon to make war.

The fact that EO put the government back in a position of power early on impacted the way in which the state was shaped and directly affected the organizational features of the government post conflict. Now the question arises, just how does war-making lead to and influence state-making? And secondly, how did EO impact the state by collaborating with the MPLA in its war making efforts? Tilly finds that war-making influences state-making because as populations resist the preparation for war, or the war itself, governments or contenders have to make concessions. For example, such concessions could be a guarantee of individual rights, property rights, institutions, the creation of courts, or the ability for individuals to participate in government\textsuperscript{248}. In Angola, these concessions came in the form of elections that had long been promised to the people and the assimilation of UNITA soldiers into the FAA and national police. When looking back to the agreements made under the Luena Memorandum in 2002 it is apparent that said agreements essentially address military issues between the MPLA and UNITA, and aside from national elections being held, civil society is largely neglected. Tilly’s literature offers an explanation for this, as it points out that the balance maintained by the government between war-making, the extraction of resources, and the protection of its territory is what affects how states are formed post-conflict. He finds that governments with lesser amounts of protection and extraction, but with increased war-making, often find that military forces play a greater role in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[247] Ibid.
\item[248] Ibid., 183.
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the creation of the state and its institutions. This also results in concessions being directed
towards the state military and its contenders, but not civil society. I believe that because EO
was contracted by the MPLA to train and arm the FAA in order to reverse gains made by
UNITA, and was so successful in doing so, EO instilled a confidence in the MPLA that was
previously lacking. At this point the MPLA truly believed Savimbi could be beaten, and thus
focused the majority of their energy on war-making. The MPLA did not need to increase their
rate of extraction to support their increased war-making capacity because firstly, they had EO’s
help, and secondly, because UNITA was under a UN arms embargo. So, it is the MPLA’s intense
focus on war-making, something that EO allowed the party to do, that explains the concessions
made in the Luena Memorandum. EO’s war-making efficiency, then, had a direct impact on
what concessions were included in Luena, and how the state came to be formed after the war
ended. Finally, I believe without EO’s involvement in Angola it is clear that there would have
been no future moment for the MPLA to assassinate Savimbi and defeat UNITA in 2002 because
only with EO’s help was the MPLA able to gain an advantage in the conflict.

Military analysts and scholars alike disagree as to whether EO transformed the conflict in
Angola. Cleary and O’Brien also agree with my assessment of EO’s performance in Angola.
These scholars believe that EO’s specialized military capabilities coupled with the newly trained
FAA soldiers allowed the MPLA to reverse prior gains by UNITA, forcing Savimbi to negotiate
in 1994. Cleary believes the firm, “undoubtedly contributed significantly to the FAA’s
subsequent military ascendancy.” Like Cleary, O’Brien credits EO with forcing Savimbi to
negotiations in Lusaka, and O’Brien believes two specific actions by EO hurt Savimbi, making a
negotiated settlement look advantageous for UNITA. O’Brien states that when EO took Saurimo

249 Ibid., 183-184.
250 Howe, 329.
251 Cleary, 164.
and Cafunfo in June 1994, the diamond fields that Savimbi needed to fund his operations, Savimbi had little choice but to agree to negotiations\textsuperscript{252}. These two scholars are correct to make these assertions, but they both fail to grasp the larger picture; that EO played a role in the formation of the Angolan state and my study fills this gap.

\textbf{CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY OF EO IN SIERRA LEONE}

\textit{Introduction}

Unlike the cases of MPRI in the Balkans and EO in Angola, the contributions of EO in the Sierra Leonean conflict are less discernable. A lack of information on EO’s activities unfortunately leaves the PMC somewhat in obscurity. It is clear in the historical analysis that EO was able to respond successfully to RUF military attacks, which targeted EO and the PMC’s client, but it remains unknown how EO played a role in the outcome of the conflict. My hope is that future studies will have access to the needed information so that others may build from and add on to my work. I believe that with additional information one would discover one of two outcomes. The first possible outcome is that EO, along with the Nigerian forces guarding Freetown, contributed to a mutually hurting stalemate, thus making it a ripe moment for negotiations with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The alternative outcome would be that EO played no role in determining the outcome to the conflict and it was in fact the RUF’s transformation into a political party that made it possible for the civil war to end.

I think it is important to allow this case study to remain in this essay so that future works can draw from the research I have already performed. Additionally, it should remain so that one of my identified and predicted outcomes can be supported by new evidence, while the alternative outcome will be disproved. Therefore, I believe that new information would be able to support my beliefs that EO did more than just respond to the RUF’s attacks. Finally, this case study does

\textsuperscript{252} O’Brien, 89.
add to the literature on PMC’s and provides important insight for those wanting to research PMC activity. In essence, this case study serves as a warning to others who wish to research PMC’s within civil conflicts because it demonstrates how analyzing PMC activity is not an easy task, and understanding a PMC’s contributions within a civil conflict can be extremely difficult to recognize due to multiple factors within the conflict, and the secretive nature of PMC’s.

This case study differs in another way from both the Balkans and Angolan case studies, as Executive Outcomes was not the only private military contractor that worked extensively in Sierra Leone. After EO’s expulsion from the country the government hired Sandline International to perform the same tasks EO had done previously. Sandline’s actions in Sierra Leone also show that the firm only responded to RUF attacks and did not impact the outcome of the conflict. This case study will assume the style of the others. I will give a background into the conflict and how the various parties came to be in power. I will then offer a detailed account of the conflict itself, speaking in depth of EO’s and Sandline’s actions in Sierra Leone. The theoretical implications section of this particular case study will be very short since I was not able to determine what EO’s specific contribution was to the outcome of the Sierra Leonean civil war.

Background

Sierra Leone’s post-colonial history is littered with revolts and contempt for the standing national government. A former British colony, formed by Britain sending freed slaves to live among the indigenous people that inhabited this area, Sierra Leone was originally called Freetown (the name of its present capital). Very few of these freed slaves were originally from the area and because of this felt more comfortable living in and around Freetown, rather than in the rural villages. A result of living in this coastal town was that these men and women adopted
Western traditions and came to be known as Krio, a term that referred to their lack of local traditions. Unlike many other countries seeking independence, Sierra Leone’s transition was peaceful and in 1961 the people gained their independence from Britain. Sir Milton Margai, who had previously been the Chief Minister during the passing of one governing body to the next, created the SLPP (Sierra Leone People’s Party), and became Sierra Leone’s first Prime Minister. Margai, however, lacked the money and access to resources that were necessary to invest in state capacity building. Desperate to see Sierra Leone’s new government achieve success he created a system where regional strongmen, who had access to labor and controlled much of the country’s natural resources, were promoted into a national government position if they agreed to labor and resource concessions. Smartly, Margai installed rival strongmen into positions in order to balance each man’s individual power. An uneventful transfer of power to his brother, Sir Albert Margai, occurred in 1964 when Sir Milton passed away.

A new round of elections in 1967 saw Siaka Stevens’ party, the All People’s Congress (APC) win a plurality of seats in parliament, and Stevens became Sierra Leone’s third Prime Minister. However, the peace Sierra Leone had experienced in its past would come to an end with this election cycle. Stevens and Margai were forced into house arrest only hours after the election results were announced. Brigadier General David Lansana, who was in charge of the Republic of Sierra Leone’s Military Forces (RSLMF) forced this coup, stating that tribal leaders had not been involved in the election process, and thus the results were not valid. Another coup, led by RSLMF officers pushed Lansana out of office, only to be swiftly replaced by yet another coup. The third coup, termed the ‘sergeants revolt’ restored Siaka Stevens to his post as Prime Minister nearly one year after winning the elections. Stevens’ did not waste any time reforming the country’s constitution in order to ensure his unchecked power. His authoritarian regime
banned all other parties from participating in government. The patron client styled system continued under Stevens, as concessions continued to be given to local strongmen. Reno finds that under Stevens, government revenue shrunk by 70 percent due to these arrangements. Prior to such concessions the number of diamonds that were exported from Sierra Leone, and the quality of these diamonds, were only second to Namibia. Sierra Rutile, a government owned group, was responsible for mining and selling the majority of these diamonds but as the legal trading of diamonds was replaced by the illegal selling of them by strongmen the government lost considerable coercive power. Through this pay-off system the government lost considerable power, and strongmen created coalitions based on tribal ties to uphold their grip on power and corruption. This patron-client system coupled with the inability of others to participate in government ensured that the citizens of Sierra Leone saw little money in their own pockets and had relatively no influence on political activity. Eventually, the patronage system would work against the government leaving the rulers to be ruled by the strongmen.

Stevens ruled until 1985, when his hand picked successor, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, became Prime Minister. Momoh, however, worked to bring even greater government change to Sierra Leone and in 1991 he amended the constitution, reversing Stevens’ authoritarian laws. Momoh’s steps towards creating a more democratic state were an act of self-preservation, as an armed group of rebels had entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, claiming they were fighting...
for democracy. Momoh was faced with domestic foes as well. The strongmen that had been promoted to power under Margai and Stevens felt they owed no allegiance to Momoh and cut him out of their legal and illegal economic activities. Momoh’s patronage waned considerably until by the early 1990s he was no longer relevant in the patron client system. Because of this, Momoh had to ask for increases in foreign aid to keep the Sierra Leonean government afloat. By 1990 foreign aid exceeded domestic revenue, and in 1993 it equaled 178 percent of all domestic receipts. President Momoh had also drastically decreased the size of the Sierra Leonean military in an effort to cut the national budget, an act that he would surely regret as RUF forces began to dominate the mining areas.

Charles Taylor, who worked to expand ‘Taylorland’ supported RUF activities in Sierra Leone. Taylor had slowly and quietly rose through the ranks of the Union of Liberian Associations (ULA) eventually becoming its national chairman. It was in this position that he gained political prominence within Liberia, although his actions during these years (1987-1989) remain unclear. But in 1989 he led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against the Liberian government, whose president was Samuel Doe. In order to sustain civil war within his own country he needed access to multiple resources, thus he helped to finance the RUF because he wanted access to Sierra Leone’s exports, in order to increase his own territory and consolidate his power. Strongmen that had grown tired of Momoh banded together with Taylor so that they too could extract resources unhindered while relying on forced labor. As news spread of this new rebel movement young men joined after hearing that their peers in Liberia were elevated beyond their poverty-stricken backgrounds by the riches they found in the

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260 U.S. State Department.
261 Reno, 8.
262 Gershoni, 58.
263 Burlij, 1.
diamond mines. These men also feared that if they did not join the RUF they would be viewed as loyal to the government, a government that lacked coercive power and appeared to be failing\textsuperscript{264}. As the RUF grew in size it began forcibly conscripting young men and women. The first few battles between the RUF and RSLMF were noteworthy. The RUF had amassed large-scale weapons and launched what appear to be military style offensives. But the RSLMF continually beat them in such battles, eventually forcing the RUF back into Liberia. Unfortunately, the RUF took this time to regroup and became a guerilla style insurgency\textsuperscript{265}. It is rumored that Taylor took away some nine million dollars a month by selling diamonds from the mines his troops overran, and Sankoh earned somewhere close or slightly less to Taylor’s estimated earnings\textsuperscript{266}.

A familiar figure from the previous chapter, EO was contracted by the government to provide many of the same services the Angolan government had benefited from. But because of the precarious situation the Sierra Leonean government found itself in EO received very little or no payment for its services, and multiple times Buckingham had to fly into Freetown and demand that Bio, and then Kabbah, who would emerge as presidents of Sierra Leone during the civil war, pay EO for its services. For the two years of work EO performed in Sierra Leone the firm racked up a bill of roughly 35.2 million dollars, but was only paid 15.7 million by the time it exited in early 1997. One of the reasons why EO was paid only a fraction of its total bill was because the IMF continued to pressure the Sierra Leonean government to spend less on military ventures. However, because of EO’s success in Sierra Leone foreign mining companies began investing in the country again and the national debt dropped substantially\textsuperscript{267}. And, EO stayed committed to the terms of its contract, even when it was not compensated. The historical

\textsuperscript{264} Reno, 15.
\textsuperscript{265} Montague, 232.
\textsuperscript{266} Gershoni, 59.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., 322.
narrative will demonstrate that the PMC successfully fulfilled its contract by taking back
diamond mines, the towns of Bo and Kenema and forcing RUF forces to give up their attempts at
capturing Freetown²⁶⁸.

**Historical Narrative**

Fighting in Liberia finally spilled over into neighboring Sierra Leone in March 1991
when RUF leader Foday Saybana Sankoh led his forces into eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia
and Burkina Faso, and began military assaults with heavy weapons. He successfully took
Kailahun, a natural resource rich area, and continued his advancement towards Freetown.
Kailahun was considered a major win for Sankoh as the region produced something around 62
percent of the country’s exports and the RUF’s presence in Sierra Leone was triggered foremost
by Charles Taylor’s need for natural resources, which he used to support his military activities.
Taylor, in addition to the RUF, attempted to mask this reason for entering Sierra Leone by
claiming that RUF forces were fighting to create a democratic Sierra Leone²⁶⁹. The standing
government of Joseph Momoh had claimed repeatedly throughout 1991 that it would hold free
and fair elections, hoping to dissuade the RUF from attacking Freetown. But rhetoric with no
action illustrated Momoh’s lack of commitment to the democratization process. Taylor and
Sankoh disregarded Momoh’s hollow promises, and the RUF soldiers continued to move closer
to Freetown. Although the RUF had stated that it was fighting for democracy it continued its
advances on the capital city²⁷⁰. Momoh deployed his RSLMF forces along with troops from
Guinea, Nigeria and mercenaries from South Africa with the hopes that these troops would stop
the RUF, which they did successfully, but later in the conflict the RSLMF would prove itself a

²⁶⁸ Gershoni, 68.
²⁶⁹ Ibid., 55-70.
²⁷⁰ Gershoni, 55-70.
corrupt and untrustworthy force\textsuperscript{271}. Discontent among RSLMF soldiers would later undermine the government’s military policies. Under both Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh the military had been ethnicized, and military spending had been cut drastically under Momoh to satisfy the IMF and World Bank, who were lending large sums to the Sierra Leonean government. Momoh had little income to pay the now 14,000 strong RSLMF due to the military cuts he made and Sankoh’s capturing of mining areas. Soldiers were often underpaid or received no compensation at all, and it became standard practice that officers would take the pay of enlisted men beneath them as their own. Many of these men had families to provide for, and many others came to resent their conscription into the military; many turned to looting and some supported the rebel movement in their free time. These men became known as sobels, soldiers by day and rebels by night\textsuperscript{272}.

Come May 1991, United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar brought both Momoh and Sankoh together for peace talks, however these talks did not result in any substantive gains because Cuellar, for his part, did not propose any solution to the conflict or a means of ending the conflict for either party and thus concessions could not be made\textsuperscript{273}. Instead of reaching out to Sankoh, Momoh bolstered his government’s military and attempted to create a war with multiple fronts. Momoh knew that Charles Taylor and the NPFL were assisting the RUF, so he created a new military organization called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) to fight the NPFL in the hinterland of Liberia. Momoh hoped that ULIMO would hurt the NPFL enough that Taylor would stop encouraging the RUF in Sierra Leone. Unbeknownst to Momoh, the creation of ULIMO facilitated a process that would grant multiple warlords unchecked control over specific territories within Liberia and Sierra Leone.

\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 59.  
\textsuperscript{272} Howe, 314.  
\textsuperscript{273} Gershoni, 64.
Additionally, with the inception of ULIMO came a wave of new parties that only complicated
the war and threatened to derail the democratization process. When Taylor saw that Momoh had
created a front organization to fight the NPFL he too created a new organization, the Lofa
Defense Force. This group was tasked with the specific aim to militarily engage ULIMO. To add
to the mess, ECOMOG was not only fighting the RUF, the NPFL and now the Lofa Defense
Force, but it too created a split off organization called the Liberian Council for Peace that
worked with ECOMOG against NPFL forces. Furthermore, ECOMOG had actively supported
another independence movement in Liberia, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(INPFL), which was a group that had split off of Samuel Doe’s [Explain who he is] army, the
Armed Forces of Liberia, and the NPFL. As mentioned earlier, because warlords controlled
and restricted access to the regions they mined, each new party or front had to remain in good
favor with the warlords in order to gain an advantage over their respective antagonist. This
system strengthened the warlord’s status and allowed for them to be a major players and decision
makers in the conflict.

Sankoh first launched attacks on villages in eastern Sierra Leone and continued to push
his men towards the diamond mines in Kono, which he took with little opposition in 1991. By
April 1992 the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by 26-year-old Valentine
Strasser ousted Joseph Momoh and the APC in a coup. President Momoh fled to Guinea where
he lived in exile and planned his next move, which he hoped would restore him to power. He
anticipated that his return to political dominance in Sierra Leone would come from the efforts
made by his newly formed political party, the National Front for the Restoration of Democracy

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274 Gershoni, 60-64.
275 U.S. Department of State.
276 Selber, 91.
(NFRD)\textsuperscript{277}. It appears that very little came from this venture though, as the NFRD is not mentioned in historical documents after this time. When Strasser took over the government from Momoh he had also promised that he would hold democratic elections, however Strasser only made such claims in order to secure American and European support for his party. He also faced the same political environment that Momoh did, little revenue and relatively non-existent institutions. Strongmen and the RUF controlled a quarter billion in US dollars of mining revenue, whereas the Strasser government saw only 3.6 million US dollars in revenue each year. To ensure that he too wasn’t overthrown Strasser tried to appeal to the young people that lived in shantytowns by wearing trendy clothes and calling himself the ‘Redeemer’. This effort to create an image that people would identify with did nothing to stop the RUF from acquiring diamond and mineral mines and doesn’t seem to have made Strasser more popular with his people either. Shrinking state revenue led to massive layoffs within the Strasser government, although oddly enough such layoffs fulfilled IMF loan conditions and international aid to Sierra Leone increased\textsuperscript{278}. Yet, Strasser was no fool and he recognized that he had to take more substantial steps towards holding elections so that his claims appeared genuine. To reinforce his commitment to elections he formed a National Advisory Council in October 1992, which consisted of fifteen members that were tasked with creating a multiparty system within Sierra Leone’s political institutions\textsuperscript{279}. Strasser engaged in a very slow build up for national elections. In January 1994 he again created a new government body to assist with the election process, the Interim National Electoral Commission\textsuperscript{280}. This commission made a public announcement for political groups to register as legitimate parties in order to compete in elections, with 17 parties

\textsuperscript{277} Gershoni, 60.
\textsuperscript{278} Reno, 20.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
registering\textsuperscript{281}. The RUF, however, was not as patient, and in January 1995 RUF soldiers took diamond mining areas in Kono, Gbangbatok and Kenema, diamond districts owned and operated by government owned organizations, Sierra Ore and Metal Company, Sierra Rutile and Sieromco\textsuperscript{282}. These districts alone had paid out 12 million US dollars in taxes to the Sierra Leonean government in 1994, and their mining activities accounted for roughly 15 percent of Sierra Leone’s Gross National Product, and 57 percent of Sierra Leone’s export earnings. The money the government gained from these companies was critically needed in order to sustain war.

Without access to these diamond areas the Strasser government, which was also receiving large sums of assistance from IMF loans, was unable to pay back these loans or its military, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF). With limited resources the Strasser government engaged a UK based PMC, Gurkha Security Guards Limited, to recapture the diamond areas under Sierra Rutile’s ownership, from the RUF and train the RSLMF in anti-insurgency tactics. The Gurkha soldiers, however, would not engage in offensive combat, and their leader Robert MacKenzie, who previously served on the Rhodesian Selous Scots special forces, was taken by the RUF in an ambush and brutally killed on the 24 of February, shortly after the firm entered into a contract with the Strasser government. Reno points out that unfortunately, MacKenzie attempted to work with the highly dysfunctional RSLMF and the trust placed in such unfaithful soldiers led to Gurkha’s demise in the country\textsuperscript{283}. After MacKenzie’s death the PMC hastily decided to pull out of Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{284}. Since Sankoh had stated he would only agree to hold national elections if he was elected the head of state, and if all foreign troops

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{281} Gershoni, 70.  \\
\textsuperscript{282} Francis 325.  \\
\textsuperscript{283} Reno, 20-21.  \\
\textsuperscript{284} O’Brien, 86. 
\end{flushleft}
left Sierra Leone once he was President, it was clear that a military victory was needed to force the RUF to the negotiating table.\(^{285}\) With the RUF only 16 kilometers away from the State house and Strasser still lacking access to Kono, Gbangbatok, and Kenema, Tony Buckingham stepped into the picture and introduced Strasser to Executive Outcomes. By May, Strasser had signed a contract with EO, in which EO was tasked with training 150 to 200 RSLMF soldiers, equipping thousands more, providing helicopter support for ground troops, and participating in offensive combat.\(^{286}\) Since the Strasser government was strapped for cash an agreement was worked out including Branch Mining, who was to pay EO until the government had the money to pay the firm. Essentially, the business agreement saw that Strasser would mortgage diamonds from Sierra Leone to Branch Energy, who would then pay EO for its services.\(^{287}\) In all, EO deployed roughly 200 men, two of them being helicopter pilots named Joup Joubert and Neil Ellis, into Sierra Leone under the command of Brigadier Burt Sachs.\(^{288}\) EO utilized MiG 23 fighters in addition to the MI-8, MI-17 and MI-24 helicopters. The PMC also set up an agreement between Russia and Sierra Leone where the Strasser government would import Russian helicopters along with Russian helicopter technicians; this venture was termed Sonuss.\(^{289}\) When EO began training RSLMF troops in 1995 the RUF was only twenty miles from Freetown. Under the supervision of Colonel Andy Brown, EO set up an intense training program that focused on training 120 soldiers in a three-week period. Avant notes that EO believed its primary goal was to train the RSLMF soldiers, but according to Lafras Liutingh, EO’s director of operations in Sierra Leone, EO reacted “with vigor” when attacked by the RUF.\(^{290}\) The Strasser government, fearing the RUF would overrun Freetown, asked EO to push the RUF back into the countryside while

\(^{285}\) Gershoni, 61.  
\(^{286}\) Selber, 91.  
\(^{287}\) Reno, 21.  
\(^{288}\) Francis, 327.  
\(^{289}\) Howe, 7.  
\(^{290}\) Avant, 87.
simultaneously freeing the Kono diamond district from RUF rebels. EO found its task of training and equipping the RSLMF extremely difficult as most of the 14,000 soldiers were underpaid, or not paid at all, and many either participated in RUF military activities while off duty, or supported the rebel movement in other capacities. Additionally, many in the RSLMF had not received even basic training, were hastily recruited, and many came to resent EO as they perceived EO soldiers to be showing them up with their military skills and their new equipment. EO’s personnel stated repeatedly during the conflict that when RSLMF soldiers found themselves ambushed or under attack by RUF forces the RSLMF soldiers would often flee, leaving EO to fight the RUF on its own291. Given Gurkha’s experience with the RSLMF EO knew it could not trust the soldiers and instead of including RSLMF officers in the chain of command, EO reported directly to President Strasser. RSLMF officers were also forbidden from entering EO’s operations rooms for fear that corrupted officers would share EO’s strategies or schedule with the RUF, as they had done with Gurkha.

The initial deployment of 30 EO personnel into Sierra Leone in May 1995 led to the quick training of 150 RSLMF soldiers, and EO moved to fulfill the terms of its contract. Lacking confidence in the RSLMF, EO soldiers decided to train and form a new and entirely different force to help them. The Kamajors, a group of Mende hunters, were ideal for EO to use. These men had knowledge of the Sierra Leonean terrain, were reliable, and had congenial relations with multiple clans, but most of all, they resented the RUF take over of their land. In all, EO trained nearly 10,000 Kamajor fighters, provided these men arms, food, intelligence and taught them strategic military planning292. By the middle of 1995 EO, along with some RSLMF soldiers, the Kamajors and a number of Nigerian troops removed the RUF from most major mineral mines,

291 Avant, 87.
292 Howe, 314-322.
and had pushed the RUF away from Freetown. Francis and Reno find that EO’s assistance changed the balance of power, giving the government the upper hand for the first time since the beginning of the conflict. Diamond mining was able to resume. Towards the end of 1995 Branch Mining was back in business and the Strasser government finally reported an increase in diamond exports, the first increase since the war had begun.

In early 1996 EO dealt one final, major blow to the RUF. RUF fighters had remained in control of the major roads, and the government and UN badly needed access to the roads to allow humanitarian aid to flow freely through the country freely. EO engaged these rebels on the Bo-Taima road and decisively won the battle, which left 281 rebels dead. Aid convoys and refugee populations were finally able to move freely within Sierra Leone. By March, nearly all the major roads had been opened and EO continued its commitment to freeing the diamond mines. These offensive attacks resulted in 500 RUF fatalities among a force comprised of only 1,500 soldiers. EO had defeated the RUF and the remaining soldiers agreed to a cease-fire on November 30, 1996. Shortly after EO’s successes, Sankoh dropped his initial precondition that all foreign forces be removed from Sierra Leone before he commit to elections. In its place, he added a new condition, that he would not have any part in negotiations with a military government. In other words, he would not negotiate with the Strasser government. But Strasser would not remain in power to force such conditions as he was overthrown by his second in command, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio in January 1996. Although for years Strasser had stated that his government would hold and support elections, he had not and Bio had grown frustrated. Strasser’s philosophy had been that if his government continued to make slow, but positive, steps.

293 Selber, 91.
294 Francis, 327; Reno, 22.
295 Reno, 22-23.
296 Gershoni, 61.
towards holding elections he could fight the RUF with this alternative front. Bio, on the other hand, saw elections as a way to end the conflict entirely and knew that if the RUF was not allowed to participate in the electoral process that the rebel movement could undermine the elections \(^{297}\). With Bio now dictating national policy, elections moved forward considerably swifter. On February 26th, just one month after ousting Strasser, elections were held with 79 percent of the Sierra Leonean people voting \(^{298}\). Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, formerly an UN official, took 70 percent of the vote. A second round of elections were held on March 15, in accordance with the country’s rules, and Kabbah was declared the winner. On March 24 Kabbah worked to reach out to the RUF, and both Bio and Kabbah met with Sankoh. The actors agreed to a two-month cease-fire, and on March 29 Kabbah was sworn in to office. Kabbah continued to push for diplomatic relations with the RUF and on November 29, 1996 he and RUF leaders signed a peace agreement, the Abidjan Peace Accord \(^{299}\). The Abidjan Accord contained provisions that worked to bring and end to the war and a sustained peace in Sierra Leone. Provisions within the agreement stated that the RUF would disarm and demobilize and a neutral non-biased group would oversee this process. After the rebels had been disarmed, programs would be set in place that would help to reintegrate these men into society. Additionally, a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace would be created. And finally, EO would be removed from Sierra Leone. Upon receiving this news EO warned Kabbah that if he were to remove the firm within 100 days of their department that Kabbah would be ousted from his position as President. But Kabbah faced pressure from both the IMF and the RUF to dismiss EO’s services \(^{300}\). The IMF had already dismissed a loan the government needed stating that the loan would only be

\(^{297}\) Gershoni, 70.  
\(^{298}\) Reno, 22.  
\(^{299}\) Howe, 314.  
\(^{300}\) Fatau, 925.
available again when mercenary activity, meaning the governments contract with EO, ceased to exist. Since Kabbah had been using some IMF loans to pay EO, he found it easier to simply ask EO to leave the country\textsuperscript{301}. With EO’s exit, the Kabbah government received three times the amount of foreign aid it had previously been given. EO did leave behind a firm that it had trained which consisted of Sierra Leonean’s, called Life Guard, to protect the diamond and mining industries. This firm was only a PSP though, and worked only to defend the mining companies from attacks; it did not provide training, arms or participate in offensive combat as EO had\textsuperscript{302}. EO’s warning to Kabbah rang true six months after Kabbah took office, when a military coup removed Kabbah from power, and he fled to Conakry, Guinea\textsuperscript{303}.

Despite the peace agreement between Kabbah and the RUF, the RUF continued military advances on the Sierra Leonean government throughout 1997. After EO left the country in January RSLMF soldiers sympathetic to the RUF staged a coup in May that removed Kabbah from power and Major Johnny Paul Koroma from the APRC party became the new President of Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{304}. Many of the participating soldiers had felt that they lacked skills, equipment and the ability to influence their own government, and had felt threatened by not only EO but also the Kamajors. Thus, the coup plotters moved quickly to disband the Kamajors as their first official government act\textsuperscript{305}. Under Koroma, Freetown witnessed widespread looting, murder and violence. From Guinea, Kabbah, who was still recognized internationally as the legitimate government power, worked to regain the Presidential seat and contacted a sister corporation of EO, Sandline International. The ousted Kabbah government and Sandline entered into a contract and Sandline began work alongside the newly demobilized Kamajors and ECOMOG to beat

\textsuperscript{301} Creehan, 1.
\textsuperscript{302} Reno, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{303} Paris, 222.
\textsuperscript{304} Selber, 92.
\textsuperscript{305} Howe, 321.
back the RUF. In order to arm the Kamajors, Sandline purchased 28 tons of small weapons from Bulgaria and moved them into Sierra Leone with the tacit approval of the UK. By February 1998 ECOMOG troops had removed the original RSLMF members responsible for the military coup in 1997, and ECOMOG troops took control of Freetown, protecting it from the RUF and sobels while Kabbah remained in Guinea. For two weeks in January 1999 the RUF took control of Freetown, but a swift counterattack from ECOMOG promptly ended the RUF’s dominance over the city. This takeover was the only time the RUF captured the capital city. ECOMOG troops remained in Freetown, as the only representatives of the Kabbah government, until July 1999 when a new cease-fire was mediated between the RUF and Kabbah.

The agreement, termed the Lome Peace Accord, was reached on July 7th and included a power-sharing arrangement, a new round of national elections, the demobilization of the RUF, and the deployment of 6,000 United Nations troops that would oversee the demobilization process scheduled to begin in October. The UN troops, as part of UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone), paid rebel soldiers 300 dollars for each weapon handed in. Although this method appeared to be a suitable way of acquiring rebel arms, the rebels realized that the more arms they sold to the UN, the more money they would make. So cheap arms were purchased by soldiers and turned in to UN troops. Although the demobilization process began shortly after UN troops arrived in Sierra Leone, some RUF rebels continued to fight not only ECOMOG forces, but also the UN. In May 2000 RUF forces took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. In response, the UK deployed 300 special operations soldiers whose aim was to keep the UN safe.

306 Selber, 92.
307 O’Brien, 86.
308 Fatau, 926.
309 Montague, 236.
310 Paris, 222.
311 Montague, 236.
forces safe\textsuperscript{312}. Taylor, still not interested in losing, and evidently in establishing a democratic Sierra Leone, sent propelled grenades, mortars and new rifles to the RUF in June 2000. An RUF sympathizer by the name of Sam Bockane led a contingent of 500 men from Monrovia into Sierra Leone with rifles, grenades and flame-throwers\textsuperscript{313}. Despite Taylor and Bockane’s attempts to continue the war, Selber and Jobarteh point out that compared to the previous four years of the conflict, there was actually substantially less violence in 2000 because the country was partitioned with the RUF holding some territories and the government in control of others\textsuperscript{314}. In 2001 the UN increased the number of UNAMSIL troops from 6,000 to 17,500 making UNAMSIL the largest peacekeeping contingent sent anywhere in the world, and also the most expensive. It is estimated that the cost of having 17,500 troops in Sierra Leone ran to nearly 47 million US dollars a month\textsuperscript{315}. Elections had been scheduled for November 2007 but were missed and rescheduled for the following May. From November 2001 to the rescheduled election date of May 14, something miraculous happened. The RUF transformed itself into a political party\textsuperscript{316}. By the time elections occurred in May somewhere around 45,000 former combatants had turned over their weapons to the UN\textsuperscript{317}. Not surprisingly, Kabbah won the presidential election again and by June 2002 it seemed peace had finally come to Sierra Leone when Kofi Annan began scaling down UNAMSIL forces. By July, it is reported, that only 100 of the 300 UK Special Forces remained in the country\textsuperscript{318}.

The path to peace was an exceptionally long one mired by each party’s need for natural resources. Yet, with the help of EO, the Kamajors, ECOMOG, and Sandline the government of

\textsuperscript{312}Paris, 222.  
\textsuperscript{313}Fatau, 927.  
\textsuperscript{314}Selber and Jobarteh, 92.  
\textsuperscript{315}Mallaby, 2.  
\textsuperscript{316}Paris, 222.  
\textsuperscript{317}Montague, 229.  
\textsuperscript{318}Paris, 225.
Sierra Leone gained security in the war, something it had not had with the RSLMF soldiers. Over the long-term, however, I find it difficult to understand how EO played a role in the outcome of the conflict. Based on the information provided in this historical narrative it appears that EO simply responded to RUF attacks and taught the Kamajors to also do this. Training the Kamajors allowed the government to gain stability at first, but tensions between bitter RSLMF soldiers and the Kamajors would later lead to a coup and more instability in Sierra Leone.

Theoretical Implications

I have come across some general statements about EO’s role in Sierra Leone, but have found no works that offer theoretical explanations directed at understanding what impact EO had on the Sierra Leonean conflict. Examples of such non-specific statements can be found in Selber and Jobarteh as well as in Montague. Selber and Jobarteh find that although EO’s presence in Sierra Leone assisted the government in militarily dominating the RUF, it is not clear to the authors what precise role EO played in influencing the outcome of the conflict. Montague believes that EO’s presence in Sierra Leone was an, “unequivocal success,” but doesn’t give specifics as to why she thinks this. I am not alone in wondering why scholars have not sought to study whether EO played some sort of role in the outcome of the war. Taulbee has also asked why very few military analysts and scholars have studied whether EO’s actions brought an end to the conflict, or if the presence of the PMC only created a temporary peace. Avant perhaps comes the closest to offering a grounded explanation of what role EO played in Sierra Leone, but she also is unable to draw any conclusions on the firm’s influence over the outcome of the conflict. Avant argues that EO’s decision to train the Kamajors created long lasting political effects within the country as the competition between the RSLMF and Kamajors led to animosity.

319 Selber, 92.
320 Montague, 234.
321 Taulbee, 11.
between the two groups, ultimately resulting in a coup. My case study also supports Avant’s findings, but does not bring me closer to understanding if EO brought an end to the conflict, or influenced the outcome in some other way. Due to a lack of clear information on EO’s actions within the country I cannot offer any new findings on how EO may have impacted the outcome of the Sierra Leonean war. I do find that EO successfully responded to RUF attacks and was able to offer its client security that previously had been unavailable.

Before EO entered into a contract with the Sierra Leonean government the government had been unable to push the RUF away from the capital city and had lost considerable revenue from diamond mining areas the RUF had overran. The government also had no control over its own soldiers, and could not even afford to give them proper training or pay them for their services. Unfortunately, Gurkha, EO, and Sandline were also unable to work with the failing RSLMF. Undoubtedly, EO gave the government a degree of security and stability by training the Kamajors, training a number of RSLMF troops and rearming both groups with state of the art equipment. The arms and training given to the Kamajors made them a force to be reckoned with and increased their prestige among the Sierra Leonean people and government, particularly because RSLMF forces were known to secretly support the RUF movement or would flee RUF attacks rather than engage them. Reno also finds that, “creditors, foreign officials and aid organizations in Freetown . . . said that EO’s presence made their jobs easier”, and the revenues generated from Branch Energy helped the government to pay many of its debts owed to creditors. Later, after EO was expelled from Sierra Leone the ECOMOG forces along with Sandline International contributed to the government’s long-term security and defended Freetown from RUF forces while Kabbah resided in exile in Guinea. Like EO, Sandline brought

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322 Avant, 90-91.
323 Ibid., 90.
324 Reno, 2-26.
new arms into Sierra Leone and rearmed the Kamajor fighters, knowing that they could not trust the RSLMF soldiers. Like EO, Sandline was only able to respond to the RUF and it remains unclear whether this PMC contributed to the outcome of the conflict. Without these actors guarding Freetown I believe Kabbah would not have been able to keep his hold over Freetown, and reach a settlement with the RUF in 1999. I also believe that with more information it would be possible to make more substantial claims about EO. As I mentioned in the introduction to this case study, I believe future works will find one of two outcomes. The first outcome is that EO’s actions within the conflict contributed to a mutually hurting stalemate between Kabbah’s forces and the rebel RUF, allowing the warring parties to find themselves in a ripe moment, which led to successful negotiations. The alternative outcome I have identified is that EO played no role in influencing the outcome, and in fact it was the RUF’s transformation into a political party that brought an end to the fighting. I hope that future works will be able to build from my work here and add to the literature on PMC’s in civil conflicts. Finally, in the conclusion section I will talk at greater length about why this case study is so important and how it serves as a warning to others wishing to study PMC’s in civil conflicts.

**CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION**

In testing my hypothesis on the cases of MPRI in the Balkans, EO in Angola and EO in Sierra Leone I have established that a PMC can impact the outcome of a civil conflict, and that PMC’s may play very different roles within conflicts, changing the way the PMC influences the outcome. The case of MPRI in Croatia has clearly shown that a PMC can lead its client to an outright military victory over its opponent, while simultaneously affecting a mutually hurting stalemate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. EO’s participation in Angola leads to an altogether very different outcome. EO’s dexterity on the battlefield expanded the MPLA’s war-making
capabilities and increased the rate of extraction for the MPLA, which directly affected the state-
building capacity of the MPLA and the organizational features of the government post conflict. It
becomes plain that EO had some impact on the way the state was formed when the war ended.
Regrettably, EO’s presence in Sierra Leone did not yield the same results. I find that EO was
successful in fulfilling the terms of its contract with the government, and also responded with
adeptness to RUF attacks. But, because I have incomplete information about EO in Sierra Leone
I am unable to form a strong argument on how the firm played a role in determining the outcome
of the war. Despite this lack of data, the case of EO in Sierra Leone does offer this essay, and the
larger literature on PMC’s, substantial value in regards to how difficult it can be to analyze PMC
activity.

Civil conflicts are often times very difficult to break down and understand because there
are a number of actors within the conflict working to support their own aims. There are also
outside forces, which attempt to influence particular actors in the conflict, and often times work
to influence the overall outcome to the conflict. In addition to understanding who these actors
are, one must recognize why these actors are there; what are their aims and what resources do
they use to obtain their wants? It is pertinent to see why and how each actor moves in the conflict
because this illustrates how outright military victories or negotiated settlements come to fruition.
Charles Denhez, a civil conflict scholar, has even qualified Post-Cold war civil conflicts as being
messy because of all of these factors\textsuperscript{325}. Yet, finding the necessary data can be challenging
simply because the country and actors that are being studied are participating in a civil
conflict\textsuperscript{326}. Now, when PMC’s are added to this mix it can be increasingly difficult to identify
what contribution the PMC made to the conflict because PMC’s by nature are very secretive

\textsuperscript{325} Denhez, 37.
\textsuperscript{326} Ciccone, 1.
organizations, which do not publish or promote what successes, or losses, they have created for their clients\textsuperscript{327}. My case study of EO in Sierra Leone highlights all of these important issues; that it can be extremely difficult to find the necessary data one needs in order to understand what actions were taken, and which actions were most important, within a civil conflict. Furthermore, this case study really serves as a warning to those wishing to analyze PMC’s because it demonstrates that there is a lack of data about these firms, making it difficult to assess PMC’s. The value, then, of including the case of EO in Sierra Leone is that this case shows not only how difficult studying PMC’s actually is, but it also serves as a reminder that civil conflicts are messy and explaining the actions of a PMC within a civil conflict will not always allow one to prove, or disprove their hypothesis.

Overall, I believe that my findings will have extremely important policy implications for countries experiencing conflicts, as well as international organizations such as the UN. Since PMC’s may be proven to be much more reliable interveners I believe their use should be considered seriously by the UN. In Sierra Leone, a few thousand soldiers were able to force the RUF to the negotiation table, yet when 17,000 UN peacekeeping troops arrived and EO left the country, fighting quickly resumed\textsuperscript{328}. If PMC’s had been used in conjunction with peacekeeping forces the mission could have led to a different outcome. Additionally, as mentioned earlier in the paper the cost of contracting EO was much less than that of the UN forces. Compare the cost of EO in Sierra Leone to that of the UN peacekeeping mission; the Sierra Leonean government for two years of work contracted EO, costing the government a total of 35 million US dollars. The UN forces, however, cost nearly 47 million dollars for only eight months of work in Sierra Leone. It is important to note that the UN faces considerably more constraints while operating in

\textsuperscript{327} Peng, 120.
\textsuperscript{328} Brayton, 313.
a conflict country, than a PMC does. UN missions often cost much more because of the manpower needed to sustain peace, and these troops are not allowed to participate in offensive combat. I merely aim to point out that PMC’s do not have to operate within these constraints, making them more attractive to governments looking to hire a private contractor. To sum, it appears that strategically and financially it is in the UN’s best interest to use PMC forces to complement and strengthen peacekeeping interventions.

My findings also supplement existing literature on the use of PMC’s, their legitimacy, potential use, and accountability. If contracted for peacekeeping missions by the UN, a specific framework would need to be implemented that would include screening of PMC personnel, a code of conduct for all PMC’s receiving contracts, short term contracts so that their efficiency could be reviewed often, revisiting the Geneva Conventions treatment for prisoners of war to extend the rights to PMC personnel, and legal accountability of PMC action in the international arena. Spearin has assembled specific instructions on how such steps would be implemented by the UN so that the organization could use PMC’s. He writes that PMC’s would be paid for their services out of a UN peacekeeping budget. PMC’s contracts would be approved by the Security Council on a short-term basis, and a committee would review the PMC’s actions and accomplishments within the conflict in order to either renew, or throw out, their contract. If the contract were renewed the committee would also approve another operating budget. Spearin describes this entire operation as being transparent to global players, and although I appreciate his optimism I’m uncertain that transparency, in this case, would be beneficial to the UN and the PMC. This model is helpful in understanding how PMC’s would work alongside UN forces,

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329 Brooks and Laroia, 124-125; Howe, 6; Spearin, 241-242.
330 Spearin, 242.
and provides a basic idea of how the UN would begin to seriously and openly enlist PMC’s for their expertise.

Now that I have spoken at length about the benefits of hiring and using PMC’s, it is important to highlight the potential pitfalls of using PMC’s within civil conflicts. Critics argue that one major disadvantage for hiring PMC’s in civil conflicts is that PMC’s operate outside of the military chain of command. This can become problematic because as the situation within the conflict country escalates and becomes more dangerous PMC’s can opt to leave, essentially deserting the military forces they were working with. If PMC’s do break their contracts like this, it is possible that they leave soldiers in the military in a precarious situation. An additional problem related to PMC’s operating outside of the military chain of command is that it is possible for military forces to be unaware of the PMC’s missions, tasks and specific location. Thus, critics point out that this can lead to coordination problems.

Perhaps the largest pitfall for hiring PMC’s is their ambiguous legal standing, which essentially makes it difficult for the international community, or individual governments, to prosecute rogue corporations, or specific individuals from a PMC if they do not operate ethically. Peter Singer pointed this issue out quite eloquently when he wrote, “although private military firms and their employees are now integral parts of many military operations, they tend to fall through the cracks of current legal codes, which sharply distinguish civilians from soldiers. Contractors are not quite civilians, given that they often carry and use weapons, interrogate prisoners, load bombs and fulfill other critical military roles. Yet they are not quite soldiers, either.”

Doug Brooks, the founder of the International Stability Operations Association, has sought to fill this accountability gap by creating his own code of conduct, and ethics rules, for

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331 Brooks (b), 1.
332 Ibid.
333 Singer, 1.
PMC’s. Individual PMC’s may join his association as long as they follow the rules Brooks has established. What this does is, it allows PMC’s to operate within some sort of existing legal structure, which guides their operations in specific countries, and guides their work for specific clients. If a particular corporation violates these codes of conduct they are expelled from the association, which is what happened with the American based PMC Blackwater, when journalists published a story highlighting the firm’s participation in torturing Iraqi prisoners\textsuperscript{334}. Although I appreciate Brooks’ guidance in regulating PMC’s, the case of Blackwater provides an excellent example of why PMC’s need to be regulated by governments and perhaps even by the United Nations\textsuperscript{335}.

Ultimately, I believe further research based on data that was not available to me is needed in order to test my hypothesis more accurately on the case of EO in Sierra Leone. It would also be useful for other scholars to test my hypothesis on all relevant cases of PMC involvement in a civil conflict to test whether my findings can be supported. Until this information is accessible my preliminary research offers a stepping-stone for further studies on PMC’s and their use in civil conflicts.

\textsuperscript{334} Brooks (a), 1-4.
\textsuperscript{335} Isenberg (b), 9-10.
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